MASCULINITIES OF THE STATE: THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE POLICE IN TURKEY

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by

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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Abstract

Political power and gendered (as opposed to gender neutral) politics constantly inform and intimately shape each other. Burgeoning ethnographies of the state draw attention to the daily construction of the state while the feminist state literature has long documented several ways in which the state is gendered, largely focusing on the bifurcated nature of its laws and regulations, effects of state policies on women, and the interactions between women’s movements and the state. Although both bodies of literature have made valuable contributions to our understanding of the modern state and how it operates, the significance of men and masculinities has largely been neglected in the study of the state.

This dissertation contributes to ongoing debates in Turkey and elsewhere about the growing authoritarianism of political regimes and police militarization, paying attention to the link between masculinities and democracy/authoritarianism. This study has uncovered what I call “masculinities of the state” in an attempt to identify and understand mechanisms of engendering political processes, institutions and norms. By using a multi-method approach, this study identifies the mutual construction of statehood and masculinities through everyday practices of state officials at different levels of the state: the prime minister and the Turkish National Police (TNP) between 2002 and 2015.

This dissertation unravels the multiplicity, historicity, and contextuality of policing, police masculinities and political masculinities in Turkey, rather than seeing the masculinity of a political leader and police masculinities as constant and monolithic. Also, unlike the literature that envisions the police as a direct embodiment of the state or merely as one of the violent arms of the state, this research demonstrates the ways in which policing(s) are historically contingent, and constantly in the making in relation to ongoing political transformations as well as shifting political actors both within the organization and across the state.
The analysis of police masculinities in relation to the gendered charisma of a political leader reveals the connections between the law enforcement and the political regime in Turkey. The shifting configuration of hegemonic masculinity of the prime minister and three models of policing and associated police masculinities that have emerged in Turkey inform and challenge each other. A militarized masculinity has become the defining characteristic of the latest model of policing in Turkey, attesting to the links between authoritarianism/democratization and shifting modes of masculinity across state branches. The Turkish case further suggests that reforms to engender a more democratic form of policing may only be temporary in the absence of well-established democratic institutions and a system of checks and balances, and in the face of arbitrary political rule.

The logic of equating masculine power with political/institutional power within the TNP and the governing body results in marginalization, and limited presence of women and femininities across state branches, designating the state sites as historically constructed domains of men and masculinities despite the increasing but slow inclusion of women in those domains.
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Table of Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 2

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 5

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ 7

Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Theory and Methods ......................................................................................................... 16

Chapter 3: The State and its Mal(e)contents in Turkey: A Historical Background .... 38

Chapter 4: Gendering Charisma: Masculinity of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Power and Politics .......................................................................................................................... 48

Chapter 5: Public Policing and Police Masculinities in Turkey ....................................................... 70

Chapter 6: The Myth of the Tough Men’s Burden: Constructing a Hegemonic Police Masculinity at the Turkish National Police ................................................................. 102

Chapter 7: Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 128

Appendix A: Interview Questions for the Police .................................................................................. 138

References ............................................................................................................................................ 140
Chapter 1

Introduction

Scenes of tear gas and masses of police in riot gear clashing with demonstrators in metropolitan streets have become recurrent images in many societies across the world. Such instances of violent encounters between police and public were frequent during the Occupy Protests of 2011 and 2012, the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013 in Turkey, protests against the failed fiscal policies of the governments in Greece and Spain, and political turmoil between pro- and anti-government groups in Ukraine.

In 2013 a policeman tear-gassed a young woman at the Gezi Park near Istanbul’s historic Taksim Square during a sit-in at the park, which triggered nationwide anti-government protests that summer. A series of protests erupted in a Midwestern US city in August 2014 after a policeman shot and killed an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown. The unbalanced police force used in those incidents sparked outrage in crowds and resulted in more police violence and brutality, raising an alarming concern for militarization of the police.

Despite the public concern and media criticism of the mounting global trend of such militarization – which mainly refers to police use of military-style equipment and tactics against civilians who live within a nation state – little attention has been given to the implications of police masculinities displayed at protest sites and the links between state power and masculine power. What these incidents imply about contemporary forms of policing and police masculinities in democratic societies, and how masculine power and state power intersect, shape, and reproduce each other in everyday police practice remained unaddressed.

In the contemporary climate, when debates abound in Turkey and elsewhere about the growing authoritarianism of the political regime and police militarization, it is vital to
explore the mutual reproduction of masculinities and political power. This study contributes to scholarly examinations of masculinities of political leaders by considering former Prime Minister, current President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a case study. Furthermore, it extends the study of political masculinities to another state branch, the police, which is both nominally and substantially a gendered institution of power, arguing that masculinities are not solely performed by individuals but they are also embedded in the structure, culture and operations of institutions.

Besides the shifting hegemonic masculinity of the prime minister, the study identified three forms of masculinities associated with three distinct models of policing in Turkey, policing prior to 2000s, which I call “macho policing”; second, the new community policing in 2000-2013, and third, post-Gezi policing, which I call “militarized policing.” The analysis of policing in three different phases suggested that the macho policing and militarized policing emerged as two variations of the historically predominant oppressive policing in Turkey. The new community policing stood as an exception to the predominant oppressive tradition of policing.

Political transformations such as the EU accession process, the period of democratic reforms in the early millennium, the declining military influence over society and politics, and the growing trend toward authoritarianism since 2011 have impacted models of policing in Turkey. Community policing emerged in contradistinction to the old macho policing that was predominant prior to 2000s and prioritized public service over sustaining public order in an attempt to establish more positive relations between police and civilians. This trend toward public policing, however, has been disrupted – if not completely ended – by the growing authoritarianism of the current regime. Charismatic President Erdoğan has turned from a champion of democratic reforms when he came to office as prime minister in the early millennium to a potent political figure that seeks to establish an arbitrary rule.
Increasing police violence and the growing authoritarianism of the regime in Turkey are closely interrelated processes. It is vital here to pay attention to how Erdoğan’s hegemonic masculinity and politics are interlinked with shifting models of policing and police masculinities. In this respect, it is relevant to inquire how the masculinity of a political leader is configured across time and context. It is essential to explore how the masculinity of a political leader contributes to his power and politics, and how the shifting politics and masculinity of a political leader relate to changing forms of policing and police masculinities.

In the past decade there has been renewed interest in the state as the object of intellectual inquiry among scholars across fields including sociology, anthropology, and political science. Burgeoning ethnographies of the state literature draw attention to the daily construction of the state, while feminist state literature has fleshed out several ways in which the state is a gendered institution. Both bodies of literature have made valuable contributions to our understanding of the modern state and how it operates. The place and processes of masculinities in the reproduction of the state, however, are still largely missing in the analysis. My research addresses an important gap in the literature on the construction of masculinities in state sites and the mutual reproduction of masculine power and state power.

Those in the masculinity studies field have highlighted that it is high time we shift our analytical gaze from women to men and masculinities if we are interested in uncovering the gendered processes and gender inequality persistent in institutions (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 1985, Messerschmidt 1993, Pascoe 2015). In the same vein, Ducat (2004) notes that in the last couple of decades “male anxiety has come to shape political discourse and behavior” (3). Much work on masculinities of institutions such as the military (Barrett 1996, Higate 2007, Hinojosa 2010, Morgan 1994) and the police (Barrie and Broomhall 2012, McElhinny 1994) continue to take those institutions as freestanding organizations, although they are political institutions invested with state authority and power. Likewise, studies on
masculinities of political leaders often focus on individuals without considering the links between political leaders and statehood, and state power.

Much conceptual work on the topic also highlights the need to study the link between masculinities and the state. Joane Nagel (1998) maintains that such projects as state power can be conceived as “masculinist projects, involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities.” Similarly, it has been over two decades since Connell (1990) stated that we need to be talking about the role of masculinity in addition to or instead of about the numerical majority of men in the state. Despite the conceptual work that has been done on the relations between the state and masculinities (Connell 1990, Nagel 1998), we lack empirical studies of what I call “masculinities of the state.”

Discourses and practices of sexuality (masculinities) are often camouflaged in political processes. Masculinities are in fact so embedded in the processes and construction of the state that they escape our attention due to their obviousness. From policy discussions on women’s sexuality and reproductive rights in the parliament, to the charisma building of a political leader, to the use of force by police in public protests, masculinities analysis sheds light on how hegemonic state discourses operate through gendered processes.

This dissertation seeks to track down the mutual construction of statehood and masculinities through everyday practices of state officials at two different levels of the state: the prime minister and the police. The main argument of this study is that political power and gendered (as opposed to gender neutral) politics constantly inform and intimately shape each other; they are entwined. Hence they cannot be thought of as separate or unrelated processes and trajectories. Exploring these gendered processes reveals the power dynamics embedded in state processes and illustrate how masculine and state power intersect and reproduce each other. Tracing multiple masculinities constructed and performed in relation to other masculinities and femininities at different state levels also demonstrates how both masculine
power and state power are multilayered, valorized, and contested, and how the mutual reproduction of state power and masculine power serve to negate the power of some in the state, as well as some in the public. This study extends the scope of masculinity analysis to the study of the police in order to test the hypothesis that masculinities are not solely performed by individuals but are also embedded in the ways state institutions operate. It demonstrates that multiple masculinities are constructed in relation to each other and femininities at different levels of the state.

My study effectively represents the first extensive fieldwork of the Turkish national police. Although numerous studies have been conducted on gender and the police in the United States and the English-speaking world, scant attention has yet been devoted to the study of the police in Turkey. Enloe (1976) notes this lack of scholarly attention in the literature when she says “we have a plethora of convincing theories of pluralism, military, and bureaucratic politics but we lack equivalent theoretical constructs arising thus far out of the study of police and police studies” (26).

There has been intense scholarly interest in studying the military in Turkey, in part due to its historical influence over Turkish society and politics (Altinay 2004, Aydinli 2009, Cizre 1997, Heper 2005, Sunbuloglu 2013). Little attention has been drawn to the police in comparison to other political institutions (see Ergut 2012, 2002, Hülagü Demirbilek 2011, Piran 2013 for exceptions). Given the alarming trend toward police brutality in democratic societies and the mounting media and public criticism over the omnipresence of the police in everyday life, studying the police calls for scholarly attention.

Turkey obviously is no exception to this. Besides violent encounters with the public at protest sites, Turkey has witnessed pervasive presence of the police in everyday life. In a society where stories of disproportionate use of force by the police at public demonstrations are a recurrent theme in the media and conversations of ordinary people, and where the police
are visible even at university campuses and football games, the attentive researcher has ample
evidence for the study of the production and reproduction of masculinities and the use of
force.

Some scholars have produced excellent work on the police of Turkey. Ferdan Ergut
(2012), using a state-building approach, focuses on the formation and transformation of the
police during the late Ottoman period and the early Republican era, and aptly illustrates the
double-edged character of the police, referring to its service-related and crime prevention
aspects. This study demonstrates that policing in Turkey bears a bifurcated nature since
policing entails public service duties such as orchestrating traffic besides its mission to
prevent various sorts of crimes such as theft, and kidnapping. In her dissertation, Funda
Hulagu Demirbilek (2011) elaborates on security sector reform and the impact of
internationalization processes on the Turkish National Police. Most recently, Leila Piran
(2013) explores the impact of the European Union as well as that of internal political and
institutional actors on the police reform that became visible in the early 2000s. My work
builds on this emerging body of literature by exploring shifting models of policing and the
construction of multiple masculinities during the police’s relations with the public and within
the organizational hierarchy of the TNP. Thus, the study reveals the ways in which multiple
police masculinities are constructed and displayed during police-citizen relations based on
police officials’ narratives and through discourses and practices of policewomen and
policemen within the TNP.

A recent shift of power among some state branches may also be helpful to understand
the timely significance of studying the police in relation to the head of the governing body –
the prime minister. The military has historically been influential in politics and society in
Turkey through the passing of emergency laws, prolonged imposition of martial law, and rule
by military regimes following military coups. The military has also established formal
authority over civilian politics through the advisory board called the National Security Council (MGK), where senior-level military officials have advised civilian governments particularly on foreign policy and domestic security issues. This extensive military influence has lately been curtailed by democratic reforms undertaken in response to EU requirements by Erdoğan and the AK Party during his first term in office as prime minister. The growing public dissent against authoritarian state policies since 2011, however, has led the government this time to use another violent arm of the state, the police, to suppress political discontent.

The mounting police brutality against dissenting citizens and the Homeland Security bill that passed into law in March 2015 – which allocates extensive powers to the police while curtailing individual rights and liberties – signal a trend toward the increasing power of the police over society, if not over politics. Unlike the military, the police does not influence politics much in Turkey, but it is highly influenced by the politics of the government as it operates under the direct command of the civilian government. Erdoğan, while restraining the political power the military had been enjoying for so long, has expanded police powers and brutality as his politics have taken a more authoritarian turn. At a time when we see a shift from the dominance of the military over society and politics to militarization of the police, there is an urgent need for theoretical and analytical tools to study the police as a political institution. Thus, this dissertation presents unique empirical and theoretical contributions to the field of police studies in addition to the study of gender and the state. As such, it also offers significant policy implications for security forces in Turkey. This study suggests that

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1 There is a controversy over the acronym of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The shorthand for political parties in Turkey traditionally consists of the initial letters of the name of the party. The official acronym for the Justice and Development Party, however, stated as “AK Party” by party officials, connotes purity and cleanliness from corruption and political vices. The party continues to be called “AKP” by its opponents. To avoid this controversy, I go by the acronym recognized by the party officials throughout this dissertation.
both internal (institutional) and external (bipartisan) mechanisms should be established to watch and regulate police practice to avoid human rights violations and the abuse of power by the police as well as the tight governmental control over the police to preclude further politicization of the TNP.

It is essential to note that although this study explores the construction of multiple masculinities at two state sites, the prime minister and the police, it does not fall in the category of police studies as such. It takes as its starting point the Turkish National Police as a state institution to analyze how masculinities and statehood mutually shape and reproduce each other.

This dissertation considers the police as both a state institution and a process. On the one hand, it focuses on how institutional structure, culture, and practices contribute to the construction of hegemonic police masculinity. On the other hand, it illustrates the shifting character of masculinities and policing by focusing on the daily construction of policing during the police’s relations with the public at a police station or a protest site.

The dissertation asks in what ways and under what conditions masculinities and statehood reproduce each other. What are some of the elective affinities that mutually shape political rule/power and masculine power in the midst of political transformations? Do we see commonalities or differences between masculinities performed/constructed/displayed by state officials located at different state sites? How is the masculinity of a prime minister similar to and different from the masculinity of riot police or a police officer who works at the budget unit? How are masculinities of the police and the prime minister formed in relation to ongoing political transformations? How are multiple masculinities constructed in relation to different models of policing? These are some of the major questions this dissertation seeks to address.

I employed a multi-method study of the Turkish state, one that explores the
construction of multiple masculinities in two sites: the prime minister (head of the governing body) and the Turkish National Police (TNP). The data for this study come from Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches, bodily comportment, and affective presentation on two key incidents: the resignation of four top military officials in July 2011 and the Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013. I have also conducted fieldwork including 35 in-depth interviews with police officers and chiefs in three cities across Turkey between January 2013 and March 2015. Through an analysis of everyday practices and discourses of state officials, I adopt an alternative perspective to the macro narratives of the Turkish state.

Building on a theoretical and analytical framework from both masculinity studies and ethnographies of the state literature, this work extends masculinities analysis to the study of the working branches of the government in addition to the study of individual political figures. In so doing, it uncovers the multiplicity, historicity, and contextuality of policing, police masculinities, and political masculinities. It also engenders gender-blind ethnographies of the state literature by drawing from the critical masculinities studies. By paying attention to the multi-layered and shifting configuration of masculinities, policing, and political power, it empirically challenges the normative anti-state stance of the ethnographies of the state literature, revealing contesting approaches to the state, political power, and the public.

Weberian approaches to this area have tended to treat the police as a direct embodiment of the state or merely as one of the violent arms of the state. My fieldwork, by contrast, illustrates the value of exploring different forms of policing(s) instead of focusing on “the police” as a monolithic category. With this changed focus, one can see how models of policing are historically contingent and constantly in the making in relation to ongoing political transformations as well as the changing actions and views of political actors within the police organization and the larger state. Thus, unlike the scholarly accounts of the state that envision the police as a monolithic and repressive state apparatus, this research illustrates
the multiplicity of discourses, and approaches among state officials/the police officials to ongoing political issues, the state and policing. By analyzing everyday practices and discourses of state officials, this gendered approach also demonstrates the ways in which masculinities shift, influence and challenge each other within and across different state branches.

The study suggests that hegemonic police masculinity *within* the TNP is formed in *relation* to marginalized masculinities such as the toxic masculinity of the Rapid Response Force (riot squad), the militarized masculinity of the Special Operations Force, and women’s assumed differences from men. Hence, hegemonic masculinity becomes a mechanism to subordinate women through delimiting the discursive and physical space of policewomen, resulting in reproduction of gendered inequality despite the increasing but limited number of women within the TNP. The study also suggests that the discrepancy between an ideal of hegemonic police masculinity and the reality of many policemen poses a constant source of contradiction for policemen.

Research has long identified fraternity and homosociality of policemen as distinct elements of policing (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, Fielding and Fielding 1992) in Britain and the US. I found that what I call the institution of “vocational brotherhood” and “respectable sisterhood” complements and softens the rigid institutional hierarchy at the TNP, and contributes to the valorization of hegemonic police masculinity by bringing policing closer to the structure of family and rendering policing more paternalistic for all its members. While vocational brotherhood connotes the notion of interdependence of men, respectable sisterhood mostly means respect and socio-spatial distance from the opposite sex in still a highly sex-segregated masculine institution. Infused with masculine ideals of fraternity, solidarity, and work efficiency, the institution of brotherhood contributes to the construction of hegemonic police masculinity as well as to drawing out the contours of spatial and
discursive presence of policewomen within the institution.

I engage with scholars who envision the state as both discourse (Mitchell 1991), and practices (Gupta 1995) while also attending to the significance of institutions. In other words, I see the state as a contradictory ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions, which enable us to explore its construction in everyday life without overlooking the significance of institutions. One strategy for studying the state, then, is to focus on the multiple sites in which state processes and practices are recognized through gendered discourses and practices of state officials across its various branches. Such an approach implies a shift from the notion of “the state as a thing” to “the state as a verb” or “performance.” An ethnographic analysis of the state enables us to track down some of the transformations and multilayered character of the state. When we say that the state is a set of processes, we can see that the state thus is an unfinished, dynamic project.

Studies in the field of criminal justice usually take the police as a given and do not discuss what it stands for (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, Fielding and Fielding, 1992). Parallel to the specific conceptualization of the state utilized in this study, I theorize the police, in addition to being a state institution, as a contradictory ensemble of practices and discourses. In this line of thinking, policing is seen as a process, rather than a fixed, taken-for-granted state entity. In other words, it is constantly in the making. Such conceptualization of the police implies historical construction of policing, enabling us to attend to its changing modes. This process-oriented historical approach to policing also allows us to attend to the contradictory or paradoxical character of it in addition to its shifting modes, rather than seeing the police merely as one of the coherent repressive state apparatuses (Althusser 1969).

The particular theorization of gender adopted in this work adheres to an understanding of gender as practices and processes through which notions of “sex difference” comes to appear as stable and natural, even though it is iteratively (re)produced and
constantly shifting (Butler 1993). In this respect, as gender scholars maintain, gender is not yet another category to “add and stir” in our analysis of social phenomena. It is rather a scholarly lens that takes questions about women/men and femininity/masculinity seriously and seeks to reshape our vision (Enloe 2007).

Masculinity is a social and historical construct (Connell 1995, Kimmel 1994). It is not a set of characteristics or a genetic instinct (Connell 1987). Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) define masculinity as a configuration of gender[ed] practices constructed in interaction, and one that can differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting. In fact, beyond being a configuration of gendered practices, masculinity is embedded in an ensemble of practices, discourses, ideals, and symbols, even when there is no direct correspondence between masculinity and what men do. Thus, masculinity is far from static and is constructed in the individual and in the collective during social interaction. It is also contextual and historical as it changes over time. Rather than possessing masculinity, “individuals produce, and move through masculinity by engaging in masculine practices” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 86). This formulation of masculinity as contextual and historical avoids the trap of essentialism.

Three empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) in this study focus on the mutual construction of masculinities and statehood. Chapter 4 (Erdoğan’s masculinity) and Chapter 5 (Public policing and police masculinities) analyze shifting configurations of hegemonic masculinity at two state sites. I analyze the hegemonic masculinity of the prime minister and the TNP by looking at their respective masculinities across time and political context. In other words, in Chapters 4 and 5, I illustrate how the state and masculinities are iteratively produced and refashioned in relation to ongoing political transformations. These chapters also explore the link between authoritarianism/democratization and masculinities.

Two empirical chapters on the police, Chapter 5 (Public policing) and Chapter 6
(Police masculinities within the institution), focus on the construction of masculinities from
two different perspectives. While Chapter 5 unearths the ways in which multiple
masculinities and different forms of policing reproduce each other across time and political
context during the police’s relations with the public, Chapter 6 illustrates the construction of
an ideology of hegemonic masculinity and an order of gender relations within the TNP by
looking at policewomen’s and policemen’s concrete practices and discourses. These chapters
illustrate the differential construction of hegemonic masculinity for internal and external use
by highlighting the construction of hegemonic masculinity within the institution vis-à-vis
during the police’s relations with the public.

Chapter 2 is composed of two major sections. The first section presents the
theoretical framework for this study by critically engaging with ethnographies of state
literature and masculinity studies. It provides a detailed literature review on theoretical
concepts and common themes, and points out the major gaps in the literature.

The second section, methodology, provides a more extensive description and
explanation for the research design and research participants. It details the sampling strategy
and describes the data I have collected, including speeches of former Prime Minister
Erdoğan, fieldwork and in-depth interviews, and methods of analysis, and additionally
addresses the study’s strengths and limitations as well as the location of the researcher.

Chapter 3 contextualizes the Turkish case by providing a historical background on
the Turkish state, especially for those unfamiliar with Turkey and its state. It discusses the
authoritarian state tradition by paying particular attention to the place of the state bureaucracy
in the political system. It also underlines the dominance of political leaders vis-à-vis a
democratic political party tradition. It moves on to present a historical background on the
police by unearthing the close affinities between the military and the police in Turkey, paying
particular attention to how Erdoğan expands police powers as he seeks to restrain military
influence over society and politics, illustrating the shift of power from the military to the police. This chapter also touches on the gendered character of the Turkish National Police.

Chapter 4 explores the implications of gendered charisma for democratic governance. It asks whether there is a relationship between hegemonic masculinity and political power. It thus draws primarily from Erdoğan’s speeches, affective presentation, and bodily comportment on specific issues: relations with the military of Turkey and the Gezi Park protests. By analyzing Erdoğan’s hegemonic masculine rule in two distinct phases; 2002-2011 and 2011-2014—when he became president of Turkey, the chapter seeks to illustrate the shifting configuration of both hegemonic masculinity and political power.

Chapter 5 uncovers the ways in which multiple masculinities and policing(s) reproduce each other during the police relations with the public. Looking at different models of policing that have emerged between the 1980s and 2015, the chapter demonstrates how the Turkish National Police (TNP) displays and embodies shifting modes of masculinity across time and context. The data for this chapter come from the fieldwork and interviews conducted in three cities across Turkey. I find a multiplicity of approaches among the police about the police attitude toward policing, the public, and the state. This chapter also reveals some of the ways the state/police and masculinities are iteratively produced and refashioned in relation to ongoing political transformations.

Chapter 6 explores how the police as a state institution constructs an ideology of hegemonic masculinity and how male and female officers’ concrete practices and discourses construct an order of gender relations within the institution. In other words, the chapter seeks to illuminate the nuances and contradictions of multiple masculinities in relation to femininities within the TNP, to describe what kinds of masculinities are privileged, and to suggest how these masculinities contribute to construction of the state and its power. This chapter too draws from the fieldwork and in-depth interviews. It also offers insights about the
notions of what I call “the institution of vocational brotherhood” (*mesleki abilik* in Turkish), and “respectable sisterhood” (*saygin ablalik*) and their significance for the culture and structure of the TNP. Unlike the overall tendency in masculinity studies not to include women in research, despite the acknowledged significance of adopting a relational approach, this empirical chapter, by including policewomen in the sample and analysis, seeks to illustrate how discourses and practices of both men and women contribute disparately to construction of hegemonic masculinity at a state institution. It also underlines the difference in policewomen’s and policemen’s connection to and conceptualization of the police/the state.
Chapter 2
Theory and Methods

New Approaches to Studying the State: Ethnographies of the State

Within the larger literature on the state, scholars with traditional views have either preferred to abandon the concept of the state, finding it too vague and narrow to be the basis of politics, and replacing it for example with the concept of “political system” (Nettl 1968), or they have treated it as made up of coherent, integral units whose actions could best be understood by looking at specific configurations of its institutions (see Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985, Mann 1986, Skocpol 1987). Since the late 1970s, a group of scholars have built on the Weberian tradition, conceptualizing the state as an institutionalized collective power above other organizations, sovereign vis-à-vis other states, autonomous or distinct from the rest of society, and identified with a national collectivity and encapsulated with a certain geographical territory (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985, Mann 1986). This body of literature, known as “the bringing the state back in” has primarily turned the trajectories of studies to macro structures, major policies, revolutions, and the political elite, largely overlooking how the state is constituted in everyday life.

A different group of scholars argue that the state is best understood by looking at its constitution in everyday life (Hall 1998, Migdal 2001, Turam 2007). Joel Migdal (2001) criticizes the institutionalists on the grounds that they tautologize the state’s autonomy by assuming the coherence of the state in following its own interests and removing agency of people to affect the course of history. He proposes to “shift the analytic focus from the state as a free-standing organization to a process-oriented view of the state-in-society,” paying particular attention to how the state is maintained through state-society interactions. Thus, the
A process-oriented approach not only rejects a unified idea of the state but also recognizes the multilayered, dynamic nature of the state.

Most recently, Morgan and Orloff (2015) build on a metaphor of the “many hands of the state,” to refer to the complexity and multiplicity of actors and institutions within the state. Thus, they argue reifying simplifications allows exploring the contradictory and incoherent forms of state action as well as processes. This emerging body of literature, therefore, points to a need for more sophisticated approaches to studying the state.

What Is in a Name: The State?

In 1988 sociologist Philip Abrams problematized social scientists’ building of their theories of the state on the unquestioned premise of the existence of the state as entity and unity. Although related to a set of apparatuses—not all of which may be governmental—Abrams and others in this tradition suggest that the state is not an apparatus but a set of processes (Trouillot 2003). In this line of thinking, it is more useful to study the “state-idea” and the structurating of practices—often not unified—that legitimate and reify the idea of the state.

Scholars in this tradition attempt to study the state as an idea (Abrams 1988), a discourse (Mitchell 1991, Secor 2001, 2007), effects (Trouillot 2003), a fetish (Taussig 1992), a fantasy (Navaro-Yashin 2002), and an ensemble of practices (Gupta 1995, Brown 1995). This body of literature ascertains that studying political institutions and the political elite is misleading if one wants to study the state, since it orients one to viewing the state as a reified entity. Analyzing the quotidian practices (Bourdieu 1977) of the state and the effects of it on ordinary people will give us a better understanding of the construction of the state. Turning the analytical focus mostly on the effects of “the state” on citizen-subjects, this literature seeks to demonstrate through ethnographic studies the ways the state idea is reproduced.
Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopower (1977, 1994, 2003) also challenges the view of the state as a central power by arguing that power is elusive and pervasive through discourse. Although his theory of governmentality has led to a reconceptualization of the state as a contradictory ensemble of practices and processes (Brown 1995, Gupta 1995), it has also been criticized for its refusal to acknowledge institutions and individuals as holders of power (Bayat 2010, Migdal 2001, Turam 2007, 2013). In light of the critique of the Foucauldian notion of the elusiveness of power, I argue that certain institutions and individuals hold more power than others in society, and that this fact should not be neglected in analysis.

I engage with scholars who envision the state both as a discourse (Mitchell 1991) and as practices (Gupta 1995), without necessarily downplaying the significance of institutions. In other words, I see the state as a contradictory ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions, which enables us to explore its construction in everyday life without overlooking the significance of institutions. One way of studying the state, then, is to explore the multiple sites in which state processes and practices are generated and recognized through gendered discourses and practices of state officials across its different branches. Such an approach implicates a shift from the notion of “the state as a thing” to “the state as a verb” or “performance.” It is also important to note that to say the state is a set of processes means the state is an unfinished, dynamic project. Thus, an analysis of the state that focuses on everyday practices and discourses within it allows us to track down some of its transformations and multilayered character.

Studies in the field of criminal justice usually take the police as a given and do not discuss what it stands for (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, Fielding and Fielding, 1992). In the ethnographies of the state literature, however, the state—as mentioned above—is conceptualized as an ensemble of practices (Gupta 1995) and discourses (Brown 1995).
Parallel to this conceptualization, I theorize the police, in addition to being a state institution, as a contradictory ensemble of practices and discourses. In this line of thinking, policing is seen as a process rather than a fixed, taken-for-granted entity. Such conceptualization of the police implies a historical construction of policing, enabling us to attend to its changing modes. This process-oriented, historical approach to policing also allows us to attend to the contradictory or paradoxical character of it in addition to its shifting modes rather than seeing the police merely as one of the repressive state apparatuses (Althusser 1969).

I find Gupta’s work (1995) particularly helpful for its ethnographic method of documenting what lower-level officials do in the name of the state. In an attempt to explore the discourses of corruption in contemporary India, Gupta traces the quotidian practices of state bureaucrats and their relations with the rural people. Using a gendered lens, I seek to explore what Turkish state officials across different levels and branches of the state—the prime minister and the police of all ranks—do in the name of the state.

Some scholars in the ethnographies of the state literature argue that what sustains the state idea is what they call the “paradoxical” or “double” character of the state. Begona Aretxaga (2003) argues “the state is split into the bad state and the good state, triggering an image of the state in which desire and fear are entangled in a relation of misrecognition from which citizen-subjects cannot be extricated” (407). The confluence of paternalism and violence, of intimacy and force maintains the state as an object of resentment for its subjects to their own fate and one desired as a subject that can cater for its citizens (Brown 1995). Hansen (2001), in his analysis of the state in postcolonial India, makes a similar argument when he identifies the image of the state as “the sublime” and “the profane,” which refer to the ideal image of the state that contains the image of a better life, and also the reality of illegibility, corruption, and insufficiency. Scholars in this tradition argue that in their search for justice, citizens often reach for the good state. They shy away from or avoid the bad state
when abandoned or maltreated by it. Veena Das (2006) ascertains that the paradoxical character, or rather what she calls the “illegibility,” of the state stems from the fact that the state, despite its premise of being a rational-bureaucratic entity, actually oscillates between a rational-bureaucratic organization and a magical entity, because of the discrepancy between the laws and regulations of the state and the vagueness and lack of clarity around those laws and regulations. Das (2006) further argues that it is in the gaps that seem incoherent that people find the resources to see the state as both “threat and guarantee” (181). I argue that the contesting and conflicting roles or faces of the state contribute to its double-character.

The police in Turkey is responsible for maintaining order in traffic, providing social services, maintaining public order in protests and fighting against terrorism. Many faces of the state – punitive and oppressive as well as caring and protective – are embedded in these conflicting practices.

The ethnographies of the state literature also aptly highlight the differential effects of the state on citizens, paying attention to the situatedness (Haraway 1988) of citizens. Citizen-subjects feel effects of the state differently depending on their social locations in society (Harris 2009, Secor 2007, Truoillot 2003). However, there is an astonishing lack of attention to the situatedness of state functionaries as opposed to the well-acknowledged situatedness of citizens. This reveals that empirical work in this field continues to attest to the unitary idea of the state by envisioning state officials as a mere embodiment of it (see Gupta 1995, Das 2006 for exceptions). For instance, police officers are not a disconnected, generic state officials or the embodied state. Referring to them as the voice or unified representation of the repressive state, the literature tends to reproduce what it promises to overcome. Das (2006) rightfully reminds us that “police officers may be charged with implementing the rules and regulations of the state, but they do not cease being members of local worlds with their own customs and habits” (170). Paying attention to the situatedness of state officials would help account for
conflicting and contesting discourses and practices emergent across and inside several state branches.

Additionally, the normative anti-state sentiment seems to run as an undercurrent in this literature. Scholars in this literature fail to capture some of the nuances and multiplicity of practices and discourses adopted by state officials due to their predominant critical stance.

Finally, this school of thought, despite its potential for fleshing out the multilayered, process-oriented view of the state and its effort to deconstruct the state idea by tracking down its constitution in daily life through empirical studies, largely lacks a gendered perspective.

**Feminist Theorizing of the State**

Feminist literature had long been criticized for the lack of feminist theorizing of the state, until radical feminists first introduced the state to feminist scholarship. Since Catherine MacKinnon (1983) suggested, “Feminism has no theory of the state,” many feminist scholars have engaged in gendered analyses of the state. Yet feminist state theory did not spring from nowhere. A larger body of literature on the state has informed feminist debates on the state.

Max Weber has been widely accepted as the first sociologist who systematically theorized about the state. In his “Politics as a Vocation” essay (Weber 1965), Weber defines the state as that entity which possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a bounded territory, and argues that politics is the sharing of state power between various groups within a bureaucracy. In Marx and Engels’ view, on the other hand, state power affects the class struggle, capital accumulation and expansion, and the struggles over the market in favor of the ruling class (Tucker 1978).

As the pioneers of the feminist state literature, socialist feminists argued primarily that the state simultaneously served the needs of capitalism and those of patriarchy. The state reinforced the capitalist relations of production through enforcing patriarchal relations of
reproduction. The public/private dichotomy was central to their theorizing as a result of the historical division between production and reproduction (McIntosh 1978, Z. Eisenstein 1983). Unraveling the bifurcated nature of welfare policies in the United States, they revealed that the private patriarchy women are exposed to in the domestic sphere is compounded by the public patriarchy securing women’s dependence on the state (Fraser and Gordon 1994, Mink 1990). Thus, many socialist feminists were quite skeptical about the potential of the state to be a progressive force for women. However, they have been criticized for adding the oppression of women to a Marxist framework, which perceives the state as an instrument of the ruling class (Hartmann 1979).

Radical feminist theorists also contended that patriarchy was endemic to the fabric of the nation-state. For some in this tradition, the state is inherently male (Z. Eisenstein 1983, MacKinnon 1983). MacKinnon (1983, 1989), for instance, argues that the state represents the institutionalization of male subjectivity. Reflecting the values of the larger society, state policy, and law serve the interests of men (644). Another major argument in this tradition is that the state is a masculine entity due to the gendered construction of citizenship resulting from the gendered allocation of rights and duties between men and women (Pateman 1989).

O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver (1999), in studying the welfare state, see the state as changing over time instead of being inherently patriarchal. They maintain that scholars should look at specific institutional arrangements as well as political alliances and discourses in order to unravel the gendered effects of policies (O’Connor et al. 1999, 9). In this view the question of whether the state is a progressive force for women could be answered by exploring actual institutional practices. Orloff (2005, 2009), adopting a contingent understanding of power and politics, and questioning and challenging the masculinist paradigms of welfare states, demonstrates the mutually constitutive relation between gender and welfare states.
In the context of the developing world, Deniz Kandiyoti (1991) argues that nationalists, in particular, saw the state as a modernizing force that would elevate the position of women in society as part of state-formation. In a similar vein, Yuval-Davis (1997) discusses the ways gender relations impact and are impacted by national processes and projects. She argues that the construction of nationhood involves specific notions of “manhood” and “womanhood.” Also, in the context of the Maghreb countries, Mounira Charrad, using a state-building paradigm (2001), discusses how Islamic legal codes and kin-based political power affect the position of women differentially in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco despite similarities in culture and religion.

As this overview of the literature demonstrates, radical feminists view the state as an oppositional force to gender equality. MacKinnon (1983), for instance, views it as inherently male and antithetical to women, while liberals hold a relatively positive view. According to liberals, although the state has historically been dominated both nominally (numerically) and substantively (shaping policies and gender relations) by men, there is nothing inherent about this domination (Randall and Waylen 1998, Waylen 1994). As women go into the public sphere in large numbers, become better educated, and hold positions of power, these gendered elements of the state can be surmounted to generate equality for all. Most feminist literature, in this sense, has sought to study the state by looking at its relation to and impact on women.

Lynne Haney (1996, 2000) has underlined the need to go beyond seeing women as the mere object of state policy. Through her ethnographic research on the juvenile justice system, Haney (1996) illustrates both the multilayered and contradictory nature of the state and the ways women engage with the juvenile justice system through challenging or conforming to state policies and practices. Another group of scholars have focused on interactions between women’s movements and the state (Ferree and Martin 1995, see
especially H. Eisenstein’s 1995 work on Australian femocrats). Turam (2007) demonstrates how Islamist men of the Gulen movement and the modernizing male bureaucracy in Turkey have both left women out of processes of engagement with the state.

Regardless of the particular tradition they come from, most scholars in the feminist state literature tend to see the state as a unified entity above and/or separate from society. Also, scant attention has been devoted to its co-constitution with society (see Haney 1996, Turam 2007 for exceptions). Additionally, although the feminist literature on the state has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the gendered character of the state, the relations between women’s movements and the state, and the impact of state policies on women, it fails to examine how different masculinities are constructed, embedded and displayed at different state sites. As Joane Nagel (1998, 243) aptly puts it, “If nations and states are indeed gendered institutions, as much scholarship asserts, then to limit the examination of gender in politics to an investigation of women only misses a major, perhaps the major way gender shapes politics – through men and their interests, their notions of manliness, masculine micro and macro cultures.” In line with this argument, I maintain that instead of essentializing the state as inherently male, we need to pay attention to the various masculinities in relation to femininities that are at work in shaping practices and discourses of various state officials located at different branches of the state. It is crucial to flesh out the ways masculine and state power complement, reinforce, and challenge each other. Tracing multiplicity of masculinities both resonates with the non-monolithic and process-oriented character of the state and avoids essentializing the gender of the state.

**Feminist Studies on the Turkish State**

In addition to being a strong and largely illiberal constitutional state dominated by the bureaucratic elite and political party leaders, the Turkish state appears to be highly
patriarchal. Most feminist research on the state has focused on the question of the
points out how nationalist Kemalist movement in the 1920s saw the state as a modernizing
force that would elevate the position of women, especially in the state-building years.
Berktay (2003) highlights how women became the objects of the reforms as their public
visibility would bear a tangible sign of the cultural transformation the male cadres of the
Republic envisioned. Similarly, Rittersberger-Kilic and Kalaycioglu (1998) reveal the link
between the patriarchal state tradition and the patriarchal family in Turkey by arguing that the
Turkish experience of state-building was modeled after the traditional father figure, in which
the state has the privilege to govern and guide its citizens as the father, the head of the
household, does the same for his family.

Ozlem Altan-Olcay (2009) demonstrates that the Kemalist reforms may be seen as an
attempt at the patriarchal regulation of society. She also discusses how the male political elite
deliberately silenced and discarded the politically active women’s movement in the early
years of the Republic. Others have problematized the construction of gendered citizenship by
exploring the culturally embedded meanings of masculinity and femininity (Delaney 1991).
In the same vein, Serpil Sancar (2012) uncovers the gendered character of Turkish
modernization by highlighting that men were responsible for building the modern state, while
women were expected to build modern families in which principles of the secular Republic
would be taught and practiced. Still others have focused on how the state, through military
conscription and militarist culture, fosters the norms of gendered citizenship (see Altınay
2004, Sünbüloğlu 2013). As this brief overview demonstrates, feminist scholarship has
successfully uncovered the gendered character of the state in Turkey in many different ways.
Yet much feminist scholarship, like its counterparts in mainstream studies of the state, has
neglected to explore the processes of masculinities in analyzing the state.
**Masculinity Studies and the State**

Masculinity studies emerged as a critique to sex role theory (e.g., the work of Parsons), which reified gender differences and also served to conceal questions of material inequality and power, implying that men and women were “separate but equal” (Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985).

Masculinity studies have only recently begun to focus on the link between masculinities and politics. Before moving on to discuss masculinities and the state, however, it is essential to talk about some of the important concepts in this literature.

Masculinity is not a set of characteristics or a genetic instinct (Connell 1987). It is embedded in an ensemble of practices, discourses, ideals, and symbols (Barrett 1996), even when there is no direct correspondence between masculinity and what men do. Once we theoretically distinguish femininities from what women do, and masculinities from what men do, transcending the biological connotations such direct associations invoke, we may begin to theorize the ways masculinities are embedded in and construct social processes and organizations in addition to informing individual behavior.

Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) identify masculinity as a configuration of gender[ed] practices constructed in interaction, and can differ according to gender relations in a particular social setting. This definition of the concept implies that masculinity is far from being static, but is constructed individually and collectively during social interaction. Also, it is contextual and historical as it changes over time. Rather than possessing masculinity in a fixed way, “individuals produce, and move through masculinity by engaging in masculine practices” (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 86). Thus, this conceptualization of masculinity as contextual and historical serves to avoid the trap of essentialism.
Empirical research has made it evident that instead of talking about a single masculinity we should recognize a multiplicity of masculinities. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) identify four types of masculinity: 1) hegemonic, 2) subordinated, 3) marginalized, and 4) complicit, all constructed in relation to each other and femininities. Hinojosa (2010) uncovers the hierarchical structuring of hegemonic and subordinated masculinities in the US military. Barrett (1996) notes multiple masculinities that vary across job specialties within the US Navy. These ethnographic works have contributed to demonstrating the construction of multiple masculinities and the power relations among men in institutions.

Hegemonic masculinity is an important concept in the field of masculinity studies. The term refers to an idealized image of masculinity in relation to which images of femininity and other masculinities are marginalized and subordinated (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Also, the Gramscian account of the concept refers to an ideological hegemony political mechanisms legitimizing and mobilizing others through coercion and consent. James W. Messerschmidt (2010), on the gendered aspects of the speeches of Presidents Bush junior and senior, maintains that the fluid and flexible nature of hegemonic masculinity such as the inclusion of humane, sensitive, and emphatic aspects in the masculine rhetoric illustrate that hegemonic masculinity is capable of reconfiguring itself. In a similar vein, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) accentuate the significance of hybridity of masculinities and femininities as “the best possible strategy for external hegemony” (15). The hybrid character of hegemonic masculinity in fact implies that it requires a constant process of negotiation, translation, and reconfiguration, referring to its shifting configuration.

The notion of shifting configuration of masculinity points to both historical and contextual aspects of masculinities. Michael Messner (2007) contends that hegemonic masculinity “is never an entirely stable, secure, finished product; rather, it is always shifting with changes in social context” (462). The situational and fluid character of masculinity
enables men to move through different, even contradictory aspects of masculinities. Men can move among multiple meanings and ideals according to their needs (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 841). When it is desirable, they may rely on some aspects of hegemonic masculinity and distance themselves strategically from others. In this way, men position themselves through discursive practices.

Much work on masculinities has problematized the construction of masculinity in various institutions and made men visible as a social category (Collinson and Hearn 1994). This includes the study of sports and masculinity (Anderson 2011, Klein 1993, Messner and Sabo 1990), male engineers in the industrial sector (Collinson 1998), men in the management world (Acker 2004, Collinson and Hearn 1994, 1996, Connell and Wood 2005, Kimmel 2005), men and crime (Messerschmidt 1993), and men in politics (Cannen 2013, Messerschmidt 2010, Messner 2007). The list can be extended by including the study of men and masculinities in the military (Barrett 1996, Hinojosa 2010, Morgan 1994) and a collection of historical works on police masculinities (Broomhall and Barrie 2012). Although research on the military and the police have successfully uncovered the multiple masculinities embedded in these institutions, little attention has been drawn to the relationship between the state and masculinities despite the acknowledgment of the significance of the topic in much conceptual work (Connell 1990, Nagel 1998).

From early on, scholars in the field of masculinities have underlined the significance of focusing on the ways various masculinities are embedded in institutions and organizations. Thus the literature acknowledges that focusing solely on how individuals construct and perform masculinities at institutions does not suffice to capture the power dynamics. Collinson and Hearn (1994) argue that various masculinities are often embedded (but usually unacknowledged) in organizational power structures. Similarly, Acker (1990) defines gendered institutions as organizations that rest on gendered assumptions in ways that
disadvantage women despite their seemingly gender-neutral structure and rules. Paying attention to the embeddedness of masculine values and assumptions in the structure, culture, and practices of organizations and institutions (Cockburn 1983, Walby 1986, Acker 1990, 2004), and the organizational or institutional constructions of gendered “persons” will help demonstrate the power dynamics embedded in social life.

Masculinity scholars’ emphasis on the embeddedness of masculinities in organizations provides a key point for studying the gendered character of the state from the perspective of masculinities. Messerschmidt (1993), for instance, problematizes the gender lens that often focuses solely on women, and the ensuing scholarship fails to explore the role of the masculine in a cultural and structural sense about such gendered institutions as politics, violence, the police, and the state, among many others. Similarly, Joane Nagel (1998) highlights that such projects as state power, citizenship, nationalism, militarism, revolution, political violence, dictatorship, and democracy can be conceived as “masculinist projects, involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities.” Contrary to the assumption of some of the conceptual work on this topic (Pateman 1989), it is vital to observe that the state is not essentially but historically a masculine institution. And since the state is not a monolithic entity, various masculinities may be embedded and displayed by the state.

It is important to note that although it is well documented that states are indeed gendered institutions like so many other institutions and organizations, this does not necessarily mean that the state is male. Such an argument would render our discussion tautological and essentialist. A gendered approach that projects the state as essentially male fails to flesh out the multiplicity, contextuality, and shifting character of masculinities, and thus the opportunity for change. More constructivist approaches to studying the link between the state and masculinities set the ground for theoretical and methodological tools for the
exploration of the various ways masculinities and the state shape and reproduce each other.

Carrigan, Connell, and Lee (1985) state in a landmark article, “Accordingly we see social definitions of masculinity as being embedded in the dynamics of institutions – the working of the state, of corporations, of unions, of families – quite as much as in the personality of individuals” (591). In a later article, Connell (1990) identifies the state “as an institution [which] is part of a wider social structure of gender relations (509), and adds that in addition to or instead of talking about the numerical majority of men in the state, we need to talk about the role of masculinity” (513). Thus it is preferable to focus on how masculinities and femininities are constructed as part of state processes.

Connell also notes that particularly the coercive apparatus of the state is strongly masculinized in its workforce, discourse, and practices. Although there has been some successful empirical work on the military (Barrett 1996, Hinojosa 2010, Morgan 1994) and the police (Barrie and Broomhall 2012, McElhinny 1994), these works take these institutions as freestanding institutions, and so do not look at how masculinities and state processes reproduce each other. Despite the illuminating conceptual work on the relationship between the state and masculinities, little empirical research has been conducted on the embeddedness of masculinities in the state and the ways the state and masculinities (re)produce each other.

Despite the overall lack of attention to the role of masculinities in the feminist state literature, masculinity studies have recently begun to inform the study of individual political figures (Coe et al. 2007, Messerschmidt 2010, Messner 2007, Foxall 2013, Cannen 2014). The underlying feature of these works, however, is that they are far from applying the theory of masculinities to different branches of the state. They mostly remain at the level of analyzing masculinities of individual political figures. Acknowledging the significance of the masculinities of the political elite, and drawing from the existing body of literature on masculinity studies, I extend the scope of this literature through empirical analysis of the
police in addition to the masculinities of the prime minister.

Finally, there is a growing interest in the field of masculinities in Turkey. Few scholars have undertaken to study the link between politics and masculinities. Bilgin (2004) analyzes the gendered character of Turkish modernization through the lens of multiple masculinities, and focuses on what she calls “Kemalist” [secular] and “Islamist” masculinities. Sancar (2012) uncovers the gendered character of Turkish modernization by highlighting that men were responsible for building the modern state especially in the 1920s while women were expected to build modern families in which principles of the secular Republic would be taught and practiced. Scholars have also begun to analyze masculinities of political leaders (Akyuz, 2012, Turk, 2014). Akyuz (2012) extends the masculinities analysis to the study of masculinities of political parties in addition to individual political leaders. These works have uncovered different paths of masculinities in Turkish political life and come up with such categories as “neo-Muslim,” “Kemalist,” and “nationalist” masculinities. Scant attention, however, has been drawn to the place of masculinities in other state institutions. My work illustrates that masculinities are not solely performed and embodied by individuals but are also embedded in the ways state institutions operate. It illustrates how masculinities are constructed differentially or similarly at different levels of the state. It also seeks to trace whether there is a continuity or discontinuity between masculinities displayed at different state sites, since such an undertaking would question the possibility of change.
METHODOLOGY

Research Questions: In particular, my study asks,

1) In what ways and under what conditions do masculinities and statehood (re)produce each other? What are the elective affinities that mutually shape political rule/power and masculine power?

2) Do we see commonalities or differences between masculinities performed/constructed/displayed by state officials located at different state sites? In other words, how is the masculinity of a prime minister related to the masculinities of riot police or a police officer appointed at a budget unit?

3) What is the link between multiple masculinities and democratization/authoritarianism?

4) What is the connection between masculinities and the paradoxical (double) character of the state?

Methods:

I have employed a multi-method research approach for my dissertation, collecting the following types of data:

- Erdoğan’s language use, bodily comportment, and affective presentation at times of political crisis, namely, his souring relations with the military following the resignations of four military top officials in July 2011 and the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. In addition to his speeches, which went viral and received much public and media criticism in the aftermath of those crises, I also look at his body language and affective presentation.

- Data from fieldwork in three major cities in Turkey.

- Demographic information on police officers and chiefs.

- 35 interviews with police chiefs and officers.

Discourse analysis: There are a number of ways of conducting a discourse analysis; the approach in this study includes analysis of both action and interaction in talk and many other forms of interaction, such as promises and threats, agreements and disagreements, and
attacking others or defending oneself. The analysis of body posture accompanies the analysis of actual speech. I conduct a discourse analysis of how Prime Minister Erdoğan handled and responded to souring relations with the military elite in Turkey and the Gezi park protests and the accompanying public dissent. The discourse analysis includes the analysis of his bodily comportment, affective presentation and his language use as the body becomes a medium through which masculine charisma is constructed/displayed/presented.

Discourse analysis of Erdoğan’s language use, bodily comportment, and affective presentation shows how masculinities are constructed as part of discourses and practices of state officials. The discourse analysis also demonstrates how this gendered construction contributes to forging of the paradoxical state idea. It offers evidence of the construction of shifting masculinities in accordance with changing policies and political discourse.

Fieldwork: When one studies a community of people or a formal institution like the police, it is likely that they receive formal answers to their questions. Conducting fieldwork helps overcome this problem to some extent by enabling the researcher to observe whether there is much discrepancy between the interview data and what research participants do in their social settings on a more daily basis.

I conducted fieldwork in three major cities in Turkey among police officers and police chiefs between January 2013 and March 2015. I made several informal site visits ranging from one to four hours and participated in group discussions, gatherings, and lunches. The site visits included informal gatherings and conversations with officers and chiefs at police stations, local social facilities of the police and think-tank organizations run by (ex)-members of the Turkish National Police.
Interviews: My two empirical chapters on the police draw largely from in-depth interviews with police officials in addition to the fieldwork. In-depth interviewing is an effective method to explore people’s lived experiences, feelings and thoughts in their own context, and to uncover assumptions. Flexibility with the time used during the interview allows for elaboration and reflection by the interviewees. Also, interviews, as an important element of feminist methodologies, allow uncovering the construction and contestation of meanings and identities (Cockburn 1991).

I utilized the grounded theory method (GTM), which is effective for analyzing qualitative interview data (LaRossa 2005, Strauss and Corbin 1998) as an analytical approach because individuals convey lived experiences discursively (Pascoe 2003) and because it is rigorous (Charmaz 2006). The analysis for police chapters began with open coding; a process of line-by-line analysis of data across each question related to the topic in particular chapters to identify main themes. Themes are coded (labeled); when patterns are evident, they are further coded as categories.

Questions for one of the police chapters (Chapter 6) inquired mainly about the police’s perceptions about people’s opinions about police practice in Turkey, modes of masculinities that are emergent within the institution, the nature of policing at different units. For the other police chapter (Chapter 5), I sought to interview police officials primarily to find out what types of policing and police masculinities are formed and displayed in their relationships with the public across different time periods.

As part of the fieldwork, I conducted in-depth interviews with 35 police officers and police chiefs between February 2014 and February 2015. Ten of the interviewees were women while 25 were men. Only one out of 10 policewomen is a ranking police chief. Seventeen of the participants were unranked police officers; the rest of the sample included police chiefs holding various ranks ranging from sergeants to four-star police chiefs. Some
nonranked officers have a police vocational school education after high school; the younger generation hold at least a four-year college degree in various majors prior to the police training provided by the institution. A group of high-ranking police officers (7) have graduate degrees from the United States (5 PhDs, 2 master’s degrees) in various fields of social sciences, and some of them currently hold academic positions. The average age is 41.7. The service years ranged from four to 29. Three officers were single, one divorced and 31 were married.

I initially sought official permission from the Turkish National Police to conduct fieldwork at two designated police centers in Istanbul. I received little institutional response to my request. Participants in this research were recruited through snowball sampling due to the issue of accessibility to the population under study. Key contacts in the police among both unranked and ranking police officials introduced the researcher to further contacts. I conducted all the interviews in Turkish and translated the data into English prior to coding. Most interviews took place at cafeterias of the police stations where research participants work, police social facilities, homes of the interviewees, and cafes outside the police stations, as well as think-tank organizations where some of the former police chiefs work. Each interview took about one to two hours. Participation was voluntary. All names used are pseudonyms. To protect the confidentiality of the participants, the cities where the interviews and the fieldwork were conducted are kept unidentified.

Strengths, Limitations and Location of Researcher:

While this study poses little overall risk for the respondents and the researcher, there are yet important dynamics that may impact the study and should be addressed accordingly. First of all, born and raised in Turkey, I am familiar with Turkish culture, political system, and
institutions. My position as a native of the Turkish language and society facilitated my understanding of the culture and politics of the institutions I studied. However, the issue of familiarity is a slippery slope, as it may also cause one to take for granted some important meanings, symbols, and significant issues at hand. I sought to overcome this dilemma by developing an outsider perspective as well, in order not to miss issues and meanings that are significant for analysis.

My position as a researcher posed a relative obstacle to gain initial access to the police, since for understandable reasons state institutions in Turkey usually are not very open to social scientific research. Such formal institutions that are often exposed to public and media criticism are cynical about those who want to study them. However, after gaining access to the population through personal contacts in the police, I was able to build a level of rapport necessary to conduct research on such sensitive issues as the police role in public protests, democratization and policing, and relations with the public, among others.

Additionally, I assume that researchers who seek to study the state and particularly the police in any country should make sure that they take the necessary measures not to risk themselves and their research participants. I tried to ensure that none of my interview questions would put police officers’ career at risk or put them in conflict with higher officials. I tried to do this by informing my interviewees prior to the interview that they could skip any questions they felt were politically sensitive and did not feel comfortable discussing.

My location as a woman researcher should also be addressed. The police is still a predominantly male institution both numerically and culturally. Although policemen I contacted were quite open and frank in their attitude to most of my questions and included me in their conversations at more casual events, I could see that they tended to adjust their behavior and language in their female colleagues’ and my presence. My position as a female researcher limited our conversation on issues such as existence of LGBTQ police officials.
and police treatment of the LGBTQ community, due to the cultural taboos around those topics. Although my position might challenge my male respondents’ comfort zone to some extent, after building a certain level of rapport, I assume I was able to get frank responses and conversations on the topics we discussed.

Being a woman researcher facilitated conversation with policewomen in general. My feminist stance, on the other hand, worked as a two-edged sword. Seeing that my feminist approach to issues might cause a feeling of inconvenience among both policemen and women at such a male-dominated institution, I tried to stay away from vocal advocacy for gender equality in the institution so as not to impact my respondents’ opinions and perspectives. Yet as a feminist graduate student, I did my best to provide equal opportunity to have their voice heard in my research.

The major limitation of this study is the relatively small sample size. Because it is an exploratory study that draws from a relatively small sample of 35 interviews, its findings are by no means generalizable. However, it is important to note that the interviews worked as a supplement to the fieldwork, and the fieldwork complemented the interview data in many ways and also provided data for more profound analysis. Thus, although the study draws from a relatively small sample, the in-depth interviews and the fieldwork serve to explore the intricacies and nuances of the topics explored.
Chapter 3
The State and its Mal(e)contents in Turkey: A Historical Background

Introduction
This chapter contextualizes the Turkish case by providing a historical background of the Turkish state for those unfamiliar with this history. It discusses the authoritarian state tradition with particular attention to the significance of the state bureaucracy in the political system. It also highlights the dominance of political leaders vis-à-vis a democratic political party tradition. It then presents a historical background for the police by uncovering the close affinities between the military and the police in Turkey and the gendered character of the latter. It concludes by pointing out the need for more study addressing the link between masculinities and the state.

I argue that the strong state tradition, all-male bureaucracy, dominance of political leaders, and close affinities between the military and the police demonstrate that masculinities serve as an intervening factor that blurs the fine line between democracy and authoritarianism in Turkey.

The Strong State Tradition and the All-Male Bureaucracy in Turkey

Much work on the Turkish state has highlighted its character as a strong state (Heper 1985, Barkey 2000). According to this view, the Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, inherited from its predecessor a strong, centralized, bureaucratic state. The state was centralized to such an extent that it did not allow political groups and parties to have much political influence. Intensively in the state-building years but also later on, the bureaucratic elite, including civilian and military members, has sought to transform society through
several reforms initiated by its founding fathers’ quest for modernization – largely understood as Westernization.

Historian Deniz Kandiyoti (1991) shows how nationalists in the newly established state of Turkey saw the state as a modernizing force that would elevate the position of women in society as part of state formation. Yet the role of women has largely been ignored, and men have hijacked the state-building project. The Turkish case is a testimony to the disproportionate involvement of men in state-building and the associated sociopolitical transformation.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first president of Turkey initiated reforms such as abolishing the Caliphate in 1924 in favor of a secular Republic, adopting the Swiss Civil Code instead of Sharia law in 1926, replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin one in 1929, and establishing the Clothing Code, which fostered adoption of European-style attire for men and women.

The newly created secular bureaucratic center, consisting of revolutionary male cadres of the new Republic, mobilized to modernize women and society at large. According to Berktay (2003), women became the objects of the reforms because their Westernized dress would serve as a major marker of the transformation. The major dilemma of the gender reforms of the new Republic, however, was the fact that the Kemalist fathers drew the contours of how women of the Republic would exist in society. Not only did the founding fathers seek to “modernize” their daughters and wives, but male bodies too became the terrain of reforms (Kandiyoti 1997). Men like women were expected to take up European attire. The Hat Law of 1925, for instance, required men to wear Western style hats and outlawed the Ottoman fez, leading to the execution of religious men who opposed the use of the European hat by the state. Thus, both as agents/facilitators, and objects of the Republican reforms, the male bureaucracy played a key role in the transformation of society.
The state elite was not only instrumental in modernizing society but also actively involved in transforming the state structure. The Republic of Turkey replaced the rule of the Ottoman Sultan, who held absolute power and owned the land. The notion of a potent state not only characterized the Ottoman patriarchal state but also became the legacy of the Republic. The founding fathers aimed to replace the personal rule of the Sultan by an impersonal rule of bureaucracy (Heper and Sancar 1998). Yet the Turkish state continued to be highly centralized, since political power was concentrated largely in the state bureaucracy. It is essential to note that the majority of the political elite in the early years of the Republic – including Ataturk – had a military background, as they had played key roles in the War of Independence. Therefore, they were highly instrumental in shaping the new state and considered themselves the guardians of the secular Republic (Heper and Sancar 1998).

The influence of the military bureaucratic elite over the state and society has continued in the form of military coups d’état. The military staged coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, and the military regime drafted two constitutions following the 1960 and 1980 interventions. Some of the justifications offered by the military bureaucracy included the inefficiency of civilian governments to sustain public order, the rise of domestic threats against the secular regime, and the unitary state. A brief look at the history of military interventions suggests that in particular the military bureaucratic influence over politics presented a major setback to the flourishing of democracy and political party tradition in Turkey. In the absence of well-established democratic institutions and a system of checks and balances, the military took liberties until recently to shape politics and society. Thus, the central bureaucratic elite has been influential in shaping politics in general and state institutions in particular. Military influence over the state was remarkably reduced during the first term of the AK Party rule due to the EU reforms that entailed the structural transformation of the institution, and it was brought under civilian rule in the 2000s (Heper
Considering the influence of the all-male bureaucracy in Turkey in transforming the political system in favor of a rational-bureaucratic system and society for a modernized system, it comes as no surprise to see that most state institutions in Turkey remain dominated by men, and the institutional culture and structure of state institutions are heavily formed by men and masculinities.

**Political Leaders, Democratization, and Masculinities**

The heavy influence of the military bureaucratic elite, which was a political actor above the state until recently, led to a weak political party tradition in Turkey. Turkey has had a multiparty system and electoral democracy since 1946. Despite this relatively long history of political parties and elections, democracy in Turkey is often identified as “leader democracy” (Heper and Sayari 2002). In the absence of well-established democratic institutions and checks and balances, political leaders’ discourse and practices gain enormous significance and impact on democratization or authoritarianism.

Scholars in the “bringing the state back in” tradition often accentuate the significance of autonomous institutions for maintaining democratic governance (Mann 1986, Skocpol 1985). Skocpol, for instance, is highly critical of the pluralist and structural functionalist approaches’ overemphasis on the involvement of the political elites in shaping policies. More recently, however, scholars of democratization and democratic transition have noted that even “electoral autocracies” (Schedler 2010) abandoned the battle against a set of formal institutions associated with liberal democracy and shifted their energies from repressing formally democratic institutions to manipulating them. This manipulation of democratic institutions by autocratic rulers is what Schedler (2010) calls “the last line of defense for authoritarianism.” Thus, the prevalence of autocratic tendencies in democratic governance is
indicative of the need not to overlook the significance of the political elite in addition to that of institutions. Even though the elite are transient in electoral democracies, they, nevertheless, may play a crucial role in manipulating or appropriating institutions, to borrow from Schedler (2010), or in restructuring institutions in more or less democratic directions at certain historical points, especially in cases of the lack of autonomy of institutions.

Due to the historical impact of leaders in Turkish politics, the political elite has become an important area of study of the state. Several scholars have discussed the topic of political leaders and democracy in Turkey (Heper and Sayari 2002, Mango 2002). These studies underline the importance of leaders vis-à-vis political parties. Heper and Sayari note, “The importance of leaders in shaping political outcomes in Turkey seems largely, though not exclusively, from the near absolute control that they exercise over party organizations” (2002, 3). Similarly, Ozbudun (2000) problematizes the potent presence of leaders as a common characteristic of political party organizations in Turkey. The fact that some party leaders outlived the parties they ruled shows the entrenched significance of leaders. For example, Suleyman Demirel, popularly known as “the father” (baba), served successively as the leader of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) until the party was closed down following the 1980 coup, and of the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi) until he finally became president in 1993. The dominance of leaders resulted in the emergence of a personalistic style of leadership and a cult of personality from time to time.

Gendered analysis of political leaders is largely missing from current analysis, despite the recognition of the significance of the political elite. From Ataturk, who self-identified as the “father of all Turks,” to Tayyip Erdoğan, for whom masculinity became an integral component of his charismatic rule, masculinities analysis should be an important framework of the study of political leaders (see Akyuz 2012, Turk 2014 for exceptions). Bora and Tol (2009) argue that the masculine rhetoric is so embedded in political leaders’ discourse in
Turkey that it almost leads one to think, “politics is male” (825). Thus, for an exploration of the construction of masculinities in the state, it is vital to focus on masculinities of political leaders, especially when considering their impact in shaping and manipulating democratic institutions.

**Policing and the Turkish National Police in Turkey**

The history of the police in Turkey must be considered alongside the history of the military. The roots of the Turkish police organization date back to the Ottoman Empire. Policing was carried out by a special branch of the Ottoman military, the Janissaries (Yeniceri Ordusu), raised and funded by local strongmen. The police role of the Janissaries was limited to large cities and during urgent cases such as riots (Ergut 1999).

It was not until 1845 that the police organization (police teskilati) – later known as the Turkish National Police (TNP) – was established as part of the massive modernizing reforms in the Ottoman military. The term “police” was first used in a decree produced the same year. The duties and authorities of the police were identified in this decree, which also laid the foundations of the modern police force. Despite the establishment of a separate police force after that time, the police institution, however, continued to recruit its members from the military until later. As Ferdan Ergut (1999) maintains in his extensive study of the link between state formation and police reform in the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republican era, “the establishment of the modern state goes hand in hand with the extraction of the means of coercion from the people and their monopolization in the hands of the state” (83). He further argues that the underlying goal in the establishment of the police in the empire was to maintain public order so as to pursue state interests, rather than to prevent serious crimes (20). In other words, the police in the Ottoman Empire and most of the Republican history were primarily concerned with protecting the state, rather than protecting
the citizenry and providing public service.

A short overview of the history of the Turkish police organization illustrates that what is called the TNP evolved from a non-distinct law enforcement agency originated in and administered by the military to a separate law enforcement agency involved in crime prevention and public service in addition to sustaining public order (Piran 2013).

Despite the prolonged process of separation of the police from the military, since the reform years of the Ottoman Empire, the affinities between the police and the military have expanded during the Republican era. As it was mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the Turkish state has been characterized as authoritarian (Heper 1985, Mardin 1973). A major sign of this authoritarianism may be traced through the history of coups. The secularist military bureaucracy’s domination over society and politics has been felt through military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, and the constitutions drafted by the military rule following the 1960 and 1980 coups.

The 1960s and 1970s in particular witnessed the collaboration of the police and military during the student and labor protests. This collaboration continued during and in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. According to Hulagu Demirbilek (2011), the seeds of the neoliberal police reform that began in the late 1990s and became manifest in the 2000s were sown by the military bureaucracy in the aftermath of the 1980 intervention. (See Demirbilek 2011 for a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between the police and the military in the post-1980 coup era.)

The rise of Kurdish insurgency during the 1980s reinforced the collaboration between the police and the military. The Turkish state established the Region of the State of Emergency (Olaganustu Hal Bolgesi -OHAL) between 1987 and 2002 in several provinces in its South East region, where emergency legislation was implemented and military and police were used as effective tools for counter-insurgency and joint operations. One of the major
signs of the blurring of the lines between police and military was the establishment of Special Operations Force (Ozel Harekat Timi) in 1985. The Special Operations Force was a military police unit established by the Police Act of 1985, which allocated extensive powers to the police in its fight against local terrorism. The primary mission of this unit is to prevent armed acts of various terrorist organizations in rural as well as urban areas, although by law the police operate only in cities. Members of this military police branch receive special military training unlike their colleagues in other branches, and are equipped with modern weapons, ammunition, vehicles, equipment, tactics, and techniques. The establishment of the Rapid Response Force (RRF) (Cevik Kuvvet) in 1983 is also testimony to the militarized character of the police. Both units were instrumental in helping the military fight against several illegal organizations, including Hezbollah, DHKPC, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) activities in southeastern Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s.

The joint history of the police and the military and the police preoccupation with maintaining public order (due to the prolonged state of emergency in the form of coups and the low-intensity war between the state and the PKK), imply that community-based policing, which basically refers to public service and crime prevention aspects of the police, in Turkey did not come to the fore in Turkey until the new millennium.

Democratic or community-based policing emerged as a new form of policing in the 2000s. There are multiple reasons for this fundamental shift in the police. The waning of the Kurdish insurgency and the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan toward the end of the 1990s, the EU’s promising announcement of the candidacy of Turkey for full membership, the AKP government’s commitment to pass democratic reforms, especially during its first

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2 The administration of the Police Academy announced on 20 September 2015 that 5,000 male college graduates would be recruited to train to join Special Operations Force due to the re-escalating Kurdish insurgency in Southeast Turkey. The low-intensity war between the state of Turkey and Kurdish insurgents reemerged following the national election that took place in June 2015.
term, and the emergence of a progressive intelligentsia within the police have been instrumental in the shift toward community policing.

Given the prolonged state of emergency after each coup, along with the low-intensity war between the Turkish state and the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast, the police and military operated together in maintaining public order, so that militarization of the police in both practice and tactics have been unavoidable. In fact, the military origins of the police in Turkey and the close affinities between them help explain the continuing entrenched militarization of the police. However, the various forms of collaboration between the military and the police to sustain public order prior to the 2000s do not seem to exist during the current popular dissent, which is becoming consolidated, especially during the third term of the AKP rule due to the declining role of the military over society and politics. Military influence seems to be replaced by militarized policing and an increasing police power and presence in Turkey.

The Turkish National Police as a Gendered Institution

Apart from the issue of the authoritarian state tradition and the close affinities between military and police, the issue of the gendered character of the police in Turkey has been understudied. From its origins in the Ottoman military, the police in Turkey has been a gendered institution both nominally and substantially. Similar to police organizations in many other societies such as the UK and the USA (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, McElhinny 1994), the police organization in Turkey began as an all-male institution. The first women entered the police organization in 1880 as prison matrons and prison nurses. It was not until 1909 that the first woman police officer (Fitnat Hanim) was officially appointed in the Ottoman period (Şahin, Tunç, and Töre 2010). Ayse Betul Or was the first woman appointed as a police
officer in Republican history, in 1934.

The first systematic recruiting of women police officers into police schools began rather late, in 1979 (32 women were admitted). According to 2005 data, women in the Turkish police account for 36 four-star directors, 27 three-star directors, 16 two-star directors, 15 one-star directors, 14 superintendents (major), 86 chief inspectors (captain), 224 inspectors (lieutenant), 105 sergeants, and 8,940 unranked police officers, for a total 9,463 (Gültekin, Leichtman, and Garrison 2010). The institution shares no systematic data on the most recent statistics.

Historical exclusion of women from policing in Turkey and elsewhere plays a significant role in characterizing the police as a male institution. Additionally, its structure, practices, and values reflect accepted notions of masculinity and femininity. Chapter 5 explores the multiple shifting masculinities embedded in shifting models of policing, while Chapter 6 focuses on how the police is both a gendered and a gendering institution that serves to reproduce gendered identities and multiple masculinities within the organization. Thus, the police is a prime candidate for the study of masculinity of the state, not only because it is predominantly populated by men but also because masculinities are embedded in the ways the institution operates.

In summary, any research that undertakes to study the link between the state and masculinities in Turkey should also not overlook such aspects of the state as the authoritarian state tradition, despite the electoral democracy, the role of all-male bureaucracy, the dominance of political leaders and the relevance of the military for various state institutions including the police.
Chapter 4

Gendering Charisma: Masculinity of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s Power and Politics

Introduction

On 29 January 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan blew up a Davos panel at the World Economic Forum (WEF)³ after a loud verbal exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres. Mr. Erdoğan apparently became furious after the moderator cut off his response to remarks by Peres on the Israeli military campaign against the Palestinians. Red-faced, legs crossed, with one hand pressing the arm of the moderator, David Ignatius of the *Washington Post*, Mr. Erdoğan turned to Mr. Peres and said, “Mr. President, you are older than me. Your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience.” Despite the persistent effort by the moderator to end the session, Erdoğan continued, “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill children on beaches.” Finally, the Turkish prime minister gathered up his papers and left the podium before anyone else, declaring, “And Davos is over for me. I will never attend Davos meetings again” (*Sabah Daily* 2009).

For Turks, Erdoğan’s anger was not unusual. Losing his temper at an international meeting, nevertheless, excited many. He was greeted as a hero by thousands when he returned to Istanbul a few hours after the walkout at Davos. The crowd was angry not only at Israel’s Gaza offensive against fellow Muslims,⁴ but also at years of being offended by

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³ WEF is a Swiss non-profit organization whose annual meetings are usually held in Davos, a mountain resort in the eastern Alps of Switzerland. The forum hosts business leaders, international political leaders, selected intellectuals and journalists to discuss the pressing issues facing the world.

⁴ The Gaza Flotilla, organized by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İHH), was carrying humanitarian aid
Europeans who thought Turkey did not deserve to join their union. Erdoğan, tall and charismatic, gave Turks a lost sense of pride (Aydintasbas 2009). While the Davos outburst gained Erdoğan new supporters in the Arab world, it also reinforced his charisma at home.

On 23 May 2014, speaking at a meeting of his Justice and Development party (AK Party) in the parliament, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated, “Should we [the government] stage a commemoration for everyone who dies? He is dead and gone.” Erdoğan uttered those words after Ugur Kurt (30), a municipal worker, died from police fire while attending a relative’s funeral at a cemevi (a house of worship for the Alevi), when the funeral procession passed near a group of demonstrators who had gathered to commemorate the death of Berkin Elvan, a 15-year-old who was killed by a teargas cartridge during anti-Erdoğan protests of summer 2013.

What do those two vignettes tell us? They are important for two reasons. The first story implies a leader who cares for an oppressed nation – the Palestinians – under siege by Israel, a rival opponent for Turkey in the Middle East during Erdoğan’s rule. Accusing Israel of state terrorism (killing children on beaches) Erdoğan portrays himself as a political leader who is concerned about an oppressed nation and world peace vis-à-vis an oppressor nation. In this vignette Erdoğan represents the compassionate and protective face of a state that cares even for the people outside its borders.

In the second vignette Erdoğan gets angry at the public protests around the death of a citizen by a teargas cartridge used by the police. He openly sides with the state as opposed to people in this case, implying that people – dissenting citizens – are expendable. This vignette displays the punitive, oppressive, and dismissive face of the state. In this we see the paradoxical faces of the state (Aretxaga 2003). At the same time both vignettes contain potent symbolisms of masculinity.

and construction materials, with the intention of breaking the Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip. Nine individuals aboard the flotilla were killed by the Israeli armed forces.
At the turn of the millennium, one-man rule seems to have emerged in some countries, including Russia and Turkey, under officially democratic or former communist regimes, while, ironically, their publics in most of the Middle East are challenging autocratic rules. In democracies where the government is associated almost exclusively with a single political leader, it is crucial to explore the implications of gendered charisma for modern governance and statehood.

In this chapter, by paying attention to the gendered character of charisma, I analyze the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and democratization/authoritarianism. This discussion also provides insights about the link between hegemonic masculinity and statehood. In order to explore these, I analyze how Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan utilizes shifting forms of hegemonic masculinity in his discourse and politics across a range of issues during different phases of his rule since 2002 when his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power. Although Erdoğan and the AK Party have been in office for three successive terms, I analyze Erdoğan’s rule in two phases. The first phase refers to his first two terms in office as prime minister, 2002-2011; the second phase covers the time period between 2011 – when he began to publicly make conservative remarks about such social issues as abortion, alcohol consumption, and cohabitation of adult college youth, and August 2014, when he became President. Such a distinction is needed to illustrate Erdoğan’s shifting forms of hegemonic masculinity in line with his changing politics. While the first phase of his rule is marked by emphasis on the need for greater democratization, economic growth, and an inclusive approach to different segments of society, in the second phase, Erdoğan embarked on a socially conservative and polarizing discourse and politics, representing and embodying the punitive, oppressive, and monitoring (surveilling) face of the state. I argue that his socially conservative discourse became more obvious and visible in the spring of 2011, when he disclosed his opinions about abortion and Caesarean births. This
chapter asks whether there is a relationship between hegemonic masculinity and authoritarianism/democratization. It also addresses some of the implications of hegemonic masculinity for the paradoxical character of the state.

My main argument is very straightforward. There is a relationship between hegemonic masculinity and types of governance. For the particular case in point, I argue that hegemonic masculinity serves as both “symbolic capital” and “ideology” in politics. Political leaders deploy masculinity as “symbolic capital” to garner more popular support and political power, and bolster their charisma, and as a rhetorical device to problematize discourses of their opponents, including their political rivals and dissenting voices in society. Additionally, hegemonic masculinity also serves as an “ideology” to blur the boundary between democratic rule and authoritarianism, and to blur the paradoxical character of the state, which helps maintain and reproduce the state idea despite its contradictory practices. A number of key points emerge from this analysis. First, Erdoğan’s construction of hegemonic masculine charisma adds to his personal and political power. Moreover, some of the analysis in this chapter also implies a link between political power and various configurations of masculinity, indicating how masculine power and state power reproduce each other.

This chapter makes three contributions to theory. 1) It puts charisma literature and masculinities studies in dialogue by fleshing out the gendered character of charisma. 2) It elaborates on the shifting configurations of hegemonic masculinity by analyzing Erdoğan’s politics adopting a historical approach. 3) It expands the scope of masculinity studies by introducing this literature to the burgeoning research on the state, which sees the state as process rather than as a thing and focuses on its “paradoxical” (double) character. It empirically demonstrates how masculine and state power reproduce each other.

The data for this chapter come from Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches and practices – including his bodily comportment and affective presentation – in two incidents: the political
crisis with the military elite when four top generals resigned from their posts in summer 2011 as a reaction to the government crackdown on some retired and active duty military personnel, and the nationwide anti-government protests – also known as the Gezi Park protests – that began in Istanbul and spread to several cities across the country in the summer of 2013. The data consist not only of his speeches, which went viral and attracted much public and media criticism right after the two incidents, but also his bodily expression and affective presentation as the body becomes a medium through which masculine charisma is constructed and presented. Thus the analysis illustrates both discursive and corporeal construction of masculine charisma.

While Erdoğan’s relation and response to the military elite and the Gezi protests stand out as two major cases, his views and discourse on several issues, from the Kurdish issue to alcohol consumption in public and abortion, are included in the analysis, as they provide insights on the relationship between Erdoğan’s construction of hegemonic masculine charisma and authoritarianism as well as statehood. Building on both masculinity studies and the ethnographies of the state literature, I conduct a discourse analysis of language use, bodily comportment, and affective presentation on these topics by focusing on how Erdoğan performs masculinities and femininities as part of his charisma through his words, body language, and interaction with his addressees. Such an analysis will help unpack the gendered character of charisma while also serving to explore the link between hegemonic masculinity and authoritarianism/democratic rule, and statehood.

The chapter opens with a literature section on charisma that is followed by a background section on Erdoğan’s life and his construction of gendered charisma up to the second phase of his rule. I then analyze shifting configurations of Erdoğan’s hegemonic masculinity and charisma in two sections by distinguishing between the first and the second phases of his rule: 2002-2011 and 2011-2014. Dividing Erdoğan’s rule into two phases
makes evident that his construction of hegemonic masculine charisma carries shifting configurations in line with his changing politics and discourse. Finally, I discuss implications of Erdoğan’s gendered charisma for democratic/authoritarian rule and its implications for statehood.

Theoretical Framework

On Charisma and Hegemonic Masculinity

Max Weber (1968), who in several ways anticipated challenges to liberal democracy arising from new forms of political movements such as dictatorial regimes, coined the term “charisma.” Among his threefold “ideal typical” classifications of authority and leadership, the first type, called “traditional,” was linked with monarchies and the “bureaucratic” type with democratic institutions. Although Weber did not develop a solid theory about the third type, “charismatic,” he discussed the emergence of exceptional leaders in times of crisis (Weber and Eisenstadt 1968).

These three sorts of governance are “ideal types” in Weber’s account, meaning they are analytical constructs that highlight various characteristics of individual phenomena (Mills and Gerth 2007). They are precise and unambiguously defined abstractions that may be compared and contrasted to reality in order to find out which criteria predominate in specific cases. In other words, they may not exist in pure form: charismatic leadership, for instance, may be combined to varying degrees with either of the two (Bernhard 1999).

Studies on charisma are limited because they usually take dictators or political and religious leaders with explicitly authoritarian leanings as their subjects (Glassman and William 1986, Overy 2004, Willner 1984). We know little about how charisma operates in democracies (see Cannen 2013 for an exception). In an era when individual political leaders’ legitimacy is so often questioned by their publics and the media on the basis of their
democratic versus authoritarian leanings, charismatic leaders skillfully develop ways to incorporate democratic discourse into their image. This bolsters their charisma while downplaying or even legitimating their authoritarian leanings to some extent, in the eyes of their supporters at least. In this respect, it is crucial to discern charisma among political figures in democratic states in the contemporary era.

The issue of the gendered nature of charisma also needs to be addressed. The overall tendency in the literature is to take for granted the gendered aspects of charisma, probably because most studies focus on the charisma of male leaders, revealing the assumption that charisma is essentially masculine. Connell (1990) complains that there is almost no recognition of gender in the research on fascism that produced theories of the “authoritarian personality,” which may in fact be re-read as a discourse about masculinity (526). Because the construction of charisma is a gendered process, the prevalent gender-blind approach to studying charisma needs to change.

Finally, a great deal of the literature views charisma as an exclusively anti-democratic force. Historically, this tendency may be explained by the rise of numerous dictatorships, frequently on a charismatic basis, since World War I (Chirot 1996). Contrary to this trend, Bernhard (1999) suggests that charismatic leadership is compatible with democracy when charisma is routinized in a rational-legal direction. Additionally, in that routinization, rational-legal procedures, such as the rule-boundedness of power, must predominate over charismatic elements (the arbitrary and personal exercise of power). In this view, the outcome will be dictatorship when this balance is reversed. While I find this account too formulaic to understand a social phenomenon like charisma, drawing on Weber, I acknowledge that democracy and authoritarianism do not exist in isolation. Considering that for countries like Turkey, which is experimenting in moving from an established electoral democracy to a consolidated one, the coexistence of authoritarianism with democracy may be expected. Here
it is essential to note, at least for the specific case in this chapter, that hybrid hegemonic masculinity serves to blur the line between authoritarian and democratic leadership in officially democratic states.

The Rise of the Hegemonic Masculine Charisma

The secularist Kemalist state, in its quest for greater Westernization and modernization, historically marginalized Kurds and Islamic circles, pushing them to the periphery of political and economic power since the early days of the modern republic (Mardin 1973). The political tradition Erdoğan had been part of – the National Outlook Movement – (Milli Gorus Hareketi) was challenged by the state apparatus when the political parties in this tradition, including Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party), were shut down by the constitutional court in 1998 and 2001, respectively. Erdoğan’s disadvantaged political position was compounded by his socioeconomic class and educational background as well. In this section, I analyze how hegemonic masculine charisma of Erdoğan developed in such a background.

In 1999 when he was mayor of Istanbul – the first member of a political party with Islamic leanings – Erdoğan was sentenced to 10 months in jail for inciting religious hatred when he recited a poem by the famous nationalist poet, Ziya Gokalp, which compared mosques to barracks, minarets to bayonets, and the faithful to an army. Rather than hampering his public image, this imprisonment added to his fame by carrying his then newly founded political party (AK Party) to power in 2002. Contrasting the image of former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, who became almost incapacitated toward the end of his term due to illness, tall, handsome, articulate Erdoğan aroused a sense of virility, youth, and power in his people. He led his Justice and Development Party to office for the third successive time in
June 2011, bringing in 50% percent of the vote. Finally, he – as the sole candidate of his
party – was elected President of Turkey in August 2014, with about 52% of the vote.
Surviving a jail stint, an economic crisis he inherited from the coalition governments before
him, coup plots, an attempt by the secularist judiciary to shut down his party, and an
assassination attempt by Kurdish militants in May 2011, he became very powerful in politics.
Indeed, under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has experienced unprecedented stability and
prosperity as well as a set of reforms in line with European Union criteria, which helped
Erdoğan and his party garner the support of liberal circles during the first and second term
elections. At a time when European countries were struggling with economic meltdown, in
2010 the Turkish economy grew more than any other major economy apart from China and
India (Invest in Turkey website). But his relative success in times of crises does not suffice to
account for his charisma. His man-of-the-people background and manners help him cultivate
a family man masculinity, caring and protective (Heper and Toktas 2003).

Erdoğan, a semi-professional soccer player, was raised in a working-class
neighborhood of Istanbul, Kasimpasa, where boys grew up with a heightened sense of
masculinity. He sold simit (a bagel-like pastry) on the streets when he was a child. He
attended a religious vocational school known as Imam-Hatip Lisesi, originally founded as a
vocational school to train government-employed imams. He connects with people by using
everyday language and associating with ordinary people, appealing to them saying, “Isn’t that
the case, sister (bacim)?” or “Don’t you think so, dear uncle?” Despite his serious face, he
has a sense of humor and playfully uses colloquial language carefully sprinkled with argot at
times. Interestingly, not refraining from displaying anger, he also does not hide other aspects
of his emotional side. He cried at his mother’s funeral in October 2011 when hundreds of
cameras were directed at him. He shed tears again in the parliament while he was trying to
convince the public to make amendments in the Constitution by reciting a poem about leftist
activists executed in 1980 by the administration of the military coup. During that speech, he represented the caring, concerned, and protective face of the state. Also, at a meeting where the eleventh year of AK Party was celebrated on 30 September 2012, he began his opening speech with a poem appealing to the emotions of participants. Rather than hampering his charisma, his hybrid (tough and tender) masculinity composed of emotionality, aggression, and man-of-the-people manners seems to bolster his charismatic image as a strong leader.

**Man-of-the-People and the Champion of Reforms**

Mr. Erdoğan’s affiliation with a political party with Islamic leanings as well as his educational background as alumnus of a religious vocational school caused the secularist state apparatus, including the judiciary and the military, as well as secular segments of society to approach Erdoğan with suspicion. Despite this secularist skepticism toward himself, Erdoğan managed to emerge as a charismatic leader. I argue that Erdoğan’s construction of hegemonic masculine charisma has been shaped differently in two phases of his rule, in accordance with his changing politics. In the first phase, covering his first two terms in office as PM, he had to diffuse and soothe the concerns about his party and himself by dissociating from the Islamist tradition they were rooted in. They chose to refer to themselves as “conservative democrats,” in an attempt to show their intention to diverge from the Islamic political tradition. Together with his party, he emphasized the need for greater democratization and peace between “the state” and the people, which meant a transformation of the punitive, oppressive, apathetic state to a compassionate, nourishing, all-embracing one.

The type of hegemonic masculine charisma Erdoğan constructed in this phase was informed by his moderate, overall conciliatory approach to the staunchly secularist state institutions and concerned segments of society, as well as his relatively inclusivist and caring
approach to dispossessed segments of society such as Kurds, Armenians, and the pious. In this first phase, when he sought to establish legitimacy and consolidate his power, he embraced and constructed a hybrid hegemonic masculine charisma that incorporated inclusive, humane, and tender elements of masculinity as well as some aspects of femininity, while he continued to draw from tough elements of masculinity including assertiveness and the use of argot especially when he needed to problematize the discourses of his opponents by accusing them of promoting military tutelage against his democratic rule. He tended to construct a hybrid masculine charisma for himself through portraying himself as championing democratic and economic reforms while attributing “toxic masculinity” – menacing and unpleasant aspects of hegemonic masculinity (Messerschmidt 2010) – to those who stand against transformation of the military and further steps toward democratization. This notion of “the protector of democracy against promoters of the status quo” also implies care for the nation.

The tension between the military elite and Erdoğan provides ample opportunity to discern Erdoğan’s relational construction of hegemonic masculine charisma and shows how hybrid hegemonic masculinity is embedded in his politics and an integral part of his charisma. Before discussing how Erdoğan built up a hegemonic masculine charisma vis-à-vis the military, which helped him put the military institution under the civilian control, it is important to highlight some of the cases that distinguish the first phase from the second in terms of illustrating both Erdoğan’s changing politics and the according shifting configuration of hegemonic masculinity he displays.

On 12 August 2005, for the first time in the history of the republic, contrary to the politics of denial that the modern republic followed towards ethnic minorities, Prime Minister Erdoğan acknowledged the “Kurdish question.” The “State of Emergency Legislation,” which was imposed in most of the southeastern cities and provinces of Turkey since 1987 due
to the ongoing tension between Turkish military forces and PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) was lifted on 30 November 2002. Fundamental individual rights of citizens living in the area were violated for the sake of protecting the state from the threat of PKK terrorism since the mid-1980s (Human Rights Watch Report). Those who were denaturalized by the Turkish state for various reasons were granted the right to regain their citizenship. Those who had been purged from the nation by the state were re-invited. In other words, the state was re-opening its arms for its dispossessed citizens. Erdoğan’s government seemed to engage in a period of negotiation and peace-making between the oppressive, exclusionary state and its unwanted subjects. On several occasions in this period, Erdoğan declared that against the oppressive, punitive state, he always stood by the people, and during his rule, the state would make peace with the people, leaving aside exclusionary, punitive, and oppressive practices, and embracing the people. In order for the state to make peace with citizens, Erdoğan believed that greater democratization in state institutions and recognition of individual rights would be needed. Among other changes, “zero tolerance for torture policy” in the police and establishing civilian control over the military worked toward this aim.

Despite his occasional autocratic tendencies during the first phase, one striking aspect of Erdoğan had been that he almost always sought to legitimize his wrath, as he did not want to risk portraying himself as an authoritarian leader who does not respect others. Tellingly, he has made speeches to portray his secularist opponents as undemocratic and in favor of military interventions against his democratic rule, as he did on the eve of making major amendments to the current Constitution in September 2010.
The Strongman vs. the Strong Military: The Collision of Masculinities

The relations between the secularist military elite and pro-Islamic Erdoğan provide ample opportunity to unpack Erdoğan’s relational construction of hegemonic masculine charisma.

The Turkish military has been one of the more political armies in the world, having an impact on Turkish society and politics through military interventions and the advisory board called the National Security Council (MGK). Turkey has witnessed three coups d’état in 1960, 1971, and 1980 followed by a postmodern coup in 1997, in which the army forced the civilian government to resign and called for an early election. As the number of military interventions imply, the military has enjoyed enormous power over civilian politics, forcing government members to resign and replacing them with interim military political rules, or simply influencing and shaping civilian government policies through the so-called advisory board, the MGK. The military tutelage over civilian politics in particular and Turkish society in general has received much criticism from various segments of society as well as the European Union, which Turkey has sought to be part of for so long.

Declaring itself the guardians of the secular regime, the military especially opposed the public and political rise of Islamism and took an active role in closing several pro-Islamic parties before Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Well aware of the vigilance of the military, Erdoğan kept a clear balance of having nonconflictual relations with the military during the first term while at the same time initiating reforms such as transforming the structure of the MGK in favor of a more civilian structure in line with the European Union criteria. While this friction may be interpreted as an attempt by Erdoğan to democratize Turkish politics and society through demilitarization (Aydinli 2012), it is equally important to see this controversy as a battle between the most masculine institution of the state and the hegemonic masculine leader Erdoğan. This conflictual relationship between the military arm of the state and the prime minister, a very important figure in the governing
body, also demonstrates the multi-layered and non-coherent nature of the state (Migdal 2001).

The most recent crisis between the high-ranking military officials and Erdoğan took place in August 2011, when the nation’s four top military officials, one of them the chief of staff, resigned in protest against the prosecution of several military officers including generals in an alleged coup. Historically, it was the military who forced prime ministers to resign and even be executed. But this time, two months after Erdoğan’s electoral victory in June 2011, the confrontation between strongman Erdoğan and the strong military elite resulted in the resignation of the generals. Observers saw this as the commanders yielding to the government, “rendering the strongman even stronger” (Righter 2011). Others commented that “the issue of who runs Turkey has been won and won by the civilians” (Bryant 2011). I argue that this epitomizes the collision of masculinities between state institutions.

Rather than seeking a conciliatory approach toward the generals, as he had previously, Mr. Erdoğan handled this confrontation with a forceful manner. The fundamental changes in the seating order of the MGK annual meeting a couple of days after the resignations revealed the nature of Erdoğan’s response. By changing the seating order as well as imbuing his body language with hegemonic masculinity, Erdoğan showed “who was the boss there.” Until August 2011, the Turkish prime minister had always sat side by side with the chief of staff of the army at annual MGK meetings. At the 2011 meeting, which took place only a few days after the generals’ mass resignations, however, Erdoğan sat alone at the head of the table. Sitting solemn-faced and with his fists on the table, while the generals kept their hands under it, Erdoğan’s body language supported the message he wanted to deliver through the symbolism of the rearrangement of the seating scheme. All the mise-en-scène revealed “who was in charge” in Turkey. The symbolism of the day did not end when the meeting was over. Erdoğan along with the generals visited another symbol of secularism,
Anitkabir, the mausoleum of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, who established the secular roots of the state. In a blue suit and classy sunglasses, Erdoğan left the mausoleum walking in front of the generals with “no companion at his side” (Torchia 2011).

As this highly symbolic showdown between Erdoğan and the military indicates, Erdoğan was able to bolster his rule and charisma thanks to his tough and decisive standing against the officials and the initiative to further transform civil-military relations in Turkey. Given that the military also had a similarly tough and hegemonic masculinity in Turkish politics until recently, this was clearly a collision of masculinities in which one had to appear as the victor. It was obvious that his triumph over the military helped Erdoğan gain more power in Turkish politics, but what elements of masculinity did Erdoğan rely on in this particular case? Portraying his military opponents as an impediment to democracy while depicting himself as the “democratic reformer,” Erdoğan’s masculine rhetoric and practices were not perceived as authoritative and threatening by his supporters. This helped him increase his power and popularity, which results in ever increasing power and popularity as a leader. In this he chose a self-construction as hybrid masculine, tough against the military for the sake of democracy. At the same time, he painted the military with “toxic masculinity” (Messerschmidt 2010) due to their undemocratic leanings and alleged authoritarian plots. This move portrayed the Turkish people as in need of protection from the undemocratic practices of the military and military influence on society in general, thus also contributing to his charisma as the savior of the nation.

Erdoğan’s charisma and politics in the first phase of his rule was informed by a special configuration of hegemonic masculinity that drew from tough and tender elements of masculinity. Yet it is important to note that the equation of toughness plus tenderness, even in the first phase, was asymmetrical, with toughness eclipsing compassion and care for the people. This hegemonic masculinity served both as symbolic capital to gain legitimacy and
charisma and as ideology to convince the public that tough aspects of masculine charisma were needed to “advance” democracy and protect it from its attackers. Furthermore, toughness was utilized proportionally and strategically by the prime minister in his struggle against those who appeared as impediments before greater democratization and economic and political stability. Tears were appropriate as public masculinity was displayed at a mother’s funeral or a group meeting at the parliament to convince the public to vote for comprehensive amendments on the Constitution, but they were not appropriate when dealing with the tough military elite, since it would be a sign of weakness. This type of toughness, needed to protect the nation from promoters of status quo, was far from being menacing for the people, as the PM was embodying and utilizing this sort of toughness against the oppressive and punitive state that targeted its own people.

The Return of the Old Patriarch: Socially Conservative Politics and Discourse

The second phase of Erdoğan’s rule, starting roughly in 2011, has been marked by socially conservative politics on issues including but not limited to abortion, cohabitation of college youth, alcohol consumption, and use of social media. The emphasis on the need for greater democratization and peace making between the state and the people has been overshadowed by a concern to shape and mold society through influencing individual lifestyles. As the PM embraced and undertook socially conservative policies and discourse, his hegemonic masculine charisma began to draw more from traditional elements of masculinity such as aggression, confrontation, toughness, and oppression. The gradually mounting authoritarian politics of Erdoğan requires and draws from traditional elements of masculinity. Moving away from his hybrid masculinity, built on a combination of tough and tender elements of masculinity and femininity, Erdoğan seems to aspire to become every citizen’s father,
brother, and husband who dismisses, oppresses, and does not compromise. If he shows a sign of weakness, his rule and legitimacy would be questioned.

He has repeatedly recommended that women of Turkey should have at least three children, declared that he is against abortion, and supported a restriction on the retail sale of alcohol after 10:00 pm, and a ban on social media tools such as Twitter and YouTube. He declared at a meeting with the women’s branch of the AK Party on 26 May 2012, “I am a prime minister who opposes Caesarean births and abortion, and I know all this is being done on purpose. I know these are steps taken to prevent this country’s population from growing further. I see abortion as murder” (Hurriyet Daily). Arguing that a young and dynamic population constitutes the basis of the country’s economy, Mr. Erdoğan framed abortion and high rates of Caesarean births as a sinister plan to preclude the [economic] growth of Turkey. Erdoğan’s remarks about abortion appear to be driven by a neoliberal concern for population growth much needed for economic growth, while also carrying some conservative overtones about promoting childbirth.

At a closed party meeting he summoned on the weekend of 3-4 November 2013, he further declared that he was displeased by the fact that some college girls and boys share the same apartments. Later he explained, “We will not allow boys and girls to live together in state-owned student residences. The values I hold do not allow such a thing. Anything can happen when it is mixed... All kinds of messy things are happening” (Hurriyet Daily, 4 November 2013). Put differently, Erdoğan acts out the role of a husband who wants to have three kids, and a father who forbids his kids from using alcohol at night and limits their internet use. He acts as the old patriarch who decides for his household and takes their actions under close scrutiny. As is clear from these examples, he mostly tends to construct this special configuration of masculinity by intervening in women’s lives and treating fellow citizens as children by deciding what they can and cannot do. This relational construction of
hegemonic masculine charisma in the second phase tends to demasculinize or infantilize fellow citizens, especially his opponents and dissenters, while remasculinizing his own politics and bolstering his charisma among his conservative political base. It is not only Erdoğan’s political masculinity but also his charisma that takes a more authoritarian turn as he embraces a more socially conservative politics and deviates from his commitment to democratic reforms.

The Gezi as a Transformative Moment

The Gezi protests and Erdoğan’s response to and handling of the protests attest to the changing nature of Erdoğan’s politics and his newly patriarchal masculine charisma. A set of demonstrations and civil unrest erupted on 28 May 2013 near Taksim Square in Istanbul, initially to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park. The peaceful protests spread quickly to other public squares and parks and turned into a nationwide wave of protests after the forceful eviction of a sit-in at the park by the police. What started out as an environmentalist concern turned into a wave of anti-Erdogan protests; protestors expressed a wide range of concerns, at the core of which were issues of freedom of the press and expression, as well as other individual rights and freedoms.

At this point, the language Erdoğan used to frame and suppress the protests, and the excessive use of police force against the protestors (resulting in seven dead and hundreds of wounded due mostly to the use of water cannons and canisters and the accompanying police brutality) illustrate how a new configuration of hegemonic masculinity significantly different than the one he constructed during the first phase is embodied by the Prime Minister. When most people expected him to take an appeasing attitude toward the protestors and listen to their concerns – as people often expect charismatic leaders to intervene and solve political and societal crises – Erdoğan chose to respond in a very aggressive and uncompromising
manner. On 3 June 2013, he declared, “We will definitely implement our urban development plan and also build a military facility in Taksim Square. I don’t get permission from a couple of ‘looters’ (capulcu in Turkish) for this” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V0X6S6xN4Gw). At the group meeting of his party in the parliament on 11 June 2013, he again said, “Now, they say the prime minister is so tough. What do you expect? Am I supposed to bend over (emphasis mine) before a couple of wanderers and ask them kindly to quit protesting? If you think that I am tough, sorry, but Tayyip Erdoğan won’t change!” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzxboMW3YA).

The symbolic meaning of Erdoğan’s response to the protests implies the metaphoric phallic power his construction of hegemonic masculine charisma rests on. “Vandals,” “wanderers,” “terrorists,” “marginal groups,” and “members of illegal organizations” are some of the epithets Erdoğan used to describe the protestors on subsequent days, attributing “toxic masculinity” to protestors by referring to their actions as dangerous, violent, and irrational. Erdoğan appears to justify his own stubborn, unyielding, and threatening approach by portraying the protestors as looters and marginal groups. Such a domineering discourse serves to limit the discursive space of his opponents to nullify their arguments. He seemed to insist that any sign of weakness on his part might have led to the questioning of his authoritarian charisma. Therefore, he appeared to build a special configuration of hegemonic masculinity that would serve as a “shield” to ward off any threats to his unaltering political rule and charisma. Apparently, the elements of toughness, insensitivity, and dismissiveness against opponents and dissenters outweigh compassion and care in the second phase of Erdoğan’s rule. At the same time, they serve to consolidate his charisma among his supporters while fomenting opposition among his critics.

Additionally, machismo seems to become part and parcel of Erdoğan’s hegemonic masculine charisma in the second phase as the language he utilizes reveals. As the once
disenfranchised prime minister moves to the political center, gains much political power, and “becomes the state” (devletleşmek or muktedir olmak in Turkish), he begins to draw more from patriarchal elements of hegemonic masculinity. The theme of protecting society, especially historically dispossessed segments of it, from those who stand in the way of greater democratization has been replaced by the theme of protecting the state from vandals, wanderers, and looters. The oppressive, apathetic, and punitive face of the state has begun to override the caring, protective, and compassionate face of the state.

Mr. Erdoğan’s aggressive masculinity did not stop in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests. During a visit to the mining disaster town of Soma only four days after the deadliest industrial disaster in the country’s history, in April 2014, Mr. Erdoğan approached a relative of one of the deceased by saying, “If you boo this country’s prime minister, you will get slapped.” After being booed by several people in the crowd, he entered a supermarket in pursuit of another protester, saying, “Come and boo me here to my face.” Disasters – whether industrial or natural – are times when statespersons are expected to visit disaster-stricken places and express condolences on behalf of the state and give the message that the state stands by and care for those affected. Erdoğan, however, chose to threaten disaster-struck fellow citizens in order to prevent further criticism and charges that state officials could have prevented such a disaster by taking the necessary precautions.

While Prime Minister Erdoğan’s polarizing discourse has led to a growing tension between his opponents and himself, his hegemonic masculine charisma seems to have been unwaveringly backed by his supporters. Some of the imagery attributed to Erdoğan by his supporters in the social media and during AK Party group meetings at the parliament, where citizens are welcome to participate in the audience, illustrate that the hegemonic masculine charisma constructed by Erdoğan finds resonance among his supporters. Especially members of the youth branch of AK Party call Erdoğan “the tall man” (uzun adam), “the master”
(usta), “man of the nation” (milletin adami), and “the world leader.” Again, “Stand upright! Don’t bend over! This nation is with you!” has become a frequent motto Erdoğan’s supporters chant particularly whenever Erdoğan criticizes opposition parties or dissenting segments of society, often in a confrontational manner. The masculinity embedded in the imagery attributed to Erdoğan obviously shows that there is some correspondence between the specific configuration of hegemonic masculine charisma that Erdoğan displays, and a politics of masculinity that at least some segments of society embrace.

Conclusion

The analysis of Erdoğan’s masculine charisma in two phases reveals some key points. First, charisma is definitely a gendered process and masculinity is one of the key components of Erdoğan’s charismatic rule. Such an analysis also renders it evident that hegemonic masculinity is never a finished product. Analyzing hegemonic masculine construction of a political leader’s charisma may help discern its historical, contextual character and its shifting configuration.

Connell (1995) argues that masculinity practices serve as ideologies that blur contradictions. Following that argument, it may be maintained that the hybrid hegemonic masculine charisma Erdoğan displays in the first phase mainly serves to blur the line between authoritarianism and democratization, making him both democratic and authoritarian. As the political leader bluntly begins to follow more authoritarian politics, he draws more from the traditional aspects of masculinity (tough, aggressive, threatening, polarizing, and oppressive), his charisma taking up more authoritarian overtones. Therefore, rather than seeing a direct relationship between hegemonic masculinity and democracy/authoritarianism, it may be argued that the relationship between charisma and democracy/authoritarianism seems to be
mediated by shifting configurations of hegemonic masculinity. In other words, hegemonic masculinity stands out as an intervening variable that accounts for the relationship between charisma and democracy/authoritarianism.

In both phases, Erdoğan’s construction of hegemonic masculine charisma is always relational and infused with power relations because this gendered charisma adds to Erdoğan’s power while at the same time helps him dominate, control and rule.

Erdoğan’s construction of hegemonic masculine charisma obviously adds to his personal and political power. The analysis in this chapter also suggests that there is a relationship between the legitimacy and political power of a political leader and a special configuration of hegemonic masculinity constructed and enacted by him. The case of Erdoğan suggests that once a political leader, initially lacking in legitimacy due to class, religious, and political background, gains legitimacy through increasing popular support, and accrues much personal and political power, he may tend to draw more from traditional elements of masculinity as opposed to its more inclusive, humane, and tender elements. Also, hegemonic masculinity serves as “symbolic capital” to gain more political power, legitimacy, and charisma and to problematize the discourses of opponents. Finally, it is also clear from the analysis that hegemonic masculinity is one of the key elements (working as a form of ideology) that serves to maintain and reproduce the state idea despite its contradictory practices and discourse.
Chapter 5

Public Policing and Police Masculinities in Turkey

Introduction

It was a bright December afternoon in 2014 in one of the largest police buildings in a metropolitan city in Turkey. While we were having lunch with a small group of policewomen at the police lounge after two formal interviews, a policeman, Ali (age 24), who seemed to overhear our conversation and deduce that I was there to conduct research, jumped into our conversation by saying that he had a lot to tell as a policeman.

After some initial conversation with the group over several matters, Ali and I went to his desk, where I asked my interview questions. After a couple of questions, I realized that he was constantly making comparisons between what he referred to as “the new police” and “the old police.” Stating that there are also regional differences in people’s opinions about the police, he explained that the negative image of the old police still informs people’s opinions about the police:

People in the East and the Southeast don’t think that the police care about them due to the oppressive attitude of the police toward the people of the region for so long. I believe they are right to feel offended because if the state killed your father, took away your son and you never heard from them, or if they burned down your house, you would become enemies with the state. If you instill fear in people’s hearts and minds, you don’t expect them to like or respect you. Even though such state practices are no longer widespread in the region, the oppressive past still haunts people’s minds.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Although police officers referred to the oppressive state practices in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey as a thing of the past, the armed conflict between the Turkish military and the Kurdish militias reignited following the national elections in June 2015. The State of Emergency was temporarily reestablished in particular provinces where the government implemented curfews.
Ali is a police officer who was appointed to the passport department three years ago. He is the youngest child of a peasant family with four children. His parents live in the Eastern city of Erzurum. Before he finished his words, his officemate, who looked around fifty, joined our conversation from his desk by saying in a serious manner:

But the conditions of that time required that sort of state practice in the region. You cannot put the blame on the police. We had to be more cautious in the 1990s. We could not trust people back then because terrorism was pervasive among the locals. The army and the police had to establish order and did a great job to protect our unitary state. Yes, we have a different approach now but we cannot judge the past by today’s standards.

Although the two policemen who shared a cubicle in a passport unit disagreed about whether the widespread state practices in the East and the Southeast in the 1990s could be justified, they both seemed to claim that there has been a significant transformation within the police.

“The old” and “the new” police were recurrent terms as I wandered among the police and interviewed more people. When I looked into the history of the police, it was impossible to miss the transformation that became recognizable in the early 2000s. I provide a brief historical account of the Turkish National Police in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Here it is important to touch briefly on the three models of policing and associated modes of masculinities this study has identified.

In this chapter, I explore an arena in which masculinity is performed and presented by the police in relation to the wider public beyond the organizational hierarchy. I analyze how the Turkish National Police (TNP) displays and embodies shifting forms of masculinity in its relations with the public. I maintain that each model of policing is associated with a distinct mode of masculinity. In light of the empirical data for this chapter, I explore the shifting forms of police masculinities in
three distinct phases: first, policing prior to 2000s, which I call “macho⁶ policing”; second, the new policing in 2000-2013, often called “community” or “democratic policing”; and third, post-Gezi policing, which I call “militarized policing.” Such a distinction is important to illustrate the link between shifting modes of policing and shifting masculinities in relation to political transformations. This chapter asks whether there is a link between models of policing and the modes of masculinity the police display in their relations with the wider public.

This chapter draws from 35 interviews with police officers and police chiefs across various ranks, and on fieldwork conducted among the police in three cities in Turkey. I draw on the ethnographic literature on the state and the critical masculinities studies. I argue that policing in Turkey is highly impacted by changing government politics, and I explore whether there is a link between shifting police masculinities and changing models of policing. I seek to contribute to the debates on the gendered analysis of the state and the ethnographic state literature by exploring the ways masculinities and statehood reproduce each other through police practice and discourse, and the ways masculine power and state power shape, challenge, or reinforce each other.

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⁶ The word macho – originally a Spanish word – refers to the sense of being “manly,” associated with “a strong sense of masculine pride, and a denigration of characteristics associated with women.” The Turkish word “maço” derives from the Spanish and often translates as a man who seeks to sexually and socially dominate women, and who refrains from expressing emotions and romanticism while behaving in an overly aggressive and assertive way. It is often associated with toughness and even maltreatment of women. In this study, interviewees use the term to describe policemen who like to dominate and suppress others through arbitrary use of masculine and institutional power.
The Old Police and the *Macho* Police Masculinity

The Turkish National Police has historically been preoccupied with sustaining public order. Until the 2000s this preoccupation has overshadowed its role to provide public services such as orchestrating traffic, issuing passports and some other state documents for citizens, and preventing crime. The primary duty of the police during the Ottoman Empire, and throughout most Republican history, was to maintain public order. The police role of the Janissaries (Yeniceri Ocagi), for example, was limited in that the military carried out this role only in large cities and during urgent cases such as riots (Ergut 1999). In most Republican history, the police was often used in collaboration with the military to suppress public dissent.

Turkey witnessed military interventions in 1960, 1970, and 1980 – almost once in each decade. The police together with the military became one of the prime tools used by the government to maintain order in streets, but also to monitor citizens closely in the form of home searches and detentions, during the labor rights and student movements in the 1960s and 1970s as well as the political turmoil between communists and ultranationalists in the 1980s. In this period, the government allocated significant powers and training to the police in order to maintain public order (Piran 2013).

With the rise in terrorist incidents and the escalation of the Kurdish insurgency in the 1980s, which the Turkish state identified as security threats to its existence and legitimacy, the government began to rely on the police in addition to the military and the gendarmerie in its war against terrorism. The period of high threats of insurgency and terrorism continued in the 1990s. Taken together, the labor movement of the 1960s and 1970s, followed by the insurgent Kurdish movement in the 1980s and 1990s – still volatile, as the current government launched military attacks on Kurdish
militants in July 2015 – led to tight security policies and allocation of high powers to the police. The police employed arbitrary and excessive use of force, and there were frequent human rights violations. The Turkish state established the Region of the State of Emergency (Olaganustu Hal Bolgesi- OHAL) between 1987 and 2002 in several provinces in the Southeast region, where emergency legislation was implemented and the military and police were used as effective tools for counter-insurgency.

It is important to note here that the AK Party government launched a peace process with the Kurdish movement that lasted from the early 2000s until the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and resulted in diminishing police and military operations in the low intensity war zone in the East and Southeast. This period of peace coincides with the period when community or the new policing emerged as an alternative model of policing. The police implemented several social projects in the region, and incidents of repressive state practices plummeted. However, the conflict between the state and the Kurdish insurgents reignited following the national election in June 2015, and the state began to use its armed forces – the police and the military – actively in its fight against Kurdish militia.

Going back to the period before the 2000s, torture at police stations, bribery, and various other sorts of human rights violations – including kidnapping citizens suspected of terrorist affiliations – became pervasive as a result of the increased police power and the lack of accountability in response to rising terrorism and the ensuing state of emergency. The emergency legislation set the ground for such violations by law enforcement. For example, the police could hold a suspect in custody longer than 72 hours without providing any justification. The police in Turkey in that period stand out as a state institution that represents and embodies the heavy hand of the state that monitors, oppresses, and punishes extensively without much impunity.
Accounts by police officers and chiefs in this research attest to this portrayal of policing prior to the 2000s; they referred to “the old police” as if speaking about a fearful ghost. Most police officers across different age groups complain that if people have negative opinions about the police today, “the old police” of the 1980s and 1990s is primarily responsible:

As a police officer, I am glad that the duties and powers of the police are well-defined and circumscribed by law today – at least on paper. It was wishful thinking to expect the police to act within law 20 years ago. The police of that time knew no rules. They were rude, macho, domineering and loved to instill fear in people.

Samet (policeman, IT unit, age below 35), in an effort to distinguish the new police – including himself – identified the old police as macho, domineering, and non-law-abiding. The constant emphasis on the dissimilarities between the old police and the new police in the narratives of the latter becomes an integral part of engendering the new police in everyday conversation.

Salih, a police chief with a PhD (36-45), complemented the officer’s statements when he shared an incident he witnessed at a police station in Istanbul in 1998 shortly after he was appointed chief:

I was working in the education department of the TNP in Istanbul at the time, and during a visit to a colleague at a local police station (karakol – now called “polis merkezi” in Turkish) I witnessed a torture scene, which I still remember crystal clear. Two police officers brought a suspect – a thief – to the police station. Without any interrogation or formal procedure, they made the suspect take off his clothes in the middle of the police center until he became completely naked, and tortured him by using iced water. And what surprised me most is that the torturers seemed to take pride in what they were doing, and the surrounding officers watched in approval and I could even say, in great envy.

As a member of the police intelligentsia, Salih has been highly critical of such abuse of power by the police. As he reported, it was common practice to torture people, and the
police seemed to punish suspects at police stations without necessarily following the formal procedures of investigating and sending the suspect to the prosecutor. The abuse of power, however, was not contained to police stations only. As the account of another police officer who became the target of police violence himself reveals, it was practiced on the street as well. Can was only a high school student in the second half of the 1990s, when he had the following encounter with a police officer in a small town in Western Turkey:

I experienced the police violence and hostility myself for leaving my bicycle on the street when I went to pay our monthly electric bill at a bank office. When I left the bank about 20 minutes later, a police officer began to swear at me and asked me, in a retaliating manner, to show my identity card and summoned me to the police station in the afternoon as if I committed a felony. I was scared to death. After that incident, I always hesitated as if I was guilty whenever I saw a police officer. If you collect memories of such encounters with the police as a society, it is not unexpected that people would not have sympathy for the vulgar and macho police.

Can notes that he is the older child of a civil servant who had always thought of the state as a “sacred entity.” According to Can, he did not look like a criminal or a usual suspect in his school uniform by which he meant, as he later explained, that anyone, regardless how they looked, might become the target of police violence. The fact that this incident took place in a Western city – outside the emergency zone in the East and Southeast – shows that police atrocity was pervasive across regions. Like other interviewees who told of similar experiences with the police, Can used words such as “rude,” ”domineering,” “authoritarian” (astigim astik), ”arrogant,” “macho,” and ”vulgar” to describe the police officer he encountered. He also noted that all this was happening due to lack of education; “Police officers were recruited at coffee houses, and among elementary school graduates. Anyone who knows how to read and write could easily become a police officer.” Thus, Can explained that police (mal)practice was due
partly to lack of education.

An older police chief, Harun, in charge of a Rapid Response Force unit (riot police), reported a similar experience with the police in the 1980s. Harun is the son of a grocery store owner in a lower-middle-class neighborhood in the Northwestern region of Turkey. Harun was only a high school student when he had his unfortunate encounter with the police, as he recalls:

Right after the military coup took place in 1980, a military officer along with two undercover police almost invaded my father’s grocery store. I was alone in the store at the time. All of a sudden, they removed everything from the shelves like looters would do and called me a “terrorist,” “traitor.” I was shocked when they finally left. They came back a couple of hours later. They told me that they inquired about me from the high school I attended at that time, and asked me to spy on the communists in our neighborhood because they heard that I was a good student. Can you imagine how I freaked out? Such was the police of the 80s.

As Harun notes, this incident took place in a northwestern city in Turkey in 1980. Like Can, Harun notes that the arbitrary violence of the police was so pervasive that anyone living in any region of Turkey could become its target at that time. Harun too accounts for the pervasive domineering and violent character of policing in the 1980s and 1990s with the lack of education along with the overall authoritarian state practices.

The fact that the last three anecdotes took place in the 1980s and 1990s shows that it is plausible to talk about a continuity of a culture of violence and machismo in the police in terms of their practice and approach to citizens. In all the anecdotes above, the informants draw vivid descriptions of the macho, domineering practices of the police. Apparently, machismo and violence were integral parts of police practice in their relations with the public.

These vignettes highlight important points about what is called “the old police” or “old policing” (eski polislik), and the associated mode of masculinity
prevalent during the two decades prior to 2000. First, the anecdotes imply that what came to be called “the old police” is marked by a mode of masculinity that draws from menacing and unpleasant elements. Primary aspects of this masculinity include arbitrary and excessive use of power in daily encounters with citizens. It is a form of power that does not seek to negotiate but demands immediate submission, and hence comes closer to military masculinity in this respect. It seeks to establish its absolute power through disempowering others, mostly fellow citizen men, through stripping them of their clothes, characters, and souls. Institutional power is performed in the form of masculine power on the bodies and spaces of other men, and women to a lesser degree. Impunity, lack of accountability, near-absolute sovereignty, use of arrogant, belittling, and coarse language and behavior, and corruption in the form of bribery and torture become important components of this masculinity. As a result, a heightened sense of domineering arbitrary macho masculinity as a form of uncontrolled power overrides the balanced institutional power that is supposed to be circumscribed by law. Moreover, this macho masculinity becomes such an integral part of policing that it appears as the primary defining characteristic of the old police even in the narratives of the police themselves.

This model of what I call “macho policing” also sheds light on the character of the state. Through the Althusserian act of “interpellation” (Althusser 1969), the police as the embodied state on the street or inside private property turns individuals into state subjects. It forces individuals to choose between being a “traitor” and a “collaborator.” By this act of interpellation, the state creates its subjects even when it retaliates, excludes, and oppresses. The state is enacted/constituted/represented in a police center, the street, or private property through the masculine police power. And the macho masculinity of the police shapes the character of the relationship between the
state and the citizen on a daily basis. In other words, the police performs state power in a highly macho manner.

As the narratives of police officers above reveal, the unpleasant personal encounters with the police, which instilled fear in individual police officers and chiefs, seem to have been influential in marginalization of some aspects of the old policing and old police masculinity, such as arbitrary use of power, impunity, bribery, torture, harsh and belittling treatment of citizens, lack of education, and use of violence instead of balanced institutional power. The new policing of the early millennium was constructed in contradistinction to the lingering silhouette of the old macho policing.

A New Species: The New Police Elite and Community Policing, 2000-2013

During a visit to a police station in Istanbul to renew my passport in the summer of 2011, I overheard a conversation between a police officer and a citizen in the front yard of the station. When the visitor said, “Officer Mehmet, let me buy you lunch today! I got my passport so fast.” The officer responded, “No need for a treat, Brother Ahmet (Ahmet abi)! Do not confuse me with the old police who would fall for a bribe of any sort! I did my job, and we are here to serve you!”

Many might think this was an uninteresting conversation that took place between a civilian and a police officer. In a society with a long legacy of the police taking bribes from civilians, however, this incident would be perceived as an important sign of change. In fact, what I found interesting in this conversation was not that the civilian was offering to buy lunch for the police officer, but that the police officer actually declined the offer. The fact that the officer made an explicit comparison between the old and new police, and his effort to put a distance from the image of the
old police, signaled an important transformation. Of course, a single incident does not suffice to make a case. What then are some of the characteristics of the new policing, often called community or democratic policing? How did it emerge and who are some of the actors that facilitated this transformation within the TNP? Before moving on to discuss the new police elite and the emerging model of policing, it is essential to remember the political events at the beginning of the new millennium that facilitated such a transformation.

With the advent of the new millennium, we began to see a new kind of policing in Turkey. Although it would be unrealistic to see this new policing as a complete break from the kind of policing pervasive during the last four decades prior to the 2000s, the AK Party government showed a new commitment to EU reforms, democratization and inclusiveness toward different segments of society, including ethnic and religious minorities, and the previously disenfranchised pious majority. During the first term of AK Party rule, this coincided with the efforts to come up with a new model of policing within the institution.

As Leila Piran (2013) aptly describes in her study of security reform in Turkey, there are multiple reasons for this change in the TNP. First of all, the waning Kurdish insurgency and the arrest of PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 marked a milestone in Turkey-EU relations. The EU’s promising announcement of the candidacy of Turkey for full membership led the coalition government run by Bulent Ecevit at the time to seek to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, among them the controversial requirement of abolishing the death penalty.

When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power in 2002, the reform process gained momentum. Policies such as “zero tolerance for torture by the police” and granting cultural rights to Kurds, along with the state’s changing discourse
on ethnic and religious minorities, has evolved toward an inclusivist government despite contradictory messages at times. Also, the State of Emergency in the East and Southeast regions was lifted only a week after the AK Party won the national election in 2002, signaling the new inclusivist policies. The government’s resolve to democratize during its first term impacted and facilitated the internal search for reform that was blossoming, especially among the upper-level police chiefs.

The new police elite, in fact, served as the locomotive for the transformations in the police institution. Before moving to discussing how the TNP was transformed in the early 2000s and the role of the new police elite in this transformation, it is important to explain who the new police elite were and are.

A new generation of police chiefs who call themselves “Akademililer” (police chiefs who graduated from the Police Academy in Ankara) emerged in the 2000s as the intelligentsia of the Turkish police. This group of police chiefs consists of Police Academy graduates who were sent abroad by the Ministry of Interior on scholarships to learn English and earn graduate degrees in various disciplines in social science. In fact, the first group of Academy graduates earned graduate degrees from the UK in the 1990s while the latter generation – mostly students of the first generation – earned their degrees from the USA during the first decade of the 2000s. This project was called the “training of police managers” (Ozguler 2001).

It was the new police intelligentsia who initiated the police reform that started roughly in the late 1990s and became visible during the first decade of the 2000s. But what distinguishes this group of police elite from police chiefs of the previous era and what role have they played in introducing and establishing what is called “community-based policing” or “democratic policing”? My research includes in-depth interviews with seven Academy graduates who hold PhDs – some of whom hold associate
professorships – and several site visits to their current workplaces. I first met most of these professors at their workplaces in the summer and fall of 2014. When I paid a second visit in spring of 2015, they had all been removed from their posts. Thus, most of these visits took place at cafes.

These police chiefs have been very self-conscious agents of change. Erkan (PhD), who previously worked in the counter-terrorism department for several years, describes the need for transformation in the police in the following lines:

I think there has been a significant paradigm shift in the police. Seeing clearly what was wrong with the police prior to the 2000s, the intelligentsia of the police thought that what we needed was to establish a service-oriented policing in Turkey. After all, we see citizens as tax-payers who seek service from the police. I think the police intelligentsia saw it was the authoritarian state practices that created a deep-seated antagonism between citizens and the police, which caused the police to lose legitimacy and trust in people’s eyes. We chose to rebuild the bridges by establishing a type of policing that does not see itself above the people. We see the police as the protector of democratic society.

One of the most striking features of this kind of the new police is their “anti-police state” stance. The police chiefs seem to agree that the problems in the old police stemmed mostly from the authoritarian state tradition in Turkey, which brought about a rupture between police and citizens. They envisioned community-policing or democratic policing that prioritized serving fellow citizens as a solution to this rupture. Thus, the reform period may be regarded as a process to establish a new “mission” and “vision” for the police in Turkey. In this respect, one of the primary goals of community-based or democratic policing can be identified as overcoming the “strong state tradition” (Heper 1985) in Turkey and fostering a healthy relationship with the public.

The views of most police officers complemented the stance of the Akademililer. In their narratives, most officers indicated that they work for the people although there
is no doubt that they are state officials. In other words, they highlighted that it was necessary to make a distinction between serving people and serving the state, and they value the former more than the latter, seeing serving people as the sine-qua-non for the existence of the police in society.

Another “Akademili,” Yavuz, a police chief with a PhD in social science, accounts for what led to this transformation in the following way:

Both the police and Turkish society were like a closed box prior to the 2000s. We were almost isolated from the rest of the world. As members of the TNP, we had no idea about various models of policing that were applied in other countries. Through our education in the UK and the US as well as our participation in the United Nations missions where we had the opportunity to work with the police of other nations such as Germany, Britain, Jordan, France, Kazakhstan, and Kosovo among others, we were able to catch up with this idea of community-policing. For example, we were introduced to different approaches to domestic violence and crime prevention. And most importantly, we saw examples of community-based policing which rests on human rights-based and information-led policing.

Yavuz moved on to discussing some of the ways the police intelligentsia worked to transfer this new body of knowledge and model of policing to the TNP and transform policing in Turkey accordingly.

As the policymakers within the institution, we worked to transfer this knowledge to the TNP through revising the curriculum in the police schools, for example, adding courses on human rights and law, and publishing academic books on various issues on democratization, police education, and other issues that are relevant to police practice. And as I said before, the change in society triggered the change in the police. People no longer were satisfied with the old police and their macho practice. And the police, I think, is the pioneer of this transformation. That’s why it tried to adapt to the changing social conditions and the demands of a democratic society more rapidly than other state branches.

Yavuz explained that the societal change and the increasing demand for individual rights and freedoms in society, in addition to the abovementioned global influences, rendered compulsory the transformation within the institution. The old ways of policing,
which rest on arbitrary and macho practices, were no longer sustainable in such an
environment. As he explained, the TNP sought to adapt to this change through
encouraging international education of its high cadres, thereby creating its own
intelligentsia who would play a significant role in transforming police practice and
culture in Turkey.

When asked about some of the distinguishing characteristics of the new policing,
Hakan, a police chief who holds a PhD, responded:

Previously, forensic science, archiving, the use of technology and
observing human rights in police practice were alien to the TNP.
The police were not required to demonstrate solid evidence to
detain a suspect, for instance. In fact, the system first rejected and
called us “the hair police” [kil-tuy polisi – a pejorative expression
used to describe those who are obsessed with unnecessary details]
because we began to apply evidence-based, information-led
policing instead of arbitrary practices.

Hegemonic masculinity operates on marginalization of other masculinities (Kimmel
2005). Apparently, the new type of policing faced an internal challenge and was initially
marginalized as being too soft and too scientific. This points to a marginalization of
some models of policing and the mode of masculinity embedded in them. Science and
scientific thought are often associated with men and masculinity in the academic
literature (Harding and Hintikka 1983, Harraway 1988, Hartsock 1983). However, we
see a denigration of evidence-based and scientific policing by those unreformed police
officials who apply more conventional ways of policing. This denigration of scientific
methods in fact implies that the association of science with men and masculinity is
contextual. Obviously, the masculinity of the new police which partly draws from
scientific knowledge, expertise, and human rights-based practice was marginalized by
the old police still dominant in the early years of the 2000s. While the old police has
denigrated evidence-based and information-led policing, the same elements have been
considered highly valuable by the new police as most police chiefs sought to mention
the use of technology and scientific methods in their practice as a distinguishing aspect from the old police.

My interviewees also highlighted that building bridges with the public is among the primary goals of the new policing. Given the infamous legacy of the old police, the new generation police chiefs found it difficult to build a healthy relationship with the public. Hakan summarized the new police’s vision by making a comparison with the “old police”:

To me, our major difference lies in our approach to people. Previously, the police represented the heavy hand of the state. The police existed almost solely to control and punish. But in a democratic society, the police should be there to sustain the well-being of the people. In line with this thinking, the police has been involved in developing and applying social projects. Together with my team, we conducted 32 social projects in my previous work place in the Southern Turkey.

In an effort to open up channels of communication with citizens, and to instill trust in people, the Ministry of Interior launched community-policing initiatives in major cities. Erkan mentions some of the community policing projects that he himself administered in a unit he previously worked at. “Connecting to Life Safely” is one such project, which promotes safe internet use for primary, middle, and high school students especially to prevent youth involvement in illegal terrorist organizations or various organized crimes such as child pornography and illegal organ transplants. “Blossoming Hope” is another social project, through which the police provided free after-school courses for students at selected middle schools in impoverished neighborhoods populated mostly by ethnic and religious minorities, in order to contribute to equal opportunity in education. Erkan related that the police aimed to correct its distorted image and show the caring and protective face of the state through such projects. Erkan concluded:
In our vision of policing, we believe that crime prevention is multi-faceted. If you raise well-educated citizens, you could prevent most crimes. And preventing a child’s involvement in illegal groups and any sort of crime is the prime contribution the police could make to society. Thinking that policing is limited to arresting criminals is an illusion. I know the police is not quite there to replace the image of macho police, but we are working on it.

As Erkan and Hakan explain, one of the major components of the new policing was its emphasis on the need to have positive relations with the public. In this new model, discourse of service and dialogue with the public replaced the police atrocity and distance from the public.

Narratives of the new police intelligentsia reveal that this group of police chiefs distinguish themselves with their criticism of the authoritarian state tradition that sees itself as above the people. They are also critical of historically predominant models of policing, especially the militaristic ways and the excessive use of force, ill treatment of people, and framing of discontented masses as threats to the state. The new generation of police chiefs very consciously promoted a relatively new phenomenon of community-policing, which prioritizes preventing the disproportionate use of force, and strengthening the accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness of TNP in serving the people. The new police discourse promoted by the police chiefs framed the primary goal of the police as serving the people vis-à-vis the state, as described in scholarly works written by the police chiefs themselves (Gultekin 2011, Teymur and Yayla 2005).

In a nutshell, the new police of the early millennium sought to construct a negotiation-seeking, conciliatory, and democratic policing. A new mode of masculinity emerged in accordance with this new model of policing. The macho masculinity of the old police was replaced to a considerable extent by the caring, serving, protecting, and scientific masculinity of the new police. Technology is used in several circumstances,
such as video recording during interrogations, to avoid police malpractice and to better serve citizens. This seemingly contradictory yet modern model of police masculinity that combines such elements as care and scientific knowledge may be seen as an outcome of the democratization process. As society voices discontent about the excessive and arbitrary police practices, the TNP developed ways to modernize itself in line with this demand. The institutional effort to build favorable relations with the public and to replace the antagonistic image of the police and state led to a construction of a seemingly contradictory caring and scientific police masculinity in the early millennium.

The Gezi as a Turning Point: The Rise of the Militarized Policing Despite the Police

If we see a police officer pull a young girl’s hair, or drag a protestor on the street, we can easily say that we are not yet a democratic society. Or how the police treat fellow citizens is not compatible with what we expect to see in a democratic society. The state, and the police in particular, should stop framing protesting civilians as terrorists. Protesting is a democratic right. Period. If Gezi happened today, I would join the protests because I too am concerned about the environment.

Those were the remarks of a police chief with a PhD (Nevzat) in response to my question in spring 2015 about the police force used at public protests since 2013. At the onset of this fieldwork, a major political uprising that had significant implications for police-citizen relations broke out. A series of demonstrations and civil unrest began on 28 May 2013 near Taksim Square in Istanbul, initially to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park. The peaceful protests spread quickly to other public squares and parks and turned into a nationwide wave of protests after the forcible eviction of a sit-in at the park by the municipality workers. What started out as an
environmentalist concern turned into a wave of anti-government protests, through which protestors expressed a wide range of concerns, at the core of which were issues of freedom of the press and expression, individual rights and freedoms, and the overall authoritarian policies of the government.

Unlike the first two terms of the AK Party, which was marked by the wave of reforms in line with EU criteria, the third term, in response to Gezi is characterized by growing authoritarian policies and government discourse. Since the TNP is under the direct control of the government, under the Ministry of Interior, police-citizen relations, and the respective model of policing are highly impacted by the government’s discourse and policies. A relatively new form of policing is reminiscent of what I call the old policing rekindled since the Gezi protests, despite the criticism of police violence by some police chiefs and officers. Nevzat’s remarks on the right to protest attest to some police resentment about the use of their force as the punishing hand of the state.

An extreme level of abusive power has characterized the police response to the Gezi Park protests. Looking at some of the statistics gives a glimpse of the level of police violence that was used. According to an Amnesty International Report released in October 2013, the Turkish Medical Association reported that more than 8,000 people were injured at protest sites, including serious injuries. The Ministry of Interior also reported that 600 police officers were injured during the violent clashes between the police and the protestors. Five people died at the demonstration sites, including a police officer. One person was shot in the head by a police officer with live ammunition. A 15-year-old teenager, Berkin Elvan, lost his life after a year in a coma, hit by a canister that was shot by a policeman in Istanbul as the teenager went to buy a loaf of bread for his family during the protests. A protestor who was beaten by a small group of police officers lost his life in the city of Eskisehir. What do these statistics tell us about the
state and the emerging model of policing? What type of masculinities do the police embody and display at protest sites when confronted by dissident masses?

The narratives of the police in this research, in fact, illustrate the diversity of opinions among the police about police intervention at protest sites. Despite the growing trend toward the militarization of the police and the associated militarized police masculinity in Turkey, the fieldwork and the interviews suggest that there are contradictory voices among the police with regard to the police’s role in public demonstrations. While critical of the police violence, most police officers and chiefs in the sample thought both the people and the government treated the police unjustly.

Serap, a policewoman who works in the social services department, stated:

The police during the Gezi protests worked selflessly and discreetly for the most part. Mostly our male colleagues slept on the streets for days. But still the police were treated unjustly. People call us “the private army of the government.” In fact, both the people and the government fueled anger and violence during the protests. At the end of the day, Gezi remained intact, and the ruling party raised its share of votes in the next election. But the image of the police is hampered to such an extent that the institution’s efforts to build up bridges between the police and the people have been wasted. The police was once again used to oppress people no matter if they agree to do so or not.

Serap seemed to argue that the police operate on orders from the government. Therefore, the police did what was expected from them. Yet neither the government nor the people appreciated their effort. Another police officer, Dilek, who works at a social services unit, also complained about what she called the “double-ethics” that the media and the public applied when they criticized the police practice during the protests:

We rightfully question the use of excessive force by the police. But why are we not equally concerned with the use of Molotov cocktails against the police and destroying of public and private property by protestors? I truly believe that protesting is a democratic right, but Molotov is a weapon of war. Our male colleagues had to defend themselves and to protect the state and the people in the face of such militaristic attack.
Like Serap, Dilek seemed to be offended by the public criticism against the abuse of power by the police during the Gezi protests. She sought to justify the police violence by the violence stirred by some protestors. In this logic, the police violence is legitimized since it is used against some dangerous threat. Alkan, however, a retired police chief who worked at the counter-terrorism unit for several years in the Southeast region of Turkey, accused the police of stirring up the clash between protestors and the police.

The police did terribly during the Gezi. They did not differentiate between children, women and the elderly, and attacked people regardless. The police institution became highly politicized. I call them “Tayyip’s police.” The police must be there to protect the people, not to oppress them. Those kids in the Rapid Response Force are too inexperienced and overexcited to handle public demonstrations. Whenever the police intervene at a public demonstration, things get out of control.

While Serap and Dilek raised a sense of resentment against the government and the people, Alkan was critical of the attitude of the police and the use of violence during the protests. Another police chief, Harun, in charge of the Rapid Response Unit, defended the police by saying,

People intended to occupy public squares and make a revolution. If the police had failed to stand upright against the protestors and showed a sign of weakness, the protestors would have thought that they could overthrow the state.

This police chief, unlike Alkan, seemed to justify the use of coercive force on the grounds that the state must be defended from its subjects at times of political turmoil, and that this is required not only for the sake of the state but also for the sake of the people. The ability to do so is associated with elements that would result in a lack of not only state power but also masculine power. Words such as “failing to stand straight,” and “a sign of weakness” demonstrate such concern. State power and masculine power were so entwined that the police through the masculine power (standing straight and not
showing a sign of weakness) was able to uphold the state.

Unlike the range of opinions about the role of the police at public protests among the police officers and most police chiefs, the police intelligentsia in the sample unequivocally condemned the excessive use of force by the police. Merve, a woman police major, noted,

The police in Turkey are terrible at public protests. As good as they are in face-to-face interactions with individuals in recent years, they are awful with the masses. Unfortunately, the police in Turkey do not exert force; they use violence.

This police chief also explained that the abusive power the police resorts to so often is the reflection of a rekindled political reasoning that is becoming pervasive in Turkey, which marginalizes and criminalizes dissenting civilians.

Today there is a tendency to frame every single protest as an uprising against the government, and the government tends to frame every dissident voice as marginal. And the police is the prime tool the state so often uses to prevent possibility of such threat.

Another high-level police chief, Yavuz, who worked at the General Directory of Security (headquarters of the TNP), echoed Merve’s views.

The use of TOMA\textsuperscript{7} and pepper gas against protestors shows that the state operates on an instinct to protect itself when confronted by public discontent. Normally, the use of TOMA and pepper gas entails expertise. The so-called legitimate power of the police must always be used discreetly and gradually and to protect people’s lives, not to jeopardize them. But when you order the police to end the protests no matter what the consequences are, as they did during the Gezi, nobody could foresee the outcome. Power is hard to contain once unleashed. That’s why we ended up seeing the police beat, drag and even kill the people. All I can say is that the abuse of power is illegal, and the law enforcement blatantly violated the law.

Ceyhun, another police major who holds a PhD, criticized police practice during the

\textsuperscript{7} TOMA, which means Intervention Vehicle to Social Uprisings, is a heavily armored water tank designed for riot control by a Turkish company. The police at protest sites often use TOMA to scatter crowds, and end protests.
Gezi and most protest sites as follows:

The police should see the protestors as fellow citizens who are concerned and disturbed by some issues and try to raise their voice, and they should stop treating them as if they are terrorists. But in fact, the type of policing we often see at protest sites reminds me of a national army who fights against a foreign enemy. We so often see angry policemen trying to suppress girls and boys who are university students.

There are alternative ways of preventing chaos. The police should exhaust channels of communication before they exert power. But, of course, using deliberation and sorting out provocateurs among peaceful protestors requires patience and hard work. The police on orders from the politicians and the bureaucrats choose the easy way and merely attack people. I’d like to see the recent protests as a bitter learning process for the police. They must learn how to handle public demonstrations more professionally and much less aggressively.

A four-star police chief also expressed disappointment about the souring police-citizen relations and the mounting police brutality. He saw the police brutality during and in the aftermath of the Gezi as a temporary situation, and things will get better.

Since Gezi, we are going through an abnormal period of time and conditions. We have worked a lot to build up a kind of policing that prioritizes serving our people and takes human rights as a reference point in our practice. I am disappointed to see that the security state is coming back.

This police chief’s concerns imply that the phenomenon of the security state is not new in Turkey. He refers to the post-Gezi era as “an abnormal period of time” during which police brutality became so widespread. But the analysis here suggests that it is actually the first decade of the 2000s that stood out as a period of “abnormality.” The police brutality and sour relations between the police and the public have stood almost as a norm for most of Republican history except for the early 2000s, where we see widespread instances of community-policing and a cultural change with regard to how the TNP approached the public, crime, and the state. In this period, there were also no major instances of violent clash between the police and the people in this exceptional
period. The rest, however, seems to be a great continuity.

Here it is essential to reflect on what model of policing and police masculinity came to the fore in light of the narratives of the police in this research and the account of what happened during the Gezi and the ensuing public protests in Turkey.

The state is enacted and represented at protest sites through military performances of police masculinity. The state through the repressive hand of the police becomes a social subject that inscribes its imprint on the bodies of its dissident subjects. It seeks not only to discipline the insurgent bodies but also to tame the disobedient souls through labeling and declaring them as “terrorists,” “looters,” and “the marginal.” It is not concerned only with reproduction of the population, as Foucault (1978) suggests, but can also kill on a horrific scale (Agamben 1998). The protest site turns into a stage where insurgent/dissident bodies and souls are penalized for the gaze of all. It also becomes a space where the subjects of the state are disciplined through the masculine power of the police. The penalizing, oppressive, maiming, and lethal face of the state appears in its fiercest form at protest sites. There is no place for the paternalistic intimacy of the state here. The caring and providing state is replaced by the annihilating violence of the police. The insufficient state that is incapable of or indifferent to concerns and expectations of the people reproduces itself through its excessive practices of repressive apparatus. The annihilating face of the state neglects, silences, and unifies the contesting voices among its branches. The annihilating militarized masculinity of the state and police is applied even in the face of criticism from police disenchanted or disillusioned by arguments about the legitimacy of the state power and violence. The militarized masculinity becomes an essential component of this annihilating yet solidifying state power.

This militarized masculinity enacted and displayed by policemen also limits the
The existence of policewomen at protest sites. As one of the interviewees notes, women police officers work in general services such as searching women protestors during protests. “We do not fire pepper gas or use the TOMA,” says Meral, a policewoman. The exclusion of policewomen from using paramilitary equipment to suppress the protestors designates the protest site as a space where “real” men confront and punish dangerous and rebellious men and women in the name of the state. It also implies that the use of violence by policewomen would challenge the notion of women as innately docile bodies or bodies to be protected. The police violence automatically connotes “man” power at contested sites of the state authority, which are also public space. Thus, women are not expected to exert force even when it is legitimated by the state, signaling that institutional police power can only be applied by masculine power.

Despite the plethora of opinions by the police chiefs and officers about the role of the police at protest sites, and the prevalent tendency to frame the police violence as excessive, we see an emergent form of policing that once again prioritizes maintaining public order over public service, criminalizes popular opposition, and inscribes state power on the bodies of dissenting citizens in order to turn them into submissive state subjects. But how does the militarized masculinity of the police reemerge despite the obvious opposition from the TNP? It is possible to account for this reemergence by the link between the government and the police. As long as the police operate under the government through the Ministry of Interior, police practice will take shape in accordance with government policies, even though police discourse on issues of violence may be different. The lack of solid control mechanisms over the police other than the government exacerbates the situation. In fact, the progressive thinking promoted by the high-level police chiefs who seek to establish a model of policing based on public service and human rights is being eliminated by closing down police
colleges and the academy, where the intelligentsia of the police has been flourishing.
The Homeland Security Act of March 2015 further reinforces the revitalization and
entrenchment of a militarized police masculinity that has been at work at most protest
sites since 2013.

The Homeland Security Act and the Closing of Police Colleges and the Academy
In the previous sections of this chapter, I discussed the changing models of policing and
shifting police masculinities in Turkey since the 1980s, based on the narratives of
research participants. In this section, I discuss some of the implications of a bill passed
into law in March 2015 on policing in Turkey.

As mentioned earlier, with the onset of the Gezi Park protests, the government’s
emphasis on democratization and individual and group rights seems to have been
replaced by a discourse of internal security threats, terrorists, and the marginal. As the
opposition from different segments of society builds, the government seems to rely
more on one of the repressive state apparatuses. This period, when the government
prepares to intensify the high domestic securitization measures through security bills, is
marked by the militarization of the police.

Probably affected by the discourse of the global threat of terrorism since 2001,
states across the world have tended to see their publics as potential terrorists and use
their energies to equip their law enforcement agencies with heavy weaponry and war
tactics. An American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report released in 2014 draws
attention to an alarming trend of militarization of a particular branch of the American
college – SWAT teams – in its practice during the “war on drugs,” which raids people’s
houses and sometimes kills civilians. Apparently, Turkey is no exception to this trend. Heavily armored police tanks occupy public spaces in metropolitan areas to be used against dissident citizens. Firing pepper gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets at people by riot police is no rare occasions at protest sites. In spring 2005, a police chief who worked at the Crime Site Investigation and the RRF for several years explained, “The state most recently swings the police over the people as a whip.” The metaphor of a “whip” that the police chief uses to depict the police at protest sites suggests that the police is used as a tool to punish and oppress civilians living within the national borders of the state. In other words, the state takes an instrumental view of the police as a force to be used.

The government in Turkey takes a primary role in the militarization of the police as a response to rising opposition from civil society and ordinary citizens. Although the Gezi protests were unprecedented in terms of the level of police violence used, they were by no means the sole site of protests where police brutality was used. As the government continues to criminalize different segments of society by labeling them terrorists and collaborators of external forces, it has relied more on the police to suppress the rising opposition. After the protests that criticized the occupation of the Kobane area by the ISIL in September 2014, the current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that the government was to propose a security package to the parliament. He declared his government’s resolution to fight with the “vandals,” stating that each TOMA burned down by protestors would be replaced by ten (Radikal Daily, 14 October 2014), to be used against dissenting civilians.

Seeing the rising popular opposition against its authoritarian policies and discourse, the government undertook to further militarize the police through the “Homeland Security Package.” The legislative proposal that passed into law in March
2015 has two major dimensions. Some of the articles of the bill are about civil rights and liberties; the other portions pertain to the police colleges and the academy faculty and students.

The bill grants the police broader authority to use their weapons at protest sites. The bill also allows the police to search any vehicle and person on the basis of “reasonable doubt.” Among other things, the police will more easily search homes and wiretap telephones without obtaining a search warrant from the prosecutor. Through this bill, which originally intends to allocate more power to the police against protestors, the police will more easily intervene in the most intimate spheres of individual citizens through home searches and wiretapping upon “reasonable doubt.” The academy in Ankara and the colleges were closed down by a clause in the bill. The current students of the police schools have been placed in public high schools and universities. The bill stirred heated debate among parliamentarians and civil society, and most articles passed into law despite harsh criticism and objection from the opposition parties and civil society.

As the narratives of the interviewees reveal, there is a diversity of opinions about the bill and its implications among the police. Adnan, a retired police chief at his late fifties who worked for several years at Special Operations Force (Ozel Harekat Timi), for example, welcomed the bill with great zeal:

The bill came from a necessity in society. After seeing such illegal violence conducted by protestors at some protest sites, I think it was high time to take precautions about those acts of violence. If a protestor uses a Molotov cocktail, or hides his face by wearing a mask, and attacks public property or the police, I think they should get punished for that. If you intend to overthrow the state, you should pay for it.

This retired police chief tends to criticize the violence caused by some protestors at some protest sites, and claims that the recent bill serves to prevent such brutality.
Another high-level police chief, Merve, although she approved of the bill, raised some serious concerns:

I personally do not object to expanding police powers if it helps the police conduct operations more efficiently. But if you grant more power to the police, laws that would delimit the contours of such power should be enacted along with it. Or else, the abuse of power in the police would be unavoidable, the consequences of which would put up an insurmountable wall between the public and the police.

Another high-level police chief, Yavuz, echoed Merve’s concerns:

There is so much discussion around the issue of “reasonable doubt,” which is in fact compatible with the EU countries. But there is also a rigorous institutional and external system of control of police misconduct as well in the EU. Because the use of power is always open to abuse and may lead to arbitrary practices, it should be limited and controlled meticulously by law. Previously, it was the duty of prosecutors to open up a legal case, but now a governor can litigate as well, which results in confusion of the duties and authorities of different state branches, which I really find detrimental to democracy since the judiciary may be under much political control now.

According to Yavuz and Salih, the bill and the authoritarian policies of the government empower a certain recent type of policing in Turkey, leading to arbitrary practices and abuse of power. Salih notes that the old police seems to have been rekindled during the last couple of years.

With the police reform that took place in the early 2000s, we thought that the old policing was gradually being replaced by a conciliatory, negotiation-seeking, human rights based policing. Given that the cases of torture, bribery and oppression of citizens plummeted during that period, we thought that the old police disappeared for good. But now it seems as if the police of the 1990s have been stocked in deep-freeze, and they began to defrost and come alive recently.

When I asked further about why they thought the old police has come alive again, Salih jumped in to say,

We have a special expression among the police for taking bribes “okuze baglamak,” which means extorting money from a shopkeeper or a business owner on a regular basis. Recently,
different units in Ankara police began to blow the whistle on each other because they each want to take bribes from the same pub owners at the pub district. When the owner of the pub complains that he already paid his due to a certain police unit, let’s say to the boys in the narcotics, those who come to collect the booty from the Financial Crimes Unit (Mali Şube in Turkish) get frustrated. Also, “the police corners” (polis köşeleri) reopened at pubs where police officers eat and drink free of charge during their work hours.

Yavuz and Salih think that the habits of the old police such as torture, bribery, and massive violations of individual rights and liberties will resurface because the authoritarian government will want to create an oppressive and violent police that would comply with its authoritarian discourse and policies. For them, the major purpose of the Homeland Security Act is to eliminate the idea of new policing by removing the Akademililer and the new police chiefs from key positions in the TNP. Ceyhun argued:

One cannot establish a police state with the new police. Therefore, the government needs to establish its militarized and corrupt police who would violate the law through arbitrary practices and would be willing to oppress, and punish without much questioning upon orders. Arbitrariness, machismo, and the violation of law are the incentives the government offers to their militarized police. And the law sets the ground for that.

Ceyhun’s words imply important points about the evolving character of policing and the state in Turkey. First, they point to the influence of politics over the police by hinting at the close affinities between the government and the police. The government may replace the existing members of the police with new ones if displeased by them. Thus, the police are expendable in this sense. Also, the government offers incentives to the police in line with what kind of policing it desires to see. Recently, arbitrary practice of law enforcement, and harsh treatment of citizens are among those incentives. Finally, the narratives of some of the police demonstrate that fallout may occur between different branches of the state – the government and some police in this case. And if confronted or simply faced with a progressive or critical body of the police, the government would seek to eliminate those cadres.
Conclusion

Policing is a process and is constructed rather than static. We see “policings” rather than a single distinct model of policing. Policing is also historical as it changes over time. Three models of policing, not mutually exclusive, which have come to the fore from the 1980s until today, are the old macho policing, the new or community policing, and the militarized post-Gezi policing.

Like policing itself, the masculinity of the police is constructed and shifts. Moreover, there is a relationship between models of policing and the masculinities police display in their relationship with the public. The fact that different models of policing are associated with different modes of masculinity implies that policing and masculinities shape each other.

There is also a relationship between models of policing and democratization. The Turkish case suggests that when the police becomes highly politicized as a result of tight control by the government, there tends to be a relationship between democratization and a specific model of policing. When there is greater commitment to democratization, a relatively democratic model of policing is likely to emerge that is more sensitive to individual and group rights. When there is a greater trend toward authoritarianism, more authoritarian forms of policing come to the fore. Macho or militarized masculinity becomes a characteristic of authoritarian policing. In other words, police masculinities take shape in line with the degree of commitment to democratization and its associated model of policing. Moreover, militarized or macho masculinity whose common components are uncontrolled violence and arbitrary practices becomes an incentive a government offers to the police when the government takes an authoritarian turn and needs to show and practice the oppressive hand of the
state in the face of rising popular opposition.

The empirical analysis in this chapter also suggests that the normative anti-state, anti-police approach predominant in the ethnographies of the state literature should be approached with caution. The diversity of opinions among the police with regard to issues of police brutality at protest sites, and the alternative understandings of policing as well as various modes of masculinity displayed by the police located at various units and levels of the TNP, demonstrate that one should not see the police as a monolithic entity and an immediate embodiment of the state. The existence of the police intelligentsia and some police officers with a relatively progressive approach to the state, public, and crime attest to this multifaceted, dynamic, and shifting character of the police.
Chapter 6

The Myth of the Tough Men’s Burden: Constructing a Hegemonic Police

Masculinity at the Turkish National Police

Introduction

Feminists have long documented that the state as an institution is gendered in multiple ways (Connell 1990, Fraser and Gordon 1994, Kandiyoti 1991, MacKinnon 1983, O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999, Pateman 1989, Randall and Waylen 1998, Skocpol 1979). Studies of masculinity, on the other hand, have focused on the construction of masculinity in several institutions and have rendered men visible as a social category (Collinson and Hearn 1994). This includes the study of sports and masculinity (Anderson 2011, Klein 1993, Messner 1992, Messner and Sabo 1990), male engineers in the industrial sector (Collinson 1988), crime and men (Messerschmidt 1993), men in the management world (Acker 2004, Collinson and Hearn 1994, 1996, Connell and Wood 2005, Kimmel 2005), and men in politics (Cannen 2013, Messerschmidt 2010, Messner 2007). Scant attention has been drawn to the ways masculinities and femininities contribute to the construction of state institutions, with the exception of the study of men in the military (Barrett 1996, Hinojosa 2010, Morgan 1994). This chapter seeks to unpack how practices and discourses of hegemonic masculinity are embedded and (re)produced in a state institution – the Turkish National Police (TNP).

Policing is a gendered and a gendering institution. Acker (1990) defines gendered institutions as organizations that rest on gendered assumptions in ways that disadvantage women despite their seemingly gender-neutral structure and rules. Policing is gendered because it has historically been identified as “men’s work.” It
continues to be envisioned so by many citizens, the media, and policewomen and policemen despite growing numbers of women across various units (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, McElhinny 2005). Additionally, its structure, practices, and values reflect culturally approved notions of masculinity and femininity. Policing is also a gendering institution because it serves to (re)produce gendered identities, and various constructions of masculinities and femininities are central to this reproduction. Thus, the police is a prime site for the study of masculinity of the state, not only because it is predominantly populated by men but also because masculinities are embedded in the ways the institution operates.

Hegemonic masculinity is a contested term. It basically refers to an idealized image of masculinity in relation to which images of femininity and other masculinities are marginalized and subordinated (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Also, the Gramscian account of the concept refers to an ideological hegemony – a political mechanism of legitimizing and mobilizing dominance over others through coercion and consent. In this chapter, hegemonic police masculinity is seen to carry both meanings; since hegemonic police masculinity is based largely on women’s perceived differences from men it works to undermine and negate women’s contribution and power in the institution.

This chapter draws from critical masculinity studies literature to understand and analyze the construction of masculinities in the Turkish National Police. Based on fieldwork and in-depth interviews with 35 police officers, the chapter explores how the police as a state institution constructs an ideology of hegemonic masculinity and how discourses and everyday practices of policewomen and policemen (re)produce a gender order within the institution. Definitions of masculinity are constructed based on perceptions about the nature of policing. Furthermore, hegemonic police masculinity
depends on several contrasting and conflicting interpretations of femininity. The chapter also illustrates that the process of constructing a hegemonic masculinity comes with a series of contradictions for policemen. In short, I aim to illustrate the ways that definitions of masculinity are constructed in both individual and collective discourse and practices as well as in institutional structures and practices.

Research has long identified *homosociality* and the *fraternity* of policemen as distinct elements of policing (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, Fielding and Fielding 1992) in Britain and the USA. I argue that what I call the “institution of vocational brotherhood” (mesleki abilik), and the associated “respectable sisterhood” as distinctly Turkish phenomena carry significant implications for TNP members and contributes to hegemonic police masculinity in Turkey by bringing police work closer to the structure of family and making policing more paternalistic for all its members. The findings in this chapter reveal that the relation between the police and masculinity is more complicated than the notion of the police as merely one of the “violent arms of the state” might suggest.

Despite acknowledgement of the need to study masculinities using a relational approach, and analyzing the construction of different masculinities in relation to each other, research on the military continues to exclude women from samples (Barrett 1996, Hinojosa 2010). By including women in the sample and analysis, this empirical research seeks to fill the gap by illustrating how discourses and practices of both men and women contribute disparately to construction of hegemonic masculinity at a state institution.

This chapter has two empirical sections in which I examine how men and women police officers’ discourses and practices serve to construct police masculinity, drawing from their opinions about the nature of policing and women’s difference from
men. It also explores the ways the institution of “vocational brotherhood” and the “respectable sisterhood” contributes to the construction and maintenance of hegemonic police masculinity at the TNP.

**The Gendering of Police Work: The Myth of the Tough Men’s Burden**

Gender is an institution that shapes social relations and reproduces social norms and rules. Human beings learn to embody these norms as if they are natural. However, individuals are agents whose actions validate, conform to, or challenge gender norms. Individuals both individually and collectively do “gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987) within the context of larger social patterns and structures. As Lorber (1994, 6) highlights, “The social reproduction of gender in individuals reproduces the gendered societal structure; as individuals act out gender norms and expectations in face-to-face interaction, they are constructing gendered systems of dominance and power.”

Masculinity too does not refer to a set of innate characteristics or a genetic instinct (Connell 1987). It is embedded in an ensemble of social practices, discourses, ideals, and symbols. Scholars point out how masculinity as a process is embedded in organizations, including the state (Acker 1990, Collinson, and Hearn 1996). Connell (1990) notes that the coercive apparatus of the state in particular is strongly feminized in its workforce, discourse, and practices.

Perceptions of policewomen and policemen about the nature of policing are instrumental in the construction of hegemonic masculinity in the TNP. This section sheds light on some of the structural and cultural causes of gendering of policing in Turkey with a focus on how discourses and practices of policewomen and policemen contribute to this construction. The section also teases out some of the nuances and
contradictions that the construction of the hegemonic police masculinity engenders.

The historical exclusion of women from policing in Turkey and elsewhere plays a significant role in the characterization of policing as a male occupation. Furthermore, policing is often associated by the media and police officers with physical strength to maintain public order (McElhinny 1994). Interestingly, opinions of both policewomen and men about the character of policing reflect this sentiment. The majority of male and all female officers in the sample work at nonoperational units such as communication, information technology, passport, budget, social services, and traffic. In fact, the majority of policing in Turkey consists of public services. Yet the ideas of policing as crime control and as a masculine occupation persist.

Policemen in the sample tend to define policing as crime control and maintaining public order, while most female officers see it as public service. Esra (a policewoman, social services, 45) identified the primary mission of the police as “The police work to build up trust in society by ensuring equal treatment of citizens. Our goal is to provide public service.” Ali (policeman, passport office, 24), on the other hand, argues,

Policing is tough. One needs to have some degree of charisma, and be physically strong. It is not easy to handle crime situations and public protests. One should have a steel-like stamina. I don’t see myself as a real police officer here in the passport unit. What we do here is just paperwork and we are like every other civil servant.

In fact, this officer defines policing as crime control, although he works at a public service department that requires little or no physical prowess or charisma. Obviously, such depictions of policing versus the reality of what most male police officers do does not preclude them from constructing policing as a male occupation and emphasizing hegemonic masculinity. Connell (1995) argues that masculinity practices serve as ideologies that blur contradictions. Based on this argument, it is apparent that
working at a public service unit in the TNP causes the police officer to undervalue what he actually does; he seeks to overcome this contradiction by attributing a sense of masculinity to policing by overemphasizing its crime prevention dimension over public service.

Although policing today consists mostly of public service and a great number of policemen occupy those positions along with their female counterparts, some units have become perceived by policewomen and policemen as hubs of hypermasculinity, revealing another area of contradiction. Counterterrorism, smuggling, human trafficking, intelligence, and rapid response force, almost entirely staffed by men, are among those preserves. When asked about their preference for units where they would like to work, most policemen stated these areas. Although police officers at nonoperational units get equal pay with their counterparts at operational units, operational units carry higher status at TNP. Those who work at counterterrorism, intelligence, and smuggling units are most likely to embody the ideal of hegemonic masculinity. Expertise, mastery of machines and information technologies, courage, and being “active” on duty are some of the assets that enable members of those units to epitomize hegemonic masculinity. Such units also entail a high degree of devotion to the task due to irregular and extra work hours and a heightened sense of perceived danger. Alkan (retired police lieutenant, counterterrorism, 62), explicated,

The notion of set work hours does not apply to undercover police. I remember spending 40 days in the mountains with my team. We were on a mission to fight against terrorists in a joint operation with the military to protect our nation.

As the account of this retired police lieutenant reveals, counterterrorism becomes the police unit that comes closest to the military in terms of its mission. Accordingly, the model of masculinity such units embody is close to military masculinity. Paternalism, patriotism, and heroism become essential elements of police
masculinity at most operational units. The policemen see themselves as “the protectors of the nation” from terrorists, smugglers, drug dealers, and human traffickers. Moreover, the notions of fighting against criminals or national security threats and protecting the nation invoke a sense of respectability in policemen.

The fact that most operational units comprise exclusively men reinforces the idea that women are not expected to and not considered capable of fulfilling the same “sacred” duty of protecting the nation. Apparently, distinct experiences of policemen in operational units compared to their female and male colleagues who work at the station house illustrate the existence of multiple masculinities within the institution. In fact, there has never existed one consistent form of police masculinity because there has never been a single homogeneous policemen and policing.

Despite the reverence for operational units, the majority of police officers end up working at various public service units. Serkan (police chief, General Directorate of Security, 39) said,

When you are in school [referring to police vocational school and police college], you dream about working at one of those operational units because you seek adventure and meaning in life.

In fact, some of the women too indicated that they would like to work at operational units. Selin (policewoman, social services, 39) indicated,

I would love to work at the counter-terrorism unit because I can imagine that saving people’s lives gives you immense satisfaction. But it is impossible when you are a mother. You have responsibilities outside of work.

As the accounts of the most policemen and women at nonoperational units reveal, the crime prevention aspect of policing is lauded over its public service dimension. Elements of masculinity that are highly revered and considered inherent in policing are based on perceptions about the nature of policing at operational units, which results in the emasculinization of public service policing. The discrepancy between an ideal of
hegemonic police masculinity and the reality of the work of many policemen poses a
kind of contradiction for their construction of masculinity. As a means to overcome this
contradiction, most policemen tend to overemphasize the physicality, perceived danger,
and crime prevention aspects of policing across units.

Despite the popularity of operational units among police officers and the
association of hegemonic masculinity with them, the rapid response force (RRF; Cevik
Kuvvet) is an operational unit that stands out as an exception to that rule. None of the
participants in this research stated RRF as an operational unit where they would like to
work. RRF is the full-time riot squad of the Turkish National Police. It is staffed by
recent graduates of police vocational schools (POMEM or PMYO). The police officers
at this unit are assigned mostly at public events such as sports, concerts, political
rallies, and public protests in addition to their patrol duty.

The Rapid Response Force in Turkey has been the focus of intense public
criticism, especially after the nationwide public protests that broke out in the summer
of 2013 due to excessive use of force by the police, which resulted in the death of seven
civilians. The interviewees reveal that most police officers, despite their appreciation of
their colleagues in that particular unit, have developed a distant stance from the model
of masculinity displayed in the RRF, or some of the masculine elements their
colleagues in the RRF embody. Serhat (policeman, communication, 40) notes,

Those boys in the RRF see policing as an adventure. They are fresh
out of the police school and have little to no experience to handle
public protests. When they face public resistance, they get too
excited and are prone to use violence. They should learn to
distinguish between police force and violence.

The marginalization of RRF among operational units thus illustrates the shifting
notions even among the police about the utility and social acceptability of violence.
Apparently, the use and legitimate amount of violence is being questioned even by the
police today. They emphasize balanced and conditional use of force as specified by law, distinguishing between police force and violence.

Violence is not necessarily an essential component of hegemonic police masculinity, at least at the discursive level. Uncontrolled use of violence, inexperience, and immaturity constitute a masculinity displayed at a unit that most police officers want to dissociate themselves from. Yet the very existence of such “toxic masculinity” – referring to unwanted aspects of masculinity such as uncontrolled violence, lack of discretion, and immaturity (Messerschmidt 2010) – embodied by RRF members, and its marginalization help reinforce the hegemonic police masculinity associated with other operational units and the broader conceptualization of policing in general. In other words, hegemonic police masculinity based on such elements as physicality, being active on duty, and mastery of technology and information systems gains legitimacy through marginalization of the toxic masculinity embodied by the RRF.

When asked about the best part of being a police officer, both men and women emphasized the congenial work environment and friendships they develop with colleagues. While most women stated that they share a congenial work environment with their female and male colleagues and become brothers and sisters, men tend to highlight their friendship with men more. Demet (police woman, budget unit, 34) mentioned the value of the congenial work environment for her in the following sentences.

What I like most about this profession is to make great friends. We share the same food and wear the same uniform with our male colleagues. We are all equal here. And we would always take care of each other.

Unlike Demet’s emphasis on contentment about sharing a supportive work environment with male and female colleagues, Can (policeman, IT unit, 30) stated,

We make great friends here. We make jokes, have a football game
after work or go on street duty together. We sleep on the street during some of the public protests. We are brothers not by blood but by our shared mission and duty.

As these quotes reveal, Demet highlights the value of friendship with men and women colleagues and the sense of trust she develops at work, whereas Can underlines the significance of after-work homosocial gatherings as well as solidarity and sense of fraternity among policemen during street duty, thanks to their shared mission. As the narratives of men in the sample suggest, the notion of brotherhood and its associated homosociality emerges as a fairly exclusionary concept that leaves women out.

Steady paychecks and job security were also depicted as among the best sides of policing by most policemen. As Fatih (policeman, passport unit, 26) explicated,

Policing was not my dream profession. But considering the rate of unemployment in this country, I found it relatively easy to become a police officer and it is a relatively well-paying job.

This was a typical answer for unranked police officers and some ranking officials in the sample. In a culture where raising a family and earning a steady income is highly valued as a sign of reliable manhood, the TNP offers some material and symbolic resources to construct hegemonic masculinity for men who mostly come from working-class families.

Aside from the material aspects of policing, some men and a few women (although this was not a typical answer) state that protecting and serving the state and the nation are among the best parts of policing. Demet explained,

It is an honor to serve our people and to represent the state, not the government. I know some people see us as the private army of the prime minister especially after the Gezi protests. But no matter what people may think, I am proud of working for our people and the state.

Similarly, Adnan, a 55-year-old retired male lieutenant who worked in the special counterterrorism unit (Ozel Tim), stated,
This is a sacred job. The state has to remain powerful. I lost several of my colleagues in the field during the fight against terrorism in the Southeast. What makes us risk our lives is our love for the nation and the state. And I think the best part of being a member of the TNP is to be able to protect the nation.

Although both some men and women see protecting and serving the nation as a sacred duty and as the best part of being in the TNP, it is apparent in discourses of men that it primarily falls on men to serve and protect the nation. Thus, the notion of “men as selfless beings” and “men as protectors of the nation” becomes an integral part of hegemonic masculinity in this culture. On the other hand, seeing women as innately unsuitable for this kind of policing means that women are not expected to fulfill it. Thus, the portrayal of policing as men’s work, especially in units such as counterterrorism, serves to underestimate the contribution or even presence of women, rendering them invisible, while contributing to building up hegemonically oriented police masculinity. The presence of women in such units as rapid response force, counterterrorism, and human trafficking would seem to threaten the notion that women should be protected. The discursive exclusion of women from policing in general and their limited or lack of access to certain units points out that masculinity is foundational to the legitimacy, authority, and identity of police work (Broomhall and Barrie 2012).

It is clear from the respondents’ accounts that policing is a modern institution of power for which the association with physicality still lies at the heart of its institutional logic and practice. Those narratives further point to the clash of stereotypes in policemen and policewomen’s minds. Hegemonic police masculinity is based on two mythic images of policing. One, policing as crime control, entails the detached and tough body of men; the other refers to the assumed physical and emotional weakness, vulnerability, instability, and service-oriented character of women. Despite most policemen’s lack of experience at operational units, which are considered the hub of
masculine policing, and despite the fact that women’s differences from men are largely
based on unfounded assumptions, men in the TNP have symbolic and discursive
resources of cultural meaning that reproduce these highly mythical images. I now turn
to how women’s perceived differences from men serve to construct and reproduce
hegemonic police masculinity.

*Flowers of the TNP: Women’s Perceived Difference from Men*

Masculinity achieves meaning within patterns of differences (Barrett 1996). Women’s assumed differences from men are instrumental in constructing and maintaining hegemonic police masculinity in the TNP. While policemen associate themselves with perseverance, endurance, and precise judgment, women are associated with emotional instability, vulnerability, and complaining, and are assumed to lack aggression, endurance, and commitment. This resonates with Kimmel’s notion that hegemonic masculinity operates by marginalization of other masculinities and femininities, enabling heterosexual men to build gendered identities (Kimmel 2005, 1994).

The participants in this research confirmed this sense when they depicted policing as a tough occupation that only those with endurance and physical prowess can achieve. More women, however, began to join TNP since the 1990s, posing a potential challenge to the conventional image of the [read male] police.

When asked about women in the TNP, all the policemen in the sample agree that women are needed at various units at TNP. After the initial statement of their conviction about the presence of women, however, they add various reasons why women should work only at certain departments and why they are not very qualified for policing in general. Despite the increasing number of women at various units and
men’s relative acceptance of them at TNP, narratives of male and some female police officers reproduce the association between weakness and women. Almost every policeman has something to say about women’s weakness. Harun (man, captain, RRF, 50) stated,

I think women bring diversity to our institution. I call them the flowers of our unit [emphasis mine]. But if you work at rapid response force, you are expected to go on street duty. Or they have to keep guard for two hours like their male counterparts do. But if I ask a woman to keep guard, I am sure she will complain that the steel vest is too heavy for her fragile body.

This lieutenant’s views about women police officers at his unit reflect many other male officers’ opinions who use metaphors of giving up and yielding when talking about policewomen. They use expressions such as “folded” and “fell out,” which evoke an image of someone who cannot resist the weight of something.

Policemen’s opinions about women’s vulnerability, fragility, and lack of endurance and capability are so deeply entrenched that they not only lead to a verbal exclusion of women, but also imply that women’s actual presence in the institution should be limited. Arif (policeman, communication unit, 46) believes,

The number of women at each unit should be limited to 3-4. If there are 10 men and 30 women at a unit, that unit does not function by any means. It is more appropriate for women to do clerical posts such as writing reports and archiving.

Similarly, Adnan (man, retired lieutenant, special counterterrorism, 55) complained about the alleged low work performance of policewomen.

Job performance of women is very low, zero. We use them for clerical duties only. We don’t even send them over to the warehouse because there may be an accident and they might get hurt there.

As this quote illustrates, the exclusion practices are usually explained by a sense of protectionism. The policemen assume that what makes a “real police officer [read policeman]” is physical strength and endurance, which admit men to membership in a
homogeneous group. Policemen’s conviction about the lack of physical strength, endurance, and capability of women serves as a discursive tool through which they can claim hegemonic masculinity by embodying physical strength, even at units where no physical strength is required. The continual reference to women’s weakness allows men to claim one of the core elements of hegemonic masculinity in this culture.

The policemen’s claim to the exclusive use of crude language becomes a medium that attempts to leave women out from the discursive space policemen intend to share and enjoy with other policemen. Cohn (1987) argues that in male-dominated institutions like the army, men tend to develop an exclusionary masculine jargon. In the TNP too, men feel free to swear and tease one another in an all-male environment. Umit’s (policeman, RRF, 27) narrative attests to this situation when he says,

Within an all male group, when you make a mistake, your colleagues may make fun of you and you would respond in a mocking manner and even swear. But you don’t feel comfortable when women are present. You have to adjust your language and behavior. In a stressful job like ours, it is too much to ask for politeness.

Having to adjust one’s crude language around women is reminiscent of a patriarchal masculinity (Barrett 1996). It serves to differentiate men from women, fostering the essentialist notion that women are shielded from crude language and need to be protected from incivility that other men can tolerate. It also gives the impression that all men enjoy “bullying” and incivility. The physical presence of women is perceived to restrict the discursive domain of men, causing men to exclude women in order to be comfortable in their homosocial environment.

When probed further about how many women police currently work at the rapid response force, Harun said, “There have been no women at our unit for the last two years. And when there are women, they are mostly assigned paperwork and work as secretaries at the office.” As this quote implies, even the assumed presence of women
may make men adjust their construction of masculinity accordingly. These men construct a hegemonic masculinity and create a sense of group membership by using and supposedly enjoying pejorative expressions for each other and by excluding women from their company, as policewomen are perceived to undermine this solidarity.

It is not only the discursive space but also the physical one that most policemen do not want to share with policewomen. Alkan justifies his opposition to women’s presence at operational units in the following lines:

In my view, policewomen belong to the station house. It is not appropriate for women to work on the street like their male counterparts do because the street is dangerous.

The association of danger with street work leads many policemen to think women should not work outside the office, which creates public and private dichotomy within the institution. Parallel to the perceived threat of danger, physical and biological differences and needs of women have been used to justify the sex-segregated workspaces. Harun said,

When my staff is on street duty, male officers may use the restroom of a public coffee house [“kahvehane” – traditional coffee houses in Turkey are frequented by men and are still highly sex-segregated]. But female officers cannot use the same toilets. We must acknowledge their differences. Policemen tend to exclude policewomen when they are assigned to street duty together. I advise male officers to treat their female colleagues as if they are their own sisters and tolerate them accordingly.

As this quote indicates, women’s biology seems to be perceived as a barrier to their performing their profession in the public sphere. Additionally, policemen are advised to treat their women co-workers as vulnerable entities to be protected from the danger they may face on the street, regardless of the institutional power granted to policewomen. The idea of tolerating women apparently entails the initiative to protect them. The notion of “office” vs. “street” policing also brings about valorization of the
latter over the former due to the perceived threat of danger and the associated masculine power with street policing. It is important also to note that gender serves to build hierarchy between women and men through sex-segregated tasks and work spaces in the TNP.

Narratives about women’s biological differences from men are not limited to the use of restrooms in public spaces. Policemen also underline women’s difference by referring to women’s menstrual period, though only by implication. “They have special days. They frequently become moody, which affect their work performance and their relations with male colleagues,” complained Hasan (man, captain, social services, 55). Other policemen told stories about policewomen to emphasize their emotional instability and vulnerability. Ali said,

> Women are the *ornaments* of our institution [emphasis mine]. They embellish the police’s image in society. They are our smiling face. They should be treated delicately. But our superiors cannot rely on women to run the units. One day they are happy and productive, the next day they are gloomy.

This policeman’s narrative actually proposes that women are considered unreliable. In fact, such notions as the vulnerability, emotional instability, and unreliability of women serve to construct a model of police masculinity whose essential components include endurance, emotional stability, and reliability or what women are assumed to lack.

Another area of women’s alleged difference from men relates to perceived domains of responsibility. Both policemen and policewomen in the sample think that women have double responsibilities (the notion of double-shift):

> I prefer to work with two men than to work with 10 women. Women have more responsibilities and problems outside of work. They are mothers, wives, and police officers. In fact, I understand and empathize with them.

Orhan (man, police lieutenant, traffic, 47) explains above why he prefers to work with male colleagues instead of women. Usually, the desire to spend more time with the
family is interpreted as a lack of professional devotion for men in various occupations (Collinson and Hearn 1994). Most policemen in the sample, however, expressed that they regret not spending enough time with their children. Nevertheless, they continue to see policewomen as primarily responsible for household and domestic work. Accordingly, they tend to see policewomen primarily as mothers and wives.

Most policewomen’s views complement their male counterparts’ opinions about women’s responsibilities. Serap’s (policewoman, budget unit, 39) views about women’s primary duties reflect many other policewomen’s opinions in the sample:

> Working at an operational unit means neglecting your domestic duties. Before everything else, you are a mother. Men, on the other hand, work longer hours and assigned to street duty every other week even if they are hired at a public service unit.

By associating policewomen with domestic responsibilities and children, policemen and policewomen continue to portray men as the primary breadwinners. In this culture, then, policemen are depicted as responsible fathers who are breadwinners of their families. Policewomen continue to be seen as wives of colleagues (Some colleagues wives are policewomen) and mothers who also work at the police station house. The overemphasis on the domestic responsibilities of policewomen over their professional work contributes to the idea of the heterosexual policemen as the father and head of the household, and of the associated division of labor at home as well.

The institutional structure and culture too are informed by and contribute to the essentializing of women’s difference from men and values hegemonic masculinity by valorizing male-dominated operational units through underlining women’s incapacity for these units. Women are assigned caring or clerical posts, and mostly work at social services or juvenile delinquency. The assignment of women to certain posts such as working with female victims and children, or clerical duties such as typing reports or answering phone calls, connotes the concept of “emotional labor” (Hochschild 1983).
Through channeling women into caring or clerical posts, the institution engenders a sexual division of labor (Acker 1990). Ironically, this division is symbolic to some extent. Yet it continues to foster the idea that policing is men’s work.

It is true that most women are assigned to posts where the institution thinks women can make a unique contribution and are most suitable for. The same posts, however, are also assigned to policemen in large numbers. Despite the sharing of caring and clerical posts by men and women police, the hegemonic masculine discourse serves as an ideology that conceals this contradiction. In most policemen’s and some policewomen’s thinking, policewomen are associated with emotion, sensitivity, and office work, and policemen with action, endurance, and strength. Hunt (in Fielding 1992) maintains “gender is a basic aspect of field relations where societies have a marked division of labor and a split between feminine and masculine cultural domains. In such settings, gender symbols are attached to actions and behaviors which have little to do with biological sex…. Masculinity was associated with ‘street cop’ in contrast to ‘management cop’ culture.” For the Turkish case, too, police masculinity tends to be associated with “street police” vs. “public service police.”

Aside from the sexual division of labor through channeling women mostly into caring and clerical posts, the quotas for women to enter the police academy and colleges stand out as another structural element that contributes to the construction of hegemonic police masculinity. The number of women to be admitted to the police academy cannot exceed 5%. Also, the admission criteria are different and more ambitious for female students, despite the views about the assumed “fragility” of women, pointing out another contradiction. Yavuz (man, police major, education unit, 39) explains:

The quotas and the low admission rates of female students at Police Colleges and the Academy, in fact, raise the bar and the standards
for women. It is more competitive to attend the academy for them than men. I believe for this reason, they are more qualified than most of their male counterparts.

Apart from the existing quotas and the admission criteria, the system of promotion seems to be based on women’s assumed differences from men. As one of the interviewees reveals (Merve, woman, captain, education unit, 38),

Promotion for women and men within the institution is based on the content of the position although the official promotion criteria are the same for all police officials regardless of their sex. But in practice, while a male lieutenant is usually assigned to escort or smuggling unit, a female lieutenant is likely to be promoted to juvenile delinquency.

The structural channeling of women into certain posts resonates with policemen’s views about women’s proper place and unique contribution to policing. Orhan stated:

There must be women at each unit because half of society consists of women. We need policewomen to search women at social events like concerts and to deal with female criminals. They are very good at writing reports. Also, we need them most at domestic violence cases. They can empathize with a battered woman more efficiently than a male officer could.

Some women officers too justify the sexual division of labor within the institution on the grounds that handling most crimes entails masculine power. Dilek (police woman, budget unit, 33), for example, argued:

The number of policewomen is very low but this is understandable. Since men commit most crimes, it primarily falls upon men to intervene. Women cannot handle most situations, especially criminal cases so easily. That’s why they should work in the office while men work on street.

Apparently, women’s views about women’s difference from men also contribute to valorization of male-dominated units and hegemonic police masculinity in this culture by implying that institutional power may be entrusted with and appropriately enforced by men only. Additionally, arguments about women’s inability to handle crime cases illustrate that men and women do not distinguish between “male power” and
“institutional power.”

The Institution of Vocational Brotherhood: The Softer Hierarchy within the Institutional Hierarchy

As the analysis in this chapter so far illustrates, the hegemonic police masculinity at the TNP is marked by such elements as physicality, fraternity, collegiality, heterosexuality, and paternalism. Despite the hierarchical structure of policing in Turkey and elsewhere, what I call the institution of “vocational brotherhood” (mesleki abilik in Turkish) plays a significant role in shaping the collegial and fraternal aspects of police masculinity in Turkey. In fact, policing across the world is characterized by the solidarity of policemen (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, Fielding and Fielding 1992). But I argue that the concept of brotherhood serves a special function at TNP.

Tanil Bora (2012) defines “brotherhood” (abilik) as one of the core aspects of masculinity and as an integral element of socialization in Turkish society. For Bora, the notion of brotherhood connotes the promise of protection for the younger or weaker. While it engenders a sense of intimacy and solidarity, it is not a complete break from hierarchy. Brotherhood exists as a particular form of hierarchy in both the police and the larger Turkish society. This form of hierarchy is structured by rank and occasionally by age within the TNP. In fact, it is a “mollified” form of authority that complements and softens the rigid institutional hierarchy of the police.

Who calls whom “brother” within the TNP? Among the graduates of the police colleges and the academy, more recent graduates are expected to call previous graduates “brother” regardless of their age. A distinct rule among ranking policemen is
that men who call one another brother should be close to each other in rank. For instance, a lieutenant may not address a four-star police chief by that title. As for unranked police officers, they are not allowed to call their superiors “brother.” They usually call their fellow unranked co-workers brothers and sisters. Thus, despite being widely used, this family metaphor is not used across ranks. Ali’s remarks below point to this boundary work across ranks:

We used to be afraid of our superiors in the past. We even hesitated to voice our opinions on any topic. But now we see our chiefs as brothers although we continue to be careful about how we behave and talk when we are in the presence of them. Most of them are very open to listen to our problems and even offer solutions at times. The real brotherhood, however, lives among our fellow colleagues (referring to other unranked policemen) in our unit. We go on a street duty together or play soccer after work if we really have time (he laughs). We are like one big family.

The institution of brotherhood can be identified as an unofficial invisible hierarchical structure that does not necessarily violate but complements and softens the rigid institutional hierarchy at the TNP. It helps foster a sense of intimacy and fraternity among co-workers at a highly hierarchical institution that would otherwise entail a high level of professionalism. In other words, the concept of brotherhood brings intimacy and warmth to the cold face of hierarchical professionalism. In a culture where highly professional people are considered aloof, bossy, and even arrogant, brotherhood serves as a legitimate channel of communication. Colleagues may see them as too bossy when they order them in a highly professional manner. But the use of brotherhood serves as a key for more efficient running of tasks.

The concept of “sisterhood” (ablalik) also exists at the TNP. Unranked policemen mostly use it to address fellow policewomen. Sisterhood, however, is not simply the female counterpart of brotherhood. The concepts are not equal in their discursive meaning and currency at the TNP. One major difference is that sisterhood
does not necessarily imply protection for the younger and the weaker, as brotherhood does. One use of sisterhood is to facilitate communication among different sexes at a still predominantly sex-segregated work environment.

One afternoon, when I was having a conversation with a group of policewomen at the cafeteria of a local police station, a policeman walked in. Seeing that we were having tea along with homemade pastries that some of the policewomen in the group had brought that day, he interrupted our conversation by saying:

Ooo, sisters! You are having a tea party again. (Turning to me, he continued:) If you get along well with those police sisters, they would feed you well! I am just kidding but they are all our respected sisters.

In fact, Deniz Kandiyoti (1987) maintains that the pervasive use of kinship idioms in public life serves to facilitate the sexually neutral character of modern interactions and the integration of the “emancipated but unliberated women” of the Republic into the public realm. By addressing a woman colleague by this unofficial title (sister), a policeman indicates that he observes the acceptable societal boundaries between sexes. It also fosters the idea that policewomen are seen as respectable wives of male colleagues. During a social at the police club, a policeman introduced me to a policewoman he worked with at the same social service unit:

Let me introduce you to Esra abla (sister)! She is such a good police officer and a mother. She is married to an accomplished colleague who worked abroad for several years. Together they serve the state well. Esra abla holds such a good example to many.

Although some of the policewomen and men introduced me to their colleagues on several occasions, none of the men were introduced as fathers or respected husbands/significant others of someone. As the narrative above illustrates, the concept of sisterhood invokes a sense of both paternalism and respect for married women, implying that being married locates women in a relatively safe terrain in public life.
While this tends to create a congenial environment among policemen and women by facilitating conversation and contact, it also connotes that women are seen first and foremost as wives of colleagues or persons who need to be treated with respect instead of just being seen as fellow co-workers.

Additionally, brotherhood connotes the idea of interdependence of men while what I call “respectable sisterhood” mostly means respect and sociospatial distance from the opposite sex. This boundary work constructed by the institution of brotherhood and sisterhood also reinforces a system of inequality between sexes. Infused with masculine ideals of fraternity, solidarity, and work efficiency, the institution of brotherhood contributes to the special construction of police masculinity as well as to drawing out the contours of spatial and discursive existence of policewomen in the institution.

Conclusion

Seeing masculinity as dynamic patterns of ideologies and practices (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), this chapter has explored the construction of hegemonic police masculinity based on notions about the nature of police work and women’s perceived differences from men. As the narratives of the participants in this research suggest, hegemonic police masculinity is marked by such elements as physicality, manly power, perceived threat of danger, fraternity, collegiality, heterosexuality, and paternalism. The performance of this masculinity, however, seems to be for internal consumption only; that is, for fellow officers. How police masculinities are constructed and performed in relation to the public is explored in Chapter 4.

Connell (1987) refers to the construction of hegemonic masculinity as a process in which groups of men and women are marginalized in an effort to “negate” their
power (187). Similarly, Foucault (1977) highlights that power relations are embedded in processes of differentiation and categorization. The model of hegemonic police masculinity is constructed mainly through marginalization of some masculinities that rely overtly on toxic masculinity, as in the case of rapid response force. This construction also draws largely from a mode of femininity whose basic elements are women’s weakness, emotionality, lack of endurance, and physical prowess. In other words, hegemonic police masculinity is constructed through marginalization of some other masculinities and differentiation from femininity. In this culture, then, hegemonic masculinity becomes a mechanism to subordinate women through deploying and delimiting the discursive and physical space of policewomen, resulting in reproduction of gendered inequality despite the increasing but limited number of women in the institution.

The analysis in this chapter illustrates that multiple masculinities exist in the TNP. Although the hegemonic police masculinity is largely based on elements mostly embodied by members of operational units such as counterterrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking, this masculinity is formed through marginalization of the toxic masculinity displayed in the rapid response force and emasculinization of public service policing, as well as marginalization of and distancing from femininity. We see a model of military masculinity that draws from aspects such as patriotism, heroism, and sacrifice for the nation in operational units such as counterterrorism. Collinson and Hearn (1994) recommend that multiple masculinities should not be envisioned as clear-cut fixed categories. These masculinities within the TNP may overlap to some extent. Yet they continue to point out that there does not exist a single consistent model of masculinity, as there has never been single, homogeneous policing.

It has been clear throughout the analysis in this chapter that the discrepancy
between an ideal of hegemonic police masculinity and the reality of many policemen poses a source of contradiction for these policemen. Policemen located at public service units tend to overcome this contradiction by overemphasizing need for physical prowess, perceived threat of danger, and endurance. These elements of hegemonic masculinity are highlighted to the extent that institutional power has been superseded by male power, at least in police officers’ discourses.

The mere physical presence of women in the police reflects and reassures masculinist notions of femininity and of women’s proper place in family and workplace. Their existence in such a masculinized institution is far from challenging conventionalist gender norms. Indeed, it serves to validate the entrenched views on primary societal expectations from women. Women’s presence in the predominantly masculine police institution seems to be unwelcome, unless they occupy supporting positions: secretary, archivist, respected wife of a colleague, which in fact underline the difference in men’s and women’s connection to and conception of the police institution and the state.

Research has long identified homosociality and fraternity of policemen as distinct elements of policing (Ehrlich-Martin 1978, Fielding and Fielding 1992) in Britain and the USA. This analysis for this chapter suggests that “the institution of vocational brotherhood” as a distinctly Turkish phenomenon has a significant function for members of the TNP and contributes to hegemonic police masculinity in Turkey by bringing policing closer to the structure of family and making policing more paternalistic for all its members.

The accounts of the respondents also point to the clash of stereotypes in policewomen and men’s minds. Hegemonic police masculinity is based on two mythic images. One is a certain ideal that depicts policing as crime control that entails a
detached and tough body of men. The other is based on gender difference, which portrays women as weak, vulnerable, emotional, unstable, and service-oriented. Despite most policemen’s lack of experience at the operational units that are considered the hub of masculine policing, and despite the fact that women’s differences from men are largely based on assumptions, they offer symbolic and discursive repertoires of meaning that serve to maintain and reproduce those mythical images. In this respect, the research suggests that policemen do not automatically acquire hegemonic masculinity by joining the TNP; rather, the police as a state institution offers some material and symbolic resources to construct hegemonic masculinity for policemen. In turn, the hegemonic police masculinity contributes to further masculinization of the state and pervasive gendered inequality in the institution.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This study set out to explore the mutual reproduction of masculinities and statehood at two state sites: the head of the governing body (prime minister) and the Turkish National Police during the AK Party rule in Turkey between 2002 and 2015. It identified the construction of multiple masculinities across two levels of the state by analyzing not only practices and discourses of individual state officials but also institutional culture and structure that contributed to and/or challenged the construction of various masculinities.

This study explored in what ways and under what conditions masculinities and statehood reproduce each other. The general theoretical literature on the state and gender, specifically in the context of Turkey, is inconclusive on this question, as we lack empirical research on what I call “masculinities of the state.”

This study has shown that masculinities and political processes and institutions mutually shape each other. The mutual reproduction of multiple masculinities across two state sites and statehood has been analyzed by paying attention to the political transformations. The first decade of the 2000s was marked by a set of political reforms undertaken by the then newly founded AK Party under the charismatic rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and a period of nonconflictual relations between the police and the public. Some of the major political reforms included improvement on such issues as freedom of expression and association, minority rights (e.g., the start of the Kurdish peace process), and the decline of military power over society and politics. The civil society in Turkey became more vibrant in this period. This period may also be identified as the heyday of the relations between Turkey and the EU.

Unlike the first two terms of the AK Party rule, the third term, or what I call the
second phase, is characterized by growing authoritarianism and the arbitrary rule of Erdoğan. In addition to socially conservative politics such as the attempt to restrict abortion, alcohol consumption, and cohabitation of college youth, the government attempted to shape and mold several state institutions such as the judiciary and the police. In the face of visible public opposition to growing authoritarianism of the political regime since 2013, and the revitalization of the Kurdish insurgency since July 2015, the government sought to transform the police along with some other state institutions to control the currents usually referred by government officials as threats to domestic security. The oppressive state discourse and police brutality in the second phase have replaced the democratic inclusivist discourse of the government, and a period of nonconflictual relations between the police and the public. The trend toward authoritarianism tends to go hand in hand with militarization of the police and frequent instances of police brutality. It is against this backdrop of contemporary political transformations that the relations between shifting masculinity of former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – the current President – and different modes of policing and police masculinities have been analyzed.

This study shows that charisma is inherently neither a democratic nor an authoritarian phenomenon. Rather it is the actual practices, politics, and discourse of a political leader that shape democratic or authoritarian tendencies of charisma. In this respect, this study presents empirical evidence to the constructed nature and the historical contingency of charisma. The analysis of Erdoğan’s masculine charisma in two phases also reveals that the hegemonic masculinity of a political leader’s charisma may help discern its historical, contextual character and its shifting configuration. The notion of the shifting configuration of hegemonic masculinity helps explore the ways in which political leaders construct changing configurations, and move through different elements of masculinities and femininities in line with their political needs.
The study also expands the Weberian account of charisma by demonstrating that charisma is clearly a gendered process. The case of Erdoğan’s construction of hegemonic masculine charisma illustrates that the gendered aspects of charisma – whether it draws more from a hybrid combination of masculinities and femininities (tough and tender aspects) or more conventional elements of masculinity – depends on changing politics.

Connell (1995) argues that masculinity practices serve as ideologies that blur contradictions. Following this argument, this study has shown that Erdoğan’s hegemonic masculine charisma in the first phase of his rule served to blur the line between authoritarianism and democracy, making him both democratic and authoritarian. As the political leader amasses more personal and political power, and begins to follow more authoritarian politics, he draws more from the traditional aspects of masculinity, and his charisma takes up more authoritarian overtones. Thus, rather than a direct relationship between hegemonic masculinity and democracy/authoritarianism, this study suggests that the relationship between charisma and democracy/authoritarianism is mediated by shifting configurations of hegemonic masculinity. In other words, masculinity stands out as an intervening variable that accounts for the relationship between charisma and democracy/authoritarianism.

The analysis of police masculinities in relation to the gendered charisma of a political leader has revealed the connections between the police and the governing body in Turkey. As the hegemonic masculinity of the prime minister began to draw from more traditional elements of masculinity in line with his increasingly authoritarian policies and discourse, a more authoritarian and militarized form of policing became dominant since the police operates under the direct control of the government through the Ministry of Interior. Accordingly, a militarized masculinity has become the defining characteristic of the latest model of policing in Turkey since 2013, attesting to the links between
authoritarianism/democratization and shifting modes of masculinity across state branches.

Another major finding is that there has never existed one consistent form of police masculinity, as there has never been a single homogeneous body of police officials and model of policing. The empirical data show that instead of talking about the police as one coherent body of repressive state apparatus (Althusser 1969), it is more plausible to talk about policing(s) in plural in Turkey. The study has identified three models of policing; old, community (democratic), and post-Gezi, that are associated with three modes of police masculinities; macho, new, and militarized.

The analysis of the construction of police masculinities during relations with the public suggests that the new or community policing associated with democratization during the first decade of the 2000s lessened and deemphasized the extent of the gender binary, resulting in a more hybrid police masculinity whose basic elements are conciliation, communication, protection, and care for the public, and scientific and technological approaches to policing. However, with the return of the slightly different mode of old policing since the Gezi protests in 2013, what I call “militarized policing,” the gender binary has been reemphasized and reinvigorated, attesting to the shifting character of masculinities. However, the analysis of the construction of multiple masculinities within the organizational hierarchy of the TNP has shown that, instead of the shifting character of masculinities, we see that the gender binary is more intensely drawn and less fluid. Although this seems to contradict my argument on the shifting character of masculinities, this contradictory construction of masculinities during the relations with the public vis-à-vis within the institution (during relations among police officials) indicates an important finding. The type of hegemonic masculinity constructed within the TNP based on police officials’ perceptions on the nature of policing and women’s assumed differences from men is for internal use only, and draws extensively from notions about the structure and culture of traditional Turkish
family. In the absence of the emphasis for greater gender equality within the male-dominated institution, and the structure and culture of the TNP that is so similar to the traditional Turkish family and society, perpetuation of a sharper gender order is expected. The multiple masculinities that include macho, new, and militarized models that are displayed during relations with the public, on the other hand, are more prone to shift in accordance with political transformations such as the trend toward greater democratization, societal demands for individual rights and freedoms and growing authoritarianism of the political regime. The less fluid construction of masculinities within the TNP, however, precludes neither the relational nor the multiple construction of masculinities. The hegemonic police masculinity within the TNP is formed in relation to marginalized masculinities such as the toxic masculinity of the Rapid Response Force, the militarized masculinity of the Special Operations Force, and women’s assumed differences from men.

The study also suggests that some parts of the police such as narcotics, Special Operations Force, and intelligence are more heavily militarized than others such as budget, passport, traffic, and social services, reflecting the paradoxical character of duties of the police in Turkey, from public service to fighting against terrorism and maintaining public order. However, once some parts of the police become more militarized, almost each branch of the police is affected because a police officer who works at a budget unit in civilian clothing, for instance, is sent to a protest site even if only occasionally. As the military policing and military police masculinity becomes the predominant form of policing, it is likely that the military logic becomes pervasive across units.

Hegemonic masculinity that is based on such aspects as physicality, being active on duty (meaning working at an operational unit), and mastery of technology, info systems, and vocational knowledge gains legitimacy through marginalization of toxic masculinity that draws on uncontrolled violence, vocational immaturity, inexperience, and lack of discretion.
The marginalization of the Rapid Response Force among operational units illustrates the shifting notions about the utility and social acceptability of violence even among the police, at least at the discursive level. The police officials’ emphasis on the balanced and conditional use of force and their distinction between force and violence attest to this. Yet the discourse against the abuse of power among police officials does not suffice to preclude instances of police brutality in everyday police practice, especially since 2013.

Hegemonic police masculinity has also been constructed based on women’s assumed difference from men, which relies on notions about women’s weakness, vulnerability, emotional instability, and their association with domestic responsibilities, which demonstrates the relational construction of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmitt 2005, Kimmel 2005).

The discursive subordination of policewomen within the TNP in general and their limited or lack of access to certain units points out that masculinity continues to be foundational to the legitimacy, authority, and identity of policing (Broomhall and Barrie 2012), while also demonstrating the differential conception and connection of policewomen and policemen to the state. Policewomen are often referred as “flowers,” “ornaments,” and “the smiling face” of the TNP. Thus their slow and limited inclusion in the historically male-dominated institution may be referred as a cosmetic addition, pointing to a lack of institutional attention to the issue of gender inequality, perpetuating institutional and cultural barriers that lead to interpersonal and systemic discrimination of policewomen. This discrimination translates to lower rates of recruitment and promotion, and the apparent sexual division of labor within the institution. The limited presence of policewomen across ranks and units also reveals that institutional power is equated with masculine power, and women are not expected to use the so-called legitimate institutional power as much as their male counterparts.
The current understanding of gender equality among the TNP personnel across different ranks is limited as most police officials identify gender equality as equal share of posts and equal pay. Quotas, admission and promotion criteria should be altered in favor of greater gender equality. Seminars and trainings on gender equality may be helpful to transform cultural, institutional, and interpersonal discriminatory practices against policewomen. Such a transformation is much needed, not only to foster gender equality within the institution but also to raise consciousness to observe and implement gender equality in police’s relations with the public.

My data suggest that there is a relationship between democratization and models of policing. The decline of military influence over Turkish society and politics during the first two terms of the AK Party rule, and the spirit of democratization and reforms as well as the internal will for institutional reform facilitated the rise of community policing in the early years of the millennium. This relatively more democratic, evidence-based model of policing is distinct from the historically oppressive policing predominant in Turkey. Yet when the government began to lose its commitment to democratization and grew more authoritarian, especially after the ruling party came to office for the third term successively in 2011, the rising clash between dissenting citizens and the government presented a formidable challenge to community policing and led to militarization of the police, a slightly different model of the old macho policing that was pervasive prior to 2000s. As discussed in the empirical chapter on public policing and police masculinities, what will happen to the shift toward fledgling and immature community policing when it is confronted by the emergence of militarized policing is yet to be seen.

The Turkish case further suggests that reforms may only be temporary in the absence of well-established democratic institutions and a system of checks and balances, and in the face of arbitrary political rule. Thus if community policing is to be institutionalized,
institutional reforms should be accompanied by fundamental structural and cultural change across state branches. Also, a nonpartisan body of council needs to be established that would regulate the highly politicized relations between the government and the TNP. Such an independent council should also be responsible for watching and regulating police practice, including human rights violations and the abuse of power by the police in favor of establishing a more democratic model of policing, especially in the face of mounting media and public criticism and much political interference. Otherwise, reform efforts are doomed to fail as long as the government is the sole mechanism that regulates the police. Finally, an internal mechanism of accountability should also be established to effectively monitor police practice to prevent abuses of power, and human rights violations both within the TNP and in police practice.

Much feminist work on the state has successfully demonstrated several ways in which the state is a gendered institution, including the impact of state policies on women and the relations between women’s movements and the state. This study, by shifting the analytical gaze from women to men and masculinities, expands the feminist state literature by illustrating how masculinity is structuring and structured by politics and political institutions. This study sheds light on how masculinities and statehood reproduce each other through everyday practices and discourses of state officials.

This dissertation has also built on and expands the ethnographies of the state literature by illustrating the multiplicity of practices and discourses of state officials within and across state branches. The diversity of opinions among police officials with regard to issues of police violence, alternative understandings of policing, and various modes of masculinity displayed across units implies that the police is far from being a monolithic entity and a mere embodiment of the state. The existence of the police intelligentsia and some police officers and their relatively progressive approach to the state, public, and crime attests to this
multifaceted, dynamic, and shifting character of the police, and challenges the predominant anti-state sentiment in the ethnographies of the state literature that tends to overlook diversity of practices and discourses of state officials.

This dissertation contributes to the ethnographies of the state literature also by engendering the study of the state. It aimed to overcome the gender-blind approach by uncovering the discourses and practices of sexuality (masculinities) involved in the reproduction of the state.

It also builds on and expands the scope of masculinity studies by expanding the analysis from the study of masculinity of individual political leaders to another state branch, the police.

Finally, by uncovering the links between democratization and charisma as well as democratization and policing, it sheds light on the ways in which political transformations affect the mutual reproduction of masculinities and statehood across state branches.

**Future Research**

Police militarization has been among the most consequential and unnoticed developments of our time. The global trend toward high securitization seems to go hand in hand with militarization of the police.

This research has highlighted occasional blurring of distinctions between the police and the military in terms of the use of guerilla tactics and military-style equipment. As the Turkish case illustrates, the police are participants in military interventions and armed conflicts with terrorist organizations more frequently than analysts acknowledge. The type of police response to public protests especially since 2013 resembles that of an occupying army, and has resulted in a body of law enforcement that looks and acts more like military than a community-based law enforcement to protect the public, even in the midst of criticism of
such model of policing among some police officials, especially the police intelligentsia.

This trend toward militarization of the police has given rise to a particularly pernicious mode of masculinity – militarized police masculinity – which is reflected in the attitudes, training of, and methods used by police officials. For a time the military was brought under civilian control during the first decade of the new millennium; we now see the rise of police militarization. Thus future research should explore the links between the global trend toward domestic securitization, the regional trend toward growing authoritarianism of political regimes and police militarization, and the associated military police masculinity.
Appendix A

Interview Questions for the Police

1- What is your age?
2- What is your marital status?
3- How many children do you have?
4- Are you an active duty police official/ retired?
5- What is your highest degree of education?
6- What school(s) did you graduate from?
7- How many years of experience do you have as a police official?
8- What police departments have you worked at?
9- What is the last/current police department that you work(ed) at?

Open-ended Questions:

1- What is the basic mission of the police in society?
2- What made you choose this profession?
3- What are some of the qualities a police officer must have? Can you think of three qualities/features that a police officer should have?
4- What are some of the values a police officer should have?
5- What do you think people usually think about the police? What words they would use to describe their feelings towards the Turkish police?
6- If you have a choice, what police department would you like to work at? (traffic, murder squad, intelligence and counter-terrorism, riot squad, education department, other) Why?
7- What is empathy? What does a police officer need empathy for?
8- What is objectivity? Does a police officer need objectivity?
9- What do you think about policing as a profession?
10- What is the best thing about being a police officer?
11- What is the worst thing about being a police officer?
12- How would you describe democracy?
13- What do you think about European Union?
14- What do you think about human rights?
15- What do you think about women’s rights?
16- What do police-citizen relations mean for you?
17- What do you think about the recent set of protests that came to be called “Gezi protests” in Turkey?
18- What do you think about the police’s role at protest sites?
19- What do you think about your male colleagues? (for women police officers)
20- What do you think about your female colleagues? (for men police officers)
21- What do you think of your role as a citizen in society?
22- What do you think of your role as a state official?
23- What does the state mean for you? Who/what represents the state?
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