RULING COALITIONS, POLICY RESPONSES, AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIME DURABILITY: THE CASES OF MOROCCO AND UGANDA

A dissertation presented

by

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To
The Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

In the field of Political Science

Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts
May 2016
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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May 2016
In the post-Cold War era, the prevailing thought was that all countries were in the process of democratization. Authoritarianism was explained away by this teleological assumption, as it was assumed that authoritarian regimes were merely proceeding along the path to democracy more slowly than other countries. Since 2001, the combination of long-lasting authoritarian regimes and the number of nascent democracies that have reverted back to authoritarianism has challenged this assumption of democratization. This new reality has caused scholars to focus on determining why authoritarian regimes have endured.

This dissertation seeks to provide answers to the following questions: Why do some authoritarian regimes persist whereas others fail? What makes a regime more susceptible to pressures from both within and outside of the regime? This research adds to the debate regarding the impact of crises on authoritarian regime durability by looking at the role that ruling coalition centralization plays. Basing my argument in the nexus of the rational choice, structuralism, and state-society paradigms, I argue that the key difference between regimes that withstand crisis and those that do not is the degree to which the dictator’s ruling coalition is centralized. Decentralized coalitions lead to elite competition as institutions outside of the executive office become politicized. Due to this competition among elites the response to the crisis is mismanaged, thereby greatly increasing the possibility of regime change. Centralized coalitions depoliticize institutions outside of the executive branch and help prevent elite-level competition. The lack of elite competition enables centralized regimes to more effectively manage crises, which in turn lessens the impact of potentially destabilizing crises.
In order to answer these questions I take a mixed methods approach, combining empirical analysis of 234 authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1999 with a comparative case study of Morocco and Uganda. In doing so I analyze the role that cooptation and coercion play in stabilizing authoritarian regimes, arguing that dictators manipulate institutions in order to monitor other elites and distribute patronage. Effectively doing this allows them to centralize the ruling coalition, which in turn allows them to better respond to potentially destabilizing mass protest events.
Acknowledgments

When I began graduate school lo those many years ago, I had no idea that so many people who would help me along the way. Words cannot express my gratitude for the support and kindness that has been shown to me throughout this process. The following is just a small token of the huge amount of thanks that I owe many people.

First and foremost I must extend my deepest gratitude to my committee members. Thank you to Dr. Denis Sullivan and Dr. Dov Waxman. I am so grateful to have had your advice and your direction in this process. Both have been invaluable, and have helped me be a better scholar. To my advisor, Dr. Amílcar Antonio Barreto, thank you so much. Without you I could not have begun this process, nor could I have finished it. Our conversations have ranged from path dependency to food to dictators to wine, and each one was intellectually stimulating and left me a more intelligent person. Thank you so much for everything, and I very much look forward to our next outing.

I have had the distinct privilege of working with some truly wonderful people during my time at Northeastern University. Many of whom have guided my research or enhanced my passion for my field of study. In Dr. Suzanne Ogden’s Chinese Politics course I was able to learn about one of the most durable authoritarian regimes in existence from a true expert. Dr. Kirsten Rodine Hardy, thank you so much. You spoke with me in depth at many points about potential sources and directions for research, and for life after the PhD. I am a proud member of Team KRH! Finally, Dr. William Crotty first introduced me to the field of democratization and authoritarianism, and his lectures and stories first sparked my interest in authoritarian regimes. I sincerely thank him for sharing his knowledge with me.
Administration in a large organization is often a thankless task. I want to make sure to call out two administrators at Northeastern University, who have consistently gone above and beyond the call of duty. Thank you to Logan Wangsgard, Graduate Administrative Coordinator for the Department of Political Science. You have been an invaluable addition to the department, and you do not get enough credit for all that you do. Thank you also to Amy Killeen, Director of Graduate Admission and Student Services. You are a true joy to work with. You make directing graduate student services seem effortless, though I know it is anything but that.

By far the best part of graduate school has been the friends I have met along the way. To the many people I have shared an office (and the infamous mice of Meserve Hall) with, but especially Guy Bellino, Jarvis Chen, and Julie Garey. You guys made life in those hallowed halls not only bearable, but fun.

For much of my time in graduate school I was a proud member of Tolstoy Reader, aka the best trivia group on earth. Adam Mosher, Alison Uzdella, Christopher Cunningham, Julie Garey, and Kristen Hudak Rosero, you guys are the best. Our friendship, spirited political discussions, and competitive trivia-ing made life in Boston one of the best things going. I don’t see you guys nearly enough, but I am excited to see where all of our different paths take us.

Charles and Sorina Brackett, hugs and loves and puppy kisses and donuts. Thank you so much for always being there from the very beginning of this strange journey. Thank you for the late-night study sessions, the brunch dates, the conversations, and the laughter.
I am so fortunate to have had an amazing group of female friends and colleagues support me throughout this process. It is not often that you can connect with so many awesome and inspiring women. Sheila Kohanteb, you are an amazing cheerleader and an amazing friend. Thank you so much for reading parts of my dissertation, being a sounding board, and being such such an awesome person. Alison Uzdella, you lived with me for 6 years (?!), put up with my nonsense, and read pretty much every word of my dissertation. You are an amazing person, and I am so happy to have you in my life.

Jennapher Lunde Seefeldt, our gchat conversations about our dissertations, our students, and running were and continue to be amazing. Thank you for being a friend, a sounding board, a complaining partner, and a confidant. Without your advice and your friendship I would have lost even more marbles. Veronica Czastkiewicz, you are amazing and an inspiration. Thank you so much for being my friend, and for all the help you’ve given me throughout this process. Claudia Larson, our dissertation dates are a large part of the reason why this is done. Thank you so much for pushing me to be a better scholar and teacher. Holy crap, ladies. We did it.

Special shout outs and thanks need to be given to Anna Revette, Aparna Kamath, Danielle Fox, Kristen Callahan, and Raseeka Premchander. Ladies, you have been so supportive of me throughout this process, and I am forever grateful that I met you all. You truly made Boston my home. Now if I just knew where Junction 17 was…

I could not have gotten anywhere close to where I am now without the friendship of Jennifer Lloyd and Katherine Sheckells. You are my lodestars. We met on the first day of university, and you guys have been a constant ever since then. We have travelled the world, lived together in our first apartment, grown up, achieved milestones, and faced
down disappointments. I couldn’t have done any of it without you. You are my best friends, my sisters, and I love you and miss you both so much.

Special thanks goes to my family. My parents, Pete and Sandy Bulpett, have supported me even when they didn’t understand what I was doing, and for that I am truly grateful. To my aunt and uncle, Mike Bulpett and Paula Murphy, Thank you so much for everything. You guys provided a dacha, gin, food, advice, great conversation, and many, many popcorn & movie nights to a wayward grad student, and you helped me more than I can say. Gareth and Fiona, I totally lucked out on the cousin front. You guys are awesome individuals. Thank you for being who you are.

Finally, I have to thank my wonderful boyfriend, Ulysses Lateiner. Two and a half years ago you took on the herculean task of being in a relationship with a stressed-out PhD candidate, and I am grateful every day that you did. The last two and a half years have been truly wonderful. Thank you so much for coming into my life, for supporting me on this journey, and, most of all, for loving me and building a home with me (and Clawdious!). I love you lots and lots, and I can’t wait to see where life takes us next.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Why do some authoritarian regimes end while others endure? In 1922 Benito Mussolini and his Fascist party took power in Italy, and Mussolini became Prime Minister of Italy. However, as soon as World War II began in earnest, his hold on power began to slip, and by 1945 he was arrested by Communist partisans. He was summarily shot and his body was hung in a public square, subject to ridicule (Hibbert 2008). Contrast this with Francisco Franco in Spain. Franco’s Nationalist regime began in 1939, and even though he faced separatist movements, student protests, and other potentially destabilizing events, his rule lasted until his death from natural causes in 1975 (Preston 1996).

This difference in durability of authoritarian regimes has been echoed throughout history. Julius Caesar was killed via a coup d’état while Augustus Caesar ushered in Pax Romana and reigned for 40 years until his death of natural causes (Africa 1991). The USSR lasted for over 70 years before it crumbled as a result of widespread mass protest movements. However, even in the face of social upheaval, the Chinese Communist Party shows no signs of relinquishing power. Contemporary African countries like Burkina Faso have undergone successive coups d’état (“What Was Behind” 2015), whereas others, like Uganda, have not experienced a coup d’état in decades. As the Arab Spring protests of 2011 spread throughout the Middle East, some dictators fell to the pressure from below, whereas others, including the King of Morocco, were able to react to these protests and stabilize their regimes.

These seeming contradictions raise the question: why do some authoritarian regimes persist whereas others fall? What makes a regime more susceptible to pressures
from both within and outside of the regime? This dissertation seeks to provide an answer to these questions through the combination of an empirical analysis and a comparative case study of Morocco and Uganda.

**Research Agenda**

The purpose of this study is to examine how dictators stabilize and ensure the longevity of their rule. The main goal of a dictator is to maintain power for as long as possible. In order to do so, they must build a coalition of elites that will support their rule. They do so by establishing clientelistic networks, and thus essentially buying the support of potential rivals. However, they also must control the population and ensure that mass unrest does not cause elite-level schisms. In order to do this, they utilize the security apparatus in order to suppress dissent and punish those who speak out against their rule.

Why is it so important for a dictator to use a combination of patronage and punishment? In order to cement his rule, the dictator must constantly walk a fine line of gathering a core group of other elites around him, and simultaneously stripping them of real power outside of carrying out his commands. This is because one of the most pressing threats that a dictator faces is that of the coup d’état, and indeed, the vast majority of dictators are ousted via coup d’état (Svolik 2009, 2012). In 49 B.C.E. Julius Caesar crossed the river Rubicon, overthrew the Roman leadership, and assumed power as the *dictator perpetuo*, or the “dictator in perpetuity.” Just five years later members of the Roman Senate murdered him, in part because he was threatening to disband the Senate in a blatant attempt to gain more power (Africa 1991). While this is arguably one of the most famous coups d’état in history, it was not the last. During the Cold War,
coup d’état were numerous, and were often supported or backed by the governments of the USSR or the United States (Weiner 2007). While the end of the Cold War was thought to have been the “end of history,” (Fukuyama 1992) it did not bring an end to coup attempts. In fact, in 2015 alone there were coup attempts in Burkina Faso and Burundi. The lesson that authoritarian leaders should take from these events is that other elites are both their best friends and their worst enemies.

All this being said, a dictator must also be wary of the masses. Although a dictator’s rule is not dependent upon the masses, he must still wary of popular uprisings, as they have the ability to destabilize his rule. Therefore, a dictator needs to be able to respond quickly to mass unrest in order to pacify the populace, suppress dissent, and punish or coopt opposition leaders. In 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring, Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak fell from power as a direct consequence of the popular uprising. However, compatriots throughout the region, including King Mohammed VI of Morocco, faced similar protest movements that did not destabilize their rule. So, why are some leaders more likely than others to survive or prevent coups d’état? Why are some leaders able to subvert mass unrest while other leaders fall? What tools do authoritarian executives use to stabilize their rule in the face of potentially destabilizing events?

In this dissertation I argue that more centralized coalitions allow the dictator to respond to potentially destabilizing events and maintain power. Potentially destabilizing events include coups d’état and mass protests. Building upon the work of Svolik (2009, 2012) I argue that that more centralized ruling coalitions better allow the dictator to monitor elites and prevent possible coups, as well as allowing him to better respond to coup attempts. This institutional apparatus has not only a monitoring function, but also a
patronage distribution function. Building upon the work of Stacher (2012) I also argue that centralized ruling coalitions are better able to respond to mass protest events, as they are able to more efficiently repress dissent and potentially coopt key opposition members.

**Contributions to the Field**

This study contributes to the growing body of research on authoritarian regimes. While this research has its roots in the height of the Cold War, in the 1980s scholars shifted away from authoritarianism to focus more on transitions to democracy. However, the study of authoritarian regimes was revived at the tail end of the Third Wave of democratization, when scholars noted that many of the democratic “successes” of the Third Wave were either democracies in name only or unconsolidated democracies that had reverted to authoritarianism.

In particular, I build upon the research concerning authoritarian ruling coalitions. Building my argument on the foundations in the lacunae of the rational choice, structuralism, and state-society paradigms, I highlight the impact of coalition centralization on regime durability. In particular, I look at the role that coalition centralization plays in responding to potentially destabilizing crises. Through a combination of empirical analysis and case studies, I show that more centralized ruling coalitions are better able to respond to potentially destabilizing events because non-executive institutions do not have independent political power, and therefore cannot scuttle executive-driven policy. The dictator is also better able to monitor potential rivals, and therefore is more likely to survive and prevent coups d’état.
I combine this examination of ruling coalition centralization with research on regime responses to potentially destabilizing events, delving into the question of how dictators respond to crises of legitimacy. I show that executive response takes a two-pronged approach. First, the dictator will retool his ruling coalition. This is particularly important in the case of a coup attempt, but it may also necessary in the case of mass protest. Next, the dictator will increase repression, specifically targeting avenues of dissent. These two things in conjunction with one another help stabilize the regime and ensure durability.

Outline of the Dissertation

This work is organized into six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter Two introduces the theoretical underpinnings of my main hypothesis that dictators with more centralized ruling coalitions are more likely to survive endogenous and exogenous shocks. This hypothesis is grounded in the theoretical paradigms of rational choice, structuralism, and the state-society relationship. I argue that dictators seek to build more centralized coalitions for two reasons. First, a more centralized coalition means that the dictator is more likely to survive or prevent a coup d’état. This is because a dictator with a more centralized coalition is better able to contain and monitor potential rivals for power. Second, a regime with a more centralized coalition is better able to respond to mass protests. This is because institutions in regimes with more centralized coalitions are depoliticized. This means that power resides within the institution of the executive, and elites in charge of other institutions are not able to scuttle policies. This makes regime responses to potentially destabilizing events more streamlined and efficient.
Chapter Three contains a large-N empirical analysis testing the relationship between authoritarian regime durability and ruling coalition centralization. In particular, this chapter seeks to determine the impact of exogenous and endogenous shocks on authoritarian regimes, as well as the relationship between coalition centralization and responses to coups d’état and mass upheavals. I use time-series regressions to test this relationship on 234 authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1999. I find that the odds that a regime will end are 21.23 times greater in regimes with less centralized ruling coalitions. Regimes with less centralized coalitions are 9.78 times more likely to end as a result of a coup d’état, and that mass protests can have dire consequences for regimes with decentralized coalitions. This chapter also analyzes the role that inflationary and GDP crises have in causing potentially destabilizing events, and finds that coups d’état do not have a robust and statistically significant impact on the decision of elites. However, there is a relationship between mass protests and inflationary and GDP crises in the year of the protest, suggesting that immediate economic concerns drive protests. Finally, this chapter looks at regime responses to potentially destabilizing events. I find that in the year after coups d’état and in the two years following mass protests, there will be an increase in political repression.

Chapter Four is the first of two case studies. In this chapter I study the ruling coalition in Morocco. This highly centralized coalition, known as the makhzen, is made up of members of the King’s family and close associates. Morocco is a study in contrasts. On the one hand, it has an absolute monarchy where power resides in the halls of the Palace. On the other hand, it has a rich history of multiparty parliamentary elections. Both Hassan II (1963-1999) and Mohammed VI (1999-present) made concerted efforts to
centralize their coalitions and depoliticize non-executive institutions by turning them into mechanisms of patronage distribution rather than institutions of representation. In making participation in non-executive institutions contingent upon allegiance to the Palace, the bounds between representative and citizen are effectively broken. This has two effects on the polity: one, it depoliticizes the electoral institutions by centralizing power into the Palace, and two, it depoliticizes the electorate by divorcing electoral institutions from the citizens.

Chapter Four also looks at two time periods when potentially destabilizing events had the opportunity to topple the Alaouite dynasty: the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, and the Arab Spring protests of 2011 and 2012. In particular, it looks at the causes of these potentially destabilizing events, and the regime responses. Hassan II responded to the potentially destabilizing 1971 and 1972 events by radically changing his ruling coalition. He did this by purging the makhzen, decreasing the independence of the military, and centralizing his coalition further. He then increased repression within the Kingdom by targeting groups and individuals that expressed even the smallest amount of dissent. The second period examined are the 2011 and 2012 Arab Spring protests. These protests occurred in the midst of the upheaval that engulfed the Middle East and North Africa. However, while Morocco had massive protests and a well-organized protest movement, it is largely considered to have “missed” the Arab Spring. In large part this was due to the quick response of the regime to the 20 February movement. Within two weeks of its start, Mohammed VI made a televised address that promised constitutional changes and more economic benefits for the Kingdom’s citizens. However, these promises were never delivered, and in the years since the protests, the regime has eroded
the rule of law and emboldened the security apparatus in order to dismantle the 20 February movement and punish those who speak out against the regime.

Chapter Five provides the second case study. It looks at the ruling coalition in Uganda, and how Yoweri Museveni stabilized the regime in the face of exogenous shocks. Much like in Morocco, the ruling coalition in Uganda is based on familial ties and on Museveni’s personal relationships. In Uganda, the ruling coalition consists of Museveni’s close family and high-ranking members of the National Resistance Movement (“the Movement”), and is drawn more and more from Museveni’s home region in western Uganda. While Museveni has not faced a coup attempt during his time in office, he and his ruling coalition have faced several periods of mass protest, most notably in 2011 and 2012. This period of mass unrest coincided with the first presidential election after Museveni pushed through an amendment to the Ugandan constitution that abolished term limits, and was partially inspired by the Arab Spring protests. Protesters called for democratic and economic reforms, much the same as the protesters in Morocco and throughout the Arab world. As in Morocco, the Museveni regime responded with a combination of clientelistic politics and widespread repression of political dissent. This combination has ensured the regime’s survival.

Chapter Six is the conclusion, which recaps my central theoretical argument that authoritarian regimes with more centralized ruling coalitions are more durable. I show that they are better able to withstand both exogenous and endogenous shocks, because a dictator is better able to monitor potential rivals among the elites and better able to respond to mass unrest. I also look to avenues of future research. In particular, I focus four areas of potential future research. The first is testing the ruling coalition theory on a
regime with a decentralized ruling coalition. A country like Tunisia, which swiftly fell as a result of the pressures from a popular uprising, would make an interesting comparative case to the Moroccan and Ugandan case studies presented in this dissertation. Another avenue of future research would be to take the works that have explored the causes of the different Arab Spring outcomes and test them on non-Arab Spring revolutions. A third area of future study would involve analyzing the interaction between ruling coalitions and opposition coalitions in order to determine the most effective tools for dividing opposition. Finally, an area of particular interest is determining what factors determine the level of ruling coalition centralization. Doing this will enable better operationalization of ruling coalition, and will open up new avenues for research.
Chapter Two: What Makes a Regime Durable?

The year 1991 marked a new era in the world. When the final death knell of the Soviet Union sounded, Samuel Huntington (1991) heralded the beginning the Third Wave of democratization and Francis Fukuyama (1992) declared that we had reached the end of history and the beginning of a new, more democratic era. It was an era in which democracy had triumphed over authoritarianism, and in which all countries were assumed to be marching on the path to democracy. Indeed, while writing in this period of vast institutional change, Huntington (1991: 137) observed the liberalization of authoritarian regimes throughout the Eastern Bloc and stated that “liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand.” His work greatly influenced the field of comparative politics — in particular the subfield of governance studies — throughout the 1990s. This is reflected in the fact that studies produced after Huntington have been characterized by a teleological assumption (Carothers 2002). That is to say that they assumed, in the spirit of the Modernizationists of the 1950s, that all countries were marching along a unidirectional path to liberal democracy. Some countries were democratizing at a much slower rate than others, but all countries were on the same general trajectory.

However, the halfway house did stand, and by the turn of the century, scholars began challenging the premise that all countries were moving in a linear fashion towards democracy (Brumberg 2002; Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; McFaul 2002). These works signaled the beginning of a proliferation of scholarly works attempting to explain the stability and longevity of non-democratic regimes (Brownlee 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2010; Selvik & Stenslie 2011). This subset within the
literature rejected the assumption that all countries are in the process of democratization, and instead argued that the “political upheavals of the twentieth-century demonstrate[d] that regime change is not a teleological process; hence, there is no certainty that incomplete democracies will become complete” (Rose & Shin 2001: 333). The failures of the Third Wave demonstrate that, even in a democratic moment, regime change and increasing political and civil freedoms should not necessarily be the sole focus of governance studies.

Why do some non-democratic regimes persist in the face of major upheaval while others crumble? What aspects of regimes enhance their durability? The central argument of this dissertation is that centralized ruling coalitions are the key to stabilizing authoritarian regimes. The reason for this is three-fold. First, more centralized coalitions facilitate the leader’s ability to monitor potential rivals, thus making it easier to prevent potential endogenous shocks (e.g., coup attempts). Second, they allow regime elites to more easily distribute rents to their patronage networks, which increases elite dependence on the regime and therefore decreases the likelihood of elite defection. Finally, centralized coalitions are more capable of responding to exogenous shocks due to the fact that they are more able to present a united policy response to crises.

In order to fully address these questions, this chapter will begin by providing a definition for the term regime durability. However, the main focus of this chapter will be to position the answer to these questions within the existing research. Research on authoritarian regime durability can be categorized into three distinct types: elite-driven explanations, state-driven explanations, and state-society explanations. Elite-driven studies explain regime durability by focusing on regime leaders and how they seek to
prevent coups through monitoring and making it too expensive for regime elites to defect (Chehabi & Linz 1998; Kamrava 2010; Lust-Okar 2004; Svolik 2009). State-driven explanations focus on institutions and institutional manipulation in order to determine how structural factors produce durable regimes (Arriola 2012; Dobson 2012; Gandhi 2010; Levitsky & Way 2010). Finally, state-society explanations focus on how society is able to influence the state (Chan 2002; Huskey 2010). My research is situated in the explanatory lacunae between these three disparate fields of study. I seek to add to the literature of regime durability by explaining how the decisions that regime leaders make in terms of building their coalition impact their chances of maintaining power. In particular, I will be arguing that the more centralized a coalition that a leader is able to build, the more they will be able to monitor potential rivals, the more institutionalized patronage networks will be, and the more ready the regime to will be to effectively respond to potentially destabilizing mass protests.

What is Regime Durability?

Regime durability itself is a contested term; however, it is also a highly important concept within the literatures regarding non-democratic regimes. Studies of regime durability have historically focused on term limits; however, if such limits exist at all, non-democratic leaders often blatantly disregard them\(^1\), as their main goal is simply to maintain their incumbency through whatever means necessary. Bunce and Wolchik

\(^1\) In order to draw from both the more established authoritarianism scholarship and the nascent hybrid regime scholarship, the phrase “non-democratic leaders” will be used throughout the literature review to describe the highest-ranking elite of both hybrid and authoritarian regimes.
(2011: 40) expand upon this by positing that “durable rule has important advantages for incumbents, including the ability to construct large patronage networks that fan out from the leader. Thus, long tenure generates strong disincentives for defection, whether by members of the ruling circle or by everyday citizens.”

Therefore, at its most basic, regime durability is readily observable through the frequency of leadership turnover. In classical regime studies, a country is considered to have political stability if it has longevity of governance. What this means is that a regime is seen to be stable if it undergoes a long period under the rule of a single leader or political party, and, vice versa, it can be classified as unstable if there is a high rate of leadership turnover. Building on this conceptualization, many leadership tenure studies point to the fact that the number of years in office has a large impact with regards to a leader’s ability to stay in office. Huntington (1968) links the age of the governing political party to the level of both regime institutionalization and stability. Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors (2003) find that the probability of regime change declines over time. With longer incumbency, rulers attain greater insights into their allies’ preferences. Such valuable information can then be strategically utilized for patronage purposes. Also, with each year in office, the ruling elites’ cadre of subordinates becomes more selective and they retain only the most loyal followers in their governing coalition. When looking at the likelihood that a dictator will be removed by extrajudicial means, Svolik (2009: 2)

2 There are two different types of stability: political and civil. Civil stability refers to the likelihood that a country will break out into civil war or other forms of violent mass contention. Political stability refers to the stability of political institutions and regimes. While both forms of stability are important for a state, their literatures are divergent. This study focuses on political stability. For a discussion of civil stability, please refer to the following: Huntington 1957; Layton 2006; Malhotra & Carnes 2008; Reynal-Querol 2002.
492) contends that “the longer that a dictator is in office, the less likely it is that he will be removed by a coup.”

Another influential study of the impact of leadership tenure is Bienen and Van de Walle’s (1991) study on leadership duration, which also points to longevity in office as the main mitigator of risk to those in power, suggesting that the longer leaders are in office, the more likely they are to stay in office. However, their study is problematic due to the fact that the data used in their statistical analysis combines a range of regimes, including liberal democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. Thus, a democracy with established and respected electoral rules is more at risk for leadership turnover than an authoritarian regime, and while this is factually correct, it is slightly problematic for studying regime durability. Authoritarian leaders are not as constrained by constitutions and term limits, and, in fact, most authoritarian leaders will either re-write electoral rules or flagrantly ignore them.

There are three major issues associated with conflating regime durability and leadership tenure. The first is the fact that by combining authoritarian and democratic leaders in a single dataset, as Bienen and Van de Walle do, results can have problems of endogeneity. That is to say, extrapolating the theory that longevity in office is a key factor in lowering risk of leadership turnover from this combined dataset may represent correlation rather than causation.

The second issue is evidenced by states with high rates of turnover. For example, since the end of World War II, Italy has had over 60 different governments (Hewitt 2013), more than any other Western European state (Davies 2013). Despite its many faults, Italy is considered a fairly stable regime due to its high levels of legislative and
bureaucratic stability (Pelizzo & Cooper 2002). Related to this is the third issue, which is that leadership tenure studies have a harder time explaining why some countries undergo crisis after crisis (e.g. Egypt’s post-Arab spring governance crises) whereas other countries are more able to respond to crises, and set in place measures to avoid them in the future.

The criticisms outlined above led scholars to conclude that definitions of regime durability need to look at more than just longevity of leadership. Slater and Fenner argued that:

The ultimate form of stability does not entail meeting and overcoming crises, but avoiding and, when they cannot be totally avoided, resolving crises decisively in the regime’s favor. When a regime survives a crisis but fails to eliminate or at least mitigate the underlying factors that precipitated it, that regime should be considered less stable than one in which similar crises are fully resolved or never even occur. (Slater & Fenner 2011: 17-18; emphasis in the original text).

Admittedly, this facet of regime durability is difficult to study, because, in essence, it is attempting to assess why something did not happen (or why a political, societal, or economic upheaval did not happen subsequently). However, it leads to another interesting facet of regime durability that is neglected when one looks solely at leadership tenure. That is related to the following question: is a regime able to respond to and survive a crisis? Several scholars put forth a simple but insightful definition of regime durability that links durability to the ability of a regime to survive a crisis (Bates 2005; Levitsky & Way 2012). These authors argue that studying regime durability based on
years in power alone gives an incomplete picture of the regime itself, because regimes that survive without facing major crises have longevity but cannot be said to be durable (Levitsky & Way 2012).

Therefore, crises can be seen as a test of a regime’s true strength, as well as their ability to adapt in the face of changing and/or chaotic times. Indeed, while many assume that politics within authoritarian regimes tend towards the status quo, the ability of an authoritarian regime to survive a crisis proves that “authoritarianism is not a stagnant governing approach” (Stacher 2012: 31). Elites and institutions both need to have adaptive capabilities in order to maintain their dominant position and authority over society (Stacher 2012). Crises can show the true strength and durability of a regime when the regime is able to respond and adapt to the resulting change in conditions. Using this definition of regime durability, the end of the communism in the Soviet Union can be explained by the institutional stagnation that occurred beginning in the early 1970s. As a result of this institutional stagnation, the Kremlin was unable to respond properly to crises, and any response that they did put forth only served to destabilize the regime (Dimitrov 2013).

The definition of regime durability in this research project is based on this final type of stability. The key question that I seek to address is why some authoritarian regimes are able to maintain power in the face of potentially destabilizing crises while others are not. Stability therefore cannot be defined as simply maintaining office or not democratizing. It also cannot be defined as staving off all crises and never having a protest movement rise up against the regime or regime policies. In order to provide a more robust explanation of why authoritarian regimes are stable, their ability to respond
to economic and other crises must be examined. Therefore, the definition that takes into account how a regime responds to crisis is best suited as a basis for explicating what exactly is meant by regime stability.

**Role of Elites**

Understanding the role of elites in an authoritarian regime is paramount to understanding how and why decisions are made. Therefore it is necessary to delve into rational choice, and to examine how it explains political phenomena in general and regime durability in specific. Rational choice is rooted in the works of Karl Popper and Adam Smith, and revolves around individuals’ strategic decision-making process in light of their environmental constraints. It is these decisions that explain the differences in outcomes (Downs 1957; Olson 1971, 1993). Many also trace its origins to Machiavelli’s *The Prince*. Rationality in this context is the optimal correspondence between an actor’s means and ends (Tsebelis 1990: 18). In its contemporary form this idea was first expressed by philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1988) in the nineteenth century as Bentham’s utility principle. Among the social sciences, economics was the first, and most enthusiastic, in embracing this line of reasoning. Scholars employing this approach eschew discussions of substantive rationality in favor of assessing an individual’s procedural or instrumental rationality. A rational person behaves in the following manner:
A rational man is one who behaves as follows: (1) he can always make a decision when confronted with a range of alternatives; (2) he ranks all the alternatives facing him in order of his preference in such a way that each is either preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other; (3) his preference ranking is transitive; (4) he always chooses from among the possible alternatives that which ranks highest in his preference ordering; and (5) he always makes the same decision each time he is confronted with the same alternatives. (Downs 1957: 6)

Utility maximization presumes that an actor weighs the costs against the benefits before making decisions designed to maximize personal advantages (Friedman 1953). In the realm of politics, a leader is driven by the desire to achieve and maintain power (Michels 1966). Downs’s (1957) classic study presumes that candidates in democratic polities were vote maximizers, meaning that they are motivated to attain and remain in office. Along the same lines, scholars analyzing politics in non-democratic polities presume that incumbent and aspiring political elites also seek the power of holding office. What differs, in light of the regime type, are the tactics used to grab and hold onto power. Within regimes studies, this can be seen in the decisions of non-democratic leaders to reward certain sectors of society for obedience and loyalty (Wintrobe 1998).

Rational choice scholarship provides an adequate explanation as to why a country might remain authoritarian. Whereas a structural explanation would focus on class dynamics or other underlying institutional concerns as an explanation for regime durability, it has a tendency to ignore agency and the impact of the decisions of actors. On the other hand, rational choice analysis looks specifically at elite preferences and the
impact of elite decision-making on regime longevity. Within the rational choice framework, leaders can be seen as having a vested interest in maintaining autocratic tendencies. Their decisions are based on the maintenance of power (Wintrobe 1998). In order to appease segments of the domestic public and the international community, autocratic leaders may hold elections. But these are less an expression of the public will than an electoral ritual performed to impress. Leaders in non-democratic regimes thus are likely to be driven by their dictatorial tendencies (Michels 1966).

While we tend to think of non-democratic regimes in general as being led by a single person, this is not the case. Leaders depend upon the support of a small group of individuals in order to maintain their rule; as such, “dictators do not rule alone” (Gandhi 2010: 34). If the regime loses support of key members of its constituency, then the regime is likely to fall (Wood 2000). Consequently, leaders need to surround themselves with a cadre of reliable and loyal individuals. By determining who is a member of the coalition, scholars can determine to whom the dictator “may be responsible and how power is organized within the regime” (Ibid: 20). In other words, a coalition of regime elites helps govern the polity and, more importantly, supports the leader and helps him maintain power. Therefore this coalition, with the leader at the helm, is situated at the epicenter of true decision-making power within non-democratic regimes.

Given that members of the ruling coalition support the dictator and help him maintain his power, there are consequences if the leader is unable to maintain their support. Therefore authoritarian scholarship also looks to the cost-benefit analyses that many regime elites go through when deciding whether or not to support the leader or leaders. As Svolik (2009) shows, authoritarian leaders are dependent upon the support of
non-ruling elites to maintain power; however, non-ruling elites are also the most pressing threat for authoritarian leaders. Part of the role of the coalition elites is to constrain the dictator, and as such, they may have to use coercive threats or tactics against the dictator. This includes coups d’état, either threatened or attempted (Gandhi 2010; Luttwak 1979), which makes elite-level struggles for power truly dangerous for the stability of the regime. The threat to the leader posed by coalition elites is illustrated by the fact that in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1956 and 2001, there were 80 successful coups, 108 failed coups, and 139 reported coup plots (McGowan 2003). The threat of coup can therefore be seen as one of the major ways by which a coalition can prevent a leader from attempting to gain more power.

Coalition elites can therefore be seen as rivals for power within the regime, and they will support the leader as long as the benefits of support outweigh the costs of defection (Ezrow & Frantz 2011). Leaders will correspondingly adopt certain strategies in an attempt to mitigate threats from other elites, including power-sharing agreements, political appointments, and distributions of rents (Magaloni 2008). These forms of patrimonialism are a key tool of dictators in mitigating threats and stabilizing their regimes. They help to create a personal connection to the regime, as well as representing a way to connect the personal well-being of coalition elites with the well-being of the regime itself (Bellin 2004).

While rational choice extols the powers of individual decision-making, decisions are not made within a vacuum. Although non-democratic leaders are not dependent upon a voting public for approval, they do need to build and sustain a power base in order to maintain power. Elites are also constrained by the formal and informal institutions of
their regimes (Brownlee 2007; Ghandi 2010). Therefore any changes in the structure of the system will necessitate a recalibration of the decision-making matrix. Even when fixated on their tenure, elites must change and adapt policies in order to maintain stability in the face of structural upheaval.

**Institutionalism, the State, and Durability**

While rational choice explanations of regime durability focus on the preferences and decision-making calculations of the ruling elite, structural explanations focus on the role of the formal and informal institutions of the state. As such, the primary question that structural theorists attempt to answer is whether regime durability is a function of foundational, intractable institutions. Political institutions are assumed to govern the interactions of individuals and groups; they set out the “rules of the game” (North 1990: 3), and institutional analysis focuses on how the structural foundations of the system influence political actors (Katznelson 1997). Institutions are viewed as structuring political life, which is why democracies and dictatorships have different policy outcomes (Gandhi 2010). In other words, by looking at institutions we can understand the political constraints and inducements that shape behavior and outcomes (Brownlee 2007). Within the field of governance studies, the structural paradigm is founded on the assumption that the institutional design of the state is the determining factor in whether or not a regime will be stable (Bratton & Van de Walle 1993).

Classical structural analyses focused on the role of the state, and as such their views of the state inform how they discuss and analyze politics and governance. Regimes themselves are built on the foundation of the state, and institutionalists often focus on
how the state controls society. There are three classical scholars upon whose works most modern studies of the state are based: Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim. Marx argues that the modern, capitalist state functions as a tool of bourgeoisie oppression, and therefore the foundations of regimes and states are built upon the exploitation inherent to capitalist economies. In the Marxian view, the state is dependent upon the bourgeoisie for money and influence (Marx & Engels 2002). Given this view of the state, politics and political interactions within all states are bound by the capitalist structures of the system. In opposition to the Marxian view that the state is a tool of the capitalist elite, Weber defines the state as the entity that controls the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. By defining the state as such, Weber therefore sees politics in terms of the distribution power and the control of coercive force (Weber 1946). This viewpoint, much like the Marxian perspective, argues that states, and the myriad institutions within states, operate in an autonomous fashion.

Durkheim stands on the shoulders of Marx and Weber but sees the role of the state in a more nuanced way. Durkheim contends that the state emerges from changes in the type of solidarity. In Durkheim’s theory, the state’s mechanisms for control of society are different depending upon the amount of division of labor within society. In states where there is very little division of labor, the state is seen as merely an enforcer of repressive laws. This is due to the fact that with no division of labor, society has what amounts to a collective conscience, meaning that all members have relatively similar tasks and viewpoints. Due to this, crimes and transgressions are not seen as acts against individuals but rather as acts against the collective. The state’s role is therefore to punish harshly those who would harm the whole (Durkheim 1984; Giddens 1986).
As division of labor increases, the collective consciousness that holds together society begins to degrade. This fragments society and transforms the role of the state. This is due to the fact that individuals no longer have similar experiences. In other words, society becomes more individually oriented as labor diversifies. Increasing divisions of labor also cause the state to become more absolutist. This absolutist state seeks to control an ideologically diverse society by implicitly or explicitly claiming a religious quality. In doing so, the state is able to legislate that any offenses against the state are considered to be sacrilegious. Therefore the state’s role is still primarily to control society through coercion (Durkheim 1984; Giddens 1986).

Whereas classical scholars focused on the state as a single monolithic entity, more contemporary scholars have drilled down to examine which particular aspects of the state itself lead to regime stability or regime change. Democratization studies look at how the institutional design of a country impacts the speed at which it democratizes. These studies have often focused on the role of elections in the transition process. Within the democratization literature, establishing elections is often seen as the first, and most important, step in the transition to democracy. Elections are, in fact, often pointed to as a causal variable in democratization (Chan 2002). However, the regime stability literature assumes that elections do not act as democratizing mechanisms and can even impede the democratization process. Many scholars argue that elections are mere tools that the ruling

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3 For much of the 1980s and 1990s, scholarly literature focused predominantly on the teleological assumption that regimes were democratizing. However, since 2001 there has been increasing attention focused on regimes that are not in the process of democratizing. Non-democratic regime scholars draw upon the democratization literature in order to explain the stability of regimes.

4 This literature is quite robust; some of the most prominent works are Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991; Diamond 1999; Schedler 2006; Schumpeter 1994.
elite uses to maintain legitimacy and power (Brownlee 2009; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Magaloni 2006). Geddes (2003) argues that elections send signals to the elites within the polity. If a regime is able to win large majorities, then it signals that there is no value-add to breaking with the ruling faction. On the other hand, elections are also seen as a tool that limits the leader’s ability to coalesce power and form a personal dictatorship (Magaloni 2008). With elections serving as both a signal to elites and limitation on a leader’s power, they are capable of mitigating the threat of overthrow by regime insiders, which Svolik (2012) argues is the greatest threat to the longevity of non-democratic regime leaders.

However, the power of elections to signal regime credibility is contingent upon two things: the creation of supermajorities, and a high voter turnout (Geddes 2003). Thus, some regime stability scholars have looked at how voters help to stabilize non-democratic regimes. Linz (2000) looks at the role elections take in manipulating the citizenry into supporting the regime, arguing that elections legitimize the regime in the eyes of citizens because the electoral propaganda positions the regime — and, in the case of totalitarian regimes, the regime’s guiding ideology — as the only “truth.” In other words, elections and campaign rhetoric are seen as a tool the regime uses to effectively brainwash the citizenry into believing that the status quo is their only real choice. A more contemporary look at the role of the citizenry in stabilizing the regime through elections is found in the concept of “competitive clientelism” (Lust-Okar 2009). Scholars who utilize this concept look to regime insiders and argue that they are more likely to be able to distribute regime-provided goods to their home regions. Voters are thus more likely to vote for regime elites, because they want a candidate who is able to deliver state resources/spoils to their
region; candidates who are more democratically minded will not fare as well in such a kleptocracy.

Although elections studies remain an important part of the field, recent studies have moved beyond focusing on the role of elections to looking at the functions of nominally democratic institutions. In this viewpoint, institutional design plays a large role in stabilizing non-democratic regimes. Some studies focus on regime type and how the institutional setup of the regime itself impacts stability as measured by longevity. Studies that focus on the structure of the executive office argue that the breakdown of regimes is caused mainly by the institutional design of the executive body. This is due to the fact that authoritarian politics “involves factionalism, competition, and struggle” (Geddes 1999: 199). Each type of authoritarian regime has these three aspects, but they experience them to different degrees. These studies find that monarchies and one-party regimes tend to endure, whereas military regimes are likely to fizzle quickly (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2011; Geddes 1999; Linz 2000). The reason for the disparity in longevity among governing types is connected directly to the institutionalization of the regime. Personalized regimes and monarchies tend to have more defined and institutionalized patronage networks, which then facilitate the ability of elites to maintain their power (Chehabi & Linz 1998).

Non-electoral institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, are also singled out and looked at in depth within the literature. Whereas the nascent authoritarian literature assumed that dictatorial institutions were mere window dressing, more recent literature argues that non-electoral institutions perform very specific tasks that help stabilize non-democratic regimes. The literature divides the role of these institutions into
two categories: the monitoring of rival elites and containment of the opposition (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2010; Svolik 2009, 2012), and the distribution of rents (Collier 1982). First and foremost, these institutions function as a means to contain opposition demands (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2010), by “allow[ing] for an environment of controlled bargaining. The dictator can select the groups to be granted access” to the institutions (Gandhi 2010: 78). These institutions also serve to reduce the transaction costs of compromise for the regime and opposition elites alike. This is because institutions, and in particular legislative institutions, are a forum in which opposition dissent can be expressed without the leadership being seen as weak. They are also a place in which the policy preferences of the leader can be not only announced, but also validated and confirmed by the legislative body. Therefore, non-electoral institutions are a means of controlling elite conflict and facilitating policy negotiations (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006).

Building upon this idea that non-electoral institutions serve to control conflict among ruling elites, scholars also argue that they allow leaders to monitor potential rivals and gain information about threats (Svolik 2009; 2012). One of the central problems within authoritarian regimes is how the leader will share power with his ruling coalition. Non-electoral institutions exist in order to facilitate this power sharing. They allow coalition elites to check the leader’s Machiavellian tendency to grab power, and they allow leaders to monitor coalition elites in order to prevent coup attempts (Svolik 2009; 2012).

While leaders of non-democratic regimes will use electoral and non-electoral institutions as a way to monitor possible rivals and prevent regime overthrow, non-
electoral institutions are also a conduit through which rents can be distributed. Rents and other forms of patronage are often used in non-democratic regimes as a way to stabilize the system, as well as a way of ensuring allegiance. In single-party regimes the party acts as a patronage system, and in multi-party systems “dictators coax some political forces into channeling their activities within their institutional creations” (Gandhi 2010: 100).

In summary, institutions in non-democratic regimes help to stabilize non-democratic regimes in several ways. First and foremost, they help to legitimate the leader’s rule either through elections or through non-electoral institutions. Furthermore, non-democratic leaders institutionalize their ruling coalitions by assigning important positions to key elites (through key cabinet positions, or high-level management positions in the ruling party), but non-electoral institutions allow the leader to monitor potential rivals in order to prevent potentially destabilizing insider rebellions. According to Merkel (2010: 27), institutions convey the “possibility of controlling the distribution of power within the ruling bloc and thereby [reduce] the moral-hazard problem among autocratic elites,” and in doing so they are able to reduce the threat of overthrow from within the regime. Finally, institutions serve as a way to entrench elites in power through the construction of patronage networks and the distribution of rents.

_Incorporating Society into the Elite-Institution Interaction_

As discussed above, institutionalists have traditionally viewed the state as a monolithic entity. According to these scholars, much if not all of society is disconnected from the state. However, contemporary studies reject the idea that the state functions independently of society, and instead focus on examining the interaction between the
state and society. Migdal takes issue with the universality of the Weberian conception of the state. He argues that the state should be viewed as a myriad set of social organizations that struggle to control each other. It is from this conflict between the organizational structures of both the state and society that politics emerges. When viewed as such, politics must be analyzed from the position of conflict (Migdal 2001). He argues that statist theories have exaggerated the power that the state has over society and have understated the sway that society holds over the state. In other words, the state-society approach argues that the state can both constrain and transform society, and that society in turn has the power to transform and constrain the state (Migdal 1988; 2001).

The state-society approach has become one of the dominant ways of looking at the structures of the state in comparative politics, but how does it speak to regime durability? In democratic studies, the relationship between the state and its citizens tends to be viewed through the prism of elections. However, within authoritarian and hybrid regimes, elections are rarely the most significant way in which citizens interact with the state. With this in mind, more recent scholarship looks to state and society interactions arguing that these interactions have a direct impact on regime durability. Huskey (2010) seeks to understand how the bureaucratization of Russian elites has had several far-reaching consequences on Russian governance. It has separated the elite from society, and therefore the ruling elite are no longer reflective of Russian society. Huskey further argues that the technocratic nature of Russian politics has the potential to lead to a de-legitimization of politics within Russia. These two aspects of the Russian political sector have the potential to destabilize the Russian regime. Other scholars argue that extreme crises are potentially destabilizing in authoritarian regimes. This is due to the fact that
there are factors within society that can be either strengthened or weakened during the crisis (mass media, opposition parties/leaders, and civil society organizations have the potential to rival the elite coalition during times of crisis, for example). If the authoritarian government is not sufficiently responsive to society, and does not act to efficiently mitigate the crisis, then the crisis will escalate and the regime will be destabilized (Chan 2002). The state-society approach therefore helps us to understand how groups within society are able to influence states.

In this study, I will be looking at how regimes react to destabilizing events. These destabilizing events come in two different varieties: endogenous (e.g. competition among regime elites for power and/or resources) and exogenous (e.g. mass protest or civil conflict). This study focuses on a combination of both of these types of threat. I hypothesize that authoritarian regimes that are more durable will have a more centralized ruling coalition. These highly centralized coalitions are more institutionalized, which increases the ability of the ruler to monitor potential threats. Ruling coalition also increases the costs for elites to rebel against the current regime, as a failed rebellion will cause elites to lose access to rents. A highly centralized ruling coalition is also better able to respond to exogenous threats to the regime, as elites are less likely to put forth competing policy proposals, and are therefore less likely to strengthen competing elements in society.

*Methodology and Data Collection*

The focus of this research is to determine the impact of endogenous and exogenous shocks on the durability of authoritarian regimes. These shocks come in the
form of elite defections or coup attempts (endogenous), and mass protests (exogenous). I hypothesize that regimes with more centralized ruling coalitions will be better able to respond to and survive these shocks. In order to test this hypothesis, I will be utilizing a mixed methods approach consisting of a large-N empirical analysis of authoritarian regimes as well as a historically based comparative analysis of regime durability in both Uganda and Morocco. Quantitative analysis is built on the assumption that human behavior and political phenomena can be systematically measured and scientifically assessed (Nardi 2003). By using a large number of cases, quantitative analysis is seen as providing a more generalizable explanation (Johnson & Reynolds 2004). However, quantitative research is often accused of ignoring both historical and cultural context (Yin 2002). Qualitative research, on the other hand, examines human behavior in context by relying on case studies and thick description (Salkind 2006). This allows the complexity and nuance of political phenomena to be parsed for meaning. However, qualitative research is often criticized for maximizing accuracy over generalizability (Johnson and Reynolds 2004), and therefore it is often derided as being less scientifically oriented than quantitative analysis. The mixed methods research approach seeks to address the criticisms levied at both quantitative and qualitative analysis, and by using this combined methodology, I intend to provide a more accurate and generalizable explanation for regime durability.

The large-N empirical analysis will consist of a time-series regression model. The dependent variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if a regime ends and 0 if it continues in a year (y). Per Gasioworski (1995), failure is defined as the turnover of leadership in the power center of the regime. In many regimes this will be when the head of state or
government (e.g. the President) cedes power. Complications arise because in some regimes, real power is not situated in a nominal head of state or government but in the military (e.g. Egypt) or in a religious leader (e.g. Iran). Regime durability and change data is pulled from two sources: Svolik’s (2012) Politics of Authoritarian Rule dataset, and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014) Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. This resulted in a dataset that includes information on 234 authoritarian regimes in existence from 1960 to 1999.

Building upon Gasiorowski (1995), I argue that these exogenous and endogenous shocks are precipitated by economic crises, in particular inflationary and GDP-related crises. These crises weaken the regime and open the door for elite rebellion and/or mass protest. Therefore coups d’état, and large-scale protests will represent the endogenous and exogenous shocks that are potentially destabilizing, and to which the regime must respond. Economic crisis data comes from the World Bank’s (2014) measures on rates of inflation and change in GDP. Data regarding coups d’état, both successful and attempted, will be drawn from the Coup d’État Events, 1946-2014 dataset (Marshall and Marshall 2014), which provides information on attempted and successful coups in countries with populations in excess of 500,000. Information about protests, including estimated size and motivation, comes from the Banks and Wilson (2015) dataset, as well as the Social Conflict in Africa (2015) database.

While the dependent variable is regime durability, the independent variables include the centralization of the ruling coalition and the degree of institutionalism of patronage networks. A more centralized ruling coalition enables the dictator to monitor regime elites in an attempt to prevent or withstand a coup attempt. A centralized ruling
coalition has the added benefit of allowing the regime to respond to exogenous shocks in a swift and unified manner. A more institutionalized patronage network facilitates the distribution of rents and helps negate the ability to opposition elites to garner support.

In the second part of my research I will focus on contextualizing regime durability through the analysis of two case studies, Morocco and Uganda. These cases will illustrate the paths that dictators take to build centralize coalitions, as well as the tools that they use to stabilize the regime in times of crisis and upheaval. These two cases are different on many different possible explanatory variables. A history of colonialism has often been used a causal variable for authoritarianism (Bernhard, Reenock, & Nordstrom 2004), with some scholars stating that former British colonies are more likely to be democratic (Collier 1982; Huntington 1984; Lipset, Seong, & Torres 1993), however, Morocco was colonized by the Spanish and the French, whereas Uganda was colonized by the British. Other scholars point to some cultures being more conducive to democracy than others. In particular, Huntington (1991) argues that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with democracy due to the lack of secularism inherent to Islamic societies. Morocco has a predominantly Muslim population and Uganda has a population that is a mix of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim (“CIA World Factbook: Morocco” 2015; “CIA World Factbook: Uganda” 2015). Still other scholars point to civil society as the key democratizing force in society (Patrick 1996; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti 1994). However, Morocco has a vibrant and well-established civil society (Sater 2007), and Uganda has a limited civil society (Scholte 2004).

Despite these potentially explanatory differences, both countries have long-standing, stable authoritarian regimes. I argue that this is because both Uganda and
Morocco have highly centralized ruling coalitions that are better able to respond to exogenous and endogenous crises through varying mechanisms. These mechanisms include both liberalizing and restrictive policies targeted to key opposition groups. Both Morocco and Uganda have a history of responding to shocks by introducing more liberal social policies and/or by passing restrictive laws that target specific groups.
Chapter Three: An Analysis of Coalition Centralization and Regime Durability

Introduction to the Data

When studying authoritarian regimes one should start with the assumption that the dictator has two Machiavellian drivers: to gain as much power as possible, and to maintain that power for as long as possible. This dissertation explores how authoritarian leaders are able to maintain their power for as long as possible, and it argues that leaders with more centralized coalitions will be better able to monitor possible rivals and will be better able to respond to mass protests. This chapter will use time-series analysis to empirically test the relationship between coalition centralization and authoritarian regime stability. I find that there is a substantive relationship between the centralization of the elite coalition and the stability of the regime.

The outline of this chapter is as follows: the next section describes both the role of the ruling coalition and the importance of centralization to the durability of the regime. Centralization is then discussed in terms of both endogenous and exogenous shocks, in particular the role of economic crises, coups d’état, and mass protests, as well as how the regime responds to these shocks. Finally, the relationship between coalition centralization and regime durability will be tested using a dataset that contains 234 authoritarian regimes occurring between 1960 and 1999.

The Role of Coalition Centralization

The popular conception of an authoritarian regime is one in which there is a single ruler. However, even authoritarian leaders are dependent upon others in order to maintain their power, and therefore “dictators do not rule alone” (Gandhi 2010: 34). Consequently,
leaders need to surround themselves with a cadre of reliable and loyal individuals. This coalition of individuals is referred to as a ruling coalition (Svolik 2012) or a Winning Coalition (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). This coalition consists of the group of individuals that are necessary for the leader to maintain power. Such a coalition helps govern the polity, and, more importantly, supports the leader and helps him continue to hold power. With the leader at the helm, this ruling coalition is situated at the epicenter of true decision-making power within and non-democratic regime. As Gandhi states “they generally indicate to whom dictators may be responsible and how power is organized within the regime. These elite institutions produce different incentives and constraints on dictators that, in turn, should have an impact on their decisions and performance” (Ibid.: 20). In other words, the leader needs the governing coalition in order to maintain power within a non-democratic regime, and the governing coalition acts to constrain some of the leader’s ability to govern without their consent.

Leaders build coalitions in order to do two things, to win and maintain office. According to Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors (2003) there are two different levels of coalition elites. The first is the Selectorate, which the authors define as the “set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership” (Ibid.: 42). The Selectorate are those who have some nominal say in choosing the leader. These may be members of a ruling party or of the military. More important to the durability of the regime is the Winning Coalition, which is the “subset of the Selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the Selectorate
as well as over the disenfranchised members of society” (Ibid.: 51). The Winning Coalition is drawn from the Selectorate, and it ranges in size from a simple majority of the Selectorate to just a handful of people. Loyalty of the Winning Coalition is maintained via mechanisms of cooptation. The dictator will either use private or public goods to maintain loyalty depending upon the size of the Winning Coalition (Barreto 2009; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

So the dictator needs a governing coalition in order to maintain power. However, this is a double-edged sword, as one of the main threats to the dictator comes from the ruling coalition itself. In fact, one of the primary roles of the ruling coalition is to constrain the dictator, and to prevent the leader from accumulating too much power. Constraining the ruler often means that members of governing coalitions have to use coercive tactics against the leader, and one of the most pressing threats facing a ruler in a non-democracy is that of a coup d’état (Gandhi 2010; Luttwak 1979). Geddes (1991: 121) speaks to this when she acknowledges that politics within non-democratic regimes “involves factionalism, competition, and struggle.” In Sub-Saharan Africa between 1956 and 2001 there were 80 successful coups, 108 failed coup attempts, and 139 reported coup plots (McGowan 2003). Faced with this ever present threat leaders must preemptively neutralize any possible contenders to power. Svolik (2012) also argues that the threat of coup is one of the major ways in which a coalition can threaten a leader should he strive for more power. Knowing that an elite-led coup is one of the major threats to the survival of the regime a leader will set up governing bodies which prioritize monitoring and gathering information on potential threats (Gandhi 2010; Svolik 2012). The more centralized these institutions are the more capable the leader is of averting
threat. This is because, institutional centralization helps to mitigate the threats posed by non-executive regime elites by either eliminating those who may be threats or monitoring the activities of potential threats. Within non-democracies executives must have a locus of decision-making power in order to neutralize threats from within their coalition.

What does it mean to have a centralized coalition? Coalition centralization is largely a matter of institutional design. Institutions in centralized polities have several key distinguishing markers. In regimes with centralized coalitions the executive office dominates the political landscape. They are the loci of a leader’s efforts to coopt potential dissenters into the regime. As such, elites within the coalition rely on executive authority in order to perform their tasks, and there is rarely public dissention among the ranks (Stacher 2012). In this institutional landscape, institutions exist in order to facilitate power sharing among the governing coalition (Ibid.). This leads to an easier and more forthright building of consensus, which is especially important given the fact that leaders must not only avert elite-level threats, but they also have to govern (Gandhi 2010). A united and centralized coalition is particularly relevant when an administration must respond to a potentially destabilizing crisis. Regimes with centralized coalitions are more capable of responding to crises because elites are not vying with each other for power and influence. Also, there is more consensus as to when it is appropriate to respond to crises with liberalizing or retracting rights.

In regimes with decentralized ruling coalitions, governing elites use and politicize non-executive institutions, which they then seek to protect from other competing institutions. This behavior leads to turf guarding (Stacher 2012), which allows for policy chokepoints wherein elites can exploit or scuttle policies passed down from the core.
executive (Huskey 2010). The impact of this is that the public perception of the strength and efficacy of the governing coalition diminishes (O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead 1986). This has grave repercussions in the event of a potentially destabilizing crisis. If elites prioritize protecting their own bases of power, then they will be much less likely to come to consensus in order to effectively and efficiently respond to a crisis, which increases the probability that the crisis will escalate. This leads to the first hypothesis:

**H1:** A centralized coalition will be more likely to respond to and survive a potentially destabilizing event.

**Elite Coalitions and Coups d’état**

In order to fully flesh out why centralized coalitions increase regime durability, it is necessary to examine both exogenous and endogenous threats to authoritarian regimes and how different coalition types respond to these threats. Regimes with more centralized coalitions will be better able to respond to threats and therefore decrease the threat’s chances of success. As previously discussed, the coup d’état is one of the central threats to an authoritarian regime. This is due the problems inherent with power sharing between the dictator and the elites upon whom he depends. Svolik (2012) argues that the overwhelming majority of dictators lose power to members of their ruling coalition, which makes power-sharing one of the biggest, but most necessary, hazards that a dictator undertakes.

However, coup attempts require a certain amount of chutzpah among the perpetrators. If they succeed they are in power; however, there are dire consequences if they fail (Hiroi & Omori 2013; Svolik 2012). So why do coup attempts happen? The
relationship between the dictator and his coalition is based on mutual distrust and mutual
dependence, which often involves the dictator setting up a system of patronage. The
dictator receives several benefits from the patronage system, including a demobilization
of opposition, increased loyalty among those in his patronage network, and a resistance to
democratization among regime elites (Bellin 2004). The dictator will pay his coalition to
support him either with the use of private funds or with the use of public goods (Barreto
2009; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Therefore the loyalty of the coalition is predicated
on economic robustness, and as such if a country undergoes economic crisis it is more
likely to experience a coup d’état. Economic crises undermine support for the regime by
deconstructing patronage networks, dividing elites, and creating opportunities for the
opposition (Geddes 1999). In other words, an economic crisis changes the rules of the
game for some elites within the ruling coalition, and gives them the opportunity to take
advantage of weakness and overthrow the leader. A dictator with a centralized coalition
will be better equipped to stave off coup attempts (Levitsky and Way 2013; Stacher
2012). It does so by allowing dictators to monitor potential rivals via institutional
mechanisms (Svolik 2012). Therefore:

\[ H2a: \textit{Coups and coup attempts are more likely to occur after an economic crisis} \]

\[ H2b: \textit{Regimes with centralized coalitions are more likely to survive coup attempts} \]
Centralized Coalitions and Mass Protests

The second source of potential destabilization within an authoritarian regime is exogenous in nature. While authoritarian regimes are not as dependent upon the support of the masses in the same way that democratic regimes are, they still need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a loss of legitimacy among the governed signals that the regime has lost hegemony in the political sphere. Therefore anti-government protests and other forms of mass mobilization are destabilizing to authoritarian regimes as they are indicative of this loss of legitimacy, and prolonged periods of protest are indicative of regime breakdown.

One of the central roles of the state is to manage the economy; however economic crises can lead to labor unrest, strikes, and social displacement (Welch & Smith 1974). Bates (2005) argues that states in sub-Saharan Africa are particularly prone to economic crisis because the patronage is so enmeshed in their institutional design. The health and well-being of the state, and how the people view the state, are inextricably linked to the economic well-being of the polity. Therefore when economic crises occur it puts political institutions under stress, and lessens their ability to complete their tasks. In times of economic crisis the poor are able to overcome their collective action costs, and credibly threaten the dictator (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). They are able to do this because his patrimonial institutions have become weakened, and this signals an opening for mobilization to the population.

However, if a dictator has a more centralized coalition he will be better able to respond to mass protests and dampen their destabilizing potential. This is due to the fact that during times of economic crisis and mass protest there is an increased sense of
foreboding within the ruling coalition (Lust-Okar 2005). Losing power due to mass upheaval could have dire consequences for both the dictator and his ruling coalition. Dictators with centralized coalitions are less likely to suffer from defectors during the course of mass upheaval. This makes them better able to respond to mass protests due to the lack of politicization of non-executive institutions. In essence this means that in polities with more centralized coalitions elites in charge of non-executive institutions will not be able to scuttle policy to enrich themselves.

Hence:

**H3a:** Mass protests are more likely to happen after an economic crisis.

**H3b:** Regimes with more centralized coalitions are better able to respond with policies that quell mass protests.

**Policy Responses to Destabilizing Events in Authoritarian Regimes**

Regimes respond to both exogenous and endogenous shocks with policy responses. These policy responses are meant to stabilize the regime, and will take one of two forms: a restriction of rights (i.e. sticks) or a liberalization of rights (i.e. carrots). A liberalization of rights is often referred to as “carrots,” or rewards for certain behaviors. Carrots are measures that build support or acceptance of the regime, and examples of carrots range from rents and patronage to increasing civil rights and liberties. A restriction of rights is often referred to as “sticks,” or acts that punish certain behaviors. Sticks are coercive or repressive measures that raise the cost of collective action for
opponents of the regimes. These measures can include an increase in the use of the security apparatus, or an increase in the number of political detainees (Gallagher & Hanson 2009). Both of these policy responses are used by regimes in order to maintain power, and they have the ability to stabilize the regime in times of potentially destabilizing crises. Regimes may utilize different policy responses at different time depending upon the type of threat to the regime.

**H4a:** Regimes are more likely to respond to coup attempts by restricting rights

**H4b:** Regimes are more likely to respond to mass protests by liberalizing rights.

**Variables and Data Samples**

The data for this analysis has been collected from several different sources. For information on authoritarian spells I used Milan Svolik’s Authoritarian Spells, 1946-2008 dataset. Countries are included in the dataset if they are determined to be authoritarian on January 1st of a given year. I have excluded countries with populations under 100,000 as these countries have the ability to distort the analysis (Gasiorowski 1995). Country years were also dropped from the dataset if Svolik labeled them No Authority. No Authority spells occur under two conditions: if there is a protracted (12 month plus) civil war over government control or if there is a 12-month or longer period of foreign occupation. I cross-referenced Svolik’s dataset with Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (GWF) 2014 Autocratic Regime Breakdown and Transition dataset. The GWF dataset provided nuance about regime type and within spell transitions that were missing from Svolik’s dataset.
Due to the availability of data the starting year for analysis is 1960 and it ends in 1999. This resulted in a dataset that includes 234 authoritarian regimes. A dummy variable \( \text{regime-end} \) will be used to denote the end of an authoritarian regime.

Measuring coalition centralization within authoritarian regimes is no easy task. Some authors use levels of societal ethnic factionalization arguing that the factional politics will be reflected from society to the regime (Stacher 2012). Others use regime type (Geddes 1999) to reflect authoritarian coalition attributes. Geddes states “different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (Ibid., 121), going on to explain that military, personalist, and party regimes all have different levels of institutionalization. These different institutions then constrain the choices of both the leadership and of members of the elite coalitions. This research seeks to examine the interaction between coalition attributes, patronage systems, and institutional design as measures of centralization of the elite coalition, which neither of the previously mentioned coalition measures fully achieve. Therefore this research uses Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors’ Winning Coalition Size \( (w) \) and Selectorate Size \( (s) \) to reflect coalition centralization. These variables take into account the size of the winning coalition in comparison to the larger Selectorate, with a smaller winning coalition being more centralized. As part of this variable Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors also account for regime type and size of patronage networks (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003).

Index variables were created to measure exogenous and endogenous shocks. Data for coups d’état comes from the Marshall and Marshall (2013) dataset. A coup dummy

\[5\] A full list of regimes is available in Appendix A.
variable was created (*coup*), and it is coded 1 if there was a successful coup, a coup attempt or a coup plot during the year in question. The Marshall and Marshall dataset also had information regarding alleged coup plots, however this was dropped from the dataset as allegations of coup plots are highly political, and is often used as a tool of the regime to persecute opposition (Hiroi & Sawa 2013). For testing of Hypothesis 3a an index variable for mass protests (*con_index*) was created from the Banks and Wilson (2015) dataset, and is composed of measures of anti-government demonstrations, revolutions, riots, and general strikes. For other models using mass protest as an independent variable, the mass unrest variables were left as separate measure in order to better understand which type of mass unrest was most likely to unset a regime and how the regime would respond to each type of unrest.

Per Gasiorowski (1995), economic crises are determined via two indicators, GDP growth rates and annual inflation rates. Data regarding these two variables was gathered from the World Bank databank (2015). As the behavior of political actors is based not just on current conditions, but on past and expected conditions I utilized rates for both the current year (*gdpchange* and *inflation*), and two-year moving averages for both inflation (*inflationavg*) and GDP growth rates (*gdpavg*) (Gasiorowski 1995). Thus models that include inflation and GDP growth rates include rates in both *y* and *y-1*. The inflation variables were heavily skewed, and therefore the natural log of both *inflation* and *inflationavg* were taken.

Measurements for liberalization and restriction of rights were taken from Gibney and co-authors’ Political Terror Scale (2015). This data measures human rights violations perpetrated by the government. It is scaled from one to five, with one being the lowest
level of political terror and five meaning that terror is pervasive in the society. An average of the U.S. State Department scale and the Amnesty International scale was taken in order to increase the available data and to adjust for discrepancies between the two types of data provided in the Political Terror Scale.

Several control variables were added to the regressions. For the regressions pertaining to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, a dummy variable Cold War was added, as coups were more likely to occur during the Cold War. Per Hiroi and Sawa (2013) regional dummy variables are added for countries in Africa and Latin America (AFRICA and LATAM), as these regions experience more frequent coups than other regions. For all hypotheses, the natural log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) from the World Bank databank was added, as poor economic development has been shown to have an adverse effect on regime durability.6

Methodology

In order to test the relationship between regime durability, coalition centralization, and potentially destabilizing events, I will be using a time series dataset that consists of 234 authoritarian regimes in existence from 1960 to 1999. For hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, and 3b have dummy dependent variables, and therefore were tested using logistic regressions with the odds ratio reported. Hypotheses 3a, 4a, and 4b had continuous dependent variables, and therefore were tested using multivariate regressions with vce robust standard errors.

6 A full list of variables and variable coding is available in Appendix B.
As with any statistical analysis there are certain limitations to the data. First and foremost, the measurement of coalition centralization is crude. This is due to the difficulty in systematically and quantitatively measuring the centralization of the relationship between elites. Measurement error is also an issue as not all regimes in the dataset have complete data for all years. For instance, World Bank economic data was only available beginning in 1960, however some cases did not have economic data until much later. This has the potential to skew the results to some extent. Despite these issues it is still possible to study the impact that coalition centralization has on regime durability.

Data Analysis

Model 1 (Table 3.1) shows the impact of potentially destabilizing events and coalition centralization on authoritarian regime durability. According to Model 1, the odds that a regime will end are 21.23 times greater in larger coalitions than in smaller coalitions. Coups are 7.48 times more likely to be successful and end a regime that has a decentralized coalition. With regards to exogenous shocks, general strikes, revolutions, and antigovernment demonstrations were all found to be statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level, while riots do not increase the odds that a regime will end. This result makes sense when one considers that general strikes, revolutions, and antigovernment demonstrations all coalesce around policy-driven grievances, whereas riots are generally more spontaneous and short-lived. The statistically significant coefficients for ruling coalition, coup, and mass protest variables therefore support the assertions of Hypothesis
that a smaller, more centralized coalition will be more likely to survive endogenous and exogenous shocks.

Table 3.1: The Probability that an Authoritarian Regime Will End

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>21.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>7.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Strikes</td>
<td>1.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutions</td>
<td>1.43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigovernment Dem</td>
<td>1.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (logged)</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>2.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>2472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2$ ($p&gt;X^2$)</td>
<td>211.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed test
Odds ratios are reported with their standard errors in parentheses.

Models 2 and 3 (Table 3.2) test the second set of hypotheses, which seek to determine a relationship between economic crises and coups, as well as the ability of more centralized elite coalitions to survive coup attempts. Model 2 shows that
inflationary and GDP crises have mixed impacts on the decision-making framework of elites to either plot or carry out a coup. Only the two-year average for GDP growth was statistically significant at the 0.05 level, showing that on-going slow economic growth will make coups and coup attempts 0.95 times more likely to happen. This odds ratio is not particularly impactful, so economic crises do not appear to have a strong impact on the regime elites’ decision regarding whether or not to carry out a coup. Therefore Hypothesis 2a is rejected.

Model 3 shows that having a larger coalition makes it 23.97 times more likely that a coup will cause regime failure. In this model, coups are 9.78 times more likely to end a regime. This means that the larger and more unwieldy that a dictator’s coalition gets, the more likely it is that a coup d’état attempt will be success and the regime will end. As the coefficients of these variables are statistically significant to the 0.01 level, Hypothesis 2b is supported.
Table 3.2: Coups, Economic Crises, and Authoritarian Regime Durability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>23.97***</td>
<td>23.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.64)</td>
<td>(11.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>9.78***</td>
<td>9.78***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.11)</td>
<td>(2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Change</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Average</td>
<td>0.95**</td>
<td>0.95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (logged)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Average (logged)</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (logged)</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>2.05***</td>
<td>2.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1.93***</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>2.02***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>2031</td>
<td>2507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2$</td>
<td>75.11</td>
<td>184.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($p &gt; X^2$)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed test
Odds ratios are reported with their standard errors in parentheses.

Model 4 (Table 3.3) tests the relationship between economic crises and mass protest. Only GDP change and Inflation in year $y$ were statistically significant at the 0.10 level or below. This indicates that negative GDP growth and positive inflation in the current year increase the chances of mass unrest. This is explained by the fact that periods of mass unrest tend to coincide with political openings. While the most obvious example of a political opening is an election, a window of opportunity can also be found in periods
when the regime’s legitimacy has weakened, such as the moment when inflation begins to noticeably rise. Therefore, Hypotheses 3a is partially supported.

Model 5 tests the relationship between winning coalition size, mass protest, and regime durability. Both Winning Coalition Size and the Conflict Index were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This means that a larger coalition is 8.34 times more likely to end as a result of mass protest than a smaller coalition. Once again, general strikes, revolutions, and antigovernment demonstrations are all statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is supported.
Table 3.3: Mass Protests, Economic Crises, and Authoritarian Regime Durability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>8.34***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.71)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Strikes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigovernment Dem</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Change</td>
<td>-6.44**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.83)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Average</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (logged)</td>
<td>20.44*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Average (logged)</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (logged)</td>
<td>64.68***</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.27)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-240.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2$</td>
<td>127.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($p&gt;X^2$)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ ($5, 1977$)</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($p&gt;F$)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed test
Odds ratios and coefficients are reported with their standard errors in parentheses.

The final models seek to parse out typical regime responses to both endogenous and exogenous threats. The dependent variable in these models is the average of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) in a given year. Models were run leading the PTS one and
two years in the future. This accounts for the fact that regime responses are not always immediate, and may take time to be reflected in measurements of political repression in the system. Models 6 and 7 (Table 3.5) seek to determine the relationship between coups and levels of repression. In both models, the ruling coalition variable is significant at the 0.01 level, however coup attempts are only statistically significant at the 0.10 level in year $y+1$. This may indicate that regime responses to coups tend to be internal to the coalition rather than systemic, and that any systemic repression is more immediate. The direction of the coefficient for the coup variable is positive, and therefore coups are associated with an increase in repression in year $y+1$. Hypothesis 4a is therefore supported with reservations.
Table 3.4: Regime Repression Post-Coup d’état

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
<td>-0.46***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (logged)</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
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<td>1447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ $(p&gt;F)$</td>
<td>19.08</td>
<td>16.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed test

Coefficients are reported with their standard errors in parentheses. Model 6 has a one-year lead on the dependent variable, and Model 7 has a two-year lead.

Models 8 and 9 (Table 3.5) test the relationship between mass protest and regime repression. In these models both Winning Coalition Size and the Conflict Index are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, due to the positive nature of the coefficient it would seem that levels of repression are increased in the two years after mass protest. Hypothesis 4b is rejected. However, this does show that the regime targets dissent for reprisal in the immediate aftermath of the event. The slightly larger and generally more significant coefficients in year $y+2$ indicate that there is actually an
The increase in political repression in the two years immediately following a mass protest event.

Table 3.5: Regime Responses to Mass Protest Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>-0.78***</td>
<td>-0.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Strikes</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutions</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigovernment Dem</td>
<td>0.04**</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita (logged)</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Obs.</td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$ (p&gt;F)</td>
<td>23.36 (0.00)</td>
<td>24.29 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, two-tailed test
Coefficients are reported with their standard errors in parentheses. Model 8 has a one-year lead on the dependent variable, and Model 9 has a two-year lead.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined several interrelated relationships that speak to a dictator’s ability to ward off threats to his regime. First and foremost, this analysis aimed to show that a more centralized ruling coalition is more durable, in part because it is able to ward off threats from both within and from outside of the coalition itself. The most
tangible threats to the regime include coups d’État and mass upheaval. A more centralized ruling coalition is better able to respond to and ward off these threats. The analysis in this chapter supports that conclusion.

In order to evaluate when these threats are most likely to occur, analysis also looked at the impact of GDP and inflationary crises on the two most pressing threats to the regime. The results for this were mixed. With regards to endogenous threats economic crises did not seem to have an impact on the decision among elites to perpetrate a coup. However, mass upheaval is more likely to happen if a country is currently in the midst of an economic crisis.

The final relationship that this chapter sought to establish was the relationship between potentially destabilizing events and regime repression. The results for these tests were intriguing. In the years immediately following an event, there was a statistically significant increase in repression only in the year immediately following the coup event. However, this relationship is weak as it was only significant at the 0.10 level, which shows that punishment for coups may be more focused on the coup perpetrators rather than on the public at large. There is a statistically significant relationship between mass protest and an increase in repression. This research showed that the Political Terror Scale registers an increase in repression in both \( y+1 \) and \( y+2 \) after any of the forms of mass protest that were tested. This includes riots which were not a statistically significant threat to regime durability, showing that the perception of threat to a dictator is enough to provoke a policy response. While these findings rejected Hypothesis 4b, they are indicative of the types of responses that authoritarian regimes have when faced with exogenous shocks.
Chapter Four: Ruling Coalition and Policy Responses in Morocco

The Moroccan Case Study

Since its independence in 1956 Morocco has often been lauded as the exception to the rule in both the Middle East and in Africa. Although it is an absolute monarchy it is often referred to as having “enlightened authoritarianism” (Howe 2005), or “upgraded authoritarianism” (Heydemann 2007). These terms refer to the fact that Morocco has combined some aspects of liberal governance with more traditional authoritarian rule — especially coercion and patrimonialism. The three post-independence kings7 have each given lip service to democracy and pluralism. In particular both King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI have, on the one hand, repeatedly referenced the ideals of democracy in speeches as well as in new laws and constitutions, and on the other hand have failed to deliver the democratic promises set forth in numerous constitutional re-writes, dismantled free speech, and unlawfully detained political dissidents, among other things.

While the post-independence Moroccan monarchs have repeatedly failed to deliver on their promises, and have, in fact, used tools of coercion to suppress dissent, they are nearly universally beloved by their people. While polling questions are generally not allowed to ask about the King, on the 10-year anniversary of his ascension to the throne, King Mohammed VI garnered an approval rating of 91% (“Morocco and its King” 2009). This led a member of the European Parliament to proclaim that Morocco

7 Mohammed V ruled Morocco as sultan of the Moroccan Protectorate from 1927 to 1957, and as King of Morocco from 1957 to his death in 1961. King Hassan II ruled from 1961 to his death in 1999. The current King of Morocco, King Mohammed VI, has ruled since 1999.
was the most stable country in Africa and that the Kingdom is a model for the region (“Morocco is the Most Stable” 2014).

The durability of the modern Alaouite dynasty was never more tested than in two periods: the coup attempts on King Hassan II in 1971 and 1972, and the Arab Spring Protests in 2011 and 2012. These events represent both endogenous and exogenous shocks to the regime, and the regime responded to each with changes to policy and a crackdown on dissent. This chapter will look at policy responses to potentially destabilizing events in Morocco, focusing on the policy responses put forth by King Hassan II after the coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, and those put forth by King Mohammed VI in response to the 20 February Movement.

This chapter will proceed as follows: the first two sections will look at the ruling coalitions of King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI. The ruling coalition in Morocco is referred to as the makhzen, which translates literally to “warehouse” in Arabic. Members of the makhzen are the true holders of power in Morocco. In addition to this it will be necessary to also look at the role of institutions in Morocco. Governmental institutions in Morocco are important to the durability of the regime. In particular, non-executive institutions play a special role in maintaining the regime. Morocco has a multiparty parliament from which the Prime Minister of Morocco is selected. The parties and legislature of Morocco can be classified as the Selectorate of the Kingdom, and therefore they are an important part of the King’s clientele network. The second section will look at the role of economic crises in Morocco, paying particular attention to the

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8 In Morocco, the organizers of the Arab Spring Protests are called the 20 February Movement. They are named after the first day of official protests.
correlation between GDP and inflationary fluctuations and coups d’etat and mass upheaval. The third section will focus on regime responses to potentially destabilizing events, and will look in particular at the causes of and responses to the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts, and the final section will look at the causes of and responses to the Arab Spring movement in 2011.

*Ruling Coalition and Selectorate under Hassan II*

This section will look at the ruling coalitions under Hassan II and Mohammed VI, as well as the institutions used by the monarch to coopt, control, and monitor potential rivals. As stated in Chapter 2, elite coalitions are made up of two distinct groups. The ruling coalition, or as Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors refer to them the Winning Coalition, is made up of those key figures who are necessary to the survival of the dictator. The ruling coalition comes from the Selectorate, which is a larger body of elites that are necessary to the dictator, but who do not have real governing power. The Selectorate are, therefore, members of the dictator’s patronage network, but they differ from the ruling coalition in that they do not have true power in the system.

In Morocco, the King is the highest authority in the land. His legitimacy is both traditional and religious in nature. Members of the Alaouite dynasty have ruled Morocco since the mid-seventeenth century, and are descendants of the prophet Mohammed. The religious and traditional legitimacy harkens back to the ancient origins of the regime, and connects to culturally important figures. The religious nature of the monarch’s legitimacy is also evident in the dual nature of the executive. According to Article 41 of the Moroccan constitution, the King of Morocco is the *amir al-munimminin*, or the
Commander of the Faithful, and as such he “sees to the respect of Islam” (Mor Const, Art. 41). Therefore the Moroccan monarch is not just the chief executive, but he is also the chief religious figure in the country. His dual authority gives him the vast majority of the power in Morocco, as his role as the chief executive coalesces power in his office and his role as the chief religious authority makes his person sacred. The sacred nature of his person makes it sacrilege – and illegal – to criticize the King in the press, and has helped the monarchy to repress free speech and target dissent.

The makhzen, as the ruling coalition, is comprised of the political elite within Morocco and consists of those closest to the king, including relatives, top-ranking military personnel, local people of influence, and cabinet ministers (Waterbury 1970). The most important of the cabinet members are the key Ministries of Sovereignty, which consists of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Islamic and Religious Affairs. These ministries have control over much of the prime legislative arenas, and they are appointed directly by the King rather than the Prime Minister (Howe 2005; Miller 2015). The makhzen make up a “hegemonic state apparatus” (Zerhouni 2004: 62), and are considered the absolute authority within Morocco.

While members of the makhzen hold positions of authority within Morocco, they are first and foremost members of the King’s clientelistic network. Together with the King, the government of Morocco is “a network of power and grants from the top rather than balance and mutual concessions among the different organs. The top or the center is then in control, and it exercises control through arbitration and distribution of rewards” (Korany 1988: 157). No matter how much lip service is paid to democratization, or how
many reforms are made, the government in Morocco remains first and foremost a field wherein alliances to the King are built (Waterbury 1970).

Under Hassan II the constitution gave the King an extraordinary amount of power, and he was able to manipulate the political system to suit his needs (Boukhars 2011). King Hassan II was a crafty manipulator of power, and throughout his tenure he increasingly centralized power within the halls of the palace. He would use a combination of brute force, wit, and cunning to ensure his own survival (Boukhars 2011; Howe 2005). In *The Commander of the Faithful*, John Waterbury described Hassan II’s power thusly:

King controls the most desirable administrative posts, and he manipulates appointments in the same manner that he distributes economic sanctions and rewards: to hold his secular clientele in line, attract new recruits, and keep opponents off balance. (Waterbury 1970: 152)

The arbitrary nature of membership in King Hassan II’s ruling coalition helped to centralize the coalition. Under Hassan II the *makhzen* was like a large family with the King at the center as the father figure. While individual members may have squabbled they were all “united in approval of the direct role of the monarchy in politics” (Waterbury 1970: 149). While this familial relationship may seem warm and inviting, Hassan II had an arbitrary and autocratic nature. If one lost his trust or questioned his role it would lead to harsh prison sentences and the loss of material wealth.

Coercive tactics and fear were not the only tactics Hassan II used to control his ruling coalition. Starting with decolonization, the King and the *makhzen* had access to state wealth in the form of land, companies, and other rents that were distributed to the King’s patronage network. Prior to independence, the French controlled vast swaths of
land in Morocco, including much of the arable land and the phosphate mines. Rather than risk destabilizing the Alaouite regime, they gave two-thirds of this land to the monarch — Hassan II’s father, Mohammed V — and his close friends (Henry 1997). The 1970s brought about the rise of economic liberalization as the dominant paradigm in international economics. In conjunction with this the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began making their loans contingent upon privatization of the economy. The 1970s were an economically unstable time for Morocco, and the King looked to the international community for funds to help stabilize the economy and fund his patronage network (Ibid.). The IMF privatization clause forced Morocco to begin the process of redistributing lands and other state owned assets to private hands.

However, this privatization was not done on the open market. In 1980 the members of the makhzen purchased the ONA Group, a holding company that was Morocco’s largest and most powerful conglomerate. The ONA Group purchased many of the soon-to-be-privatized government resources (Henry 1997). The group’s purchase of these ostensibly privatized assets assured the IMF that the income from those assets did not leave the hands of the makhzen, but it also meant that Morocco had complied with the economic privatization provisions tied to donor money and international loans.

This is indicative of the larger problem of corruption that marked Hassan II’s reign, and that continues to persist within Morocco. The privatization of state-owned assets during economic liberalization is just one instance of the high levels of corruption. Public goods and development projects were used to increase the personal wealth of the makhzen. This type of corrupt activity was rampant. One example occurred when members of the makhzen were given public money to build new shipyards in Marrakesh.
While Marrakesh is a business center within Morocco, it is also 100 miles from the sea (“Royal Gulag” 2001). There was also an instance in 1971 wherein Pan American Airlines (Pan Am) reversed plans for an Intercontinental Hotel in Casablanca. The project was to be built and run entirely by Pan Am, and was being built in order to increase tourism in Morocco and showcase Pan Am’s North African service. Ostensibly, this project would have benefitted both Morocco and Pan Am, however, Pan Am decided against moving forward with the project after they received many too requests for hefty “commissions” from high ranking Moroccan officials (Howe 2005).

High levels of corruption can have a deep and lasting impact on economic development within a country. It reduces government efficiency, which negatively impacts economic growth (Ezrow and Frantz 2011). Higher levels of corruption in dictatorships are also signs of more entrenched patronage networks. Dictators use these patronage networks in order to buy support. Rents are divvied out through formal institutions, and these institutions — often legislative bodies and political parties — are built and maintained by the dictator in order to lower transaction costs, monitor potential rivals, and strengthen patron-client relationships (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Therefore the existence of institutions, like the parliament, does not necessarily signal democratic opening, but rather they are often signs of a dictator’s political machinations.

While high levels of corruption can lead to stronger patron-client relationships, it can also have an adverse effect wherein it can destabilize the regime through endogenous shocks. If corruption levels are perceived to be too high they can lead to coup attempts. These coups are known as “guardian” coups. High-ranking military personnel usually head these coups, and the perpetrators want to maintain the existing power structures.
However, they also want to fix fundamental aspects of the system and bring the regime back to its most pure form (Huntington 1968). This is where the monitoring function of institutions is particularly useful. If the ruling coalition is more centralized then the dictator is better able to prevent potential coups from happening, and more likely to survive coup attempts if they do happen. This relationship between corruption, patronage, guardian coups, and authoritarian stability will be explored later in the chapter during the examination of the coup attempts against Hassan II.

*Ruling Coalition and Selectorate under Mohammed VI*

When King Hassan II passed away in the summer of 1999 his eldest son, Sidi Mohammed, ascended to the throne. The newly minted King Mohammed VI brought with him great hope for democracy. He was seen as a more liberal and Western-minded leader, and the people of Morocco believed that he would begin the transition to a more constitutional monarchy. This hope was further supported in Mohammed VI’s first throne speech when he avowed his devotion to the constitutional monarchy, the multiparty system, and a strengthened rule of law. He also promised to tackle corruption, poverty, and human rights issues (Mohammed VI 1999). However, while there have been improvements in certain policy areas, most significantly in women’s rights, true democracy is still a far away dream for Morocco’s citizens. This is because Mohammed VI has continued the top-down leadership of his forbearers. Even after a constitutional revision in 2011 the vast majority of power within the Kingdom lies in his hands.

The *makhzen*, and its patronage network, continue to exist under Mohammed VI. In 1999 the King sparked a great deal of optimism that the *makhzen* would lose power.
Within the first year of rule Mohammed VI dismissed many of his father’s key advisors and replaced them with technocrats. One of the most significant changes to the ruling coalition was the replacement of Driss Basri as Minister of the Interior. Basri was Minister of the Interior from 1979 to 1999, and was Hassan II’s closest and most trusted advisor (Howe 2005; Miller 2013). He was also the most feared member of the makhzen. This is because, as Minister of the Interior, Basri had control over Morocco’s coercive apparatus. Therefore many of the human rights violations that occurred during the Years of Lead⁹ can be laid at his doorstep.

Shortly after his accession to the throne, Mohammed VI enacted what became known as the Artichoke Operation, or the slow and methodical removal of Basri from power. The first step involved taking away the directorship of the Bureau of Territorial Surveillance and placing it under a gendarmerie officer. The second step involved moving the mission to manage Moroccan claims to Western Sahara from Basri’s control to a former diplomat. These two steps effectively took the most key security related posts away from Basri. The next step of the Artichoke Operation involved removing Basri’s men from the head of the state television and national news agency. Basri was also the Minister of Information, so this step took away his power over propaganda. The final step involved giving him the Grand Ribbon of the Arch, Morocco’s highest award for public service and then summarily dismissing him (Derdzinski 2009; Howe 2005).

However, Driss Basri was just the first in a slew of ministers to be replaced. These new members of the makhzen were more technocratic and were often considered to

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⁹ The Years of Lead, or les années du plomb, are the term applied to the harsh repression and iron fisted rule that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. This will be discussed in further detail later in the chapter.
be more liberal. In fact, many of Mohammed VI’s key palace insiders were educated in the West (Miller 2013), and there was great hope that they would tackle the biggest problems facing Moroccan society (Selvik and Stenslie 2011; Zerhouni 2004). While the removal of Basri and other ministers can be viewed as a signal of Mohammed VI’s more progressive and liberal viewpoint, as well as an attempt to atone for human rights violations that occurred during the Years of Lead, there is an argument to be made that Basri’s dismissal was simply a political maneuver, and was a continuation of the policies of cooptation that marked Hassan II’s rule. Basri’s Deputy Minister was replaced by one of Mohammed VI’s good friends, Fouad Ali El Himma,\(^\text{10}\) who became the “king’s eyes and ears” in the Interior Ministry (Derdzinski 2009, 52). In fact, the King has consistently put friends and business partners in positions of power. The removal of some of his father’s most powerful ministers was merely a maneuver to centralize and personalize Mohammed VI’s ruling coalition.

Indeed, ministerial appointments as a form of patronage have not changed in Mohammed VI’s reign. An example of this occurred shortly after Mohammed VI ascended to the throne, and was the final nail in the coffin of the Moroccan people’s democratic hopes. Parliamentary elections were held in 2002, and although the Islamist party – the Justice and Development Party (“PJD”) – won 42 seats in the election, they were not represented in post-election ministerial appointments. Instead, the King chose Driss Jettou, a palace loyalist who was not affiliated with any party as Prime Minister.

\(^\text{10}\) Between 1999 and 2007 El Himma rose up the ranks in the Ministry of the Interior. In 2007 he resigned from the Ministry to run for office, and in 2011 the King appointed him to an advisory position within the Royal Cabinet (“King Mohammed VI Appoints” 2011).
Jettou’s cabinet primarily consisted of high-ranking members of the loyalist political parties regardless of the number of seats their respective parties held in parliament (Miller 2013). With each successive set of parliamentary elections, and each distribution of ministerial appointments to palace insiders, voter apathy has increased and turnout has generally decreased over time (Howe 2011; Miller 2013; Zerhouni 2004). This has further entrenched legislative positions and the corruption associated with them as a way to increase personal wealth.

At the beginning of Mohammed VI’s reign corruption was one of the major issues facing Morocco, and one of the issues he promised to tackle in his first throne speech. However, 16 years later corruption remains a major problem within Morocco. With a score of 39 out of a possible 100 (100 being least corrupt), Transparency International ranks Morocco as 80th in the world in terms of perceived corruption. In particular, budget openness, measured in part by the extent of legislative oversight and opportunities for public participation, is minimal (“Corruption Perceptions Index” 2014). According to the Global Corruption Barometer the vast majority of Moroccans feel that the level of corruption in Morocco remained the same or increased between 2007 and 2010, and that the government is doing little to combat corruption (“Global Corruption Barometer” 2013).

This perception of government corruption has a basis in the practices of the elites. In 2010 the Wikileaks cables showed corruption at the highest levels of the makhzen. The leaked cables and emails showed that state institutions in Morocco are used to solicit bribes, particularly within the real estate sector. This is a continuation of the institutionalization of the corruption that occurred under Hassan II. In fact, these cables
illustrated that the *makhzen* now collect and distribute bribes through the ONA Group (“US Embassy Cables” 2010). The ONA Group is controlled by the palace, and decisions within the company are made only by the King and two of his closest associates, Fouad Ali El Himma and Mounir Majidi, the King’s private secretary (Benchemsi 2012; Black 2010). One of the leaked cables stated that it “now clears most large development projects, regularly coerce developers into granting beneficial rights to ONA” (“US Embassy Cables” 2010). Around the same time that the Wikileaks cables were published the ONA Group merged with Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI), a private holding company owned by the Moroccan government. This privatized the company and took it off the Casablanca stock exchange, thus ending the financial transparency that was necessary to be a publicly traded company in Morocco (Benchemsi 2014). SNI’s financial dealings, which are controlled by the King, are now shrouded in complete secrecy.

As previously stated, higher levels of corruption are indicative of stronger patron-client relations. They help the dictator buy support from influencers and reward supporters (Maghraoui 2001). Patronage and corruption go hand-in-hand in Moroccan governance. Under both Hassan II and Mohammed VI there have been high levels of endemic corruption. The monarchy has essentially used economic rents to centralize their coalitions and maintain power. However, this is a double-edged sword as high levels of corruption were also used as a call to action prior to the 1972 coup attempt and the Arab Spring protests.
Institutions and Regime Durability in Morocco

Institutions in Morocco, and in particular electoral and legislative institutions, are used to preserve the political authority of the King and by extension the *makhzen*. Institutions in Morocco are constitutionally guaranteed. Beginning with the 1962 constitution, and continuing in the current constitution, the people of Morocco have been granted an elected parliament as well as a multiparty system (Mor Const (1962), Art. 3; Mor Const (2011), Art. 7). Indeed, Morocco has progressed much further than many other states in the Middle East and North Africa in developing these democratic structures (Selvik and Stenslie 2011). However, Morocco’s representative institutions are not democratic in nature, and are merely cooptative mechanisms used to centralize power in the hands of the monarchy and the *makhzen*.

Even through successive changes to the constitution, real power is held in the king’s hands. Under the 1962 constitution all legislation was required to be passed either by the parliament or by voters in a referendum. In actuality, parliament was unable to propose legislation and could only act as a rubber stamp for legislation proposed by the palace. The King also had the power to declare a state of emergency, and was the only one with the right to dissolve parliament (Mor Const (1962), Art. 35). Moroccan legislatures did not even have the ability to form their own governments as the constitution gave the King, and only the King, the right to appoint the Prime Minister and his Cabinet members (Mor Const (1962), Art. 72). The constitutional changes put forth in 2011 made some progress, most notably that the King had to choose the Prime Minister from the majority party in parliament (Mor Const (2011), Art. 7). However, the King is still able to rule by decree, appoint or dismiss cabinet members, dissolve parliament, and
set the legislative agenda (Mor Const (2011), Art. 51; Mor Const (2011), Art. 74; Mor Const (2011), Art. 104).

In addition to the centralization of power found in the constitution, the legislature, the multiparty system, and the electoral process help reinforce the existing power structure. The electoral system is designed to coopt regional elites and envelop them into a patronage network. Small, heavily gerrymandered districts were drawn in order to determine and control representation. In particular, these districts ensure that representatives in the legislature are loyal to the King (Barwig 2012; Sater 2009). The multiparty system, the high levels of corruption in government, and the institutionalized patronage system have all led to a fragmentation of the political system.

The multiparty system that is guaranteed within the Moroccan constitution centralizes power in the Palace and fragments potential opposition. This type of system is an inclusive electoral system, and it serves to strengthen ruling coalitions and maintain the status quo (Barwig 2012; Sater 2009). Electoral rules made political entrepreneurs out of local elites. An electoral system that is based on proportional representation with low thresholds and small districts encourages local elites to run for office in order to gain access to beneficial patronage systems. Becoming a part of the institutionalized patronage system breaks the ties between the representative and the constituent. Due to the economic gains associated with loyalty, representatives become more accountable to the dictator and the ruling coalition than to the broader population. This has a three-fold effect on the system. One, it strengthens the regime by making the elected officials more accountable to the dictator and the ruling coalition than to the citizens. This is achieved by linking material rewards to loyalty to the regime. By tying access to the patronage
system with electoral success the dictator ensures the loyalty of legislators. Loyalty is measured by the ability to tow the line and approve palace-friendly bills. This perpetuates the rubber stamp nature of the parliament, as voting against palace-approved bills could result in decreased access to rents.

The second effect is that Morocco’s electoral and legislative institutions serve to fragment potential opposition. An inclusive multiparty system serves to increase the number of viable political parties within the system. The monarchy has used political pluralism to its advantage in an effort to be the main arbiter of politics (Maghraoui 2013). Indeed, the monarchy has created new political parties in order to attract economic elites into the political scene (Sater 2009). The profusion of political parties makes it harder for opposition parties to form sustained coalitions. Alliances between parties tend to be ad hoc and built around a specific issue. When the issue has passed these coalitions dissolve and never develop into more wide-ranging calls for change (Cavatorta 2009). This party fragmentation allows the monarchy to step in, solve conflicts, and manipulate parliament to suit his aims.

Permanent coalitions are even harder to maintain given the fact that political parties in Morocco shift from being loyalist to opposition parties frequently. This loyalty switching is best illustrated by the 2013 cabinet reshuffling. One of the oldest parties in Morocco, Istiqlal, withdrew from the governing coalition in early October 2013. When the new cabinet was formed it involved ministers with close palace ties, including some who had served in positions under Hassan II. However, what is interesting here is not the make-up of the cabinet, but the decision of Istiqlal to abandon the governing coalition. In doing so they switched from a loyalist to opposition party, in part, because they did not
want the blame for rising food prices (Errazzouki 2013). Because politicians, and therefore political parties, are political entrepreneurs in the inclusive electoral system they will switch loyalties in order to maintain elected positions and therefore maintain access to the patronage system. However, in doing so, they alienate the electorate, who, in turn, begin to view the system as corrupt and inefficient.

This brings us to the third way in which the multiparty parliamentary electoral system in Morocco serves to maintain the status quo: the demobilization of voters. Widespread corruption and rent-seeking practices among politicians, plus distrust in the system’s ability to change, lead to voters losing faith in the system. Potential voters see parliament and political parties as inefficient avenues for change (Kamrava 2010), and therefore cease to participate in electoral politics. This is mirrored in measurements of trust in electoral institutions. A 2012-2014 Arab Barometer survey of 1,116 Moroccans found that 43% of respondents “absolutely did not trust” parliament, and 59.5% believed that corruption was the same or worse than it was two years ago (Jamal et al. 2014). This has led to a decrease in participation in parliamentary elections. The same survey showed that 51.2% of respondents did not vote in the last parliamentary election\(^\text{11}\) (Ibid.). These elections were the 2011 parliamentary elections that were held in response to the Arab Spring protests in February of that year. This illustrates the true extent of voter demobilization. Given that post-Arab Spring parliamentary elections were a signal of sweeping change and hope for democracy the fact that over half of respondents did not

\(^{11}\) Voter turnout information for the November 2011 parliamentary elections has never been released, so it is not possible to compare survey responses with official numbers.
vote shows the extent to which potential voters feel disconnected from parliament and elected officials.

Economic Crises and Potentially Destabilizing Events

As discussed in Chapter Three, potentially destabilizing events have some correlation with economic crises. Chapter Three looked at the impact of two types of economic crisis, inflationary and GDP. It was found that coups d’état do not have a robust and statistically significant causal relationship with inflationary or GDP crises, however, mass protest events are more likely to occur in conjunction with economic crisis. Graph 4.1 shows both inflation rates and GDP growth rates in Morocco from 1960 to 2013. In order to illustrate the relationship between economic upheaval and potentially destabilizing events it also shows incidences of coup attempts and mass upheaval. Coup attempts are marked by the green dotted lines, and mass protests are marked by the purple dotted lines. Coup d’état information comes from the Marshall and Marshall (2015) adverse regime change dataset, and mass protest data comes from a combination of the Banks and Wilson (2015) dataset and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (2015). In order to pare down the amount of noise on this chart only anti-government demonstrations are illustrated.

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12 No World Bank Data is available for Morocco for the years 1964 and 1965.
13 The choice of anti-government protest for illustrative purposes was based on the fact that the Arab Spring protests discussed later in the chapter are classified as such.
From this graph the relationship between endogenous and exogenous regime shocks, GDP and inflation rates in Morocco, can be parsed out. Prior to the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts GDP change was erratic and fluctuated greatly, and there was also rapidly increasing inflation. The Arab Spring protests of 2011 are associated with slower, but steadier, GDP rates and inflation rates (particularly in the food and oil sector) that were on the rise in the year in which these protests occurred. This corresponds with the relationships between inflation and protest that were evaluated in Chapter Three.
Endogenous Shocks and Regime Durability: The 1971 and 1972 Coup d’état Attempts

In the modern era of the Moroccan monarchy there have only been two coup attempts. These events occurred in 1971 and 1972 during the reign of Hassan II. This section will look at the causes of these coups as well as how the regime responded to them.

Hassan II ascended to the throne in February 1961 upon the death of his much loved father Mohammed V. Upon gaining the throne the first thing that Hassan II had to do was ensure that the monarchy had political supremacy in Morocco (Miller 2013). In order to maintain the power of the monarchy, he needed to establish his ruling coalition. He began by coopting several key players into the patronage system. His first step was bringing Istiqlal into the patronage system, thus curtailing their ability to persuade effectively criticize the regime. Istiqlal was essential the fight for independence from France, and had shifted to a political party once that was achieved. Due to its role in the independence movement, it had a certain amount of prestige among the people of Morocco (Howe 2005). The 1962 constitution, drafted by Hassan II, removed Istiqlal’s ability to make change from within electoral institutions, and began the process of consolidating power within the monarchy.

The first decade of Hassan II’s rule was turbulent. As he was trying to tighten his grip on power and centralize his ruling coalition, the King had to deal with the rising power of the leftist elites, including the political party Union des Forces Populaires (UNFP) and its leader Mehdi Ben Barka (Selvik and Stenslie 2011). He also had to deal with student unrest, workers’ strikes, and the rise of Pan-Arabism, all of which put strain
on his credibility as monarch. In order to deal with the social chaos of these movements Hassan II relied greatly on the military and the security services. He integrated military officials into the ruling coalition, and rewarded their loyalty with influential positions. In 1964, he named General Mohamed Oufkir, who was the head of the intelligence services, as Minister of the Interior, and in 1965 he negated the constitution and enacted a state of emergency (Miller 2013), giving the military, intelligence services, and the palace nearly unlimited power.

This reliance on the military was an attempt to fully coalesce power within the halls of the palace. However, factors outside the palace were serving to destabilize the coalition and endanger the monarchy. In addition to social upheaval and the rise of leftist parties, the economy of Morocco was in dire straits. The corrupt distribution of land at independence led to an economy that was not modernized. The lack of modernization led to underperformance in many indicators of economic viability including productivity, high rates of unemployment, and rising inflation — especially of food staples (Miller 2013). These economic factors were exacerbated by rampant corruption and government theft (Gandhi 2010; Howe 2005; Waterbury 1976).

This background of coalition politics, social upheaval, and economic chaos set the stage for the two coup attempts that would rock the monarchy. The first attempt happened on July 10, 1971. It was Hassan II’s 42nd birthday, and he was throwing a lavish fête at his palace in Skhirat. Guests included most of Morocco’s high-ranking military officials, including General Oufkir, as well as members of the diplomatic corps, and other influential Moroccans (Doublet 2006; Howe 2005). The party was also where
Lieutenant General M’hamed Ababou and General Mohamed Medbouh, two Berber officers in various positions of authority, attempted to overthrow the monarchy.

As the celebrants were sipping on beer, playing golf, and relaxing, 1,200 cadets were being bused to the palace doors. The cadets were given thousands of rounds of live ammunition, and were told to not let anyone out alive. They ended up killing 98 people, including government ministers, the Belgian ambassador to Morocco, and the King’s personal physician. Hassan II, General Oufkir, and several other aides survived the violence by hiding in a bathroom (Doublet 2006; Howe 2005; Miller 2013).

In the midst of the chaos the King endowed General Oufkir with even more authority. Once the violence was over the repercussions began, and Oufkir used his newfound authority to retaliate against the perpetrators. By the end of the day both Lieutenant General Ababou and General Medbouh were dead, and within the week all other rebel officers had been summarily executed, and many of the cadets were thrown in jail after quick trials.

A little over a year later a second coup attempt was perpetrated; this time by General Oufkir and two Air Force commanders. On August 16, 1972, as the king was flying home from France on a Royal Air Maroc Boeing 727 four fighter jets from the Kénitra Air Force base intercepted the plane and began trying to shoot it down (Howe 2005; Miller 2013). Once he realized what was happening it is said that the King took control of the aircraft, and fooled the ground crew into thinking he was dead by radioing them the message that “the tyrant is dead” and his plane was able to land safely (“King Hassan” 1999).
The response to these coup attempts was multifaceted, and coercive tactics were used against both elites and the masses as Hassan II attempted to centralize his ruling coalition and prevent further destabilizing events. Hassan II’s first action was to centralize his ruling coalition through purges and changes in institutional structures. In the immediate aftermath of the 1972 coup attempt General Oufkir was quickly summoned to the palace at Skhirat, where he was summarily executed.\textsuperscript{14} Oufkir’s family, including his six small children, was sent to prison in the Saharan desert where they lived in deplorable conditions (Oufkir and Fitoussi 2002). The Air Force personnel who took part in the coup — as well as those who took part in the Skhirat coup attempt — were either tried and executed, or sent to Tazmamat prison.

Tazmamat was a notorious prison in the southeast of Morocco. It was built for the sole purpose of holding political prisoners and those individuals whom the regime had “disappeared.” It was a place of cruelty, where people were held without due process, and faced torture and starvation (Tuquoi 2009). It was also kept secret from the Moroccan people until 1992 (Miller 2013), and was an integral tool in Hassan II’s quest to prevent future destabilizing events. The weak rule of law allowed Hassan II to manipulate the justice system and harshly punish anyone who he deemed to be a dissident.

Prior to the coup attempts the military played a large role in the ruling coalition. However, after two coup attempts in quick succession Hassan II lost faith in the loyalty of the armed forces, and publicly called them “despicable and evil” (“Et tu, Oufkir”

\textsuperscript{14} There is some dispute as to whether or not General Oufkir was executed. Hassan II claimed publicly and in his memoirs that Oufkir committed suicide, however, Oufkir’s body was riddled with bullets, many of which could not have been self-inflicted (Hassan; Howe 2005; Miller 2013; Oufkir and Fitoussi 2001).
Within weeks of the 1972 coup attempt he had purged the armed forces of potential threats, and completely refashioned military institutions in order to guard against coup attempts in the future (Howe 2005). He fired all of the chiefs of the armed services, made himself the commander in chief, abolished the defense minister position, and forcibly retired four military judges who acquitted some 1,000 service members implicated in the 1971 Skhirat coup attempt (“Et tu, Oufkir” 1972). By the end of 1972, Hassan II had assumed complete and direct control of the military. He was personally responsible for supervising promotions, determining where officers were stationed and for how long, and for determining the Kingdom’s stock of weapons (Howe 2005).

The fallout from the coup attempts also reached beyond the institutions of power. In Chapter Three examined the relationship between state repression and coup attempts, and found that state repression increases the year following the coup attempt. This is most likely due to the fact that coups are insider attacks on the dictator, and therefore the first step in stabilizing the system is to purge potential threats from inside the halls of power. The second step is to control society and prevent the masses from destabilizing the system. In order to quell any popular uprisings, suppress dissent, and maintain an iron grip on power Hassan II authorized the use of state violence against anyone who spoke out against the monarchy and anyone who called for democracy (Howe 2005). The 1970s and 1980s are called les années de plomb, the Years of Lead, and are a dark era when political trials, torture, and disappearances were the norm (Howe 2005; Miller 2013). Tazmamart, and other secret prisons, began to fill with political dissidents, including intellectuals like Abraham Serfaty who was tortured, publicly tried, and condemned to prison for “attacking the security of the state” (Miller 2013: 170). Hassan II also cracked
down on newspapers and book publishers, forcing them to close if they published content deemed to be counter-monarchy.

Hassan II used multiple tools in order to maintain power and prevent future coup attempts. As discussed above, he completely overhauled the ruling coalition and the institutions thereof, and in addition to this he used to the coercive apparatus of the state in order to violently suppress dissent. The third and final tool that he used was to increase the size of the Selectorate in order to diffuse potential organized opposition. He reached out to more political parties and Islamists in order to bring them into the patronage networks. This increased the size and cost of the patronage network, so Hassan II sped up the process of privatizing publicly-owned assets (Henry 1997). As previously stated this privatization process was not done on the open market, but was rather done in the back halls of the palace. Assets went not to the highest bidder, but to those in Hassan II’s clientelistic network. These assets, therefore, became a way for Hassan II to use soft power in order to buy support, and centralize his coalition by tying up the economic fortunes of his ruling coalition with that of the regime itself, thus de-incentivizing rebellion.

At the end of 1972, Hassan II called for new elections to be held. By officially recognizing more Islamist and other political parties, he increased the number of parties represented in parliament (“Et tu, Oufkir” 1972). The increase in the number of political parties and groups also helped to divide potential opposition to the monarchy, and it continued the process of factionalizing potential opposition. Coalitions became more and more impermanent, and would only coalesce around certain bills. Hassan II also used his power of decree to outlaw parties who pushed for more deliberative powers in the
parliament (Ibid.), and therefore kept access to state rents available only to those who agreed that parliament was a rubber stamp body. This helped to further centralize his coalition by depoliticizing non-executive institutions, which made it impossible for potential rivals to scuttle regime responses to future potentially destabilizing events.

The 1972 coup attempt was the last time that an overthrow of the monarchy from within the ruling coalition was attempted. Hassan II’s quick thinking helped him survive two coup attempts in two years. After these coup attempts, Hassan II began instituting several changes designed to prevent further coup attempts from happening. He purged the ruling coalition and retooled institutions in order to further centralize the ruling coalition. This helped him better monitor other elites, and prevented them from perpetrating coups. In the process of institutional change, he gave himself control over the vast majority of the coercive apparatuses of the state. As part of the purges, Hassan II removed military officers from their posts and from the ruling coalition. He then used these coercive institutions in order to quash dissent from both inside and outside the ruling coalition. Finally, he increased the Selectorate by increasing representation in parliament. This served to increase access to the patronage network, but also to further factionalize the opposition. Together these actions served to stabilize the regime by centralizing the ruling coalition in order to prevent further endogenous shocks.

Exogenous Shocks and Regime Durability: The 2011 Arab Spring Protests

In June 1999, Hassan II passed away, and his eldest son became Mohammed VI. Due to Mohammed VI’s actions in the months directly after his ascension to the throne, including appointing Western-educated technocrats to positions of power and dismissing
Driss Basri from his post as Interior Minister, the Moroccan people had great hopes that the promises of democracy were going to be fulfilled at last. However, those dreams were soon dashed, and by 2002 Moroccans had lost faith in Mohammed VI’s democratic nature.

However, while the lack of expected democratization was one of the causes of the Arab Spring protests of 2011 and 2012 in Morocco, it was joined by economic concerns. Corruption within the makhzen and the lack of checks on the actions of the ruling coalition accountable for their actions were rallying cries of the protesters. Protesters shouted for the “end to autocracy” and for a dismantling of the makhzen. There were also concerns regarding high rates of unemployment among Morocco’s large young-adult population (Pelham 2011). Four out of every five unemployed people in Morocco are under the age of 34, which is twice the rate for the general population (Young 2014), so these economic concerns were a major call to action for many of the protesters.

Inflation was also a point of contention, particularly inflation of the prices of staple foodstuffs, cooking oil, and fuel. Rising prices for these staple goods had a huge impact on the lives of Moroccans, particularly when combined with the extraordinarily high unemployment rates among young Moroccans. The relationship between rising inflation and mass protest corresponds with the findings discussed in Chapter Three. Model four in that chapter found that inflation in the year $y$ has a directly proportional causal relationship with mass protest. This is further illustrated by Graph 4.1 that shows that inflation in Morocco was steadily climbing in the period directly preceding the Arab Spring protests.
The situation in Morocco came to a nadir in February 2011. Taking the example of the protests that began in Tunisia in December 2010, young people came together to organize for change in Morocco. They called themselves the 20 February Movement, named for the day of the first protest of the Moroccan Arab Spring, and they were primarily composed of young people who were unhappy with the political and economic status quo. Following the initial protest in Rabat on February 20th, protests spread to other major cities in Morocco and were near daily occurrences attracting tens of thousands protesters.

In an attempt to curtail the protests the regime recognized the grievances, and in a surprise speech on March 9th Mohammed VI raised the minimum wage, raised pay for civil servants, and promised comprehensive constitutional change (Mohammed VI 2011). This proactive reform agenda resulted in the speedy draft of a new constitution, with the King promising a constitutional referendum in June. This unexpected speech directly addressed the protesters’ grievances, and marks the first time that a Moroccan King has agreed to give up some power to elected officials (El Amrani 2014). The new constitution was approved by 98% of voters (Bakri and Goodman 2011), gave more power to the legislature, made the King choose the Prime Minister from the largest party in parliament, and recognized Berber as one of the official languages of the Kingdom (Mor Const, Art. 5).

However, the promises of this new constitution have not been realized. The King still interferes in politics and is the dominant authority on policy in Morocco. In part, this is due to the continued inability of the political parties in legislature to form long-lasting coalitions. In November 2011 early parliamentary elections were held, and the Justice
and Development Party (PJD) won 107 out of 355 seats in parliament. PJD is ostensibly an opposition party, and its head Abdeliliah Benkirane was chosen as Prime Minister after the election. However, Benkirane frequently voiced opposition to the 20 February Movement, and continually defended the monarchy as the tie that holds Morocco together. In particular, he did this during debates on Islam and freedom of belief (El Amrani 2014). Benkirane and PJD won a vast majority of their support from people living in the slums of Morocco’s major cities and from Islamist groups (“Le Parti Justice” 2011). His appointment as Prime Minister is a continuation of the traditional patterns of cooptation seen in the Kingdom. Hassan II, Mohammed VI, and previous rulers of the Alaouite dynasty have a long-standing tradition of paying off rivals, especially ones that pretend some allegiance to the King (Howe 2005).

The factionalized and depoliticized nature of the multiparty system is further illustrated by the events of October 2013, when the coalition government in parliament fell apart after Istiqlal withdrew from the governing coalition. They shifted from the governing coalition in order to protect themselves from criticism regarding price hikes on food and fuel (Errazouki 2013). This highly political maneuver was an attempt by Istiqlal to maintain access to the institutionalized patronage system while blaming other political parties for the ills of the country. Their withdrawal from the coalition sent parliament into disarray, and Mohammed VI interceded in parliamentary affairs and formed a new cabinet. This resulted in a palace-friendly Cabinet of Ministers, including several people who had been voted out of office in the November 2011 elections being re-positioned to these higher posts (Ibid.). Less than two years after Morocco’s Arab Spring and the King was once again interfering in parliamentary business, and had established a Cabinet with
close ties to the palace. Despite the calls for more democracy from protesters, the Moroccan parliament remains a rubber stamp legislature that serves as the makhzen’s foremost institution of patronage.

As stated in Chapter Three, in the years directly after a mass protest event the regime will respond with coercive tactics, and the country will see an increase in repression. Although not as publicly known as Syria or Libya, in the wake of the Arab Spring the regime in Morocco has used its coercive institutions to quiet dissent. The targets of police and security forces have primarily been protest organizers and journalists although others that speak out against the regime are subject to the same treatment. There have also been crackdowns on non-profit organizations. These activities have worked together to stifle dissent.

Human rights organizations, like the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (“AMDH”), have had their activities systematically banned. Operating since 1979, with nearly 100 regional offices, the AMDH monitors and reports human rights violations committed within the Kingdom. Since 2011 they have ever more frequently had their meetings blocked (“Morocco: Persistent Restrictions” 2015). In the past two years AMDH has increased their reporting of regime abuses, and have subsequently also received ever-intensifying attempts to block their efforts. Under Moroccan law non-profit organizations are required to report changes in executive leadership, however, when AMDH attempted to do so they were prohibited from legally registering the new executive committee (Bozonnet 2015), which inhibits their ability to effectively monitor the human rights situation in the Kingdom. Added to this the Moroccan government has threatened to withdraw AMDH’s status as an organization of “public utility” based on the
accusation that it is “a political entity opposing state institution” (“Morocco: Persistent Restrictions” 2015).

The state is targeting AMDH and other human rights organizations because they dare to call attention to the increasing human rights violations perpetuated by the state security apparatus in the wake of the 20 February protests. In particular, AMDH has called attention to the plight of journalists and members of the 20 February Movement, who have been increasingly subjected to imprisonment and torture. With the blessing of the King, parliament passed a new revision to the penal code in April 2015. This revision was dubbed “the law of the underwear” (Mekouar 2015), and it strengthens a number of provisions within the penal code dealing with extra-marital relations, homosexuality, the public consumption of alcohol, and religion. This new set of laws also includes a protection for the makhzen in that it punishes the “non-consensual publication of online digital montages” (Ibid.). Protest organizations and critics of the regime commonly use these montages in order to criticize government officials. This law has effectively increased the number of tools that the security forces can use to punish those who speak out against the regime. These sorts of vaguely worded laws are being increasingly enforced in order to punish journalists and protesters while protecting the makhzen from criticism.

As journalism has trended more towards citizen journalism government attempts to silence opposition have turned more toward censorship of the web. Shortly after the start of the 20 February Movement the website mamfakinch, which means “we won’t give up” in Arabic, was founded. It was the official news website of the pro-democracy movement, and it derived much of its content from citizen journalism. They focused on
news stories that were not covered by official state media, in particular abuses by security forces and government corruption (Mamfakinch 2014). However, in 2012 an Italian spyware firm that works only with governments hacked into the mamafakinch system, and infected it with powerful spyware that had the ability to track all users, keystrokes, and passwords (Debruyne 2015). The attack took mamafakinch offline for several months, compromised the security of its anonymous journalists, and eventually led them to close their doors permanently in February 2014.

As in many other authoritarian regimes, Moroccan security forces have also benefitted greatly from the international War on Terror in their quest to squash dissent and ensure regime survival. In March 2003, suicide bombers attacked several cafes in Casablanca killing 45 people, and shortly after this the government enacted a series of anti-terror laws. These laws have been used to target journalists for either inciting terrorism or for threatening national security. Hicham Mansouri, Maati Monjib, and five other journalists were prosecuted under the anti-terror laws for running a smartphone app that trained people on citizen journalism (“Journalists and Activists” 2015). Monjib used to run the Ibn Rochd Center for Communication Studies but he ended up closing the institute at the end of 2014 due to harassment from security officials (“Morocco: Ibn Rochd” 2014), and at one point in 2015 a travel ban was placed on him so that he could not leave the country to attend academic conferences (El Yaakoubi 2015).

In order to intimidate dissidents the Moroccan government in the post-Arab Spring years has used former CIA black sites to interrogate those who are accused of being anti-regime. One of the most famous Moroccan black sites is located in Temara, and was used during the War on Terror by the CIA to detain and torture suspected
terrorists. When the CIA ceased using this site it was taken over by the Moroccan government, who now uses it to detain and torture people with no ties to terrorist organizations (Alami 2015). The victims of this government action are mainly political opponents, and their coerced confessions are used to convict them on trumped up charges (Alami 2013).

The uptick in state repression in the years since the Arab Spring has led to the dismantling of the movement. Most of the founding members of the 20 February Movement have left the movement entirely. This is due to a combination of factors, including a lack of democratic progress and deep divisions in the movement with regards to goals (Rachidi 2015). As previously stated, the regime has also targeted members of the 20 February Movement, and this political pressure has caused membership to drop dramatically (Fakim and Verghese 2014). Political trials have targeted the pro-democracy activists and at least 2,000 members of the movement have been detained since 2011 (Rachidi 2014). This drop in the number of participants has lessened the impact and effectiveness of the 20 February Movement. Due to tight security and a large amount of surveillance their marches have ceased to draw large numbers, and many potential members have been frightened off by the potential consequences (Rachidi 2015). The highly coordinated and impactful strategy that was utilized in response to the 20 February Movement could not have occurred without Mohammed VI’s centralized ruling coalition. It enabled the King and the makhzen to maintain their power while giving lip service to democracy, and the centralized nature of the ruling coalition, meant that institutions outside the Palace remained depoliticized and therefore could not scuttle the security apparatus’ targeted measures of repression.
Conclusion

The work in this chapter built upon the foundation laid in Chapter Three’s empirical analysis. In that chapter it was hypothesized that more centralized ruling coalitions are better able to respond to and survive potentially destabilizing events. In that chapter it was found that regimes with a more centralized ruling coalition were more likely to survive both a coups d’état and a mass protest events. It was also found that authoritarian regimes are likely to respond to both endogenous and exogenous shocks with an increase in repression. These findings were illustrated in the Moroccan case study.

This chapter has analyzed the Moroccan regime’s responses to two potentially destabilizing events: the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts, and the Arab Spring Protests of 2011 and 2012. Hassan II and Mohammed VI have both used cooptation and coercion in order to stabilize their rule and to coalesce more and more power in the halls of the palace, and in doing so they were able to effectively depoliticize non-executive institutions. While both monarchs paid lip service to democracy neither Hassan II nor Mohammed VI fulfilled the promises they made in this regard. The makhzen continues to be the highly centralized ruling coalition with the King at its head, and it continues to have the vast majority of power in the system. Hassan II established the parliament as an institution of patronage, where rents of the state are handed out to those who support the King, and his son has continued this process even while ostensibly giving more power to the Prime Minister. Both rulers have used political pluralism to factionalize the opposition, and ensure that opposition parties will be unable to unite against them. These
are all key hallmarks of a centralized ruling coalition with power centralized in the executive office. Finally, as found in Chapter Three, authoritarian regimes are likely to respond to potentially destabilizing shocks by increasing the amount of repression in the system. In the face of two coup attempts Hassan II gave the security apparatus free range to suppress dissent, instituting *les années du plomb*. When faced with a potentially destabilizing antigovernment demonstration in the 20 February Movement, Mohammed VI used the state security apparatus to quash dissent and ensure that journalists and citizens were punished should they criticize the monarchy. The centralized nature of the ruling coalition in Morocco, and the measures that they have implemented in the aftermath of potentially destabilizing events, have allowed the Alaouite dynasty to endure even during the most trying of times.
Chapter 5: Ruling Coalition and policy responses in Uganda

The Ugandan Case Study

In 1962 Uganda gained its independence from the British Empire, however, it quickly fell into a cycle of coups d’état and power struggles. From the period of 1969 to 1986 it was also controlled by a series of brutal dictators, including Milton Obote, Idi Amin, and Tito Okello. In 1986, Yoweri Museveni became the president of Uganda after fighting the Ugandan Bush (1981 – 1986), and deposing Okello. Museveni ushered in an era of governmental and economic stability. While it was never considered a liberal democracy, Uganda under Museveni was still seen as a success story in the region. In fact, throughout the vast majority of his rule, Uganda was considered a more progressive oasis in an otherwise illiberal region. During his tenure in office, Museveni has restored peace and stability after decades of conflict, had success in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and was seen, in the West at least, as someone with democratic tendencies ("Uganda and Its President" 2013).

A closer look at the situation in Uganda tells a different story. Since 2005, Museveni has pushed through a series of laws that have targeted opposition candidates, civil society organizations, and the LGBT community, which have led to an increase in rights abuses as well as an increase in the suppression of dissent (Puddington 2015). This concerted effort to punish dissent increased after the 2011 and 2012 protests, and by 2015 Uganda had been downgraded by Freedom House to Not Free, in large part due to the attacks on civil liberties ("Freedom in the World" 2015).
Despite Uganda’s non-democratic status, Museveni will frequently use the rhetoric of democracy in his speeches, while simultaneously suppressing free speech, and otherwise trampling on the rights of Ugandans. This being said, his failure to deliver on democratic promises has not impacted his popularity. In a 2014/2015 Afrobarometer Museveni’s approval rating was 81.4%, which is a slight increase over certain other survey years (Afrobarometer Data 2015). In part, this is due to the large patronage networks and the regime stability that Museveni has brought to Uganda.

This is the paradox of Uganda. Museveni continues to have high levels of popularity, while at the same time he and the ruling National Resistance Movement have experienced several periods where mass unrest has threatened to topple the regime. A particular recent example is the protests that began after the 2011 presidential elections, partially inspired by the Arab Spring protests that also began in early 2011. This event represents the most potentially destabilizing exogenous shock to face Museveni during his tenure as president. Thousands took to the streets on a weekly basis to protest both economic and political conditions in the country. This chapter will look at the cause of and responses to this period of unrest.

This chapter will proceed as follows: the first section will look at Museveni’s ruling coalition. Museveni’s ruling coalition consists of members of his family, as well as a group of people known as the *historicals*, who are the 26 men who helped Museveni fight the Bush War (Tripp 2010). In addition to examining the centralization of the ruling coalition in Uganda, it is necessary to look at non-executive institutions. The institutions are mechanisms of cooptation and means through which patronage is distributed in Uganda. Therefore they are an important mechanism used by Museveni to stabilize his
regime and ensure the longevity of his rule. The second section will look at the role of economic crises in Uganda, paying particular attention to the correlation between GDP and inflationary fluctuations and mass upheavals since 1986. The final section will look at the causes of and responses to the 2011 and 2012 protests, focusing in particular on the coordinated response of the regime to these protests.

Ruling Coalition and Selectorate under Yoweri Museveni

Yoweri Museveni became president of Uganda in January 1986. Before that he led the National Revolutionary Army (“NRA”) in their Bush War against the despotic and inept leaders of Uganda. Milton Obote, Idi Amin, and Tito Okello, the previous presidents of Uganda, had systematically ruined the Ugandan economy and political institutions through a combination of malfeasance, ineptitude, and violence. The Ugandan Bush War occurred between 1981 and 1986, and pitted the NRA against the governments of Obote and Okello.

After ousting Okello in 1986 Museveni became the President of Uganda, and quickly began solidifying his rule. One of his first steps was to choose the individuals that would support his rule, but who would not pose a coup d’état threat. Museveni’s ruling coalition, therefore, is composed of two groups of people: members of his family and the historicals. Museveni’s wife and son are both key members of the ruling coalition, and there appears to be an effort to groom Museveni’s son, Lieutenant Colonel Muhozi Kainerugaba, as a successor to Museveni (“Muhozi Project” 2013). The historicals are a group of 26 high-ranking members of the resistance who fought with Museveni and the NRA during the Ugandan Bush War (Tripp 2010). In order to prevent them from
becoming threats to his regime, it was necessary for Museveni to add the *historicals* to his ruling coalition and give them some semblance of power.

Members of the ruling coalition hold positions as high-ranking officials of the cabinet, in the leadership of the National Resistance Movement\(^{15}\) (“the Movement”), and as the directors of the security services. These three institutions make up the structure of the ruling coalition in Uganda. This next section will discuss the importance of the Movement and of the security apparatus to maintaining the regime. Museveni came to power after a 20-year period in which the leaders of Uganda manipulated ethnic groups in order to create schisms in society and prevent opposition from coming together to overthrow them (Tripp 2010). This sectarianism was one of the first facets of politics that Museveni combatted upon achieving office. Instead of setting up a multiparty electoral system, which had been the system under previous leaders, Museveni set up a no-party system. Uganda’s no-party system deemed that all political parties contributed to sectarianism and upheaval, and therefore the best path forward for Uganda was to abolish political parties altogether (Museveni 1986).

However, the Movement continued to operate. This was due to some definitional wizardry. The Movement was classified not as a political party but as a movement, and thus it was legally allowed to exist and take part in politics. The difference between a movement and a political party was not clearly defined, and for all intents and purposes the Movement operated as a political party. Indeed the vast majority of Movement members can best be categorized as Uganda’s Selectorate, and the high-ranking officials

\(^{15}\) The Movement evolved from the NRA after Museveni became President. After 1995, the NRA was renamed the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (“UPDF”), and is the main military branch in Uganda.
are also crucial members of the ruling coalition and Museveni’s cabinet of ministers (“The Cabinet” 2016). In fact, the leadership in the Movement consists of a list of who’s who in Uganda politics (“Party Leadership” 2016). Even low-ranking membership within the Movement guarantees access to state rents as well as membership within Museveni’s clientelistic network. As will be discussed later the corruption that is inherent to politics in Uganda plays a large role in maintaining Museveni’s rule. The Movement is the main institution of cooptation in Uganda, and as such Museveni’s Uganda has become more and more similar to other one-party African regimes. Rising in the ranks of the Movement is contingent upon being “more Movement,” that is being a more loyal party member. Access to lucrative assignments, tasks, and party leadership positions is contingent upon pleasing Museveni (Barkan 2005).

While the Movement is home to many powerful figures and is used as an instrument of cooptation, there is some internal criticism of Museveni, particularly after he pushed for the 2005 amendment to the constitution (Barkan 2005; Tripp 2010). Article 105 of the 1995 constitution stated that presidents shall be limited to two terms in office (Uga Const (1995), Art 105), and Museveni wished to amend this Article to abolish term limits. Unhappy with this blatant push for power, some of Museveni’s harshest critics have come from the Movement, including Dr. Kizza Besigye, a perennial challenger for the presidency. Dr. Besigye and several other long-term and trusted members of the Movement began to openly criticize Museveni when he began blatantly trying to extend his tenure in office in the mid-2000s (Barkan 2005). While Besigye has remained in perpetual opposition to Museveni, many of these same critics have returned to the fold and to the ranks of the Movement, as they found that continued criticism of Museveni
brings with it persecution, bodily harm, political isolation, and exile ("Freedom in the World" 2015).

The Movement and the cabinet are the political wing of Museveni’s ruling coalition; however the security apparatus is also an integral part of the ruling coalition. The extent of the security apparatus is not entirely clear. The budget and institutional details for this sector of the government are not officially available ("Uganda: A Profile" 2016). However, at the very minimum, it consists of the Uganda People’s Defense Force ("UPDF"), the Special Forces Command, as well as a vast spy network that operates in Uganda (Lawrence 2015). The leaders of the security forces have historically been Museveni’s close confidants and family members (Tripp 2010). Currently, Museveni’s half-brother, General Salim Saleh is a major general in the Army, and is Senior Military Advisor to the President (Magombe 2013). This is evidence of the increasingly important role that Museveni has given the military. In recent years, he has implemented a “strategy of building a higher-profile military constituency and extending the armed forces into parts of civil society” ("Museveni on the Defensive" 2013). The security apparatus is important to the durability of the regime, and is therefore a necessary component of the ruling coalition, because it is used to control the population and suppress dissent. The military has 10 seats in parliament, and is used to monitor parliamentarians and push Museveni’s legislative agenda forward. The security forces also monitor civil society groups, academics, other groups deemed harmful to the regime. Furthermore, they are given broad authority to use force to break up groups of people that they judge to be unlawfully assembling ("Freedom in the World: Uganda” 2015).
The leadership of the security forces, including the military and the police, therefore has an immense amount of power in the system. However, that power is contingent upon the good favor of Museveni. If you are no longer useful to him, or you attempt to go against him in any way, then you will swiftly find yourself removed from your previous position. This is best illustrated by the removal of General David Sejusa from his position in the High Command of the UDPF, and as co-coordinator of the intelligence services. For decades Sejusa had been one of Museveni’s right-hand men, and his key point person in the security services. He ran the spy services, which monitored citizens as well as elites, and in the course of his career he oversaw many deadly operations and arrests (Lawrence 2015). However, in 2013 he began to publicly criticize Museveni and the regime. The source of his frustration was the so-called Muhoozi Project, which is the succession plan that has Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, rapidly rising in the ranks of the military, and eventually succeeding his father in the presidency. The first step of this controversial plan was the promotion of Muhoozi to General in charge of the Special Forces Command (“Muhoozi Project” 2013). In response to this, General Sejusa began to openly criticize the regime, and was forced out of office after he exposed a plot by the security services to kill officials who opposed this plan, including himself. Sejusa ended up leaving the country and living in temporary exile in London (“Ugandan ‘Whistleblower’ General” 2016).

Like all dictators, Museveni maintains control of the system through a mixture of cooptation and coercion. As previously mentioned, the main institution for cooptation is the National Resistance Movement, and corruption is the main form of patronage within Uganda. Transparency International ranks Uganda at 139 out of 168 countries in terms of
corruption, stating that they have limited budget openness (“Corruption Perceptions Index” 2015). While budgets are drafted yearly, how money is spent is not subject to open review within Uganda. Indeed, Uganda’s level of corruption is one of the highest in Africa, a continent that has long had a problem with corruption. Furthermore, doling out rents to his clientelistic network has come at the expense of dealing with problems of unemployment among young people and job creations (Nossel 2015).

One of the main sources of corruption involves international development assistance. In this regard, Museveni plays both sides of the deck. He sells Uganda as both a fragile and a stable state in order to solicit more aid. Uganda is strong because it has overcome a tragically unstable and sectarian past, but it is weak because it continues to fight the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) in the north of the country. The stability of the government assuages the concerns of donors, but the fragility in the north has allowed Museveni to continue to solicit funds for the military and defense (Fisher 2014). This has the added bonus of increasing military spending, a key part of the president’s patronage network.

Furthermore, aid for development projects is often misappropriated. USAID has spent nearly $20 billion on aid and development projects in Uganda (Epstein 2014), most of which is intended to address the health and sustenance needs of the people of Uganda (USAID 2016). However, budgets for these projects are severely bloated, which shows a level of government malfeasance and theft of funds intended for Uganda’s most needy. In fact, in 2012 the British and Irish governments suspended all direct aid to Uganda after officials in the Ugandan government funneled the money to their personal bank accounts.
The total amount stolen from aid projects amounts to over $12.7 million USD (“Aid Robbed in Uganda” 2012; Tran and Ford 2012)

Corruption is not just seen in the realm of international aid. While Uganda has not historically had mineral wealth, it recently discovered that there are fairly extensive oil reserves under Lake Albert, which is in the western part of Uganda on the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Drilling began in 2015, and the newly discovered oil wealth has already led to societal problems and an increase in government corruption. Infrastructure projects meant to transport oil to market, including major upgrades to road and rail networks, have yet to begin even though they were scheduled for 2010. Exploration for the oil reserves has also had a devastating effect on the local population, bio-diversity of Lake Albert, and on the nearby farms (Jeong 2015; Vokes 2012).

In part, this is because oil is not seen as a public good, but as a way to enrich Museveni and his ruling coalition. In 2010, the Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill was drafted. This bill was met with outcry from legislators as it would have given the Minister of Energy near total control over the oil sector while curtailing parliamentary oversight (Vokes 2012). The Bill was eventually passed in late 2012 (Biryabarema 2012). Irene Muloni, a prominent supporter of Museveni, was appointed Minister of Energy and Mineral in 2011. This powerful ministry position gives her, and by extension Museveni, near complete control over decision-making, and her appointment was seen as a reward for that support (Mwesigye 2011). This is indicative of the cooptation necessary for centralization of the ruling coalition. In order to fully centralize the ruling coalition the dictator must coopt important elites and depoliticize institutions. Given that the Ministry of Energy is in charge of the
valuable energy sector, it is necessary that the person appointed to that position be a known supporter of Museveni and the Movement in order to ensure that the valuable oil and mineral assets remain under the control of the ruling coalition and that their profits can be distributed to Museveni’s clientelistic network.

Regulation and contracting for the drilling of oil is controlled completely by Museveni and the executive office, and as such it lacks transparency. Companies who wish to acquire drilling rights have to pay ever-larger sums of money for that right. After a Canadian oil firm, Heritage, sold their mining rights to Tullow, an Irish firm, the Ugandan government informed them that they owed $434 million US dollars in capital gains taxes. Tullow disputed this, but eventually paid a $121 million deposit while the matter was undergoing arbitration. Tullow paid the balance, so that they could retain the drilling rights (Vokes 2012).

In Uganda, policy decisions are not made in order to ensure the general welfare of the mass population. Instead policy decisions are made in order to maintain power and ensure that the status quo persists (Tripp 2010). The high levels of corruption are the foundation on which power is built and maintained in Museveni’s Uganda. It is the mechanism through which Museveni ensures the support of his ruling coalition and of his Selectorate. The spoils of the corrupt system serve only to enrich the small portion of the population that has any semblance of power, and have therefore contributed to the durability of Museveni’s regime.
In Uganda, electoral institutions on all levels of government are a means of coopting people into the system of corruption, and therefore into the patronage network. While much is made of the overlap between ethnicity and voter support in Africa (Erdmann 2007), Ugandan elections and politics buck this trend. Ethnicity is not one of the deciding factors in voters’ minds when they vote for president (Tripp 2010), or when they vote for their local and federal level representatives (Carlson 2015). In both presidential and legislative elections, voters are not interested in bolstering their ethnic group, but are instead more concerned with clientelism and patronage. In other words, voters will opt for the candidate who provides the best returns for their vote. This is impactful to the durability of the Movement regime, as it means that Museveni and the Movement need not be concerned with democratization or giving up power, but instead they merely have to ensure goods are distributed to supporters. This has the effect of breaking the vertical bonds between voter and representative, while strengthening the power structure that is centralized in the office of the executive.

Uganda holds presidential elections every five years; however, these elections have become a farce. In the last 15 years Museveni has consistently sought to change election laws in order to preserve his position as president. He began with term limits. Article 105 of the 1995 constitution originally limited the president to two, five-year terms in office (Uga Const (1995), Art 105). However, just before Museveni was about to start his second term in office, parliament amended the constitution and abolished term limits. This was accomplished in large part due to a Shs5 million hand-out to each Movement MP if they agreed to abolish term limits (Kafeero 2014), as well as a cabinet
reshuffle that coopted those who were against the lifting of term limits in a successful effort to minimize disagreement over this issue. Indeed, after the cabinet reshuffling many of the newly appointed cabinet members became the loudest voices calling for the constitutional amendment (“President Shuffles Cabinet” 2005).

The second constitutional change that Museveni is trying to push through deals with Article 102 of the Ugandan Constitution, which currently states “A person is not qualified for election as President unless that person is…not less than thirty-five years and not more than seventy-five years of age.” While Museveni won the 2016 presidential election with more than 60% of the vote (Kron 2016), he is currently 71 years old. Constitutionally, this means that he will be too old to run for president in 2021. However, instead of abiding by this constitutional check on executive power, in the past two years he has made a concerted effort to abolish age limits in other political institutions. This effort began with his appointment of Benjamin Odoki, a retired Chief Justice, back to the Supreme Court. This was done against the advice of the Judicial Service commission as Odoki older than the mandatory retirement age of 70 years old (“Museveni on the Defensive” 2013). This constituted a signal that Museveni holds no stock by constitutional age limits.

Following this implicit acknowledgment that age limits should be abolished, the Movement has drafted and proposed legislation in 2015 that proposed to amend the 1995 constitution and abolish presidential age limits, arguing that Museveni “should be judged by the development he has ushered into the country and not the length of his stay in power” (Arapmoi 2015). This new amendment has yet to be passed by the legislature, but if it is it opens the door for a fifth presidential term for Museveni, and will abolish the last
barrier between Museveni and permanent presidency. Furthermore it signals the centralization of power within Uganda, and the depoliticization of the legislature.

The party system in Uganda has also been manipulated in order to serve the needs of Museveni. As previously stated, the 1995 constitution dictated that Uganda was to be a no-party system. Museveni and the historicals argued that political parties were responsible for the sectarianism that had caused or exacerbated many of Uganda’s previous problems, and therefore the best way to guard against this in the future was to eliminate parties altogether (Tripp 2010). From that point on Museveni and the Movement dominated and limited political and civil space. In 2005, the constitution was amended in order to allow for multipartyism. This was widely viewed as a boon to those who criticized the abolishment of presidential term limits. The parliament would pass the amendment that lifted term limits, if the no-party system could be abolished (Tripp 2010). Rather than a pivot towards democracy this new multipartyism is way for Museveni and his ruling coalition to consolidate power in the executive office.

How is power consolidated in multiparty Uganda? As in Morocco, the opposition in Uganda remains weak and divided. Opposition parties do not form permanent coalitions, and instead only come together to boycott proposed policies or initiatives (Tripp 2010), which allows Museveni and the Movement to maintain the existing power structure. Coalitions between parties are so difficult to build and maintain that when Kofi Annan tried to get the two main opposition candidates, Kizza Besigye and Amama Mbabazi, to join forces by bringing them together for a meeting with him in London they flatly refused to cooperate with one another (“President Forever” 2015). Furthermore, due to the extensive patronage networks that radiate out from the office of the president,
opposition parties do not have access to the same funding opportunities as the Movement. Therefore the level of support they are able to buy and maintain is more limited in scope than that of the Movement. This limits the ability of opposition parties to build broad-based support in a country where money and corruption are the main currencies.

Lack of respect for electoral rules and the open manipulation of elections\textsuperscript{16} have shown the people of Uganda that elections mean nothing and do not have the power to change the system. Continued manipulation of electoral institutions has broken the bonds between representative and citizen. Lack of trust in the system undermines the social contract between the state and the citizen. This is evident in decreasing voter turnout. In 2001, legislative and presidential elections were held, and turnout was measured at 74% of the voting age population. The February 2016 presidential and parliamentary election turnout was 60.37% ("Voter turnout data" 2016). Furthermore, while Museveni retains high job approval ratings, the ruling party has an approval rating of 48% and trust in government is mixed as 29.8% of respondents trust parliament a lot, but 25.5% report to have little trust in the institution (Afrobarometer 2016). The decreasing voter turnout rates and the lack of trust in Parliament illustrate how the citizens view power and institutional integrity in Uganda.

Two additional institutions, the judiciary and the district system, have also been manipulated in order to further centralize power in the executive office. Judicial independence is guaranteed in Article 128, Section 1 of the 1995 constitution, which

\textsuperscript{16} Most recently, Uganda’s February 2016 presidential election is widely seen as fraudulent. There were widespread reports of voter fraud, and ballot manipulation, which led to multiple incidences of rioting when some voters found that the choices for president were missing from the ballot (Brown 2016).
states that “in the exercise of judicial power, the courts shall be independent and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority” (Uga Const (1995), Art 128). And for the first few years of Museveni’s rule the judiciary was considered an independent and relatively non-corrupt institution, however, since the early 2000s this independence has eroded rapidly. Judges serve at the whim of Museveni (“President Forever” 2015), and rulings are often overturned in order to better benefit the president and the ruling party (Tripp 2010). Furthermore, an Al-Jazeera report on corruption in the judiciary found that corrupt practices are seen from the police to judges. They concluded that the “court system is more akin to a market place where justice (or rather injustice) is on sale” (Mutaizibwa 2014). An Amnesty International report found that laws have been used more and more frequently to increase and reinforce state control, and reduce constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties of expression, assembly, and association (“Rule by Law” 2014). These laws include the infamous Anti-Homosexuality Act, as well as the Public Order Management Act, which will be discussed in more detail later. A wholly subservient Supreme Court deemed the Public Order Management Act constitutional, and both laws were drafted in order to maintain the centralized power structure and suppress dissent.

The district-based nature of the Ugandan political system has also been used to increase the Selectorate and the reach of Museveni’s authority in the hinterlands of Uganda. Local councils have proliferated in recent years, and, at minimum, there are 600,000 people employed by these local government structures (Vokes 2012). These local councils were coopted into the Movement machine during the initial power centralization push in the early 1990s. Local-level civil service jobs are, therefore, part of
Museveni’s and the Movement’s patronage network, and are used to consolidate support and buy votes. This is best evidenced by the fact that Museveni has openly stated that he will not be giving infrastructure monies to the regions that give him lower levels of electoral support (Tripp 2010).

**Economic Crises and Potentially Destabilizing Events**

As discussed in Chapter Three, potentially destabilizing events have some correlation with economic crises, in particular with inflationary and GDP crises. Since Museveni took power in 1986 there have been no coup attempts, so this section will only consider the relationship between economic crises and mass protest events. In Chapter Three, Model 4 shows that GDP and Inflation in year $y$ had a statistically significant relationship with mass protest at the 0.10 level or below, indicating that negative GDP growth and positive inflation in the current year increases the chances of mass unrest. Graph 5.1 shows both inflation rates and GDP growth rates in Uganda from 1986 to 2013.\(^{17}\) Mass protests are marked by the purple dotted lines. The data for mass protest incidents comes from a combination of the Banks and Wilson (2015) dataset and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (2015). As in Chapter Four, due to the classification of the 2011 and 2012 protests examined later in the chapter only anti-government demonstrations are illustrated as the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests are classified as such.

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\(^{17}\) No World Bank data is available for Uganda for the years 1988 and 1989.
Graph 5.1: Economic Conditions and Potentially Destabilizing Events in Uganda, 1986-2013

From this graph the relationship between exogenous regime shocks, GDP change, and inflation rates in Uganda can be parsed out. In particular, there seems to be some correlation between stagnated or falling GDP and rising inflation rates with anti-government protests in Uganda. In the 2011 and 2012 case examples, the year-over-year GDP change was 9.6% in 2011 and 4.4% in 2012. The inflation rates are more telling in this instance, as the inflation rate in 2011 was 4.8% rising to a staggering 20.8% in 2012.

Exogenous Shocks and Regime Durability: The 2011 and 2012 Protests

In January 1986, when Yoweri Museveni overthrew Okello and became the President of Uganda, he paid lip-service to changing the political and economic malaise
that had gripped the country. Jubilant crowds were reported at his swearing in ceremony on January 29, 1986 (Rule 1986), and Museveni gave a speech stating that his rule would mark a “fundamental change in politics” (Museveni 1986) in Uganda. He further stated that he and the Movement government had several goals, including establishing democracy, security, ending sectarianism, regional cooperation, an end to assassination, and an increase in cooperation and unity. First among these goals was restoring democracy and security to the people of Uganda. With regards to democracy, Museveni stated that:

The people of Africa-the people of Uganda-are entitled to democratic government. It is not a favor from any government: it is the right of the people of Africa to have democratic government. The sovereign power in the land must be the population, not the government. The government should not be the master, but the servant of the people. (Ibid.)

He was just as strident, if not more so, when it came to speaking of the need for security, arguing that the people of Uganda should only die of natural causes, and that “Every person in Uganda must be absolutely secure to live wherever he or she wishes. Any individual or any group of persons who threatens the security of our people must be smashed without mercy” (Ibid.).

This tension between security, and using an iron fist to ensure security, and democratic ideals is something that plays out in Uganda to this day, perhaps never more so than in 2011 and 2012 when a series of increasingly large protests occurred in Uganda. These protests followed the February 2011 presidential election, and as with the Arab Spring protests participants were calling for more democracy, as well as an end to
corruption and profligate government spending. This section will explore the causes of the 2011 and 2012 protests as well as the regime responses to those protests, placing them in the nexus of this tension between security and democracy.

Democracy in Uganda has been a case of promises unfulfilled. As previously stated, Museveni took power in early 1986; however, the first presidential elections were not held until 1996. Arguing that until Africa saw economic growth, and a strong middle class, it could not sustain multiparty democracy (McKinley 1997), Museveni spent the years in between being sworn in and the first presidential elections restoring economic stability to Uganda. Under the Okello, Obote, and Amin regimes, Uganda’s economy was highly unstable, and there were wild swings in inflation and GDP growth rates. One of the first things that Museveni did was to take part in the International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) Economic Recovery Program in 1987. This helped Uganda begin a remarkable economic recovery, and more, importantly, stabilize economic indicators (Sharer, De Zoysa, & McDonald 1995). However, this restructuring of the economy also led to an exacerbation of the corrupt governmental practices, evidenced in the fact that Uganda’s Corruption Perception score sank from 2.71 in 1996 to 1.9 in 2001 (“Corruptions Perceptions Index” 2015). Illustrative of this is the fact that in the 1990s only 20 cents of every $1 USD the government had allocated to educational spending made it to the

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18 Until 2012 the Corruption Perceptions Index was measured on a scale of 0 to 10, with lower numbers indicating higher levels of corruption and vice versa.
19 1996 is the first time that Uganda appears on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. While having corruption numbers from 1986 to 1996 would be ideal for showing that economic stability and an increase in corruption have gone hand in hand, the sharp increase in the amount of corruption in Uganda in the period directly after economic stability illustrates a pervasive culture of corruption that was exacerbated by the economic situation in the late 1990s.
school system (Moyo 2009). The worsening corruption coupled with increased access to government rents enticed members of the Museveni government to hold onto power in order to increase personal wealth.

At the same time that corruption in Uganda was worsening, democratization was stalling. In the mid-1990s, Museveni and Uganda were lauded by the West as being a new type of regime in Africa. In 1997, Madeleine Albright said Museveni was a “beacon of hope and that Uganda was a strong “uni-party democracy” (French 1997). Others argued that his rule was the death knell for strong man dictators on the continent (McKinley 1997). However, this international acclaim for his democratic tendencies is not supported by democratic indices. Freedom House has consistently criticized elections and human rights violations in Uganda, and Museveni’s push for the end of term limits in 2005 signaled his intention to further undermine democracy in Uganda.

During this same time period Museveni and the UDPF were waging a war against the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) in the North. The LRA perpetrated wide scale atrocities against the people in the northern regions of Uganda, including rape as an instrument of warfare and the use of child soldiers (“ICC: Uganda” 2004). The battle against the LRA and the need for security has allowed Museveni to strengthen the military and paramilitary outfits (Tripp 2010). This has led to an increase in the use of the paramilitary organizations, and not just to fight against the LRA. Concern for security and stability has ensured that the paramilitaries have been used against those who express dissent against Museveni and his ruling coalition. As these paramilitary groups are not officially sanctioned, and therefore they are not regulated by the Ugandan constitution they are allowed to use interrogation techniques that are not constitutionally permitted
(Tripp 2010). This has helped perpetuate the breakdown in the rule of law, which in turn has helped Museveni and his ruling coalition maintain power.

This consistent weakening of democracy was one of the major calls to action for the opposition in 2011. February 2011 marked the fourth presidential election cycle under Museveni and the Movement. Since term limits had been abolished in 2005, Museveni was able to run for a fourth term in office. He officially won the 2011 presidential election with 68% of the vote. This win was accompanied by allegations of vote buying, vote rigging, and state intimidation of the media (“Uganda Launch Independent” 2011). Indeed, in their report on the election, the European Union Election Observation Mission noted that “avoidable administrative and logistical failures…led to an unacceptable number of Ugandan citizens being disenfranchised,” (“Final Report 2011) while also noting that there were a number of instances of violence and intimidation at the polls. They also observed that, in the run-up to the election, the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, a state-owned news organization, gave Museveni and the Movement “substantially more coverage than their nearest rivals,” and that state-radio practiced the same kind of favoritism (Ibid.).

Inspired, in part, by the Arab Spring protests the democratic movement in Uganda began in April 2011 to organize protests. These rose out of calls to fix a system that had allowed elections to be rigged and wasteful government spending to go unchecked, as well as a protest against rising commodity prices. A group called Activists for Change organized the protests, and included democracy advocates as well as opposition politicians (Namiti 2011). In the months prior to the election, inflation rates began to rise rapidly from 6% to 11%, which caused the price of goods to skyrocket (Gatsiounis 2011;
Namiti 2011; “Uganda Launch Independent” 2011). There were also widespread reports of supremely wasteful government spending, including over $750 million USD on fighter jets, and $1.3 million on Museveni’s fourth term inauguration ceremony (Namiti 2011). Additionally, vote rigging reportedly led to government theft. Museveni’s subordinates are reported to have removed the equivalent of $350 million USD from the Ugandan treasury in order to buy the election (Epstein 2014).

The rigged election, the perception of an increase in government malfeasance, and mismanagement of the economy led to the organization of the Walk to Work protests. These protests were to be held every Monday and Thursday, and they started on April 11th in Kampala. They consisted of thousands of Ugandans walking to work in order to protest the aforementioned high levels of inflation and government corruption. By April 14th the protest had spread to other major cities, including Gulu in the north and Masaka in the south. While the vast majority of protesters were ordinary Ugandans, opposition politicians also took part, including Dr. Besigye and John Ken Lukyamuzi of the Conservative Party (“Kizza Begiye Held” 2011).

The government response to these protests was swift. The military and police were called out to suppress the protests. They used live ammunition and killed at least nine protesters. They also violently attacked journalists covering the protests (Burnett 2012). They also ended up shooting Dr. Besigye in the hand, and detained him and Lukyamuzi for hours on April 11th (“Kizza Begiye Held” 2011). As the protests spread so did the violence against protesters. One protester in Gulu was shot in the back as he fled security forces, and another was shot in a shipping container as he attempted to hide from the same forces (“Uganda Launch Independent” 2011).
Despite the violence, protests continued sporadically throughout 2011 and 2012. This led to a more organized and concerted reaction from the regime. Museveni formulated a three-pronged approach to ensure the durability of the regime. This consisted of a reconfiguration of ruling coalition, a legislative response, and a more vigorous response on behalf of the security forces. The ruling coalition was not drastically changed, but Museveni did begin demoting those who spoke out against him, including General Sejusa and other high-ranking members of his cabinet. The biggest post-protest cabinet reshuffle happened in 2012, when Museveni began thinking ahead to the 2016 presidential election, and promoted several people to ministerial positions who were tasked with rallying the faithful prior to the election. In particular, he appointed two gentlemen who were close confidants and instrumental to his rule, Frank Tumwebaze and Richard Todwong. They are closely associated with a parliamentary faction that pushed for another run by Museveni in 2016 (Kigambo 2012).

On the security forces side Museveni personally devised and oversaw a campaign to spy on the opposition movement. This was called Operation Fungua Macho, which translates to “open your eyes.” While the government does not officially acknowledge that this program existed, leaked memos detail the use of technology in order to spy on and oppress opposition (Hopkins and Morris 2015). In order to accomplish this the government used a highly invasive spyware program called FinFisher, which is produced by the UK-based Gamma Group. Sold to repressive governments throughout Africa and the Middle East, including Syria, this program allows governments to remotely monitor computers, smartphones, as well as other equipment in real-time (Hopkins and Morris 2015; Toor 2015). This allows governments to monitor not only the planning of protests,
but the real-time location of the opposition. Operation Fungua Macho involved over 70 members of the intelligence service, and resulted in the arrest and detention of over 600 people, including members of parliament and Dr. Kizza Besigye (Toor 2015).

On the legislative and legal side, Museveni and the Movement have systematically targeted non-governmental and social groups in an effort to stabilize his regime. This is because these groups, and in particular non-governmental organizations, act as a monitor on government actions. These organizations monitor the condition of human rights, land acquisitions, oil revenue transparency, and other sensitive areas. Due to their monitoring function and their ability to spread information to the public, Museveni his supporters blame them for having a negative impact on public perceptions of the government (Burnett 2012). Therefore they have systematically undermined the constitutional rights to freedom of speech, assembly, association, and the press.

This erosion of civil liberties has been accomplished through the passage of two laws in particular. The Public Order Management Act (“POMA”) and the Anti-Homosexuality Act (“AHA”). These laws were passed in direct response to the 2011 and 2012 protests, and they have two distinct goals that Museveni hopes will help stabilize his rule. The vaguely worded POMA seeks to control opposition groups and restrict their ability to operate and spread information. The AHA, and the rhetoric that the regime has used against homosexuality, have targeted an unpopular population in Uganda. Both of these laws have legitimized the state and society’s targeting of these various groups and made it more difficult for NGOs to operate safely.

POMA was passed in August 2013, and was “widely criticized for restricting free speech” (“Museveni on the Defensive” 2013). It also gives the police power to break up
any meeting if they suspect that they are meeting for political purposes ("Rule by Law" 2014). This has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of people arrested for activism. In particular, those who speak out on issues relating to elections have been targeted. The vagueness of the law’s wording allows many of the detained to have trumped up charges filed against them, especially if they have spoken out or criticized the regime in anyway. Amnesty International reports that this has caused many Ugandans to self-police their speech in order to not be arrested without cause ("Rule by Law 2014).

The AHA was passed by Parliament in December 2013, and signed into law in February 2014. The Act criminalized homosexual relationships in Uganda, both by citizens and by visitors. Penalties included life in prison for those convicted under the law ("Rule by Law" 2014). This bill was first proposed in Parliament in 2009, but it was tabled for nearly three years. Many advocates interpret the timing of the bill’s resurgence as a strategy to gain support for the government by targeting an unpopular population (Burnett 2012). After passing AHA, Uganda was harshly criticized by Western leaders (Johnston 2014). In a speech directed at United States’ President Barack Obama and his open criticism of the law, Museveni warned Obama against “taking the line that passing this bill would damage [the] relationship [between the US and Uganda],” further stating that the debate over homosexuality was “provoked by Western groups who come to our schools and try to recruit children into homosexuality” (Museveni 2014).

Although the Supreme Court overturned the bill in August 2014\textsuperscript{20}, during the time it was enacted it had dire consequences for the LGBT population in Uganda. Amnesty

\textsuperscript{20} It was overturned on a technicality. When the bill was voted on there was not a quorum, and therefore the vote was invalid. This has not made Uganda safer for those in
International reports that the passage of the bill has increased and sanctioned violence against those even suspected of being gay. It also increased the targeting of NGOs that provide aid, education, or advocacy to the LGBT community under POMA (“Rule by Law” 2014). Human Rights Watch found that many in the LGBT community fled the country due to the uptick in oppression after February 2014. In fact, the AHA has increased the power and impunity of the security services, as they now have increased charter to monitor citizens’ activities (“Uganda Anti-Homosexuality” 2014).

The enactment of the two laws inhibits freedom of speech and assembly. POMA does this more overtly by restricting freedom of association. However, the AHA was a more subversive way to restrict expression. By targeting a deeply unpopular group AHA was a diversionary measure meant to distract people from the causes of the 2011 and 2012 protests. Furthermore, these two laws together prevented groups from speaking out about the injustice of the laws themselves. The passage of POMA and AHA legitimizes state abuses of power, as well as Museveni’s attempt to use the legal system to centralize his power and target groups he deems subversive or destabilizing (“Rule by Law” 2014). Groups meeting to coordinate protests against AHA report police harassment and the expansion of surveillance under AHA (Ibid.), which serves to further curtail freedom of expression and association. In essence, people who spoke out against these state policies were labelled as dissidents and were punished as such. Furthermore, Operation Fangua Macho gave the security apparatus the tools necessary to have greater monitoring capabilities than they previously enjoyed. The laws passed in the wake of the 2011 and the LGBT community, and there is currently a revised version of the bill being debated in Parliament (Johnston 2014; “Uganda Planning New” 2014).
2012 protests have limited the constitutional rights of the Ugandan people. They now have to watch how they act, what they say, how they express themselves in the privacy of their own homes and in their private communications. These tactics have increased state repression in Uganda, and it could not have been accomplished without Museveni’s centralized ruling coalition. This allowed the regime to maintain its power while targeting groups that dissented against it. The depoliticized nature of non-executive institutions meant that the measures used by the security apparatus against protesters and societal groups could not be scuttled.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the Ugandan regime’s response to the potentially destabilizing protests of 2011 and 2012. During the course of his 30 years in office Museveni has used both cooptation and coercion in order to stabilize his rule, and concentrate power in the office of the executive. At the beginning of his rule Museveni stated that democracy was one of the key rights of the people of Uganda, however, since then he has systematically taken power and rights from the people. The National Resistance Movement continues to be the main institution of patronage in Museveni’s Uganda, and members of the Movement keep their place in Museveni’s clientelistic network by adhering to his policies. Opposition is weak and divided, in part because they are fighting for access to a limited amount of spoils. Finally, Museveni has emboldened the security apparatus, and given it the tools it needs to suppress dissent. Together these things have ensured the durability of Museveni’s regime even during times of potentially destabilizing events.
This chapter built upon the work findings of Chapter Three’s empirical analysis and of Chapter Four’s Moroccan case study. Although these are very different countries with very different histories, the authoritarian regimes in each have acted in very similar ways. In both cases, the dictators have made concerted efforts to centralize their ruling coalitions. In doing so, they have manipulated institutions to take away their political power and foster dependence on the executive. They have then used these institutions to co-opt key elites and distribute patronage. These centralized ruling coalitions enabled the authoritarian regimes of Morocco and Uganda to respond to potentially destabilizing events in a way that ensured the survival of the regime. In alignment with Chapter Three’s empirical analysis, both Morocco and Uganda responded to potentially destabilizing events with a repressive tactics that targeted opposition groups and those who expressed dissent.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

In the popular vernacular, authoritarian regimes are often spoken of in terms of their individual rulers: e.g., Syria is Bashar al-Assad, Zimbabwe is Robert Mugabe, North Korea is Kim Jong Un. This connection between regimes and individual leaders leads to the widespread assumption that dictators rule alone. However, while dictators are not popularly elected, they are supported by key elites who hold the fate of the regime in their hands. These individuals make up the dictator’s ruling coalition, and they are both the source of his strength as well as one of the greatest threats to his rule. In this dissertation I show that the centralization of a dictator’s ruling coalition has a direct effect on the durability of the regime and argue that more centralized the ruling coalition is, the more durable the regime will be.

Regimes are generally overthrown in one of two ways, through coups d’état or as a consequence of mass protest. As stated above, ruling coalitions are necessary for regime survival; however, their members also pose the most pressing threat to the political status quo, as they are the most likely perpetrators of a coup d’état. Dictators with more centralized ruling coalitions are more effectively able to monitor potential rivals for power, and therefore are more likely to prevent or survive coups d’état. The second threat to a regime’s survival comes from outside the regime’s ruling coalition. In the face of mass unrest, dictators with more centralized ruling coalitions are more likely to survive protests. This is because institutions in a regime with a more centralized ruling coalition are subservient to the executive, and thus these non-executive institutions are depoliticized. This means that the elites in charge of these institutions are not likely to
scuttle policy decisions or responses to potentially destabilizing events, as their fate is inextricably tied to that of the regime.

In examining the role of centralized ruling coalitions in responding to potentially destabilizing events, this dissertation seeks to add to the growing body of research concerning authoritarian regimes. Previous studies of authoritarianism have focused on either coups d’état or mass protests. This dissertation argues that dictators are and should be concerned with both kinds of potentially destabilizing event, and that their ruling coalition plays a large role in their ability to survive both types of shock.

In developing my theoretical framework, I delved into the literatures on rational choice, structuralism, and the state-society relationship. While these literatures provide explanations for why some authoritarian regimes endure while others fail, they have several weaknesses. Rational choice looks at the role of elites, and how dictators’ preferences shape regime outcomes. With a foundation of utility maximization, or the cost-benefit matrix that each actor constructs in order to decide whether or not to support the regime, rational choice also says a good deal about why individuals would support the dictator. However, while the role of elites is paramount to authoritarian studies, rational choice does not speak to the role of institutions. Even though the dictator manipulates formal institutions in order to perpetuate his rule, institutions still play a large role in constraining the choices available to actors within authoritarian regimes.

Structuralism focuses on the role of institutions in maintaining regimes. In the authoritarian literature, special attention is paid to the role of elections, parties, and parliaments in stabilizing regimes. These institutions are not seen as democratizing forces, but rather as institutions of cooptation and clientelism. They act to entrench elites
through the construction of patronage networks and the distribution of rents. Adding to this role, institutions also allow the dictator to contain and monitor elites, which is of strategic importance to the dictator as it allows him to control access to his patronage network and monitor potential threats to his power. Despite giving due consideration to the importance of institutions, structuralism is not without weaknesses. In particular, scholars tend to discount the role of human agency in structural accounts.

The final theoretical paradigm is the state-society approach. This approach views politics through the prism of conflict, assuming that the state is trying to influence society at the same time that society is trying to influence the state. Mass protests call for change to the status quo, and the ability of the regime to respond efficiently to these calls for change increases the likelihood that the regime will endure. The major criticisms of the state-society approach involve the methodological difficulties in studying this interaction between state and society. In particular, the conflict is difficult to operationalize, and therefore this approach does not easily lend itself to empirical analysis.

As Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) have written, every theoretical paradigm has its strengths and its weaknesses. Rational choice emphasizes the role of human agency but discounts environmental impacts on that agency. However, its emphasis on agency makes it a good fit with empirical analysis. Structuralist accounts assume that institutions impact outcomes; however, they also have a tendency to discount human agency and do not lend themselves to generalizations. Both rational choice and structuralism discount the role of society in provoking change, whereas the state-society approach emphasizes this interaction and its role in producing change. However, it is not very well suited to empirical analysis. By combining each of these approaches, this dissertation seeks to
address each of their weaknesses and provide a unified causal explanation for authoritarian regime durability.

My central hypothesis argues that ruling coalition centralization is a key factor in determining whether or not an authoritarian regime is durable. However, there are several other competing explanations of authoritarian regime durability. Bellin (2005) looks at the role of the coercive apparatus in stabilizing authoritarian regimes. She argues that the durability of authoritarian regimes is directly linked to the robustness of the coercive apparatus. This robustness is contingent upon four factors. First is the economic health of the regime, as prolonged economic crises lead to a decomposition of the military and security apparatus. Second is whether the regime has international support, as that support helps mitigate the impact of economic malaise. Third, if the security apparatus is highly institutionalized, it will be more likely to step aside and not suppress mass uprisings. This is because highly institutionalized coercive apparatuses are more “rule governed, predictable, and meritocratic” (Ibid.: 28). Finally, the more of the population that mobilizes against the regime, the more likely it is that the coercive apparatus will step aside, as combatting thousands of civilians could have serious repercussions for the legitimacy of the security institutions. However, while coercive institutions are extremely important to a dictator’s rule, focusing on them negates the role of other mechanisms of authoritarian control. It also does not speak to the fact that the greatest threat facing a dictator is the threat of the coup d’état, which is most likely to come from within the security apparatus. How does the dictator contain this threat while enabling the security forces to suppress dissent? The security apparatus, therefore, is just one piece of the puzzle of authoritarian regime durability.
Other scholars contend that the international system is the most important explanation for authoritarian regime durability. Looking at the post-Cold War era, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that countries with extensive ties to the West are more likely to democratize, as these ties increase the costs of using the coercive apparatus. However, this thesis is contradicted by the two case studies presented in this dissertation. In particular, due to its geographic location and strategic importance, Morocco has had robust ties to the West for much of its post-independence era. These ties to the West have not had a democratizing effect on Morocco, however, and in fact have aided and abetted the King’s coercive institutions, as former black-site prisons are now being used to hold political prisoners. Similarly, Museveni has used ties to the West to shore up his rule in Uganda. In particular, he has used the ongoing war against the Lord’s Resistance Army as an excuse to demand continuously high levels of foreign aid. Given the highly corrupt nature of the Ugandan political system, it is unsurprising that this aid is then directed not to development or security, but to the patronage network.

Finally, scholars also argue that the lack of democratization is a direct consequence of the absence of a middle class in many authoritarian regimes. Inglehart (1997) argues that as a middle class develops within a state, a cultural shift occurs. This is because the middle class has its basic needs met, and so can focus on striving for post-modern concerns, such as more inclusive and representative governance. This shift to post-modern concerns means that the population is more likely to press for democracy. Therefore, authoritarian regime durability can be explained as benefiting from unequal and poorer societies. However, this is not a sufficient explanation for authoritarianism. For instance, authoritarianism is also seen in countries with high per capita incomes, such
as Singapore. The Morocco case study also shows the weakness of the middle-class argument. Morocco has historically been a very unequal society, with wealth concentrated in the hands of the few. However, Morocco still has a vibrant and long-standing tradition of activism and participation in associational groups. Explanations centered on the role of the middle class fail to address these sorts of aberrations.

These different explanations of authoritarian regime durability, and their weaknesses, present a puzzle. Why are some authoritarian regimes more durable than others? This dissertation fills the gaps presented by many of the above-mentioned explanations by looking not only at the role of the coercive apparatus, but also at the role of ruling coalitions and domestic institutional arrangements. How does the dictator manipulate institutions in order to protect his rule? How does he use the coercive apparatus to suppress dissent, but also ensure that its future is tied inextricably to that of the regime itself? How does the dictator institutionalize patronage networks and control access to those networks in order to buy the support of key players in the system?

In answer to these questions, I argue that the makeup of the regime’s ruling coalition plays a pivotal role in determining the stability of the regime. Simply put, regimes with more centralized ruling coalitions are more durable. In order to support this assertion, I looked at two types of potentially destabilizing events that can overthrow a regime, mass protests and coups d’état. Dictators stabilize their regimes and build their coalitions through two mechanisms: cooptation and coercion. They coopt key elites into the regime, and they also shape electoral and non-electoral institutions to be subservient to the executive. Electoral institutions do not have power outside of the executive office and mainly act as avenues for patronage distribution to the leader’s clientelistic network.
Dictators use non-electoral institutions, such as the security apparatus, to punish those within the ruling coalition as well as those outside the coalition who speak out against the regime. This dissertation also looks at the role that economic crises play in leading to potentially destabilizing events, determining that GDP and inflationary crises have an impact on mass protests but no statistically significant impact on elite rebellion. Finally, this dissertation shows that elites respond to potentially destabilizing events for years after they occur. In the face of mass protest events, dictators will empower the security apparatus to uncover and punish potential threats to the regime, and political repression subsequently increases. This regime response helps to suppress dissent and is used in conjunction with cooptation in order to stabilize the regime.

The empirical study in Chapter Three tested the relationship between ruling coalition centralization and regime stability. I found that dictators with ruling coalitions that are larger and less centralized are 21.23 times more likely to end than regimes with smaller and more centralized ruling coalitions. I further found that both endogenous and exogenous shocks are more likely to end a regime with a less centralized ruling coalition. Therefore it can be extrapolated that regimes with more centralized ruling coalitions are more durable than those with decentralized ruling coalitions.

The empirical study also tested the relationship between economic crises and potentially destabilizing events. Economic crises are indicators of a regime’s ability to manage expectations. One of the main tasks of government is to manage the economy, and if a regime has a declining GDP or rising inflation rates, it risks losing legitimacy and therefore is theoretically at greater risk of facing either a coup d’état or a mass protest event. However, coups d’état are not more statistically more likely to happen in
conjunction with economic crises, whereas mass protest events are more likely happen if there is a decrease in GDP or an increase in inflation in the year in which the protests begin.

Finally, the empirical study looked at how regimes respond to potentially destabilizing events by testing their relationship with political repression scores in both year \( y+1 \) as well as year \( y+2 \). This is based on the assumption that regime responses to potentially destabilizing events are not always immediate, and that this will cause some lag in the increase or decrease in political repression. I found that coup d’etat attempts cause an increase in political repression in the year immediately following the attempt, but not in the second year after the attempt. This indicates that retaliation for coups tends to be internal to the regime. The dictator may immediately crack down on dissent, attempting to control the masses while they reorganize their ruling coalition. With regards to mass protest events, I found that political repression increases in both \( y+1 \) and \( y+2 \). This year-over-year increase in repression ensures that the regime has firmly quashes opposition members.

Chapter Four consisted of the Morocco case study. Since independence in 1957, Morocco has had three rulers, Mohammed V, Hassan II, and Mohammed VI, all members of the Alaouite dynasty. My case study looked at the ruling coalitions of Hassan II and Mohammed VI, and how the centralization of their ruling coalitions has led to the durability of the regime. The ruling coalition of Morocco is called the makhzen and consists of members of the King’s family, close business associates, and Ministers of Sovereignty. Both King Hassan II and King Mohammed VI have paid lip service to democratic ideals and governance; however, in Morocco the plurality of power is located
in the halls of the Palace. While it does have a multiparty parliamentary system, the parliament and the traditional ruling parties remain depoliticized, and their main function is to support the King’s policies. In essence, they are mainly a means for more efficiently distributing patronage to the King’s clientelistic network.

Chapter Four also looked at the role of potentially destabilizing crises under both Hassan II and Mohammed VI. In 1971 and 1972, Hassan II faced two coup d’état attempts orchestrated by members of his inner circle. After each of these coup attempts, Hassan II responded with harsh reprisals against those who participated, as well cracking down on dissent in general. His response was so harsh and thorough that the decade after the attempts became known as *les années de plomb*, or the Years of Lead. Hassan II also instituted several key changes in the ruling coalition, most notably the promotion of Driss Basri, who became the chief architect of the Years of Lead, to Minister of the Interior. These changes helped stabilize his regime by further centralizing the ruling coalition.

Mohammed VI ascended to the throne in 1999, bringing great hopes for democracy. Basri was one of the most hated members of Hassan II’s coalition, and Mohammed VI also considered him a serious potential rival for power. Consequently, Mohammed VI began his rule by methodically relieving Basri of his duties and power. This cemented the assumption among many Moroccans that Mohammed VI was going to move the country toward democracy. However, this feeling swiftly turned to disillusionment. Under Mohammed VI the predominance of the *makhzen* continued, and electoral institutions remain depoliticized and highly corrupt. Corruption remains rampant and power remains centralized in the halls of the Palace. This continuation of politics as usual laid the groundwork for the 2011 and 2012 Arab Spring protests. In
agreement with the findings from the empirical analysis in Chapter Three, these protests also coincided with high levels of youth unemployment and rapidly rising prices of food, fuel, and other commodities. While many of the Arab Spring protests in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa ousted dictators or led to civil war, the protests in Morocco did not. This is in large part due to the reaction of the King and the ruling coalition. They responded to the protests with a new constitution, which appeared to be more democratic. However, this was a false promise. While Mohammed VI granted some democratic concessions, they were never implemented in any substantive way. Furthermore, the regime responded to the protests with targeted force, and the security apparatus has systematically suppressed dissent, particularly online in a successful effort to disband the February 20 movement.

Chapter Five consisted of the Uganda case study, in which I illustrated how Yoweri Museveni bucked the historical trend by establishing a durable and stable authoritarian regime in a country where previous dictators cycled in and out of office. Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (“the Movement”) came to power in 1986 after ousting the previous dictator, Tito Okello. As in Morocco, Museveni has paid lip service to democracy, while remaining wholly authoritarian. Museveni’s ruling coalition consists of members of his family and a group known as the historicals. Together they have the plurality of the power, and the legislature and the lower ranks of the Movement are primarily institutions of patronage distribution. The security apparatus also plays a large role in Museveni’s Movement regime, as evidenced by the fact that they have permanent seats in the legislature and close family members, including Museveni’s son, head many of the security institutions.
While Museveni has not experienced any coup d'état attempts, in 2011 his incumbency was shaken by a series of protests inspired by the Arab Spring. These protests were driven by the fraudulent February 2011 presidential elections, as well as rapidly rising inflation rates. These protests were known as the Walk-to-Work protests, and took place throughout 2011 and 2012. Reaction from the regime was swift. Museveni emboldened the security forces to suppress dissent, and as a result the intelligence network was increased dramatically. Political repression has also taken the form of a series of laws that severely restrict Ugandans’ constitutionally granted freedoms of assembly and expression.

Located in the explanatory lacunae of the rational choice, structuralism, and state-society paradigms, my research offers several contributions to the comparative study of authoritarianism. The combination of empirical analysis and qualitative case studies supports my theoretical argument that the centralization of ruling coalitions has an impact on the durability of authoritarian regimes. By illustrating the ways in which authoritarian leaders respond to potentially destabilizing events, my research warns against trusting wholeheartedly in the democratic promises of democracy that dictators make in the face of potentially destabilizing events. Most importantly, my findings contribute to the growing body of research on authoritarian regimes that has emerged since 2001. While research on authoritarian regimes has focused on various aspects of authoritarian rule, this dissertation combines several key aspects of these studies into a cohesive study of authoritarian rule in times of crisis.

There are several interesting avenues of exploration that stem from the work done in this dissertation. 2011 marked an activist moment globally, as countries throughout the
Middle East and North Africa saw massive protests. Inspired by the ability of citizens in these countries to enact change, citizens of non-Arab countries took to the streets as well. These protesters sought many things, including more democratic governance and better management of the economy. Morocco and Uganda are prototypical examples of how countries with centralized ruling coalitions responded to these mass protests. Regimes with centralized coalitions were able to cohesively and efficiently respond to this activist moment with a combination of cooptation and coercion. They used the security apparatus to suppress dissent and monitor opposition, and thus they were able to end these protest movements. Future research could analyze cases of regimes with decentralized coalitions. How do decentralized coalitions respond to potentially destabilizing events, and in what ways do those responses contribute to the end of the regime? One example of such a regime was Tunisia under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali Ben Ali became President of Tunisia in 1987, and after taking over the presidency, he promised democracy to the Tunisian people. However, these promises were unfulfilled, and Tunisian politics remained authoritarian in nature (Brownlee 2005). Indeed, for much of Ben Ali’s tenure, Tunisia was considered a durable authoritarian regime.

This durability was linked to how Ben Ali built his ruling coalition, and in particular how he structured his relationship with the military and the security apparatus. The ruling coalition consisted of what was known as the Family, or the extended network of kinship that made up the top echelon of elites in Tunisia. This ruling coalition was based on blood relationships and on high levels of corruption. However, this corruption did not extend beyond the ruling coalition, and therefore lower-level elites were never enveloped into Ben Ali’s patronage network (Anderson 2011). This helped decentralize
the coalition and left the door open for institutions to be politicized by competing elites. Furthermore, in an effort to maintain power, Ben Ali sidelined the military and removed them from the political sphere. Tunisian military personnel were trained in the West and so were highly capable but also disconnected from the Tunisian ruling class (Townsend 2015). The domestic security apparatus, which consists of the police and the National Guard, had a central role in the ruling coalition, and they were responsible for many of the human rights violations that occurred throughout Ben Ali’s rule (Pachon 2014). The military refused to suppress the protests, and therefore it was left to the domestic security apparatus to try to control the population and prevent further protests (Townsend 2015). They did so with violence, which ended up increasing the number of protesters and the frequency of protests. When the protests began to escalate in early 2011, the elites within the domestic security apparatus, including members of Ben Ali’s presidential security force, rebelled and defected from the regime (Pachon 2014). The protests changed the cost-benefit analysis of the elites within the security apparatus, and because of the decentralized nature of the ruling coalition, it was easier for them to defect and thus destabilize the regime. A detailed case study of such a decentralized ruling coalition would provide a useful counterpoint to the case studies presented in this dissertation, and further evidence for the important role of coalition centralization.

Analysis in this dissertation focused on state responses to potentially destabilizing events in the two years after the event in question. However, new research addresses the longer-term outcomes of mass protests, particularly with regards to longer-term impacts of the Arab Spring. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015) argue that in cases where Arab Spring protests were able to topple dictators, prior structural conditions had a direct
causal effect on the type of new regime that was instated. Roberts and Willis (2016) look at the impact of protest techniques on outcomes, arguing that protesters’ use of violence does not impact post-revolution democratic outcomes; what matters are the pre-existing institutions and social capital. Utilizing the state-society approach, Dodge (2012) takes a pessimistic view of regime outcomes, arguing that even in cases where ruling elites are removed from power, the institutions that they built to maintain their rule remain. In particular, Dodge argues that the powerful security apparatuses and the networks of patronage have remained largely untouched in the years post-revolution, which means that politics in countries like Egypt and Yemen are likely to remain unchanged. Taking these arguments and applying them to non-Arab Spring countries would be an interesting test of their validity. For example, the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 would be an interesting case to study the impact of these theories. How have structures, cultures, and the state-society relationship in Ukraine impacted the outcome of the revolution that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych?

My dissertation focuses on the makeup of a dictator’s ruling coalition, and touches only briefly upon the opposition to the regime. Another avenue for future research could involve looking at the intersection of the ruling coalition and the opposition. Are regimes with centralized ruling coalitions more likely to have divided opposition? What tools does the dictator use to diffuse opposition, and what is the most effective combination of tools in the regime’s arsenal for dividing opposition? These questions build upon the research in this dissertation, as well as research being done by others in the field, and have interesting implications for forces acting against authoritarian regime durability.
One of the most pressing areas for future research involves determining what factors are likely to lead to ruling coalition centralization. This takes a step back from determining the impact of ruling coalition centralization to determine the key causes of centralization itself. The operationalization of ruling coalition is highly problematic, and scholars have looked to authoritarian types (Geddes 2003), ethnic factionalization (Stacher 2012), and other factors as proxies for measuring ruling coalition centralization. My prediction is that some combination of regime type, societal factors, the length of time the regime has been in power, and how the regime gained power have an impact on ruling coalition centralization. Determining the answer to this question could give researchers a more explanatory measure of ruling coalition centralization. Furthermore, this could lead to a more robust explanation of authoritarian regime durability.

One of the most difficult aspects of studying authoritarian regimes is that much of their operations are hidden from view. Dictators survive and regimes endure because the leaders have control over media, speech, the legislative process, and many other facets of politics in their countries. This dissertation has attempted to peer into that world by looking at how different regimes have responded to potentially destabilizing events. Using a combination of theoretical underpinnings, empirical analysis, and qualitative data, I have argued that leaders manipulate institutions in order to centralize power in the executive office, and I have shown that their rule is better supported by a more centralized ruling coalition.
Appendix A
Authoritarian Regime Spells
1960-1999

Afghanistan, 1947-1973
Afghanistan, 1974-1978
Afghanistan, 1990-1992
Afghanistan, 1996-2002
Albania, 1945-1992
Algeria, 1963-1993
Argentina, 1963
Argentina, 1967-1973
Argentina, 1977-1983
Azerbaijan, 1993-NA
Bahrain, 1972-NA
Bangladesh, 1972-1974
Bangladesh, 1975-1982
Bangladesh, 1983-1991
Belarus, 1997-NA
Benin, 1962-1963
Benin, 1964-1965
Benin, 1966-1967
Benin, 1968-1969
Benin, 1970
Benin, 1971-1991
Bhutan, 1971-NA
Bolivia, 1953-1964
Bolivia, 1965-1969
Bolivia, 1970-1971
Bolivia, 1972-1979
Bolivia, 1980-1982
Brazil, 1965-1986
Brunei, 1984-NA
Bulgaria, 1945-1990
Burkina Faso, 1961-1966
Burkina Faso, 1967-1980
Burkina Faso, 1981-1982
Burkina Faso, 1983-1987
Burkina Faso, 1988-NA
Burundi, 1963-1966
Burundi, 1967-1987
Burundi, 1988-1993
Burundi, 1997-1999
Cambodia, 1954-1969
Cambodia, 1976-1979
Cambodia, 1988-NA
Cameroon, 1961-1983
Cameroon, 1984-NA
Cape Verde, 1976-1991
Central African Republic, 1961-1965
Central African Republic, 1966-1979
Central African Republic, 1982-1993
Chad, 1961-1975
Chad, 1976-1977
Chad, 1984-1990
Chad, 1991-NA
Chile, 1974-1990
China, 1950-NA
Comoros, 1976-NA
Congo (Brazzaville), 1964-1968
Congo (Brazzaville), 1969-1992
Congo (Brazzaville), 1998-NA
Congo (Zaire), 1966-1995
Cuba, 1953-NA
Cyprus, 1961-1963
Cyprus, 1968-1983
Czechoslovakia, 1947-1990
Djibouti, 1978-NA
Dominican Republic, 1931-1962
Dominican Republic, 1963-1965
Dominican Republic, 1967-1978
Ecuador, 1962-1963
Ecuador, 1964-1966
Ecuador, 1967-1968
Ecuador, 1969-1972
Ecuador, 1973-1979
Egypt, 1952-NA
El Salvador, 1949-1980
Equatorial Guinea, 1969-1979
Equatorial Guinea, 1980-NA
Eritrea, 1994-NA
Ethiopia, 1890-1974

21 NA denotes a regime that was still in power on December 31, 1999.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>1961-1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1992-NA</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1961-NA</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1961-NA</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1974-NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1945-1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>German Democratic</td>
<td>1949-1990</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1997-NA</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>1952-1969</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1959-1963</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1958-NA</td>
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<td>1964-1966</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1965-NA</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1985-NA</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1979-NA</td>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1916-NA</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>1946-1990</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1937-1978</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>1925-1979</td>
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<td>1961-1974</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>1980-NA</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1975-1993</td>
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<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1961-1999</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1971-NA</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1947-NA</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1958-1971</td>
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<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>1954-NA</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1969-1982</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>1954-1960</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1983-1989</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Dates</td>
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### Appendix B

#### Variable Descriptions

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<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Calendar year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Alphanumeric regime identifier consisting of standardized country abbreviation and regime number for that country, e.g. YAR5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reg_ID</td>
<td>Numeric regime identifier.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Country name.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spell duration</td>
<td>Years in which a given authoritarian spell occurred.</td>
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<td>Regime</td>
<td>Regime type, e.g. Yugoslavia from 1945-1991 was a Communist, one-party regime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GenStrikes</td>
<td>Strikes that have 1000+ workers from more than one employer. (Banks and Wilson 2015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>Violent demonstrations that have 100+ participants and involve physical force (Banks and Wilson 2015)</td>
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<td>Revolutions</td>
<td>Illegal or forced change of governing elite, or an attempt to gain independence (Banks and Wilson 2015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AntiGovDem</td>
<td>Peaceful public gathering of 100+ people whose purpose is to express discontent with the government and its policies (Banks and Wilson 2015).</td>
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<td>Con_index</td>
<td>Conflict index variable that combines GenStrikes, Riots, Revolutions, AntiGovDem, variables to measure exogenous crises when used as an dependent variable.</td>
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<td>Coup_suc</td>
<td>Number of successful coups d’état that happened within year $y$ (Marshall and Marshall 2015).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coup_att</td>
<td>Number of attempted, but unsuccessful, coups d’état that happened in year $y$ (Marshall and Marshall 2015).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coup_plot</td>
<td>Number of thwarted coup plots that were reported by government officials during year $y$ (Marshall and Marshall 2015).</td>
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<td>Coup</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 indicates that a successful coup, an coup attempts, and/or a coup plot happened during a given year $y$.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTS_a</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale’s (2015) Amnesty International based measure of political repression.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTS_s</td>
<td>Political Terror Scale’s (2015) State Department based measure of political repression.</td>
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<td>PTS_avg</td>
<td>Average in year $y$ of the PTS_a and the PTS_s variables.</td>
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<td>GDPChange</td>
<td>Percent change in the GDP in year $y$</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPAvg</td>
<td>Average of the percent change in the GDP in year $y$ and year</td>
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<tr>
<td>lnInflation</td>
<td>Natural log of the GDP Inflation in year $y$.</td>
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<tr>
<td>lnInflationAvg</td>
<td>Natural log of the average of the inflation rate in year $y$ and year $y-1$.</td>
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<tr>
<td>lnGDPPC</td>
<td>Natural log of the GDP Per Capita in year $y$.</td>
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<td>ColdWar</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 is marked for regimes that occurred between 1960 and 1991.</td>
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<td>Dummy variable, 1 is marked if the regime is located in Latin America.</td>
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<td>Dummy Variable, 1 is marked if the regime is located in Africa.</td>
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<td>Regimeend</td>
<td>Dummy Variable, 1 is marked if the regime ends in year $y$.</td>
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