THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOMELAND AND DIASPORA:

THE CASE OF GREECE AND THE GREEK-AMERICAN COMMUNITY

A dissertation presented

By

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To

The Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In the field of

Political Science

Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts
April, 2015
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

In an increasingly global world, diasporas are unique actors since they represent a fusion of the cultures, interests and mentalities of their old and new homelands. Thus, the relationship between homelands and diasporas becomes quite significant. Nevertheless, it remains understudied. This dissertation attempts to contribute to the study of this phenomenon through an in-depth examination of the relationship between Greece and the Greek diaspora in the United States. The Greek state and the Greek-American community are interdependent on each other. The state relies on the community for assistance in the areas of development, economic cooperation, humanitarian aid, and advocacy for foreign policy issues. The community relies on the Greek state for support with respect to Greek education and the preservation of Greek culture in the United States. The relationship between the two entities reflects the dynamics of a partnership although the state has tried in the past to extend its control over the Greek-American community. However, the community has proved its independence vis-à-vis the Greek state. In order to have a more fruitful partnership in the future, a number of conditions should be in place, including a systematic and well-planned diaspora policy on the part of the Greek state and better organized structures on the part of the Greek-American community. Moreover, a better and deeper knowledge and appreciation of each other is very important for any further cooperation: the Greek state needs to get to know the spectrum of Greek identity and culture that exists in the Greek-American community while the Greek-Americans need to have a deeper knowledge of Greece and Greek culture. The Greek-American diaspora can have a significant role as an agent of positive change and it can be a unique bridge between the two nations enriching them both at the same time.
DEDICATION

To my father Georgios who passed before he could see me complete my dissertation, and to my mother Maria who has been the primary force behind it.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my primary advisor, Professor Amilcar Barreto, for his support, his faith in me and his other doctoral students, his patience, his high academic standards and his wise advice. I would also like to thank Governor Michael Dukakis for his advice and encouragement, for sharing his amazing experiences, and for believing in the role of Greek-Americans as agents of positive change. Many thanks also go to Ambassador Georges Prévélakis, who has given me valuable guidance and support. He was the one who suggested that I work on this topic even before I enrolled in the PhD program.

I owe gratitude to Northeastern University and to the Department of Political Science not only for offering me the opportunity to pursue this dissertation but also for supporting me financially through it with a Tuition Assistantship award, Teaching Assistantship awards, Senior Teaching Assistantship awards, a Summer Research Grant and the Dissertation Completion Fellowship. Professor Portz has been particularly supportive to me and to all doctoral students at the department.

This work would not be as complete without the contribution of several Greeks and Greek-Americans whom I interviewed or with whom I discussed these issues on several occasions, including diplomats, advocates, community organizers, professors, priests, and Greek school
teachers. I would like to thank, in particular, Professor Aristotle Michopoulos, Nick Larigakis, Dr. Vasiliki Rapti, and long-time friends Panos Spiliakos and Eleni Vidalis in the United States for allowing me to interview them. I would also like to thank Ambassador Petros Panayotopoulos and Dr. Ilias Karanikas in Greece for offering me an interview. My thanks extend also my anonymous interviewees in Greece and in the United States who were kind enough to share their time and thoughts with me. Maya Tsokli and her assistant Elli Tsiforou were very supporting and provided me with the Minutes and the Reports of the Special Parliamentary Committee for Diaspora Greeks at the Greek Parliament, among other useful material. I am also thankful to the staff of the library of the Greek Parliament in Athens and of the library of the Council of Hellenes Abroad in Thessaloniki where I performed part of my research.

I extend my thanks to my friends Dr. Chris Chanyasulkit, Anna Pakiou and Xanthippi Kotzageorgi-Zymaris who supported my work in significant ways. I would also like to thank Consul General of Greece in Boston Ifigenia Kanara and Kaiti Galanopoulos for their encouragement and support. Dr. Sheila Kohanteb, Dr. Allison Uzdella, Professor Liubomir Topaloff and Professor Natalie Bormann’s advice and assistance during my earlier years in the PhD program was very valuable. Barbara Rich, Lyle Ring and Logan Wangsgard in the Department of Political Science have been very helpful for several years now. I also would like to thank PoliTea, the graduate student organization at the Department of Political Science, which offered me the opportunity to present an early version of this research and get helpful feedback on it.

Last but definitely not least, I thank my family, without whose support this would not have been possible. My father Georgios and my mother Maria made their children’s education their first
priority, making significant sacrifices along the way. I would not be where I am today if it were not for them. My husband Menios has been amazingly patient and supportive during the time I have been working on my dissertation. He has been sharing this journey of exploration with me and he has given me valuable advice along the way. My children, Vasilis, George and Maria, have been patient and encouraging during the long time I spent researching and writing. They eagerly waited for me to finish so that I could spend more time with them. Hopefully, this can be an inspiration for their own explorations. My brother Dimitris contributed substantially to this work in different ways for several years now from afar.
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I am a first generation Greek-American. This identity still sounds quite strange to me since it feels as if I came only yesterday to this country — not twenty years ago as I really did. My six-year-old son, who is a second generation Greek-American, described our dual identity in a very accurate way. When my husband and I became American citizens last year, our son said that now all of us are both Greek and American — but he added that my husband and I would always be a little more Greek than American while he and his siblings would always be a little more American than Greek. With his simple but very logical approach, he touched at the core of generational differences in Greek-American identity.

In the last twenty years I have worked and socialized with all generations of Greek-Americans in the context of Greek-American community organizations in the Boston area. I came to know them and their problems quite deeply. My experiences ranged from Greek afternoon and Saturday schools in the parishes to Modern Greek Studies programs in universities, and from cultural organizations of the community to advocacy ones.

I came to know the concerns of university students from Greece who were far from their homeland, of Greek-American parents who were concerned with how to pass their culture to their children, of priests who had to balance the needs of first generation Greek-American parishioners with those of non-Greek converts, of community organizers who were concerned with low participation, and of Greek school teachers who had to face significant challenges in their work. With the exception of the priest, I have found myself in the role of all the above.
Working at the Greek Consulate in Boston several years ago gave me the opportunity to see many of these problems from the perspective of the Greek state. I was introduced to the will of many Greek diplomats and public administration employees to contribute as much as possible to the needs of the community and to those of Greece. However, I was also introduced to the many problems of the Greek bureaucracy, of Greek public administration structures and of the often inadequate and counter-productive policy-making at the national center.

The topic of the Greek-American community and its relationship with the Greek state was, therefore, an obvious choice for my dissertation in political science, since it allowed me to bridge my real world experience with academic research. My prior academic background in political science, national identity and nationalism, and public policy offered me valuable tools with which I could approach the topic. I used a single-case study research design and qualitative research methods. My research combined fieldwork in Greece and in the United States, and document/archival research.

Building on my past experiences, I made new observations of the Greek-American community, its culture, identity and institutions. I studied Greek schools in the role of participant-observer as a Greek School teacher and parent. I also performed thirteen interviews of Greek-American community leaders — in advocacy organizations, community organizations, and Greek schools — academic experts and Greek state representatives (diplomats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, and Members of the Parliament), some of which were eponymous and some anonymous.

I used Greek Parliament documents (Minutes and Reports of the Special Permanent Committee on Diaspora Greeks), Greek officials’ speeches and interviews, Greek political party
documents (charters and content of web-sites), and other official Greek state documents (the Greek Constitution, Greek laws, official news archive and the content of the web-sites of Greek Ministries and institutions). I used official documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America (the Charter, letters and encyclicals, and the news archive), and of community and advocacy organizations (resolutions, other official documents and the content of their web-sites and social media pages), and Greek school textbooks. I also used official Lobbying Reports for Congress and official documents of the American government and its institutions. Moreover, I used Greek, Greek-American and American news sources, as well as the content of the web-sites of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Cypriot government, International organizations, and Non-governmental organizations. Last, I also used surveys that were performed by third parties and secondary scholarly sources.

My research has dealt with history, identity, politics, culture, education, economics, and foreign policy and has looked into how the activities of the Greek-American community and the Greek state across these areas are interconnected. The findings of my research are presented in this dissertation and are organized in the following chapters:

Chapter 1 provides a review of the literature on nations, national and ethnic identities, nationalism, diasporas and relations between homelands and diasproas. Although the case of Greece and the Greek-American community is mentioned in several instances, this is primarily a theoretical chapter with comparative elements.

Chapter 2 offers a historical overview of the evolution of Greek diaspora communities and, more specifically, of the Greek-American community. It is concluded with a description of the community’s organization and institutions.
Chapter 3 analyzes the two most significant concepts in the context of the relationship between Greece and the Greek diaspora: Greek identity and Greek culture. This chapter discusses the differences between Greek identity and culture in Greece and in the Greek-American community, and how these concepts are reflected in diaspora policy and activities.

Chapter 4 examines the Greek state’s strategy and rhetoric with respect to the diaspora and their historical evolution. Furthermore, it offers an analysis of Greek state institutions and policies for the diaspora.

Chapter 5 analyzes the system of Greek education in the Greek-American community, the roles of the Archdiocese and the Greek state in it, and it suggests an alternative educational framework.

Chapter 6 surveys the Greek-American historical and contemporary contributions to the economy and development of Greece. It also includes a section on humanitarian aid offered by the Greek-Americans to the Greeks of Greece in times of crisis and it is concluded with a comparative approach.

Chapter 7 offers an introduction to the Greek-American involvement in Greek foreign policy through the description and analysis of the Greek foreign policy issues for which Greek-Americans advocate, and of the major Greek-American advocacy organizations.

Chapter 8 examines Greek-American political mobilization and advocacy on particular foreign policy issues and offers an analysis of this advocacy in the context of homeland-diaspora dynamics.
Chapter 9 summarizes the research findings and the main points of all preceding chapters, makes generalizations that contribute to our understanding of homeland-diaspora relations, and points to areas for further research.
CHAPTER 1
NATIONS, STATES AND DIASPORAS

Nations and States

Nations and nationalism never cease to feature prominently in the international news and to pre-occupy anyone from politicians and policy-makers to teachers and journalists. Their political significance has led several scholars to an intellectual quest for their deeper meaning and their sources of origin. These scholars provide us with a variety of definitions for the words *nation* and *nationalism*. However, they generally agree that the basis of national identity is the *sense* that people have of belonging to the same national community.

Behind the idea of the nation lies the myth of common ancestry which functions as a connecting bond between the nation’s members (Anderson 2006; Geary 2002; Horowitz 2000; Connor 1994a; Hobsbawm & Ranger 2007; Gellner 1983).¹ Myths may be based more or less on reality but they may oversimplify a complex set of events and conditions (Mandravelis 2011), removing elements or offering a biased or distorted interpretation in the process. Despite the mythic dimension of the common national origin, the idea of nations may become naturalized in the minds of people, thus becoming hegemonic.²

According to Anderson (2006), nations are imagined political communities. Imagined because we will never be able to know all of the other members of the same nation, political

¹ The term “myth” means that we are not judging whether this sentiment is based on historic veracity. National myths may correspond more or less to historical reality but they are, nevertheless, politically significant. Often, elements of history are present but may be distorted in the process of creating a particular national myth that is adjusted to the current political necessities.

² Building on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, such an ideal is one that is not questioned and is embraced as common sense (Lustick 1993).
because they refer to a state, and communities because they express a sense of “we.” Anderson’s major contribution to the definition of nation is his argument that nations are socially constructed, which set up the current paradigm in the field. In opposition to this constructivist paradigm, primordialists argue that nations are unchanging natural or biological creations that have always existed. According to this view, national bonds build on kinship bonds and are, hence, hardwired into human minds (Huntington 1996; Laponce 1987; Smith 1986).

The concepts of nation and national identity should be distinguished from the related concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity. First, ethnic identity is an ancient phenomenon that refers to a sense of belonging to a group that shares particular ethnic attributes, such as language, culture, customs, and religion, and which occurred as an outcome of historical conditions. Like co-nationals, ethnic community members also share a myth of common ancestry.

However, ethnic identity is not necessarily political; it does not make the same demands upon the state. Nationalists, on the other hand, insist that ethnic borders must coincide with political or administrative boundaries (Eriksen 1993: 99). Nation-states are seen as created by and for the ethnolinguistically and, even, ethnoreligiously defined nations (Brubaker 1996). Those borders could demarcate or support an autonomous region within a state, the creation of a separate state, the irredentist expansion of the current state or a separatist claim that the ethnic community’s portion of the existing state should break off and join their co-ethnics in a neighboring state.

Nations also differ from ethnic groups in terms of their historical emergence. Ethnic identities and notions date back centuries. In contrast, nations are modern phenomena that build
on pre-existing ethnic elements.\textsuperscript{3} They are associated with modern states and support the existence of such states or the aspiration for their creation on the basis of the principle of self-determination. Nations are based on a politicized version of a dominant ethnicity that is used to render support to a particular state — either the existing one, or the one they seek to create — and argue for the uniformity of its population. In the process of making political claims, politicized ethnic group members transition into nationalists and endorse the argument that ethnic or ethno-national homogeneity is their mission.

Many scholars agree that nations are constructed, as opposed to the historically occurring ethnic groups, and that they are conceptualized in the minds of national intellectual elites. Nationalism as a phenomenon connecting the idea of national community to particular political demands emerged just prior to the eighteenth century American and French Revolutions, which are considered the first national revolutions, giving birth to the idea of the American and the French nations respectively as the ultimate source of sovereignty and political power. Connor (1994b) argues that it is unclear at which point in the development of nations we can place their actual emergence.

What is even more problematic is that it is very difficult to assess the national identity of the rural masses since they were for the most part illiterate and our sources regarding them come from – and they are, thus, filtered by – the intellectual elite. The historical evidence used in scholarly analysis tends to show that the concept of national identity favored by the elite had not been shared by a significant part of the rural population until late in the nineteenth century or even later, according to Eugene Weber’s (1976) study of the history of French peasantry.

\textsuperscript{3} The political identities of the pre-modern period, especially those of the common people, are still not adequately researched.
However, other cases of mass rural participation in wars of independence may challenge this general assertion.

Scholars who generally agree with the paradigm of constructed national identities may disagree on other relevant issues. Some among them (Connor 1994a; Horowitz 2000) stress more than others the sense of *kinship* as the basic characteristic and main uniting bond of a nation. Although Connor (1994a) agrees that ethno-national identities are myth-based rather than fact-based, he stresses their profound emotional depth and psychological power. He argues that the nation is a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related and that nationalism is the identification with and loyalty to one’s nation. The sense (or myth) of common ancestry creates a sense of peoplehood which is, then, the basis for the strong emotional bonds among members of a nation. Connor is joined by other scholars (Horowitz 2000; Petersen 2006) who also stress the emotional basis of ethno-national identity and try to identify the causes of ethnic or ethno-national conflict by looking at these emotions. According to these scholars, it is the sense of kinship that makes mobilization for one’s national kin very appealing.

In the process of creating a national identity, there is an interaction between old and new elements. More specifically, ancient ethnic material is manipulated, reformulated and used selectively in order to create the content of nations, masking the fact that national identities and national groups are themselves modern creations (Geary 1995; Hobsbawm & Ranger 2007; Anderson 2006; Gellner 1983). Geary (1995), in particular, stresses the constant change in the content of national or other political identities and in the membership of national groups throughout history.

This argument supports the non-static, constantly evolving nature of identities and of the socially and politically constructed pre-national and ethno-national groups. For Gellner (1983), nation and national culture are not only modern creations but they also cannot survive
without the state. He sees nations as outcomes of industrialization and modernization processes. The creation of nations was a historical necessity, according to Gellner, and nationalism is a rational response in defense of political units in the context of modern economic conditions.

The construction of national identities is seen as a project of the political elites and ethnic entrepreneurs (Geary 2002; Hobsbawm & Ranger 2007; Barreto 2001). However, certain scholars (Gellner 1983) tend to focus on the identity-building role of political institutions and processes rather than that of human agency. Brubaker (1996) stresses the nationalizing role of the state. Anderson (1991) combines all these factors in his analysis of nations and nationalism, arguing both for structural reasons and for the significant role of the elite. According to Barreto (2001), the construction of national identity by political elites is a product of rational choice since these elites serve their own political interests and aspirations through the creation and propagation of national identity.

Ethnic elites objectify the cultural traits into the iconography of national identity that best serves their long-term interests. This suggests that different nationalist elites may objectify national identity in terms of dissimilar cultural traits. Indeed, it is plausibly argued that the manipulation and transformation of pre-existing cultural traditions into national ones promote nation-building and the consolidation of power (Hobsbawm & Ranger 2007). The elites, moreover, often institutionalize social cleavages in pursuit of nation-state consolidation, selectively reinforcing earlier prejudices in encoded racial domination (Marx 1998).

A question that still remains is whether there is indeed such an ontological difference between the members of the elite and the masses with respect to their identification with a particular nation. Is indeed the elite — or, the mobilized segment of the national elite — always involved in a conscious manipulation of national elements? Is it always self-interest that
motivates them to engage in such actions? And how then can cases of self-sacrifice by members of the elite be explained in the context of multi-faceted national struggles?

In our quest for the sources of national identity, although the elite actions may seem easy to explain despite the questions raised above if we delve into self-interested motives, what still remains less studied is why the masses follow, i.e. why they choose to abide by and internalize a constructed identity that seems to consolidate the power of the elite. Scholars that have dealt with nationalism as a mass phenomenon (Connor 1994a; Horowitz 2000) provide a psychology-based theory centered on the role of emotions and the sense of kinship, as it is discussed above; but they, actually, tend to describe rather than explain these psychological processes. Connor, in particular, argues that nationalism, as a mass phenomenon with a strong emotional basis, cannot be explained through rationality (Connor 1994a). Scholars of ethnic conflict (Horowitz 2000; Petersen 2006) argue that instrumentalist explanations that focus on the creation and use of national identities by the elite for particular political goals are inadequate to explain the intensity of conflicts involving ethno-national identities.

Barreto (2009) offers a different approach in his attempt to explain nationalism as a mass phenomenon. Although he also recognizes the emotional strength of national identity, he argues that it is, indeed, a rational decision on the part of the masses to adopt the nationalistic ideology and to internalize national identity because it provides them with emotional satisfaction. However, creating a clear distinction between the masses and the elites, where the former are at the receiving end of a one-directional relationship, dismisses any notion of the participation of the masses — who, it could be argued, are at the core of the nation — in the creation of the content and limits of national identity and renders them passive receivers of intellectual constructs that others created.
Within the constructivist paradigm, the main actors in the construction and preservation of a national identity are ethnic-entrepreneurs who begin this process prior to the construction of the nation-state. In the case of ethnic entrepreneurs who succeed in establishing a sovereign state, this process is administered by the government and state apparatus thereafter. Structuralists see the state in its identity-building function as a set of institutions, rules and processes, while scholars that follow the rational choice or instrumentalist approach see the human agency, i.e. the political elites, behind the state. Regardless of how the state is viewed, what is of interest to the present study is the means it uses, i.e. policies, rhetoric and actions, with regards to building and preserving national identity — a process that Laitin (1998) calls the state’s “id project.” Education is one of the most significant policy arenas in this respect.

By their nature, educational institutions transfer knowledge and values to the student population, the next generation of citizens. In the hands of the state, they also reflect national ideology (Kaplan 2006). Voting rights (Connor 1994b) and citizenship laws are another way to codify nationhood by setting particular limits on who can be considered part of the nation and who cannot in an attempt to use electoral processes and territoriality as a basis for an overarching national identity (Massad 2001). The cultivation of collective memory through public national commemorative events and monuments is another form of identity-building processes (Zerubavel 1995). This process, according to Zerubavel, is highly selective in terms of which events will be included in the national commemorative calendar and which will be omitted in order to create the intended historical image for the nation.

A special identity-building and identity-preservation project that tends to be overlooked by political scientists is the creation of national museums. Public school systems inculcate the young; museums reinforce these lessons for children and adults. Museums ensure national and cultural authenticity and have the power to shape collective values (Anderson 2006; Zerubavel...
Placement in the museum defines an ethnic or historical element as an *authentic* piece of the nation and of national culture while also defining the nation and its national culture as authentic by offering historical artifacts as physical links to a glorious ancient past. Whoever decides what goes inside the museum — perhaps the Ministry of Culture, government elites, archaeologists, or others — becomes the “gate-keeper” that distinguishes cultural authenticity from that which is inauthentic and, thus, defines the cultural content of the nation.

Ethnic elements pre-exist but undergo a process of selection and reformulation in order to become parts of the new national culture. In this context, ethnic cultural festivals, a mobile version of the museum, and folk culture, in the form of folk arts and dances, can also be appropriated and redefined by the state in order to project a culturally authentic national image (Guss 2000) or may become arenas where national campaigns for identity preservation and even independence take place (Handler 1988).

Regardless of attempts by the state to inculcate a feeling of national unity in one way or another, there are also other factors that promote the creation of bonds among the members of the national community. Among these factors a very significant one, although generally overlooked, is the common relatively recent historical experiences of co-nationals that reinforce the sense of a common past and of a shared destiny. Wars, famines and other national catastrophes and struggles that have taken place in the last one or two centuries forge such historical bonds. The effect of these large scale historical circumstances has more or less been shared by nations in their totality, especially if they happened after the creation of modern nation-states, and they have left their mark of violence, victimization and loss on the whole national population.
We only need to think back to the two World Wars, the Balkan Wars, civil wars, forced population exchanges, foreign occupation, and so on that took place during the twentieth century. Negative experiences may actually function more as bond-creating mechanisms due to the deeply felt emotions associated with them. The basis of the bond-creating capacity of these experiences is, first, that they were experienced by a significant section of the national population — war, for example, is an experience that all shared even if the direct suffering or loss may vary — and, second, that they were passed on to following generations acquiring a multi-generational dimension.

Scholars and practitioners have only recently identified historical trauma as a possible cause of current health and other social problems of specific population groups. The relevant aspect in these studies is that historical experiences indeed survive and through commemoration and socialization are passed on to following generations, creating bonds between current and previous generations. Thus, the preservation of the memory of a shared painful past consolidates the unity felt by members of the same ethnic or national group. According to Bullock, the traumatic experience is passed on to the following generations through parenting.\(^4\)

Therefore, regardless of attempts by the state to put together a specific commemorative calendar and to cultivate specific historical memories, the fact that the families of the current nationals have experienced these events just a few generations earlier and have, often, preserved their memory in oral accounts of family history shared with the younger generations, is adequate to create national bonds through the use of history. The time frame of the last couple of centuries, after the emergence of modern nations, provides a laboratory for collective

\(^4\) Dr. Ann Bullock worked on Native American historical trauma and its generational transmission. Hers and similar studies try to explain current health problems facing Native Americans by looking as far back as the genocidal Trail of Tears (PBS 2006).
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memory and oral history that spans a limited number of generations. Although the state, in its
nation-building capacity, can use and manipulate history, history also plays an independent
role in the creation of national bonds through the agency of individuals and families.

Depending on how the raw material of nationalism — historical, ethnic, cultural — is
used by the elites or other actors, it can formulate a certain identity. The sub-elite plays a
powerful role in ethnogenesis either by further supporting or by countering the state-centered
ethnogenesis. The agency of the civil society actors as they delve into communal historical
memories is nowadays reinforced by a multitude of communication technologies. The state’s
monopoly as the depository of national culture and history may be challenged through
technologies that empower civil society and individuals and by other factors such as
independent literary and other artistic production that centers on historical themes.

Intermarriage across different ethnic or other groups within a nation is another factor
that is generally overlooked as a nation-bonding mechanism. Such intermarriage reinforces
national unity and a sense of historical continuity, once a nation is constructed out of what is,
more or less, an ethnic mosaic. There is a general academic consensus that modern nations are
created out of combinations of pre-existing ethnic elements and groupings. However, due to
intermarriage among these sub-national communities, what were previously different ethnic
groups within a state have started to acquire biological, social and emotional bonds with each
other. Thus, intermarriage between ethnic groups has turned into intramarriage in the context
of the nation.

Family, social networks and other civil society elements are created and function as
unifying bonds pulling together different ethnic groups or other sub-groups that may make up
the nation. Within the nation, any competition between ethnocultural elements is neutralized
and, in the end, they make no difference (Behdad 2005). The pre-national variety of ethnic
elements may be either erased or shared across the nation. In the same manner, if a historical experience was only limited to a segment of the national group, through intermarriage and the creation of social networks among disparate sub-national groups, this historical experience becomes part of the collective historical narrative. At the same time, the state uses selective historical amnesia in a way that suits its goals of specific form of national identity and culture (Ibid.).

Nationalism is the ideology according to which the national and political boundaries must coincide. Such requests can be as mild as the call for an autonomous region within an existing state. But nationalistic goals may include the quest for independence from the state or territorial expansion into another polity. Nationalists are staunch supporters of the protection of the nation and the state from any external influence or interference, and may be associated with ethnocentrism and a consideration of their nation as superior to others. Ultra-nationalism, an extreme form of nationalism, acquires the character of a civic religion, where the nation is the object of worship. In this context, extreme confessional devotion can spell trouble to the non-nationals who reside within the boundaries of the newly articulated national state.

The relationship between nation, nationalism and religion is a particularly interesting one, given that both national and religious sentiments can be deep and strong, and religion may be either a strong supporter or a staunch adversary of nationalism. For example, due to their national character the Orthodox Christian Churches — Church of Greece, Russian Patriarchate, Serbian Patriarchate, etc. — tend to be seen as another representation of the nation and as a source of support for national political aspirations. The creation of these national churches functioned as a way of reaffirming national control over the spiritual realm by removing these Orthodox communities away from the direct administration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Thus, the Church of Greece may have functioned more or less as a proponent of Greek
nationalism once it proclaimed itself as an autocephalous Church and became closely connected to the Greek state.

However, in earlier times, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was ideologically opposed to nationalism (Kitromilides 1994). A Synod of the Orthodox Church held in the Patriarchal Cathedral at the Phanar issued a proclamation against nationalism in 1872, during the height of the nineteenth century nationalist movements, arguing for the unchristian character of nationalistic struggles that involve the Church since there are no distinctions across national lines among the Orthodox faithful according to the Church’s doctrine. In the words of the current Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew (1999), that Synod condemned phyletism, a notion akin to racism and nationalism, in the following manner: “We renounce, censure and condemn racism, that is, racial discrimination, ethnic feuds, hatreds and dissensions within the Church of Christ.”

From Nation to Diaspora

The phenomenon of diaspora is an extension of the phenomenon of the nation. Diasporas are communities of co-ethnics or co-nationals who live outside of the homeland but who preserve or are expected to preserve a strong connection to their homeland and to its national identity. This definition distinguishes the diaspora from notions of immigration that presuppose that the immigrant would assimilate into the host culture and cut most ties to the homeland. Diasporas may have experienced diasporic movement more than one time, hence
being diasporas of diasporas. These diasporas may have both a primary and secondary homeland, the secondary homeland being their original diasporic destination (Safran 2005).

For first generation diasporans, often, “home” is where they currently live and “homeland” is their country of origin, thus distinguishing among concepts of belonging, and giving them a transnational dimension. Diasporic nationals may assimilate to a certain degree in the host country but this assimilation is not strong or exclusive enough to remove cultural traits and an ethnic identification with the original homeland. This partial assimilation, which is to a certain degree essential to the diaspora’s economic and social survival and, moreover, success in the host country, creates a phenomenon of hybridity that characterizes the diaspora and which distinguishes it from the ethnically/nationally “pure” and “authentic” homeland and its national inhabitants. Due to this hybridity and the importation of cultural elements from the host country in the midst of the diasporic culture, the diaspora may be seen as culturally “impure” compared to the culturally “pure” homeland. The diaspora, therefore, finds itself living in limbo between the homeland and the host country.

According to another but similar definition, a diaspora is the dispersal of an ethno-national group in more than one state outside its homeland — natal or imagined, according to Cohen (1997) — that preserves a sense of common origin (Cohen 1997; Sheffer 2006; Prévélakis 1996). The notion of dispersal has a dynamic character, implying the movement

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5 This condition describes, for example, the case of Eastern-European Jewish diaspora in America. Their primary homeland is Israel/Palestine and their secondary homeland is one of the countries of Eastern Europe.

6 According to a recent Finnish study, young Kurdish immigrants and refugees in Finland identify their current place of residence as “home” and their place of origin as “homeland” (Toivanen 2014).

7 This would, for example, describe the case of Palestinians and Jews born outside of the territory of Palestine/Israel.
from homeland to other countries, and it may be considered limited by some scholars since it necessarily presupposes population movement or emigration. The latter scholars support a broader definition of diaspora that also includes any segments of the ethno-national group that find themselves outside the homeland due to changes of state borders and, thus, which are being treated as minorities (King & Melvin 1999; Connor 1986).

A state becomes a homeland for co-ethnics living beyond its borders who have never lived within state territory, when the homeland’s elite defines them as members of the homeland nation (Brubaker 1996: 58). As a result, the nation is larger than the state’s territory or citizenship; it includes citizens or residents of other states (Ibid., 111-112). The issue of economic migrants as part of the diaspora is a debatable issue in the scholarly community. Some scholars exclude economic migrants from the diaspora but others include them as long as they are permanent residents of host countries while preserving emotional and social bonds with the homeland. A characteristic expression of these bonds are remittances that support relatives living in the homeland (Braziel & Mannur 2003).

The academic community cannot really afford to exclude this group from the notion of diaspora since the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen large waves of migration for economic reasons that have either offered the basis for the creation of modern diasporas or have added membership to pre-existent diasporic communities around the world. Moreover, the concepts of permanent and temporary tend to merge or, at least, become vague in our ever-changing globalized world where people may change countries of residence every now and then as they take on new professional positions. Many of the older diasporas were also originally made up of communities that had migrated for economic reasons, like the eighteenth

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8 Economic migrants may not be seen as members of the diaspora because of their temporary residence in another country. Their temporary presence is often associated with lack of any significant social or political involvement with the organized diaspora in the host country.
and nineteenth century Greek merchant communities in Europe, which were crucial in the cultivation of the Greek national idea and organized the struggle for Greek independence.

A new relevant term has emerged during the last decades in social sciences to describe the reality of the complex and multiple transnational identity (or identities) of migrants. The term ‘transmigrant’ refers to immigrants who have a public identity connected to more than one nation-states and whose daily life is based on many and continuous connections across international borders (Schiller, Basch & Blanc 1995). This ‘transmigrant’ condition accurately describes the first and even later generations of the diaspora, depending on the degree of their connection to the homeland state.

Diaspora should be seen both as a micro- and a macro-social phenomenon (Claval 1996). Sheffer (2006) argues that ethno-national diasporism is increasing rather than decreasing and agrees with other scholars that it is an old historical phenomenon rather than a recent one (Cohen 1997; Prévelakis 1996). Moreover, he argues that newer diasporas are not unique but rather share common characteristics with older ones. The diaspora preserves the memory of the historical link with the homeland and has a sense of co-ethnicity with others who share their background either in the homeland or in other territories (Sheffer 2006).

The diasporans maintain contact with the homeland and with their co-ethnics in other countries, a fact that leads Prévelakis (1996), building on Sheffer’s argument, to stress the importance of considering diaspora as a network of people who preserve active bonds. Other scholars, however, disagree on how much emphasis the diaspora places on the homeland. Instead of considering the identity and the actions of the diaspora as primarily geared towards the homeland, they focus on the diaspora’s interest in the recreation of culture and community abroad (Clifford 1994). According to Safran (2005), ethno-religious diasporas see homelands as sacred, since they are the depositories of their religion as well as their ethno-national culture.
They are places with a strong religious element in their national identity and the location of sacred monuments, such as monasteries and historic churches, places where saints lived, were martyred and were buried, and places where important religious texts were written (Ibid., 42).

Diasporas preserve their identity by maintaining boundaries around them. According to the concept of boundary-maintenance (Armstrong 1976; Brubaker 2005), boundaries help preserve the distinctive diasporic identity. They are necessary for the preservation of the diasporic community as a distinct entity within the host society. Armstrong (1976) suggests that the mobilized diaspora functions as a quasi-society within the host country. Boundaries are preserved either by self-segregation, primarily through endogamy (Armstrong 1976; Smith 1986; Brubaker 2005), or by imposed social exclusion (Laitin 1995; Brubaker 2005).

Ethnic identity (or, more accurately, ethno-national identity since it is connected to a homeland state) is preserved in the diaspora through a variety of institutions such as family and community institutions, religious institutions, economic associations, formal educational institutions and cultural organizations (Murphy & Leeper 1996). Safran (2005) recognizes as one of the main characteristics of diasporas their collective memory of the homeland as well as a recollection of their sufferings, in the form of actual memory, myth or vision. Memory of fairly recent tragic events in their diaspora’s collective history is easier to be preserved (Ibid., 41). Significant historical experiences define the diasporic identity. As new experiences are added on, the diasporic identity, like ethno-national identity in general, becomes redefined.

Diasporas may be the product of either voluntary (emigration) or involuntary movement through persecution or forced exile (Cohen 1997; Sheffer 2006). The archetypal diaspora is the Jewish one, which has generated a lot of academic and political interest. Safran (1999), although he accepts the need for broad categorization, nevertheless, cautions against accepting dissimilar groups of migrants as diasporas. Sheffer (2006) also stresses the difference between
migrants and diasporans although he recognizes that there is not yet a clear dividing line; consequently people classified under one term may cross over to the other. He, further, points out that the main theoretical question that requires further investigation is why ethnic diasporas maintain their identities.

Cohen (1997) classifies diasporas along the following lines: victim diasporas (the historical reason for their dispersal was violence, slavery or persecution), labor and imperial diasporas (including colonizers and indentured workers), trade diasporas (focusing on merchants), and cultural diasporas (with postcolonial, hybridized identities that center on culture and ideas). He also makes the distinction between diasporas with a national homeland and stateless diasporas, for example, Kurds and Sikhs. Among the stateless diasporas, the Jewish case — a stateless diaspora for most of its diasporic existence — presents particular interest. The lack of a homeland as a reference point for the Jewish diaspora for two millennia led to the existence of the Jewish identity almost exclusively as a diasporic phenomenon (Safran 2005: 44). The creation of the state of Israel was accompanied by the Zionist hope for an end to the Jewish diaspora (Ibid.), so the two were seen almost as mutually exclusive.

The relationship between diasporas and host countries is usually a positive one, although there is a general perception that diasporas are trouble-makers for the host country. Sheffer (2006) identifies a spectrum of different strategies that diasporas adopt in their host state depending on how they perceive their relationship with the host country and their homeland. The relationship between host countries and diasporas has been problematic primarily in cases where the diaspora may be using violent means either in order to promote the idea of recognition of its homeland or in cases where it feels threatened by the host state.

9 These stateless diasporas are still ethno-national diasporas since they are connected to a nation: an ethno-national group with a political identity and aspirations.
Historically, it has been more common for the host state to be aggressive towards diasporas rather than the opposite. Often homeland and diaspora are mirror images of each other, as both positive and negative elements reflect on the other entity. For example, Israel has had a positive impact on the diaspora both by instilling pride for its progress among the diasporans and for dispersing the negative image of diaspora Jews. But the Jewish diaspora also takes the blame for negative actions by the Israeli state (Safran 2005).

According to Safran (2005), the degree of identification of diaspora members varies according to different factors. Significant among these are the level and depth of institutionalization of the diaspora, how different they are from the host society, and how dense they are demographically. He also stresses the significant role that frequent replenishment of the diasporic community has played in the preservation of a diasporic identity, especially in the case of European immigrants to the United States, who became easily assimilated within a few generations.

Despite attempts by the homeland state and diaspora organizations to preserve the diasporic identity, many diasporans choose to assimilate in the host country’s culture and society by loosening or altogether cutting their links to the diasporic community. Pluralistic and democratic polities enable the preservation of a diasporic presence but they may also facilitate assimilation (Safran 2005: 40). When the actual connection with the homeland is disrupted, through migration, it is transformed into a sentiment (Schiller, Basch & Blanc 1995).

When the diaspora considers the host country’s culture and society as superior to its own, assimilation is more wide-spread. When the diaspora considers the host country’s culture and society as inferior to its own, assimilation is rare.10 This difference in conditions between

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10 The presence of Americans in Panama presents a similar case. They remained separate from the native population and preserved their American ways without adopting any local cultural
different host countries explains why Greek-Americans assimilated at a greater extent than the Greek diaspora in African countries. The pressure to assimilate also varied from place to place, from region to region and from urban centers to rural settings. An example of a famous Greek diasporan who decided not to identify with the Greek-American community was Vice-President Spyro Agnew, the son of a Greek immigrant, who lacked knowledge of the Greek language and had given up his family’s Greek-Orthodox faith. Instead, he promoted himself as an all-American politician. He made it clear that Greece was a part of who his father was, not himself.\textsuperscript{11}

Although, historically, the pressure to assimilate was strong, especially for white immigrants in the United States, immigrant communities with a strong ethno-religious affiliation appear to be the exception. Herberg (1983) makes this argument with reference to Americans of European ancestry who were assimilating to religiously defined American prototypes. Ethnic heterogeneity exists but only within each religious category, i.e. the prototypical Protestant, Catholic or Jew. This argument is equally valid for the case of the Greek-Orthodox immigrants, although the national differentiations within the Orthodox Church — primarily the different national languages used in church services — kept the different ethnic Orthodox communities separate one from the other.\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{itemize}
  \item In anecdotal information, Vice-President Agnew referred to Greece as “My father’s homeland” (\textit{I patris tou patros mou} in Greek) during his official visit to Greece in October 1971. Greeks were expecting that Agnew would consider Greece his homeland and when they realized that this was not the case, they became disappointed.
  \item An American Orthodox identity is currently emerging due to the phenomenon of subsequent generations of diasporans who choose to keep the religion but do not pay adequate attention to
\end{itemize}
In addition to the Greeks and the classic case of the Jewish diaspora, other diasporas for which religion and kinship are fundamental elements of their collective identity are the Armenians, Parsis, Indians, Sikhs, and Tibetans; due to the religious basis of their identification, their homelands acquire a sacred character (Safran 2005). Assimilation often happens when a member of the community chooses to marry outside of it, although there are numerous cases where the non-diasporic spouse became an “adopted” member of the diasporic community through marriage. The fact that the Greek-American population generally shares the same religion (Greek-Orthodox), which differs from other more or less dominant American denominations, has been a strong factor in the preservation of the solidarity of the group and of its ethnic identity by cultivating, among other practices, in-marriage in the community. In other cases of immigrant groups which are divided among different religious affiliations, such as the Catholic and Lutheran German-Americans, out-marriage is encouraged and the ethnic bonds among members of the group and a sense of ethnic exclusiveness are weaker (Kazal 2004).

In the recent decades, there has been less interest both on the part of diasporas and on the part of host countries in promoting aggressive assimilation in the host country’s culture and society, primarily due to a new set of international norms that value multiculturalism, tolerance and diversity, in the context of which a different ethnic identity may be seen as an asset rather than a disadvantage. Nevertheless, host countries attempt a “nation-building project” that aims at undermining the outside allegiances of its immigrant diasporas (Schiller, Basch & Blanc the old language or other ethnic cultural markers, thus choosing to participate in English-only Orthodox parishes. Such parishes also draw members from different ethnic groups who have been traditionally Orthodox but also include increasing numbers of American converts to Orthodoxy.
1995: 48). Within this “nation-building project,” the right to dual citizenship becomes quite paradoxical.

In the U.S. naturalization ceremony, a new citizen gives an oath of allegiance to the United States that includes the requirement to give up any loyalty to another state entity. However, the U.S. recognizes the right of its citizens to have another citizenship which implies that it recognizes their allegiance to another entity. Beyond the issue of dual citizenship, host-state policies towards immigrant and diasporic communities do not adequately understand or adapt to the transnationalism of the diaspora households that is centered on multiple active bonds with the homeland (Schiller, Basch & Blanc 1995: 49). This shortcoming is not only reflected in relevant domestic policies — on immigration, education, labor, economics, etc. — but also in the host-state’s foreign policy, including political, diplomatic, economic, social, and cultural approaches, towards the diasporas’ homelands.

**Homeland and Diaspora**

Diasporas usually have positive relations with the homeland, which is seen as their national and cultural cradle. Homelands have a tendency to “stretch” numerically their diasporic community by viewing even emigrants who are assimilated as part of their diaspora (Brubaker 2005). Although it might be assumed that diasporas and homelands are always in agreement and enjoy good relations, this is not always the case. Diasporas may create more challenges for their homelands than for their host countries (Sheffer 2006). This often happens when the diaspora opposes a certain type of regime in the homeland (for example, a dictatorship). However, overall friction in the relationship usually comes from the homeland’s politicians who proclaim that the *raison d’être* of their diasporas is to remain loyal to, and serve, the homeland (Sheffer 2006).
External national homelands, homelands with members of their national group living beyond their territory, become protectors of their ethnic co-nationals, supporting them materially or otherwise, and protesting attempts by the host state to “nationalize” them (Brubaker 1996: 58). States with a diasporic dispersion increasingly see themselves as “deterritorialized nation-states” (Basch, Schiller & Szanton-Blanc 1994), imagining an extension of their nation and state wherever their diasporas have become integrated members of host societies (Schiller, Basch & Blanc 1995: 51). Therefore, homeland states see diasporas as their constituencies and as global resources (Ibid., 52). The increase of transnationalism and of globalization processes may have reduced the significance of borders and territorially based entities but they have led to a rise in deterritorialized nation-based identity politics (Ibid.).

The rhetoric and actions of homeland states reflect their interest in the diaspora, which they see as the global dimension of their nation. In the last twenty years several states have created a variety of administrative bodies exclusively geared towards the needs and interests of their diasporas. These administrative bodies are usually part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as the Irish Abroad Unit in Ireland, or, in the case where the homeland places great political significance on the diaspora, more significant political units may be established, such as the Ministry of the Diaspora in Serbia. It is hypothesized that these developments are indicative of the realization on the part of the homelands that they need to cultivate their bonds with the diasporas due to anticipated political benefits that will come out of this relationship as well as due to the increased domestic pressure to reconnect to the diaspora, especially when this involves directly or indirectly a significant percentage of the homeland population.

The ways in which diasporas connect with their homeland states have changed significantly through time, reflecting changes in the transnational nature of the world economy, in transportation and communication (Schiller, Basch & Blanc 1995). Information technology
and the communications revolution have reformulated the relationship between states and
diasporas in unprecedented ways (Kotzias 1998). States try to reformulate their authority
through these digital/virtual diaspora networks and through many technological means that the
era of globalization offers (Varadarajan 2003). They use the Internet to offer information
directly to the diaspora and to cultivate the latter’s connection to the homeland. Through e-
government, services or information available to or specifically targeting the diaspora are
accessible in seconds, bringing the government of the homeland into the living rooms of their
co-ethnics abroad.

However, states cannot control all the flow of information and activity that takes place
through electronic channels of communication and which gives private individuals and
organizations more power than they ever had in disseminating information and ideas, and in
connecting and mobilizing people. Yet, although the state has lost its relative monopoly in the
dissemination of national culture and in the formation of national identity, the connection to
the homeland and the sense of identity within the diaspora is stronger due to the technological
connections that globalization offers. In a rather counter-intuitive way, the state still benefits
in this whole process, since it is viewed as the metropolitan center of the nation and as its
cultural depository.

New communications and information tools also help diasporas organize and connect
with their members across different states. Anderson’s (2001) notion of long-distance
nationalism refers to how mass communications and mass migration enable nationalism to
reach beyond a state’s borders. These processes deterritorialize nationalism and disconnect it
from the nation-state, while they enable the diaspora to play a long-distance political role in
the homeland’s affairs. Diasporas strengthen their presence as ethno-national entities that may
be connected to their homeland but are also independent from it. We see the creation of
transnational (or trans-state) diaspora networks built on web-sites, e-mail lists and social networking communities.

Diasporas preserve their connection to the homeland and to other groups of their co-ethnics who are dispersed around the world by following the social and political news in real time through satellite TV, web-TV and web-sites. They are in virtual contact with their families and friends through e-mail, Skype, texting, Facebook, Twitter and other social networking sites. The low cost of telephone communication and international travel compared to earlier times, has increased the frequency and intensity of contact with the homeland, thus, strengthening the diaspora’s national identity. Extensive trans-state networks of diasporas recreate a non-territorial sense of nationhood which, although symbolically and emotionally connected to the national center, has an autonomous existence that may not involve the homeland directly. The deterritorialization of social identities is a feature of globalization, as Cohen (1997) argues expanding on Perlmutter’s argument, and it allows the coexistence of multiple identities and syncretism of cultures, a condition that actually leads to the empowerment of diasporic identities.

**Hybridity**

The experience of diasporic communities is generally characterized by a strong duality. Two identities and loyalties vie for the soul of the diaspora, that of the homeland state and that of the host country. Diasporas experience both cultural influences and feel connected to both countries and societies, sometimes more to one than the other. This duality leads to the creation of a hybridity as presented, for example, in the case of the Greek-American community, culture and identity. The new diasporic culture and identity are distinct from both original ones, and are fully shared only with the members of the particular diasporic community. For this reason,
many members of the diaspora find themselves in-between the two cultures and societies or “in limbo,” not fully a member of either because they always are labeled with an additional identity than the one the mainstream society shares. The creation of hybrid cultures and identities is a phenomenon that will probably gain even greater momentum under the influence of globalization forces that enable the flourishing of various hybrid, nested and other new forms of global identities.

García-Canclini’s (1995) notion of hybridity as the product of the interaction between modernity and tradition is particularly relevant in the case of diasporas. Diasporas tend to be locked, at least partially, in the time of departure from the homeland. Thus, many times they have preserved traditional elements that tend to disappear in the homeland. The homeland traditions may come in conflict with the culture of the host country, when the latter tends to be more modernized than the culture of the homeland. Consequently, in the case of diasporas we do not only see a domestic cultural conflict between modernity and tradition, as in García-Canclini’s work, but a multi-layered cross-cultural conflict and hybrid synthesis. Modern and traditional may co-exist but also merge with each other in the case of diasporas making unclear who or what belongs to the modern or traditional sphere. What is considered modern in the context of the homeland, may be seen as traditional in the context of the host country.

The Greek-American, Italian-American, and other hyphenated ethnic epithets imply hybrid cultures and identities that borrow elements of both the homeland and the host country creating a cultural and social diasporic niche in the host country’s society. Often, a hybrid linguistic idiom develops, such as Greenglish (the Greek-American dialect) or Spanglish (the Spanish-American dialect) as well as hybrid sets of customs — for example, the use of bridesmaids in Greek-American Orthodox weddings — which target the particular diasporic group and which may be a more or less exclusive form of communication among the members
of this group. Thus, such hybrid creations function both as means of inclusion of the diasporic community in both cultures and societies and also as a mechanism of exclusion which sets the particular community apart from both countries’ societies and cultures and creates for it an autonomous diasporic existence.

At the same time, the diasporic culture interacts with the homeland but even more so with the host country. This interaction is ongoing and it implies a bi-directional influence. The diasporic culture adopts a larger or smaller part of the host country’s culture but, at the same time, it also shapes the culture of the host country. This is particularly evident in the case of host countries that are multiethnic with a significant history of immigration, like the United States. Thus, for example, we may see the American custom of wedding and baby showers being introduced to the Greek-American social practice but we also see *My Big Fat Greek Wedding* being one of the most popular independent films in American film history, shaping the cultural landscape of the host country.

**Diasporas as Political Actors**

Diasporas are non-state actors that have the power to influence domestic politics in their homeland and in their host country, as well as international politics, by influencing foreign policy decisions and international organizations. Diasporas and homelands generally tend to be in agreement over foreign policy issues that affect the homeland, but this is not always the case. Thus, their mobilization on these issues may be either in support of the homeland’s political goals — for example, the agreement between Jewish Americans and the government of Israel over security of the state of Israel — or in opposition to them — for example, differences of opinion between the Irish government and Irish-Americans regarding action in Northern Ireland or between the Armenian-Americans and the Armenian government
regarding Turkish recognition of the Armenian genocide as a prerequisite for normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.

An example of conflict between the interests and goals of the homeland and the diaspora is increasingly the case of Israel and the Jewish diaspora. Some diaspora Jews, especially leftist intellectuals, seem embarrassed by Israel’s actions that are seen as going against international norms (Safran 2005). Although the majority of diaspora Jews harbors positive feelings towards Israel which is seen as a refuge, the disaffection with Israel has even taken the form of criticism of its creation among certain diaspora circles, wondering whether the creation of Israel has indeed been “good” for Jews (Ibid.). Diasporas, thus, ultimately lobby for what they, and not the homeland’s leadership, consider important (Shain 2002: 120-123).

According to Safran (2005), diasporas are more eager to preserve sentiments of hostility to their historical enemies and more maximalist in their ethno-national vision or territorial claims that their co-ethnics living in their homelands.\(^ {13} \) Laguerre (2006) argues that it is not only the homeland that engages the diaspora in pursuit of specific political goals but the host country may also use the diaspora as an intermediary in its attempt to build political and commercial relations with the homeland. However, both the homeland and the host country may ignore the diasporas and their diplomatic potential at other times.

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\(^ {13} \) He gives the example of the Greek, Armenian, Sikh and Jewish diasporas that fulfill this condition but the list of diasporas who appear more extremist in their political views than their homelands could be much longer.

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Diasporas and international relations theory

Theories of international relations have treated diasporas in different ways. Diasporas are not considered significant political actors for classical realism and neorealism, since these
theories focus on an anarchic international system, where states are the primary, if not only, actors of any significance. According to realism, states are unitary actors within an anarchic system who act in a rational way that serves their national interest, which centers on the pursuit of power and security (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). Thus, traditionally, realists have not dealt with diasporas. However, certain realist theorists have adapted the role of the diasporas to fit the realist framework of analysis (Papasotiriou 2000).

Diasporas may be recognized as factors that influence the foreign policy of host states but they are also seen as an extension of the homeland state, expressing and promoting its interests. Conversely, if they seem to influence the foreign policy of the homeland state, that would also possibly be seen, though a realist perspective, as an expression and promotion of the interests of the host state. In any case, under the realist paradigm, diasporas are seen as “arms” of one state into another rather than independent actors, and the realist prescription is for states to use the diasporas in order to promote their political goals in the global arena, acting in a pragmatic way and within the framework of the national interests of the states in question (Papasotiriou 2000).

Papasotiriou (2000) also cautions against overestimating the power of the diaspora in influencing the foreign policy of the host state, arguing that unless the national interests of the host state converge with those of the homeland, such attempt to influence policy-making will be unsuccessful. Therefore, nothing trumps a state’s own national interest, not even the vote-seeking motives of legislators, according to realist thinking.

Liberalism recognizes the significant role of non-state actors, ranging from international organizations to non-governmental organizations and individuals. For liberals, international politics is as much (if not more) about cooperation as about conflict. Moreover, liberalism recognizes the influence of domestic politics and human agency on foreign policy
(Viotti and Kauppi 1999). Since diasporas may influence the foreign policy of the host state — occasionally, also of the homeland state — through political pressure groups, this political role that the diasporas play through the foreign policy formation process, seems definitely relevant to the liberal paradigm.

In the neoliberal approach, specifically in complex interdependence, diasporas may play an important role, since this theory places emphasis on transnational cooperation and on the role of civil society networks in shaping international politics. Moreover, the multiple channels of interaction that the theory identifies (Keohane and Nye 2000) fit very well with the varied state - non-state actor relationship between the homeland and its diaspora, as well as with respect to relations among diasporas. Under the framework of complex interdependence, we have an extended recognition of the role of non-state actors, their significance and the complexity of the transnational relations that these actors engage in.

**Diasporas, International Conflict and Development**

Diasporas play a particularly important role in cases when their homelands experience conflict. In inter-ethnic conflicts, there is evidence that diasporas of the ethnic groups engaged in the conflict may find common ground when they get together in a neutral country. An interesting case is Cyprus, where much of the inter-communal — between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots — conflict resolution activity takes place in the UK. Beyond such organized and purposeful activity, the two communities tend to co-exist better in England, especially in the Green Lanes area of London, reminiscent of the Cypriot past when the two communities lived together in an undivided country, than in their homeland.\(^{14}\) Therefore, distance from the

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\(^{14}\) The case of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot diasporas in the Green Lanes area of London is described in the article “Cypriot London” in the BBC London section (BBC 2005).
source of conflict may act as a positive “cooling factor” in a case of intense or long-term conflict.

However, distance can also reinforce an existent conflict among diasporic groups and it may even contribute to it. An example of an international conflict that has taken transnational dimensions is the conflict over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, between the aforementioned Republic and Greece (Danforth 1995). The diasporas of the two states in Canada and Australia — less so in the United States — have experienced the conflict even more forcefully than the people in their homelands, probably a main reason being that the two opposing communities find themselves necessarily living together in the diaspora as opposed to their physical separation due to the national border that exists between them back home.

Conflict between diaspora groups may also reinforce the conflict between their respective homelands. In the above case, the continuing conflict among the diasporas of Greece and FYROM may have contributed to the prolonged state of the conflict among the two states. Diasporas have also greatly contributed in fueling conflict in their homelands by funding and recruiting for political and military organizations, including para-military and liberation organizations, some of which may be considered by national and international actors as terrorist groups. Among those diasporas that have contributed to either formal or informal organizations involved in an ethnic or international conflict have been the Jewish, Palestinian, Armenian, Turkish, Albanian, and Kurdish diasporas, to cite a few examples.

The past mobilization of Jewish communities around the world in support of the zionist vision for the creation of the state of Israel, has currently taken the form of Jewish diaspora support of Israeli governmental and non-governmental organizations that share the diaspora’s
view on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Albanian diaspora was the main source of funding and international lobbying in support of and recruitment for the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA), the military organization of the Albanians of Kosovo fighting against the Serbs with the ultimate goal of Kosovar independence (Albanian American Civic League). The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the official representative of the Palestinian people at the UN before its replacement by the Palestinian National Authority, had significant support from and was a representative of the Palestinian diaspora. This factor complicates the question of UN recognition of a Palestinian state, since such a state will not include the diaspora (Weiss 2011), leaving a particularly politically relevant portion of the Palestinian people outside of official international representation channels.

Although diasporas may be perceived as actors that cultivate and fuel ethnic conflict, they can also contribute to conflict resolution (Sheffer 2006) as well as to the economic and social development of their homeland state. Organizations such as UNESCO and USAID actively promote this type of action. UNESCO, in particular, states that one of its objectives is to “strengthen the capacity, sustainability and effectiveness of Diaspora networks as a means to promote brain gain [for the developing countries] – as opposed to current brain drain – through the use of ICTs [Information Communication Technologies]” (UNESCO).

The conclusions of a recent UNDP report on the role of the Somali diaspora in conflict resolution and development in Somalia (Sheikh & Healy 2009) are an example not only of the potential for positive political change that diasporas have but also of a blueprint for specific actions and policies that engage the diaspora positively and productively in the affairs of the homeland. Other examples of cases where scholars and/or practitioners suggest that a greater

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15 Each diaspora should not be treated as a unitary actor, although there are often certain large and representative diaspora organizations that have a clear position on significant political issues.
involvement of the diaspora could strongly support conflict resolution and development are in Sri Lanka (Bandarage 2009), in Sierra Leone, Liberia and other African countries in the Horn of Africa and in the Great Lakes region (Mohamoud & Osman 2008). However, Orjuela (2008) argues that there is some inherent danger in involving diasporas in post-conflict reconstruction, because, although this involvement may reduce grievances or inequalities that were the cause of the conflict, it can also reproduce them.

Diasporas provide bridges between homelands and host-states and they act as carriers of the culture and heritage of their homelands abroad being, effectively, cultural ambassadors. Moreover, they are connected to political networks in their host countries, thus, having the power to promote specific foreign policy goals through the most effective channels, i.e. lobbying efforts and personal connections with the political leadership of the host country. Diasporas can also play a major role in support of homeland state policies that target the greater international audience, such as cultural and arts policy, tourism policy, international trade policy, development policy and international campaigns for human rights issues. The Greek diaspora in the United States offers a case-study for the study of the diasporas and their current and potential cultural, political and diplomatic role as bridges between the two countries. Hence, the study of the relationship between the Greek-American community and the Greek state offers a significant insight into the dynamics of the phenomenon of homeland-diaspora relations.
History of the Greek Diaspora

Diaspora scholars usually refer to the Greek diaspora as one of the old or classic diasporas. The history of Greece is essentially the history of Greek diaspora. Greeks since the ancient times have been travelers, establishing colonies or communities in different parts of the world. In ancient times, Greek colonies were spread throughout the Mediterranean. For a certain period these ancient Greek colonies were not only relatively powerful but they also influenced culturally the surrounding populations (Hasiotis 1993). This cultural influence was an element that was missing in the later, neo-Hellenic diasporic communities since they were much weaker than the ancient ones, and within one generation they had already started to show signs of assimilation (Ibid.).

The Greek character of the ancient colonies started, eventually, to disappear due to distance from the metropolis — identified as a collectivity of regions in mainland Greece, the Greek islands and Asia Minor — and intermarriage or conquest by other peoples. During the Hellenistic times, Greek cities established by Alexander the Great in different areas of his extended kingdom, preserved the Greek language and culture, and disseminated them across the then-known world, rendering Hellenistic Greek (the Koine) the lingua franca of the time. The Roman conquest of Alexander’s kingdom and its aftermath produced a hybrid Helleno-Roman culture that latinized many of the former Greek establishments. Greek eventually re-emerged as the official language of the Eastern part of the Roman Empire under Emperor
Heraclius in the seventh century. Orthodox Christianity and the Greek language were the hallmarks of the Eastern Roman Empire, widely known — although erroneously so — as the Byzantine Empire.

Migration of Greek-Orthodox populations during the Byzantine period was limited and took place primarily within the borders of the empire (Hasiotis 1993). These migrations were part of the Byzantine state’s policy of settling Greek-Orthodox populations in strategic areas, usually close to the borders (Ibid.). Hence, communities of Greek-speaking Orthodox populations were found throughout the Mediterranean and the Middle East, either because of these state policies or due to earlier historical developments. In the last centuries of the Byzantine Empire, successive invasions caused new population movements and diasporic waves beyond the Byzantine territory (Ibid).

During the decline and ultimate fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, large segments of the Byzantine intelligentsia – as well as whole communities fleeing invasion and massacre – moved to Europe, primarily Italy.16 The Ottoman conquest, successive invasions, wars, massacres, the settlement of Muslim populations as well as the pursuit of economic and professional opportunities beyond the Ottoman lands led to subsequent waves of internal and external migrations, primarily towards Western and Eastern Europe (Hasiotis 1993). This period between the fifteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century or end of eighteenth century marks the first period of the neo-Hellenic diaspora (Ibid.).17 Part of Greek

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16 This Byzantine “refugee” diaspora would later contribute to the Renaissance and the renewed interest in Greek and Roman studies.

17 Different scholars set the beginning of the neo-Hellenic or modern Greek history — in the context of which a modern Greek identity emerged — at different times. Usually the fall of Constantinople and the incorporation of Greek-inhabited territories in the Ottoman Empire mark the beginning of modern Hellenism. However, other historians place this beginning later,
diaspora since the Ottoman times – and until today – has also been a small but highly dynamic academic diaspora, i.e. Greek students studying in foreign educational institutions (Ibid., 58-59).  

Most of the diasporic communities that were created between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries had a mercantile character (Hasiotis 1993). Although the size of these communities was significantly smaller than diasporic communities created after 1880, they were, nevertheless, particularly active (Ibid.) and relatively powerful. A significant characteristic of even the earliest diasporic communities of this period was that they set up collective institutions that kept the community connected and preserved its identity into subsequent generations – even if assimilation did eventually play a role.  

These early collective institutions, called Fraternities, Adelfotites (in Greek) or Confraternitas (in Italian), were charter-based, offered educational and social services (including healthcare) to their members, and established Greek-Orthodox churches (Ibid., 60).

A community of thousands of Greeks resided in the Venice area in the first century after the Ottoman conquest. This community was eventually granted the right to build a Greek Orthodox Church and to be recognized as a “Greek colony” via the official recognition of the

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18 Most Greek students during the Ottoman period were studying at Italian universities and, later, German and other European universities (Hasiotis 1993). In Italy, there were special educational institutions for Greek students, for example, the Greek College of Saint Athanasios in Rome in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, affiliated with the Catholic Church, and the Flanginian School in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, established by the Greek community of Venice (Ibid.).

19 The existence of communal organizations and institutions enables the tracking of both the membership and the development of diasporic communities through archival research (Hasiotis 1993).
Confraternity (Scuola) of Orthodox Greeks or of the Greek Nation in 1498 by the Venetian authorities. At that time, the Greek community of Venice was one of the most economically powerful centers of the Hellenic diaspora. Although this era may be considered a pre-modern period by many standards, including a concept of modernity characterized by the emergence of political concepts such as those of nations and nationalism, we already see a strong ethnically-based collective diasporic identity around which a proto-national community — or what could be considered as such — is organized through institutional and quasi-political means in order to promote its culture, religion and economic interests.

Greek emigration to Southern Italy continued in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when numerous Greek families, including nobility, found refuge there, contributing both to the prosperity of the area and to its culture (Nicholas 2005). In the Southern Italian regions of Calabria and Puglia, one encounters even today the Griko people, speakers of a Greek-Italian dialect who follow the Byzantine Rite of the Roman Catholic Church, and who are descendants of those early modern Greek diasporans that settled in the area throughout the late Byzantine and Ottoman periods, replenishing earlier ancient Greek communities.

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20 The information on the Confraternity is available through the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies in Venice, [http://www.istitutoellenico.org/english/storia/index.html](http://www.istitutoellenico.org/english/storia/index.html) [accessed on 1/10/2012]. The original Greek word that is translated as “nation” by the Hellenic Institute was probably «γένος», the most common term used during the post-Byzantine period and through the war of Greek Independence in the nineteenth century to refer to the community of Greeks, irrespective of where they are located. The term refers to familial bonds, considering the greater Greek community an expanded community of kinsmen. Common ancestry is the primary focus of the term but, by extension, it also refers to ethnic bonds (culture, language, religion) and may imply political rights and the right to self-government as a quasi-natural consequence.

21 The Greeks from Mani who settled in the south of the Italian mainland and in Corsica brought with them the practice of bloody vendettas which they introduced in their new places of residence (Nicholas 2005).

22 The Grikos of Southern Italy have created the Union of Municipalities of Grecia Salentina, through which they attempt to preserve and promote the Griko culture, according to the official
According to Hasiotis (1993), however, new medieval or modern settlements in areas of earlier Greek colonies or communities do not necessarily express a historical continuity between the old and the new diasporic phases of these communities. Often fundamental differences in the types and reasons of settlement across time, i.e. discontinuities in Greek diasporic patterns, did not encourage an organic connection between older and newer settlers through common institutions (Ibid., 25).

During the Ottoman centuries, communities of Greek merchants, ship-owners and professionals were dispersed across urban centers of the time, primarily Mediterranean port cities and European capitals (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 200). The characteristics of the Greek communities in the Near East during this time differed from those of the Greek communities in European cities. The former exhibited a much stronger Greek identity and a lack of interest in assimilation as opposed to the latter (Hasiotis 1993: 30). This difference was partly due to the existence of fundamental ideological differences between Muslims and Christians in the Near East, which were absent in Europe making identification with the dominant population easier (Ibid.).

Hasiotis (1993) argues that there is another catalytic factor that explains this difference. The frequent movement of Greek populations within the Ottoman territory, including its urban centers, led to a continuous social networking among Greek-Orthodox populations from different areas of the Ottoman lands. This fluidity rendered geographic origin a rather vague

site of L’Unione dei Comuni della Grecia Salentina, www.greciasalentina.org [accessed on 1/10/2012].
concept, thereby, strengthening a common ethnic identity irrespective of geographic location and origin.\textsuperscript{23}

The Ottoman Greek financial, political and intellectual elites were either members of the diaspora or had strong connections to it. They occupied positions of political influence in the Ottoman Empire and beyond.\textsuperscript{24} The Ottoman principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (\textit{Moldovlahia}) were ruled by Greek hegemons appointed by the Ottoman court in 1711 and thereafter (Woodhouse 1991: 116).\textsuperscript{25} As a result, in these areas, Greek language and culture flourished during the later Ottoman Empire, until they started to conflict with the emergent Romanian nationalism. Prior to the Greek Revolution, Count Ioannis Capodistrias, later the first Governor of independent Greece, was the Czar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002:12). He was also a significant figure in Swiss politics, being greatly appreciated by the Swiss for his contribution to their constitution (Grimsted 1968).

As economic conditions began to change in the end of the eighteenth century, the significance of earlier diasporic centers, like Venice, started to diminish, giving rise to new diasporic communities, for example in Trieste. Consequently, the Greek diaspora shifted from West European centers to East European ones (Hasiotis 1993). As movement between Ottoman East and Christian Europe started to become easier, the Greeks took advantage of the

\textsuperscript{23} This condition may not describe the reality of other Greek-speaking and/or Greek-Orthodox populations in the Ottoman Empire, primarily in the rural areas, some of whom may have been more limited in their mobility and relatively isolated. However, mobility is found even among pastoral mountainous populations. For example, the Vlachs moved around as seasons changed and followed nomadic patterns moving across the Balkans throughout the centuries.

\textsuperscript{24} The Ottoman Greek political elite held high administrative posts in the Ottoman Empire, primarily staffing the Ottoman equivalent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a regular basis.

\textsuperscript{25} These regions are today part of Romania (primarily), Moldova and Ukraine.
commercial opportunities this development offered. These changes led to a “spectacular
development of the Greek diaspora” during this time (Prévélakis 2000: 174).

Almost all revolutionary movements between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries
aiming at the liberation of the Greek people from Ottoman rule were inspired, organized, led,
staffed and funded by the Greek diaspora, whose many prominent members were sacrificed in
the struggle for Greek freedom (Hasiotis 1993: 70-71). Diaspora communities were
instrumental in the creation of Greek nationalist ideology that inspired the struggle for
independence. National ideology was introduced to the Ottoman Greek communities through
the traders and seamen of the Greek diaspora, who acted as links between rural Greeks and
enlightened Europeans (Prévélakis 2000: 174-175). Due to its important position in European
societies and its economic success, the Greek diaspora was a catalyst in cultivating the
philhellenic movement in Europe (Hasiotis 1993).

The Greek diaspora communities became the link between Greek fighters and the
governments of the European nations while taking over the organization of the Greek
revolutionary underground (Hasiotis 1993). In addition to nationalism, the Greek diaspora was
also influenced by the political, social and economic progress of European nations (Ibid.). The
diasporans adopted the new liberal ideas and adapted them to the Ottoman and Hellenic reality,
using commercial networks to pass them on to the Greek communities across the Empire
(Prévélakis 2000: 174-175). In this diasporic framework, the ideology of Greek opposition to
Ottoman rule took multiple forms: “Orthodoxy versus Islam, liberalism versus
authoritarianism, people versus dynasty” (Ibid.).

A major revolutionary document that aimed at cultivating Greek patriotism and
envisioned a reformed and modernized Greek state was *Elliniki Nomarchia*, printed in Venice
in 1806. However, *Elliniki Nomarchia* also turns against the wealthy Greek diaspora, which was seen as benefiting from the status quo of the Ottoman rule and, thus, not being particularly enthusiastic about the struggle for Independence (Brewer 2001: 12-13). Nevertheless, overall, the Greek elite in Europe used its connections to foreign governments to support the idea of Greek independence and organized the uprising through the creation of *Filiki Etaireia*, a secret revolutionary society that was established in 1814 in the midst of the Greek diaspora community in Odessa (Brewer 2001: 26), recruiting across the diaspora and the Ottoman territory. Thus, we see the phenomenon of an ethno-national diaspora with a strong identity and specific political objectives already before the establishment of the Greek national state.

The Greek nation – in its deterritorialized form of a wide-spread diaspora network that had clear strategic advantages, such political access, funds and education – gave rise to the modern Greek state. Although the beginning of the Greek state is clearly defined chronologically, the beginning of the Greek nation is much more obscure. Already in the early period of Ottoman rule, political rhetoric and political activities, particularly among the diaspora, aimed at independence. Such early political aspirations were stemming from a

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26 *Elliniki Nomarchia* means “the Greek rule of law.” Although it was a very influential text, its author remains unknown; it is signed by *Anonymous the Greek*.

27 This network also included Greek communities within the Ottoman Empire. Besides the ancient hearths still inhabited by Greeks, older and newer Greek communities were dispersed throughout the Ottoman Mediterranean.

28 The return to a liberated homeland is a common theme among diasporas. In the Jewish case, this feeling has been particularly long-lasting and has become a fundamental part of their collective conscience during their unhappy diasporic condition (Safran 2005). A poignant expression of this nostalgia for the homeland is found in the last Passover seder, which is said as everyone raises their glasses of wine: “Next year in Jerusalem!” This saying may acquire different meanings or even no particular meaning for different generations, especially among the Jewish-American community, while it also reflects an understanding of Jerusalem and Israel as a refuge for the Jewish diaspora (Beinart 2014). Polish émigrés in the nineteenth century also prayed for a return to a restored Poland, while a wish/prayer among some Armenians currently is “Next year at [Lake] Van” (Safran 2005).
strong collective, pre-modern political identity, as evidenced by the very existence of a mobilized diaspora with a collective political conscience during the struggle for independence, during numerous failed liberation movements throughout the Ottoman centuries, or during the peak of early diasporic communities, such as the Venetian *Confraternita*. These observations lead to the conclusion that the notion of an early (diasporic) ethno-political identity is still relatively unknown and requires further research.

The Greek population at the time of independence in 1830 was primarily concentrated in mainland Greece, the Greek islands, Eastern Thrace, today known as European Turkey, Asia Minor and Cyprus. Greeks were also found throughout the southern Balkans and in diaspora communities in Russia, Eastern and Western European cities, including regions in southern Italy, Mediterranean ports and other cities in the Middle East, especially in Egypt and the Levant. Following independence, some members of the Greek diaspora started gradually to migrate to Greece in order to join the Greek state’s political, economic and social elite, while others preferred to remain outside of the territory of the new state.

Demetrios Ypsilantis, previously an officer in the Russian Army, was initially one of the central figures in the power struggle over who will rule the newly founded Greek state (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002). Eventually, the national assembly of the newly liberated Greeks invited Ioannis Capodistrias to become the first Governor (*Kyvernitis*) of the incipient Greek state. Capodistrias was seen as a savior, the only Greek able to put the new state in order

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29 The geographic term “mainland Greece” refers to the contemporary mainland territory that includes not only the southern territories that were part of Greece at the time of independence but also central and northern Greece which became incorporated in the Greek state several decades later.
He was picked from among the ranks of the distinguished members of the diaspora, being formerly a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, as was mentioned above.

However, the stronger the new state became the smaller the role of the diaspora.\textsuperscript{30} The rise of the Greek state meant the decline of the diaspora in terms of its political and economic significance (Hasiotis 1993). Modernity, the path that the Greek state chose, required a strong nation-state, making nation-building a priority and erasing the role of diasporas (Prévélakis 1998: 3).

The period between 1821 and 1922 can be characterized by a dual process, according to Prévélakis (2000). On the one hand, we have the emergence and expansion of the Greek nation-state, and on the other, the contraction, close to the level of extinction, of “the space of the Greek diaspora” (Ibid., 178).

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Greek state did not grow at the expense of the diaspora; the diaspora stagnated and the state expanded, with the balance of power shifting in its favor. (Ibid.)

Although the establishment of the Greek state may have led to a relative concentration of Greek population within its territory, nevertheless, Greek diasporic presence continued. However, despite newfound economic success, the diaspora’s activity and significance with respect to Greek affairs was diminished compared to the previous period.

\textsuperscript{30} The diminished role of the diaspora with the establishment of the new state is a phenomenon that we also see in other cases. For example, the newly created state of Israel took on the role of the ultimate representative and protector of the Jewish people while the Jewish diaspora started to lose its relative power due to a state that was its own creation. In a similar way, the Palestinian diaspora loses ground as the Palestinian authority is gaining more legitimacy and international recognition.
Part of the diaspora moved to Greece and contributed to the Greek state- and nation-building. Since the diaspora became partly incorporated into the new state, especially in leadership positions, we could argue that the two partially merged, that one started shaping the other within the context of the modern Greek state structures and territory.\(^\text{31}\) During the early years of independent Greece, the conflict between *autochthones* (locals) and *eterochthones* (outsiders) Greeks dominated the formation of the new nation-state. *Eterochthones* were considered all the diaspora and Ottoman Greeks who were not born in the limited area of southern Greece which became the first liberated Greek territory, so they constituted the majority of the Greek population at the time.

The *autochthones* dominated the national scene. As such, the formulation of the state, nation and, even, modern Greek culture — including the standardized modern Greek language — was the product of the influence of the *autochthones* over other forces of the Greek nation either from the Ottoman lands or the diaspora. Although the diaspora was influential in the context of the new nation-state, it did not drastically shape state- and nation-building processes. Had the diaspora played a more significant role in shaping the Greek state, Greece

\(^{31}\) A question that arises is whether a diaspora that becomes incorporated in the state remains conceptually a diaspora or not. If the spatial dimension is significant, then it is probably not a diaspora anymore. If, however, the notion of diaspora is related more to a condition of trans-national existence (in terms of mentality, social connections and economic activities), then geography should not matter and it can continue to remain a diaspora even within the geographic space and structures of the new state. A second question that arises with respect to this fusion of diaspora and state is whether the state is so dominating that it imposes its control on the diaspora rather than letting it preserve its relative independence within a liberal state structure. Normally, the diaspora does have this independence as long as it remains beyond the territory of the state, but it tends to lose it within the limits of the all-powerful nation-state. The last question is whether the diaspora has the critical mass, power, authority and/or legitimacy to drastically influence the state through state- and nation-building projects or whether local national forces are more powerful in this respect.
could possibly have avoided many of the pathologies and crises that it has encountered in the last two hundred years.\footnote{If the experience of Western European state organization had influenced the Greek state more fundamentally in its incipient phase through the Greek diaspora, current problems could possibly have been avoided. What the European Union and the IMF are currently asking Greece to do is essentially to adopt a model of rational economic state structures and operations. This could have happened much earlier had the diaspora played a more powerful role in shaping the Greek state.}

The organizational model, practices and mentality that became the dominant characteristics of the Greek state apparatus were the product of the influence of the \textit{autochthones}, the local Greek elite in southern Greece prior and during the Revolution of 1821.\footnote{A major element of state organization according to the European model was centralization. Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002) argue that the centralization of the new state was necessary during the historical and social circumstances of post-revolution Greece, since the alternative to that would be chaos associated with the feuding chieftains and local notables. Their argument has strong historical basis, since the gains of the revolution were almost lost during the civil strife among the local Greek Ottoman elite during 1824-1825 (Ibid.). They further argue that the negative elements of the new state formulation came primarily not from the modern state structures but, rather, from the old elites gaining influence on those structures. Therefore, real westernizers and Enlightenment liberals remained marginalized in the state-building processes of the nineteenth century (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002). Diasporas, including western educated Greeks, were too weak to influence political developments. They either had to join the old powerful elites in their power game or remain marginalized, being tolerated due to the fact that they brought legitimacy to the new state due to their connection to the West (Ibid.). As many of them became part of the new state apparatus, becoming state officials, they lost their independence (Ibid.). Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002) see in later reformers such as Charilaos Trikoupis and Eleftherios Venizelos, the intellectual descendants of early and mid-nineteenth century diaspora.} They proved to be more powerful than the enlightened and cosmopolitan diaspora. The practices that they introduced were to a great extent a continuation of clientelism and Ottoman corruption (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002). On the other hand, the German rulers and state advisors in the aftermath of Capodistrias’ death as well as foreign governments who imposed conditions on the new country lacked knowledge of the Greek and Ottoman cultures, and, inevitably, imposed foreign institutions on the Greek people that were not adequately culturally
adjusted and that disregarded Greek reality and any positive elements of pre-existing political organization, such as indigenous forms of local community organization and self-government.

The comparative advantage of the diaspora with respect both to locals and to foreigners is that it could combine the European progressive elements and the Greek cultural character unlike any other political actor, due to deep knowledge of both. The intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment, being primarily diasporans, were soon marginalized in the new state and the national culture and state institutions, primarily educational institutions, did not reflect their ideas (Gourgouris 1996: 52-53). The most characteristic example of the dominance of the autochthrones over the diaspora was the assassination of Governor Capodistrias, the highly regarded Greek diasporan who tried to shape the Greek state as its first ruler, by local notables who resisted losing their privileges (Ibid.). That development set the pace for the decades that came after and shaped the current political culture minimizing the potential positive influence of the diaspora on the organization of the new state.

State- and nation-building coincided with a number of historical developments during the nineteenth century. A series of armed conflicts with Turkey over territories that remained under Ottoman control contributed to Greek bankruptcy and instability. The economic and social conditions for the majority of the population were so difficult that forced large segments of the population to emigrate. Therefore, the nineteenth century marks the beginning of a new period in the history of the Greek diaspora.

The second period of the modern Greek diaspora lasted from the establishment of the Greek state in 1830 until the beginning of the Second World War (Hasiotis 1993). As the Greek diaspora communities became more successful financially – or in anticipation of such success – Greek presence expanded in the nineteenth century throughout the Levant, North Africa,
India and the United States.\textsuperscript{34} The new economic migrants from Greece were a diaspora that would be very dissimilar to the old, wealthy and educated diaspora, most members of which decided to return to Greece only towards the end of the nineteenth century, when Athens became somewhat similar to the other European capitals (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002: 201).

The Greek state was not as much concerned with the phenomenon of emigration at this time. The emigration and diaspora phenomenon during the nineteenth century was considered more of an exportation of social and economic problems than a drain on the talents of the new country. Ethnically Greek migrants from the territories that still belonged to the Ottoman Empire and from other areas beyond the Greek and Ottoman territories, like the British-controlled Cyprus, also participated in this exodus in search of a better life in the Old and, primarily, the New World.

Therefore, the new waves of Greek diaspora in the nineteenth century came not only from the newly established Greek state but also from territories beyond it. The nineteenth century, especially the post-independence period, also marks the peak of the Greek community of Egypt and its highly successful economic activities (Hasiotis 1993). South Russia and the Caucasus region were the primary destinations for the Greek Pontians of the north and east Asia Minor, who created communities in these areas that collectively reached more than 200,000 members, mostly farmers but also businessmen and industrialists (Ibid.).

The changes that the Greek diaspora experienced in the post-1880 period were radical. For the first time in Greek history diaspora becomes a massive phenomenon due to

\textsuperscript{34} According to modern Greek historian Richard Clogg, two important dimensions of modern Greek history that have not been adequately covered by scholarly research are: (i) the Greek presence in the Near East \textit{(kath’ imas Anatoli)}, and (ii) the mass migration of Greeks since the eighteenth century outside of the modern Greek state and Near East region (Clogg 2004: 19).
unprecedented waves of emigration that emerged in the 1880s. The other significant shift from the past patterns of immigration was the emergence of overseas destinations in addition to popular European, Caucasian and Mediterranean ones. The new destinations were in North and South America, Africa and Australia (Hasiotis 1993).

Emigration was reduced dramatically – but temporarily – in 1921, when the United States, the primary destination for the aspiring émigrés, reduced the annual quota of immigrants allowed in the country (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2002: 205). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Greek diasporic communities became also the victims of rising nationalisms in their respective countries of residence (Hasiotis 1993) and were caught in the middle of anti-colonial struggles and, later, decolonization.

The trend of massive migration in search of a better future continued into the twentieth century, peaking during the period 1880-1920, while Greece expanded as a result of consecutive wars in the north and northeast. Pursuing Megali Idea (the Great Idea), Greek military forces embarked on a military expedition to conquer Ottoman areas in an attempt to expand Greek territory and to reconstitute a modern Byzantine Empire, taking advantage of their ally gains following the end of World War I. However, this newest nationalistic and irredentist vision that aimed at the incorporation of all Greek-inhabited Ottoman territories within a single national entity was not something all dispersed Greeks aspired to.

…the cosmopolitan Greeks of Alexandria, Constantinople (Istanbul) or Smyrna (Izmir) continued to defend the diasporic ideal. They were contemptuous of the Athenians, whom they regarded as provincial and dependent on the Western Powers. Why should Greeks abandon their privileged position inside a great Empire in order to embark on a utopian political project? To them, it seemed
easier to conquer the Empire economically and politically from the inside, than
by military force from the outside. (Prévélakis 1998: 3)

The ensuing Turkish nationalism eventually turned against the ethnic communities of the
Ottoman Empire, leading to the persecution and virtual extinction of the Greek communities
in the country.

The Greeks from Asia Minor — on the Aegean coast, in Cappadocia, and in Pontos —
and from Eastern Thrace found refuge in the Greek state and in the new diasporic lands,
primarily America, in the aftermath of their persecution and in the context of a formal
population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The devastating defeat of the Greek
army and the historical uprooting of the Greek population from the Ottoman Empire coincide
with the birth of the Turkish nation-state and mark the end of both the millennia-old Greek
presence in Asia Minor and Greek expansionist projects.

In the post-1922 world, classical Greek diasporic space had indeed shrunk. According
to Prévélakis (2000), “the Greek diaspora did not collapse but was crushed by the confrontation
between the forces of imperialism and nationalism” (Ibid., 178). The traditional form of
Hellenic organization based on a diasporic network of Greek communities within and beyond
the borders of Empires, what Prévélakis (2000) calls the traditional galactic organization, had
been replaced by a dendritic form of organization (Ibid.), a highly centralized, geographically
limited and state-controlled structure of Hellenism that followed the Western prototypes of
modern nation-states. A positive element of the new dendritic organization of Hellenism was
the ability to offer shelter to the Greek refugees of the Eastern Mediterranean (Ibid.), similarly
to the shelter that the newly created state of Israel offered to the persecuted and traumatized
Jewish populations after World War II.
Following the end of World War II, the Greek state concluded the final phase of its territorial expansion with the incorporation of the Italian-controlled Dodecanese islands. The destitution that World War II and Nazi occupation brought to Greece caused another wave of emigration, inaugurating the third period of modern Greek diaspora which was to last for the following decades (Hasiotis 1993). Greece lost a large segment of its population to other countries, primarily the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany and other West European countries, in the 1950s and 1960s (Ibid.).

The status of most immigrants to Germany was that of a temporary guest-worker (gastarbeiter) and many immigrants returned to Greece after spending a number of years in Germany. Indeed, the twentieth century Greek diaspora took a variety of forms. According to Prévélakis (2000) it was ‘a diaspora of the diaspora’ — resettlement of the expelled Greeks from the Ottoman lands — a ‘proletarian’ diaspora due to economic crises in Greece, a diaspora of political refugees following the Greek civil war, and an academic/intellectual diaspora primarily towards the United States (Ibid., 178-179).

The emigration wave of the post-war period came to a halt in the 1970s as the Greek economy was improving and was further reduced in the 1980s, when Greek democracy had finally consolidated following the military junta of 1967-1974. By that time, very large Greek communities had been established in the United States, in Australia, in Canada and in Germany, while the Greek communities in Egypt and the rest of Africa dwindled. Greek communities in Africa shared the fate of European colonialists (Hasiotis 1993), becoming targets of popular uprisings and anti-foreigner domestic reforms during the decolonization period and earlier anti-colonization struggles.

They gradually left for Greece or for other diasporic destinations. The majority of Greeks in Russia and the Balkans started migrating back to Greece as a result of the political
changes of the 1990s. Partly due to external political changes, including European integration, and partly due to the will of the diaspora to return to the homeland, a wave of reverse migration “back” to Greece has been taking place since the 1980s (Hasiotis 1993).35

The unification of Europe and the steps towards ever-increasing globalization in the last decades expanded another form of migration, that of Greek students, scientists and professionals towards European states and aspiring urban financial centers around the world. Naturally, this newest diaspora does not share the main attributes of the diasporic waves of the twentieth century. It took another economic crisis of gigantic proportions, i.e. the one Greece has been experiencing since 2009, to reinvigorate the idea of massive emigration as the only solution to problems of economic survival, possibly opening up a fourth period in the history of modern Greek diaspora.

The current diasporic wave, which has not yet been fully recorded and analyzed, is still mostly comprised of highly skilled and educated migrants, a main reason being the overall high level of educational attainment among the younger generations in Greece. What was once a favorite destination for emigrants, namely the United States, is almost out of the question due to the strict regulations regarding immigrant visas that the American government has adopted. Thus, they choose Europe and Australia or any country that can offer them employment. As a result we see today the widest global dispersion of Greeks in the history of modern Greek diaspora.

35 The quotation marks signify the multiple meanings that “back” might have for these diasporans. It may mean a return to the land they emigrated from or it may mean a return to the family’s, not to a personal, homeland. Or it may not mean a return at all, but rather migration to a place they have never lived in but which is considered to be the ethno-national heartland, the ultimate symbolic and actual Greek homeland. In the latter group belong, for example, the Greeks from the former Soviet Union who migrated to Greece in the 1990s. Neither they nor their ancestors had ever lived within the current Greek territory.
This newest diaspora often holds high-level professional and academic positions around the world.

According to the Greek government, the Greek diaspora is spread across the continents in the following percentages: 61% in North and South America, 23% in Europe, 13% in Oceania, 2% in Africa and 1% in Asia. The primary centers of Greek diaspora are predominantly in the Anglophone world: the United States — which has the highest concentration of diaspora Greeks, measuring up to a few millions — Australia and Great Britain. Prévélakis (1998) argues that the close links of the Greek diaspora with the Anglo-American world can be explained by the Greek dominance in marine commerce, a cultural affinity that Greeks have with the Anglo-American culture, and coincidental historical factors (Ibid., 5). Although Greeks have joined the elite in the United States and in Great Britain in great numbers, this may not be so in other countries where the diaspora resides (Ibid.).

The continuation of the phenomenon of the Greek diaspora to present time illustrates the “existence of a diaspora culture in the Greek nation” (Prévélakis 2000: 178). The contemporary Greek diaspora differs in many ways from the older Greek diasporas but these

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36 These are the percentages according to the General Secretariat of Greeks Abroad of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and can be found at http://www.ggae.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnnode=16 [accessed on 5/15/2011]. These numbers are fairly recent but are not up to date. Current percentages may be somewhat different following the newest wave of emigration due to the economic crisis since 2009.

37 The majority of the political leadership of Greece during the last quarter of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, have been members of the diaspora for shorter or longer periods. Almost all recent prime-ministers and many ministers and MPs have been educated abroad and lived in other countries for a number of years. At least two past Prime Ministers have had dual Greek and American citizenship. However, I would argue that a Greek political culture that leads to pathologies in the Greek state apparatus and which is the political legacy of the Ottoman and early independence periods, is so ingrained into the state structures, operations and mentality that incremental changes that people with a diasporic experience have attempted to bring to the country may not be adequate to change how the political system works. Quite often, many of them are the products of the pre-existing political culture, a condition that leads them to preserve this culture rather than fight it.
differences are anticipated since all diasporic phases are the products of local as well as global historical circumstances. The new diaspora inhabits a new diasporic space that is much more extended than the classical space of the Greek diaspora (Ibid.). However, spatial characterizations and geographic definitions of the diaspora have a diminished significance in an age where technology in its various forms deterritorializes almost all individual and collective actions and interactions.

**History of the Greek-American Community**

The Greek-American community is the largest community of Greeks outside of Greece and it is particularly significant because of the status of the United States as a global leader and because of the high level of political influence and economic and professional success that a large segment of the community enjoys. The presence of Greeks in the United States spans more than two centuries. Sporadic Greek immigration to the United States is already noted in the eighteenth century with the infamous Greek colony of New Smyrna and lasted throughout the nineteenth century. This pattern changed towards the end of the nineteenth century when massive waves of Greek immigrants started coming into the country. Greek immigration peaked in the early twentieth century to be followed by another large wave in the post-World War II period.

The earliest Greek immigrants were brought to the United States in 1768 by Dr. Turnbull to work in his plantation in the South, creating the New Smyrna colony (Papaioannou 1985: 31-33). The colony was named after the Asia Minor city that was heavily inhabited by Greeks. Unfortunately, the hopes of the newcomers for a better life were soon crushed as they
realized that their life at the plantation would be full of abuse and exploitation. Gradually, several of them fled the plantation and the colony was eventually dissolved after several years (Ibid.). The survivors moved to Saint Augustine, Florida, where they created the first Greek community and established the first Greek Orthodox Church in the United States. However, the ethnic character of the community did not last very long, primarily due to its relatively small size. Eventually, any sense of Greek continuity among the descendants of the former New Smyrna residents was lost (Ibid.).

In the twentieth century, American society, having recently experienced its own national revolution which was inspired by ancient Greek political ideals, saw the Greek revolution against the Ottoman Empire in a very positive light. A number of American philhellenes traveled to Greece and participated in the Greek struggle or otherwise helped the Greek cause (Papaioannou 1985: 38-39). On their way back home, these Americans brought with them several Greek male orphans whom they adopted and educated. Many of these children became very distinguished scholars and professionals, taking advantage of the extensive educational opportunities that their rich patrons offered them (Ibid., 40).

Beyond this unique group, there are a few other categories of early Greek immigrants in the nineteenth century. Some of them were Greek merchants who decided to create a basis in the US and stayed here indefinitely (Papaioannou 1985: 46). Others were Greek sailors – a very familiar occupation to the Greeks since ancient times – who came aboard ships of various

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38 The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America purchased the Avero House in Saint Augustine, which had housed the community of Greeks who fled the New Smyrna plantation. The Archdiocese created a chapel dedicated to the missionary Saint Photios in Avero House and named the building Saint Photios National Greek Orthodox Shrine. The Shrine acts as a symbol of remembrance of the first Greek immigrants in the country and their unfortunate adventures. Information about Saint Photios National Greek Orthodox Shrine and its history can be found at [http://www.stphotios.org/](http://www.stphotios.org/) [accessed on February 5, 2014].
flags and decided to never return back (Ibid., 47). By the 1880s large numbers of Greeks started reaching the East coast as more and more economic opportunities were appearing in the United States. These early immigrants, the pioneers, acquired primarily manual jobs in the railway, factories or the construction industry.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the immigration waves were very high and frequent. In total, hundreds of thousands of Greek peasants left Greece for a better future in America between 1900 and 1930 (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2000: 210). The main reasons for Greek immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were poverty and destitution, repeated agricultural disasters, extreme financial burdens due to usury and the institution of dowry, continuing military and paramilitary conflicts, and political instability (Hasiotis 1993: 98-99).

Life was particularly harsh for immigrants and their families up to the first decades of the twentieth century. Those early Greek-American immigrant communities preserved their proletarian character for an extended time, as their members were unskilled manual workers dreaming of returning, eventually, to the homeland (Hasiotis 1993). The situation was relatively easier for Greeks who came from urban and cosmopolitan centers than it was for Greeks living in territories outside of the Greek state. Since the great majority of Greeks living in territories outside of the Greek state were not Greek citizens, they were not officially counted as Greek immigrants once they arrived in the United States. Therefore, official immigration statistics underestimate the number of Greek immigrants that entered the country.

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39 Greek migration to the United States reached more than 500,000 between 1880 and 1940 and this number may increase to over 600,000 if we take into consideration the Greek immigration from territories beyond the Greek state (Hasiotis 1993: 96). Since the great majority of Greeks living in territories outside of the Greek state were not Greek citizens, they were not officially counted as Greek immigrants once they arrived in the United States. Therefore, official immigration statistics underestimate the number of Greek immigrants that entered the country.
those who came from the countryside. Among those centers were the cities of Greece and the Ottoman Empire (mostly in Asia Minor), the Greek islands and Cyprus (Ibid.).

These immigrants experienced not only a very perilous journey to get to the United States, which usually involved great sacrifices on behalf of their families, but also daily abuse, exploitation and deplorable living and working conditions. The lack of knowledge of English and of a basic understanding of how the American legal system worked, not only marginalized them but also made it easy for them to get in trouble with the law and the authorities (Papaioannou 1985). They often became victims of fellow Greek padrones, supposedly protectors but, actually, exploiters of the vulnerable immigrants. The Greek-American press of the time, especially the New York-based newspaper Atlantis, fought against discrimination and the padrones system, which was eventually dissolved, but also scolded the Greek state, including its diplomatic representatives in the United States, for leaving the immigrants without any form of protection or assistance (Ibid., 189-190).

Most of the Greek immigrants in the first decades of the twentieth century were thinking that they were in the United States only temporarily, in order to work and amass some wealth for themselves and their families back in Greece. The goal was to return back home as soon as

40 Hasiotis (1993) argues that the greater adaptability of the Asia Minor Greeks, in particular, is also attributed to their former contact with American missionary and humanitarian activity in Asia Minor, primarily through the Near East Relief (Ibid., 105-106).

41 A special mention should be made of the case of massive numbers of Greek boys and teenagers who worked in the shoe-shine industry. They experienced very unhealthy work and living conditions and they were completely unprotected and vulnerable due to their age. To make matters worse, they, along with large numbers of other unskilled Greek immigrants fell victims of their own compatriots who played the illegal and unethical role of “padrone,” and became caught in the nets of indentured servitude (Papaioannou 1985: 59-60).

42 The Greek-American newspaper Atlantis referred to padrones as 'somatemporoi' (Papaioannou 1985: 191), meaning 'merchants of human body.' The case of the padrones and their victims was a form of human trafficking and modern human slavery.
they could (Kontargyris 1964: 57). During that time, only 50% of Greek immigrants wished to
remain permanently in the United States, compared to 90% of other European immigrants
(Hasiotis 1993:107). In 1930 Greeks ranked last among ethnic groups in the United States who
had American citizenship (Ibid.).

During the first decades of the twentieth century reverse migration was also noted. A
significant percentage of Greek immigrants returned to Greece after having spent anywhere
between a few months and ten years in the United States (Hasiotis 1993: 107). Nevertheless,
many decided to stay permanently in America, solidifying the Greek presence in the country.
Immigration slowed down during the interwar period due to the Quota Act of 1921, which
drastically reduced the number of immigrant arrivals, for example down to only one hundred
in 1924 (Ibid., 111). Some aspiring Greek immigrants defied the new legal limit and entered
the country illegally. About 2,000 illegal Greek immigrants entered the country annually during
this period of limited immigration (Ibid.).

The massive waves of immigration had a negative influence on Greece, including on
its productivity and prospects for reform (Hasiotis 1993). While the modern Greek diaspora
prior to Greek independence had been credited with bringing modernization to Greece,
significant numbers of the second period’s diaspora returned to Greece as proponents of
conservatism, being of old age and having a diasporic experience characterized by isolation
(Ibid.). Although there were progressive voices among the overseas and repatriated diaspora,

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43 There were two immigration quota acts in the 1920s. The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and
the Immigration Act of 1924, which included the National Origins Act. The Act of 1921
introduced the notion of limitation or quota on immigration and was the first one to target
primarily South and East Europeans. It introduced the National Origins Formula but this was
further elaborated and codified with the 1924 Act, which made it more permanent. The Act of
1921 limited the entrance of new immigrants from a specific country to 3% of the number of
the immigrants from that country already living in the US in 1890. The Act of 1924 superseded
the previous act and imposed even stricter limitations, further reducing this percentage to 2%.
conservatism was a major force in those diasporans impacting domestic political developments in Greece, especially in the interwar period (Ibid.).

Greek immigrants from the beginning of immigration and until well into the twentieth century had two primary concerns. One was to send money back to their families in Greece or save enough to return back home with some financial security. Their other concern was to get together with their compatriots and start a local community with the purpose of setting up a church and a Greek school for their children.

At the same time, people who were from a particular town or region in Greece, started creating societies of local character referring back to their place of origin. These local societies contributed not only to the preservation of a social support network and of an emotional bond with their place of origin but also to the social and economic development of their home towns in Greece (Kontargyris 1964: 137). The organization of several Greek societies and associations by the newcomers, in addition to the creation of parishes, helped create a familiar

44 Thousands of Greek families and the Greek economy as a whole benefited greatly from these remittances. Greek development in the twentieth century should be partly credited to this contribution by Greek-Americans. Chapter 6 includes a discussion of the significance of Greek-American remittances for the Greek economy.

45 The first organized Greek community in the United States was the Greek community in New York city, which was followed by the Greek communities of Lowell, Massachusetts, Chicago and Boston (Kontargyris 1964: 86). The first Greek Orthodox church on American soil was established in Saint Augustine, Florida in 1777 by the Greeks who fled the New Smyrna colony. The oldest church that is still operating is Holy Trinity in New Orleans, which was established in 1864 by Greek merchants (Ibid., 92-93).

46 Since the nineteenth century, numerous public facilities — schools, churches, roads, hospitals, aqueducts, etc. — were built or restored across the Greek countryside by Greek-American societies. A significant characteristic of these contributions was that they were collective grants, made by groups of Greeks who united their efforts for this purpose. This is a break from the long tradition of individual benefactors, usually rich Greeks of the diaspora, who donated public infrastructure to the Greek people. The contribution of Greek-American organizations to development in Greece is discussed in Chapter 6.
“Greek environment” in the United States that kept alive the immigrants' identity, their social relations and their bond with their homeland (Ibid., 85).

The early Greek-American communities requested and were sent priests from the Church of Greece.\(^47\) However, due to a lack of a local bishop and to the multitude of administrative models and affiliations of the first churches,\(^48\) there was lack of overall unity and a propensity for conflicts, which at times became violently strong and very divisive and harmful to the unity of individual communities as well as to the unity of the Greek-American community as a whole (Papaioannou 1985).\(^49\)

In addition to contributing to the development of their home-towns, Greek Americans

\(^{47}\) The diaspora churches, i.e. Orthodox churches beyond areas that were historically administered by established patriarchates and archdioceses, were considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (Istanbul) according to canonical order. However, it was the Church of Greece that supplied the new churches with priests. Due to Turkish pressures on the Patriarchate regarding the anti-Turkish activities of Greek-Americans, the Patriarchate gave jurisdiction of the Greek-American churches to the Church of Greece in 1908. This was also a move to prevent the Russian Patriarchate from getting control over the Greek-American churches, which is something that it had already requested (Papaioannou 1985: 234). The Greek-American Church remained under the jurisdiction of the Church of Greece until 1921, when it was returned to the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate after it had experienced in its midst the painful political divisions that also plagued the Church of Greece during the struggle between royalists and venizelists.

\(^{48}\) The Greek-Orthodox churches in the United States, because they were established by the community, adopted a communal organizational model, similar to the protestant type of communal organization, where the laity made all administrative decisions with little or no input from the local priest. Even under Archbishops Athenagoras and Michael, “Greek Orthodox parishes in America continued to follow a Protestant Congregational type of Church polity in which the local congregation plays the decisive role in the life of the parish, especially in matters of administration. And, in some cases […] the laity, passed judgment even on purely spiritual matters.” It was only under Archbishop Iakovos that “local congregations ceased to be independent and 'they amalgamated into one Church”’ (Papaioannou 1985: 351-352).

\(^{49}\) This refers to the various administrative affiliations of different Greek-Orthodox churches. During the first decades, a Greek-Orthodox church may have been under the administrative jurisdiction of the Church of Greece, the Russian Patriarchate, the Patriarchate of Antioch, or the Patriarchate of Alexandria (Papaioannou 1985).
were generally very concerned with what was happening in Greece and wanted to help and participate as much as possible. When Greece fought in the Macedonian Struggle (1904-1908) for the liberation of Macedonia from the Ottoman rule, Greek-Americans contributed financially to the Greek cause (Kontargyris 1964: 142). However, it was mostly during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 that their contribution was very considerable: they sent 1500 volunteers to join the Greek forces and supported the war effort in any other way they could, through an early pan-American Greek organization, the Panhellenic Union, which acted as a federation of Greek societies and was based in New York (Ibid.).

Although Greek-Americans came together to support such significant Greek causes and to address their own needs, they often experienced conflicts and divisions among their ranks. Conflicts erupted at a local and national level with respect to a number of religious matters but the most painful conflict was due to the transfer of *ethnikos dichasmos* (national schism) from interwar Greece to the Greek-American community. *Ethnikos dichasmos* was one of the most pervasive political and social divisions of modern Greek history. It was the conflict between royalists, supporters of King Constantine, and liberals or venizelists, supporters of Eleftherios Venizelos.

The conflict was particularly bitter and full of hatred in the United States (Kontargyris 1964: 98) and continued even after the original conflict in Greece was resolved. The diaspora’s involvement in the political developments in Greece endangered the unity of the Greek-American communities and undermined their potential political role in America, especially during a time of xenophobia (Hasiotis 1993). Unfortunately, religious leaders of the community as well as the powerful Greek-American press, which had played the role of protector and educator of the Greek immigrant until then (Papaioannou 1985: 189-190), fueled the conflict
It took a very long time for the former enemies to be willing to move forward towards communal unity and reconciliation.

The creation of an independent Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America in 1922 came to signify the beginning of the end of social and political divisions and of the administrative and coordination difficulties that existed across the network of Greek Orthodox churches up to that time. The deep and powerful political division between royalists and venizelists took a long time to heal. It can be argued that the Archdiocese experienced peace and unity only after the appointment of Athenagoras as Archbishop in 1930 (Kontargyris 1964: 103) and, especially, after his great efforts at reconciliation and overall administrative reform.\footnote{Archbishop Athenagoras was not only the great reformer who consolidated and reconciled the embattled and divided Greek Orthodox Archdiocese (Papaioannou 1985).} He

\textit{Atlantis} and \textit{The National Herald (Ethnikos Kyrikas)} were the two leading Greek-American newspapers of the twentieth century. \textit{Atlantis} was the older of the two and was politically conservative, supporting King Constantine and the royalist cause during the conflict (Papaioannou 1985: 206-209). It later supported the 1937 Greek dictatorship under Ioannis Metaxas, the junta of 1967, and conservative parties in the post-World War II period (Ibid.). \textit{The National Herald} was politically liberal and supported Eleftherios Venizelos. It was initially opposed to Metaxas' regime but later supported him (Ibid.). It was also opposed to the 1967 junta, and supported the centrist George Papandreou and liberal parties (Ibid.). Following the fall of the military regime in 1974, it supported the conservative Constantine Karamanlis (Papaioannou 1985: 206-209). Of the two, only \textit{The National Herald} continues to be published today.

\footnote{Another ecclesiastic controversy that divided the Greek-American community at the time was the rebellion of a priest, Contogeorge, against the Archdiocese. Contogeorge opposed the

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also exhibited statesman-like qualities, projecting Hellenism and Orthodoxy to the greater American society while reconstructing the Church through emphasis on human relations (Ibid.).

The establishment of the Archdiocese marks the beginning of a communal structure centered around the church that has uniquely shaped Greek-American experience throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. A significant and unique element of Greek-American church organization is that, historically, both at the local and at the Archdiocesan level there is great participation of laymen in the administration of the church. This condition renders the Church more democratic and testifies to the strong identification of the community with the church, while being an expression of the powerful role that the Orthodox faith plays in Greek ethnic identity. However, even before World War I, tension started to appear within the Greek-American community regarding the level of control of diaspora organizations by the Church (Hasiotis 1993).

The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (A.H.E.P.A.) was a major Greek-American organization that shaped Greek-American experience and changed fundamentally the relationship of Greek-Americans with the greater American society while challenging the dominant role of the Church. The creation of A.H.E.P.A. in 1922 was the

changes in the Archdiocese that Athenagoras and the Patriarchate decided to implement. Due to his appeal to several faithful and to a number of parishes, he created a schism in the community that took time and delicate administrative decisions on the part of the Church to be resolved (Papaioannou 1985).

Archbishop Athenagoras was the first Greek Church leader to have close relations with the American political leadership. He was often invited to the White House by President Roosevelt (Papaioannou 1985). He enthusiastically supported Truman and expressed gratitude for the Truman Doctrine, which extended American protection to Greece (Ibid.). Athenagoras’ close relationship with Truman can be illustrated by the fact that he traveled on Truman's private plane when he left the United States to assume his new position as Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in 1949 (Ibid.).
answer to American xenophobia and discrimination against the Greeks. This xenophobia culminated in 1922, when Greeks became the targets of Ku Klux Klan (Kontargyris 1964: 149).

A.H.E.P.A. soon acquired a leading role in Greek-American community. It aimed at uniting and protecting Greeks across the United States and in promoting their Americanization while preserving their Greek ethnic identity. The organization was also dedicated to the support of Greek causes and to funding numerous development projects in Greece. A.H.E.P.A., soon after its establishment, acquired social and political power and prestige within the greater American society. This is illustrated by the fact that its leadership had direct access to the United States President early in the organization's life (Papaioannou 1985: 161).

However, A.H.E.P.A. created controversy among the Greek-Americans due to its decision to abandon the use of the Greek language, which was seen as one of the two sacred central elements of Greek-American identity — the other being the Orthodox faith — and due to its fervent promotion of Americanization, which was not favored by many (Kontargyris 1964: 163). However, the success of A.H.E.P.A. is probably a testament to the view that Greek ethnic identity can indeed survive even in the absence of the use of the Greek language, which tends to wither with successive generations of American-born descendants of Greek immigrants (Vidalis 2014).

The unity of the Greek-American community under the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese was gradually solidified but it experienced a number of challenges in the following decades. The issue of the use of the English language, first in Sunday Schools post-World War II and, later, in church services, threatened again to divide the Archdiocese and the Greek-American

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54 Eleni Vidalis is a long-time leader of the Greek-American community of Boston, former President of the Federation of Hellenic American Societies of New England and of the parish of Saint John the Baptist Greek-Orthodox Church of Boston. I interviewed her as part of my research on January 24, 2014 in Boston, Massachusetts.
community (Papapaioannou 1985). The supporters of the use of the English language argued that this would be a necessary step in order to keep the American-born generations close to the Church and, through the church, to their ethnic identity (even if the language was not present). Those against the use of English, argued that such an action would equal a betrayal of the Greek identity and the legacy of the first immigrants. Ironically, both were trying to preserve the Greek ethnic identity but focusing on two different ethnic markers, one being the Greek language and the other the Orthodox faith.

As time went by, the Greek-American community was also increasingly in need of church leaders who were accustomed to the American way of life. During the 1930s and 1940s, a youth revolt started within the Greek families and the Church (Papaioannou 1985: 169), as the first generations of American-born Greeks were coming of age. The American and the Greek element started to conflict in the minds and hearts of the youth, with the former winning over the latter. As a result, there was the need for church leaders to better communicate and address the needs of these generations of Greek-Americans, and to take on the challenges that the surrounding American environment presented.

For this reason, Archbishop Athenagoras established the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology in 1937 in order to prepare priests who were highly educated and acclimated to the American way of life (Kontargyris 1964: 108) and who would be able to guide spiritually their parishioners and to communicate with them effectively in the face of the challenges that American society presented for them. During this time, the Church also organized another archdiocesan organization with chapters in every parish, the ladies' Philoptochos Society.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} The Philoptochos Society has only female members and is a charitable organization assisting those in need primarily through funding. They also provide assistance to the church. It was
The 1940s presented new challenges but also opportunities for the Greek-Americans. The stories of the brave Greeks who heroically fought the axis powers in World War II, created a positive image of Greek immigrants in the eyes of Americans (Kontargyris 1964: 122). This development represented a break from the past American attitude of prejudice and contempt for the Greeks. Greek war-time bravery also reinforced Greek-American pride (Ibid.), which seemed to be weak among the American-born generations who had adopted an American identity. The tragedy that Greece experienced during Nazi occupation and the desperate need to rebuild the country and to support the society in the post war years, led to an unprecedented united effort by Greek-Americans, with the support of American philhellenes, to send funds, food and clothing to Greece.

For this purpose they established the Greek War Relief Association (G.W.R.A.), which was extremely successful, contributing millions of dollars and tons of food and other necessary material during the war and post-war years to the embattled Greeks. It was assisted in its efforts by the United States government, several American organizations and individuals, and the governments of other nations (Papaioannou 1985: 179). The G.W.R.A. was a unique example of extremely effective cooperation among Greek-Americans, who, although being

created in 1932 by Archbishop Athenagoras, who followed the model of the Philoptochos of the Smyrna churches in Asia Minor (Papaioannou 1985: 167-168).

Developments in Greece influence not only how Americans view Greece but also how they view Greek-Americans. And, vice-versa, the image and status that Greek-Americans enjoy in the United States contribute to how Americans view Greece.

The G.W.R.A. made extensive use of the resources of Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, using the school's facilities and enlisting the help of its students to support its mission (Papaioannou 1985: 177).

The Greek War Relief Association contributed close to 9 million US dollars to Greece during the period of 1942-1945 (Kontargyris 1964: 160). It delivered a total of 670 tons of food and assisted the destitute Greeks in various ways, extending its assistance to war prisoners and the injured (Ibid.).
experienced in communal organization, encountered great difficulties in achieving harmonious cooperation and effective collective action – not unlike what is happening in other ethnic communities. According to Papaioannou, this was a period of “unprecedented harmony prevailing among the Greek-Americans” (Ibid.). He, further, argues that: “This effort was, perhaps, until then, the greatest effort ever made by any ethnic group in America in support of the Motherland” (Ibid., 181).

Despite continuing to deal with internal controversies from time to time, the Greek-American community thrived in the post-World War II period and it started to join mainstream American society. Nevertheless, it remained connected to what was happening in Greece during this time. The Greek-American press supported the post-war return of King George the II, and the nationalists in their struggle against the communists in the Greek Civil War (1945-1949), and propagated the independence of Cyprus in the 1950s (Papaioannou 1985: 208).

In terms of the internal affairs of the Archdiocese, Archbishop Michael, who succeeded Athenagoras in 1949, when the latter was elected Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (Istanbul), focused on reforming the religious education system and on creating programs for the youth that the community desperately needed. In 1951, he introduced the Greek Orthodox Youth of America (G.O.Y.A.), the first youth movement for the young Greek Americans of the formative teenage and early adulthood years, thus, bringing young generations closer to the Church and to their ethnic identity (Papaioannou 1985: 172).

In contrast to both Athenagoras and Michael who were occupied primarily with Church reform, Archbishop Iakovos, Michael's successor, felt that the time was right to open up to the

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59 G.O.Y.A. declined in membership and activity in the 1960s and 1970s and it received the criticism that it was more in the hands of the clergy and less in the hands of the youth. However, since the 1980's, G.O.Y.A. has been reinvigorated (Papaioannou 1985: 174).
greater American community. Although he was also facing several internal issues of great importance, Iakovos was the first Greek-American church leader to “take public positions on vital issues of the American society. Iakovos entered the debate on civil rights long before it became a popular issue in America,” and he continued to pursue it even though he experienced the disapproval of some members of his constituency (Papaioannou 1985: 353-354). The Archbishop made the cover of Life magazine standing next to Martin Luther King Jr. during the historic march. Iakovos is credited with the accomplishment of making an immigrant Church into a mainstream American Church.  

There is no doubt that Iakovos' ministry has been beneficial to our Church community and Hellenism at large. He led them both out of the isolation of the 'ethnic ghetto' into the main stream of America. (Ibid., 353)

Iakovos' effort would not be fruitful, if it were not for the willpower of the Greek-Americans to succeed and claim their place in American society. Although the great majority of the first generation of immigrants were not educated or in possession of any professional skills, they rose on the American social ladder through hard work and, within one generation, they became entrepreneurs (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2000: 210) and professionals, starting to amass wealth and power. An important characteristic of Greek-American families was the emphasis that they placed on the education of their children.

60 Archbishop Iakovos was honored by the United States government with the United States Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor, “for his twenty years of dedicated service to strengthening the moral and spiritual fiber of the nation” (Papaioannou 1985: 356).

61 An exception to this is the settling of Greek immigrants from the Dodecanese islands in Tarpon Springs, Florida. They not only brought their craft of sponge diving with them but they also developed the local sponge diving industry due to the sophistication of their sponge diving methods (Papaioannou 1985: 141-143). Another unique characteristic of the Tarpon Springs
Moskos also stresses another factor that enabled the Greeks to quickly attain success in their adoptive country while preserving their identity. He argues that the assimilation of Greeks to American civic societies and the business world happened prior to their acculturation to the American culture. This condition helps explain the co-existence of Greek-American success and preservation of a Greek ethnic identity throughout the century (Moskos, 1989: 140).

Once Greek-Americans became accustomed to the American way of life, they started participating in the American political process. Before World War II, Greek-American newspapers began endorsing presidential candidates and, gradually, Greeks started running for political office.62 Greek-Americans, usually second, third or fourth generation, became mayors, state representatives, state senators, United States representatives and United States senators. Among them, the most high profile cases were Spyro Agnew, the son of a Greek immigrant who became Vice-President under President Nixon, and Michael Dukakis, who served as Governor of Massachusetts for two terms and was the Presidential nominee of the Democratic Party in 1988.63 In addition to direct involvement in the American political life, Greek-Americans understood early that the American political system is responsive to public concerns, especially when those are associated with significant numbers of voters. Thus,

Greeks is that, instead of becoming Americanized, they, actually, “hellenized” Tarpon Springs, especially during the period of high Greek concentration in the area (Ibid.).

62 Greeks overwhelmingly supported and voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal in 1932 (Papaioannou 1985: 109).

63 Other noteworthy cases are those of long-term US Representative, John Brademas (later a president of New York University), Paul Sarbanes, long-term US Representative and US Senator, and Paul Tsongas, also a US Senator and Representative. Most Greek-American politicians, including these three, have been affiliated with the Democratic Party.
starting during the interwar period, they became active in raising awareness and advocating for issues that were affecting Greece, Cyprus and the Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{64}

What became known as the “Greek lobby,” the movement of mobilized Greek-American activist and advocacy organizations that aimed at influencing the Congress with respect to issues of Greek interest, was formed following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (Papaioannou 1985: 154). However, similar political activity on a number of issues had started decades earlier although in a less coordinated manner. Three professionally-staffed organizations participated in this movement that protested the Turkish invasion of Cyprus: the American Hellenic Institute, the United Hellenic American Congress, and the American Hellenic Development Alliance (Ibid., 183).\textsuperscript{65} Archbishop Iakovos held an unofficial leadership position in the Greek-American political movement and contributed to its successes. While working with the Greek-American organizations and lobbyists, he used his personal connections to promote the Greek-Cypriot interests and the Greek positions on a series of other foreign policy issues to which he was strongly committed (Malouhos 2002).

The Greek-American political mobilization of 1974, characterized by the slogan “killer Kissinger,” provided the Greek-Americans with a sense of political empowerment.

\textsuperscript{64} Such issues were in the twentieth century the Dodecanese Islands, Epirus, Macedonia, Cyprus, the Patriarchate, and Greek-Turkish relations. Among these, only the issue of the Dodecanese islands has been resolved. Advocacy continues for the remaining issues. The work of Greek-American organizations with respect to foreign policy advocacy is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

\textsuperscript{65} A.H.I. was founded by former Undersecretary of Treasury Eugene Rossides (Papaioannou 1985: 183). A.H.I. continues to be a leading Greek-American lobbying organization. Its work is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The United Hellenic American Congress was founded by legendary Greek-American leader and businessman Andrew Athens in Chicago. The United Hellenic American Congress was considered to be the political branch of the Archdiocese of North and South America (Ibid.). The American Hellenic Development Alliance was founded and chaired by George P. Livanos (Ibid.).
(Papaioannou 1985: 182), which later continued through their successful attempts to impose an arms embargo on Turkey and to preserve the “10-7 ratio of military aid to Turkey and Greece,” which was threatened to be revoked due to the anti-Americanism of the Greek government under the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (P.A.S.O.K.) (Ibid., 183). As the political leadership of Greece under P.A.S.O.K.'s Andreas Papandreou was moving ideologically away from the United States in the 1980s – at least in rhetoric – A.H.E.P.A. worked to improve relations between the two states (Ibid., 161). The *Hellenic Chronicle*, the major English-language Greek-American newspaper, fought Papandreou's anti-Americanism in Greece: “for there is one thing which Greek-Americans do not want, it is the drifting apart of America and the land of their origin.”

In the 1970s the issue of the language used in the Archdiocese and the parishes became again a source of controversy. Archbishop Iakovos wanted to introduce the partial use of English in church services, as needed in each parish, for the purpose of enabling the understanding and participation of the English-speaking faithful. However, this innovation, although it gained the approval of a large percentage of the faithful as evidenced by the 1970 Clergy-Laity Congress's decision, it created a strong opposition on the Greek-speaking part of the community, the Greek-American press, which was primarily using the Greek language.

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66 According to *National Journal*'s Christopher Madison, “Congress's pro-Greek tradition, reinforced by an effective job of the Greek-American lobby, prevailed.” Moreover, “It is difficult to overestimate the extent to which Congress has traditionally held the Greek-American friendship sacred. Greek Americans, not unlike American Jews, are an ethnic group whose power far outweighs its numbers.” (Madison 1985: 961, as quoted in Papaioannou 1985: 183-184). The Greek-American community felt betrayed when President Carter lifted the embargo in 1978 (Papaioannou 1985: 182).

and, most importantly, the Ecumenical Patriarchate under whose jurisdiction lies the Archdiocese. Hence, the Patriarchate did not approve the Congress's decision.

Archbishop Iakovos, although hailed for his role in policy advocacy in support of Greek issues, especially with respect to Cyprus, and in the social and political empowerment of Greek-Americans, was also seen as the person responsible for the de-hellenization of the Church (Papaioannou 1985: 212). The basis for this characterization is Iakovos’ support for the partial replacement of Greek by English as the language used in church. The Greek language continued to be the official and dominant language in church services but it gradually became *de facto* replaced by English, since the ratio of English- to Greek-speakers started to favor predominantly the former and since the Archdiocese acquired the character of a mainstream American religious organization.68

By 1980, there were about one million Greek-Americans in the United States, although the statistics and estimates made by Greek organizations disagree regarding the exact number (Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2000: 211). As it is noted below, current estimates raise the number close to 3 million. Although new additions to the Greek-American community from Greece have decreased significantly in the last few decades, there is still a small but steady stream of primarily a new wave of academic and professional diaspora entering the United States. Since the current Greek economic crisis started in 2009, a modest increase in immigration from Greece has been noted, bearing predominantly the characteristics of a highly skilled diasporic

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68 Today, the official language of the Archdiocese and of religious education is English. Greek is also used as an official language but it holds a secondary role. The language used in services matches the linguistic make-up of each individual parish. Thus, we find a variety of language combinations used across the Archdiocese, from English-only parishes to Greek-only parishes with most parishes using a combination of both languages. The liturgical language used in each church depends both on the mixture of English- and Greek-speakers and on the preferences of the priest and the parishioners. In the same church/parish some services and sacraments may be in one or the other language and others may be in both.
wave. The Greek-American community is currently the wealthiest, most numerous, most successful and most active part of the Greek diaspora.

The Organization of the Greek-American Community

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, estimates the number of Greek-Americans to be approximately 2,500,000 with the greatest concentrations being in New York (approximately half a million), Chicago (about 400,000) and Boston (250,000). Additionally, large concentrations of Greek-Americans are also found in Florida, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Houston, Texas.\textsuperscript{69} According to the 2013 estimate of the U.S. Census Bureau, there are 1,265,072 people of Greek ancestry in the United States.\textsuperscript{70} However, according to the U.S. Department of State, “an estimated three million Americans resident in the United States claim Greek descent” (U.S. Department of State 2014). Descendants of mixed marriages may or may not identify themselves as Greeks in the American census (American FactFinder 2013), reflecting the existence of a spectrum of ethnic and ethno-national identifications among Greek-Americans, in particular among those who have a small percentage of Greek ancestry.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69} These were the recent estimates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ypourgeio Exoterikon)’s web-site under Foreign Policy: Geographic Regions: North America: USA (Exoteriki Politiki: Geografikes Perifereies: Voreia Ameriki: IPA), at www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/el-GR/Policy/Geographic+Regions/North+America/USA [accessed July 15, 2011, web-site no longer available].

\textsuperscript{70} Margin of error is 25,274.

\textsuperscript{71} Another, probably more important, reason why Greeks in the United States did not record their ethnicity as Greek in the census is that they think this is not a relevant answer to the question of ethnic background, which offers options such as white/Caucasian, black, Native American, etc. Consequently, the understanding is that this question refers more to racial/ethno-racial rather than ethnic background and most Greeks tend to choose “white/Caucasian” rather than opt for the open-ended answer of “other” and fill in “Greek.” Thus, the US census does not give us the full and accurate picture of the numbers of the Greek-
a. The Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese of America

The Greek-American community is primarily organized in parishes, which have the form of local communities and are part of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. According to Archbishop Iakovos, “We are organized into communities or parishes in order that we may be of 'one accord' and of 'one mind' [...] Our parishes are the center of our total life – our family and social life as well” (Iakovos 1976: 727). Each parish is governed by a parish council, whose members are laymen and which cooperates with the parish priest. The parish councils are quite powerful as far as the affairs of their parish are concerned. The parishes are financially self-sustaining. The fact that the parishioners fund their church, gives them a lot of leverage with respect to decisions that do not affect the dogma of the church. The parishes also contribute a certain amount annually to the Archdiocese that will fund the Archdiocesan operations and institutions.

The Archdiocese of America is led by Archbishop Demetrios and its headquarters are in New York City.\(^72\) It is not an autocephalous Church but falls under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul, Turkey, which has the status of first among equals in the Orthodox world. The Archdiocese is made up of one Direct Archdiocesan District and eight Metropolises: Metropolis of Boston, Metropolis of Chicago, Metropolis of

\(^{72}\) Information for the organization of the Archdiocese is available on the Archdiocese’s official web-site at www.goarch.org [accessed on 1/30/2014]. In addition to the parishes and institutions, ten Greek-Orthodox monastic communities throughout the United States are also under the jurisdiction of the Archdiocese.
Atlanta, Metropolis of Denver, Metropolis of Detroit, Metropolis of Pittsburgh, Metropolis of San Francisco, and Metropolis of New Jersey.\textsuperscript{73}

The Archdiocese is governed through the Eparchial Synod, which is comprised of its Metropolitans, heads of the Metropolises, the Archdiocesan Council, made up of clergy and laymen, and the biennial Clergy-Laity Congresses, where all the parishes are represented. All three bodies are headed by Archbishop Demetrios. The Clergy-Laity Congresses are of particular significance because they are the ones that take the most important decisions regarding the administration and operation of local parishes and the Archdiocese. The participation of laity in ecclesiastical decision-making in the Greek Archdiocese provides them with a unique power among Orthodox laity world-wide, since no other Orthodox Church administration model allows for this degree of lay participation in the administration of the church. Nevertheless, because the Archdiocese is under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate, the Patriarch has to approve the decisions of the Congresses and any other major decisions in order for them to be officially adopted.

The Archdiocese, through its Departments of Greek Education and Religious Education administers the Greek Schools and Sunday Schools, which are established in most parishes.\textsuperscript{74} Greek schools are either afternoon or Saturday language schools but there are also some parochial Greek day schools across the United States. In addition to a Greek School and a Sunday School, each parish also normally has a G.O.Y.A. Chapter, and a chapter of the ladies' 

\textsuperscript{73} The Direct Archdiocesan District includes the New York area, western Connecticut, Washington, DC, and the Bahamas, and is administered directly by the Archbishop.

\textsuperscript{74} Greek schools and Greek diaspora education are discussed in depth in Chapter 5. Sunday schools are made up of H.O.P.E. (Hellenic Orthodox Primary Education) and J.O.Y. (Junior Orthodox Youth) branches. H.O.P.E. is the educational program for grades K-2 and J.O.Y. for grades 3-6.
Philoptochos Society. All of these local organizations are branches of national level organizations under the auspices of the Archdiocese.

The Archdiocese also operates the two Greek-American institutions of higher education, Hellenic College, a four-year college, and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, a graduate school of theology and seminary. Additionally, it administers an orphanage, Saint Basil's Academy, and a nursing home, Saint Michael's Home. The International Orthodox Christian Charities and the Orthodox Mission Center, are also organizations of the Archdiocese that have a global reach.

b. Societies and Community Organizations

In addition to their affiliation with the church, Greek-Americans are organized in numerous societies and associations. Many of these are societies with a local character with reference to their place of origin in Greece. They may be as specific as to include only the emigrants of a certain Greek village or town and their descendants. Others have a broader reach and include all those who came from a certain prefecture, or from a geographic region that includes many prefectures. Regional federations represent several local organizations from a particular Greek region, for example the Pan-Cretan Association represents many smaller Cretan associations. These organizations may have chapters across the United States in addition to their local member-organizations.

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75 G.O.Y.A., or Greek Orthodox Youth of America, is the church-affiliated youth organization for teenagers. Another Church youth organization is Y.A.L., Young Adult League, which is relatively inactive.

76 Greece is divided administratively in prefectures, which would be equivalent to US states but with almost no actual political powers.
The large size and constituency of the regional federations allow the creation of large networks and large-scale events with reference to a particular region in Greece. Moreover, the federations offer more powerful representation of the interests of the particular regional communities than individual societies of local character could offer. These organizations continue to serve their original mission to support social relations among their members, to promote the Greek identity and heritage, especially their local culture, to help and support their places of origin, and to advocate on behalf of these places if political developments require such action. An illustrative example of the latter is the Pan-Macedonian Association of America, which is actively involved in the issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which is of great concern to the residents of the northern Greek region of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{77}

In addition to societies of local character, there are also organizations that have a charitable, cultural, educational or professional character.\textsuperscript{78} Some are small and have only a single branch and others have chapters across the United States. A.H.E.P.A. is still one of the leading organizations with chapters across the country, although participation as well as activity level has probably diminished compared to the past. Among the charitable organizations, we can include certain human services institutions, like the Hellenic Nursing and Rehabilitation Center in Canton, Massachusetts. A couple of recent community organizations that have a lot of momentum and are increasing in popularity are Greek America

\textsuperscript{77} The activity of Pan-Macedonian and other regional organizations with respect to foreign policy advocacy is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

\textsuperscript{78} There are hundreds of Greek-American organizations across the United States. Some of them are more than one hundred years old, others were active for a certain number of years and then they dissolved, and others are newly established.
Foundation and George Stephanopoulos’ The Next Generation Initiative, both aiming at promoting the Greek heritage and at supporting young Greek Americans.

The Greek-American community has been an activist community since its early years, advocating primarily for issues that affect Greece and Cyprus, as well issues that affect Hellenism and Orthodoxy around the world. A few Greek-American professional advocacy organizations are leading the policy advocacy work with the support and participation of other Greek-American community organizations.\(^79\) All these organizations are often collectively called “the Greek lobby” since their primarily action is to lobby the Congress, the administration and state governments regarding Greek issues. Some of the policy advocacy organizations of the past are either not active or their activity is reduced or lacking visibility. New advocacy organizations have also been created recently.

The Archdiocese retains a leadership role in the Greek-American community with respect to the promotion of certain foreign policy issues, although most of the actual advocacy work is done by the advocacy organizations. Some of the leading organizations are the American Hellenic Institute (A.H.I.) and the Hellenic American Leadership Council. The activist Greek-American organizations are often collectively referred to as “the Greek lobby.” This characterization may also be used for individual advocacy organizations that are particularly active, like A.H.I. Some question whether there is indeed a strong Greek lobby with systematic policy advocacy action and whether it is effective. The advocacy organizations work closely with the two Congressional caucuses that focus on Hellenic issues, which are

\(^{79}\) The advocacy issues and organizations are discussed in depth in Chapter 7. Mobilization and advocacy for foreign policy issues is discussed in Chapter 8.
made up of members of the Congress with an interest in promoting the relationship between Greece and the United States.\textsuperscript{80}

c. The Greek-American Press

In the twentieth century the two dominant Greek newspapers, \textit{Atlantis} and \textit{The National Herald}, both published in New York, yielded a lot of power among the Greek-American community. Beyond these two, numerous smaller publications could be found around the country, others lasting a long time and others existing only a couple of years. Almost all of these publications were in Greek, the major exception being \textit{The Hellenic Chronicle}, published in Boston. With the advent of new, digital forms of communication and with the gradual dominance of the English language as the working language among Greek-Americans, the classical form of a Greek-language newspaper catering to an immigrant population tended to be less dominant.

Although \textit{The National Herald} is still probably the most widely read Greek-American newspaper — it also has an English language section today — numerous other publications, both in print and in digital form have appeared in the last decades. Odyssey and Greek-America Magazine offer Greek-American news and cover issues of Greek interest both in print and in digital form. The Pappas Post (\texttt{www.pappaspost.com}) is a new media phenomenon in the Greek-American community, offering exclusively digital news coverage and using social media extensively. It is joined by a few other major online news resources such as Greek Reporter (\texttt{greekreporter.com}) and Greek Current (\texttt{greekcurrent.com}), which is operated by the Hellenic American Leadership Council. A number of Greek-American radio stations and

\textsuperscript{80} The Congressional caucuses are discussed in Chapter 7.
television programs also operate in all cities with a substantial Greek population, most of them broadcasting for a limited number of hours every day or week.
CHAPTER 3
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: NOTIONS OF GREEK IDENTITY AND CULTURE IN THE HOMELAND AND THE DIASPORA

I. The View from Athens

_Hellenicity_ (Ellinikotita or Greekness) is the fundamental concept that defines and is defined by the Greek state. _Hellenicity_ (Greekness), consisting of all the elements that make up Greek identity and culture, is the core of the nation and what the state is built upon and is sustained through. The state and the concept of Greek identity are involved in a bidirectional relationship, where one shapes the other. The Greek state is seen as the legitimate and sovereign political entity that acts as the depository of Greek culture and identity, institutionalizing the role of the Greek nation as “trustees of a great civilization” (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 228).

Giannaras (2003) cautions against limiting the notion of Greek culture and equating national with cultural identity. For him Greek culture is a way of life (τρόπος του ζωή) and a way of relating to others rather than a collection of specific cultural expressions (Ibid.). Culture is expressed through the work of intellectuals and artists but it is a concept that is broader than intellectual, literary and artistic production (Ibid.).

According to Giannaras (2003), Greek culture is strongly influenced by the political character of ancient Greek culture and the subsequent notion of a Christian community as a

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81 These views of the state are reflected in state rhetoric, in the rhetoric of other governments and in the popular rhetoric prevalent in Greek society and in the Greek diaspora. This study will elaborate on the first and the last of the above mentioned rhetoric. The state rhetoric is discussed in the next chapter while the views of the diaspora are presented in this chapter.
communion of persons in search of existential meaning. The existential priorities influenced all aspects of human life which create the whole human existence and social life: art, philosophy, political life, economics, technology, folk piety (Ibid.). On the other hand, national identity has a strong ideological and folkloric character, including some or all of the following: common language, common religion, common collective historical memories, customs and traditions, mentality and even patterns of behavior (Ibid., 27).

Collective historical memory is preserved through national tradition, namely traditional costumes, traditional dances, traditional architecture, traditional music. Giannaras (2003) argues that these are often preserved as “images of the past” (typoi tou parelthonos). What is “traditional” is essentially a set of cultural characteristics frozen in time: the time around the establishment of the modern Greek State in 1830 and of the subsequent state- and nation-building processes. The emergence of a national “tradition” created an artificial differentiation between modern and non-modern, between a culture that is lived and a culture that is preserved.

Although Greek identity had a political dimension already before the time of Greek independence, nationalism re-formulated it into a Western-cut national prototype. This encounter with modernity presented significant challenges for pre-existing forms of identification and cultural worldviews and practices.

By adapting to the conditions of the modern era, the Greek nation accepted in 1821 what its representatives had rejected in 1453 by preferring the Ottomans to the Latins: its medium-term political integrity in exchange for its long-term cultural identity. (Prévélas 2000: 184)

The territorial aspect of the nation-state undermined the ethnocultural idea of the Greek nation and “eradicated the Hellenistic distinctiveness” on its territory (Ibid., 176). Hence, the state acted “as a melting pot for modern national identity” (Ibid.).
Two major sides emerged in the conflict over the core content of the national identity in the newly established Greek state: the traditional, favoring religion\(^8\) as the identifying element, and the modern, favoring language (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 13).\(^8\) Overall, early nineteenth century national ideology emphasized the connection to ancient Greek past and considered modern Greece a resurrection of ancient Hellas (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002). The Greek language was a central element of Greek national identity, its centrality being the outcome of the Enlightenment’s and, later, Romanticism’s image of Greece (Ibid.).

This romantic image of modern Greece rooted in ancient Greece was based on linguistic continuity which, therefore, rendered the Greek language the primary marker of Greek identity and culture. However, historical circumstances presented Orthodoxy as the primary popular form of identification of the inhabitants of Greek and Ottoman territories. Greek identity and culture around the time of Independence were primarily based on Orthodox faith, given the fact that the latter was vested with Greek cultural expressions and extended into a Greek metaphysics, while Orthodoxy also trumped language affiliation across the populations in mainland Greece. Greek identity was espoused by non-Greek speakers and Greek speakers alike primarily as a Greek-Orthodox identity.

\(^8\) Christianity is even more closely intertwined with Greek culture: “The Christian faith itself is a major point of convergence of the Hellenic and Judaic traditions” (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002). Most of the New Testament was written originally in Greek and the Greek language was the vehicle through which Christianity was not only disseminated but also sustained and developed through the subsequent centuries. The writings of the Church Fathers in late antiquity and medieval times, were both in Greek and in Latin. Many of the saints either were Greek, spoke Greek or lived in Greek-inhabited territories. Most liturgical texts of the Orthodox Church were written in Greek more than a millennium ago and are still in use in their original language and form.

\(^8\) The search for a Greek national identity in the context of the Greek nation-state was also an attempt to define modern Greek culture and cultural identity.
During the Ottoman times, Greek-speaking and other Orthodox populations preserved their “Byzantine” character. Orthodox Christianity had been fundamentally shaped by Greek culture — in language, art, religious customs, etc. — while also influencing the content and expressions of Greek culture and identity for centuries. The fusion of the two cultures during the Byzantine Empire became so strong that led to a merging of the two identities. Although the Greek language was preserved during this period, the primary form of identification was religion, which also became the major unit of categorization of Ottoman subjects for the purposes of sub-state administration under Ottoman rule.

Therefore, Greek identity prior to its “nationalization” in the context of the Greek state was relatively broad, was characterized by a certain degree of inclusiveness and flexibility, had as its primary marker the Greek-Orthodox faith, and was rooted in the Byzantine reality. The most popular Greek lore related to liberation that is preserved until our time was not in any way associated with ancient Greece. It was the legend of the marbled king, referring back to the last emperor of the Byzantine Empire, who would one day come back to liberate his people from the infidels.\textsuperscript{84} Such imaginary was of central significance in the Greek and possibly non-

\footnote{According to this legend (Ο θρυλός του μαρμαρομένου βασιλιά), the last Emperor of Byzantium, Constantine Palaiologos, was not killed during the battle that led to the conquest of the Constantinople by the Ottomans. Instead, he was turned into a statue made out of marble and, in time, he will become alive again and will lead his Orthodox army in retaking his beloved City. The fact that his remains were never found reinforced this legend. The contemporary popular Greek song “Marmaromenos Vasilias” (Marbled King), which is part of the song collection “Mikra Asia” that laments the Asia Minor disaster of 1922, gets its title and relevant references in the lyrics from this legend. This is a testament to how such imaginary continues to shape modern Greek identity and the interpretation of recent historical events, like 1922, and, even of contemporary developments. Contemporary reality is seen by the people as part of a historical unity, echoing phantasms of the past. For them, time is unified and events and persons of hundreds of years ago feel familiar. Nevertheless, collective memory usually does not go further back than the Byzantine times, partly because of the temporal distance and partly because of ideological discontinuities between ancient and medieval Greece. Popular legends and historical memories that evoke strong emotions are primarily limited to the Christian past and concentrated primarily on collective triumphs and collective losses.}
Greek Orthodox psyche in the context of a battle between faithful and infidels. The connection to ancient Greece was imposed on the popular imaginary by the Enlightened Greek intelligentsia and through the romantic perspective of the Europeans.

Thus, Orthodoxy became the primary and *de facto* vehicle of identification with modern Greek culture. During the time of Independence, Orthodoxy was the unifying bond among the multi-lingual Ottoman subjects who joined forces to defeat the Ottomans and to become free. The state’s emphasis on the Greek language and on the connection to ancient Greece as primary markers of Greek identity “vitiated the very vision of a Greek cultural imperium over the other Orthodox Christians of the East, and at the same time dug a deep ditch between popular culture and the ‘new state culture’ ” (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 14).

The national vision of Greek Romanticism deviated from that of European Romanticism, which envisioned modern Greece as the reincarnation of its ancient predecessor. Greek Romantics wanted to resurrect the Byzantine Empire uniting all Orthodox brethren under Greek leadership, building on a perception of Greek cultural superiority among other Balkans populations (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003). With that political goal, they started a process of Hellenization of non-Greek speakers across the Greek territory and beyond. The perception of Greek cultural superiority became widely internalized by non-Greek speakers and became their motivation behind the adoption of a Greek national conscience.

Orthodoxy was used by Greek Romantics to penetrate the world of Orthodox peasants and turn them into Hellenes with the Greek language as their

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85 Later, in the midst of rising and conflicting Balkan nationalisms, an additional element emerged as a defining factor in who partakes in Greek identity and who does not; it was a question of choice, a ‘sentiment’ or ‘consciousness’ (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 15): “Greek identity rested on the paternal faith or the maternal tongue, on time-honoured customs, but above all on a person’s right to choose it” (Ibid., 23-24).
instrument. Language, therefore, was both a medium and an end in itself.

(Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002)\textsuperscript{86}

The Greek language became the “major instrument of acculturation into Greek citizenship” drawing on the prestige Greek education and language enjoyed, primarily through commerce in Ottoman times (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 21) but also through its status in the Orthodox tradition. In the first decades of the new state the term \textit{hellenochristianikos} (Greek Orthodox) was coined by folklorist Spyridon Zambelios “in order to define the essence of Neohellenism against both ancient Hellenism and European Hellenism” (Gourgouris 1996: 182). According to Gourgouris, “religious discourse carried…the most formative signifiers of Neohellenic national culture” (Ibid., 199). “In the case of Greece, since at least its inauguration as a State (1832), the perception of God has always reflected back the image of a homogeneous social body” (Ibid.).

In 1860, historian Konstantinos Paparigopoulos published the first Greek national history, \textit{The History of the Greek Nation}. His primary focus was Hellenic cultural continuity across time, addressing the gap between nineteenth century \textit{Hellenism} and ancient Greece in order to complete the Greek national imaginary. He introduced the missing link in Greek continuity, i.e. the Byzantine Empire, which was the bridge that connected ancient and modern Greece (Gourgouris 1996; Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002).\textsuperscript{87} The Byzantine Empire may have been dominant until then in popular imaginary but his history rendered it firmly part of national

\textsuperscript{86} Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002) stress the willingness of the non-Greek speakers to become hellenized. Modernization and pride in membership in a community with a glorious ancient past were adequate motivations for the “hellenisation of the southern Balkan Orthodox Ecumene” (Ibid., 259).

\textsuperscript{87} Paparigopoulos and other national historiographers based their work on the “unity of historical time and cultural geography,” incorporating a notion of cultural decline (Gourgouris 1996: 258).
ideology, which Greek Romanticism turned into irredentist dogma. Contemporary *Hellenism* and modern Greek culture were part of this continuity. Local and fragmented historical accounts were replaced by a comprehensive version of Greek history.

Although Paparigopoulos offered the ultimate Greek national history, his emphasis on cultural continuity of the Greek people as an ethno-national group, wherever they may have dispersed, partly undermines the centrality of the modern Greek state, with its specified territorial dimension, in Greek history. The uniqueness of the modern Greek state may be challenged if we take into account the variety of culturally Greek political formations that preceded it, ranging from ancient Greek city-states, to Hellenistic kingdoms, and from the Byzantine Empire to small independent medieval principalities during the Ottoman period (Prévévakis 2000). Nevertheless, the writing of a national history rendered the Greek state the official carrier, preserver and protector of the millennia old *Hellenism* and Hellenic Culture.

Paparigopoulos’ work had a definitive influence on Greek identity in the second half of the nineteenth century, placing Greek culture at the heart of national identity (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 15). Consequently, partaking in this culture was the primary criterion for membership in the Greek nation (Ibid.). This dimension of Greek identity helped unify the nation and reaffirm the popular sentiment of a common cultural bond (Ibid.).

Although the Greek language and the Greek-Orthodox faith remained the main elements of the national identity, as the idea of the newly created Greece became “sacred,” language, Church and history had as their mission to support the new state. Language, Church and culture may have been ethnically Greek before but now they became “nationalized:” they became the conceptual pillars on which the state was built and which legitimized it as an ethno-national institution. They acquired the character of “national” cultural creations and expressions.
Eventually the nation-state, it [sic.] secured unchallenged supremacy in the ideological restructuring of the traditional Greek world outside the state’s boundaries and succeeded in forcing the Ecumenical Patriarchate to relinquish its leading role in the Greek world. (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 13)

Therefore, nineteenth century irredentism aimed at the creation of a “‘Helladic’ ideological imperium” (Ibid., 14) rendering Athens as the new center of Hellenism in the place of Constantinople.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the notion of Greek culture shifted; it was now seen primarily as a folk culture, following extensive research by folklorists across the Greek countryside (Gourgouris 1996: 179).88 Hence, the emphasis on Greek folk songs, historical narratives of the revolution, and the demotiki, or the vernacular form of the Greek language (Gourgouris 1996). The memoirs of Greek Revolution War Hero and, later, leader of the Constitutional movement, Yiannis Makriyannis, were central in the national imaginary of the nineteenth century textualizing national memory (Ibid.).89 Folklorists were often trying to identify cultural elements in contemporary Greek cultural practices, or even in the practices of non-Greek populations within the Greek territory, that connected them to ancient times. This

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88 The Greek folk culture dominates the cultural landscape of the Greek diaspora. This is attributed not only to the fact that this cultural version was dominant throughout the twentieth century in Greece but also to the fact that the great majority of the large diasporic waves of the nineteenth and twentieth century were from the countryside, so they were predominantly carriers of a folk rather than an urban version of Greek culture. This reality left its mark on Greek-American cultural and educational institutions.

89 Gourgouris (1996) argues that Makriyannis’ other major work, Visions and Miracles, plays a central role in the post-Marxist, neo-Orthodox movement in the Greek intelligentsia, replacing Greek metaphysics for its European counterpart, to which these intellectuals were previously attached.
was their contribution to the argument of cultural and, thus national, continuity since Antiquity (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 245-246).

Since the end of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, Greece had been embroiled in a linguistic conflict between proponents of the adoption of the vernacular (demotiki) and those who supported the use of a “pure” version of the language (katharevousa), which was partly artificially constructed to be grammatically closer to Ancient Greek. The central position of the Greek language in the content of Greek identity made disagreements about the language particularly significant and emotional. The Greek state was to be affected by the decision since it would adopt the linguistic version that would be the winner as its official working language. Eventually, it was the state which, under the influence of intellectuals and ideologues, ended this philological debate by adopting the demotic form in the last quarter of the twentieth century, thus, shaping the linguistic culture of the country.

As national aspirations dominated Balkan and Ottoman political developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Greek cultural domination and the broad cultural image of the Greek nation started to be challenged. The select nation on the south-eastern fringe of Europe, which would act as a beacon of light in the East and would civilize its less fortunate brethren in the region, became the threatened, insecure and ‘brotherless’ nation of late nineteenth century. (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 26)

A new threat from the Balkans was Communism. The political and historical circumstances of the first decades of the twentieth century that introduced counter-nationalist and ideological threats to Greece, reshaped Greek identity and Greek national culture giving them a more rigid,

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90 The conflict between the two language versions “expressed the conflict between traditional elitism and progressive populism” according to Prévélakis (2000: 183).
nationalistic, homogeneous and limited form (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003), that would be
dominant in the twentieth century.

The Asia Minor debacle of 1922, by signifying the end of the millennia old extensive
Greek presence in Asia Minor — as well as the end of Greek irredentism — also gave rise to
a parochial definition of ‘Greekness’” (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 16). A limited territorial
dimension of Hellenism emerged: for the first time in its history Greek homelands would be
almost exclusively within the borders of the new state, rather than spread out across the
Southern Balkans and Asia Minor. The old hearths were to be remembered in collective
(national) and family-centered memory as the “lost homelands.”

The state’s territory became almost finalized in the first decades of the twentieth
century, as its population became more homogeneous than it had ever been following the
exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The military regime of Ioannis
Metaxas ruled Greece in the interwar amidst the rise of fascist regimes and ideologies that
dominated across Europe. During the interwar, the nineteenth century Greek identity was
transformed into an exclusionary, selective, rigid, ideologically-based and limited form of
ethno-national identity with the tendency to stress its connection to the ancient past
significantly more than its connection to recent periods of modern Greek history.

Whereas during the years of irredentism state ideology reflected a generosity of
spirit towards potential convertees and tolerance for ethnic idiosyncrasies, the
interwar state pursued its mission in history. The exclusive relationship with
antiquity became one of the two legitimizing elements of ethnicity. The other
was ideological purity. The new content of Greek nationalism was a negative
reflection of the communist creed. (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 17)
Following a period of hostility towards the cultures of non-Greek speaking communities within the Greek territory — which culminated with Metaxas’ interwar regime (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002) — a newer version of the Greek nation re-incorporated them as local cultural differentiations within the main Greek cultural body; nevertheless in the context of a wide-spread linguistic Hellenization strategy.

In the following decades, although democracy was restored, the heritage of Metaxas national imaginary and of anti-Communist national ideology haunted the country. The main national threat was now Communism, since Balkan nationalisms were subdued to a global system of ideological conflict. The dominance of conservative attitudes in Greek society also contributed to the cultivation and preservation of a rigid national ideology. Many hierarchs promoted this ideologically-based national identity creating a quasi-politicized ideological ethno-national Church.

Since the early twentieth century and through the following decades, the Orthodox faith, instead of being a universalist and uniting element among Orthodox people, took on a nationalist and ideological garb. In Greek and Balkan Orthodox Churches placed national and ideological causes above Orthodox bonds. This ideologically-based, nationalistic, limited and inflexible form of national identity was also exported in the diaspora, especially during the large immigration waves up to 1920 and, later, in the post-World war II period. This national identity was sustained in the diaspora both by the diasporans themselves and by the institutions of the Greek state.

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91 The ethno-national vision of the Orthodox Churches and the quasi-political and nationalistic attitude is still encountered today, although not all Orthodox or all Church leaders agree to it. Those who oppose stress the spiritual over the national/political character of the Church.

92 Since diasporic identities, cultures and mentalities remain temporally “situated” at the “time of departure,” they may not be influenced by the political, ideological, social and cultural evolution of their homelands that took place after their departure. Hence, diasporas preserve
The interpretation of Greek identity as that of a homogeneous, mono-lingual people that revolves around specific national symbols, primarily of a folkloric and selectively historical character, continued post-World War II, as the communist threat endured rendering Greek nationalism the ideological opposite to Communism. The two sides of the Greek civil war (1945-1949) exhibit this ideological conflict. One side was the communist. The other was the ethnikofrones, the ones who have an ethniko (national) fronima (conscience). If someone was a carrier of the “proper” content of Greek identity, the choice of side during the war became obvious.

The state fear of an internal and external communist threat led to the emergence of “a form of nationalist fundamentalism, which unlike nineteenth-century irredentism was defensive, exclusive and parochial. (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 18)

These characteristics of Greek identity remained dominant throughout the twentieth century, as national identity continued to be viewed through Cold War lenses. In the 1990s the end of Cold War and new political developments in the Southern Balkans based on a late wave of aspiring nationalisms and identity politics, reinforced once more this national ideology. Historical circumstances were now more similar to the beginning of the twentieth century and to the nationalist dynamics surrounding the Balkan Wars. Therefore, anti-Communist national

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93 This version of Greek culture and identity is completely opposite to Giannaras’ (2003) universalist Greek culture.
discourse was replaced by a Balkan-centered nationalist discourse; one aimed at countering threats stemming from new and reawakened Balkan nationalisms.

Today, it is almost unimaginable for Greek people to conceptualize Greek identity and Greek culture outside of the conceptual framework of modern Greece and of the Greek state. The dominance of the state and of national ideology over the content of Greek identity and culture lead to the continuation of the above mentioned characteristics of parochialism, exclusivity, homogeneity, and rigidity to the present time. Primary markers remain the Greek language and the Orthodox faith.\textsuperscript{94}

Although the merging of Greek and Orthodox identities was the product of history, the nationalization of the Church in the last two centuries continues to distort the content of Orthodoxy. Whatever or whoever was culturally Greek in the history of the Church is thought of almost exclusively in Greek national terms today. Hence, there is a backward projection of national \textit{Hellenicity} to pre-national times and to non-national cultural agents or objects.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{94} From time to time there are a few debates regarding the form of the Greek language, especially with respect to its modernization through simplification of spelling or the simplification of grammatical forms. More extremist reformers occasionally may argue in support of the adoption of the Latin alphabet, which would replace the Greek one.

\textsuperscript{95} For example, the three hierarchs, protectors of Greek Letters, who had a broad understanding of ancient Greek culture and how it is connected to Christian theology, have effectively been reduced to the limited role of being the protectors of Greek national education. This example is particularly significant since the quintessentially universal character of the work of the Church Fathers acquires a national or, even, nationalistic form today, as it becomes a contemporary superficial Greek national symbol without examining its historical and philosophical content. An alternative view of Greek culture, like Giannaras (2003) suggests, would stress the cultural and philosophical dimension of the three Hierarchs rather than its superficial national symbolism. In a paradoxical way, the symbolic function of current national symbols, limits and circumscribes their content, recasting it in national terms, thus negating their actual historical and cultural depth. Thus, these tend to be seen only in their superficial, national-symbolic dimension and they may even be trivialized through their mass and low quality material reproduction.
The evolution of Greek identity, including its diasporic dimension, during the last two hundred years resembles an hourglass; the top part signifies an earlier broader concept of Greek identity, the narrow part signifies its nationalization during the twentieth century which rendered it too narrow, and the bottom part signifies its natural broadening in the current diasporic and homeland reality. Current conditions both at home and in the diaspora reshape and broaden the notion of Greek identity while state and diaspora institutions, somewhat unwillingly, try to catch up and adjust to the new reality. The current identity crises and struggles are somewhat reminiscent of the nineteenth century. Interestingly, in the Greek diaspora in the United States (and probably elsewhere), it is primarily the Greek language that is being under attack while in Greece political and social developments have challenged the dominance of Orthodox faith — as well as the sense of belonging to the Greek nation based on descent.

The significant increase of immigrant population in Greece has led to the need to reconsider the rigid limits of ethno-national identity and its connection to notions of homogeneity. The adoption of a culture-centric view of Greek identity may be appropriate today as was necessary in the nineteenth century in order to unite a multilingual population. However, the transfer of new religions, primarily Islam, in the midst of Greek society proves to be a major challenge in the context of a redefinition of Greek identity. Westernization, Europeanization and globalization present additional challenges.

Footnote 96: Greek identity is undergoing significant challenges presently, especially due to the high level of immigration in the country in the last decades which changes the cultural environment and applies pressures both on notions of citizenship and, primarily, on notions of identity. Regardless of the opposition of national ideologues, Greek identity has opened up, probably necessarily so, to include young children of different ethnicities and nationalities born or raised in Greece. Their presence has influenced the Greek educational system making educational policy more responsive to immigrant needs and has led to the creation of multi-cultural and inclusive curricula.
Consequently, on the one hand we see supporters of a more pluralistic version of Greek culture and identity and, on the other, those who are more eager than never to shield and protect it from what they perceive almost as a global cultural conspiracy that aims at the eradication of Greek identity and culture. The latter group stresses the need to preserve the parochial, rigid and restricted form of Greek national identity. Both trends exist also in the diaspora (although the dominance of a conspiracy theory is much weaker) and both sides may use Orthodoxy as a prism to support their version of Greek identity; the former basing their approach on the universal dimension of Orthodoxy, and the latter building on the use of the Church in the context of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes of the past. The current crisis has also led to a polarization between a pro-European and anti-European/nationalistic approach towards Greek identity and a deep crisis regarding the moral and philosophical basis of modern Greek culture.

**Hellenism and the Greek State**

The Greek state is the most important political representation of *Hellenism (Ellinismos)*, which refers primarily to the collectivity of Greek people around the world. *Hellenism* has also a significant cultural dimension as it refers not only to the people but also to the greater cultural realm of the Greek world. The Greek state has the role — or is expected to do so — of protector and supporter of the Greeks, in addition to being the protector and promoter of Greek culture worldwide.\(^97\) This role is reflected not only on the state's emphasis on diaspora policy but also

\(^97\) In the context of Greek popular commentary and political rhetoric, a paradox arises regarding the image of the state. The state is seen both as the source of all problems and as the only entity responsible and able, if it so wishes, to solve them. Hence, politicians, holding the reins of the state government, while being personally blamed for everything they also have a messianic quality in the eyes of their voters.
in its foreign policy strategy, in the context of which it expects the diaspora to be an active supporter of national foreign policy goals.\textsuperscript{98} These policy goals are primarily connected to either Hellenism or Greek identity — i.e. challenges to Greek populations or symbols of Greek culture beyond the Greek territory.

Scholars and intellectuals of modern Greece (Prévélakis 2000; Seferis 1977) often argue that Hellenism — understood in broad, ethnocultural and historical terms — and the modern Greek state have been in a conflictual rather than a symbiotic relationship: “from its beginnings, the form of the Greek nation-state was in conflict with its content, Hellenism. This conflict was reproduced at all levels” (Prévélakis 2000: 176). According to Prévélakis, the creation of the modern Greek state led to a compromise “of Hellenism with modernity” (Ibid., 184).

The identification of the Greek people — the components of Hellenism — was a rather complicated matter at the time of the establishment of the Greek state and in its aftermath and it is strongly connected to the definition of Greek identity. At the time of Greek independence, the primary term used for the Greek people was genos (stock) (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 227), referring to an extended familial bond and common origin that unites all the Greeks. The word ethnos (nation) was used as a synonym for genos and it could also include the non-Greek speaking Orthodox inhabitants of the Greek and Ottoman territories; nevertheless, the Greek ethnos remained elusive as an idea (Ibid.). Hellenism was partly equated with the Greek nation and partly remained a broader, culture-based concept. In any case it was not territorially bound by the Greek borders in any time in the history of the Greek state.

\textsuperscript{98} See discussion on the state rhetoric in the context of its diaspora policy in the next chapter. For a discussion on foreign policy and the state’s expectations as well as the diaspora’s views about its own role in Greek foreign policy, see Chapter 8.
The incorporation of non-Greek-speaking Orthodox populations in the revolutionary struggle and, later, in the new state had to be reconciled with the role of the Greek language as its ultimate Greek national characteristic (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 233). Otherwise, how could they be members of Hellenism? Paparigopoulos’ publication of the History of the Greek Nation in late nineteenth century not only established the nation’s cultural continuity but also expanded the notion of the modern Greek nation to include linguistically differentiated communities which it “has incorporated in its long history from antiquity to modern times” (Ibid.). Thus, Hellenism was comprised both by the Greek and multilingual Orthodox communities of the Balkans and by the carriers of Greek culture and identity beyond the Greek territory.

Hellenism is defined in Greek as “the sum of all the Greeks that live in the world” and as “the Greek nation as carrier of civilization/culture” (Babiniotis 2004: 322). Hellenism has both a spatial and a temporal dimension. The spatial stresses its diasporic character that includes older and newer communities of Greeks living within and beyond the Greek territory. The temporal or diachronic connects it to the Greeks of the past. This connection can be materialized today through historical and cultural symbols that offer that historical depth to the existence of Hellenism. A third dimension of Hellenism is more complex as it looks inward at the content of the culture that is carried by its members. This dimension is closely connected

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99 Orthodox Albanian-speakers (Arvanites) contributed greatly to the Revolution and Vlach-speakers (Vlachoi) were significant contributors in Greek Enlightenment; both communities shared the Greek national goals (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002).

100 Today, for example, Greeks Vlachs carry a proud identity as Greeks of a Vlach cultural differentiation (not ethnic or national differentiation) and they are not seen in any way as being less Greeks by the rest of the population. Hence, Vlachs make up part of contemporary Hellenism. The definition of the content of Greek identity and culture defines membership in Hellenism.
to *Hellenicity*: it is the internal dimension of the identity of *Hellenism*, which often equates it with Greek culture.\textsuperscript{101}

The extra-territorial dimension of *Hellenism* is multifaceted. *Hellenism* encompasses Greek communities spread around the world. These communities are either rooted in history — like the small Greek community in Istanbul — or are earlier or later diaspora communities that have preserved a strong Greek character — like the Greeks of London or the Greek-American community. In a global age when the agency of individuals is much greater that it has ever been, we can talk of networks of individual Greeks living beyond the Greek territory and not necessarily communities. Consequently, *Hellenism* includes, for example, Greek humanitarian groups stationed in Afghanistan or Greek academics spread throughout East Asian universities. However, another aspect of *Hellenism* makes it an even broader notion.

*Hellenism* has an intimate relationship with *Hellenicity*. The term *Hellenism*, beyond its anthropocentric conceptualization, includes the notion of *Hellenicity* or Greek identity and culture because Greekness is what defines *Hellenism* as a collectivity of people with a common identity. In other words, *Hellenism*, the collectivity of Greeks around the world, is the vehicle through which Greek culture and Greek identity is carried through space and time. The cultural aspect of *Hellenism* includes also symbols of Hellenic culture that are found in and outside of Greece.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} This dimension is closer to the English-language definition of the word ‘Hellenism’ which refers to Greek, primarily ancient or Hellenistic, culture (“Dictionary: Hellenism”).

\textsuperscript{102} In that sense, the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which controls the Christian pilgrimage sites in the Holy Land or the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria are also Hellenic institutions and part of *Hellenism*, as carriers of Greek-Orthodox culture. This is evident not only by the fact that their small staff is Greek and the official language of the Patriarchates is Greek but also by the fact that they have a very close connection to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which appears to be their political protector.
The notion of Hellenism is also centered on history. As a result, it includes, for example, locations of ancient Greek ruins around the Mediterranean or abandoned Greek homelands in Asia Minor and Pontos. Last, a broad understanding of Hellenism also includes locations where Greek culture is currently present even if Greek people are not. This sub-category includes Greek language institutions around the world, and ancient Greek or modern Greek history, language and culture programs in international universities, whether they are staffed by Greeks or not. Therefore, Hellenism in its broadest definition is made up of a number of elements: the Greek people, Greek cultural symbols, history — centered on past locations of Greek presence — and the current Greek educational and cultural activity around the world. Although Greek origin is an important aspect of Hellenism, its emphasis on culture makes it a rather universalist concept. Its spatial dimension, it could be argued, is its most important characteristic.

Political life in Greece in the last two centuries was dominated by conflicting ideologies — primarily nationalism and Communism — that were responsible for the “transformation of the vision of Hellenism” (Prévélakis 2000: 183). Beyond reformulating notions of identity, nationalism also affected Greek organizational culture by eliminating community independence and replacing it with centralized state control (Ibid.), changing the traditional way in which Hellenism was organized in the form of local communities enjoying a degree of self-government rooted in long-term Greek tradition (Giannaras 2003). However, Koliopoulos & Veremis (2002: 265-266) argue that the only real model of self-government were the diaspora communities and not the local communities in the Ottoman territory which were compromised due to their subservience to the Sultan, the economic interests of the heads of the community and the limited functions they had.

Communism, on the other hand, while fighting central traditional elements of Greek identity (primarily the Greek Orthodox faith), also attacked a crucial part of Hellenism: the
Greek intellectual and financial elite (Prévélakis 2000: 183). For Greek communists, the elite was the bourgeois and imperialist enemy (Ibid.). Thus, they undermined the connections among collective centers of Hellenism by placing their fraternity with Balkan Communists above ethnic bonds (Ibid.).

In the words of the Greek Nobel laureate poet George Seferis, “Greece becomes a secondary affair when one contemplates Hellenism. Whatever in Greece gets in the way of my contemplation of Hellenism, let it be destroyed!” (as cited in Gourgouris 1996: 213). Seferis, a figure of crucial importance in modern Greek literary culture, saw Hellenicity in more universal terms, contemplating the Hellen as anthropos (human), as a way of being (Gourgouris 1996) — essentially seeing it as a purely cultural identity, nevertheless grounded to a diachronic Greek reality.

Hellenicity gradually acquired a philosophical, metaphysical and sentimental nature (Gourgouris 1996). Nevertheless, Seferis is a proponent of the “unity of Greek tradition” (Ibid., 214), arguing that “I can’t have a clear image of Greece otherwise” (as cited in Ibid.). Therefore, although fundamentally based on Greek experience, the realm of Hellenism is universal according to a Seferian approach. This view echoes also Giannaras’ (2003) view of the universalist, inclusive, philosophical and anthropocentric (rather than nation-centric) view of Hellenism.

The Greek state’s view of Hellenism reflects its national ideology and it is encoded in Greek citizenship laws. These laws set limits to membership in the Greek nation and in the ranks of Hellenism. In this context, Greek origin is the primary criterion for citizenship. Citizenship was based on jus soli (right of the soil) upon the establishment of the Greek state, aiming at homogenizing the existing population of the newly liberated Greek territory. However, the jus sanguinis (right of the blood) dominated the notion and practice of citizenship.
with reference to prospective citizens who lived beyond the Greek territory throughout the last two hundred years (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003).

Foreign-born Greek homogeneis or simply homogeneis (Greek nationals) were, and still are, preferentially treated when it comes to Greek citizenship. The Greek nation, in other words, although it created the Greek nation state, according to official theory, could not possibly be associated solely with that state; and although the Greeks followed the usual path of one nation one state and one state one nation, the Greek nation existed and exists not only within the confines of the Greek nation state. (Ibid., 26)

The Greek state awards Greek citizenship to any foreigner who can prove that he has a Greek ancestor through birth certificates and other official documents. Even if this process is done fairly late in someone’s life, he or she is still registered as a Greek citizen/national by birth, not naturalized. Children of Greek nationals born outside of the Greek territory are almost automatically recorded as Greek citizens following a fairly simple procedure. They have all the rights and obligations of Greek citizens adjusted on certain issues — taxation, military service, entrance to the Greek university, etc. — due to the fact that they live abroad.103

The Challenge of Applying Concepts to Policy: Diaspora Hellenism — Who Is Included?

In the state’s policy approach toward the diaspora, both concepts are dominant although it is not easy to clarify either the notion of Hellenicity or Hellenism in the diaspora. The idea

103 According to Professor Mihopoulos (2014), Greece has protected its diaspora more than other countries. Greece and Israel are unique in their sense of ethnic continuity since they both give Greek and Israeli passports even to persons who can prove a distant (many generations back) ancestry from a Greek or a Jew (Ibid.).
of Hellenism is often vague in the context of political rhetoric and policy framework — maybe purposefully or necessarily so — since it is not easily identifiable who is part of Hellenism and who is not. Beyond specific regulations regarding who gets Greek citizenship and how nationality is defined when it pertains to certain administrative matters, the idea of who is a Greek or Greek-American in the United States is rather vague depending on different interpretations of Greek identity and different criteria used.

Is self-identification playing the primary role in placing people within the ranks of Hellenism? Or, is it other, somewhat measurable factors, such as up to 1/8 descent from Greek ancestors, or knowing the Greek language, or being Greek-Orthodox, or a combination of all of these? Should we include in the ranks of Hellenism someone who is 1/16 Greek and does not identify at all as Greek or Greek-American? The problem of not having a clear picture as to who makes up Hellenism in America affects diaspora policy. A lack of a deep knowledge of the audience in question, whose interpretations and expressions of Greek identity and culture are multiple as described below, can lead to improper or inadequate policies that do not address the existing needs or that do not make full use of the potential for collaboration between the state and the diaspora. Greek diaspora policy so far is based on the assumption of a homogeneous Greek-American community, somewhat recognizing only intergenerational differences.

104 This is also a conceptual as well as a practical issue that the Greek state and society are faced with when it comes to the residents of Greeks. Are older minorities, such as the Muslims of Thrace, or newer immigrants, such as the numerous Albanians, Pakistanis, Chinese, and others, part of Hellenism? Is there a need to reconsider and broaden the notion within the current Greek circumstances, or not? Should the notion of Greek identity be affected and readjusted? Once again, the content of Hellenicity (Greekness) defines membership in Hellenism.
The Greek Cultural Diaspora Redefined: Are We Missing Someone?105

A special group of Americans who are not of Greek origin is part of the Greek cultural diaspora but is not included in the notion of Hellenism as far as the state is concerned. Therefore, no cultural diaspora policies are acknowledging their existence. This group is the increasing community of Greek-Orthodox of America who are not ethnically Greek. Thousands of American converts to Orthodoxy make up the extended Greek Orthodox diaspora by joining the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America.106

Giannaras (2003) argues that Greek diplomacy should include this part of Greek cultural diaspora, which remains beyond the reach of the Greek state. The lack of any meaningful and purposeful interaction between Greece and the non-Greek Greek-Orthodox diaspora in America contributes to the latter's mixed attitude towards Greece and the Greek state.107

On the one hand, they are attracted by the spiritual history and contemporary spiritual practices of the Greek territory; after all, Greek culture has been central in Orthodox

105 This cultural diaspora, although based on religious bonds, is reminiscent of the French-speaking diaspora within the realm of the Francophone world. That diaspora is primarily not ethnically French, but the French language, and any kreole mixtures, are central both to their distinct identity, as Haitians, etc., and in their relationship with France. Francophonie and the Francophone world is also reminiscent of another relevant cultural realm that of Hellenism, although Hellenism implies primarily ethnic membership and secondarily cultural connection.

106 There are also large communities of Russian Orthodox, Antiocheans (Orthodox of Lebanon and Syria) and Orthodox of other national Orthodox Churches in the United States. Through their affiliation with a particular Orthodox parish, they also become affiliated in one way or another with the homeland of that national Church, whether they are its nationals or not. The Greek cultural diaspora includes primarily the non-Greek members of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese rather the Orthodox affiliated with other national Churches.

107 The following description of attitudes of converts in parishes and at Hellenic College/Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology is based on the author’s long-term experience living within the Greek-American community and interacting with its ecclesiastical institutions for the last 20 years.
Christianity. Sometimes they learn Greek, especially those among them training to be priests, and they are often more zealous preservers of Greek-Orthodox religious traditions and more knowledgeable of the scriptures than Greek-Americans or Greeks in Greece.

On the other, however, they look at the Greek state in a very defensive way at best, since they feel that the Greek state — as an extension of the Greek-American parishes and the Greek Archdiocese — sees them as, and wants to make them into, Greeks. But they do not want to be Greek; only Greek Orthodox.

This tension is present throughout Greek-Orthodox parishes and organizations as well as at Hellenic College and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, the only higher learning institutions of the Archdiocese that also train future Greek-Orthodox priests, many of whom are also converts. Due to the large numbers of the converts, the large numbers of mixed marriages and the increasing number of American-born generations of Greek-Americans, there is a challenge to the Greek ethnic identity of the Greek Orthodox Church in America. Currently, some of them may even be hostile to anything related to Greece and the Greek language, as they draw a clear line that divides the spiritual from the secular, a line that tends to be absent in Greek culture and identity. However, this does not mean that the Greek state is not relevant to this community of non-Greek Orthodox since they practice Greek religious culture. These converts will not be Greek but can be — and many of them already are — philhellenes and global carriers of Greek-Orthodox culture.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ A relevant anecdote regarding an incident that involved a non-Greek Orthodox illustrates the central role of this group in Greek culture. A Greek-Orthodox of African origin who was born Orthodox and whose father was an Orthodox priest in Africa, confronted the owner of a Turkish restaurant whose name included a reference to Istanbul saying “You took [Constantinople] from us.” This sense of membership in a global culturally Greek, Greek-Orthodox collectivity is pronounced among several non-Greek Greek-Orthodox. On the other hand, American converts usually do not have a sense of sharing in Greek culture but rather only in the spiritual aspects of Orthodoxy.
II. The View from New York

*Hellenicity in the Greek-American Community*

In 2012, a new Greek-American advocacy organization, Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC) (Logothetis 2012a), conducted a survey on what it means to be Greek-American. HALC created a “cloud” with the 150 words most frequently used in the survey answers. The most common words used to describe Greek-American identity were ‘Greek,’ ‘family,’ ‘heritage,’ ‘culture,’ ‘philotimo,’ ‘pride,’ ‘values,’ ‘leadership,’ ‘honor,’ ‘ancestors,’ ‘Greeks,’ ‘history,’ ‘life,’ ‘believe,’ ‘world,’ and ‘traditions,’ followed by many others that included references to Orthodoxy, Greek history, Greek culture and values. This survey is very illustrative, confirming widely-known perspectives on Greek-American identity, although we do not have details about the sample size and survey procedures. However, an underlying assumption is that these answers reflected the views of a digitally literate and, therefore, younger segment of the community. Moreover, the responders were probably politically aware of Greek issues, implying the presence of an ethno-national identity, since the organization that performed the survey is a Greek-American political advocacy organization. This means that Greek-Americans with an ethno-cultural or ethno-religious identity focused on Greek Orthodoxy, who tend to shy away from Greek ethno-national political expressions are either excluded or underrepresented in the sample. The same is true for older, non-digitally literate generations. These conditions can explain the fact that faith-words (Orthodoxy, etc.) were not as dominant, although present, in the description of Greek identity.

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109 A “cloud” represents visually the frequency of certain words in a document or across several documents. The size of the letters of each word corresponds to the frequency with which it appears. Hence, the most frequent word will appear with the biggest letter size and the least frequent with the smallest. The sequence in which the words are presented here reflects their frequency in the answers and, therefore, their letter size in the “cloud.”

110 *Philotimo* is a word of central importance in the context of Greek cultural values. It means ‘love of honor,’ with ‘honor’ having many interpretations. Thus, someone who has *philotimo* is helpful, responsible and industrious beyond expectations, without gaining anything in return, or against his or her own self-interest. In a sense, it is a form of self-sacrifice.
survey confirms well-known identification approaches within the Greek-American community, i.e. the dominance of notions of family and community, cultural practices, values and references to a recent or remote collective past. The stress on values dictating an honorable behavior and a proper way of life are particularly significant since there is the tendency to equate ethnic identity with particular expressive cultural markers such as traditional arts and customs and less so with values. The Greek identity is all encompassing in the life of Greek-Americans. Its impact starts with the family, expands to community institutions and, ultimately, to life beyond the community.

A year later, in 2013, two Greek-American women from Chicago produced a very insightful video entitled “What it means to be Greek” featuring nine Greek-born and American-born Greek-Americans from the Chicago area: a priest, a Greek school teacher, a doctor who is also an author and a poet, an athlete, a professor, a store owner, a housewife, a teenager and an elementary school student.112 They all referred to the global historical importance of ancient

112 The video, directed by Ivan Silverberg, executive produced by Allina Nikolopoulou, and produced by Georgia Taxakis was created for the cultural event “Coming Together at Skokie 2013,” which took place in Skokie, Illinois. It is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8sLILU3Maa0#t=157 [accessed on 2/16/2015]. Interestingly, although it has 158,054 views on ‘youtube’ and over 1000 likes, which attest to the fact that it indeed reflects wide-spread attitudes and emotions, it also has 45 dislikes. The 395 comments posted give a unique insight into views on Greek identity. Some negative comments reflected anti-Orthodox/neo-pagan attitudes or were nationalist hate-comments (from a variety of other nationalities, including Albanian and Persian). Other comments stressed the idea that you are only born Greek, you cannot become Greek. A view that was expressed in a number of comments and which is very significant when it comes to Greek identity discourse was that some Greeks from Greece wanted to distinguish the views expressed on the video from what a Greek from Greece would argue that his or her Greek identity means, hence for them being Greek-American and being Greek is very different. Many Greeks from Greece and the diaspora were touched by this emotional expression of Greek-American identity. However, some disliked the fact that many participants in the video did not speak in Greek, stressing explicitly or implicitly the centrality of the Greek language to Greek identity. For some it was almost incomprehensible how these Greek-American could claim to be Greek but did not know the language.

An interesting comment says that the ancient monuments and the Greek values may be central in Greek-American identity but if you live in Greece “the landscape, nature itself...
Greek civilization as the root of the Western civilization. They all stressed that we see all around us today the continuing and diachronic influence of Greek culture rooted in ancient Greece.

This culture, they stressed, in its ancient or later forms, has given birth or strongly contributed to science and mathematics, art and culture, theater, Olympic games, athletics — with emphasis on the marathon — democracy, freedom of speech, government, architecture,

Hellenizes you.” Bitterness also became apparent as a number of comments argued that Greeks who emigrated looked for the easy way out of the difficulties of life in Greece while others argued that diaspora Greeks preserve Greek pride and identity more than Greeks in Greece. Another comment argued that this is a description of “what is supposed to be Greek!” implying that reality differs. Numerous were those comments that criticized the negative attitude and the proclivity to conflict that was present across commentators, arguing that this is a very common negative characteristic of modern Greek discourse and interaction. Some also criticize what they consider to be clichés in the video, and in Greek identity, especially with respect to Greek pride in ancient accomplishments, while others put their faith in the diaspora now that Greece is experiencing not only an economic crisis but a political and social crisis, a crisis of morality, identity and values.

What is probably most surprising regarding these comments is the genuine questioning of some, and opposition by others, of the presence of a Greek Orthodox priest and Orthodoxy in the video. This offers an insight into the modern Greek reality, where a segment of the Greek population, primarily those in Greece and some first generation diasporans, do not see Orthodoxy as a central part of Greek identity focusing almost exclusively on its secular aspects. This is a Greek vision very removed from the dominant Greek-American vision of Greek culture and identity. The attacks from the Greeks of Greece were primarily based on perceptions of Greek Americans as being full of words but not really doing anything with respect to the Greek culture or that they cannot contribute anything to Greek culture and identity, when these concepts are centered in Greece — a very unfair criticism that reflects the Helladic (i.e. based on Greek territory) ignorance of the diasporic reality. The territoriality of Greek identity was strongly present in a number of these comments as well as the unwillingness of some to accept the Greeks of the diaspora as Greeks since they do not partake in contemporary Greek reality but in an imaginary Greece. They undermined what are proud elements of the Greek-American identity because they do not fit the cultural mold of a Greek currently living in Greece — without recognizing the fact that there is not only one such mold even within Greece. Many stressed that it is necessary to be part of Greek society in order to be considered Greek. According to this definition, Albanians growing up in Greece are seen as more Greek than Greek-Americans. Another commentator argued “How can the kids of immigrants who have grown up away from Greece know what it means to be Greek? What new does a video made by American citizens have to tell us? I do not have anything with anyone but the Americans [are] in America and the Greeks [are] in Greece.” [corrected formatting]
education, Orthodox faith, philosophy, Greek cuisine — with emphasis on the use of olive oil — and traditional games, like tavli. The younger generation also included Greek-American cultural productions in the definition of ‘Greekness’ such as *My Big Fat Greek Wedding*. Some respondents raised the idea of connection between memory and identity, as well as between emotion and identity. Strong reference was made to ancient Greek civilization and art both in the comments and in the choice of images by the filmmaker.

A characteristic all respondents shared, which is very indicative of Greek-American experience, was a strong pride and an emotional connection to Greek identity and culture, regardless of the specific cultural elements that they chose to stress in their description of the content of Greek identity. The Greek educator in the video spoke of the importance and responsibility of transmitting the “immortal” Greek culture and cultural heritage to the younger generations of Greek-Americans. She further urges Greek-Americans to “keep the sparkle burning, the sparkle that is burning inside us, and…make the sparkle into a flame and become torch bearers of history.”

The professor referred to her experience of Greekness as “an overpowering wave of the senses triggered by the familiar warmth of sounds and scents and sights.” She pointed out that Greeks are part “of a collective wisdom thousands of years in the making,” and that Greek culture is “an experience… has to be lived, it has to be breathed, it has to be spoken, it has to be shared through multiple expressions.” The marathon-runner referring to Greek cultural roots said “Can a tree survive without roots? It cannot. It will die.” and goes on to say that “Greece is a light, a light. Greece is a shining light. A shining light that is never extinguished.” The aged housewife referred to common cultural roots as “something that holds us together. Something that identifies us in some way.” The female store keeper argued that as Greeks “we have to preserve our origin, our heritage, our customs, and our culture.” The English-speaking
psychiatrist and poet stated: “I cannot negate the Greek core of me in lieu of the American core because then I would be losing half or more of who my soul was, what my heart is.”

This second generation Greek-American psychiatrist, poet and author described his Greek identity by reading one of his poems:

I am the bridge over the Atlantic
one foothold in Greece, the other in America
I span two continents and bracing both
My parents’ hearts in Greece, their children here, their parents there
I am the bridge of their hearts, loved, held and cherished
Made from the dust of Greece, breathing American air
I am their glue, binding them all together
Straddling, holding two continents in my embrace
I am their bridge, their DNA
Have been, always be compelled
I hold them in my heart
Their bridge, spanning the Atlantic
I am their depository, their safety box
Keeping all their memories of their mothers and fathers
Of sisters and brothers
I am their safe house carrying their treasures secreted in my heart
I hold them all in me and pass them on to my progenies.

What these verses tell us is that Greek-American identity is primarily family-based and memory-based. It is very emotional and very personal. There is a strong intergenerational element that is the axis along which the identity and culture is passed on and remains alive.
This intergenerational element, the sense of origin, ancestry, progeny and continuity, becomes in turn an integral part of Greek-American identity. The duality of the Greek-American psyche becomes evident, as it is split between two cultures, two identities, two worlds.

The Greek-American immigrants came primarily from rural areas but settled predominantly in urban centers. The Greek-American diaspora includes today among its ranks immigrants from Greece (first generation Greek-Americans), their descendants (second to fifth generation Greek-Americans), and descendants of Greeks who did not come from mainland Greece but from the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{113} Those Ottoman territories either became part of independent Greece after their emigration or are still parts of other neighboring states, such as the Pontic coast or Asia Minor in Turkey. However, even for these descendants the Greek state is the cradle of their culture. Although their ancestors may have never been citizens of Greece, Greece represents for them the hearth of Hellenism, since their families’ ancestral homelands are not inhabited by Greeks anymore; they are the so-called ‘lost homelands.’

The Greek-American identity is a geographically detached version of Greek identity, since the connection to a particular place of origin is removed both in space and in time, usually one or more generations back. This temporal distance will keep increasing as the sixth and seventh generation Greek-Americans will gradually emerge. Important identity markers, such as speaking the Greek language — especially, speaking fluently — are being increasingly replaced by other cultural indicators, primarily the Orthodox faith but also by various cultural expressions. For example, the performance of Greek folk dances is an activity that has a

\textsuperscript{113} There were also Greek immigrants to the United States for other centers of the Greek diaspora, primarily Egypt.
dominant role in social and educational activities of Greek-Americans, significantly more so than the Greek language.\footnote{I thank Dr. Nicholas Prévélakis for sharing this idea with me. One can probably find many more Greek-Americans who are able to dance Greek folk dances than Greek-Americans who are able to speak Greek well. Hence, they have incorporated the dance element in their familial culture but not necessarily the language. It is much easier to share in Greek culture by coming up to join a dancing crowd than trying to learn the language.}

From the beginning of the Greek-American experience, two cultural markers defined Greek-American identity similarly to the homeland: the Orthodox faith and the Greek language. Throughout Greek-American history, the fundamental concern of the Greek-American community has been how to preserve its identity and culture and how to pass these on to the following generations. A priority for the new immigrants since the beginning of the twentieth century, and even earlier, was the creation of organized communities that would establish Greek Orthodox churches and Greek schools to educate their children in the Greek language and culture. Greek schools, the Church and other community institutions became the vehicles that transmitted Greek identity to the subsequent generations while preserving the social bonds among the members of the community whose life revolved around the church.\footnote{“More so than with Protestant and Catholic parishes, Orthodox parishioners tend to acquire an intimate knowledge of one another that spills over into life outside the chapel” (Monos 63).} Greek language, culture and the orthodox faith were not to be separated and they were all being practiced, taught and preserved primarily through the Church.

In 1980, following research into three generations of New York Americans, Alice Scourby (1980: 43) wrote that “the majority of Greeks still have a relatively strong attachment to their ethnic culture in spite of identification with American society.” She concluded that both US-born and foreign-born Greek-Americans have a strong Greek identity, which has not
diminished as they advanced to a higher socio-economic and educational status; neither have they abandoned the Greek community (Ibid., 49).

Although there is a spectrum of Greek-American identity, for most Greek-Americans this identity is still centered on all or some of the following concepts: the Church, the Greek language and the Greek culture. A recent psychological study of Greek-American and other ethnic youth in New York by professor of psychology James Koutrelakos revealed that “Ethnic identity can continue, strong, across generations, if the right factors are in place” (as cited in Contis 2011); these factors refer primarily to the role that community institutions play. According to Koutrelakos, ethnic identity and pride can have a close connection to self-esteem since “while race involves how those in power see others, ethnicity is all about how a group sees itself” (Ibid.). These findings give even greater significance to Greek pride, which is revealed as a dominant characteristic of Greek-American identity in the video. However, they presuppose communal institutions that will provide a sense of belonging and peer support to Greek-American youth within the context of a common religion and ethnicity (Vidalis 2014).

Although the practices of many Greek-American institutions may have led, either purposefully or not, to a relative homogenization of the notion of Greek-American identity, especially where the presence of these institutions was dominant, Greek-American identity reflects a spectrum. This spectrum has influenced, in turn, the community’s institutions. It should be noted that notions of Greek culture and identity were varied early on, since Greek immigrants came from different places and had different experiences both prior to their arrival in this country and in its aftermath. Consequently, there is not one Greek-American mold but many different versions of Greek-American identity with multiple and varied cultural expressions.
The existence of an identity spectrum can be partly explained by the fact that, as part of a personal diasporic experience — extending into the past and reflecting the present — Greek-American identity becomes strongly personalized. At the same time, generational factors have significant explanatory power. Alice Scourby’s (1980) study helps shed light on these factors. In the context of her study of three generations of Greek-Americans in New York she found that the first generation is identified with an ethno-religious form of Greek identity while the third generation, emerging in the 1970’s, is more closely identified with the cultural values of the Greek-American community (Ibid., 50).

For the first generation, nationality, Orthodoxy and the Greek language were crucial parts of their identity. The second generation reluctantly accepted these main axes of identification becoming the bridge between the Greek and the American world (Scourby 1980). The younger generation exhibited a confusion and inconsistency about the content of Greek ethnic identity leading the researcher to argue that “Clearly, so much of ethnic identity is an unconscious experience as well as an ambivalent experience” (Ibid., 50).

An ongoing identity conflict takes place sometimes subtly and sometimes more explicitly as we move from one generation to the other. Each generation often opposed the previous generation’s views and challenged its form of identity. While younger generations in early to mid-twentieth century reacted to the Greek identity of their parents and gave up the Greek language, a reversal is noted in subsequent generations. Therefore, they may go back to learning Greek while their parents cannot speak it, or they may become attached to the Orthodox faith while their parents were more neutral about it.

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116 The poetic verses mentioned above describe the psyche of the second generation Greek-Americans.
Newer generations reverse the assimilationist attitude of their parents or grandparents partly due to changing social and cultural conditions within the greater American society and partly due to intergenerational oppositional dynamics. This dynamics includes the emergence of an interest in searching for personal or family roots that previous generations may have obscured.

…the third generation of Greek-Americans started to search for roots abandoned by their parents. Language, religion, folklore attracted the new generations which felt a strong urge to (re)define their identity. (Prévélakis 1998: 6)

Greek language has been of central importance to Greek identity for many Greek-Americans but it is probably one of the most difficult parts of Greek culture to sustain in the diaspora. This is particularly true in the case of distant descendants of Greek immigrants or the children and grandchildren of mixed marriages. This trend away from the language is even more pronounced among Greek-Americans who are spread out around the country, away from urban centers with large concentrations of Greeks and strong and active Greek institutions.

Alice Scourby’s (1980) research findings indicate that, as we move to subsequent generations, the use of the Greek language becomes less central as an identifying mark and is less frequent. According to the study, subsequent generations were increasingly more favorable towards using English as the basic form of communication in the church, for example in the sermon, but were a little less enthusiastic about switching from Greek to English in the liturgy; Scourby (Ibid., 47) argues that this difference may be because they distinguish the practical aspect of religious language from the sacramental or mystical, which they are more prone to leave in its original form. Greek school attendance was also found to decrease passing from one generation to the next. However, probably due to the fact that the respondents were
members of the large and well-organized Greek-American community of New York, even in the third generation about 70% had attended Greek School (Ibid., 48).

According to the 2011 U.S. Census Bureau, only about a quarter of the Greek-American population speaks Greek at home.\textsuperscript{117} A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that acquiring and preserving a different language in the face of the dominant English language takes much more effort than learning and adopting other manifestations of Greek culture. Regardless of its centrality and “sacredness” in the eyes of Greeks and many Greek-Americans, the Greek language when used at familial or social settings often means the exclusion of a non-Greek spouse, non-Greek speaking children or other non-Greek speaking members of one’s own family and, definitely, of an extended circle of American friends.

As it happens with immigrant communities, the Greek language tends to be more dominant and a higher priority for the first generation and within large urban Greek-American communities; these communities offer an adequate number of speakers that is enough to sustain the use of the language in the context of Greek-American institutions and social networks. However, the emergence of the subsequent generations may still challenge the dominance of the language even in the places with high concentration of Greek speakers.

The Orthodox Church was and remains central in Greek-American life, functioning as the institutional leader and offering a spiritual binding “glue” to the community. The role of the Church and Orthodox faith has been crucial in the life of Greek-Americans both historically and at the present; ultimately, for most Greek-Americans, the community was, and is, the parish. The Greek-American Church was the outcome of the initiatives and the struggles of the

\textsuperscript{117} According to the 2011 U.S. Census Bureau’s “American Community Surveys Reports: Language Use in the United States: 2011” by Camille Ryan, issued in August 2013, only 304,928 Americans of Greek descent over the age of 5 spoke Greek at home. Source available at: \url{http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdf}. This is about a quarter of the population that is of Greek descent, according to the 2013 U.S. Census estimation.
Greek-Americans and, at the same time, it was the symbol of their identity and their source of pride, support and solace (Papaioannou 1985).

For a large and gradually increasing segment of the community, the Greek-Orthodox identity has replaced their Greek-American identity. Thus, they have a strong affiliation with the Church and follow all the ethno-religious customs but have cut their links to the Greek language and to their ethno-national identification as Greeks. The move away from the language while staying close to the Church started early on and it was, probably, a relatively unavoidable situation.

In the 1930s, with the American-born children of the pioneer Greek immigrants coming of age, the American social, cultural and moral attitudes started to challenge the values and practices of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek-American family and community (Papaioannou 1985). There was concern among the hierarchy of the Church about the fact that as the young Greek-Americans moved away from the language, they would also move away from the Church — due to the fact that, throughout most of the twentieth century, the official language of the Greek Orthodox Church in America was Greek — and all sense of identity would be lost within a generation (Ibid.).

The Greek Orthodox Bishop of Boston Joachim Alexopoulos, while contemplating in the 1920s the future of Greek-Americans which appeared to him to be dominated by the English language, argued for what he considered a necessary change: the use of English at least in Orthodox religious education, in order to preserve the Orthodox faith and, through that, the Greek ethnicity:

When, one way or the other, the Greek language is gone, only the Orthodox faith will be able to remain by the means of perpetuating our phyletic conscience and ethnic traditions. (as cited in Papaioannou 1985: 380)
This was an insightful and accurate observation and projection, which was, partly, materialized. However, what Bishop Alexopoulos had not anticipated, was the new waves of immigration from Greece after World War II which kept the language alive. This debate over which marker of the Greek identity should be emphasized, especially the question of whether they should sacrifice the language in order to save the Church, divided the Greek-American community a number of times during the twentieth century and continues to be a subtle — and sometimes not so subtle — issue even today.\footnote{118}

The third generation, emerging in the 1950s, turned strongly towards Orthodoxy as its primary ethnic identity to the detriment of the Greek language or other ethno-national symbols, as Greek started to be equated with Greek-Orthodox (Scourby 1980) and the connection to Greece started to fade.\footnote{119} This was a generation that felt American and had cultural connections to both the Greek and the American culture. This turn towards religiosity in lieu of other ethnic markers was wide-spread across ethnic communities in America and became a way of identification with American society.

Belonging to a religious institution was not only a new way of determining one’s ethnicity, it was a legitimate way of being an American, because while one was

\footnote{118} The fault line along which this conflict is usually observed is between the first generation of Greek-Americans, who speak Greek as their native language — and part of the second who speak well enough — and the third generation and onwards, who speak little or no Greek. However, there are also first generation immigrants who do not consider the language important and they have not taught it to their children, as there are also third, fourth or, even, fifth generation Greek-Americans for whom language is important, who speak it well or study it and who want their kids to learn although their own parents and grandparents may not know the language.

\footnote{119} The interplay between Orthodoxy, the Greek language and other, primarily folkloric, aspects of Greek ethno-cultural identity is reminiscent of the evolution of Greek identity in the nineteenth century but in a reverse way.
expected to give up the “ways of the old world”, one was never expected to give up one’s religion. (Ibid., 45).

Internal long-term tensions within the Church started to lead to changes in the cultural direction of the Church starting in 1950. Regardless of A.H.E.P.A.’s great success and influence as the first major Greek-American organization to use English as its official language, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese continued to support the use of Greek as its official language until late into the twentieth century. In 1950 English was finally introduced in religious education. \(^{120}\) This was a conscious decision that express the fact that reality led to the need to sacrifice the language in order to preserve the faith.

Orthodox religious education aimed at disseminating the Orthodox faith and Orthodox culture to young Greek-Americans. It was the second educational concern of the Greek Archdiocese and the community, following the concern for Greek education. Historically, Sunday Schools were created after Greek schools had been in operation for some time, when the need for catechism and religious education of the youth became apparent (Papaionannou 1985). However, gradually, religious education became more expanded than Greek education.

On the one hand, this expansion reflected the shift of a significant part of the community away from the language and towards the faith, and, on the other, it further cultivated this shift. Religious education eventually seemed more important in the lives of the Greek-Americans

\(^{120}\) Legendary but somewhat controversial Archbishop Athenagoras, serving in the 1930s and 1940s, was fiercely against the use of English in religious instruction. Instead, he turned Sunday School effectively into another form of Greek School (Papaioannou 1985). As Fr. George Papaioannou states in his monumental account of Greek-American history, “In Athenagoras' judgment, it was Hellenism that would save both Orthodoxy and national consciousness” (Ibid., 383). However, the use of Greek in religious education according to a Greek-American religious educator “…worked the other way around: the great difficulties in teaching the Greek language started to destroy the children's interest in religious instruction. A few children who knew Greek understood the religious lessons, but the lessons were 'Greek' to the rest of them” (Ibid.).
and the Church, since it addressed challenges that the Greek-American youth faced in their everyday life. Although not without problems or facing criticism, the Religious Education Department of the Archdiocese has created an elaborate program — in terms of material, educational programs, events, etc. — of religious education that cover students from pre-school through young adulthood, compared to Greek Schools that only serve pre-K to 6th grade.121

After the 1950’s, the Church continued to be dominant while the Greek language and Greek school attendance continued to wane in subsequent decades, while exogamous marriages became more frequent (Scourby 1980). The community had become rooted in America. Nevertheless, it preserved a strong distinct ethnic identity centered on the Church (Ibid.). An interesting trend was that subsequent generations were more favorable towards the Church compared to the first generation (Ibid.).

The Greek identity of the last large wave of immigrants, after 1965, is strongly rooted both in Greek nationality and the Church, which they see predominantly as a Greek ethnic Church and as the focal point of their community — similarly to the earlier immigrants (Scourby 1980). These late first generation Greek-Americans still lead many of the community institutions, forming them according to their understanding of Greek-American identity: as an ethno-national identity that is an extension of the twentieth century Greek identity dominant in Greece. This generation, “…view[s] the introduction of English in the Church as part of a conspiracy to “de-hellenize” it (Ibid., 51), especially since after 1970, English was introduced in church services — on a need-to basis.

121 See the web-sites of the Religious Education Department and the Greek Education Department in the official site of the Archdiocese for a description of the work of each department. They can be found at http://www.goarch.org/archdiocese/departments/religiouSed (Department of Religious Education) and http://www.goarch.org/archdiocese/departments/greekeducation/ (Department of Greek Education) [accessed on 2/18/2015]
The Greek-Americans whose identity centers almost exclusively on the Church usually
join parishes that are more “Americanized” — dropping the Greek language and not celebrating
Greek national holidays — or they may even attend parishes that do not belong to the Greek
Archdiocese.\(^\text{122}\) They are also the ones who are not fond of or are opposed to Greek Schools in
the parishes. For them, Greek identity has evolved into a Greek Orthodox identity that is
associated only with the English language, whereas other Greek cultural aspects, such as the
importance of family and community or even a vague connection to a glorious ancient past
may still be present.

The Church today follows two apparently opposing trends at the same time. On the one
hand, it moves towards “Americanization” in order to address the needs of the American-born
and of converts, stressing the spiritual over the ethnic or national. On the other hand, it
preserves its ethno-national character by leading the community in political advocacy on behalf
of Greek foreign policy issues. As the primary institutional representative of the Greek people,
it continues to celebrate Greek national celebrations, to be the primary institution for the
teaching of the Greek language to the youth and to promote Greek culture; all of these to the
dislike of American Orthodox converts who cannot understand why religion and nationality
have to be one and the same.

An important factor for the continuation of the ethnically Greek character of the Church
is that the Church’s leadership, its archbishops from the 1920s to present time, have been born

\(^{122}\) They usually attend parishes that belong to the Antiochean Archdiocese. The Antiochean
churches tend to be less ethno-national compared to other Orthodox churches in America —
for example, the Russian or the Serbian ones — mostly because they represent Christian
communities within Muslim countries, especially Lebanon and Syria, rather than Orthodox
nation-states. Most of them have also replaced the Arab language with English. Hence, they
tend to attract Orthodox that would be most accurately described by the term “American
Orthodox” without strong national affiliations, among them many Greek-Orthodox of Greek
origin.
outside of the United States, and were native Greek speakers with a strong love for the Greek language, a strong bond with Greece and an interest in Greek affairs. As the American-born take over these positions, the cultural direction of the Church may be affected and may be less involved in Greek culture and, especially, in Greek political issues (Mihopoulos 2014).

Preserving the Greek identity — whether this is centered on the Church, the language, the culture, the community or on values — is not an easy task for Greek-Americans since American identity takes over through schooling and social activities (Vidalis 2014). The Church plays a central role in preserving not only a religious but a holistic Greek identity, including a sense of community and belonging (Ibid.). The centrality of the Church in Greek-American life and identity had and continues to have another dimension beyond the religious/cultural one. The Church has been the organization that helped Greeks stand on their feet in the new country, that taught them, that celebrated with them, that surrounded their passing. The Church took over the social problems facing Greek-American kids and tried to address them through religious youth programs such as GOYA and summer camps (Ibid.).

A smaller group within the community is the one that is not affiliated at all with the Church for ideological, religious or other reasons. They rally around a secular view of Greek identity where language and culture are important but without the centrality of the Church. That part of the community tends to be first generation and, usually, highly educated holding top positions in academia and in the business and professional world.

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123 Archbishop Alexandros serving in the 1920s was born in Halkidona, Turkey, Archbishop Athenagoras serving until 1948 was born in the Ioannina region in Greece, Archbishop Michael serving in the 1950s was born in Thrace, Greece, and Archbishop Iakovos serving 1959-1996 was born in Imvros, Turkey (Papaioannou 1985). Archbishop Spyridon serving in the late 1990s was born in Ohio but spent part of his childhood in Greece and he lived outside of America until his enthronement as Archbishop (“Biographical Profile”). The current Archbishop Demetrios was born in Thessaloniki (“Official Biography”).
Greek culture — beyond its religious and linguistic dimensions — is another important aspect of Greek-American identity. The way it is understood is partly through the preservation of customs, partly through popular artistic expressions — folk and contemporary music and dance — partly through food, and partly through a system of values. Greek-American culture includes certain values that are considered to be part of their Greek heritage: industriousness, responsibility, honor, philotimo, leadership, community, faith and others. Pride in Greek history and in the achievements of ancient Greek civilization is also wide-spread among Greek Americans and is a central part of their pride in Greek identity.

Greek-American festivals, the most common Greek-American large scale cultural events showcasing Greek food and folklore, may have now become the primary fundraising activity of the Greek churches but they were originally organized as reproductions of traditional communal celebrations in Greek towns, usually on a patron saint’s feast day, during which the central square of the town would turn into a marketplace and performing area (Monos 1996). The connection to contemporary Greek culture is the outcome of a number of factors.

First, the communications revolution, primarily the internet, skype, web-TV and social media, have connected even fourth or fifth generation Greek-Americans to the contemporary production of Greek culture — or, at least have provided them access to it. Second, satellite television and newer services that offer connection to Greek TV in Greek-American homes through internet connections, have had a tremendous impact creating a sense of cultural (re)connection of Greek-Americans to Greece. Third, frequent travel of Greek-Americans in Greece as well as travel of Greek celebrities (politicians, singers, etc.) to the US, has reinforced this connection. Fourth, the cultivation, partly with the help of the above mentioned factors, of an evolving contemporary Greek culture through cultural and social events based in the US has also contributed. Last, a factor that is important by itself but which also reinforces all of the
above is the new arrivals of Greece from Greece either to study, or for professional reasons or to immigrate, especially in the context of the current crisis. Often, they originally come to study and they stay on at a professional capacity, academic or otherwise.

The phenomenon of an identity spectrum is not only present in the Greek-American community. It also exists in the rest of the Greek diaspora as well as in Greece. The content of Greek identity has also shifted through time and space during the previous centuries. In the context of a homeland-diaspora relationship, what is important is the existence of common cultural axes, points of convergence between the Helladic notion of Greek identity and the Greek-American notion.¹²⁴

Referring to Greek-Americans as “less” Greek does not really make sense since there is no accurate “measure” of Greekness; what does exist, though, are different versions of Greekness. As noted earlier, Greekness is, for many Greek-Americans, a way of being, of feeling, of belonging irrespective of any cultural markers. Both the Greek identity and the Greek-American identity may share equal emotional strength, even if they hold on to different cultural attributes or they develop in different social settings.

It is this emotional strength that renders all forms of Greek identity significant, rather than their specific content or the external preservation of one cultural characteristic versus the other — even if these characteristics are as central as the Greek language and the Greek Orthodox faith. The changes that Greek identity has undergone in the United States mean that this identity is alive and adapting — in its diasporic, ethnic, ethno-national, ethno-cultural, or ethno-religious form — rather being “dead” and, therefore, “preserved.” The challenge for the Greek state, and for Hellenism in general, is to identify and work on the basis of the common

¹²⁴ ‘Helladic’ (Elladikos) refers to the notion of Greek identity and culture associated with the territorial area of modern Greece. This can often be used in opposition to ‘Elllinikos,’ which means Greek, which can include all expressions of Greekness across space and time.
elements, the areas of unity with the Greek-Americans rather than to center on the areas of
disunity.

From a historical point of view, the diasporic identity can be considered a part of the
evolution of Greek identity along different evolutionary paths; it is also an extension of what
we could call mainstream Greek identity. Some Greeks of Greece see these Greek-Americans
as truer Greeks in spirit, even if they do not speak the language, while for others they are not
Greek because, to them, being Greek means that you have to share in Helladic culture and
society and to fit what is perceived to be a single mold of Greekness, the “real” version of
Greek identity. They cannot easily accept that there can be different versions of Greekness,
which may not be the same as the sense of Greekness that Greeks in Greece have.

Eleni Vidalis (2014), leader of the Greek-American community in Boston, counters this
view that sees Greek-Americans are less authentic Greeks. She argues that diaspora Greeks are
even more Greek because for them identity “is emotional, it lies in the heart.” They express
their Greekness by fighting for Greece’s rights and not blaming Greece without doing
something (Ibid.). “Greek-Americans are more Greek” since they fund and run their own
programs to preserve their identity, including sustaining their churches, their Greek schools,
and their Greek parades while they work with American politicians “to promote Greece, not
for personal gains” (Ibid.). This exclusive notion of Greek identity where diaspora Greeks are
not accepted as Greeks is the outcome of the territorial conceptualization of Greek identity as
connected exclusively to modern Greece. The world of ethno-national states offers space only
to ethno-national identities, not diasporic ones as legitimate forms of identification.

An important feature of Greek identity in Greece as well as in the diaspora is
regionalism. Numerous Greek-American organizations were created based on the place of
origin of the new immigrants. These organizations are still active, some more than others,
testifying to the fact that regional and local identities are still strong among Greek-Americans. Relations among regional organizations and their membership are very “brotherly” since members of one organization may also be members of another due their family’s origin for different places in Greece.

Cooperation across organizations has been wide-spread throughout Greek-American history. Occasionally, there may be some tension between regional organizations. Since there is no inherent conflict among the Greek regions, such tensions, generally infrequent, tend reflect differences in priorities regarding customs and symbols that are more important to one region compared to the other or competition for access to the same community resources.

The Greek-American identity carries with it not only the Greek culture and experience but also that of America and that of immigration and diaspora. The diasporic experience and all its complexity are unknown to most Greeks of Greece. This different, diasporic experience includes the *xenitia*, the dual identity, the sense of being part of a small minority, and not that of a dominant Greek majority.\textsuperscript{125} Both negative and positive experiences come with being part of the diaspora.

The reason why Greek-American identity and culture may not be seen as Greek by the Greeks of Greece is, on the one hand, that they have been obviously impacted by cultural influences from the surrounding American culture, therefore leading to a cultural fusion and hybridity. On the other hand, they are connected to the culture of Greece through the filter of time: the Greek-American culture that is experienced today refers to a significant extent to the culture dominant in Greece during the time of each family's departure for the United States.

\textsuperscript{125} ‘Xenitia’ refers to the experience of living in a foreign land. It carries a lot of emotional weight and it has been the theme of several popular contemporary and traditional songs, since immigration and xenitia (or xenitemos) have been quite prominent in modern Greek history.
Thus, the cultural difference is partly due to a temporal as well as geographic distance from Greece. As a result, the Greek-American culture is a characteristic diasporic culture.

The earlier historical survey of the evolution of Greek national identity can also shed light to the phenomenon of Greek-American identity. The first large wave of immigration was during the period 1880-1920. This was the time of Greek romanticism and irredentism. This condition influenced the Greek identity that the new immigrants exported to America. However, many of the Greek immigrants during this period came from Ottoman lands and may or may not have been influenced by Greek romanticism. Although they came to this country in large numbers, the culturally intolerant and assimilationist attitudes of the American society at that time led them to either create cohesive communities or merge within the greater society — or, in a way, do both.

The next large wave, post-World War II, partly mixed and partly stayed separate from the previous generations of immigrants and their descendants. They were bringing with them a solidified Greek national identity that was the outcome of ideological conflicts affecting Greece since the interwar. The identity that was formulated at the time and reproduced through Greek national institutions was characterized by rigidity, homogeneity and parochialism and was limiting the scope of Greekness to the Greek territory. This was the identity that was brought to the United States and that influenced Greek-American institutions from that point onwards. Greek national symbols became central in Greek-American life, increasing the gap between the newcomers and second and third generation Greek-Americans who started to disassociate from a national conceptualization of their Greek-American identity. Such symbols were primarily Greek folkloric expressions: traditional dances, costumes and music.

The aesthetic of Greek-American institutions, under this strong ethno-national influence, acquired a touristic quality in addition to its folkloric character. Decoration of Greek-
American institutions at the time and until today, in some cases, centered around Greek National Tourism’s posters of Greece and replicas of mixed historical Greek symbols: the primary emphasis was on the two historical periods that are central in Greek national ideology: ancient Greece and the War of Independence, known as the Revolution of 1821. Therefore, replicas of ancient Greek columns or statues were placed next to portraits of the heroes of the War of Independence or decorative tsolias dolls.\footnote{Traditional eighteenth - nineteenth century male costume from the Greek mainland.} The symbolism of the Church covered the Byzantine period, so the historical narrative was complete: within the parish buildings, one could get glimpses into the three major historical periods of Greek history; the Byzantine was the most “authentic” since the Byzantine culture of the Church was still “alive.”

The dominance of particular cultural symbols not only shaped the content of Greek-American identity but it also led to a uniformity within and across the communities following a national prototype. For example, Greek school boys wore predominantly one particular form of traditional costume, the standardized costume of the tsolia featuring a foustanella, in school commemorations of Greek Independence while the girls wore predominantly another specific traditional costume, the standardized costume of Amalia, the first queen of liberated Greece.\footnote{A male skirt that was part of the tsolias costume.} The commemoration culminated in the recitation of poems for the anniversary of Greek Independence.

This format of school celebrations is still in use and is the same that has been used in schools in Greece since the beginning of the twentieth century. Although other costumes are also worn, these ones are dominant, homogenizing the historical memory and the historical aesthetics across the communities. This condition of ethno-national homogeneity is encountered today across most Greek-American communities, organizations and educational
institutions — and, of course, it is still dominant in Greece. Nevertheless, these symbols evoke strong emotions and pride among Greek-Americans, despite their artificial homogeneity or selective use in the context of Greek national ideology.

The Greek-American community is both introvert and extrovert when it comes to the dissemination of Greek culture. Cultural events organized by different organizations are sometimes publicized publicly, addressing a greater American audience. However, most often they are addressing only the community, especially if it is an event in the Greek language, or because either there is the assumption that the non-Greek audience is not interested or because it is a low budget event that is best kept within the community whose emotional connection to the cultural content of the event trumps its concern for its non-professional organization. These events are often characterized both by familiarity and by parochialism. Thus, the Greek language, faith and national symbols dominated primarily the introvert dimension of the community, with the exception of Greek parades which are full of national symbols — no one outside of it would anyway either understand them or realize their significance.

Greek culture has been disseminated by the Greek-American community to the greater American society primarily through Greek festivals organized by the parishes, featuring Greek cuisine, Greek music and dance. The community has also established numerous cultural organizations and has organized cultural events, reflecting both low and, occasionally, high Greek culture. These events have showcased primarily traditional and contemporary Greek music and dance, and, occasionally, ancient Greek and Byzantine Art, and modern Greek cinema.

Literary activities usually happen within Greek-American academic circles, including the small community of Modern Greek Studies students and specialists, and do not normally extend to the community. Although Greek-American culture may not usually carry elements
of Greek high culture, the cultural expressions of Greek-Americans, primarily folkloric in character, carry strong emotions and a strong sense of pride. Nevertheless, we should stress that Greek culture is not exhausted in folklore or national historical symbols but has a much greater depth and breadth than what is normally expressed through the activities of community institutions.

Through ethnic mixing which is predominant in Greek-American family and social life, Greek-American identity starts to face other inherent challenges as well. An exogamous tendency became significantly more pronounced as we went from first to third generation Greek-Americans (Scourby 1980: 48). Now the Greek-American is also the ‘Other’ of modern Greek history. He is the son / she is the granddaughter / he is the great-grandson of not only Greeks but also “Americans,” with whatever cultural or other significance this identification may carry, Irish, French, English, Italian, Lebanese, Russian — or, to make the situation even more complex, Turks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Slavs, Jews. If the Greek-American identity is not stretched to allow space for Greek-Americans of a mixed ethnic background, it will eventually break.

If the institutions do not adjust to this reality and preserve an exclusivist, rigid, limited and parochial Greek character, they will shrink and, eventually, even die. The intermixing with other cultures can disseminate Greek culture not only among the progeny of the Greek-Americans but across a much wider audience which has now become part of the Greek family through intermarriage. However, for those who stress the homogeneity and “purity” of Greek culture and Greek people, intermarriage amounts to an ethnic tragedy.

Greek-American identity has started a cultural trajectory of its own while still being connected to the cultural body of Greece. Studying Greek-Americans from the point of view of Greek history, we should probably refer to them as ‘American Greeks’ rather than Greek-
Americans, which stresses the American dimension of the diaspora. This identity differs from referring to them as the Greeks of America, an identification that implies that they share the same characteristics and cultural realities as the Greeks of Greece but they just live in a different land.

The term ‘American Greek’ recognizes the fundamental cultural change at the level of identity as well as regarding the outward cultural expressions of Greeks who emigrated to America and their descendants. The term ‘Greek American’ places them in the context of a Greek phenomenon (diaspora), which is part of Greek history, rather than an American one (immigration) which places them in the context of American history. If the diasporic identity is seen through the perspective of continuity and discontinuity in Greek history, the emergence of the ‘American Greek,’ in all different identity formulations, is a piece of the history of Greek identity and culture rather than an external part to the Greek realm and reality — so the Greek-American or ‘American Greek’ is an integral part of Hellenism.

**Greek-American Perceptions of the Greek State**

The Greek-American community preserves its independence from the Greek state, while cooperating with it and preserving strong bonds with the homeland. It also preserves its pluralism in understanding and, partly, redefining the content of Greek culture and identity. The Greek identity that is projected by the Greek state is one that is centered primarily in the geographic area that comprises the Greek territory. However, *Hellenism* and *Hellenicity* have historically been broader concepts, not limited by the current geographic borders. The state
considers the Greek-America community a crucial part of Hellenism, at least in rhetoric, while its relationship with the diaspora forces it to broaden its understanding of Greek identity.\textsuperscript{128}

The Greek diaspora acknowledges and accepts the Greek state as the depository and protector of Greek culture, Greek identity and Greek people worldwide. This is illustrated both by the interaction and cooperation between Greek-American institutions and the Greek state and by the role of Greece, and by extension of the Greek state, in the Greek-American imaginary.\textsuperscript{129} As HALC’s survey and the video “What it means to be Greek” show, the connection of Greek-Americans to Greece is full of nostalgia and emotion. Greek-Americans are, generally, emotionally attached to Greece, have helped it in the past and want to help it as much as they can; their sense of duty to the Greek state was illustrated, for example, by the fact that many Greek-Americans enlisted in the Greek army to fight in the Balkan Wars (Mihopoulos 2014).\textsuperscript{130}

They tend to have a romantic view of contemporary Greece as the cradle of ancient Greek civilization. The Greek state is an extension of Greece; it is, in a way, Greece institutionalized. The fact that the Greek-Americans recognize the Greek state as the depository of Greek identity and culture is also implied in the Greek-American criticism that the Greek State is not doing enough to support their attempts to preserve the Greek identity and culture, especially through funding Greek education in the United States (Vidalis 2014). Therefore, it

\textsuperscript{128} The attitude of the Greek state towards the diaspora as reflected in its rhetoric, policies and institutions is discussed in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{129} The following chapters discuss this interaction and cooperation in various areas: education, economics, development, and foreign policy.

\textsuperscript{130} A discussion of past and present Greek-American assistance to Greece and the will of Greek-Americans to help even more is included in Chapter 6.
is implied that the state has the unique role and responsibility to nurture Greek identity and culture around the world.

The bonds between Greece and Greek-Americans are felt as kinship bonds. When Greece is in trouble, they see it as their poor mother or grandmother (Mihopoulos 2014). They may feel a duty to help but they may also blame “her” for the trouble she is in, if there is some form of Greek responsibility involved in the problem.\footnote{This was a fairly common attitude among Greek-Americans with respect to the current crisis Greece is facing. They blamed Greek irresponsibility, mismanagement, extravagant spending and corruption for the crisis. This attitude is discussed in Chapter 6.} However, in times of trouble, they put the blame on the shoulders of the state and its representatives, distinguishing them from the notion of Greece, which remains as illustrious as ever.

Echoing the kinship dynamic, Eleni Vidalis (2014), a leader of the Greek-American community of Boston, uses a family-based metaphor to criticize the imbalance between the Greek state’s demands on the Greek-Americans and the low level of Greek state support extended to them: “it is as if one child does all the work and the other gives orders.” These views illustrate the familial dynamics in the relationship between Greek-Americans and the Greek state.

The Greek-American community has cooperated with the Greek state in a number of issues for more than one hundred years. Nevertheless, deeper cooperation and a sense of trust is missing from the relationship (Mihopoulos 2014). Leaders of the community argue that the relationship is not what it should be, that the Greek state does not show adequate respect to them, remembers them only when it needs them — “otherwise we are not important” — and does not realize the struggles that they are faced with in as Greeks of the diaspora (Vidalis 2014).
The Greek public sector’s pathologies and its bureaucracy are not only a source of concern for the Greek-Americans but are also hampering the diaspora-homeland relationship (Vidalis 2014). Thus, the Greek-Americans recognize the Greek state as their cultural metropolis but they dislike its problematic structures, processes, attitudes and mentalities. They do want a relationship with the Greek state and they recognize it as a partner; what they criticize are the inadequacies of the Greek state in fulfilling its role as the protector of Greek culture and Hellenism world-wide. Therefore, they are putting emphasis on what the role of the Greek state should be in their life: supportive, respectful and cooperative (Ibid.).

Regardless of past efforts both by the American polity and society and by forces within the Greek-American community to assimilate, Greeks, as well as other ethnic communities, created their own niche in American society and have become its permanent feature. We could possibly argue that the US is more of a mosaic and less of a melting pot, or, alternatively, that it is a place where mosaic structures and melting pot dynamics co-exist. This is how Greek identity and communities stayed alive in more than one hundred years. In the context of a civic nation, there is more room for a different ethnic identity compared to an ethnic nation. Therefore, in the case of the United States, the Greek-Americans, despite assimilation pressures of the past, comfortably find their space in the American mainstream and are proud to hold a triple identity: partly Greek, partly American and wholly Greek-American.
I. Diaspora Policy and Rhetoric

The Greek state has codified its role as the protector of world-wide Hellenism in the current constitution. The State actively cares for the life of Greeks abroad and for the preservation of its bonds with the Motherland. It also actively cares for the education and the social and professional promotion of the Greeks who work outside of the Greek territory” (Syntagma tis Elladas 2007: 98).

132 The current constitution was adopted in 1975, following the restoration of democracy after the fall of the military junta. It has been revised three times: in 1981, 1986 and 2001.

133 The Greek word used in the original text is ‘apodimoi.’ In its translation, I follow the official translation of ‘apodimoi’ in Greek state institutions, where it is translated as ‘Greeks Abroad.’ Although the Greek term literally means the emigrants, those who have left Greece, the term is used in practice in a broader sense to mean the Greek diaspora. Diaspora policies of the Greek state target the whole diaspora — Greeks and foreign citizens of Greek origin who live abroad — including those who emigrated, those who are the descendants of those who emigrated and those who live in areas that are historic homelands of Greeks but which never belonged to the modern Greek state.

Although the constitutional prescriptions refer to ‘apodimoi,’ leading scholars to argue that the state limits its responsibilities only to the emigrants (Papastylianos 2013: 50), I, nevertheless, argue that it practically has the meaning of ‘diaspora’ since the word ‘apodimoi’ has been used almost interchangeably with the words ‘omogeneis’ (co-ethnics or of the same genos) and ‘diaspora’ (diaspora) in official and popular terminology. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad refers to itself as the primary institution of diaspora policy (see discussion later in this chapter), although its Greek title it includes the words ‘apodimou ellhnismou,’ meaning ‘emigrant Hellenism.’ When it comes to policies for the diaspora, including education policy and other attempts to preserve bonds with the homeland, there is no distinction between first and second generation diasporans. All diaspora policies target all diaspora Greeks, except for the ones that refer specifically to Greek citizens. However, acquisition of Greek citizenship is currently wide-spread among subsequent generations of diasporans, and, consequently, it is not a distinguishing characteristic of only the first diasporan generation.
The care for the diaspora that is reflected in the constitutional prescriptions echoes once more the kinship terms that are often used to describe the relationship between state and diaspora: “Hellenism is conceptualized as an extended family, whose members enjoy the state’s care in different degrees depending on the category to which they belong” (Papastylianos 2013: 50). This constitutional demand not only expands the realm of national action beyond Greek borders but it also holds the state accountable if it fails in its mission to care for the diaspora and to promote its bonds with the homeland. Although this is the current constitutional framework, in the previous century — and in the absence of any relevant constitutional prescriptions — the state’s interpretation of its relationship with the diaspora, in particular with the Greek-American community, changed a number of times as the interests of the Greek state changed, the social status of Greek-Americans rose, and the global power of the United States increased.

The Historical Evolution of Diaspora Policy and Rhetoric

The first waves of massive Greek immigration to the United States began at the end of the nineteenth century, when Greece was still in the process of nation- and state-building. Immigration was the result of deep economic crisis, political instability and insecurity that were due to numerous reasons ranging, from agricultural disasters to continuous military conflicts for the expansion of the Greek state. For the Greek governments at the time, immigration was not a concern. On the contrary, it helped ease some of the social pressures on the state. The state soon started to realize that a Greek diaspora in the United States could offer additional benefits, i.e. remittances, political support (Papadopoulos 2013). There was also the belief that they could be helpful agents of modernization upon their return back home (Ibid., 220).
After the turn of the century, immigration was met with concern. The state started worrying about the massive loss of population and a new phenomenon: the threat of assimilation and of the loss of Greek identity (Papadopoulos 2013: 220-221). Nevertheless, the Greek-American community was still in the shadow of the Greek state: the Greek-American newspaper *Atlantis* criticized the Greek government for not protecting the immigrants from the life-threatening dangers in their new land (Papaioanou 1985). This was the time when the Greek state started getting actively involved in the affairs of the Greek-American community.

The Greek government saw a great opportunity to “nationalize” the Greek-speaking and other Orthodox immigrants from the Ottoman Empire in the United States (Papadopoulos 2013: 221-222). Hence, the nation-building processes at home were also exported to the diaspora. The Greek Ottoman immigrants still recognized as their national center Constantinople and the Ecumenical Patriarchate rather than Athens and Greek state institutions, while local identities trumped an overarching Greek national identity among Greek and Ottoman citizens alike (Ibid., 222).

Given what was at stake on the Eastern horizon at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, allegiance to the national centre in Athens was presented to the Greeks of the diaspora as their principal duty. Thus, even outside its borders, the Greek state was able to subjugate the communities by

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134 A Greek diplomat stationed in the United States in the beginning of the twentieth century gave a poignant description of the difficult circumstances that the immigrants were facing becoming victimized by employers and “employment-mediators,” while preserving the nostalgic memory of their homeland and their strong national conscience (Papadopoulos 2013: 221).

135 Conflicts between immigrants from two different neighboring areas of liberated Greece, Arkadia and Laconia, led to the creation of two different churches while tension between Ottoman Greeks and Greek citizens was quite apparent, especially during certain times (Papadopoulos 2013: 222-2).
once again doing away with community independence. (Prévélakis 2000: 177; italics in the original text)

The Greek government, in order to promote a homogeneous Greek national identity, became actively involved in the Community through the creation of the Panhellenic Union, a Greek-American organization that aimed at uniting all Greeks regardless of specific origin (Papadopoulos 2013: 223).

The government’s goals were: countering localism, “Hellenizing” the non-Greek speaking Orthodox Ottomans, preventing assimilation, getting financial support through member contributions to the Panhellenic Union, and getting political support for its foreign policy goals; all of these benefits were the expected outcomes of the government’s control over the community and its organizations (Papadopoulos 2013: 223).\(^\text{136}\) This approach reflects a view that expects the Greek diaspora to be dependent on the national center.

Athens represented a dendritic system of organization and, for that reason opposed any other non-dependent centre of Hellenism. […] For the Greek state […] there were neither any diaspora communities nor any Ottoman Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, but terrae irredentae and brothers to liberate. (Prévélakis 2000: 177)

The Panhellenic Union was put under the control of the Greek government, especially following changes in its charter in 1908 under the influence of Greek Diplomat Lambros Koromilas (Papadopoulos 2013: 224). This was a time when Balkan nationalist aspirations

\(^{136}\) The government’s income through the Panhellenic Union partly supported its Macedonian Struggle military expenses (Papadopoulos 2013: 224). The Macedonian Struggle included a series of conflicts with other Balkan and Turkish troops and it was an attempt to counter Balkan nationalisms within the Ottoman Macedonian territory with the ultimate goal of the incorporation of Macedonia to Greece, a goal that was realized during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.
were been played out within the immigrant communities in the United States in an attempt to persuade both fellow immigrants and the American government to support specific national goals (Ibid.). Koromilas also masterminded a type of Greek-American financial support to the Greek economy in the form of a special contribution in exchange for improvement in the diplomatic services and protection of the immigrants from exploitation; half of the contribution would go to the “needs of the nation” and the other half to the care of the immigrants (Ibid., 225).

Leaders of the community and pre-existing organizations resisted both the Panhellenic Union and the control by Koromilas (Papadopoulos 2013: 225). The publisher of the popular newspaper Atlantis, Solon Vlastos, kept stressing the need for the immigrants to become integral parts of the American community and started differentiating between the interests of the Greek state and the interests of the Greek-American community, despite his continuing support for Greek foreign policy goals (Ibid., 226).

The Atlantis opposed the Panhellenic Union, whom Vlastos suggested should be an independent Greek-American organization, since the Union emphasized that the Greek-Americans should have as their “point of reference” the Greek State (Papadopoulos 2013: 225). Therefore, we note the emergence of a certain Greek-American attitude towards the Greek state: Greek-Americans were critical of the state’s attempt to control them, of the incompetence of state representatives, of the exploitation — primarily financial — of the community by the state, and of the lack of genuine state concern for their problems. However, although they fiercely wanted to preserve their independence, they still passionately supported the Greek state’s foreign policy goals and have kept promoting them for more than 100 years.

During the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the influence of the Greek government and the Panhellenic Union was still relatively strong within the community (Papadopoulos 2013: 227).
The goal of the cultivation of the Greek national feeling at the time was to enlist the Greek-Americans in the Greek army, an attempt that proved partly successful. Indeed, 45,000 out of the 200,000 Greeks who lived in the United States enlisted in the Greek army (Ibid.). The possibility of Greece’s participation in World War I led to a new disagreement between those who supported the rights of Greek-Americans and those who supported the interests of the Greek state with respect to whether or not Greek-Americans should enlist in the Greek army and whether, in the case they did not, they would be considered deserters; *Atlantis* alternatively suggested that they should join the American army if they wanted to fight (Ibid., 228).

The relatively high level of connection between the Greek state and the Greek-American community in the aftermath of World War I, led to the exportation of the deep political and social division plaguing Greece at the time to the already divided Greek-American community. The National Schism (*Ethnikos Dihasmos*) that occurred in Greece during 1910-1922 stemmed from the disagreements between the King and Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos regarding Greek foreign policy, which included the decision of whether or not Greece should enter in World War I and on which side. The Schism created a deep, bitter and long-lasting social division between supporters of the King, known as *royalists*, and supporters of Venizelos, known as *venizelists*.

This Schism was exported to the United States where it was felt so strongly that it threatened the very existence of the community as a unified social body. It also lasted long after it was resolved in Greece. However, according to Papadopoulos (2013: 228-229), it was not just the political disagreement that polarized Greek-Americans; to a great extent the National Schism was the new guise for the pre-existing division between those who supported the interests of the Greek state and those who supported the interests of the Greek-Americans seen as independent from the state.
Hence, for the most part, those who supported the Panhellenic Union, including the Greek-American newspaper *Ethnikos Kirix* (National Herald), also supported Venizelos, while those who supported the autonomy of the community, among them the newspaper *Atlantis*, supported the King (Papadopoulos 2013: 228-229). The former group also did not support the naturalization of Greeks as American citizens while the latter did support it. Although the Schism was deeply divisive, it (re)connected the community with political developments in the homeland; in a rather paradoxical way, it also “constitutes the beginning of political maturation” for the Greek-American community (Ibid., 229-230). Therefore, after World War I, Greek-Americans became solidified as an ethnic community, “which is part of the American nation” (Ibid.).

Within this new reality of a politically conscious ethnic Greek-American community, the Greek state attempted to adjust its strategy in order to take advantage of the political pressure that the Greek-Americans could apply as an ethnic group on the American government and on international organizations (Papadopoulos 2013: 230-231). However, the political divisions of the interwar period undermined the possibility for the Greek-American community to unite as a “pressure mechanism” in order to promote the Greek foreign policy goals (Ibid., 249).

While in official rhetoric the immigrants were considered an instrument of the foreign policy of Greece and the Greek governments and the diplomats were treating the Greek communities of America as an extension of the political division in Greece, the rival local leaderships took advantage of the conjuncture more in order to hurt their opponents rather than to project the Greek positions, as Greece was aiming. (Ibid.)
The Greek embassy supported the creation of organizations representing the Greeks from Greek homelands that had not yet been incorporated in the Greek State and which remained among its irredentist goals (Ibid., 230). They were expected to voice their wish for their homelands to be united with Greece (Ibid.). However, despite the submission of a memo by these organizations to the Council of Peace in 1919 in support of Greek irredentist claims, attempts to coordinate the advocacy action of the unredeemed Greeks was not successful, mainly because personal and political conflicts led to the dissolution of many of these organizations (Ibid., 231).

The promotion of Greek foreign policy goals in the United States was primarily undertaken by the National Panepirotic Union, created in 1918 to counter the claims of the Albanian organization *Vatra* (meaning Hearth) and to promote the Greek claims regarding Northern Epirus (Papadopoulos 2013: 231). Panepirotic was the main pressure mechanism for the other Greek irredentist claims as well (Ibid.), framing them within the normative framework of self-determination.

Post-World War I, the Greek-Americans felt that they had a better chance of supporting their goals through the republican presidential nominee and his isolationist policy rather than through President Wilson, in defiance of Venizelos suggestions (Papadopoulos 2013: 232-233). This was another point of early divergence between the state’s policy and Greek-American attitudes and actions. However, President Harding was eventually not supportive of Greece due to international circumstances and domestic political developments in Greece (Ibid., 233).

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137 Northern Epirus was eventually ceded to Albania.
After Venizelos lost the elections of 1920, and as his supporters in the United States continued to cooperate with venizelists in Greece and in Constantinople (Istanbul), he visited the United States creating a wave of Greek-American and American popular support that worried the government in Athens (Papadopoulos 2013: 233). These developments shifted the stance of the Greek state towards the Greek-American community, since the Greek government became concerned about the influence the community could have on domestic politics in Greece through its support of Venizelos; so it considered the Greek-Americans “more as an anti-establishment force rather than an instrument of Greek foreign policy” (Ibid., 234). This concern led to the Greek embassy’s encouragement and support for the creation of a strong royalist organization to counter the influence of the venizelists (Ibid.).

In the aftermath of the Asia Minor disaster, the Schism finally ended and the Greek government shifted its attention to the role the Greek-Americans could play in pursuit of foreign policy goals (Papadopoulos 2013: 234). The first coordinated Greek-American advocacy action, through the creation of an early Greek “lobby,” was its successful lobbying in Congress in partnership with Armenian American organizations and some Protestant churches against the ratification of the American-Turkish treaty of Lausanne (Ibid.). The lobbying campaign took advantage of the influence that the massacres of Christian populations in Turkey had on the American public opinion (Ibid.).

After 1923 Greece supported the existing status quo in the Balkans but was still concerned about the rights of the Greeks community in Turkey (Papadopoulos 2013: 235). During the interwar, Greek diplomats joined forces with Greek-American organizations to support the Greek character of Macedonia in opposition to Bulgarian and other Slavic claims, and to support the rights of the Greeks in Turkey (Ibid.). These goals continue to be dominant.
in the Greek-American advocacy agenda today, in addition to the Cyprus issue which was raised later.

The Greek state also encouraged the support of the issue of Northern Epirus (Papadopoulos 2013: 235). However, this is also the period of probably the first instance of significant disagreement between the Greek state and the Greek-American community and of the inability of the state to control the advocacy organizations. The issues of Cyprus and the Dodecanese islands were raised by Greek-Americans who came from these places but their advocacy was not encouraged by the Greek state; it actually defied the state’s suggestion not to raise the issues, since the Greek government did not want to disturb its relations with Britain and Italy (Ibid.), the powers controlling Cyprus and the Dodecanese respectively.

The Panhellenic Union, still alive in the post-War years, changed its position and suggested that Greek-Americans become American citizens in order to be more effective in their influence with regards to Greek foreign policy issues; Greek success in the American society would improve the image of Greek-Americans, and as a result would increase American support for Greek causes (Papadopoulos 2013: 236). Nevertheless, the Greek state and the Panhellenic Union continued to consider the Greek-American community as a continuation of the Greek diaspora communities of the past and did not understand the internal transformations of the Greek-American community (Ibid., 236-237). The Americanization of Greek-Americans, the independent spirit of the community and internal problems in the Pan-Hellenic Union led to the final demise of the organization — and, therefore, to the end of the Greek state’s control over Greek-American affairs — at a time of increasing racism and xenophobia in the American society (Papadopoulos 2013).

Social conditions of the time led in 1922 to the creation of the major non-Church affiliated Greek-American community organization, the American Hellenic Progressive
Association (AHEPA). This organization aimed at proving that Greeks were no less “white” than the other Americans and that they could be successful and worthy members of the American society (Papadopoulos 2013: 238). The emergence of AHEPA partly signified the removal of the community from the sphere of influence of the Greek state, although the organization stressed both the Greek origin and Greek culture of its members and actively supported Greek foreign policy goals in the following decades.

In contrast to the popular form of Greek-American identity, AHEPA stressed the cultural connection to ancient Greece, almost completely disregarding aspects of modern Greek culture; they found in their ancient Greek connection a bridge to American identity and society (Ibid., 239). It soon gained a lot of respect within the Greek-American community and unprecedented respect for a Greek-American organization from the greater American community. It also gained respect in the eyes of the Greek state which had no choice but to recognize the newly formed Greek-American organizations, the AHEPA, the GAPA and, especially, the newly established Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, as the institutional representatives of the Greek-American community (Ibid., 240). Therefore, the Greek state changed its position and approached the community as a close partner. Since that time, the Greek-American community “had as its place of reference the United States and not Greece” (Ibid.).

The establishment of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America in 1922, was the major development that reinforced the community’s independence vis-à-vis the Greek state. The Greek state initially promoted the idea of the establishment of the Archdiocese, which it

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138 GAPA, Greek-American Progressive Association, was an organization that was created shortly after AHEPA to counter AHEPA’s interpretation of Greek identity. GAPA focused on the popular characteristics of neo-Hellenic identity, i.e. the Greek language and the Greek Orthodox Church, with which it was closely connected.
saw as a vehicle through which it could perpetuate its influence on the community after the American government created obstacles for the operation of community organizations under the control of foreign governments (Papadopoulos 2013). From a historical perspective, the centrality of the Church in the community marked a return to older forms of Hellenic organization: the Orthodox faith was the primary form of collective identification and the Ecumenical Patriarchate — not Athens — was the symbolic and administrative center of American Hellenism.

Correspondence of the time between diplomats and the Greek government testifies to the fact that the Greek state did not want an independent Archdiocese that would be beyond its control and that would not prioritize the needs of the Greek state over the needs of the Greek-American community (Papadopoulos 2013: 243-244). Despite Greek state opposition, “the Archdiocese was being transformed into a vehicle for the autonomy of the communities of America from the influence of the Greek state” (Ibid., 246). The establishment of the Archdiocese led to “the creation of a Greek-American symbolic center. This way, the foundations were in place for an American Orthodoxy independent of the influence of the Greek state” (Ibid.). Consequently,

The Archdiocese of America became one of the main vehicles for the creation of an American Hellenicity and not a central instrument for the control of the Greek communities by the Greek state (Ibid.).

A misconception on the part of the representatives of the Greek state was that the Greek-Americans were dependent on Greek state authorities, similarly to the Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire or in Egypt, while they also miscalculated the willingness of the Greek-Americans to be placed under the state’s control (Papadopoulos 2013: 248). The Greek-Americans were still willing — and they have been ever since — to contribute to fundraising
for Greece and they even voluntarily enlisted in the Greek army in the past; however, they were not willing to necessarily leave their jobs to join the Greek army or to give systematic contributions to the Greek state (Ibid.). The autonomy of the Archdiocese and its leadership of the community became gradually accepted by the Greek and the American states (Papadopoulos 2013). Following the Asia Minor Disaster in 1922, for the Greek state, the diaspora was primarily useful for its financial contribution to the Greek economy through the highly valuable remittances that they were sending to their families (Ventoura 2013: 325).

Since the 1930s the Greek government adopted another approach towards emigration, influenced by Malthusian concerns; it identified “excess population” in the Greek society (Ventoura 2013: 327). The influx of one million refugees in the aftermath of the Asia Minor Catastrophe, and the Greek bankruptcy that followed the economic crisis of 1929 were the contributing factors to what was perceived as excess population whose needs could not be addressed in the context of the Greek economy, society and state apparatus (Ibid.). In official correspondence among government officials at the time, the demographic problem is acknowledged as a top priority for the government (Ibid., 327-328). Thus, the Greek government was actively trying to identify possible emigration destinations in order to solve the pressing economic, social and political problems that were believed to be associated with the size of the population (Ibid., 327).

With the emergence of the first American born generations, the Greek state also started to be concerned about wide-spread assimilation in the Greek-American communities (Ventoura 2013: 332). This was a new phenomenon in the Greek diasporic experience since the traditional neo-Hellenic diasporic communities were considered to have a “civilizing” role in the countries where they resided which were primarily urban centers in the Eastern Mediterranean that had not modernized (Ventoura 2013). The Greek government identified a combination of factors
that led to the assimilation of Greek-Americans: the lack of education of the great majority of immigrants, most of whom were from rural areas, and the assimilationist pressures both from within the community — due to the appeal and practicality of identifying with the American culture and identity — and from the American state and society during a time of racism and xenophobia.

During the Metaxas regime, during the interwar period, the Greek state attempted to mobilize the Greek diaspora towards two goals: one was the legitimation of the dictatorial regime governing Greece at the time and the other was the Greek-American contribution to Greek economy and to Greek diplomatic efforts (Ventoura 2013: 333). Knowing that it could not control the Greek-Americans, the Greek government tried to create a partnership with the community in order to advance its goals. Metaxas sent a representative to the United States who would inform the diasporans about his regime’s work in Greece, to investigate what problems they were facing and to explore the possibility of contact between the Greek-American youth and *Ethniki Organosi Neon* (National Youth Organization), which was the regime’s youth branch (Ibid.).

Although the emergence of World War II did not allow the cooperation between the community and the Greek government to be realized, the observations of Metaxas’ representative were particularly insightful: he recognized the presence of a quaint and dual Greek-American identity and the value of the Americanization of Greek-Americans in their role as supporters of Greek state goals (Ventoura 2013: 333). He argued that “The Greek-American must become American 100%, without ceasing to be also Greek 100%” (Ibid.).

The inability of the pre-World War II governments to formulate a successful diaspora policy was attributed, according to Agis Tampakopoulos, the Justice Minister of Metaxas’ regime, to the mean-spirited Greek bureaucracy, the indifference of state officials and the lack
of dedicated diaspora institutions (Vogli 2013: 369). According to Tamvakopoulos, the state representatives undermined the Greek national interests by not giving adequate attention to the diaspora and to the role it could play to support Greece in a number of ways (Ibid., 369-370). This is an example of the discrepancy between state rhetoric and state action with respect to the diaspora, which is associated with the general lack of foresight in Greek foreign policy making (Ibid., 370).

Official memos of the government-in-exile during World War II, stressed the significant role that the Greek-American community can play in the promotion of Greek foreign policy goals and the need to approach the community carefully and to instrumentalize it (Ventoura 2013: 333-334). During the war and the German occupation of Greece, the Greek government continued to consider the Greek-Americans as “national capital” for Greek foreign policy goals, primarily irredentist ones (Ibid., 334). In order for the community to fulfill this role, it needed to feel a strong bond with Greece and a way to achieve this was through its infusion with new waves of Greek immigrants; the Greek government actively supported new waves of emigration during World War II and during the subsequent Greek civil war (Ibid.).

Greek-American organizational and political power became evident through their effective mobilization in support of occupied Greece, leading the Greek government to systematically ask for their help during the war (Ventoura 2013: 334-335). The community’s social and economic success, its significant humanitarian aid to Greece during the war, its mobilization for Greek causes and its potential role in the post-war reconstruction of the country strengthened the Greek government’s interest in Greek-Americans (Ventoura 2013: 335).

139 For example, in 1943 the Dodecanesean Council of the United States submitted its resolutions in favor of the union of the Dodecanese islands with Greece to the allies in cooperation with the Greek government-in-exile located in Cairo (Ventoura 2013: 334).
World War II created a new dynamic in the relationship between the “national center” and the “co-ethnics” in the United States. The Greek-Americans not only acted autonomously from the Greek politicians on issues that concerned their distant homeland, but they assumed the role of its ambassador and protector. (Ibid., 336)

The successful Greek-American humanitarian assistance to Greece during the war through the Greek War Relief Association, marked also the beginning of the community’s active involvement in the political and economic affairs of Greece, aided by their sense of empowerment and the realization that their position in American society was influenced by the image that Greece had in American eyes (Ibid.).

Upon the end of the war, the Greek-American leadership put together plans for the economic reconstruction of Greece and was very interested in the Greek social and political post-war developments (Ventoura 2013: 336). In 1945 the Greek government and irredentist organizations in Greece asked the Greek-Americans, primarily the Panepirotic Federation, for help regarding Greek claims in Northern Epirus (Ibid., 337). Greek-American organizations promoted the Greek goals ahead of the 1945 Peace Council and played the role of intermediary between the Greek and American state representatives in the 1946 Council of Foreign Ministers (Ibid.). This was the period of partnership and cooperation between the Greek state, its diplomatic representatives in the United States and Greek-American organizations. In 1947, Archbishop Athenagoras and the President of the Greek War Relief Association met with President Truman following communication with the Greek Embassy in order to ask for American assistance for Greece (Ibid., 337).

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140 The work in the original is ‘*omogeneis,*’ which can also be translated as ‘co-ethnics,’ of the same ‘*genos*’ (family origin) or ‘*diasporans.*’
In the context of the Cold War, which was inaugurated with the Greek civil war, the Greek state started to be even more attached to the Greek-American community, emphasizing the significance of the community and the need for the existence of strong bonds between the Greek-Americans and Greece (Ventoura 2013: 337). Hence, new plans were launched for empowering the connection of Greek-Americans with Greece, including strengthening Greek education with the creation of a respective committee in 1949, discussing the potential creation of a Council of Greeks Abroad in 1950, dedicating 1951 as Greek Home-coming Year, and introducing a bill for the establishment of a Higher Council of Diaspora Greeks (Ibid., 338).

Through the organization of the Home-Coming Year, Greece turned towards its diaspora, primarily the Greek-Americans, in order to: ask them to support Greek tourism, which was expected to be one of the areas that could contribute towards the economic development of the country; strengthen the diaspora’s bonds with the homeland; create in their minds the image of Greece as a modernized country; and acknowledge their success and contributions (Vogli 2013). The King of Greece talked about a new “Great Greek Idea,” referring to the diaspora, implying that a “Great Greece” beyond Greek borders would bring economic and diplomatic benefits to the country (Ibid., 363-364).

However, the Greek state was also interested in the potential of the Greek-Americans to pressure the United States to accept new waves of immigrants from Greece in the post-war

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141 The Prime Minister, in his announcement of Home-Coming Year, stated that “the imperative need for a closer contact with our emigrated brothers” was a major reason for its organization (cited in Vogli 2013: 352). The organization of Home-Coming Year was plagued by several problems due to administrative inefficiencies and poor planning; however, it included an impressive set of events which was never repeated and was soon forgotten in the context of Greek diaspora policy (Ibid.). Differences with respect to the state’s treatments of its diaspora communities in the context of the Home-Coming Year, made it obvious that the interests of the Greek state dictated that the Greek-Americans had priority over other diasporic communities (Ibid., 362).
period, since emigration was still seen as a way of solving domestic problems (Vogli 2013: 364-365). The Greek government’s plans for greater unity between the Greek-American community and Greece were not realized, primarily because of concerns about a possible American reaction to the mobilization of an ethnic community under the guidance of a foreign government, but also because of economic and administrative difficulties (Ventoura 2013: 338). Nevertheless, the Greek-American community acquired a central role in Greek state rhetoric and in the “collective imaginary of the ‘Outside Hellenism,’” taking the place of the formerly illustrious and powerful Greek community of Egypt (Ibid, 339-340). The goal of the state was not the return of Greek-Americans to Greece but rather their success in the United States and their continuous emotional connection to Greece, both of which were necessary prerequisites for their successful contribution to Greek domestic and foreign policy goals.

The 1960s marked an important period in the relationship between the Greek state and the Greek-American community. A new large wave of Greek immigrants had started to arrive in the United States in search of a better life, renewing the ranks of Greek-Americans and transmitting to the community contemporary Greek experiences and strong emotional bonds with Greece. This new group of Greek-Americans was more attached to the Greek state than the American born generations and was more committed to Greek domestic and foreign policy issues. In 1967, a military coup in Greece led to the establishment of a junta regime that would govern the country until 1974. The Junta tried to legitimize itself through its connection with the Greek-Americans, many of whom supported it and saw it as a necessary evil in order to prevent social chaos and the movement of Greece towards the Communist block. The regime cultivated a relationship with the Archdiocese which would provide the military government with the guise of legitimacy. At the same time, many Greek-Americans mobilized in the United States against the regime, advocating for the return of democracy to Greece.
The fall of the junta was eventually caused by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. This was a catalytic event for Greek-American mobilization. The Greek state turned again towards the Greek-Americans in order to get their support for Cyprus. The Greek-American leadership and the Greek government worked as partners in order to pursue important national goals. Had Greece and Cyprus not had an influential and committed Greek-American community to promote their goals, the limited successes of Greek foreign policy with respect to Cyprus and Turkey would probably not have happened.

Democracy was consolidated in Greece with the creation of the first-ever socialist government in 1981 under the leadership of a Greek-American academic, Andreas Papandreou. The 1980s created tension in the relationship between the Greek government and the Greek-American community when the socialist and anti-American rhetoric of Papandreou forced Greek-American organizations to differentiate their position from that of the Greek government and to work on improving Greek-American relations. With the end of the Cold War and the reawakened nationalist Balkan aspirations, especially the emergence of a former Yugoslav republic as the independent “Republic of Macedonia,” the Greek state turned again towards the Greek-Americans for support on the issue of the Macedonian name and joined efforts with them in a massive global mobilization campaign.

Today, the support of Greek-Americans is expected in a number of issues, ranging from the Greek economy and development — especially during the current crisis — to Cyprus and the Patriarchate. They are also seen as cultural ambassadors of Greece and as partners in Greece’s pursuit to improve its global image. The state recognizes its responsibility to diaspora education but its role in this field is rather ineffective and limited.
An Explanatory Note

Based on the history of the relationship between Greece and the Greek-American community, we can support the hypothesis that the Greek state aims at certain benefits that it can get from the diaspora and it is for this reason that it wants to keep the bonds with it alive. This state behavior falls within Waterbury’s (2010) explanatory framework, according to which homeland states build a relationship with their diaspora in anticipation of material or symbolic benefits from it (Ibid., 6-9). The state interacts with the diaspora along a series of axes (educational, cultural, political) that are the primary foci of its dedicated diaspora programs and institutions.

The benefits that it has aimed for since the end of World War I are economic and political: the former, primarily in the form of remittances and investments, the latter primarily in the form of support for Greek foreign policy goals. Other benefits may include the transfer of knowledge from the Greek-American community to the homeland regarding development and modernization of the public sector, or assistance in the (re)branding of Greece internationally. The state has also historically turned towards the diaspora at times of crisis and when it feels threatened (Papasotiriou 2000: 152).

However, the instrumentalist explanatory theory leaves two questions unanswered. Is the expectation of benefits the only reason that the state engages in the preservation of bonds between homeland and diaspora? And, why does the diaspora participate willingly in a

\[142\] In order to answer this question, further research would require a comparative study within the framework of diaspora rhetoric and actions, in the context of which the state’s behavior towards diaspora communities that are considered powerful and beneficial to it, like the Greek-American community, would be compared with its attitude towards diaspora communities that are not powerful or particularly beneficial.
relationship with the homeland state and contribute to it through any means it has at its possession, often counter to rational choice principles?


The danger for the future of the diaspora does not come directly from the policies of the Greek State itself, but rather from profound forces related to the nation-building process. For almost two centuries the Greek State tried to eradicate the diasporic dimensions from Greek culture, the basic substances permitting Greeks to create Diasporas. The whole logic of territorial nationalism, the foundation of the modern Nation State, goes against the diasporic ethos. (Ibid., 8-9)

This conflictual dimension has also influenced the dynamics of the relationship between the Greek-American community and the Greek state. Prévélakis (1998) argues that if the state manages to eliminate the distinct elements of diasporas, “Greeks will have destroyed their chances at a diasporic culture by their efforts to adapt to an antiquated nationalistic environment” (Ibid., 10). Hence, he emphasizes the need to preserve the diasporic characteristics in order for the diaspora to be able to play a significant role.

The Greek state is the only part of global Hellenism that participates in international politics as a sovereign political entity (Papasotiriou 2000: 152). Currently the Greek state, as cultural depository and as the historical or imaginative hearth of all Greek people world-wide, has a partnership role with the Greek-American community, which, nevertheless, preserves its independence. Most of the Greek-Americans are willing to play the role of helper and supporter of the Greek economy and polity and they have proved that both in the past and in the present.
However, they oppose certain state practices that make their contribution to Greece very
difficult and they want the state to be both more respectful and more supportive to them and to
their own needs as diaspora Greeks.

This point raises an important issue that reveals Greek public sector pathologies. The
Greek state sabotages itself in its attempt to get diaspora assistance through raising numerous
practical problems for the Greek-Americans. At the same time, there is a gap between its
rhetoric of support of the Greek-Americans in their quest for better Greek education and its
relevant actions. This condition illustrates the diachronic phenomenon of inconsistency
between rhetoric and actions of the Greek state. Despite the creation of diaspora institutions
and the continuing rhetoric that stresses the significance of the Greek diaspora for Greek
domestic and foreign policy, an effective, comprehensive and systematic diaspora policy
remains elusive.

The Ministry, the Ministers and their Diaspora Rhetoric

In current state rhetoric, the Greek-American community is seen as a bridge between
Greece and the United States. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web-site, “the
large and successful Greek diaspora in the United States […] is definitely an important link
that unites the people of the two countries” (“Inomenes Politeies”). An older version of the
Ministry’s web-site noted:

…[we should particularly mention] the contribution of the Diaspora Greeks,
who always consistently reinforce the national attempts all around the world
and constitute a valuable channel of friendship and development with their
countries of residence.\textsuperscript{143}

In a speech at the Greek Parliament in 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitris
Avramopoulos emphasized the role of Greek-Americans as a bridge between Greece and the
United States arguing that: “…with the United States, we share values, a common historical
path, and the unique bridge that is called Diaspora Hellenism” (Avramopoulos 2012b).\textsuperscript{144}

The state rhetoric reflects the bi-directional nature of the relationship between
homeland and diaspora. On the one hand, the state has the responsibility to care for the
diaspora, according to the Constitution. On the other, it expects the diaspora to support Greek
political goals. The following statement by Evangelos Venizelos, Vice-President of the Greek
government and Minister of Foreign Affairs, illustrates this point. During his presentation at
the Standing Committee for Defense and Foreign Affairs at the Greek Parliament, Venizelos
described the strategic dimension of Greek foreign policy since the restoration of democracy
in 1974. This dimension includes the

\textsuperscript{143} This quote is from an earlier version of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (\textit{Ypouriigeio
Exoterikon}) web-site, under “Multilateral Diplomacy” (\textit{Polimeris Diplomatia}) in the section
entitled “Goals and Priorities of Greek Cultural Policy” (“\textit{Stohoi kai proteraiotites tis Ellinikis
Exoterikis Politikis}”). The web-site was available at: \url{www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/el-
GR/Policy/Multilateral+Diplomacy/Culture/TargetsPriorities/} [accessed July 15, 2011, web-
site no longer available as of 2012].

\textsuperscript{144} See previous footnote regarding the use of the term ‘diaspora’ versus ‘\textit{apodimoi},’ which
was used here in the original.
…utilization[^145] of Greeks abroad in the greatest degree possible as a pressure group and, as the same time, the protection of the Greek communities or communities of Greek origin… (Venizelos 2014)^146

The notion of protection is associated with kinship dynamics. Another aspect of this dynamics is the Greek state’s pride in the achievements of Greek-Americans, especially in the realm of politics (Diplomat A 2011).

Beyond pride in the diaspora’s accomplishments and offering physical protection to Greeks abroad, the state also has the responsibility, according to the Constitution, to cultivate the diaspora’s bonds with the homeland. In his speech to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense at the Greek Parliament, Vice-President Venizelos, stressing this point, argued that

A principle of the foreign policy of a country with a diaspora like ours is, of course, the preservation of the strong bonds of the Motherland with world-wide Hellenism, with the Greeks of the diaspora.^[147] (Venizelos 2013a)

[^145]: The original is “*axiopoiisi*,” which literally means “to make something worthy,” or “to use in a good/productive/worthy way.” It can also be translated as “capitalization” on the Greeks abroad. A more literal translation removes the negative connotation of “utilization.”

[^146]: The Minister also referred to the importance of cultural and Church diplomacy, since the Greek state takes on the responsibility of protection of Christian populations and monuments, primarily in the Middle East (Venizelos 2014). In this context, he stressed the Greek state’s bonds with the three Greek-Orthodox Patriarchates of Jerusalem, of Alexandria and of Antioch (Ibid.).

[^147]: As in the case of Avramopoulos’ statements, Venizelos is using ‘*apodimoi*’ in the original. I am translating it as ‘diaspora’ in order to convey a more accurate interpretation of the substance of the term used by Venizelos.
He also placed the diaspora among the priorities of Greek foreign policy and named it a strategic partner of the Greek state (Ibid.). During another speech at a meeting of the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary Association at the Greek Parliament, Vice-President Venizelos, echoing the statements of the President of the Hellenic Parliament who had spoken before him, stressed

…the significance we assign to the Greeks abroad and to the constitutional, but primarily, national and moral responsibility that the motherland has to care for the cultivation of its bonds with Hellenism abroad. (Venizelos 2013b)

Consequently, he introduces the element of morality with respect to the state’s responsibilities towards the diaspora. The introduction of this notion opens the way to non-instrumentalist interpretations of the state’s actions, which would require further research.

The cultivation of the bonds between homeland and diaspora, which is seen as a moral duty, refers primarily to Greek culture and education. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrios Dollis, a Greek-Australian politician, summarizes the foundations of Greek diaspora policy arguing that the axis along which the Greek diaspora is preserved as such and is connected to Greece includes three main themes that form the core of Greek identity and the

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148 Greek political leaders have at times invited distinguished Greeks from the diaspora to participate in the government or to lead public organizations. The most high-profile case was when conservative Prime-Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis invited Professor Andreas Papandreou, the son of his centrist political rival, Georgios Papandreou, to come to Greece from the United States in 1959 in order to lead an economic development program. After his imprisonment and exile during the Junta years, he returned to Greece again and, eventually, became the first Greek socialist Prime-Minister in 1981. Greek-American George Papandreou, Andreas’ son, was Prime-Minister of Greece from 2009-2011. During his tenure he actively pursued the involvement of the diaspora in Greek governance in order to bring technical and organizational knowledge from their foreign homelands to Greece. Among those he invited to join his government was Greek-Australian politician Dimitrios Dollis, who served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
basis of the bonds that keep Hellenism together: Greek language, Greek culture and Greek-Orthodox faith.\textsuperscript{149} The Greek state is trying to keep the Greek-Americans psychologically close to Greece and it wants to support them by cultivating emotions of love towards the old homeland, and to transmit the same emotions\textsuperscript{150} to the new generations through Greek education and the Church (Diplomat A 2011).\textsuperscript{151} However, whether the strategy and actions of the state are successful is questionable (Ibid.).\textsuperscript{152}

The cultivation of bonds is another way of referring to the preservation of Greek identity in the diaspora. The identity rhetoric has also evolved through time. According to Ambassador Petros Panagiotopoulos, Secretary General of the General Secretariat for Diaspora Greeks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Greek state wants to promote a Greek \textit{cultural} identity in the diaspora (Panagiotopoulos 2011b), rather than a Greek national or ethno-national identity, which used to be part of the rhetoric as well as of political practice in past decades.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{149} These were comments by Dimitrios Dollis during his presentation at the Special Permanent Committee on Diaspora Hellenism at the Greek Parliament on January 12, 2011 (“Praktika” 2011a: 13).

\textsuperscript{150} The most important foreign policy goals, which also raise strong feelings among the Greek population in Greece, are ones that are expressions of the attachment to cultural markers, such as the Orthodox faith and history. Therefore, we see mobilization against the destruction of Orthodox churches in the occupied Northern part of Cyprus, against the usurpation of cultural and historical symbols associated with Macedonia, and in support of religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (Istanbul).\textsuperscript{150} These foreign policy goals and the involvement of the Greek-American diaspora in them, will be discussed in a following chapter.

\textsuperscript{151} Diplomat A is an anonymous professional source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whom I interviewed for the purposes of this research.

\textsuperscript{152} The Greek-Americans preserve their Greek identity and pride based primarily on their own efforts and institutions. The Greek state recognizes that the Archdiocese has made a tremendous contribution to the preservation of Greek traditions, the Greek language, and the existence of bonds with Greece, while supporting the Greek-Americans in a variety of ways, not only spiritually (Diplomat A 2011).

\textsuperscript{153} Until recently, the term ‘ethnic,’ which is primarily a cultural rather than a political term, would often be translated as \textit{ethnikos} in Greek, which means ‘national.’ Hence, the two notions
The use of the expression “preservation of Greek national identity” with reference to the Greek-Americans, which was quite common in the state’s diaspora rhetoric until recently, leads to the assumption that whoever is part of the Greek-American community, or part of American Hellenism, is not much different from the Greeks who live in Greece, hence, the two groups are not only co-ethnics but are also co-nationals in the sense that they share the exact same Greek national experience. Such a conceptualization of Greek-American identity misrepresents the Greek-American reality, and, as a result, does not address the existing needs of the community.

Currently, the Greek state rhetoric has moved away from talking about preserving the Greek national identity in the diaspora and it refers to the preservation of an ethnic or cultural identity as both the outcome as well as the prerequisite of strong bonds between the diaspora and the homeland. The rhetorical shift from Greek national identity to Greek ethno-cultural identity, shows a broader understanding of the realities of the Greek-American community. At the same time, such a shift builds a better diplomatic relationship with the United States government, which may be more positively inclined towards another state promoting its own culture and ethnic bonds within the American society rather than its national identity, which implies national/political allegiance to the Greek homeland. The latter might be potentially seen as something that challenges the loyalty to the American national identity. Thus, the rhetorical shift is probably a more prudent choice.

The state views the Greek-American community, and the diaspora in general, as partner and supporter in political, diplomatic and economic pursuits, especially in the context of the current crisis. It acknowledges the strategic advantage of incorporating the diaspora in Greek ‘ethnic’ and national would be confused linguistically as well as conceptually and that confusion had implications in Greek policy and diplomacy. Recently, the term *ethnotikos* started to be used to signify ‘ethnic.’
policy. Vice-President and Minister Venizelos argues that “Hellenism abroad changes the dimensions of our country because the ecumenical Hellenism is a real international power” (Venizelos 2013b).

The diaspora can influence both foreign governments and foreign societies and get them to support Greek claims and efforts. One of the “strategic axes of foreign policy,” according to S. Lambrinidis, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as stated in his 2011 presentation at the Parliamentary Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs, is:

…to unite our forces with the diaspora and to rally around common goals in a national attempt to reconstruct the state and to approach other Communities of citizens of foreign countries around the world which can support this effort.

(Lambrinidis 2011)

In particular, with respect to the Greek-Americans, the Greek state anticipates that diaspora politicians will influence American policies by promoting the Greek interests with respect to Greek and Cypriot foreign affairs issues (Diplomat A 2011).

At the same time, the Greek state is grateful for the historical promotion of Greek issues in Congress through Greek-American voters and organizations and wants such advocacy to continue (Diplomat A 2011). During the current crisis, state representatives argue that Greek-Americans can support Greece through their influence in Congress in addition to other forms of assistance that they can provide; the US economy can be negatively affected by the Eurozone crisis which is deepened with the continuation of the Greek crisis, therefore, the US has an interest in supporting Greece to get out of the crisis (Ibid.).

The current crisis has offered opportunities for greater involvement of the diaspora in the affairs of Greece. Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos, stressed the central role that the diaspora can play during this critical period continuing the historical pattern
according to which the Greek state turns towards the diaspora in times of crisis. Minister Avramopoulos, talking about the necessary measures that his Ministry has to take to reduce diplomatic expenses in the midst of the economic crisis, mentioned that these actions were taken without compromising the operations or the image of Greece abroad. The diaspora had greatly assisted the state in this effort and was expected to continue to play the role of the state’s supporter, or even mentor.

The ecumenical Hellenism, a pillar of our foreign policy and essential supporter of our national issues with ... a great will for service, participates, inspires us and encourages us in this collective effort. The relations between the State and Greeks abroad [154] have been upgraded, as you have noticed, during the last period with a large campaign that we have launched around the world, inspiring our co-patriots there but also asking for their own support in the great national effort. And the response is heartwarming. It reminds us of moments in our recent historical past, where volunteerism and the individual and collective contribution were really a shining example of the greatness of the Greek soul. (Avramopoulos 2012c)

Avramopoulos stressed the emotional aspect of the relationship which is relevant particularly in times of crisis. The emotional connection is central in the relationship between homeland and diaspora. Therefore, diaspora policy acquires a strong psychological and emotional dimension.

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154 In the original, the word used is ‘apodimoi Ellines,’ meaning ‘Greeks abroad’ or, more accurately, ‘Greek emigrants.’ However, I argue that he uses the term as equivalent to ‘diaspora.’ In this case, Avramopoulos’s purpose is not to distinguish between emigrants and non-emigrants, since the two groups work together through community organizations. The use of these terms in an official context is also discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
Vice-President Venizelos also acknowledged the support of the diaspora during the crisis and its potential role in supporting further Greek reforms in a speech at a meeting of the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary Association at the Greek Parliament.

We are grateful for the messages of solidarity and moral support from the diaspora Hellenism to the Greek people, we deeply appreciate every gesture. I want to clarify that the crisis that we experience is not treated as an issue of charity through the solidarity networks of Hellenism. It is a deep problem of development and communication, because Greece is very often the victim of negative stereotypes which have been imposed in the international discussion. (Venizelos 2013b)

The Vice-President went on to explain to the diasporan politicians present at the meeting that what Greece essentially needs is investments, reforms, privatizations, tourism but, most of all, a reconstruction of its international image which is critical for the international status of Greece, of the Greek economy and Hellenism (Ibid.). Venizelos was attempting to get the diaspora’s support for economic reconstruction and development but also for the rebranding of Greece, or, more accurately, for reinstating the good image of Greece. The fact that he connected it to the image of Hellenism made it even more personal for the diasporans, since it was like saying to them that if the image of Greece is negative, then your image as Greek diasporans is also hurt, hence the quality of the international image of Greece impacts your own identity.

Specifically with regards to the central role that the Greek state is expecting, or requesting, the diaspora to play in improving the international image of Greece, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos stated the following at the Greek Parliament.
It is about time to activate at a central level an action plan for the image and the identity of our land. A strategic initiative of the Greek Prime-Minister in which the Greek state, the Greek citizens and the Ecumenical Diaspora[^155] Hellenism, will contribute decisively. [...] A strategic priority of our policy is the substantive utilization of the forces of Ecumenical Hellenism. [...] For us, the policy for the Ecumenical Hellenism constitutes a separate chapter for our foreign policy and priority of vital importance for the reconstruction of our homeland. (Avramopoulos 2012b)

Avramopoulos’ and other Ministers’ statements regarding the crisis are reminiscent of state rhetoric of the post-war period, especially since the word “reconstruction” has been dominant in both historical discourses. In both cases, state authorities were concerned about the reconstruction of the economy and the country in general, including the reconstruction of its image (the image of modernized Greece post-World War II vs. the image of a prosperous and dependable Greece at the present time), and they turned to the willing diaspora in order to materialize this goal.

The state is also concerned that the continuing deep economic crisis can influence the relations between Greek-Americans and Greece, as the lack of effectiveness of Greek policies has a negative influence on how Greek-Americans perceive of Greece (Diplomat A 2011). Minister Avramopoulos conveyed to the Greek Parliament the negative feelings of Greek-Americans regarding the current situation in Greece.

[^155]: See previous footnote regarding the use of the term ‘diaspora’ versus ‘apodimoi,’ which was used here in the original.
The good image of Greece has to be restored in North America and among the Hellenism living there, which constitutes the strong bridge which unites us. We share today feelings of bitterness and discouragement of the Diaspora Greeks for the international image of the country, maybe for those who live beyond the borders of Greece, the impressions and the sentiments are even stronger. (Avramopoulos 2012a)

The opposite happened during the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, when the international light on Greece had a very positive impact on how Greek-Americans perceived of the country (Diplomat A 2011). Thus, according to state representatives, the current situation has to be reversed in order to reduce the negative impact on Greek-American perception of Greece (Ibid.). The diaspora is, therefore, seen both as a partner in the state’s attempt to improve the country’s image world-wide and as a target group whose image of the country should be improved.

The diaspora can play the role of the state’s global partner even beyond the current crisis. The Greek state has identified the potential of the diaspora to contribute as a partner of Greece in cultural diplomacy. The current official approach to global diplomacy, as stated on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web-site, emphasizes the promotion of an expanded notion of Greek culture, beyond traditional/folk culture or artistic production, with an emphasis to the inclusion of the ancient Greek ideals, which are the basis of Western culture. These are the guidelines that shape the Ministry's cultural diplomacy.

The underlying logic is that, through the creation of a deeper cultural understanding and the construction of cultural bridges into the international community, specific foreign policy goals of a political nature will be further enhanced. The diaspora is seen as the state's partner in cultural diplomacy.
...Greek education and Greek cultural heritage, as well as the modern artistic and intellectual creations can act as powerful weapons by creating the conditions for a broader understanding and positive attitude towards our national positions in the international community. [...] [we should particularly mention] the contribution of the Diaspora Greeks, who always consistently reinforce the national attempts all around the world and constitute a valuable channel of friendship and development with their countries of residence.¹⁵⁶

However, regardless of this understanding of cultural foreign policy and the role the diaspora can play in it, the culture and education of the Greek-American diaspora does not have the cultural dimension mentioned here but is, rather, generally limited to the more folkloric aspects of Greek culture.

The need to adjust to the realities of the diaspora, including the increasing number of American-born generations, is also reflected in the state’s current approach to the diaspora. Possibly influenced by his temporary stay in the United States and his extensive interaction with the Greek-American community, Minister of Foreign Affairs Avramopoulos seemed more in tune with the Greek-American realities and the need of the Greek state to adapt to them. He argued that:

The time has come for our diaspora policy to open up to the generations of Greeks who were born in the diaspora and who have been integrated in the production system in science, in the letters and the arts and politics, and are in

¹⁵⁶ This quote is from an earlier version of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ web-site, under “Multilateral Diplomacy” in the section entitled “Goals and Priorities of Greek Cultural Policy.” The web-site was available at: www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/el-GR/Policy/MultilateralDiplomacy/Culture/TargetsPriorities/ [accessed July 15, 2011] [website no longer available as of 2012].
the core of decision-making. The making of decisions that define the future of their countries and which may have an impact on international relations and on the interests of Greece. So we create new networks for Ecumenical Hellenism and we introduce policies of empowerment of the historic origin and the national identity of our Diaspora. Because hellenicity unites more than twenty million Greeks in the world. (Avramopoulos 2012b)

The state wants the younger generations of Greek-Americans to be supporters of Greek interests but it does not expect them to be Greek nationals; it wants them to be philhellenes and integrated members of the American society who preserve their bonds with Greece (Diplomat A 2011).

II. The Greek State and the Greek-Americans: Diaspora Institutions and Policy

Certain state institutions are dedicated exclusively to the diaspora, while others work on diaspora issues as part of a broader policy portfolio.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Diaspora falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and constitutes one of the Ministry’s priorities, as it was discussed above. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs has among its stated goals: “the preservation and strengthening of the bonds between Greece and the Greek diaspora,” “the promotion and protection of the rights and the interests of Greeks abroad,” and “the monitoring of community, educational and ecclesiastical affairs of the Greeks abroad” (Ypourgeio Exoterikon 2011).
The overall coordination for diaspora policy is among the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In particular, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs oversees diaspora policy. According to Deputy Minister, Dimitrios Dollis, a Greek-Australian politician — hence, a diasporan Greek himself — the diaspora policy guidelines are the following:

The language, the culture, our faith are the three things that unite Hellenism. The empowerment of the Greek Cultural Identity of our Diaspora, of the Greek Language Teaching and Learning, and of the Hospitality Programs, are within the immediate priorities of the Greek state. Our first concern is the way with which we will connect this large community of [Diaspora] Greeks, especially the youth, with contemporary Greece… In the policy planning that we will follow for the Diaspora Greeks, all Greeks abroad will participate…. The attempt to highlight the talent and potential of the Diaspora Greeks should also be connected with the promotion of philhellenism in the countries where they reside. This is something that Greece needs even more in our days. (Riba 2010)\textsuperscript{157}

Deputy Minister Dollis brought a unique diasporic perspective to Greek diaspora policy:

You know, the diaspora Greek is not asking for many things. He does not ask for funding. He has the means to contribute himself, to cover his needs. And he wants to contribute. This is something that he has already proven. And he will continue to contribute. What he asks for is respect and the opportunity to be

\textsuperscript{157}Hospitality Programs refer to programs that involve hosting diaspora youths in Greece. These programs are planned, funded and implemented primarily by the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad. The recent crisis has caused a decrease in these programs due to lack of funding.
heard. In the broad dialogue that we are initiating with the diaspora, we are inviting everybody to participate, those who are members of diaspora organizations and those who are not. We want to hear the young man, the young woman, all our diasporans, how they view this relationship and what they expect from Greece. (Ibid.)

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Kassimis shares Dollis’ approach:

Global Hellenism is a very important part of the Nation. They are not voters, they do not ask for expenditures. They ask for support in order to preserve and disseminate in the local societies where they live, the Greek spirit and the Greek culture. (Geniki Grammateia 2009a)

In 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos announced in the Greek parliament the creation of a body that would include diaspora members in order to design a new foreign policy strategy, taking into account the perspectives and the potential of the diaspora.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the initiative to create a Special International Committee of Scientists, Experts, Diplomats, Businessmen, and intellectuals from Greece and abroad, in order to perform a thorough study about the new role of Greece in the world and to create the bases and the directions of a new doctrine in foreign policy. (Avramopoulos 2012b)

Recently, the Ministry also created a new organization for diaspora services, the Foreign Ministry’s Citizen Services Center for Greeks Abroad, but it was forced to close this down due to the economic crisis in 2014.
Partly due to chronic ineffectiveness of Greek public policy and public administration and partly due to the frequent change of governments, the dialogue between homeland and diaspora as well as other projects aiming at cooperation have not been fully implemented and have not been as productive as hoped.

a. Missions in the United States

The most immediate connection between the Ministry and the Greek-American community is through the Greek diplomatic missions in the United States. Beyond the Greek Embassy, the Greek state established Consulate Generals and Consulates in American cities with a large Greek population. These nine diplomatic missions promote the relations between Greece and the United States, serve the Greek-American community and connect it with Greece (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In addition to the Greek Embassy in Washington, DC, there are Consulate Generals in Boston, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago and Tampa, Florida; there are consulates in Atlanta and Houston. The Greek diplomatic mission to the United Nations is also based in New York.

The geographically wide representation of the Greek state through its consular authorities offers expanded opportunities for contact between the Greek state and the diaspora for a number of practical reasons (Diplomat A 2011). The Embassy and the Consulates support

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159 Serving the states of Arizona, Southern California, Colorado, Hawaii, New Mexico, and South Nevada.

160 Serving the states of Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, as well as Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
and cooperate with Greek-American organizations in their jurisdiction, including Greek-American think-tanks and advocacy organizations. The Embassy, in particular, often cooperates with Greek-American advocacy organizations which are based or mobilize in DC.

b. General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad

The first governmental organization dedicated to the diaspora was the Directorate for Hellenism Abroad in 1947, which did not have adequate information about the diaspora and was plagued by bureaucratic delays, administrative inadequacies, and inefficiencies, that rendered it ineffective (Vogli 2013: 358). In 1983, the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal exclusively with issues pertaining to the diaspora. For particular policies, especially those that pertain to education and culture, there is cooperation with other ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture, which have the supervision of the creation and implementation of educational and cultural diaspora policies respectively. The Secretariat also supports the operations of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE), the semi-independent Greek diaspora umbrella organization, which has its own headquarters in Thessaloniki.

The title of the Secretariat is officially translated as Secretariat for Greeks Abroad (from the original Geniki Grammateia Apodimou Ellinismou) but if we attempt an accurate translation of the title, we would get ‘Secretariat for Expatriate Greeks’ or ‘Secretariat for

Greek emigrants.’ As it was mentioned earlier, Greek institutions, rhetoric or policies that refer to *apodimoi* or *apodimos ellhnismos* tend to refer in practice to a broad Greek diaspora rather than only to emigrants. Nevertheless, the mere choice of words in the title of this institution implies a particular state-centric approach to the diaspora, which, according to Prévélakis (2000), undermines the diaspora’s diachronic and multi-generational existence: “For the Greek state, the Greeks of the diaspora are emigrants (*apodimoi*), Greek nationals who temporarily find themselves outside of Greek borders and whose only dream is to return” (Ibid., 181).162

The Secretariat is the primary state institution that plans and implements diaspora policy. The General Director of the Secretariat, Ambassador Petros Panayiotopoulos (2011a), elaborated on the goals of Greek diaspora strategy under the auspices of the Secretariat in a speech at the International Conference for the Diaspora. These goals include the support and promotion of the interests of Greeks abroad; the preservation of the cultural identity of the diaspora through strong bonds and exchanges; the preservation of the Greek language; the promotion of Greek culture as the model on which modern political and cultural life are based; the empowerment of Greek networks “which function as bridges of friendship and cooperation between Greece and the global community and can support the national interests and the goals of Greek foreign policy;” and, last, the involvement of various Greek institutions (from the public sector, the academic community and civil society) in diaspora policy (Ibid.).

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162 Prévélakis (2000) also comments on the use of another official term, ‘*pallinostisis,*’ that refers to the return of expatriates but is used to include any type of diasporan settlement in Greece: “The immigration into Greece of populations such as the Pontian Greeks, who had never set foot on Greek territory, is called *pallinostisis,* that is return. The use of a term, which goes back to the return of Ulysses to Ithaca (the Homeric nostos), clearly shows the ideological [weight] of the term. The Greek state thus adopts a paternalistic attitude to these ‘lost’ children” (Ibid., 181).
The General Director also presented a policy model based on these general strategic goals. This diaspora policy model involves: activities and events that will “strengthen the cultural identity of Greeks abroad” while “disseminating the Greek culture” in their countries of residence; the empowerment of the Council of Hellenes Abroad and diaspora networks; the strengthening of the relationship between the Greek Parliament and the diaspora in order to promote the national interests and bilateral relations; the support of cultural educational programs in the diaspora (primarily in tertiary education, but also including support for libraries, exchange programs, and use of technology); a bi-directional communication policy; support for diaspora organizations; and cooperation with the countries of residence in cultural activities (Panagiotopoulos 2011a).

What all of these policy statements illustrate is that there is a clear emphasis on a cosmopolitan dimension of Greek culture, at least in rhetoric. At the same time, Greek culture and language have a central role in Greek foreign policy; hence, their preservation and dissemination are national goals. In this context, diaspora policy becomes primarily cultural policy, based on empowered diaspora networks. Greek culture and language are seen as means for strengthening the identity and the bonds of the Greeks abroad with the Greek homeland. Ambassador Panagiotopoulos (2011a) also argues that the role that Greek culture and the Greeks abroad can play is important in creating cultural bridges on which to build diplomatic cooperation.

In light of this, the Greek state wants to act both as the protector of Greek people, interests, culture and identity, and as the cosmopolitan promoter of ecumenical Greek ideals that are carried via the said culture. This is a dual political role that is reflected in the cultural and educational policies that target the diaspora and beyond. Behind this dual role, we can identify a pattern that exists throughout Greek social and political life, and which is
strengthened through modern communication technologies; within this pattern, the local meets
the global: the goal of the Ministry and the Secretariat is as much to connect the young Greek-
American with his grandfather’s village as it is to connect Greek culture with a global audience.
The idea is that educational and cultural diaspora policies and diplomacy will accomplish both
of these things at the same time.

Elaborating on Greek cultural policy, we should stress that its audience is dual. One the
one hand, it targets the diaspora, since the promotion of Greek culture aims at empowering
Greek-American confidence and pride (Diplomat A 2011). On the other hand, it targets a larger,
non-Greek global audience, including the greater American society. While the diaspora is seen
as the state's partner in targeting a global cultural audience, the broader cultural policy that the
state is engaged in (for example, promoting exhibitions of Greek antiquities in foreign
museums) does not only target the greater American audience.

It still indirectly targets the diaspora with the hope that such projections of Greek
culture in the American mainstream, will also cultivate the Greek pride among the Greek-
Americans (Panagiotopoulos 2011b). In the same manner, the Greek state’s support for the
promotion of Modern Greek Studies in American universities, targets both Greek-American
and American students. The Greek state expects the Greek-American community to be
cultural ambassadors of Greece who enable Greek culture to reach the greater American
society. However, despite all the rhetoric, Greek policies towards the diaspora tend not to be
comprehensive and systematic, and are, often, poorly implemented or completely absent.

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163 In some cases, the high level of funding provided by the Greek state was “lost,” was not
used in a productive and sustainable way and, as a result, the educational programs were
undermined (Diplomat A 2011)
The Hellenic Parliament’s Committee for the Diaspora Greeks

Greek politics is characterized by polarization in several policy areas and by constantly changing policies, as power is transferred from one party to the other. However, in the case of diaspora policy, there is a general consensus about the basic policy principles throughout a wide political spectrum. This general agreement becomes evident through the work of the multi-party Special Permanent Parliamentary Committee for the Diaspora Greeks. The President of the Committee, Ilias Karanikas (2011), confirmed that there are no significant policy differences among its members who represent different parties.

The only point where there is major disagreement among political parties represented in the Committee is on the issue of diaspora vote in Greek national elections. The disagreement does not regard whether there should be participation in the elections by the diasporans — this is a point where there is general agreement — but rather it is related to technical aspects regarding how such an electoral change will be realized (“Ekthesi” 2008).

The committee was first formed in the 1990’s and its membership changes relatively frequently. According to Article 43A of the Parliamentary Rules, as cited in the Committee’s 2008 Report, the goal of this Committee is:

…the preservation and empowerment of the relations and bonds of the National Representatives and the Greek People with global Hellenism, the coordination of the activities of the Greek Parliament and the Council of Hellenes Abroad, the study of the problems of the Diaspora Greeks, the support of their resolution and the strengthening of the relations with members of other parliaments who are of Greek origin. (“Ekthesi” 2008: 2)

Moreover, according to the Report,
The activities of the Committee aim at the projection of the interest of the Greek Parliament in Ecumenical Hellenism, while its priorities are educational and cultural issues, issues of communication and the promotion of the Greek political positions abroad. (Ibid.)

As the Committee’s President, Ilias Karanikas, stated during one of its sessions, the mission of the Committee is to make proposals to the specific ministries responsible for diaspora issues, rather than actually engage in the implementation of any solutions (“Praktika” 2011b: 37).

This Committee, along with other parliamentary Committees which focus on international issues, reflects principles of the parliamentary diplomacy that the Greek Parliament is engaged in. The Committee acts as an additional bridge to the diaspora, especially through direct communication which happens either in the context of the official trips of its members to different cities around the world or in the context of visits and presentations of representatives of diaspora organizations to the Committee.

According to MP Michael Pantoulas, the Committee members visit the different Greek diaspora communities around the world in order to: “represent the interests of [Greece] and our national issues” (“Praktika” 2011b: 33). However, there are also different voices that suggest that the parliamentary representatives are independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, therefore, they are not going on official visits to represent the Ministry’s policies; instead, they can discuss more freely their views on the different issues with the diasporans (Ibid., 39). Mr. Pantoulas also adds that, during these official visits, the members of the committee …must communicate the love, the respect, the interest of metropolitan Greece, but, mainly, [we have to make sure that] our diasporans are aware that we are dealing with their problems, which are related to Greece, or with the
preservation of their cultural identity […] and that this involvement of ours and
our interest produces results. (Ibid., 33-34)

An important part of this bi-directional communication is listening to the problems,
concerns and requests that the diasporans have as far as the Greek state is concerned, and
passing this information on to the Parliament and the Greek government. According to Mr.
Pantoulas, “what the diasporan needs wherever he might be living is that metropolitan Greece
really listens to what he is asking [and] talks about it and [that] the ministries materialize [it]”
(“Praktika” 2011b: 36). Recently, after several years of its operation, concerns were raised
regarding the bureaucratic processes that weaken the Committee’s work and contribute to its
detachment from the base of the diaspora (“Ekthesi” 2008).

Possibly the only political party that participates in the Committee and has a different
ideological approach to diaspora policy — especially diaspora educational policy — is the
Communist Party of Greece. According to the party representative’s memo, which was part of
the Committee’s 2008 report, the Communist Party applies the communist ideology in its
interpretation of the reasons for Greek emigration, as well as in its approach to the current
policy framework for the diaspora. The Communist Party of Greece considers the twentieth
century waves of Greek emigration the result of the failed capitalist system in Greece, which
forced Greeks to become workers in foreign countries. Although they recognize the love that
the Greeks abroad have for their native country and the need to create bonds between Greece
and the diaspora, they criticize the attempts of the Greek state to cater to the educational and
other needs of the diasporans and their children through the political elite. They see behind the
state’s policies an attempt to control and oppress the diasporans through “appearing as their protector and defender.”

Additionally to the committee, which is made up of elected representatives, the Greek Parliament recently established a Directorate of International Affairs and Hellenism of the Diaspora, which offers support to the Committee and assists in the communication and cooperation between the Parliament and the diaspora Greeks and promotes inter-parliamentary diplomacy (“Diefthynsi Diethnwn Ypothesewn”).

**Political Parties and the Diaspora**

The diaspora features prominently among the concerns of Greek political parties. This is reflected both in their suggested policies regarding the diaspora and in their organization which is comprised of diaspora branches. SYRIZA (*Synaspismos tis Rizospastikis Aristeras*), the left wing governing party of Greece, has recently risen to prominence as it won the election for the first time in January 2015. Being traditionally the third party, its new victory has influenced its internal dynamics. Since SYRIZA is clearly a left wing party, inspired by Marxist doctrines, it did not have offices in the US. Its recent popularity has led to a wide-spread network of supporters among the Greek diaspora, including from among the Greek-American community, many members of which oppose the austerity measures that international organizations have imposed on Greece and which SYRIZA strongly opposed, at least until the

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164 This information is included in the Memo entitled “VI. Positions of the Communist Party of Greece” by Nikolaos Gatzis, Second Vice-President of the Committee and Communist Party MP (“Ekthesi” 2008). It is part of the annual report of the Special Permanent Committee on Diaspora Greeks submitted to the Greek Parliament
elections. Hence, recently, a local SYRIZA organization was established in Astoria, New York.\footnote{The New York organization (Syriza New York) has a web-site (http://www.syriza-ny.org/) and a Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/syriza.nyc). SYRIZA is possibly the only Greek political party whose local organizations in the United States have an active digital presence.}

New Democracy, which has shared the governance of the country with PASOK in the post-dictatorial Greece, emphasizes its relationship with the diaspora possibly more than any other party. The tendency of the Greek-American community to predominantly support New Democracy, since New Democracy is the leading right wing/center-right party, probably reinforces the interest of the party in the diaspora. The ultimate decision-making instrument of the party is the National Convention, where representatives of the diaspora participate.\footnote{According to Article 6 §2.6, the leadership of SAE and “the President or Vice-President or Secretary of every Federation of a Greek Community abroad” (“Katastatiko” 2013: 11) can participate in the party’s convention.} In-between the National Conventions, the highest body of the party is the political committee, which also includes representatives from the diaspora.\footnote{According to Article 12 §2 of the party’s charter, the political committee is the highest body of the party in-between the party conventions and it includes, among other members, the Presidents of party offices abroad and “The President or Vice-President or Secretary of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (S.A.E.) and seven (7) representatives of the Greeks Abroad, who are elected with a secret ballot at the Ecumenical Hellenism Convention” (“Katastatiko” 2013: 21).}

In the context of the National Convention, the Ecumenical Hellenism Convention also takes place.\footnote{The Ecumenical Hellenism Convention takes place in the context of the party’s regular National Convention, according to Article 6 §1 (“Katastatiko” 2013: 7). Two Ecumenical Hellenism Conventions have taken place, one in 2010 and one in 2013 (“Tomeas”).} New Democracy has focused its attention on the diaspora both by rebuilding its network of diaspora offices and by launching the Ecumenical Hellenism Conventions. The Ecumenical Hellenism Conventions are held not in order to represent New Democracy
supporters but in order to address issues that concern the whole diaspora (“Tomeas”). The Convention was launched out of “the deep belief of New Democracy, in the definitive role that finally the Greek diaspora must have in our homeland” (Ibid.).

New Democracy has offices (Local Organizations) or representatives in five continents, including six in the United States.\textsuperscript{169} According to the party’s web-site, there are Local Organizations of the party in Boston, MA; Long Island, NY; New Jersey, NJ; Queens, NY; New York, NY (located in Astoria); Chicago, IL, and there is also a New Dimension Youth Local Organization in Morton Grove, IL and a party representative in Princeton, New Jersey (“Tomeas”). One of the four main departments of the party’s central organization is the Department for Greeks Abroad (\textit{Tomeas Apodimou Ellinismou}). The role of the Department for Greeks Abroad is to contribute towards designing a national strategy that will capitalize on the potential of the diaspora (Ibid.). For the party, “everything happens through the empowerment of the diaspora organizations” (Ibid.). The Department stresses that the ethnic identity of the diaspora Greeks is and must be above their party identity, so that they can work together and be empowered (Ibid.).

Overall, for New Democracy, the relationship with the diaspora should be a bi-directional one, in the context of which there will be exchange of information and active diaspora participation (Party Representative 2011). The New Democracy diaspora strategy is based on: (a) the preeminent role of the Church as a uniting bond between Greece and Ecumenical Hellenism; (b) the support of the Greek education in the diaspora through new educational models, teacher training, use of the internet, more university Chairs, scholarships, and other

\textsuperscript{169} The charter of the party enables, according to Article 5 §4.4, the establishment of party “Organizations of the Greeks Abroad … which aim at the promotion of the national issues and at solving the general problems of the Greeks who live or reside in the region that they oversee” (“\textit{Katastatiko}” 2013: 7).
activities; (c) the strengthening of the bonds between the metropolis and the diaspora through better information on the developments in Greece and in the diaspora through the internet; (d) the creation of new programs and institutions that focus on exchanges, digital libraries, summer schools, and cultural activities; (e) the empowerment of the political influence of the diaspora in their countries of residence; (f) the diaspora’s participation in Greek politics in order to reinvigorate the Greek political system and to ensure the equal participatory rights of the diaspora; (g) the diaspora’s investment in the Greek economy and its contribution to Greek tourism; (h) the creation of a world network of Greek (or Greek in origin) businessmen “who will be ‘ambassadors’ of Greek products in the world;” and (i) the fundamental reform and reactivation of SAE (“Tomeas”).

PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), the Greek center left party that dominated Greek politics since it first came to power in 1981, has a network of local party organizations in the diaspora, similarly to New Democracy. PASOK gradually lost its popularity in the last few years, until it, eventually, occupied the seventh place in the elections of January 2015. Therefore, despite the earlier visibility of PASOK’s office in Astoria, New York, the party’s current local organizations in the United States are not very active, despite earlier proclamations of the party regarding the need for the diaspora party organizations to be active and dynamic (“Ethniki Syndiaskepsi”).

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170 It has been very difficult to collect information on PASOK’s local organizations in the United States. The party offices in Germany appear to be the most active diaspora organizations, with a dynamic digital presence.
The operation of the diaspora organizations is defined by the party’s charter. Article 31 §2 of the charter attempts to regulate the members’ activities beyond the party organizations: “The members of the organizations of Diaspora Hellenism can participate in political bodies of their place of residence which share the Movement’s values and goals” (“Katastatiko Panelliniou”). Representatives of the diaspora party organizations participate in the National Convention. The National Council, the party’s ultimate body in-between the party’s conventions, also includes representatives of the party’s diaspora organizations. Last, PASOK has a Department for Greeks Abroad, similarly to New Democracy, as one of its main organizational departments.

PASOK refers to the diaspora as “national capital” that is above party politics (“Ethniki Syndiaskepsi”). In the party’s document on diaspora policy that was the product of the 2011 National Convention, it is argued that the diaspora needs a more organized network that would allow its empowerment and would lead to coordinated action. The document further argues that the diaspora’s support for Greece is crucial during the current crisis and that its effective action requires a bi-directional relationship with the “national center” (Ibid.). This relationship, on the one hand, will capitalize on the knowledge and experience of the diaspora and, on the

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171 According to Article 31, §2 entitled “Diaspora Hellenism,” “The Primary and Secondary Organizations of Diaspora Hellenism as well as the Regional Organization are set up and operate on the basis of the relevant Bylaw that the Central Political Committee votes on” (“Katastatiko Panelliniou”). The Primary Organizations are local grassroots organizations. The Secondary Organizations are prefectural (referring to sub-region divisions) organizations.

172 The National Council includes “… at least seven (7) members of the Organizations of Diaspora Hellenism, who come from different countries as well as at least three (3) members who are foreign citizens and come from different countries” (“Ethniko Symvoulio”).

173 The Facebook page of Department of Greeks Abroad can be found at https://www.facebook.com/TomeasApodimouEllinismou [accessed on 2/27/2015].
PASOK sets the Greek diaspora in the context of cultural globalization (“Ethniki Syndiaskepsi”). It, further, recognizes the need for the creation of diaspora networks and the potential of the diaspora to contribute in Greek culture, science, economy and development. Strategic goals of the party are the integration and mobilization of the diaspora in its countries of residence, as well as the connection and participation of the diaspora in developments in Greece (Ibid.). The party stresses, in particular, the activity that the diaspora should have through local party organizations (Ibid.).

Interestingly, in party rhetoric two different terms are used to refer to the Greek diaspora. New Democracy is using “Ecumenical Hellenism,” while PASOK is using “Diaspora Hellenism.” Possibly, although the content of the two terms is the same, the choice of the word “Ecumenical” in New Democracy rhetoric, is purposefully reminiscent of the Ecumenical dimension of Orthodoxy and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is the religious center of Greek diaspora.

**Inter-Parliamentary Associations as Greek Initiatives for the Diaspora**

The Greek state has launched two inter-parliamentary organizations that connect the Greek Parliament with parliamentarians from around the world who are of Greek origin or who are Orthodox. These are unique organizations because through them, the Greek state attempts to organize the Greek diaspora and the Greek Orthodox populations around the world at an inter-state level, by bringing together representatives of foreign state institutions. These
organizations create an intersection where ethnic and religious diasporas meet inter-state politics. In the context of these organizations, Greek national interests seem to converge with the national interests of the foreign countries that these co-ethnics or co-faithful represent.

The World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary Association (WHIA), unites parliamentarians of Greek descent around the world. It was founded in Athens in 1996 and has as its goals the creation of bonds among members of parliaments around the world who are of Greek descent, to strengthen the relationship between Greece and the countries where these parliamentarians live, and to promote the Greek language and culture in these countries (“About WHIA”). The involvement of Greek-American politicians in this organization increases their awareness and commitment to the issues and creates a stronger global platform for their support.

Vice-President and Minister Venizelos, addressed the meeting of the WHIA at the Greek Parliament in 2013, saying the following:

Dear colleagues, the fact that you are elected and you serve in the legislative Bodies of your countries, constitutes a highest honor and recognition for you personally, but also for Greece as the country of your origin. You serve, obviously and appropriately, your countries and the citizens who honor you with their vote, but we are happy and we are touched because you preserve your Greekness and your live bonds with Greece. You are the most select members of our diaspora, members who have democratic approval and legitimacy. Dear colleagues, I would like you to communicate to the Diaspora \[^{174}\] in your country, a message of unity of Hellenism, the recognition of its activity and of

\[^{174}\] The word in the original is ‘omogeneia.’
the successes of Greeks abroad, and, most of all, a message of love. (Venizelos 
2013b)

Regarding the importance of the Greek diaspora and, in particular, of the diasporan 
parliamentarians with respect to Greek domestic and foreign issues, Venizelos stated:

…the role of the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary Association is, obviously, 
particularly important, because you, the elected members of the Parliaments in 
your countries, Greeks in origin, politicians, constitute a network with a huge 
power of influence. In reality, the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary 
Association is a particularly interesting form of parliamentary diplomacy, and 
you, naturally, are the live bridge between your parliaments and the Hellenic 
Parliament. (Ibid.)

Vice-President Venizelos tactfully merged the Greek interests with the interests of the countries 
that these parliamentarians represent by framing them in normative terms, therefore, 
overcoming the obstacle of competing national loyalties.

Of course, as Parliamentarians of your countries, you have the obligation to 
promote and to implement the foreign policy of your country. On the other hand, 
you are fully informed about our open national issues, about the great fronts of 
our Greek foreign policy. You are well aware of our positions regarding peace 
and security in the greater region, you are well aware of our positions on Greek-
Turkish relations, on the Cyprus issue, on the situation in Southeastern Europe 
and in the Mediterranean. You are aware of our positions regarding the 
European problem, the European crisis and the prospect of European
integration. It is obvious to me — and I am confident that we share the same opinion — that there is no contradiction between your obligation to promote the foreign policy of your country and, at the same time, being heralds of the Greek positions on the various open issues that concern Hellenism. There is no contradiction, because the Greek foreign policy is a policy of principles, based on International Law, on the respect of human rights, of good neighborly relations, of the continuous pursuit of peace and stability in the greater region. (Ibid.)

The Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO) is the second inter-parliamentary organization that was created as an initiative of the Hellenic Parliament. It aims at uniting Orthodox parliamentarians across the world in order to promote cooperation on addressing political and social issues through a common Orthodox perspective as well as on preserving the global Orthodox culture and protecting Orthodox populations (“About the IAO”). Greek-American members of Congress participate in this organization, promoting issues of concern to Orthodox faithful which are also important to the Greek state. The issue of religious freedoms of Greek Orthodox populations, including the religious freedoms of the Patriarchate, falls within this group of Orthodox issues of common interest.

**Organizational Models of the Diaspora and the World Council of Hellenes Abroad**

(SAE)

There are two main forms of unifying organization for the global Greek diaspora. The first one is a centralized model, with Greece at the center, where the control of the Greek state over the diaspora is maximized (*modelo aktinoton sheseon*); however this model compromises
the diaspora as it undermines its independence and, hence, its vitality (Papasotiriou 2000: 153).
Papasotiriou stresses the fact that such a control of the diaspora by the Greek state would not
only be counterproductive but it would also be dangerous, since the majority of the diasporans
are nationals of foreign countries that cannot be under the control of a foreign government
(Ibid., 153-154). Prévélakis (2000) refers to this model as a dendritic model, in the context of
which the state controls the diaspora, undermining the autonomy of diasporic communities.
For Prévélakis (Ibid., 175), “The Greek state was, from the beginning of its existence, a bitter
opponent of community spirit.”

The second model is relational. According to this model, diasporic centers have a
relationship with each other and with the center, maximizing the solidarity, mutual support,
synergy and overall global presence of the expanded nation (Papasoritiou 2000: 154). This is
similar to Prévélakis’ (2000) galactic model, which refers to a decentralized model of numerous
autonomous diasporic communities. According to Prévélakis (1998), this model describes how
Greek diaspora communities traditionally related to its other and to the main centers of
Hellenism.

Prévélakis (2000) argues that the Greek state attempts to apply the centralized or
dendritic model on the organization of its diaspora. Papasotiriou (2000) agrees with Prévélakis,
arguing that the current organization has elements of both models featuring both centrifugal
(stemming from the diaspora) and centripetal (stemming from the state) forces. He, further,
argues that the centralized model dominates the organization of the diaspora at times of crisis,
while the decentralized model is dominant during the rest of the time (Ibid.).

The main institution that has been uniting the Greek diaspora with the main centers of
Hellenism for centuries was the Greek Orthodox Church (Prévélakis 1998). However, the
Greek state attempted to take over the role of the Church and the Patriarchate as the symbolic
and actual center of Hellenism and as the point of reference of a global diaspora network. In its attempt to organize, coordinate, control and instrumentalize the diaspora, the Greek state contemplated the creation of a Higher Council of Greeks Abroad as early as 1954 (Ventoura 2013: 329). The introduction of a relevant bill was followed by discussion in the Greek parliament which stressed the significance of organized diaspora communities (Ibid.). However, it was not until 1995, when a major diaspora organization was initiated by the state with the cooperation of prominent Greek diasporans.

Thus, a new world-wide organization of diaspora Greeks was created, the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE). This organization was unique in a number of ways. First, it was the first organized network of Greeks all around the world. Second, it was the first centralized attempt by the state to organize the diaspora. Third, the organization had an advisory role to the Greek government on issues affecting the diaspora. And finally, its operation was a Constitutional prescription; according to Article 108, paragraph 2 of the current Greek constitution,

> The law defines the specifics related to the organization, the operation and the responsibilities of the Council of Greeks Abroad, which has as its mission the expression of all the forces of world-wide Hellenism. (Syntagma 2007: 98)

The underlying idea was that SAE would for the first time unite all the Greeks around the world in the form of a powerful political and social organization.

SAE, initially, was met with enthusiasm by a significant segment of the diaspora. It offered the first broad platform for inter-personal relations and solidarity among Greeks from throughout the diaspora and the Greek state (Papasotiriou 2000: 156). It should be noted that members of SAE are not individuals but pre-existing diaspora organizations. Massive global
SAE conferences took place in Thessaloniki, where SAE’s headquarters are located, for a number of years.

The choice of Thessaloniki was symbolic since it is the second largest city in Greece but it is not associated with the Greek state, since the main state institutions are located in Athens. The choice of Thessaloniki symbolized the independence of SAE from the Greek state, at least at a symbolic level. SAE was organized in regional councils, one for each continent, including SAE America, the American regional branch. In the first years of its existence SAE undertook a massive fundraising campaign for the purpose of funding the communities of Greeks in the former Soviet Union, since they were experiencing significant financial problems and a low standard of living in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union (Papasotiriou 2000: 156-157). This was one of the first examples of how SAE could act as a body of solidarity among diaspora Greeks.

However, the ambitious idea of SAE as the ultimate organization of diaspora unity and action was materialized rather poorly, regardless of the huge sums of money spent. Instead of applying good organizational practices that would build on the organizational experience of the countries where the diaspora resided, the organization replicated bad organizational practices stemming from the experience of the Greek state. The SAE branches, together with its youth sections, were active in the 1990's but soon thereafter started to lose ground and are now almost non-existent. Mismanagement, interpersonal conflicts and lack of strategic planning and implementation, rendered SAE in need of major structural repair, if it is to continue to exist at all. Internal dynamics in the diaspora were also very problematic.

The Greek-American community saw SAE, on the one hand, as a promising and powerful tool of networking with other diaspora communities and with the Greek state; for this
reason, leaders of pre-existing organizations in the Greek-American community joined the leadership of SAE. However, on the other hand, the Greek-American community perceived of SAE as an artificial organization constructed and imposed on them by the Greek state. They perceived it both as an attempt by the Greek state to control them and as an attempt to undermine the pre-existing organizations by placing them under the SAE umbrella; at best, it was an unnecessary parallel organization to pre-existing forms of Greek-American community organization, at worst, it was an attempt to take over and patronize the Greek-American community.

Scholars and practitioners, including the Greek government, have realized that SAE has proved to be inefficient and ineffective, and that it is in need of reconstruction or replacement by another form of organization or platform for cooperation. Prévélakis (1998) considers the creation of SAE as an attempt to replace the network of the Orthodox Church centered on the Patriarchate. He criticizes the fundamental basis of the state approach to the organization of the diaspora, since the problem is deeper than just the inefficacy of SAE: “the State, because of its inherent logic, can neither understand the functioning of the chaotic Diaspora networks nor submit them to its rigid structures” (Ibid., 8). Hence, according to Prévélakis, the diaspora by nature is not compatible with rigid and uniform state structures.

He, further, argues that the centralization and uniformity of the state-controlled system of diaspora organization undermines the community organizations that are naturally adjusted to the realities of each country of residence and which stem from the diasporans themselves, while it also centralizes, and, therefore, inhibits the interaction among different segments of the diaspora.
The domination of the Greek diaspora by Athens represents an obstacle to it developing its own forms of organization. Each community lives in a different environment, with the various needs and opportunities requiring appropriate organs. The Greek state pushes for the same form of organization based on a centralizing principle. The existence of bodies that come under the state represent an obstacle to the creation of bodies that come under the communities. The Greek state polarises the network of communities of the Greek diaspora. Most of the time, links between communities go via Athens. [...] The development of links that cut across the space of the diaspora is inhibited by the centralism of the network. (Prévélakis 2000: 182)

Practitioners and government representatives who may not question the very structural basis of the organization, are still, nevertheless, concerned with its ineffectiveness and the wasteful use of public funds and consider the organization’s reform necessary. The discussion regarding the reform of SAE is often centered around the following issues: enforcement of its own organizational rules, search for alternative sources of funding, so that it is not “kratikodiaitos” or on a state-only “diet,” and identifying ways of engagement of productive segments of the diaspora, like networks of businessmen, within the SAE framework (Party Representative 2011). Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Venizelos, summarized the government’s vision for a reformed SAE saying:

Our goal is to contribute to the revision of the organizational framework of the Council of Hellenes Abroad. We have to encourage self-organization, self-funding and to ensure the capability of all our diasporans to be members of the Council of Hellenes Abroad. (Venizelos 2013b)
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos (2012c), being concerned about the fact that the human capital of the diaspora remains underutilized, argued that “SAE must evolve as soon as possible into an intervention instrument” that will be active in political, economic and other decision-making centers. He, further, stressed the need for the reformed SAE to be non-partisan and added: “We need a modern and flexible organization, which will truly release the great possibilities of ecumenical Hellenism, instead of limiting it” (Ibid.).

Papasotiriou (2000: 157) stresses the fact that the financial independence of SAE from the Greek state will be a crucial factor in SAE’s independence from the control of the state. He excludes, however, certain areas in which the Greek state could still contribute financially without compromising the independence of the organization; such an area is primarily Greek education (Ibid.). He, further, suggests that SAE should take on the global promotion of Greek commerce through the creation of a type of independent “chamber of global Hellenism” (Ibid., 158).

Nevertheless, regardless of whether it will happen through SAE or independently from it, the Special Parliamentary Committee on the Diaspora Greeks envisions the creation of a strong diaspora network and a more productive platform of cooperation between the Greek state and the diaspora in their Report to the Greek Parliament.

According to the current reference framework and taking into consideration the strategic role of the human capital of Greece, as a primary factor in the realization of the strategic goals of the country, we suggest the creation of a platform of cooperation, networking, creativity and innovation with the Diaspora Greeks. Half the heart of Hellenism is beating beyond the national borders. We have the obligation to build an active, real and continuous network
of Greeks, who will become “Ambassadors” of Greece in raising the position of our homeland within the international community. (‘Ekthesi’ 2008: 42)

When the Greek State (Literally) Meets the Greek-Americans

Since before World War II, the Greek government has been sending its representatives on short trips to the United States to meet with members of the Greek-American community. This inter-personal contact has contributed to a more accurate view of the diaspora by the Greek state. However, for a long time it did not have a systematic character and when it did acquire a systematic character, primarily through the annual trips of the members of the Parliamentary Committee, their visits were not always productive and did not lead to adequate follow up. Nevertheless, these visits did have an educational character for both the Greek politicians and the Greek-Americans.

The official visits that have the clear purpose of connecting the Greek state with the Greek-American community have recently been the visits of the members of the Special Parliamentary Committee on the Greek Diaspora and of representatives of Greek municipal governments in the context of Greek Independence Day festivities. Greek Independence Day, celebrated on March 25, commemorates the beginning of the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire. This is the largest ethnic celebration of the community, with the exception of religious feast days, primarily Christmas and Easter. Greek schools hold Independence Day celebrations with plays, speeches and poems narrating the Greek struggle of independence, while in the large American cities, there are Greek Independence Day parades. The Greek politicians lead the parade together with Greek consuls and the leadership of the Greek-
American community, while representatives of community organizations (parishes, local organizations, Greek schools, etc.) participate in the body of the parade.

In addition to these celebratory visits, Greek politicians who visit the United States for the purpose of official meetings with representatives of the American government or international organizations based in the United States, meet with members of the Greek-American community and, occasionally, give public talks. In the context of the current crisis, in particular, the Greek government wants its representatives to take advantage of official visits in the United States in order to communicate with the Greek-American community and work on improving the Greek-Americans’ view of Greece. In 2012 Minister Avramopoulos informed the Greek Parliament that:

Towards this goal [of improving the image of Greece], we will utilize the coming General Assembly of the United Nation for a series of contacts in New York and in other large American cities. The Deputy Minister for Greeks Abroad, Mr. Tsiaras, is already in San Francisco and Los Angeles. (Avramopoulos 2012c)

Nevertheless, Prévélakis (2000) cautions that the relationships formed out of these contacts may transfer negative elements of Greek public life to the diaspora.

Numerous networks of relationships are built up between Greek politicians, important people in the diaspora and the diplomatic services. Within these networks the same networks of patronage develop which are typical of Greek political and social life. (Ibid., 181)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also attempts direct communication with the diaspora through official messages on the occasion of the commemoration of the struggle for Greek Independence and on feast days. Often, these messages are read by the state’s representatives in the context of celebratory events that they attend in the diaspora. Indicative of the state’s
attempt to use these historical and cultural celebrations to reconnect the diaspora to the current status of Greece is the following excerpt by the Deputy Minister Theodoros Kassimis on the occasion of the 187th anniversary of the beginning of the struggle of Greek Independence in 2009.

187 years later, the challenges that our country is facing are different, but not less important as far as its sovereignty, its cultural heritage and its national causes are concerned. The battles are now given daily in arenas other than battle fields and as Greeks we are called to prove ourselves worthy successors of the heritage that our ancestors left to us. Let us not forget that whatever they managed to do was the product of working together and [having] faith in the final goal. Let us also move forward under the guidance of the same principles proving again to the rest of the world that the greatness of nations is not measured by numbers and material possessions but by the soul and the courage that they show when the circumstances require it. We owe this to our ancestors but even more so to ourselves and our children. (“Mynima YFYPEX”)

The Issue of Diaspora Vote

Since the first National Assemblies in the post-revolutionary years, diaspora Greeks were excluded from having political rights in the new state, including the right to vote and to hold public office, since “the political community of Greek citizens did not necessarily coincide with all of Hellenism” (Papastylianos 2013: 49). Hence, as the state was consolidating its territoriality, the diaspora became marginalized. Although the imagined Greek realm still
includes a global, wide-spread Hellenism, only those who are citizens and who live within the specified Greek territorial realm have political rights (Papastylianos 2013).

The actual and the imagined Greek realm are distinct notions and have implications for political rights. The historical developments of the nineteenth and twentieth century limited and consolidated the actual Greek realm as a territory where Greek populations lived. Instead, the imagined Greek realm remained borderless.

The deterritorialization of the [Greek] realm did not aim anymore to its expansion but to its liquidation…Essentially it was not a realm within which native Greek populations resided but a realm which “resided” within those who had Greek origin… (Papastylianos 2013: 57)

Consequently, political rights were associated only with the actual and not the imagined Greek realm.

Belonging to the Greek territorial realm was associated with having the Greek nationality and citizenship. Since the nineteenth century, Greek nationals could not have a second nationality in addition to their Greek one; however, by the 1950s many Greeks had *de facto* two nationalities because they did not follow all the required procedures or because they acquired two nationalities at birth, one being the Greek nationality of their parents and the other the American (or other) nationality of their country of birth (Vogli 2013: 366-367).

Based on the *jus sanguinis* that dominates the legal framework of Greek citizenship, descendants of Greek citizens born and living abroad can acquire the Greek citizenship. The paradox of the current voting framework is that Greek citizens who live abroad cannot vote in Greek elections where they live but they can do so if they go to Greece. Thus, the diaspora vote
is not an issue of citizenship rights but rather an issue of mobility; the citizen’s right to vote is, therefore, nullified due to mobility limitations.

The Greek diaspora has demanded the right to vote in Greek elections for decades. The diaspora vote could take place either in the form of voting in their country of residence (at the Greek consulates) or in the form of mail-in ballots. Instead of voting for representatives from the regions where they are registered in Greece, they could vote for representatives for their diasporic region (for example, North America) who would make up a small number of MPs in the Greek Parliament. Therefore, the diasporans would vote for political parties as well as for members of the parliament who would represent their geographic area. However, until the early 2010s, the two major parties, PASOK and New Democracy as well as the other political parties have failed to agree on the specifics of a law allowing such participation and representation of the diaspora Greeks in Greek national elections and in the Greek Parliament (“Ekthesi” 2008).

New Democracy is probably the political party with the strongest commitment to the diaspora vote (Party Representative 2011). The main Greek political parties are interested in reinvigorating and reorganizing their party’s network among the diaspora. Party representatives argue that a renewed interest among Greek-Americans in Greek party politics will not divide the Greek-American community (Ibid.). An active presence of Greek political parties within the Greek-American community may, on the one hand, empower the community’s involvement in Greek politics but, on the other, they will hurt its harmony and unity. Looking back at the first decades of the twentieth century, the transfer of Greek political divisions in the Greek-American community destroyed the community’s unity and threatened its very existence. The present as well as the historical experience shows that Greek-American organizations, and probably Greek organizations in general, are prone to divisions and discord.
Given the Greek proclivity towards discord and the wide-spread Greek partisan polarization that has infiltrated Greek institutions and Greek society, the activation of Greek party politics in the U.S. can potentially be divisive and harmful to the already fragmented Greek-American community. Greek political parties have inhibited cooperation, meritocracy, and overall progress in Greece. There is no adequate evidence that they will have a positive impact through their dominant presence in the U.S. The funds required for a successful political campaign across the diaspora could be more productively spent on activities supporting the Greek diaspora, like education. At the same time, there is no adequate evidence that the representation of the diaspora in the Greek Parliament will promote diaspora issues significantly more than current or other alternative channels of communication and cooperation.

(Not) Knowing thy Co-Ethnic: the Greek-Americans and the Greek State

The relationship between the Greek-Americans and the Greeks of Greece, including the representatives of the Greek government, is partly based on a cultural misunderstanding. The Greeks of Greece, and the Greek state, do not readily recognize the spectrum of Greek identity that exists in America — with its combinations of different levels of significance attached to different cultural markers — and they expect that the Greek-Americans are (or should be) culturally the same as the Greeks who currently live in Greece. They also fail to recognize the mixed family backgrounds that many Greek-Americans have or the difficulties of growing up as part of a small ethnic minority in another country. Last, they tend to forget the loyalty that Greek-Americans must have to the United States and their dual pride in being both Greek and American.
At the same time, the Greek-Americans get acquainted with the Greek language and culture through their families and the institutions of the Greek-American community. If the family or the community institutions are unable or unwilling to offer a cultural education, including language education, that is comprehensive enough to cover all aspects of Greek high culture — including history of all periods, literature, historical and contemporary Greek art — and a social study of modern Greece, then the Greek culture that is disseminated within the Greek-American community and with which the Greek-Americans identify is predominantly limited in scope to particular customs and folk or popular practices, such as popular Greek music and folk dances. In that case, the Greek-American student of Greek culture does not have a full understanding of either contemporary or historical Greece. Since knowing and understanding one another is the foundation of any good relationship between two parties, lack thereof can lead to a problematic relationship that produces improper and inadequate policies, and lack of productive cooperation.

Greek Policy Challenges: in Search of a Comprehensive, Systematic and Effective Diaspora Policy

It is evident from the previous discussion that state representatives recognize the potential of the diaspora and attempt to create policies and institutions that will capitalize on the diaspora’s strengths while also addressing its needs. However, rhetoric and practice often diverge in Greek experience. Consequently, the existence of institutions or the proclamation of diaspora policies does not necessarily mean that appropriate policies are in place or that these policies are successfully implemented.
Analysts and practitioners of Greek public policy tend to agree that there is an overwhelming lack of strategic and systematic approach to policy-making across the policy spectrum, including in diaspora policy, which is caused by the pathologies of the Greek public administration system (Diplomat B 2011). Specific policy actions take place without clear strategic goals or proper implementation and they generally do not fall within a systematic and long-term policy-planning framework. Regardless of the proclaimed goals of institutions or the emotional national rhetoric, a strategic national plan for the diaspora is missing (Party Representative 2011). Therefore, the benefits that may come from a particular initiative or cultural event do not build on previous efforts but are disconnected from them.

Moreover, the policy towards the diaspora — including educational and cultural policy, and the cooperation with respect to foreign policy and the economy — is not designed as a comprehensive policy but is made up of disconnected pieces under the guidance of different ministries. However, even that fragmented interaction with the Greek-American diaspora is limited both in terms of quantity and in terms of quality and scope. Hence, the potential of the diaspora as a diplomatic partner is undermined in cultural, economic, political and other forms of diplomacy, while the needs of the diaspora are still not fully addressed.

Certain dimensions of the diaspora have also not been considered. The diaspora can take part in a secondary global cultural dialogue through interaction with other ethnic/cultural diasporas in the United States. Moreover, it can also be placed within the framework of the European diasporas. Currently, there is no sense of “Europeanness” among the Greek-American community, which is generally not knowledgeable about the European dimension of Greece.
The analysis of the relationship between Greece and the Greek-American community so far, highlights the necessary components of a Greek diaspora policy. Papasotiriou suggests that the Greek state should avoid manipulating the diaspora, which not only has its own dynamic but is, in many ways, more successful than Greece in handling global challenges (Papasotiriou 2000: 152). Athanasios Platias, reflecting on Papasotiriou’s analysis, considers three elements crucial in Greek diaspora policy: the Greek state (a) should avoid attempts to manipulate the diaspora, (b) should be aware of the limitations in the diaspora’s actions, and (c) should implement necessary domestic reforms in order to allow the diaspora to be active (Platias 2000: xviii).

The diaspora policy should be formed on the basis of the comparative advantages that Greece has in the American context, primarily the role of Greek culture and language as the basis of Western civilization and their relevance to American history, politics, science and education. It is very fortunate for Greece that the core of the bond with the diaspora — the culture and the language — is also the means to increase its soft power. The Greek-American community is the key in the country’s quest to increase its soft power in the American context and Greek education is crucial in enabling the community to play this role.

Moreover, the Greek state should address all of its different diaspora sub-groups in the United States: the immigrants from Greece and the American-born generations with their varied abilities to speak the language and their varied knowledge of the Greek culture; the faithful of the Greek-Orthodox Church, those Greeks affiliated with other Christian denominations or other religions (especially Greek Jews), and those not religiously affiliated; the ethnic-Greeks and the non-Greek members of the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese, who make up the Greek Orthodox diaspora.
Last, educational, cultural, foreign, economic and tourism policies should be seen as interconnected with the diaspora playing the important role of a human bridge and a cultural and ethnic ambassador of Greece to the American society. If we accept even the most conservative numbers of the diaspora, we see that there is the potential of 1 million Greek “diplomats” in the United States. Who would not like to use such a diplomatic mission?

In closing, in the context of the dynamics between the Greek state and the Greek diaspora, Prévélass (1998) argues that the degree of influence the state has on the diaspora and vice versa, can be definitive for the future of both.

Will the dynamic of Diaspora impose its logic on the declining Greek State or will the Greek State, in its spasmodic endeavours to keep afloat, strangle the perspectives of the Diaspora? In the first case the world will witness the return of the Greeks, in the second it will observe the Finis Greciae. (Ibid., 10)
CHAPTER 5
GREEK DIASPORA EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter will present the current state of Greek education in the United States, analyze the main policy assumptions and implications for diaspora education policy, and attempt to offer an alternative model for Greek-American education. Greek education refers to the teaching and learning of the Modern Greek language and Greek culture, including history, geography, social studies, religious customs and traditions, folklore and art. The previous chapter offered an analysis of the close connection between identity and culture, with language being an essential part of both. This close connection is also reflected on policy. Greek education policy includes aspects of cultural policy and cultural policy is another form of education policy.

However, there are significant differences between the two. Greek education policy has historically targeted, primarily, diaspora Greeks — especially as far as primary and secondary education are concerned. Greek cultural policy has always had a broader audience: the greater American society. Greek education policy stresses primarily Greek language education, although it includes cultural elements. Greek cultural policy stresses primarily the non-linguistic aspects of Greek culture; if literature is involved, it tends to be in translation so that it is accessible by a wider audience.

A significant amount of the information and commentary in this chapter is based on my own observations, unless another source is listed, during my long-term experience in Greek education in the Boston area (as Greek School teacher for six years, instructor at foreign/Greek language schools for two years and lecturer in Modern Greek at the university for one year).
When a homeland state engages in identity building and preservation in the diaspora, the primary “tool” that it uses, similarly to domestic nation-building processes, is education. Hence, diaspora education becomes an extremely significant dimension of national politics and of homeland-diaspora relations. According to Stephanos Constantinides (2007: 17), a Greek-Canadian scholar who has written extensively on the Greek diaspora, “Greek language education remains the most important pillar for the support of the identity [of the diaspora communities].” The Greek state has an interest in shaping and sustaining this identity though education.

The previous chapter’s discussion on the state’s rhetoric and policy priorities, illustrates both the fact that the diaspora is one of the priorities of Greek foreign policy and that the state acknowledges Greek education as the heart of the overall diaspora policy and as an important dimension of Greek foreign policy in general. Greek diaspora education and Greek cultural education abroad play a central role in the diaspora’s preservation of bonds with Greece, in the diaspora’s and the foreign audience’s support for Greek political and economic goals, and in the global image of Greece, and, thus, its soft power. Professor Hess (2014) argues, for example, that we need to create a class of bi-cultural people in order to promote economic cooperation between the two countries.

The role of Greek culture as the basis of Western civilization renders Greek cultural education abroad an essential tool of Greek foreign policy, especially in an era when classical education tends to be replaced by a technocratic alternative. It is, further, of great importance that Greek education is intimately connected both to humanistic values and to technological and scientific progress. Consequently, it offers a relevant cultural dimension to mainstream education of all eras and in all fields.
The diaspora has clearly identified Greek education as a primary goal of its communal organization. Greek education in the United States is directly under the auspices of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, as a result of the historical evolution of the Greek-American community and its educational system. One of the first concerns of the new immigrants was the establishment of Greek schools. Greek education became, eventually, broadly institutionalized in the context of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America.

Since the identifiers of Hellenic culture in each environment depend on who are the agents who enact cultural preservation (Professor B 2014), the pioneers who set up the community institutions defined both the educational structures and the content of Greek culture and identity which were to be disseminated through these structures. The early Greek-American community of the beginning of the twentieth century reproduced a cultural structure that replicated the Greek village of the time which was organized around the priest and the teacher (Ibid.).

The church-based dimension of Greek identity was further reinforced by the immigrants from Asia Minor who were identified primarily through their Orthodox faith (Professor B 2014). Although this Greek-American educational structure was the product of the specific socio-economic and cultural conditions of the beginning of the twentieth century, it is still the dominant and virtually exclusive form of Greek education — with the exception of the newly created Greek charter schools, which will be discussed below — a century later, leading some experts to doubt the viability and suitability of this educational structure for the contemporary Greek-American community (Ibid.).

Due to the specific educational and cultural community structures and symbolisms, Orthodoxy in the United States bears the burden of Hellenism (Professor B 2014).
relationship between the two concepts is quite significant and rather complicated: Hellenism is a broader concept than Orthodoxy (Ibid.), but also Orthodoxy is a broader concept than Hellenism in other respects. At the same time, the two coincide if we take as a starting point the Byzantine Empire, the second “Golden Age” of Greek history, and the formulation of Greek culture primarily as a Christian culture thereafter. These conceptual connections have implications both for the current and the historical content and structure of Greek education but also for the creation and implementation of alternative educational models.

The diaspora not only welcomes but also expects the supportive involvement of the Greek state in one way or another in its education, specifically with respect to the wide network of parish-based Greek Schools (Vidalis 2014). The Greek state is a partner of the Archdiocese and connects the Greek-American educational establishment with the educational and cultural production in Greece. The two main demands of the diaspora on the Greek state are support for Greek diaspora education, together with the creation of opportunities for diasporans to be involved in the country’s development. According to a survey of the Greek diaspora performed by Kapa Research in cooperation with Harvard University's Center for Hellenic Studies, what the Greek diasporans expect more than anything else from the Greek state is better education for their children (“Pagkosmia Ereuna”). This research was performed under the auspices of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Therefore, the evidence point to the fact that both the Greek state and the Greek diaspora have a strong interest in Greek diaspora education. On the one hand, through Greek diaspora education, the Greek state aims at the creation of a larger ethno-national or ethno-cultural audience and at the enhancement of its domestic and global role as the protector of Greek culture and Greek people world-wide. On the other hand, diaspora education is crucial
for the diaspora itself as the main means through which it can perpetuate its communal existence:

> Through Greek language education the Greek communities aim at the construction of the collective “we.” This “we” is constructed [...] from the diachronic elements of ethnic origin and from contemporary cultural elements.

(Constantinides 2007: 19-20)

Professor Constantinides makes this argument echoing the work of Professor Mihalis Damanakis, a key figure in Greek diaspora education policy. From the discussion so far it becomes obvious that diaspora education aims not only at the dissemination of Greek language and culture but also at the creation and preservation of a Greek identity in the diaspora.

Greek diaspora education differs from Greek language and culture education that targets the non-Greek Americans. The former aims at identity building, while the latter aims at providing non-identity-based knowledge; hence, the former targets emotions, while the latter targets the intellect. Nevertheless, emotions play a role in the connection of non-diasporans to Greece, especially if their Greek education is reinforced by visits and interpersonal connections with the country and its people. Emotions together with memories associated with them — from family and community life, from schooling and collective historical memory or from a combination of all these sources — create the necessary basis of any ethnic, national or ethno-national identity. Since diaspora education shapes an identity, even if its methods and content are changed or upgraded to make it more effective, it will still have a strong emotional and psychological dimension.

A recent study of Greek and other ethnic adolescents in the New York area by psychologist James Koutrelakos provides evidence for the definitive role that heritage
education, involving language and culture, has on the preservation of Greek identity among Greek-American youth, even in generations further removed from the original immigrant generation. His study points out that:

…heritage education (or courses designed to teach the culture and language of a specific ethnic group), language and religion play decisive roles in keeping ethnic identity alive. Overall, they are associated with a strong sense of ethnic identity. Koutrelakos underlines that when students have some kind of heritage education, 'ethnic identity does not significantly differ (i.e. does not decline) from second to third generation.'

Feeling a part of a group and its institutions is psychologically helpful, he explains: 'When learning Modern Greek, it’s not just an intellectual task. It also involves being associated with a group and asserting Greek identity. Attending church services, while providing a spiritual experience, also gives you a place for socializing with people of your group....We cannot live alone and be humans.' (Contis 2011)

Koutrelakos stresses the importance of community institutions in heritage education and in identity preservation in new generations.

176 "Greek Americans who don't have access to heritage education may have different experiences. It was difficult, [Koutrelakos] adds, to probe the ethnic identity of people of Greek heritage who do not take part in Greek institutions. 'It's hard to get Greeks not in Greek school...or those who don't go to church,' he explained.” (Contis 2011)
What's clear about his study is that these institutions have a continuing, critical role as ethnic social glue, not to mention offering psychological relief. Koutrelakos adds: 'My study shows that Greeks in the diaspora recreate their traditional educational and religious institutions to preserve heritage and identity.' (Ibid.)

Koutrelakos’ findings are significant because they highlight the fact that Greek identity, and ethnic identity in general, is indeed strong in subsequent generations and is associated with high self-esteem and pride, but the preservation of ethnic identity happens under certain conditions. These conditions are related primarily to ethnic community institutions and heritage education, to the use of heritage language, and to active community and church participation.

Language and culture educational policies through community institutions are very important not only for identity preservation but also for the mental and emotional well-being of ethnic youth. A relevant study points to: “the positive influence of ethnic regard in … [the] daily lives of adolescents from ethnic minority backgrounds” (Kiang et al., 2006: 1338).

This study of the psychological impact of ethnic identity on adolescents found that having a high regard for your ethnic identity is positively correlated with happiness and greater ability to cope with stressful situations (Kiang et al. 2006). Consequently, ethnic identity preservation is a positive outcome not only for the diasporic community and the country of origin but also for the greater American society.

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177 This was a study with a sample of Chinese and Mexican students.
Historically, Greek diaspora education, although in the hands of the Archdiocese, employed the schooling model that was dominant in Greece. Greek-American education consisted of an exported and adjusted version of the Greek public school system, which had shaped the educational experience of the great majority of diaspora educators. However, the old Greek school system not only was foreign to the American educational and social reality but was also falling behind modern educational practices.

Instead of enriching Greek education through the introduction of familiar and effective American practices, the opposite happened. The (Greek-) American student was introduced to old Greek educational practices. The differences between the Greek and the American educational models were probably even more prominent in the past than they are now, causing confusion for the first generations of young Greek-Americans and leading many of them to pick one identity over the other rather than creating a layered or hybrid identity. Many of the early generations of Greek-Americans but also young Greek-Americans across time, chose the American over the Greek identity, often giving up the ethnic culture, language and, even, faith (the latter was usually the most enduring among Greek cultural indicators). Nevertheless, many have preserved a hybrid form of identity and these are mainly the ones who created and run community organizations.

Greek education in the United States has historically focused on a state-centered understanding of Greek culture and on Greek national identity rather than on the diachronic and universal dimension of Greek culture and on a cosmopolitan ethnic Greek identity. This reflects an underlying complexity and confusion regarding Greek identity and culture and their relationship with the Greek state. Focal points in Greek education are: the Revolution of 1821, which led to the establishment of the modern Greek state; the Orthodox Byzantine past, which
is experienced through the church; and Ancient Greece, which is seen as the ultimate glorious part of Greek national history.

Therefore, the highlights of a rudimentary and unstructured Greek social studies curriculum fluctuate among ancient Greek mythology and history, some Greek geography, Greek war heroism — through the history of the 1821 Revolution and World War II — and folk culture, including traditional dance and religious customs. Even today, one may frequently find in Greek diaspora schools the Greek national symbols that are seen in schools in Greece: old portraits of the heroes of the 1821 War of Greek Independence, a map of Greece and a Greek flag. These have been probably the most dominant elements of the educational aesthetic of schools in Greece stressing the temporal, spatial and symbolic dimensions of the Greek nation and the Greek state.

The transfer of this aesthetic approach in the Greek-American educational system has mixed results. For some students, the predominance of national symbolism has succeeded in instilling a Greek ethno-national identity that, nevertheless, comes second to their dominant American national identity. For others, it not only failed to do so but it caused them to turn away both from Greek school and from their Greek identity. This negative experience may be more pronounced for children of mixed marriages or of families with multiple ethnic backgrounds.

Numerous stories were narrated to me by friends and acquaintances over the years regarding cases of Greek-Americans who never spoke Greek again after Greek School or never sent their children to Greek school or taught them Greek due to the negative experience they had at Greek school growing up. Concerns have also been expressed regarding the existence of a culture of emotional blackmail, in the context of which, if you deny Greek school, you
deny your Greek heritage (Professor B 2014). Nevertheless, a long-time Greek school educator and former Greek school director argues that such negative reaction to the language and the Greek school probably has more to do with the internal dynamics of the family against which the kids “revolt” rather than Greek School per se (Educator B 2014).

The ethnic culture of immigrants tends to be centered on the culture prevalent in the homeland at the time of departure. Hence, we see linguistic and other cultural practices that were dominant in Greece in the past and have generally not been transmitted to younger generations to be present among the members of the Greek-American community, even in the younger generations. At times, the way Greek is spoken by younger generations of Greek-Americans does not only carry the influence of English words and English grammatical and syntactical constructions, but is also rich in older language forms of the Greek language that are not encountered in standard Greek today. Among these may be local idioms or regional grammatical structures, or even slang of the 1950s, that reflect a cultural freezing of the Greek-American language (Professor B 2014).

Overall, it is unclear whether the Greek school has been strong or weak, dominant or marginal, victim or victimizer, a success or a failure. According to the discussion throughout this chapter, evidence points to both directions and to mixed results.

I. Greek Primary and Secondary Education in the United States

Greek diaspora education in the United States is operated by the Archdiocese in partnership with the Greek state. The primary and secondary Greek education has two primary forms: Greek day schools and Greek afternoon or Saturday schools. The day schools are mostly
parochial, belonging to a particular parish, and, consequently, to the Archdiocese, but Greek public charter schools have appeared in the last decade or so and are gradually increasing in number. There is also one independent Greek private school. Charter schools are also independent both from the Archdiocese and from the Greek state.

These schools cover primary and some of them secondary education. The afternoon or Saturday schools offer afternoon or Saturday classes and cover only primary education students. They make up an extensive educational system of hundreds of Greek schools around the country. Greek education at the tertiary level is offered at colleges and universities across the United States for undergraduate and graduate students regardless whether they are of Greek origin or not. Nevertheless, the majority of the students in these classes tend to be of Greek origin. Thus, university level Greek education also has a strong diasporan dimension.

The creation and operation of Greek parish schools have been an experiment in community organization based on participatory action and democratic principles, and the evolutionary dynamics of community identity preservation and adaptation. It is a unique example of an extensive educational system that was initiated and exclusively operated by civil society for over one hundred years. Greek education was one of the early priorities of Greek immigrants, who wanted to ensure that their language and culture would pass on to their children. The Greek communities (parishes) undertook the responsibility of establishing Greek schools as either day schools (parochial) or afternoon/Saturday schools. Hence, the Greek churches became the organizations responsible for running these schools.
a. Greek Day Schools: From the Archdiocesan System to Charter Schools

The first Greek communities established churches and operated Greek schools in the absence of any system of central control and coordination. When the Archdiocese was created in the 1920s, Greek education started gradually to become more uniform and coordinated across the country. Decisions regarding the use of the Greek language and major Greek education issues were made by the clergy-laity congresses, the ultimate decision-making body of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese.

The Office of Greek Education of the Archdiocese, located at its headquarters in New York, became the ultimate authority on issues of Greek education in the United States, since the parochial day schools and the afternoon/Saturday Greek schools belonged to the Archdiocesan educational network. The Office of Greek Education today supervises a church-based school system, which is currently comprised of about 30 day parochial schools and about 340 afternoon/Saturday Greek schools across the country. As a result, Greek education in the United States at the levels of preschool, primary and secondary education is primarily under the direct supervision of the Church.

Parochial day schools were more numerous during the twentieth century but their number was, gradually, reduced since many of them closed down or were turned into afternoon and Saturday schools. In addition to the Archdiocesan system of Greek education, in the last decade or so a number of Greek public charter schools started appearing around the country. There is also one Greek day school that does not fall under the two categories of parochial or charter: it is an independent private non-profit school. Tables 5.1-5.14 in Appendix A present a list of all the Greek day schools in the United States.
Greek day schools (parochial or charter) are staffed by American and Greek-American educators, and educators from Greece who are employed in the Greek public education system and who are temporarily, usually for a few years, assigned to a Greek day school in the diaspora. The coordination of the placement and supervision of the educators sent from Greece takes place through the Greek education office of the Consulate General of Greece in New York. These educators are also paid by the Greek government as if they were teaching in a Greek public school but their pay is significantly increased, often doubled, while serving in the United States since they work outside of their national home base.\footnote{178} Educational material from Greece is also used by the Greek day schools since their curriculum is in some cases equivalent to the Greek national education curriculum.

The administration and control of these schools is not in the hands of the state but in the hands of the Archdiocese for parochial schools, or of school administrators and their states’ educational authorities for public charter schools. The administrative system of Greek day schools in the United States is very different from the administrative system of Greek day schools elsewhere, primarily in Europe. In the case of European states, Greek schools are essentially operating as Greek public schools, being established and run by the Greek state through its local representatives, rather than the local diaspora community. The educational independence, at least as far as the control and administration of educational institutions is concerned, of Greek schools in the United States illustrates the independence of the Greek-American community vis-à-vis the Greek state and the state’s acknowledgment of this situation and respect of the independence of the community.

\footnote{178} These salaries as well as the number of appointed educators in diaspora schools have significantly decreased recently due to the economic crisis.
The creation of Greek charter schools is a new and promising phenomenon in the context of Greek education in the United States. These schools, whose number is constantly increasing, have been met, for the most part, with significant success. They are public independent bilingual schools and their students are predominantly not of Greek ancestry in contrast to the Greek day schools affiliated with the Archdiocese which are geared primarily towards the Greek diaspora. Charter schools have to be approved by state authorities and they have to fulfill state requirements but they have freedom over the organization and content of their curriculum, their teaching methods and other aspects of the school’s operation. Charter schools are particularly popular in the American educational system, since they are often seen as the solution to the problems plaguing public education.

Charter schools are, hence, not educational institutions of/for the Greek diaspora but they are Greek education institutions that serve the greater American student public, including the diaspora. These schools were most often created by Greek or Greek-American educators but were not initiatives either of the community or the Greek state. Nevertheless, they have been generally supported by both. They usually teach Greek daily and, in some cases, they teach certain subjects, like math, in Greek. The Greek state has been very interested in the case of the Greek charter schools (“Ekthesi” 2008). Ambassador Petros Panagiotopoulos (2011b), who was the General Director of the General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized these schools exceptional cases. A number of charter schools have also organized student trips to Greece. A unique case among them is Plato Academy in Florida which has created a network of six Plato Academy schools in various cities in the state.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{179} According to the school’s official site \url{http://www.platoacademy.net/} [accessed 3/7/2014].
b. Greek After-School Education: The Archdiocesan School System of Afternoon/Saturday Greek Schools

The largest network of Greek schools in the United States is the network of Greek afternoon and Saturday schools operated by the Greek Orthodox parishes. Most Greek-Americans associate Greek education with the parish-based Greek School. However, the identification of Greek education with the Church presents certain challenges.

By conflating the idea that religious affiliation with the Greek-Orthodox Church automatically identifies someone as ethnically Greek, these schools present a singular notion of Greek-ness that in effect marginalizes some of the population that is in fact Greek. (Hantzopoulos 2012: 139)

Regardless of the centrality of the Orthodox faith in Greek identity and of the Church in the life of the Greek-American community, there is a small percentage of Greeks who do not wish to be affiliated with the church but are still interested in Greek education. At the same time, there are also members of the parishes who are not ethnically Greek and are not interested in Greek education.

According to the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America, there are approximately 340 Greek schools of this kind across the United States, serving more than 10,000 students of Greek origin in pre-K to grade 6 (“The Archdiocesan”).\(^{180}\) There is no Greek school for secondary education students. These schools are located in the church's building complex, usually in the basement, but several schools have their own large ground floor or

\(^{180}\) This number represents a decrease from 450 afternoon/Saturday Greek schools operating in 1970 (Soumakis 2010: 221).
upper level classrooms. They usually meet one to three times a week for a total of one to four
hours.

Often the schools have mixed classes with one teacher teaching to two or more grades
at the same time, depending on the number of children on each grade. The teachers are usually
Greek-born immigrants or university students from Greece but also, increasingly, American-
born Greeks. The families of the students do not have to be paid members of the parish
community but they get discounted tuition if they are. Students pay tuition but this is generally
low compared to other extracurricular student activities and very low compared to other foreign
language lessons. The teachers are paid, usually by the hour, a relatively low wage.

Most often the Greek schools do not have financial or administrative independence,
although there is usually a principal or director. The schools are considered part of the parish
and the church community and major decisions affecting the school, including hiring decisions,
are generally made by the parish council. The Greek schools, in addition to their weekly
lessons, hold celebrations that include performances and poem recitations for Christmas,
summer graduation and for the two Greek national holidays, the Greek Independence Day on
March 25 and, more rarely, for the anniversary of the entrance of Greece in World War II.

In addition to the extended network of Greek afternoon/Saturday schools under the
Archdiocese, there are also a few schools of this type that have other religious affiliation.
Although the Archdiocese is the dominant religious institution in the Greek-American
community, a small number of Greek religious communities that are not affiliated with the
Archdiocese also exist around the country. Among them are Greek Orthodox communities that
follow the old calendar and, as a result, do not belong to the Archdiocese, as well as very few
Greek Evangelical communities. These religious communities also have Greek schools that operate in a similar manner as the ones belonging to the Archdiocese but are completely independent from it.

Overall, the Greek schools of the Greek Evangelical communities stress the national character of Greek education and, thus, participate in the Greek Independence Day parades. The schools of the old calendar churches tend to focus on the linguistic and cultural aspects of Greek education, probably with less of a national tone to it. They also do not participate in parades, since their church wants to stress the distinction between the secular/political and the spiritual aspects of the community. Additionally to these parochial afternoon schools of other religious affiliations, there are also a small number of private, independent after-school/Saturday Greek schools that are not affiliated with any religious organization.

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\footnote{Most of these churches belong to the Church of Genuine Orthodox Christians of America and they are branches of the Church of Genuine Orthodox Christians of Greece, which was created as the result of a schism within the Church of Greece regarding the adoption of the new (Gregorian) calendar; but some are independent churches.}

\footnote{For example, the Greek School of Saint Mark of Ephesus Orthodox Cathedral (see http://www.stmarkofephesus.org/?page_id=17 [accessed on 3/10/2015]) in Westwood, MA or the schools under The Church of the Genuine Orthodox Christians of America (see http://www.hotca.org/directory/schools [accessed on 3/10/2015]). An example of the schools affiliated with the Greek Evangelical Church, a protestant denomination, is the Greek School of the Greek Evangelical Church of Boston, located in Newton, MA (see http://gecb.org/greek-school/ [accessed on 3/10/2015]).}

\footnote{An example is Greek for Kids, a private, non-profit, independent afternoon and Saturday Greek School in Newton, MA. For more information see http://www.greek-4-kids.com/ [accessed on 3/10/2015].}
c. The Role of the Greek State

The overall structure and dynamic of Greek education in the United States attests once more to the Greek-American community’s independence from the Greek state, the role of the Greek state as a partner to the community in issues of Greek language and culture, and the community’s commitment in preserving its culture and identity and passing it on to its children. The current legal framework that shapes the role of the Greek state in Greek education outside of Greece is set up by a recent law (voted on October 31, 2011) titled “Greek language education abroad and relevant provisions” (“Ellinoglossi Ekpaideusi sto Exoteriko kai alles diataxeis”) (ΦΕΚ Number 233 A'/04.11.2011, Law number 4027). According to this law, Article 1, §1, the Greek Ministry of Education and Religions has as its stated goals:

- a) the teaching, cultivation and promotion of Greek language and culture to citizens of the Greek diaspora and the world,
- b) the multifaceted development of the personality of the Greek students abroad with the preservation of elements of their Greek identity and the simultaneous reinforcement of mutual understanding, of peaceful coexistence and of cooperation between individuals and groups of different origins,
- c) the showcase of special cultural elements, traditions, history, knowledge and experience of the Greek diaspora and using them in a positive way, especially through the educational system,
- d) the mutual exchange and communication among all the communities of the Greek diaspora, on the basis of Greek history, language and culture,
- e) the creation of

international networks of Greek education through the use of new technologies aiming at lingual, educational and cultural exchange and action. (“Nomothetiko Ergo”)

The historical evolution of community organization in the case of the Greek-Americans and their close connection to the Church has created different conditions for the organization and operation of institutions of Greek education in the United States compared to other countries. Only during the military junta in Greece (1967-1974), did the Greek state attempt to have a more direct control of Greek education in the United States. This attempt proved to be quite harmful both for the Greek-American community and for Greek-American education, since it involved the exportation of authoritarian political culture and nationalist ideals in the diaspora. This was another attempt by the junta to connect itself to the diaspora both in the hope of gaining support and legitimacy, and for the purpose of empowering its national messianic role as the savior of the extended Greek nation.

In recent decades, the Special Secretariat for the Education of Diaspora Greeks and Inter-cultural Education was created as part of the Greek Ministry of National Education and Religions. The issues related to the education of diaspora Greeks fall under the jurisdiction of this Special Secretariat and its affiliated institutions. One of these institutions is the Institute for the Education of Diaspora Greeks and Intercultural Education. The majority of the work on diaspora educational issues, including the publication of textbooks and other educational material, the organization of relevant conferences and the training of diaspora teachers of Greek language, has been undertaken by a specialized research and academic affiliate of the Ministry of Education, the Laboratory for Intercultural and Migration Studies (Ε.DΙΑ.Μ.ΜΕ.), which is an institute of the University of Crete. Its most relevant activity is the program “Education of Diaspora Greeks” (“Padeia Omogenon”).
The Greek Ministry of Education, through the Education Coordinators, its representatives in the Greek diplomatic mission in the United States, partners with the Office of Greek Education of the Archdiocese and collaborates with it in specific ways: it arranges and funds the assignment of educators from Greece to the parochial day schools and Greek public charter schools — usually, only part of the staff of these day schools comes from Greece — it produces educational material through E.DIA.M.ME. for use in the Greek day and afternoon schools, it organizes activities for diaspora students, such as international competitions, and is generally supportive of the work of the Archdiocese and other Greek educational organizations. Until recently, there were two Education Coordinators representing the Ministry of Education, in the United States, one in the Greek Consulate General in New York and one in the Greek Consulate General in Chicago. However, due to the cut of expenditures because of the economic crisis, only one has remained in New York.

Every aspect of public administration has been affected by the economic crisis. Hence, public organizations are not working at full capacity or are completely failing to work properly due to lack of funds. This situation has also affected public institutions that work in the area of Greek education in the diaspora, including E.DIA.M.ME. The books that it produced have stopped being printed but can be downloaded online for free. E.DIA.M.ME. also used to organize training seminars for teachers of Greek. However, since 2011, E.DIA.M.ME. has not held any annual training seminars for diaspora teachers of Greek language. Moreover, the laboratory's online forum for Greek language teachers outside of Greece, called Diaspora
Forum, seems to be greatly underused with few postings, the latest dated in 2011, while it has more than 26,440 registered members.\textsuperscript{185}

A recent development on the part of the Greek Ministry of Education for all diaspora Greeks and other foreign students of Greek language is the creation of the \textit{Ellinomatheia} program, in the context of which students of Greek language in the United States and around the world can take a Greek language exam in specified examination centers.\textsuperscript{186} If they pass, these students are presented with certificates of competence, advanced knowledge or fluency in Greek, offered by the Greek state. The examination program is offered in three levels, each one being separated in two sub-levels.

This examination program is not only successful in encouraging young students to study Greek because they can achieve a particular goal, getting a certificate, but it is also successful in “upgrading” the knowledge of Modern Greek both in the eyes of Greek-Americans and in the eyes of the greater American society, to an “official” educational activity, instead of a parochial or family-based one, that offers a recognized certificate. Symbolically, the Greek state and the Greek Ministry of Education play an important role as the institutional representatives of Greek culture and identity. For this reason, both the educational authorities of the Archdiocese and the students and families of the Greek schools look towards the Greek

\textsuperscript{185} For more information, see E.DIA.M.ME., Paideia Omogenon, Diaspora Fourm, \url{http://www.ediamme.edc.uoc.gr/diasporaforum/} [accessed April 3, 2014]

\textsuperscript{186} The exam program \textit{Ellinomatheia} is offered by the Greek Language Center in Thessaloniki, an institution that is under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and which cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Pistopoiisi Ellinomatheias”). The goal of the Center is the support of the Greek language, its teaching and learning, inside and outside of Greece (Ibid.). For the purpose of the \textit{Ellinomatheia} exams, the Center has certified different exam centers around the world, usually at Greek educational or community institutions (Ibid.).
state for material, inspiration, support and, in the case of the examination process, approval of their proper knowledge of the Greek language.

There is a shared attitude among the different state institutions and political parties in Greece that there is need for improvement of the Greek education programs abroad to make them more effective. There is a list of problems that all responsible state institutions recognize the need for: better training of diaspora educators; improvement of the physical spaces and facilities that host such schools and programs; the creation of updated and appropriate teaching materials that address the needs of foreign language learners; the creation of materials that include a comprehensive view of Greek culture; and the use of modern technologies, like distance learning capabilities. Dimitrios Dollis, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed also the emphasis that has to be given to early education as well as to the teaching of Greek as a foreign language to the children of the diaspora, both measures aiming at a more effective teaching and learning of the Greek language (“Praktika” 2011a: 9-10).

The Greek state also actively promotes the educational visits of diaspora youth to Greece. The General Secretariat for Greeks Abroad offers a series of very popular hospitality programs that target the Greek diaspora youth and aim at strengthening its bonds with Greece. However, these programs have been strongly affected by the expenditure cuts due to the ongoing economic crisis.

In the context of these programs, young Greeks from abroad have been hosted by the Greek government and participate in a number of activities that aim at introducing them to modern Greece, strengthening their Greek cultural identity, creating friendships between young Greeks from different places in the world and young Greeks in Greece, and rewarding good students who have a good knowledge of the Greek language and a love for Greek people
and culture (“Programmata Filoxenias”). Moreover, the General Secretariat has two camps for children of the Greek diaspora that focus on Greek cultural and educational activities (Ibid.). In addition to these official hospitality activities, Greek-American organizations and other organizations in Greece also organize similar trips and summer programs. Summer language schools and regular summer camps are other options for a more structured summer experience in Greece for Greek-American students.

d. Evaluation of the Greek School System\textsuperscript{187}

The present system of Greek diaspora education has numerous critics among families, teachers, community organizations, experts, and Greek state authorities. Ambassador Panagiotopoulos (2011b), for example, has expressed his concern that the richness of the Greek language is undermined in the context of the present situation. Due to the dominance of the afternoon/Saturday Greek schools in the Greek-American educational experience, the evaluation of the current status of Greek diaspora education will focus primarily on them.

In 1998, the then Archbishop Spyridon created an expert- and professionally-staffed Commission on Greek Language and Hellenic Culture that would study the condition of the Greek parish schools and would recommend solutions. The conclusion of the Commission was that “Although we witnessed much that is commendable, we also encountered areas of

\textsuperscript{187}This evaluation, as well as the subsequent recommendations for educational reform, are the result of a long-term study of the Greek diaspora educational system in an observer-participant role as a teacher in Greek afternoon/Saturday schools in the Metropolis of Boston for six years. Almost all of the evaluation points as well as most recommendations also agree with the findings of the 1999 Report from the Archbishop’s Commission on Greek Language and Hellenic Culture entitled “The Future of the Greek Language and Culture In the United States: Survival in the Diaspora” (“The Future” 1999).
disturbing weakness in the system” (Rassias 1999) and presented recommendations of action “with a sense of great urgency” (Ibid.), pointing to “persistent structural and systemic problems” (“The Future” 1999).

Greek education policies and practices in the United States throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries have produced mixed results. The Greek Orthodox Church in America has to be credited with sustaining the Greek identity, language and education from the beginning of the presence of Greek immigrants in the United States and into the twenty-first century. The existence of day schools and of an extended network of afternoon/Saturday schools found almost in every Greek-Orthodox parish, have made access to Greek education easy and socially expected. According to Hantzopoulos (2012),

While many disagree about the effectiveness of such after-school educational initiatives as sole vehicles of language acquisition, the data reveals that these schools serve as important spaces to facilitate the development of the Greek language, curb language loss and preserve some specific aspects of Greek culture. (Ibid., 139)

Being part of the parish, the Greek school has also reinforced a sense community among the students’ families, which is an important component of the diasporic Greek identity.

The role of the school as part of the parish, reinforces the emotional and social connections among members of the community. Families of a certain parish or Greek school are often connected to each other through marriage and other familial relations. The role of koumbaros is particularly dominant and important in Greek social networks, since it provides a way to create family-type bonds with other Greek families with which one may or may not
be connected by blood or marriage. Such family and social connections are noted within and among Greek-American parishes, schools and organizations.

Many times students have not only their siblings but also multiple cousins at their Greek school. Family and other social bonds also unite teachers, school directors and families of students and alumni within and among Greek schools. Hence, the Greek school in its current rather exclusive form caters to the emotional and social needs of the students, their families and everyone involved, and acts as an extension of the Greek family. Socializing through the community organizations, including Greek schools, at any age, often leads to the creation of additional family or family-type bonds among community members.

Regardless of its emotional and communal dimension, the Greek school experience has not been positive for many students and their families. There are cases of students who chose to disconnect from their Greek heritage and identity at least partly due to their negative experience at Greek school. In less problematic cases, families opted out of Greek school either for private lessons or dropped out of learning Greek altogether. Although the schools may have taught the language to many Greek-Americans through the years, it has been primarily those who already spoke Greek at home who benefited, adding the literacy aspect to their prior knowledge of the language. Teaching Greek as a foreign language emerged only recently as a concept and has not, yet, matured as a teaching methodology. Moreover, it has not been fully or adequately implemented in Greek schools.

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188 Koumbaros is used both for (the approximate equivalent of) the best man at one's wedding, and for the god-father of one's children. Koumbara is the equivalent for women with reference to the roles of the maid of honor and the god-mother. These are life-long family-type bonds among individuals and their families and a way of extending family relations beyond blood relations or relations through marriage.
With the exception of updated textbooks that attempt to reflect the approach of teaching Greek as a foreign language, no major reform of the expansive Greek school system has taken place at the archdiocesan or parish level. It is interesting that problems pointed out in a 1964 study of the Greek-American community by Kontargyris, continue to plague much of the Greek school system today. All these long-term fundamental problems of Greek education have implications for Greek-American culture and identity, for the cohesion of the community and for Greek foreign policy.

As a starting point, the physical aspect of many Greek schools is rather problematic. In many cases, classes take place in rooms that are not appropriate classrooms, sometimes being created through setting up temporary walls and other constructions. Often, Greek school classrooms are in the basement of the church without windows or with very small windows, and experience a number of problems associated with spaces located in basements. In many cases, school decoration and set up have historically tended to be dry and non-student-friendly, especially compared to their American school environments.

The school environment often lacks interesting and pedagogical elements that could render learning a fun, playful and intellectually stimulating activity. Overall, Greek schools most often do not have the appearance of a professional educational institution. Although this situation is not the same across all schools, it, nevertheless, has been dominant for a long time and is still plaguing schools today. However, the aesthetic symbolism of the learning environment in Greek Schools has special significance because the school image virtually defines concepts like Greek identity, Greek language and Greek culture in the student’s mind. Although there are often significant practical limitations that are partly responsible for the poor aesthetic condition of Greek schools, the result is that Greece is presented to the students, some
of whom many never visit it, through the images that the school generates; if these are negative images, they will stay with the students in the long term.

The problem of the physical appearance of the school and the classrooms, which plays a critical role in the student's learning and overall school experience, is associated with more fundamental and structural problems that Greek schools have been facing. The Greek school is part of the parish. It does not have administrative independence but it is supervised by the parish council, often through a School Committee. A parish council has many issues to take care of and has, primarily, to safeguard the operation of the church.

Therefore, the school often lacks the attention and definitely lacks the independence to organize and to run fully as an educational institution, in the form of a professional language and culture school; instead it functions as an auxiliary to the community, as one of the church’s activities. Thus, the school space may turn into storage area during the church's annual festivals or luncheons. Space limitation is indeed an issue in parishes but this situation not only undermines the operation of the school but also, symbolically, shows that the school is a lower priority to food festivals and fundraising with implications regarding both the content and the status of Greek culture and Greek education in the context of the parish community. Since the ultimate decision makers regarding the school are generally the priest and the parish council members, the school may get trapped, as it is often the case, in a situation where its decision-makers may not speak Greek, may not be educated themselves, may not consider Greek education a priority and may not even favor the operation of the Greek school.

The premise of the operation of Greek school is cultural preservation (Professor B 2014); hence it is instrumentalized for the preservation of the community rather than being recognized for its inherent educational value. Critics of the current system argue that its
primary goal is the preservation of the parish structure (Ibid.) rather than educational attainment. When there are a priest and a parish council that favor Greek education, the school may run smoothly and be supported. But when there are not — and parish councils change quite often — significant problems for the school’s operation may arise. This is a situation that will probably be experienced even more often in the future with the increase of non-Greek-speaking priests and parish council members who may value Greek education less, or who may consider it irrelevant to the church and its primarily spiritual function.

The administrative set up of the parishes is such that, although it encourages a democratic and participatory dynamic in the parish assembly and in the parish council, it does not reserve a comparable decision-making role for the school, since the school is administered either by the parish council directly or by the School Committee, at least as far as major administrative and financial issues are concerned. In some cases, there is greater micro-management by the council or the committee. The School Committee, which in many cases is not an active institution, is appointed and not elected. At the same time there is, often, a lack of transparency and clarity as to the committee’s role, dynamics and legitimacy, it may not be adequately supportive and cooperative towards the school, and it may not operate properly. However, there are also cases where the School Committee is indeed very active and supportive and schools that experience such a support by the Committee, the priest and the parish council may flourish.

The above analysis points to deficiencies in the basic administrative structures with respect to the school which often does not function properly in support of Greek education. Moreover, the only truly participatory element within the school community, which may not coincide with the parish community, is the PTO which plays primarily a supportive and, rarely, an advisory role. The relationship between the school and the parish council is a hierarchical
one, with the parish council at the top of the hierarchy. Soumakis (2010: 219) points to a gendered dimension of the decision-making dynamics with respect to Greek education. Although it was the Greek and Greek-American women who operated the Greek education system, “It was the church hierarchy which articulated the needs of the Greek immigrant community and constructed a physical and ideological space for women to fulfil those needs” (Ibid.).

The finances of the Greek school are another important issue. Since there is no administrative independence, there is also no financial independence. Usually, the schools do not have a separate fund or account; consequently, they are even more dependent on the parish council and more vulnerable when these parish councils are not seeing them favorably. And even when they do see them favorably, they may disagree among themselves regarding which are the priorities that should be funded first. Especially when funds are low, it is a higher priority, and understandably so, to pay the church's operational bills than to build a library for the Greek school. They generally, although not always, cover one basic operational expense, teacher salaries, but it is very difficult to extend funding beyond this basic expense in many cases.

The low amount of tuition leads to an imbalance between income and expenses with respect to the school. As a result, for many parishes Greek schools represent a financial loss, making some question their financial viability and refer to the Greek school as a wasteful activity of the church, while for others, if the Greek school does well financially, it is seen as a way for the parish to make money. At the same time, there are occasionally parishes that undertake the whole financial responsibility of operating the Greek School without charging tuition. In any case, operational and school improvement budgets are most often never created
or seriously taken into account. Nevertheless, they are crucial for the proper and effective operation of any educational organization.

The lack of separate and adequate funding (Professor B 2014) lies at the source of most problems of Greek schools. Funding is necessary for classroom decoration, for the purchase of books and other educational materials, and, primarily, for hiring and sustaining a trained and dedicated teaching staff. Teacher wages, usually paid by the hour, have historically, been low and inadequate, and continue to be so (Ibid.). Teachers may be paid as low as a few dollars more than market hourly rates for babysitting. Or, they may be paid more depending on their qualifications and on the finances of the church. There are some churches that pay a higher amount, around $50 an hour but this is generally very rare.

The low teacher wages lie at the heart of the school problems for a number of reasons: a) schools cannot attract qualified teachers, b) schools cannot keep qualified teachers once they realize the amount of extra, non-paid, work that needs to be done to sustain a quality program, and c) even the teachers who agree to be paid this amount cannot, practically, dedicate the amount of time necessary to enhance the quality of the school because they cannot afford to work numerous extra hours for free.

On the one hand, teaching at a Greek school is an actual part-time job because it requires many more hours than the few hours of teaching per week in order to prepare the lesson, set-up the classroom, collaborate with the other teachers and the director of the school, communicate with parents, be involved in other school activities, organize and participate in school celebrations beyond the regular school time, work on the overall development and improvement of the school and on their own professional development as educators. The 2
hours of teaching per week can easily average to 10 hours, if you take into account all of these responsibilities.

On the other hand, teaching is not paid even closely to a part-time job, and the same is true in most cases for the compensation of the director who has an even greater responsibility of running the whole program. This problem is also associated with the very low tuition charged. In an attempt to make Greek school accessible to all the families, tuition is very low compared to any other extracurricular activities the students are involved in, especially when these activities involve foreign language lessons. The difference is as great as, for example $3/hour cost for Greek School vs. more than $40/per hour cost for group classes of foreign languages in the Boston area.

The problem with the low tuition is not only a lack of adequate funding of the school, its programs and its teachers. It also acts symbolically as a factor that undermines the overall value of Greek education and Greek language compared to other skills, especially other languages, and student activities. It is human nature to value something that is expensive — this is reflected on economic laws — and to consider “cheap” something that is actually cheap, especially in the context of an educational and professional market where you have to pay well for almost every service or activity. Even in the case of American educational activities that are free, there is a major corporate or organization sponsor that undertakes all the financial expenses of the activity in order to offer a quality program to all families for free.

The implications of the finances of Greek diaspora education — both at a symbolic level and with respect to the serious compromise of the quality of educational programs — for the image of Greek language and culture are obvious. The low pay of the teachers, the low tuition and the very low investment in Greek schools reflect at attitude according to which
Greek activities are expected to be free, and the work of the teachers and the sustainability of the schools are dependent primarily on the Greek *philotimo* (sense of honor) of everyone involved rather than on professional standards. This situation reinforces the parochialism of Greek education within the context of a highly demanding American educational environment.

The teaching staff is the most important asset of any school. However, the lack of support of the teachers reflects a lack of respect for them and the work they are doing and directly undermines the school. The work of the Greek school teachers and their requests are not taken seriously and they are considered secondary personnel (Professor B 2014). Chicago area Greek educational institutions are an exemption due to the fact that the insular community of the city is highly vigilant with regards to issues of quality Greek education (Ibid.), so it is in a better position compared to the rest of the country.

Very often it is difficult to find any teachers at all, not to mention qualified teachers. Lack of teacher training and teaching effectiveness are also problematic points. Many times the teachers do not have any higher education credentials. Among those who have, only few have educational training, most of the time in a different subject and age group than the ones they are called to teach at Greek school. At the same time, almost none has adequate training in teaching Greek as a second language, other than limited, occasional seminars organized by the Greek Ministry of Education in Greece, where only very few are able to go.

Several decades ago the need to train teachers was first noted. Saint Basil's Academy, established in 1944 in Garrison, New York was the educational institution that trained Greek School teachers until 1972 (Soumakis 2010: 221).\(^\text{189}\) St. Basil's also trained teachers to serve

\(^{189}\) An initial plan by the school’s first Dean of Studies, a highly educated Greek-American woman, was to expand St. Basil’s College to a three-year college with a comprehensive and up-to-date training program for its students in education, child development, Greek language,
in the parishes as secretaries, consequently the role of the Greek school teacher was that of being a ‘community servant’ and assistant to the priest in running the administrative, educational and even liturgical operations of the parish (Ibid., 223-224).

This perspective also had implications not only for the service role of women in parishes but also for the role of Greek schools as institutions that would be supportive to the parish. Hence, Greek School and Greek education was limited in scope in order to be a supportive institution of the Greek-American parish rather than being a professional and outward looking educational institution. The Archdiocese, although it was the lifeline for Greek diaspora education, limited and circumscribed Greek education’s role.

The low educational standards of St. Basil compared to similar teacher training programs at American universities, influenced the educational content and operation of Greek Schools, since these remained outside of the developments in American education, due to the fact that their teachers, who were at best St. Basil’s graduates, were kept out of such developments. Therefore, Greek schools remained “oases” of old-style Greek instructional and institutional organizations in the midst of American educational modernization. When the

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190 According to Professor Counelis’ evaluation of the school upon the request of Archbishop Iakovos at the time: “The Archdiocese’s efforts were haphazard and incomplete; they wished to educate Greek women on their terms, while limiting the positions they could occupy within the community. Greek Orthodox women could engage in teaching, secretarial, and social service work under the auspices of the parish priest. Yet, according to Counelis, the professional training they were receiving was so poor, he felt it was better to close down the school altogether” (Soumakis 2010: 226). Criticism of St. Basil’s also referred to its reproduction of a Greek institutional model, which was alien and unappealing to Greek-American women (Ibid., 227).
teacher training center closed down due to its inability to reach educational standards that
would enable its accreditation, it was decided to merge with the Hellenic College (Soumakis
2010: 229). Thus, Hellenic College incorporated teacher training in its undergraduate
programs, absorbing the students of St. Basil into its own student body. However, a very small
percentage of Greek school teachers are graduates of Hellenic College, who have gone through
either elementary education or human development training or who have followed the
specialized track for teaching Greek as a foreign language.

Moreover, the teachers' knowledge of Greek is many times problematic. Increasingly,
teachers are American-born Greeks, who may be fluent — in the best case — but, nevertheless,
make significant grammatical mistakes in oral and, especially, written Greek. Even among the
Greek-born teachers, not everyone has excellent knowledge of Greek grammar, vocabulary,
syntax and spelling or even Greek history and culture. In other words, being a native speaker
of a language does not make you necessarily a good language teacher. The above mentioned
problems, especially the low pay and the lack of adequate support, lead to a high teacher
turnover which may, on the one hand, have the advantage of renewing the teaching staff with
new approaches and ideas, and, especially, newcomers from Greece but, on the other,
complicates and accentuates the situation, especially with regards to the lack of teacher training
or teaching experience.

Greek schools are also characterized by an environment that lacks cooperation. Unlike
American schools, there is no active and systematic sharing of teaching ideas, methods and
materials among Greek school teachers and across Greek schools (Educator A 2014). This is

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191 Saint Basil’s still operates as a home for children whom their parents cannot care for and as
a school for these children.
the exact opposite from the attitude officially promoted in the American educational system which cultivates sharing of material, ideas, activities, teaching methods and tips. The lack of organization of these teaching resources, and dissemination among teachers undermines the professionalism of the institution, since many teachers either lack knowledge of the existence of such resources or access to them.

Therefore, an overall culture of teacher support that could make up for lack of training and other organizational problems, is lacking. Overall, the lack of interest in investing, literally and figuratively, in the present and future of the afternoon/Saturday Greek school system has been ever-present and wide-spread with important implications for the operation of Greek schools, the quality of Greek-American education and Greek policy goals. As a result, with few exceptions, Greek schools continue to exist but not to flourish as they could, while the most valuable possession of the schools, the teachers’ enthusiasm and love for the Greek language, the Greek culture and for teaching, is often sooner or later crushed by the many problems of the school system, leading many of the teachers to either leave the school system or compromise with a reality of low inputs and low expectations and invest as little of them as possible in Greek diaspora education.

Another on-going criticism of the Greek schools since their inception and up to this date has been their disconnect from the American educational reality, including the lack of teaching methods, practices, activities and material that would parallel the ones used in American schools, making the Greek school experience more pleasant, more effective and more familiar to Greek-American students. In terms of the teaching materials, through the years there have been attempts to update the textbooks and to create various supportive educational material. The material produced in Greece is now accessible via online downloads and there is also a new series of textbooks for all levels produced by the Greek Office of the
Archdiocese that reflects a leveled approach to teaching Greek as a second language with the inclusion of cultural elements.

Very popular among teachers and students of Greek schools are also the series of textbooks and supportive educational material produced by Dr. Papaloizos, a long-time writer and producer of Greek-American educational material, through his own organization, Papaloizos Publications. What is currently lacking, however, is texts that can be used as leveled readers since children's books from Greece cannot be easily accessible to the majority of the Greek school students due to their limited knowledge of the language. Moreover, there is no curriculum that would act as the basis of a systematic and coordinated educational system that could assist the teachers, especially when they lack adequate experience, and which would cover all the necessary elements of Greek culture.

Teaching methods and practices in Greek schools have, historically, followed the model of schools in Greece which did not address the needs of Greek-American students and were quite foreign to them. The lessons have been dominated by a textbook while students have to be seated throughout the lesson, both practices being basic elements of the traditional teaching method used in Greece. This learning framework is probably less effective and very different from the one used in American schools where no textbooks are used through the first grades of elementary school. Instead, interactive, play-based learning through hands-on activities that require movement in the classroom is dominant.

The American practices reflect scientifically-based strategies that enhance learning and love of learning. Greek schools use textbooks and a textbook-based approach, often as early as pre-K classes. Although the mere use of textbooks is not necessarily problematic, the central and exclusive role of the textbook as the primarily or only teaching aid at the expense of any
hands-on, play-based, creative and interactive learning experiences is indeed problematic. The overreliance on the textbooks happens due to the fact that there are no teaching strategies for teaching Greek as a foreign language that center on oral speech — the key in foreign language learning — and which do not involve the textbook. The only exception would be if the teacher has prior knowledge of such methods or develops her own based on personal research.

However, such strategies are crucial since textbooks have not proven to be the most effective teaching aids for teaching a foreign language — possibly, even for other subjects. This is especially relevant to younger ages, whose primary ways of learning do not involve textbooks but rather play, movement and their senses. There are plenty of teaching methods that can be adapted from the American educational system, especially those employed in teaching English as a Second Language and in early education, and from various resources available online which incorporate hands-on learning in a variety of topics and age groups and are very effective and appealing as teaching tools.

The timing of most Greek school lessons, which often take place in the afternoon, has not been conducive to effective teaching and learning. The students are often burdened with what happened during the day at their American school (Educator A 2014). Moreover, Greek school takes place during the time that they need a break following a long school day (Ibid.). Some of the old Greek school regulations also did not allow the students to have a snack or water during their lesson (Ibid.), which coincided with snack time in the regular schedule of the American student. Saturday morning classes, which are increasingly the case across Greek Schools, do not have these problems, but Saturday schools only meet once a week, while afternoon schools often meet twice.
Pessimism is, usually, prevalent among community and church leaders regarding the future of Greek schools and the Greek language, which has implications for Greek-American identity and for the Greek-American community. They, generally, identify the lack of interest by Greek-American families in Greek education as the main cause of the problem. However, the cause is not mainly the lack of interest but rather the low educational quality of the school system that many families do not tolerate and, consequently, leave the Greek school, bringing the enrollment down (Professor B 2014). The low quality is primarily due to the lack of investment and strategic design, as well as due to the mental framework regarding the significance, relevance and content of Greek education. These underlying factors lead to a lack of interest and faith in Greek schools.

As educational, parenting and child-rearing standards are raised and become more sophisticated, parent demands upon Greek school become greater. However, most often the school, in its present condition, cannot meet these demands for the various reasons that are analyzed here. In cases where it attempts to do so, it meets great obstacles. Overall, Greek schools have historically offered an experience in Greek language and Greek education devoid of a strategic and comprehensive curriculum, interesting activities and intellectual challenge, although exceptions of dedicated, creative and resourceful Greek teachers never cease to exist.

To make matters worse, throughout the twentieth century, and even today, there has also been tension between Greek and Sunday schools within the Greek-American parishes for the loyalties of their students and for access to the limited resources available to them. This tension between the two schools often reflects a tension between the Greek-speaking and non-Greek-speaking sides of the community, since the two schools use Greek and English respectively. Each side was often primarily concerned with promoting the interests of one school over the other. This subtle — and, at times, not so subtle — conflict cultivated and also
reflected the competing versions of Greek-American identity: an identity focused on Greek language and connection with Greece versus an identity that was centered on Greek Orthodox faith and was culturally more Americanized.

Last, the form and operation of the Greek-American education system has significant implications for the content of Greek culture and identity, as it both reflects and shapes the perceptions of Greek-Americans regarding these concepts. Greek identity is a layered identity, which includes an emotional connection to family, to personal history and to memories at its core. Other layers include social relations and community ties, and cultural beliefs and practices that define the experience of the group. The outermost layer includes the outward-looking, universal Greek cultural and philosophical values, which may be secular or religious, of a diachronic character.

The borders defining each layer are rather porous, since emotional significance may be attached to intellectual principles, while the distinction between family and community ties may disappear. As a diaspora community institution, Greek-American schooling has multiple roles to fulfil: psychological, social, educational, cultural, diplomatic. However, the Greek-American education does not approach Greek culture and identity holistically, addressing all of these identity layers at the same time: the outward and the inward, the communal and the individual, the intellectual and the emotional.

The structure of the educational system, due to its lack of professional mentality, approach and standards, allows the accentuation of problematic behaviors. Observers argue that it reflects deficiencies of culture, interventionism, internal conflicts, individualism, protectionism, and the dominance of a double identity: professional vs. personal (Professor B 2014). This structure enables the emergence of conflictual dynamics regarding who is the agent
who enacts the heritage promotion, who is more relevant or has more authority to talk about modern Greece (Ibid.). The analysis of Greek education in the United States points to the fact that Greek Schools face significant quality problems that should be addressed, while the place of Greek education and Greek school within the American educational experience should be redefined.

Summing up the analysis of Greek education, we note that the intimate connection of the two institutions, the Church and the Greek School, although it has provided for the creation and long-term basic support of the latter, it, nevertheless, involves an unavoidable conflict of institutional goals since both institutions are after the same, limited resources while their priorities, visions and needs may differ substantially. This conflict takes place in the context of a clear institutional hierarchy that prioritizes ecclesiastical over educational goals.

The existence of parallel institutional structures that are nevertheless closely affiliated would avoid the conflict produced by a hierarchical placement of the institutions and their respective goals. Nevertheless, the continuation of Greek education within the church system provides a practical and emotional safety net that ensures access to the very basic resources, although it may prevent access to others, while it also cultivates the Greek identity within the context of a kinship-based religious community.

**e. Evaluation of the Greek State’s Policy Approach**

So far we have attempted an analysis of the wide-spread Greek school system which is the primary institution of Greek education for the diaspora youth in the United States. The Greek state is expected to play a supportive role with respect to Greek schools in the United
States, empowering and enriching the overall educational experience. However, leaders of the Greek-American community are often quite critical of what they perceive as the state’s lack of interest and action with respect to Greek diaspora education (Vidalis 2014).

Although the Greek state is not the primary supervisor of these schools, it does have certain responsibilities. On the one hand, it has produced a wide variety of books that are finally somewhat adjusted to the realities of American-born non-Greek-speaking students, but, on the other, there are still weaknesses in its overall approach to Greek education in the diaspora. The underlying assumption of Greek policy, according to Professor Damanakis (2007), head of E.DIA.M.M.E. and one of the most influential experts in diaspora educational policy, is that the Greek diaspora students should be seen through a sociological lens that explains how children of immigrant families relate to their environment. Along these lines, he believes Greek-American children should be taught about the Greek immigrant experience and study how a Greek diaspora child connects to his own Greek-American community and other Greek communities around the world (Ibid., 211-213).

However, this overall approach, although it does address certain psychological needs, presents some fundamental problems. First, the Greek language and culture are seen as very limited concepts; they are the language and culture of a certain immigrant group. In this approach the Greek case is not differentiated from other immigrant experiences. However, there is a special relationship between the Greek and English language, not to mention between Greek culture and Western civilization in general, which is unlike the relationship between English and any other immigrant language.¹⁹²

¹⁹² Except for German, since English is a Germanic language. Another possible exception to this could be the Italian language due to its Latin background. However, there is a closer
English is heavily indebted to the Greek language on which the English vocabulary for science, technology, philosophy, humanities, social science and other subjects is based. Greek history and culture is connected to the American culture in a unique way. American political thought was founded on the basis of ancient Greek prototypes. This is a connection that the American state tried to reinforce through Greek-inspired public architecture. All of this significance and relevance of the Greek language and culture not only for America but for the global community is missing in a policy approach that treats the students primarily as sociological subjects of immigration studies.

For Greek-American students, Greek education should illustrate this connection between diachronic Greek and American culture, politics, science and other realms. Hence, the emphasis should not be on creating lesson plans based on a Greek-American child's visit to the local Greek-American grocery store, as Professor Damanakis is suggesting in his curriculum for the Greek diaspora (Damanakis 2007: 211, 213), but on the ecumenical significance of Greek language and culture. In this manner, the whole immigrant community is lifted from its marginalized condition and its ethnic image is significantly upgraded. Otherwise, a fundamental comparative advantage that the Greek language and culture have will be lost.

An approach that was particularly sensitive to the vulnerability of the immigrant might have been appropriate for the early massive waves of uneducated Greek immigrants and their descendants in the first decades of the twentieth century at a time of racism and xenophobia. However, it is not adequate or appropriate as the main policy principle in the context of a multicultural normative framework and at a time when Greek-Americans have reached high levels of socio-economic success. The Greek diaspora policy reflects a deeper lack of connection among Ancient Greek, Modern Greek, and English than among Latin, Italian, and English despite the common Latin alphabet that unites the latter group.
understanding of the educational systems and political cultures of the countries where the diaspora resides.

Therefore, a uniform approach is employed across the diasporic realm to address certain issues, for example, with respect to the production of textbooks. State-produced educational materials are not adapted to the educational philosophy and methods of each country of residence, while significant differences across these countries exist. Such an adaptation would be particularly important in cases of countries with a sophisticated educational culture and a highly developed educational system.

This problematic approach to diaspora education is associated with a disconnect between Greek educational and cultural policies. These are distinct policies but they are conceptually interconnected. The problem is that this conceptual interconnection is not adequately translated into practice. Therefore, the audiences remain distinct; Greek education, especially in the younger ages, serves the diaspora children while cultural policy targets the larger population.

However, Greek education, especially in the younger ages, should not be reserved only for the Greek diaspora but should target a wider American audience as the vehicle of ancient and diachronic Greek ideals, of research and science, of art and creativity, of philosophy and democracy. The Greek School has a unique opportunity: it can take over the role of classical education based on the teaching of the live form of the ancient language since classical education tends to be eliminated for the purpose of empowering technology and STEM-based educational approaches and curricula.

Elements that are associated with the broader, ecumenical Greek culture are reserved for the realm of cultural policy. They are considered to be of interest to a larger audience. These
elements of the bright Greek culture are not adequately stressed or are even completely missing from Greek education, as if they should be reserved for the non-Greeks while the Greeks should only be educated in the esoteric elements of their immigrant culture and use the language only as an immigrant code to communicate with each other.

According to Professor Constantinides (2007: 20), “The Greek diaspora is a cultural realm. Its dialectic relationship with the metropolitan Greek center is an important element that will allow its survival.” Indeed such a relationship is necessary. However, part of the problem of Greek education in the United States is that historically, it has been the result of a mostly unidirectional dimension of the relationship between the Greek state and the diaspora, as the influence from Greece has dominated the relationship dynamics. This has led to a homeland-diaspora transmission not only of the Greek language and culture but also of the problems associated with education in Greece, including problems with antiquated and low quality teaching material and methods, and rigid structures. Consequently, Greek-American education has been devoid of all the positive influences from the American education system due to its attachment of an educational philosophy centered on the Greek state.

Ideally, Greek education in the United States should offer a combination of the best practices and material from Greece and the United States. In that case, the diaspora would indeed work as a bridge of productive communication and cooperation between the two cultures. A side benefit of such cooperation could even be a positive influence of American educational models on the education policy and system in Greece, through the expansion and adjustment of a good pilot program of diaspora education that combines Greek content with American educational methods.\footnote{Many teachers in Greece, especially in early education and first elementary grades, being empowered by communications technology, make already use of creative ideas from the} Thus, creative teaching methods, project-based learning and
student-centered teaching that can be applied on the teaching of Greek language in the United States, can also contribute to the renewal of the educational system in Greece (Rapti 2014).

Although the Greek state is expected to have a significant role in the context of Greek diaspora education, part of the problems affecting the quality of this education is the exclusive reliance to a central authority, either to the state or to the Church, for educational resources, material and guidelines. As it has been discussed, the Greek state is seen as carrying the burden of educational responsibility, which is illustrated in state rhetoric and in the legal and constitutional frameworks. The United States is a country with a fundamental faith in private enterprise and initiatives. Nevertheless, although the product of civil society, Greek-American education follows more of a Greek public school model either in the parochial day schools or in the afternoon/Saturday programs.

The lack of private non-profit initiatives in setting up new Greek day schools and after-school programs or in the production of teaching material, with the exception of the widely-used Papaloizos publications, limits the possibilities for high quality Greek diaspora education. Such private activity would not undermine but rather reinforce the quality of the church school network, creating positive competition and collaboration. The example of Papaloizos Publications, which offer a complete series of textbooks, online resources and other educational material, attests to the fact that more Greek-American-produced material and schooling would benefit Greek education. The Papaloizos books are much more popular and widely-used in Greek Schools than the textbooks produced by the Archdiocese, since teachers find the former easier to use and more appropriate for learners of Greek as a foreign language.

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American and other international educational systems around the world. However, these are individual initiatives rather than state-sponsored teaching practices.
There is a wide-spread attitude in Greece according to which the Greek state should not promote individual Greek businesses. However, by promoting Greek businesses, especially abroad, the Greek economy benefits. The Greek state would enhance Greek diaspora education and the Greek economy at the same time if it played the role of facilitator between private production of children’s books and educational material in Greece and the Greek-American community. However, there is no attempt by the Greek state to promote private Greek educational material (books, toys, etc.) or opportunities (summer camps, summer schools, etc.), which are necessary and extremely helpful for Greek-American students. Except for an online marketplace operated by the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese which offers a limited number of Greek children's books, there has been no large scale attempt to connect Greek-American families and schools to educational products or resources from Greece.

Last, the diplomatic significance of Greek schools is overlooked, while their great potential is not recognized. Greek schools can be agents of cultural and educational diplomacy, having the ability to create a knowledge-based environment of mutual respect and understanding between Greece and the United States. This presents a paradigm shift in the approach toward Greek diaspora education which has been predominantly seen as an extension of the Greek national education system.

Although the political role of Greek schools as nation-building agents in the diaspora was prominent in the history of Greek-American education, their diplomatic role, which is particularly relevant and suitable in the context of contemporary global norms and political dynamics, has remained greatly undermined and underused. The uniqueness of Greek schools is that they are not official state organizations that target a foreign audience but they are civil-society, grassroots, knowledge-based organizations of transnational character. As a result,
through their autonomous diasporic dimension, the domestic becomes foreign and the foreign
domestic.

f. Suggested Educational Reforms

These reforms target primarily the expansive afternoon/Saturday Greek School system.

*Adjustment of Policy Goals*

Diaspora education policy needs to be reframed and its goals readjusted. The reform of
the current system of Greek education is necessary in order to achieve three main goals within
a new framework for diaspora education policy. The first goal is to enhance the cultural identity
of the Greek-American community and expand it beyond certain common cultural markers.
This will contribute to self-esteem and pride of Greek heritage and can reinvigorate and
empower Greek-American communities and their organizations. It can also offer an appealing
cultural alternative to those who have chosen to refrain both from the community and from the
traditional expressions of their ethnic identity, since it recasts their cultural heritage in a
different light.

The second goal is to enrich culturally the greater American society, both through the
diaspora and through non-Greek students of Greek language and culture. The American society
is open to cultural expressions and is eager to be educated, at least in most regions of the
country. It also has a great respect for Ancient Greece although it has no knowledge of the
other periods of Greek history and culture, including the culture of modern Greece. Moreover,
American political culture strives for multiculturalism and diversity, which are important
social values and are seen as enriching the life of the country as well as of each individual American.

The third policy goal is associated with the second and is related to diplomacy. A reformed and expanded educational and cultural policy can contribute to the positive relationship between Greece and the United States by increasing the former's soft power in a mutually beneficial educational context, which is centered on common values and stresses the deep cultural connections that Greece and the United States share. Through comprehensive and effective educational and cultural policies, one nation can see itself in the other. Thus, the diplomatic character of Greek education in the diaspora and beyond should be emphasized. Greek diaspora education has the inherent dynamics of educational diplomacy with a broad reach and potential. The diplomatic role of Greek schools should, therefore, be acknowledged and should guide further reforms of the educational system.

*Online and Distance Learning*

Both for educational and cultural purposes, one of the most useful tools in order to reach a world-wide audience is the distance/online learning capabilities. Such technological capabilities can help cover significant gaps in teacher training and in access to educational material. Ε.ΔΙΑ.Μ.ΜΕ. offered such distance training in the past. However, it has not offered it since 2011 and it was only on an annual basis. Online training needs to happen more often than once a year. Other American online professional development and teacher training programs can act as models and sources of ideas. There could even be a partnership between
these teacher training sites and Greek authorities for the creation of a series of courses for Greek language teachers.

Currently, a few online teacher training seminars by cultural organizations in Greece are occasionally available but such programs are most often for teaching Greek to adults. Moreover, the teachers in the United States do not generally know of them and these programs also require payment, which makes them controversial choices for teachers who make very little out of teaching Greek.

The digital age offers unlimited opportunities for the enhancement of teaching and learning. Online language activities can help the children and adults learn and practice Greek through fun ways that are also appropriate for different ages and different levels of knowledge of the language. These activities should be leveled, gradually introducing more expanded vocabulary and more complex grammatical structures. Highly successful American and international online learning platforms can offer models for the development of similar Greek ones.

Teaching culture through online activities can be particularly effective. Children can play interactive games that convey knowledge of Greek history and culture while using Greek. Children and adults can visit Greek museums, cities and archaeological places virtually, listen to Greek concerts and have access to Greek films and performances online. Currently there are some online resources but many of them share certain problematic characteristics: they are not student-friendly either in terms of their use, organization or appearance; they often lack quality; they have a non-professional character; they have several technical problems and glitches; and they often lack sound (especially in interactive games or other interactive experiences, where spoken Greek can greatly contribute to the learning experience).
It is also difficult for parents, teachers and students to know of the existence of these resources since there is no database or a form of communication that could offer a comprehensive view of available online activities. Hence, equally important to the creation of online learning activities is the public information regarding their availability.

Overall, one of the best investments that the Greek state can make is in online educational activities. Their availability in both Greek and English would greatly increase the audience that can make use of these resources and disseminate Greek culture more broadly. Such opportunities for interactive online learning are particularly important for a large segment of the Greek diaspora which does not live in places with organized Greek education, including certain countries but also a large section of the American territory.

Teacher Training

Distance learning can be an excellent tool for connecting teachers with training centers in Greece. However, teacher training should also happen in the United States at an interpersonal level, at least at the center of each Metropolis' district and can be organized jointly by the Office of Greek Education of the Archdiocese and the Greek Ministry of Education. The trainers and the content of the training programs are particularly important. If possible, trainers from Greece can visit Greek-American Metropolises, which are the regional centers of the Greek-Orthodox Church. This is logistically much easier to organize and much less expensive than a seminar in Greece, where Greek educators from around the world are invited and their expenses are paid. However, if E.DIA.M.ME. can offer such training programs again, it should certainly do so. But training should not be limited to that.
For training that takes place in the United States, there are numerous experts and university professors of Greek origin who can create and offer an excellent and much necessary list of training courses, that is more attuned to the needs of the Greek-American student and the realities of the American educational system. Such course can include: training in the Greek language and culture, especially, but not exclusively, for the American-born educators; training in teaching methodologies and practices, including effective American educational models, ESL ideas, curriculum design, lesson plan design (Educator A 2014), student evaluation, etc.; training in developmental psychology (Ibid.); training in differentiated learning, since often classes have mixed levels; training in creative and innovating ways to teach a foreign language using art, science, drama, social studies, etc.; training in classroom management, a significant problem for many schools since students, often, do not want to be in a classroom after school or on Saturday morning; training for special education, since learning disabilities, ADHD and other behavioral problems are present in Greek School classrooms; training in school administration for principals — currently they often have no professional background and repeat past practices that are not the best and are far from the administrative model of American schools and educational organizations; information about researching and applying for grants, and other issues.

The training/professional development courses and programs that were mentioned above can be offered individually and independently one from the other or jointly as ongoing professional development programs. There are already a few online programs and a few programs in Greece that offer a certificate for teaching Greek as a second language. However, the price of the online programs, close to $10,000, makes them impossible choices for the Greek teachers who make a few hundred dollars a month from teaching Greek.
The institution which would be most suitable to organize and offer a comprehensive training program for teaching Greek as a foreign language and ongoing supportive professional development programs for teachers and administrators of Greek schools is Hellenic College. Hellenic College is the undergraduate institution of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and is part of the Hellenic College/Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology educational complex in Brookline, Massachusetts. Hellenic currently offers a certificate for teaching Greek as a second language but this is open only to its undergraduate students as a specialized track with a small enrollment. Consequently, this training program has a minimal, almost non-existent effect on Greek school teachers, since the great majority are professionals, usually in non-education-related fields, students at other colleges or universities, or stay-at-home mothers and grandmothers. None of these categories can have access to this training.

A cooperation between the Greek state, the Archdiocese and Hellenic College could lead to an expansion of the already existing training program, opening it up to the community at a significantly reduced cost for the trainees if various actors involved — the Greek state, the Archdiocese, Hellenic College, the parishes and donors or corporate sponsors — contributed towards at least part of the cost of the program.

This teacher training that leads to certification could take place throughout the year or in a concentrated, intensive form during a few weeks in the summer, like similar training that leads to professional certifications. Teaching English as a Second Language teacher certification programs, which are short and intensive, offer a model for the Greek certification program. As a result, Hellenic College, with the support of education specialists from other universities, could grow and become the center for teacher and leadership training with respect to Greek education in the United States (Professor A 2014). Once the training structures are
built, the Greek state can be invited to support it, although there is an overall lack of confidence in the Greek state based on past experience (Ibid.).

Some experts suggest that Greek education should be fully professionalized, employing professional, full-time teachers (Professor B 2014). However, this suggested reform, which would require a fundamentally different educational structure that could sustain full-time staff, could probably be implemented only in urban centers with large Greek-American concentrations and would, therefore, not easily serve all of the extended and wide-spread network of Greek schools across the country.

Additional Teacher Support

A professional quality work requires a professional treatment, including the appropriate economic incentives for teachers for investing more time in training and class preparation (Educator A 2014). In that respect, an appropriate teacher compensation is very important for the overall improvement of the educational system. Moreover, teacher evaluations could be beneficial both for the overall improvement of the school and for the professional improvement of the educators, since areas in need of development or change can be easily identified through evaluations (Ibid.). Last, the work of the teachers can be easily supported through providing access to thousands of teaching tips and ideas for hands-on activities, creative curriculum, classroom decoration and other topics that are available online through web-sites, blogs, Facebook pages and Pinterest boards maintained by teachers, parents and education professionals from the United States and from Greece.
Many Greek and American teachers are resourceful and creative, coming up with very innovative ideas in the face of limited or non-existing budgets. These ideas can significantly enhance Greek education programs with virtually no funding involved. Organizing such free resources for school improvement is fairly simple and would facilitate the teachers’ access to them, especially since most teachers are not aware of the majority of these sources. The organization of a teaching resources database can be undertaken either by regional Greek teachers associations, usually organized at the level of the Metropolitan district, by the Metropolises, by the Office of Greek Education at the Archdiocese, by the Greek Ministry of Education, or by any other organizations aimed at promoting Greek education.

Curriculum Content, Teaching Methodologies and Educational Activities

The primary educational goal of Greek schools is to teach the Greek language and Greek culture. The starting point is asking the question “What constitutes Greek culture?” This is a fundamental question that both educational and cultural policies need to address in order to set up their appropriate goals and courses of action. Greek culture in the Greek-American community tends to be limited to religious practices, social gatherings, Greek food, traditional Greek dances and traditional and contemporary Greek music. Although Greek culture definitely includes all of these, it also includes science, philosophy and democracy, and an extensive history with numerous cultural achievements that bear centuries’ old and millennia old wisdom.

Greek culture has made some of the most significant contributions to humanity, and it has broad temporal, spatial and multidisciplinary dimensions. These elements need to be brought back to Greek education. Hence, the Greek culture that is included in the curriculum
should relate to all periods of Greek history and should be connected to scientific thought and exploration, philosophical wondering, artistic expression, and democratic organization among other cultural and historical elements. Due to the very limited amount of time of Greek school lessons during the week (1-4 hours), the curriculum and teaching schedule should be well-organized and dense in order to reflect these elements.

The Greek language should be seen not as an end in itself but as a means to explore life and the world, to learn and to create. Using the Greek language through hands-on activities should take up most of Greek school time. These activities can explore Greek literature, science, history and social studies through a simplified, even basic, language and with a gradual progression to richer vocabulary and more complex grammatical structures. In the context of the lesson, students can create using drama, creative writing, visual and performing arts.

The grammar/vocabulary lesson of the day can be applied and practiced through these creative activities. Examples of relevant activities that can be used are the following: science experiments and nature explorations to highlight ancient Greek scientific discoveries and the process of scientific reasoning; projects on history and social studies that employ interviewing, research and presentation skills; exploration of simplified Greek children's literature texts accompanied by basic creative writing exercises; use of a variety of artistic means, from painting to photography to video production, to create and explore Greek social studies or any other subject; use of theatrical and other kinetic games for language practice, etc.

The use of collaborative projects and an overall creative project-based approach can also enhance the learning experience (Rapti 2014). Differentiated learning approaches should also be employed since most often there are more than one levels of students in a class. The educational content, suggested teaching methods, resources and activities, should be included
in a curriculum and teacher handbook prepared by the Office of Greek Education of the
Archdiocese with the support of the Greek Ministry of Education. This new curriculum should
come with relevant teacher training in the different Metropolitan districts.

The overall idea is to create a professional Greek school that offers a positive, effective
and quality learning experience, bringing together the best and most relevant practices and
ideas from the American and Greek educational experiences. Although the education system
in Greece has certain positive elements, the traditional practices of the Greek schools have,
historically, been foreign to the students, dry and ineffective. The added value of the American
educational models is that they are highly professional, science-based, effective, fun, creative
and challenging, teaching children how to learn but also making learning a fun activity.
Moreover, the children are already used to the educational practices of the American school.
These practices are also more suitable for a Greek education model that opens up to the greater
American society.

Programs for Secondary Education

The lack of any secondary education programs in the Greek school system presents a
huge gap in Greek diaspora education, as Boston community leader, Eleni Vidalis (2014)
points out. Greek school instruction typically ends in the sixth grade. However, Greek-
American adolescents should not be overlooked as students of the Greek language. They are
currently probably the only age group whose learning needs are not addressed, since there are
classes both for elementary school students and for university students and adults.
There are several reasons why continuing to educate the Greek-American teenagers is of great importance: a) during their time at Greek school they are gradually building a formal knowledge of Greek and this learning process suddenly stops at a certain age and the knowledge that they got so far gradually fades in lack of any reinforcement from that point on, b) as adolescents they are very inquisitive, they still love exploring the world, they are very creative, and their critical abilities and interests are extremely enhanced (compared to their elementary years); all of this educational potential is currently lost when it comes to Greek education; c) such activities enhance the students’ extra-curricular profile as they prepare for college applications; d) as teenagers, they are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure and other influences and their Greek ethnic identity may still be a compromising factor with respect to their social life in certain American communities and peer environments; a continuing Greek education during this sensitive period, could address issues of identity and self-esteem and provide a co-ethnic peer support environment; e) there are plenty of ideas that can act as Greek extra-curricular activities that are fun and appropriate for teenagers, so that the Greek lesson is not a “lesson” but rather an after-school activity.¹⁹⁴

Greek activities for teenagers can be similar to American educational activities for the same age group but with the use of the Greek language and Greek educational content. An example can be a Model Greek Parliament or a model version of the ancient Greek democratic process centered on the *ekklesia tou dimou*, modeled after Model United Nations, Model Congress or European Youth Parliament for high-school students. Other options could be art

¹⁹⁴ The religious youth organizations and activities of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, such as the Greek Orthodox Youth of America (G.O.Y.A.), the parish youth basketball teams, and the summer camps have greatly contributed in addressing these issues and creating support networks for Greek-American teenagers. However, all of these organizations use the English language and focus on the ethno-religious dimension of Greek-American identity.
or science activities using the Greek language, working on projects that would be appealing to teenagers; for example, science experiments or video production workshops—there are many Greek-speaking experts in these fields all around the United States that could organize and lead such activities. Such experiences can also act as career explorations. For example, there can be architectural workshops or robotics workshops with Greek-speaking specialists.

**Reaching the Non-Greek-American Student**

The current Greek school system also represents a lost opportunity in a different way. It serves almost exclusively Greek diaspora students. However, the greater American student community would view Greek culture and Greek-Americans in a more positive light if they were also exposed to Greek education (Vidalis 2014). They could benefit from a Greek education that would unlock for them the mysteries of the English scientific vocabulary, among many other benefits it could bring them. Many of the students of Greek schools are technically not heritage speakers, since they lack even a basic knowledge of Greek, in some cases even of Greek cultural practices. In that sense, they do not differ much from American students who have no Greek background.

Although Greek schools are in principle open to any students who wish to learn Greek, in practice they are focused on their own community. However, it would be beneficial both for the school community and for the greater local community if more non-Greek students entered Greek school. Of course, this requires Greek schools to offer an effective, appealing and quality alternative to other extra-curricular activities, especially to those activities involving foreign languages. Overall, the more the Greek school is connected to a broader understanding of
Greek culture, the more popular and relevant this culture and language will seem to American and Greek-American students alike.

Groups of students who have no prior knowledge of Greek and who cover different age groups should be accommodated in the Greek school system. A newcomer who is ten years old and wants to learn Greek, cannot really fit in the current structure which starts with the basic level at preschool-K. All other grades require some prior knowledge of the language. Hence, there is a need to add beginners’ classes to the regular pre-K-6 school structure, so that students of any age without prior knowledge can enroll in the school. Otherwise, the majority of Greek-American students, who do not know the language, and any American students are completely excluded from formal Greek education unless they start at age 4 or 5, or wait until they are adults to enroll in adult Greek classes or take Modern Greek in college.

Greek education does not have to be experienced only through Greek schools. A wider strategy is necessary for the promotion of Greek language and culture in the American educational system by stressing their relevance and significance for American students, especially in an age of global thinking and global skills. The way this can happen is through supporting and promoting Modern Greek as one of the foreign language electives in American elementary, middle schools and high-schools, or as one of the classes offered in after-school/enrichment programs. Greek cultural activities can also take place within American schools or through extra-curricular activities and events. Children's libraries are still popular in the digital age and play an important role in the educational experience of students.

The Greek language and culture can be introduced to the American students through their libraries: during library story-times in Greek, wherever foreign language story-times are offered, and through the addition of Greek children's books, of translated Greek children's
books or of books about Greece in English, in American public and school libraries. Depending on the culture, interests and practices of different American schools and local communities, more ideas about Greek cultural and educational activities may be applicable.

Educational Material

Possibly the only major improvement in Greek Schools during the previous decades has been noted with respect to Greek textbooks. Although textbooks are not as dominant in the first grades of American schools, Greek language teaching for all ages has centered on textbooks. Despite some progress, Greek textbooks are still far from the standards of other foreign language textbooks for children. At the same time, the lesson has to be less textbook-centered. Hands-on and other interactive activities can supplement the textbook lesson of the day and be structured so that they apply the new grammar and vocabulary or review previous lessons in an engaging way. These activities, while building on specific grammar and vocabulary can also incorporate Greek social studies elements.

The key to enhancing reading skills is reading and listening to stories read. In light of the great selection of American readers for all reading levels and of the emergence of a similar leveled reader production in Greece, the use of leveled readers for students of the Greek language can be very appropriate and beneficial. For students with a good knowledge of Greek, the leveled readers from Greece can be used. They are very appealing, fun and interesting, and can fit various interests and student profiles. Moreover, they can be used either in class or at home. Writing and reading comprehension activities can be based on them.
However, for the students who lack a good knowledge of Greek, these readers are not appropriate, at least until they reach that level of knowledge. For these students a new, targeted series of leveled readers should be created following, primarily, the American model which is quite sophisticated. These readers can progressively introduce sounds, vocabulary and grammar, through texts of gradually increasing complexity. Simplified Greek children’s literature or other pieces of Greek literature, and themes based on Greek culture, social studies or science can also be included in the readers.

Greek school libraries continue to be important in the digital age. Hence, the creation of school libraries with appropriate material is very important for cultivating language skills and a love for the Greek language. A variety of children’s books from Greece, including picture books and readers, as well as reading material produced specifically for the needs of Greek-American children, are very important assets of the schools. They will cultivate the students’ familiarity with the language and love of reading. They will also involve the parents in the students’ learning, since, for many students, it will be their parents who will read to them either because of their age or because of their limited knowledge of the language. Having someone read to you also enhances reading skills, vocabulary and love of reading. However, these libraries need to be funded both for purchasing the books and for organizing them appropriately.

In addition to books, other educational material and teaching aids can be essential for Greek Schools. Some of them, especially educational toys, are primarily available from Greece while other teaching aids and classroom resources can be acquired in the United States and can be the same aids and resources that are used in American schools but adjusted, if necessary, in order to be appropriate for teaching Greek. Educational toys can be either ones that employ the Greek language and Greek social studies themes, such as puzzles of Greece or Greek spelling
board games, or simple toys that can found in the American market but which can be used in the Greek school for hands-on activities that will build grammar, vocabulary, oral speech and listening comprehension.

Such toys can be either used for dramatic play, for example, play kitchen sets, or for other types of play that can build vocabulary and communication, for example, miniature animals or Legos. Educational toys are most effective when they are used to apply the lesson of the day or review prior lessons and when their use is relatively structured, is incorporated in the lesson plan, and reflects the curriculum. Educational toys can be donated by parents or other members of the community or purchased. Funding is also required for acquiring these supportive educational materials.

Curriculum and Lesson Organization

Due to its generally non-professional nature, Greek school is often characterized by a lack of adequate lesson organization, especially since many teachers are new every year. However, the fact that Greek classes take place only a few hours a week, makes the need for a well-organized and structured lesson and overall curriculum even stronger, since the use of these hours has to be as efficient as possible. The American school system can offer great guidelines and ideas about curriculum and lesson development.

Ideally a curriculum should be developed at the level of the Archdiocese, allowing, nevertheless, flexibility to individual schools to adjust it according to their needs and abilities. A curriculum should reflect what should be taught in its class, including a broad understanding
of Greek culture in its multiple historical and contemporary interdisciplinary dimensions. The culture-based approach to language learning is also preferred by language professionals as evidence show that it is more effective (Rapti 2014). A syllabus would reflect when each item will be taught and lesson plans would present how each item will be taught during a specific day.

Weaving social studies and creative activities into the language curriculum would require a significant amount of work but would significantly upgrade teaching outcomes, especially for teachers who do not have an education background. The curriculum and lesson planning should be accompanied by a parent handbook that would include any information the parents should know (Educator A 2014).

Due to the inherent teaching difficulties that the common phenomenon of classes of mixed levels presents, a lesson plan that incorporates differentiated learning is also necessary in order to make the most efficient use of class time for all students in the class and to make the teacher’s job easier, more productive and more effective. Ideally, due to significant differences in the language level among students of the same age, a two-track program, with different classes for those who are fluent or more advanced and for those who have a more basic knowledge of the language or are less advanced, would more effectively address the students’ needs (Educator A 2014).

School Funding

 Funds are crucial for the proper operation of Greek Schools and their overall improvement. Probably the most significant factor that has prevented the further development
of Greek schools has been, historically, their low funding, especially at the level of the parish, which is primarily responsible for their financing. Although the parish council, usually, but not in all cases, takes on the school expenses, especially the teacher salaries, it generally does not fund extensive school budgets that would allow a more professional operation of the school but rather limits its financial contribution to the most necessary expenses, usually after it approves them. However, this financial arrangement, although keeping the schools alive, it nevertheless stifles their operation and growth as proper educational organizations.

According to the Uniform Regulations of the Archdiocese for All Parishes, Article XII, Section 1, the parish councils are responsible for funding the educational organizations of the parish and offering them “budgetary grants-in-aid” for their proper operation. However, in many cases, these regulations are not followed in practice either due to financial limitations or due to different community priorities.

Priorities of the school and priorities of the parish council do not always coincide and, in view of limited resources, other financial priorities take over, endangering the proper function of the school. At times, the disagreement may not be as much related to pressing priorities within the context of a limited budget but rather to different values and interests, as parish councils may not value Greek education or may not be interested in improving its quality. Problems arise from the need to have the parish council’s approval for Greek school expenses that they may not approve, since, not being connected to education and to the proper functioning of educational institutions, they may dismiss requests or undermine school needs and priorities. Within this context, the need for a financial and administrative autonomy of Greek Schools, while preserving them as parish organizations, becomes pressing.
Possibly a better financial model would involve a full school budget that is submitted to the parish council. The parish council would then inform the school as to what expenses it is willing to fund which are not expected to be covered by tuition. This funding would be in the form of a grant to the Greek school. Beyond that, the school can cover its expenses through fundraising activities through the PTO or grants. One idea that is often used in American private schools is renting the school for a birthday party and using the rent as extra income for the school. Numerous fundraising ideas and grants are available online. An organization of these resources would enable access to them by school directors and PTOs. This is a project that the regional teachers’ associations in cooperation with the Office of Greek education in the Archdiocese could take over.

School Facilities

The school environment is crucial in attracting a student and his or her family to the Greek school and in the overall learning experience. Moreover, in the case of Greek Schools, it is also a way to inspire (or not) students to learn Greek and to convey an image (positive or negative) of Greek culture and Greece. The problems with the quality and appearance of school facilities are historical. The facilities are probably the most difficult aspect of Greek schools to change, since they would require great amounts of funds that are almost impossible to find.

The parish council is most often not interested in investing in the Greek school because school attendance has waned. However, the point that they are missing is that the level of investment in the school will also define the level of attendance. Historically, no major investment — in facilities, educational material, teacher training, etc. — has been made in Greek schools and now that parents are more educated and demanding than ever, it is expected
that interest in attending will be decreased. Hence, the low level of investment is the cause behind low attendance while increased investment is the key to increased school attendance.

Despite the difficulties of moving ahead with bigger construction projects, smaller changes are possible. Depending on the facility problems of the parish, small constructions, like adding a wall or a window, could improve the overall facility situation. Smaller interventions would involve painting, fixing small structural or cosmetic problems, and preventing the use of the classrooms for other uses. If the finances of the church do not allow or the parish council does not agree to fund construction projects for the school, external funding through grants and other fundraising activities that would also identify individual donors could contribute significantly towards small construction projects.

Regardless of the form that the facilities have, significant improvement could be made in the school through wall and classroom decoration. Part of this physical improvement requires funds but these decoration funds are very low compared to any construction project and would offer a significant benefit in the appearance of the school in lack of bigger facility changes. Support could be provided to the school directors and the teachers through a more organized presentation of sources of classroom decoration supplies, classroom decoration ideas and funding suggestions for decoration expenses. Probably most of the school directors and school teachers are not educators in the American educational system and are not aware of these opportunities. Informing them of those, could be an additional way of supporting Greek schools. At the same time a better teacher pay would make the teachers able and willing to invest more in organizing and decorating their school.
In recent decades, interest in early education (0-5) has greatly increased, as scientists recognize the huge potential of early education in shaping a child’s future. Nevertheless, early education has been underutilized at best in the context of Greek education. Historically, Greek school classes started at the age of six, completely missing this window of early development. Gradually, kindergarten and, later, pre-K was included in many Greek Schools, in some cases accepting even three-year-olds.

Younger students, given that you have the required support, can greatly benefit for Greek language exposure in an organized and stimulating learning environment. The reason is that in these young ages it is much easier to learn a new language and learning a second language before the age of 5 can have a great positive impact on brain development. At the same time early education is the key to the effectiveness of Greek school in later years.

In young ages, teaching and learning a language is almost exclusively an oral activity, although Greek schools use textbooks that introduce the Greek letters starting as early as age four. In early education, the whole lesson can be done through play-based oral communication making extensive use of educational toys, and creative activities. Therefore, the students’ understanding and ability to speak can be greatly enhanced. If the students have this ability by the time they start first grade, the literacy segment of Greek school education will be much easier. If they know what is the right way to say something, it is much easier to explain to them the grammar behind it and to teach them how to read and write it.

The most effective way to use the window of early education is by having a structured and organized approach through a curriculum and lesson plans. This is particularly important for the most efficient use of the short time of Greek lessons. An example of structuring the
lesson so that the language is gradually introduced through playful activities is by using narration of fairy tales to talk about something that happened in the past, exposing the students in this manner to simple past tense through story-time/imaginative play. Dramatic and other toys and basic educational materials are excellent teaching aids for this age, and, even beyond it, offering experiential, hands-on teaching and learning. In this playful and creative manner, the teacher does not only transmit the language, but also a love for Greek School, of the Greek language and of learning.

*Summer and Vacation Day Camps*

In the American educational system, many schools and other institutions offer weekly educational programs during vacation weeks in December, February and April and during the summer. The Greek schools can use this opportunity to offer immersion activity-based programs during vacations. The Archdiocese is already using the summer and some weekends during the year for holding summer camps, winter weekend camps and weekly bible vacation schools at the parishes. However, no such day camp programs exist for Greek school, while the students could greatly benefit from the extra language practice in a fun and relaxed atmosphere that does not require the use of textbooks or writing. These programs can be offered for all ages, including teenagers, and can reflect a rich set of play-based and creative activities in art, science, and social studies after the model of similar American vacation programs.
Cooperation, Institutional Organization and Support

A wide partnership among different institutional actors would offer the ideal conditions for a major improvement of Greek education (Rapti 2014). Cooperation among teachers within each Greek school and among school directors and teachers across different schools is essential for the support of the teaching staff and the overall improvement of Greek education (Educator A 2014). This cooperative model is also used in the American educational system, which stresses the exchange of ideas and the creation of support networks among colleagues and among mentor figures and younger professionals.

This cooperation can primarily involve regional Greek teachers’ associations, which can be upgraded to organizations of professional support. An organizational network of all Greek schools across the United States could also empower teachers and directors, and enable the exchange of ideas. More seasoned educators or educators with a professional background in education or in Greek language can be excellent resources for younger educators or for those who lack such a background. The frequent temporary hiring of teachers and the high teacher turnover makes this need even greater.

Ideally, Greek Schools would be administratively and financially independent from the other parish institutions. They would still be parts of the parishes but as autonomous entities. However, practically, such a break from past practice could prove quite difficult and even impossible. A partial solution would be the empowerment of School Committees, whose members would be elected and which would include representatives of the teaching staff and the students’ parents.

The Committee would oversee the operation and finances of the Greek School. An advisory board to the School Committees within each Metropolitan area could be comprised
by education and Greek language and culture experts who would make suggestions and enrich the schools’ programming. Greater cooperation should also take place between the school and the parish council (Educator A 2014), which should recognize and respect the educational priorities of the school, even if it may not have the ability to fund them. The creation of a separate school account which can be overseen by the School Committee is essential for the ability of the school to effectively cover its expenses.

Traveling and Learning in Greece

Greek-American students connect with Greece through their family trips to the homeland. However, many students have not travelled to Greece or do not travel often. For these students as well as for those who would like a more structured learning experience, different options are already offered. However, further steps in this direction are: a) the creation of more organized travel opportunities to Greece, for example for the graduating class of Greek schools, b) the creation of more learning opportunities in Greece for diaspora children, including, among others, language-learning summer camps, participation in archaeological excavations, volunteering, and, for older students, internships and summer jobs, and c) an organized and comprehensive presentation of available opportunities in Greece during the summer to the students and their families.

The first step can be undertaken by Greek Schools, Greek-American organizations and the Greek state. The second is undertaken, primarily, by organizations in Greece and the Greek state or through a partnership between Greek-American organizations and organizations in Greece. The third step can be undertaken by the Greek state, primarily the General Secretariat
of Greeks Abroad and the Greek missions in the United States, Greek-American organizations and Greek-American parent or teacher groups.

In conclusion, a Greek school system with expanded and upgraded programs can still be under the auspices of the Archdiocese and the Office of Greek Education. Although no major structural changes are suggested at this point, the internal dynamics in the parishes should be such that the Greek school enjoys more independence from the parish council than it has so far and it is directly supervised by the Greek school committee which includes representatives of the Greek school community. The creation of a professional organization of Greek schools and Greek school directors across the country could further enhance the administrative independence and the support offered to Greek schools.

The training can be primarily undertaken by Hellenic College and overseen by the Office of Greek Education. Although each school can develop its own curriculum, a basic curriculum can be developed by the Office of Greek Education in cooperation with academics, teachers and specialists from the community. Funding for the schools, for training and for any additional educational programs can come from a variety of sources: the parish, increased tuition, private and public donors and sponsors, fundraising activities, grants, and possibly the Archdiocese and the Greek state. Further research into the administrative and financial structures of other educational systems can offer a more detailed plan for the suggested administrative and financial changes.
II. Greek Tertiary Education in the United States

The Greek state has historically expressed great interest in Chairs and Programs in Modern Greek Studies in the United States and around the world and it has supported them in various ways, but primarily through funding. The tertiary level of Greek education is, therefore, under the care of the Greek state, when the latter is willing and able to fund and support relevant programs, in partnership with the educational institutions where they take place. Modern Greek studies programs are, generally, not controlled by the Greek-American community, with the exception of the higher education institutions that belong to the Archdiocese. However, the community may also support and participate in the activities of the university programs and both the programs’ professors and students are or become members of the community.

The Greek state has repeatedly expressed its interest in the creation of more Chairs of Modern Greek studies, especially in American universities (“Ekthesi” 2008), but such plans have not been realized and the funding for existing chairs is often problematic. This is another area where the problems of Greek strategic, systematic and comprehensive policy planning and implementation become evident. The creation of these Chairs is usually the product of the vision and the hard work of the Greek-American academic diaspora, or of American hellenists, linguists, classicists or other experts.

An important point with respect to academia is that although there is a heavy and influential Greek and Greek-American presence in its midst, the academia Greeks often make up an isolated piece in a greater fragmented Greek-American community. They often do not participate in the activities and, even more so, in the administration of community institutions. Instead, they have created Greek academic circles across disciplinary fields which, generally, remain outside of the grassroots community institutions although they may participate in elite
Greek-American organizations. This separation between the academic/intellectual and the rest of the Greek-American community undermines the dissemination of high Greek culture among the members of the community.

Moreover, the lack of adequate and comprehensive cultural education of the Greek-American community leads to a lack of interest and, possibly, an inability to appreciate or connect to expressions of contemporary or historical Greek high culture. Thus, the addition of a cultural component both in the Greek School curriculum and in cultural and educational activities in the community would enable this connection and familiarity with Greek high culture. Modern Greek studies programs and faculty could enrich the cultural background of the Greek-American community through a form of adult community education programs.

Cultural and educational events at the universities that aim at promoting Greek culture are often quite limited in their audience both with respect to the greater Greek-American community, who could benefit from them, and, often, with respect to the university community where these events take place. Although the highly specialized and sophisticated cultural events within the academic community are important, it could be argued that, as beacons of knowledge, the role of these academic depositories of Greek culture in the United States is also to disseminate it to the greater Greek-American and American public. However, the reach of many of the Modern Greek programs and events is often, but not always, relatively small.

Recently Modern Greek studies programs have become more interdisciplinary expanding to other fields in the humanities and social studies. This interdisciplinary approach to Modern Greek studies, which used to be exclusively language- and literature-based in the past, has enriched the relevant programs. We also see the emergence of Greek-American studies as a distinct field in ethnic studies.
In order for Greek culture to have a broader reach at the university level, the focus should be placed on general cultural classes offered at the undergraduate level instead of classes with more limited topics that are offered at the graduate level. Although the latter should continue to be offered and doctoral dissertations on Greek topics should be encouraged in order to ensure the continuation of research and teaching in Modern Greek studies, undergraduate classes have a significantly larger audience, and, thus, disseminate Greek culture and appreciation for Greece across a wider population.

It is probably more important to have multiple American and international students in a variety of future careers who will have some knowledge and appreciation of Greek culture rather than to focus available resources on specialized graduate level classes that would benefit small groups of graduate students who may or may not be specialists in Modern Greek studies, without arguing that the latter is not important. The key to having an appeal among undergraduates is to make the class topic more generic, for example, Greek literature rather than the study of a specific Greek writer. The offering of classes should take advantage of the university’s regulations for the fulfillment of cultural, international or language requirements. The need to fulfil such requirements could increase the student audience and, hence, expand the reach of Greek cultural education significantly.

**a. Greek Institutions of Higher Learning in the United States**

The Archdiocese, soon after its establishment, created the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology (www.hchc.edu) in order to train future priests, who were taught, besides Greek Orthodox theology, the Modern and Ancient Greek languages. A few decades later, it created Hellenic College (www.hchc.edu), the institution that would offer undergraduate
training in Orthodox theology and other fields. However, although Holy Cross is an internationally recognized center for the graduate study of Orthodox theology, Hellenic College has remained a very small college that offers a limited number of concentrations and that has not developed much academically.

Although Modern Greek and Ancient Greek are taught and are requirements for many undergraduate and graduate programs at Hellenic College and Holy Cross, the comparative advantage of Hellenic College as the only Greek institution of higher learning in a city and country that are the global academic hubs, is generally dismissed. Hellenic College could be the ultimate center of Greek studies and Greek culture, contemporary and historical, in the United States, if, like in the case of Greek Schools, a comprehensive and strategic plan guided its vision of institutional development and this was assisted by the necessary financial investment. The Greek state, the Archdiocese and the Greek-American community through its institutions, individual and corporate donors, and individual initiatives could contribute to the development of Hellenic College as the academic center of Greek studies.

Another case of a Greek-American higher education institution is the newly established, in 2004, Hellenic American University (www.hauniv.edu). This university was created as a private initiative by a group of Greek-Americans and offers a limited number of undergraduate and graduate degrees. It occupies a small campus in Manchester, New Hampshire (one of the New England cities with a relatively high concentration of Greek-Americans) but it is generally not well-known within the Greek-American community.

The special characteristic of Hellenic American University is that it follows the model of many other foreign universities, especially ones in the United Kingdom, which also have campuses in Greece. Therefore, it has a Greek branch, Hellenic American College, which is
located in Athens. The students can attend classes in either campus and they get degrees from the Hellenic American University upon the completion of their studies. Although the University bears a Greek name and has a Greek campus, it, nevertheless, does not offer any degrees in Greek studies.\textsuperscript{195}

b. Modern Greek Studies Programs

In several colleges and universities around the United States, Modern Greek classes are offered to undergraduate and graduate students through, usually, either the Classics Department or the Modern Languages Department. In addition to Modern Greek classes, which focus usually on language and literature, classes in ancient history, art and philosophy are often offered, as are also classes in Byzantine history and art. Occasionally, classes in Modern Greek art and classes across the humanities and social sciences that focus on Greece are also offered. In some schools, there is a Modern Greek Studies Program either as an interdisciplinary program or as part of one of the existing departments, usually Classics or Modern Languages.

According to the Modern Greek Studies Association, there are more than 50 Modern Greek Studies Programs in American colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{196} In some schools there is also a Greek-American Studies Program. Chairs of Greek studies are found across a number of

\footnote{\textsuperscript{195} A private non-profit college recently established by a Greek-American in California is Saint Katherine College (http://www.stkath.org/). This is an independent Orthodox college that offers a small variety of degrees but it does not offer any degrees in Greek studies, although it offers degrees in Orthodox theology.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{196} For a complete list of Modern Greek Studies Programs, see the M.G.S.A. web-site at http://mgsa.org/Directories/programs.html [accessed on 3/13/2015].}
universities either in the context of Modern Greek Studies Programs or in other departments.\textsuperscript{197} In addition to the academic programs, the Modern Greek Studies Association, incorporated in Maryland, is the academic and professional association that connects and supports scholars and programs that focus on Modern Greek Studies.

Usually Modern Greek Studies courses center on language. There are courses for beginners — generally these are more popular than the advanced language classes — for intermediate level and for advanced level. Universities with an extended Modern Greek studies program offer both undergraduate and graduate classes. Modern Greek literature is taught either in Greek or in translation. Other classes focusing on Greece cover all periods of Greek history and Greek art, Greek philosophy and political thought, modern Greek politics and economy, modern Greek art, literary criticism, anthropology of Greece, Greek folklore, sociology of Greece, and social and cultural study of Greece.

Students who take Modern Greek classes, especially the language classes or classes focusing on modern Greece, tend to be of Greek origin. However, foreign language requirements and study abroad opportunities in Greece have increased the interest in the language either in advance or in the aftermath of such travel to Greece. However, the teaching and learning of Modern Greek is plagued by a fundamental question that is related to the broader global image of Greece in its modern and historical dimension: why learn Greek?

\textsuperscript{197} Among these Chairs are, for example, the Nikos Kazantzakis Chair in the Center for Modern Greek Studies at San Francisco State University (http://moderngreekstudies.sfsu.edu/), the George Seferis Chair in the Program of Modern Greek Studies at Harvard University (http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~modgreek/), and The Constantine G. Karamanlis Chair in Hellenic and European Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/karamanlischair).
Hence, the tertiary Greek education, similarly to Greek education in lower levels, is related to broader concepts that have cultural, political and economic implications.
CHAPTER 6
GREECE AND THE GREEK-AMERICAN COMMUNITY: ECONOMICS, AID AND DEVELOPMENT

The Greek-American diaspora has been involved in the Greek economy in a variety of ways throughout the twentieth century, and it continues to do so into the twenty-first. This involvement occurs primarily in the areas of trade, development, financial and humanitarian aid, investments, and tourism. Certain initiatives come from the diaspora, especially with respect to aid and development, while others are part of a strategy by the Greek state to promote Greek industries through the help of the diaspora, primarily with respect to trade, tourism and attracting investments in Greece.

The Greek policy of engaging the Greek-American community in these economic activities resembles the other Greek policies with respect to the diaspora: ambitious general goals but unclear objectives and strategies to achieve them, inconsistencies, discontinuity and lack of adequate implementation and follow up. Overall, there is no adequate cooperation or trust between Greece and the Greek-American community (Mihopoulos 2014). Greek state attempts to involve the diaspora in the Greek economy have been met with limited success, primarily due to the above-mentioned problems, while the attempts by the diaspora to involve itself in the Greek economy and society have been more effective.

The state's strategy of reaching out to the diaspora, regardless of its effectiveness, shows that the Greek government, historically, has relied on the Greek diaspora when it comes to serious problems it faces, such as the devastation from World War II or the current economic crisis. According to Prévélakis (2000: 181), the Greek state “sees Greeks abroad as a source of capital,” since the diaspora is expected to contribute financially towards the economic problems
of Greece. The diaspora is seen as a partner, actual or potential, while the Greek-American community holds the primary role within the Greek diaspora due to its economic, social and political achievements as well as its large size.

Looking more in depth into the nature of the relationship between the Greek state and the Greek-American community, when it comes to economic issues Greece has, historically, viewed the Greek-American community as its “rich uncle.” Both the Greek state and the Greek society view it as such, especially since numerous Greek families depended financially, at least for a number of years, on a rich relative who had emigrated — most often to the United States. These emigrants and their descendants may be seen as financially successful but they may also be considered as culturally-compromised; they may be seen as a poor relative culturally/linguistically, since they represent a less “authentic” version of Greek culture and identity. Moreover, they are seen as a dependent relative, as the children who are away from their motherland Greece. The Greek state can, thus, be both “greedy” and “paternalistic” towards the diaspora. This is a pattern that we see in many state-diaspora relations.

This imagery of the rich uncle on whom we should rely and who can save us, is found in many Greek movies, primarily comedies, of the 1960s where the character of the rich uncle, aunt, or other relative is seen as a source of financial help but it also represents the connection of the Greek people to the cosmopolitan west and to modern culture.\textsuperscript{198} However, this modernization and westernization that the Greek-American relative personified received a mixed reaction by the Greek family in film and in real life. On the one hand, the economic and

\textsuperscript{198} See, for example, the popular 1957 comedy film \textit{The Aunt from Chicago} \cite{I theia apo to Chicago}, where the rich, cosmopolitan Greek-American aunt is coming to visit her brother’s family in Greece. She is modernizing the family by introducing elements of the American way of life, involving material and behavioral changes, not without conflict, in order to successfully marry off her nieces. The film was directed by Alekos Sakellarios and was produced by Finos Film, a leader and pioneer in Greek film-making.
associated cultural progress and social success might be seen in a very positive light and may be considered in need of imitation, an imitation which would be inescapable as seen through the lens of a linear modernization process. However, the social and moral changes that the Greek-American represented might also be seen as rather controversial, since the worldly progress achieved in America could be in conflict with traditional Greek values and ways of life. The latter, being centered on personal relations, often trumped the American way of life, which is based on economic and social success, as the best path to follow in life in relevant social commentary.

The official and unofficial pursuit of economic support from the Greek-American community is illustrative of how the Greek state thinks of the diaspora in general: it expects certain benefits from it. However, this relationship involves more than a rational calculation of expected economic benefits. The Greek state reaches out to the diaspora under the assumption that the diaspora's loyalty and emotional connection to the old homeland is strong enough to make diasporans feel obliged to support it and be even willing to undergo certain sacrifices for it. Consequently, this relationship is based on a sense of national or macro-familial collective and individual obligation, that the Greek-Americans feel, or are expected to feel, towards the people and the country of Greece. This is reflected in the rhetoric of both the Greek state and its representatives, and in the rhetoric of the Greek-American organizations and their leaders.

This perception appears to be the opposite of how the Greek states perceives of its relationship with the Greek-Americans, and the diaspora in general, when it comes to other subjects, such as Greek education and culture. In that case, the assumption both on the part of the diasporans and on the part of the Greek state is that Greece has the obligation to address the educational and cultural needs of the Greek-Americans out of a sense of loyalty that the state has — or should have, in cases of criticism of the state's inadequacies — towards the
members of the ethnic group it represents that live beyond its borders. Therefore, in terms of economics, the state needs the diaspora, while in terms of education and culture, the diaspora needs the state. In other words, the diaspora may offer material benefits to the state, while the state may offer intangible, identity-related benefits to the diaspora.  

**Trade between Greece and the U.S. and the Role of Greek-Americans**

The Greek-American community is expected to contribute to the Greek economy in various ways. Greek trade policy hopes to engage the Greek-Americans, among other Americans, in the promotion of Greek products in the American market. In terms of trade, diaspora organizations, often in cooperation with the Greek diplomatic missions, support and encourage imports of Greek products, primarily food and agricultural products, in the American marketplace. The Greek-American community plays a more significant role in promoting Greek imports in the US rather than in promoting US exports to Greece. Greek-American media and small businesses are active in the promotion of Greek products through business transactions that involve advertising, sales and distribution of commercial goods, either in cooperation with Greek export companies or with Greek-American import companies.

Trade between Greece and the United States is placed within the context of official trade agreements between the United States and the European Union ("Economic and Trade

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199 The state may also get intangible benefits from the diaspora based on its pride for the global presence of Greek people and culture, and for the achievements of Greek diasporans.

200 Other Greek products that are exported to the United States include agricultural products (like tobacco), clothing and apparel (including fur articles), petroleum products and by-products, construction material (steel, cement and marble), pipes and razors, while major American products being exported to Greece include electrical equipment, telecommunications equipment, medical and pharmaceutical items, computers and electronic equipment, timber and wood-pulp, agricultural products, and machinery ("Economic and Trade").
Relations”). Nevertheless, there are additional agreements and cooperation between the two countries in an attempt to further promote trade and other economic relations (Ibid.). Almost all Greek products are guaranteed access to the American market and since a 1993 inter-state agreement, Greek companies can access American public contracts (Ibid.). The Greece-US Economic and Commercial Cooperation Committee is a high-level official organization that aims at promoting economic and trade cooperation between the two countries, while the current expanded cooperation between Greek and American companies is seen as mutually beneficial (Ibid.).

The Economic Relations Office of the Greek Embassy in Washington, D.C and in the Greek Consulates in New York, San Francisco and Chicago, are assigned the task of promoting cooperation between the two countries, engaging the Greek-American community in the process. In addition to these governmental institutions, there are a few other independent organizations that aim at fostering economic cooperation between the two countries and in which the Greek-Americans play a prominent role. Founded in 1947, the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce, based in New York, has the mission of strengthening commercial, economic and cultural ties between Greece and the United States (“Chamber History”).

The Chamber was originally created to promote the financial interests of Greek shipping companies, which were located in New York’s financial area (“Chamber History”). It, later, expanded its goals to fostering trade and commercial ties between Greece and the US and its membership included both Greek-American companies and American companies that had business operations in Greece (Ibid.). Its Greek-American membership consists primarily
of either companies that do business in Greece or companies that import, sell or otherwise process Greek products (Ibid.).

Another professional and large scale attempt to promote Greek trade takes place through the annual Hermes Expo business events. Hermes Expo International is a Greek-American company that organizes large annual exhibitions related to economic and cultural exchanges, and focuses primarily on bringing together Greek agents (governmental, municipal, private sector) with the American public and market. Although it is a Greek-American initiative, it cooperates with the Greek state (ministries and diplomatic missions) and Greek businesses. Hermes Expo was established in 1992 and has enjoyed a large membership and high visibility.

This trade expo has among its stated purposes the connection between foreign, primarily Greek, governmental organizations and foreign, primarily Greek, companies and the American market. As such, it plays an important role in the promotion of Greek industries — especially tourism, the food industry, and others — in the United States. According to Hermes Expo organizers, their events were “the catalysts of the signing of the business and cultural agreement between the two Cities Philadelphia and Thessaloniki, Greece” (“Company

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201 While the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce is active in the United States, the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce operates in Greece with a similar purpose. However, the role of the Greek-American community is much more significant in the former rather than the latter, which is staffed by Greeks and primarily targets the business audience in Greece or the American industries. The American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce has been also active in the United States. Most recently, it participated in the organization of the Hellenic Pavilion at the AUSA (Association of the United States Army) 2014 International Meeting and Exposition in Washington DC (“Hellenic Pavilion”). The Pavilion was under the auspices of the Greek Ministry of Defense and the participants were Greek governmental organizations and industry representatives from Greece (Ibid.).

202 The goal of Hermes Expo is: “to continue serving as a leading trade platform and expand the success of bridging the International Market with the United States by uniting and tapping into the potential business exchanges between the US and abroad” (“About”).
Participants from Greece in Hermes Expo events include not only businesses but also Chambers of Commerce from several Greek cities, Greek educational institutions, Greek-American businesses and media, Greek-American educational institutions, Greek health organizations, and various Greek governmental organizations in the areas of tourism, commerce, local government and development (Ibid.).

Greek Tourism in the United States and the Greek-American Community

Tourism and shipping are the two most important industries of Greece. Tourism plays a major role in the relationship between Greece and the Greek-American community. The Greek-American community is a loyal and important customer of Greek tourism due to its frequent trips to Greece and to the large numbers of Greek-Americans visiting the country every year. However, the Greek-American tourist presence in the country is not beneficial only to the Greek economy.

According to Maya Tsokli, MP and member of the Greek Parliament’s Special Permanent Committee on Diaspora Greeks, Greek-American tourism is also crucial for Greece for another reason: it is important for the preservation of the diaspora’s Greek identity, and for reconnecting the diaspora with the homeland (the national center), as diasporans revisit their historical and cultural roots (“Ekthesi” 2011: 29). The Greek-American community is also

203 The two cities have signed a friendship and cooperation agreement but are not sister-cities (“Adelfopoiimenes Poleis”). Thessaloniki has also signed similar agreements with Boston, Massachusetts and Brooklyn, New York in the 1990s, and it is a sister-city of San Francisco since 1990, and Hartford, Connecticut since 1962 (Ibid.). Several Greek cities have signed similar agreements with American cities or have become sister-cities.

204 Although Hermes Expo is a Greek-American initiative aiming primarily at connecting Greek industries with the American market, it has expanded its scope to the home economies of other ethnic groups that live in the United States and which are interested in exploring trade and exchange opportunities in the American market (“About”).
considered a partner of the Greek state in the promotion of Greece as a tourist destination in the greater American society. According to Tsokli, who held the Committee’s portfolio of Greek tourism and cultural policy, the diaspora can have a powerful role as “ambassador of Greek culture, as a bridge for intercultural dialogue and as supporter of Greek tourism” (Ibid., 29).

The Greek state has been following a strategy for the promotion of Greek tourism in the Greek-American community and in the United States for decades. Post World War II, Greek tourism was seen as a primary means for the development of the Greek economy and specific policies targeting the diaspora in the context of promoting Greek tourism were implemented in the 1950s (Vogli 2013). Such policies and state initiatives, which targeted primarily Greek-Americans, included the organization of the Greek Home Coming Year in 1951, which aimed at encouraging the diaspora to visit Greece through an elaborate program of cultural and social events specifically organized for the diasporans (Ibid.). However, such policies were rather poorly planned and brought about mixed results (Ibid.). Even more important, there was no follow up or overall continuity in Greek tourism or diaspora policy thereafter (Ibid.).

With respect to tourism, the Greek state is officially represented in the United States through the Greek National Tourism Organization (EOT), which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Tourism. EOT’s New York office has the purpose of actively promoting Greek tourism in the Greek-American community and in the greater American society.205 Although powerful Greek tourism campaigns take place from time to time, for the most part

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205 It's offices in other American cities closed down in recent years. The Greek National Tourism Organization (Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou or EOT) celebrated in 2012 sixty years of activity (“Istoria tou Organismou”).
Greek tourism policy in the United States has not been very proactive or aggressive in its marketing, and has been characterized by low visibility.

At the same time, publicity for Greek tourism is strongly geared towards Greek-Americans. This strategy is not very productive since Greek-Americans are already favoring Greece as a tourist destination. Hence, Greek policy needs to connect with the non-Greek audience in order to actively pursue its goals. Greek tourism policy also does not clearly recognize a specific role for the Greek-Americans as bridges for the promotion of Greek tourism to the greater American society.

The potential role that the Greek-Americans can play in the promotion of Greek tourism is quite significant for a number of reasons. First, due to their familiarity and emotional connection to Greece they can be willing and able representatives of the country and its tourism, taking the role of Greek tourism, and culture, ambassadors. Second, they have very expanded personal and professional networks in the United States and beyond. Third, they can contribute to tourism policy design in terms of both marketing and program development, based on their own experience and expertise; for example, they can contribute to the development of new forms of tourism, such as archaeological tourism with active tourist involvement in excavations, educational and children’s tourism, innovative ideas in agro-tourism, culinary, historical, religious and other forms of tourism.\textsuperscript{206} Their dual perspective and experience as Greeks and as Americans is quite important in this respect.

\textsuperscript{206} An example of a project focusing on children’s tourism is the web-site Kids Love Greece (kidslovegreece.com), which is the result of a partnership between Greeks in Greece and Greek-Americans. The web-site encourages families with children of all ages to visit Greece and offers numerous ideas for kid-friendly activities around the country. Also, by reaching out to the Greek Orthodox diaspora, even if not ethnically Greek, the Greek state can promote its religious tourism.
State representatives envision different strategies that can be employed in order to realize the potential of the diaspora with respect to tourism. Maya Tsokli stresses the need to utilize “the dynamic presence of the diaspora abroad in order to promote Greek tourism” (“Ekthesi” 2011: 30) and the importance of the participation of the diaspora in the policy design and implementation of Greek economic diplomacy (Ibid.). In her report to the Greek Parliament on behalf of the Special Permanent Committee on the Diaspora Greeks, she suggests specific actions that can be taken in order to improve Greek tourism strategy.

Her suggested strategy includes the following actions: cooperation between Greek state organizations that focus on the diaspora and those that focus on tourism; extensive use of online and satellite communications; cooperation between Greek state institutions and diaspora organizations; offering incentives to the diaspora to visit the country, for example discounts; making its access to the country easier; targeting strategically the different subgroups of the diaspora; offering incentives to diaspora-owned travel agencies to promote Greek travel packages; offering incentives to the diaspora to own a summer house in Greece; and encouraging diaspora investments in Greek tourism (“Ekthesi” 2011: 29-32). Last, she stresses the links between tourism policy, the promotion of Greek gastronomy, and the promotion of Greek food and agricultural products; Greek diaspora restaurant owners would play a significant role in the triple promotion of Greek cuisine, Greek food products and Greek tourism (Ibid., 32).

Minister of Culture and Tourism Pavlos Geroulanos presented his strategy for engaging the diaspora in Greek tourism policy at the Special Permanent Committee for the Diaspora Greeks in 2011.\(^{207}\) He talked about the need to build a strategic relationship with the diaspora,

\(^{207}\) The Greek Ministry of Tourism has been an independent ministry only since 2012. Prior to that, the tourism portfolio was part of the Ministry of Culture, which was officially named Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Successive governments have switched back and forth
especially in countries like the United States and Germany, which are traditional sources of tourists for Greece, in order to support Greek tourism during the current economic crisis (“Praktika” 2011f: 2-4). In this context, he mentioned the strategic role that the consulates and their press offices, NGOs, businesses and individuals from the diaspora can play and have played so far (Ibid.).

The Minister talked about a mutual partnership, the prerequisite of which is to persuade diasporans to visit Greece and to give them back their Greek pride. He, further, stressed that there are four areas which are important in this cooperative relationship: “culture, investments, promotion and accessibility” (“Praktika” 2011f: 5). Therefore, we see a connection between culture and tourism, where cultural activities are aimed at also promoting Greek tourism in partnership with the Greek diaspora. Moreover, we see a connection between investments and tourism. In particular, Geroulanos mentioned that “60% of all the investments in [the program] Invest in Greece at this time [May 2011] are related to tourism” (Ibid., 6). He also stated that diasporans are interested not only in investing in hotels but also in building private summer houses to be rented to tourists and in the creation of infrastructure to support golf tourism.

The promotion of Greek tourism abroad, based on effective ways of communication with the help of the Greek diaspora, is a major part of Greek tourism policy, according to the Minister. The internet, including the use of social media, plays a major role in this strategy; an example of the use of the internet in the context of this strategy is the project MyGreece, which

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208 Accessibility refers to transportation problems that Greece often experiences during the tourist period, primarily due to strikes.

209 Invest in Greece is the official campaign to attract foreign investors to Greece.
relies heavily on the younger generations of Greeks abroad (“Praktika” 2011f: 6). Moreover, Geroulanos recognized the great potential that the internet and social networks have for identifying the members of the diaspora and building a productive relationship with them (Ibid., 23).

He also referred to the creation of strategic partnerships with the diaspora media for a more productive promotion of Greek tourism abroad. He mentioned a specific partnership that has already started between the Greek National Organization of Tourism and Greek News, a weekly Greek-American Newspaper based in Astoria, New York, for the promotion of Greek tourism. Such a partnership will be mutually beneficial since the newspaper benefits from tourism advertisements and the National Organization of Tourism benefits from the publicity campaign (“Praktika” 2011f: 7). Geroulanos stressed the need for personal contact between state officials and the Greek diaspora, consequently justifying the expense for official trips overseas, as a prerequisite for a closer relationship and strategic partnerships. He argued that, as far as tourism is concerned, these personal contacts make more of a difference than an advertising campaign (Ibid., 15).

Although what Geroulanos is describing and suggesting is a set of positive steps for the promotion of Greek tourism through the diaspora, the diaspora is still primarily seen as a target market in his policy framework — for example, through his emphasis on the use of tourism advertisements in Greek-American media — while the role of the diaspora as an active partner in designing and promoting Greek tourism policy is still missing. Although he mentions the

\[210\] MyGreece’s official website can be found at [http://www.my-greece.gr/](http://www.my-greece.gr/) [accessed on 10/6/2014].

\[211\] He also referred to the need for a more effective programming of ERT Satellite (the Greek state’s satellite channel for the diaspora) that would ensure a more productive promotion of Greek tourism among the diaspora.
relatively high level of foreign investment in Greek tourism, it is not clear to what extent these investments are diaspora investments and, if they are, how exactly they affect the Greek tourism industry.\textsuperscript{212}

Summing up, the diaspora should not be seen only as the target population of Greek tourism policy, making tourists out of Greek-Americans, which is something that, for the most part, is already happening, but also as a bridge to the American public, as a partner for the promotion of Greek tourism to the greater American audience of which they are a part. The diaspora’s access to and participation in this greater audience, together with the diasporans’ professional expertise, is the diasporic advantage that Greece has as far as its tourism policy is concerned. Tourism policy through Greek-Americans would bear more positive results than — or in addition to — tourism policy for Greek-Americans. Last, as the minister stated, tourism and culture are very closely connected. Thus, the Greek-Americans can hold the dual role of culture and tourism ambassadors of Greece, since culture and tourism can be seen as the two sides of the same coin: learning about Greek culture is like taking an imaginary trip to Greece, while visiting Greece gives you the opportunity to have a first-hand experience of Greek culture in its natural setting.

\textbf{Greek Shipping Industry in the United States}

The other major industry that has been central in the economic relationship between the Greek-American community and the Greek state has been the shipping industry. Greece has

\textsuperscript{212} Foreign investments in tourism can be controversial since foreign-owned tourist complexes in Greece may be all-inclusive resorts that do not fully benefit the local Greek economy, especially if they import their food and supplies, and if they have almost exclusively foreign staff, as it happens increasingly in popular tourist areas around Greece.
been for a long time one of the global leaders in commercial shipping, while Greeks have been active — and even pioneers — in shipping since ancient times. Global centers, like New York and London, have become the bases for Greek shipping for more than one hundred years. Some of the early and most influential Greek immigrants have been active in shipping and commerce. Greek ship-owners, ship-workers and merchants created some of the early Greek immigrant communities in the United States, like the one in New Orleans. In 1924 the first Greek bank, Bank of Athens Trust Company, a subsidiary of the Bank of Athens in Greece, was established on American soil (Malafouris 1948: 261) in order to serve the financial needs of newly established Greeks in New York, many of whom were associated with shipping.  

The pioneer Greek immigrants in the lower Manhattan area, many of whom were associated with shipping, established in 1916 a small Greek Orthodox church dedicated to the patron saint of the sailors, Saint Nicholas (“Rebuilding Saint Nicholas”). Several decades later, the World Trade Center would be built in the immediate area surrounding the church. Saint Nicholas was destroyed during 9/11 but plans were approved to rebuild the church in the Ground Zero area as a tribute not only to the Greek-American community but also to the victims of the terrorist attack regardless of their religion, and as a symbol of hope. The church

213 The Bank was renamed Atlantic Bank of New York in the 1950s, reinforcing its connection to transatlantic shipping, and became a subsidiary of the National Bank of Greece when Bank of Athens merged with National Bank of Greece. Atlantic Bank was sold to New York Community Bank in 2006 (“About Us”), cutting the direct financial and banking link between Greece and customers in the United States.

214 The groundbreaking ceremony for the new church took place on Saturday, October 18, 2014. Due to disagreements with New York’s Port Authority (Eckstorm 2011), it was doubtful whether Saint Nicholas would be rebuilt in the immediate Ground Zero area. However, after mobilization of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese and the Greek-American community, agreement was reached with New York’s authorities to rebuild at Ground Zero. The new church is designed by Santiago Calatrava (Ibid.), who is also designing the rest of the Ground Zero construction projects.
is changing its role and symbolism through time: from being the haven for Greeks who just came off the ship, merchants, sailors, and other Greek immigrants of the lower Manhattan area in the early twentieth century, to being reinvented and rebuilt as an all-American and global symbol of freedom, sacrifice and remembrance.

Beyond the unique symbolism of Saint Nicholas church, now called Saint Nicholas National Shrine, the Greek shipping community and its presence in the United States is a unique case for a number of reasons. Some of the leading companies in this Greek industry are essentially Greek-American: their offices are based in New York or other American port cities, and the families, or family branches, that own these companies also live in the United States. Hence, probably the most successful industry of the Greek economy is partly based in the United States and its companies are owned and staffed, at least partly, by Greek-Americans.

Many families of Greek ship-owners, while being Greek at heart, live a cosmopolitan life as global jet-setters. They preserve a Greek identity that shapes both their professional and social life; this identity has been preserved by them and they have been preserved through this identity:

…members of nineteenth- and twentieth-century commercial and shipowning communities who lived all their lives abroad and were Russian, British, Italian or American subjects retained their ‘Greekness’, which was pivotal for their success and preserved by tight kinship and social circles. The successful progress of Greek-owned shipping was partly based on the fact that this identity guaranteed access to the informal ‘club’ of Greek merchants and shipowners abroad. (Harlaftis 2005: xx)

Family, local ties to the Greek islands, where the traditional shipping families came from, and tradition influenced Greek shipping well into the twentieth century and continue to do so: “The
structure of Greek-owned shipping firms has been heavily based on family and common island ties” (Ibid., 292).

The attitude and practices of the traditional ship-owning families in the twentieth century resembled those of the nineteenth century. Intermarriages were used extensively to keep the business within closed circles. Respect for tradition continued to be very important and beliefs were passed on carefully to new generations. (Ibid., 294)

Although new families entered the ship-owning business in the second half of the twentieth century, these newcomers imitated, for the most part, many of the old ways of operating.

The organization and structure of the new [post WWII, non-traditional] shipping firms closely followed the pattern of the traditional ship-owners. […] In this way kinship, island and ethnic ties ensured the cohesion of the international Greek maritime network. The unofficial but exclusive club of these cosmopolitan entrepreneurs clung to its Greek character; ‘Greekness’, beyond any cultural or patriotic aspirations, was extremely important for their economic survival. It provided access to all the expertise of shipping. […] It also provided consultancy from older and wiser members and information about the activities of the most successful members of the group. (Ibid., 297)

Based on this tight and traditional organization, which was the key to its success according to Greek shipping historian Gelina Harlafits (2005), Greek shipping continues to flourish in the international maritime economy and to infuse the Greek-American community with a longstanding commitment to the Greek identity and heritage, while, in a very practical way, it also offers access to global networks and to large amounts of funds.
All that while the Greek shipping companies based in the United States, together with Greek-American commercial companies that import from Greece, are directly connected to the economy of Greece. Greek shipping interests are so central in the national economic interests of Greece that the Greek-American advocacy organizations, the so-called Greek lobby, “vigorously defended Greek shipping interests whenever it perceived legislation as a threat, such as that calling for the enforcement of expensive double hulls for crude oil tankers” (Tagliabue 1997).

Two major non-profit organizations associated with Greek shipping are also based in New York, where the American headquarters of Greek shipping businesses are usually located. The Onassis Foundation, the American affiliate of the Athens-based Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation, founded by shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis to honor his dead son (“History”), and the Stavros Niarchos Foundation, founded by Onassis’ arch-rival Stavros Niarchos, are important New York non-profit organizations funded by significant endowments.\(^{215}\) Numerous educational, cultural and other development projects in Greece, the United States and around the world are funded annually by these foundations. The Onassis Foundation also runs the Onassis Cultural Center in New York, which fills a significant void in Greek cultural activity in the United States. These organizations as well as the Greek shipping company offices in New York have sister/parent offices in Greece and in other places around the world, making them global Greek organizations and businesses; transnational in operations but preserving their Greek character.

\(^{215}\) Information about the Stavros Niarchos Foundation can be found at its official web-site: Stavros Niarchos Foundation. \url{http://www.snf.org/} [accessed on 10/20/2014]
Greek-American Investments

The Greek-Americans, either if they emigrated themselves or if their parents or grandparents came from the old country, feel an emotional connection to Greece. As many, if not most of them, are businessmen, they have often thought, attempted to, or succeeded in investing in Greece. Among other diaspora investments, a historic Greek-American investment made in the 1950s had a deep and lasting impact on post-war Greece. Aristotle Onassis, the most prominent member of the Greek diaspora at the time, bought the rudimentary national air carrier of Greece and turned it into a high profile company within the next two decades (“Istoria O. A.”).216

The existence of high quality air travel access to Greece boosted its economy significantly (“Istoria O. A.”). Onassis also brought international attention to Greece through his lavish vacations on his private Greek island, indirectly promoting Greek tourism internationally (Ibid.). His airline, Olympic Airways, became the possession of the Greek state around the time of his death (Ibid.). The company never again reached the luxury that it experienced under his ownership and, eventually, under the pressure of Greek politics, employee unions and high debt, closed down (Ibid.). In 2009 the name and logo of the company were bought by a private airline (“Istoria O. A.”). Today Olympic Air exists as a small private airline, unrelated to its namesake.

The role of the Greek state in Greek-American investments in Greece has been quite contradictory. On the one hand, the Greek state has been active in attracting investments by Greek-Americans, as well as other Americans. On the other, it creates significant obstacles to prospective investors, either purposefully or not. Left wing politicians and labor unions,

\[216\] Onassis was based in New York for part of his life.
although having a job-centered agenda, have been very vocal against capital investments and big business, especially in the post-1980 period, when the socialist PASOK won the elections for the first time.

The anti-business rhetoric of left and center-left parties continues until today, influencing public policy and political culture. This creates an environment unfriendly to foreign investments. At the same time, numerous Greek-American businessmen, who attempted to invest in Greece, complain of unending problems with the Greek bureaucracy. From a convoluted bureaucratic system, to constantly changing laws, to taxation that does not encourage investments, these businessmen have experienced a variety of Greek political and bureaucratic problems, which have often led them to give up on their investment efforts.

The bureaucratic processes that the Greek state requires in any business transaction render investments extremely difficult and delay them; in some cases, forever. The other problem with investing in Greece is the constantly changing legal framework — in particular, the unfavorable and constantly changing taxation laws, as Members of the Parliament also argue (“Praktika” 2011e: 6). Public officials recognize that there is a need to create an investment-friendly environment, and to connect Greek businesses with the diaspora (Party Representative 2011).

Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantinos Tsiaras (2012), argued that there should be a fast-track for investments in addition to low taxation. Greek-American community leaders also stress that there should be incentives to promote diaspora investments in the country (Vidalis 2014). So far, relevant diaspora experiences have been more negative than positive, since the Greek public sector environment is often hostile to the diaspora; Greek-Americans have to pay a fine if they stay longer than a certain amount of time in the country, the quality of public services is often rather poor, and Greek bureaucracy makes them suffer, as they argue (Ibid.).
The current crisis and revelations about mismanagement and widespread corruption move the so-necessary prospects of Greek-American investments even further away. Realizing the importance of diaspora investments, the Special Permanent Committee for the Diaspora Greeks suggested in its 2011 Report to the Greek Parliament that Greece needs a consistent policy of country branding which “will help the country transform the negative climate” by highlighting the Greek values and ideals, and which will make investing in Greece more attractive (“Ekthesi” 2011: 43). However, this strategy, although necessary, still does not address the underlying structural problems that the Greek economy is facing and which make it unfriendly to investments.

The only silver lining in the current crisis is that low prices for land and buildings may attract diasporans as well as other foreign investors. The difference between the selling of pieces of land to ethnic Greeks, who live abroad, versus to foreigners is significant at a symbolic national and cultural level. When a person of Greek origin from abroad buys a Greek asset, Greeks do not feel that the country is been sold off to foreigners or xenoi. In the words of a member of the Greek Parliament: “if something is for sale in Greece, you [the Greek-Americans] should buy it so that it stays in Greek hands. Participate in any plan that can help our homeland” (“Praktika” 2011e: 9).

Following the implementation of controversial austerity measures after the beginning of the current economic crisis, economic indicators started to slowly improve, although this positive development will take years to trickle down to Greeks’ personal finances. With this cautiously positive outlook in mind, Greek and Greek-American institutions urge Greek-Americans and Americans to invest in Greece, taking advantage of the current low cost and overall low prices for doing business in the country, especially regarding the sale of companies in financial trouble and of physical holdings, like land or real estate.
In 2014, the Athens Exchange and the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce, based in Athens, organized the Third Greek Investment Forum: “GR for Growth.” This forum followed last year’s Second Greek Investment Forum: “Greece, seizing the opportunities,” and the First Greek Investment Forum: “Greece under reform: creating growth-revealing opportunities.” Such organized efforts to attract investments by Greek-Americans and Americans alike are the outcomes of partnerships between Greek-American organizations, the Greek private sector, the Greek government and Greek organizations that focus on economic exchanges and growth. According to Yanos Gramatidis, former President of the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce: "This is the right time to invest in Greece. Favorable pricing and financial incentives have created unique investment opportunities in both the private and public sectors" (“The Athens Exchange” 2013). Current American-Hellenic Chamber president, Simos Athanasopoulos, stated with respect to the latest Greek Investment Forum:

After a period of great uncertainty, Greece's business climate is improving rapidly, making this an opportune time to invest in the country. […] Favorable pricing, new financial incentives and the implementation of extensive structural reforms have created a plethora of compelling investment opportunities, in both the private and public sectors, which we intend to showcase at the Forum. (Ibid.)

The Greek state, through the Ministry of Development and Competitiveness, has also launched the campaign “Invest in Greece” (“Enterprise Greece”). This is a program that is addressed to foreign investors in general, including diaspora investors. As a result, it is unclear how many of the current investors are of Greek descent and whether there is a different strategy or procedures regarding the diaspora investors.

In the context of this new campaign to attract investments, new laws were promulgated in 2010 and 2013 aiming at addressing many of the past obstacles. Whether these laws will be
fully implemented and will, indeed, resolve past problems, remains to be seen. Even within the context of the new campaign, there are still significant legal and structural problems in Greece that need to be addressed. Entrepreneurship and a restored sense of trust in the Greek state as an economic partner, can indeed lead to the growth and development that the Greek economy desperately needs.

The Role of Remittances

In addition to past and present funding for business investments, remittances have also played a major role as a means of bolstering the Greek economy throughout the twentieth century and beyond. The great numbers of Greeks that immigrated to the United States before World War II and in its aftermath, meant that the majority of Greek families had a relative in America. The low standard of living that many Greeks experienced, both before and after the war, precipitated a long-term financial dependence on overseas relatives. For many of these migrants, the ability to offer remittances to their families back in Greece was one of the primary reasons for their migration to the United States.

The Greek economy was sustained during those decades by the millions of dollars that poured into it through remittances, in addition to packages of international financial assistance, like the Marshall plan.

The émigrés were therefore children of the Nation sacrificed on the altar of emigration. This human sacrifice was acceptable mainly because it decreased the effects of unemployment, as well as social and political strife. Soon however, the Greek State found out that emigration could also be quite profitable from an economic point of view. The remittances sent by émigrés to
their families became a means to cover part of the chronic balance of payments deficit. (Prévélakis 1998: 6)

According to studies of the impact of these remittances, they benefited the economy of Greece significantly, and they had a positive impact on economic growth, primarily through boosting spending.

The individual pattern of consumption of remittance recipients improves very drastically, as does the local standard of living in areas of heavy migration, as the recipients shift to more urbanized consumption habits. At the aggregate level, remittances do not seem to have the power to impose any serious burdens on the balance of payments, despite their strong import-generating effect. On the contrary, remittances promote economic growth, employment, and capital formation. (Glytsos 1993: 154)

Although remittances were high throughout the twentieth century, as economic conditions in Greece improved and immigration to the United States diminished significantly, dependence on remittances from relatives decreased. More recently, as the economic crisis was developing in Greece, the total amount of remittances followed a downward trend. According to the World Bank, there was a drop of close to a billion USD in annual remittances during recent years but last year this negative trend started slowly to be reversed. Remittances were approximately 2 billion USD in 2009, 1.5 billion in 2010, 1.2 billion in 2011, 680 million in 2012, and 800 million in 2013 (The World Bank 2014).

**Funding for Development in Greece**

Beyond remittances, Greek-Americans have also contributed to the Greek economy and society through funding numerous development projects in the last one hundred years. Greek-
American organizations, like the Onassis and Niarchos Foundations, are among a long list of Greek-American contributors to development in Greece. The role of the Greek-Americans has been crucial in infrastructure building and community development during the twentieth century but also in the context of the current crisis.

Since the early establishment of the first Greek-American communities and organizations, one of their major concerns was to help their towns and villages back home. Immigrants from the same Greek region or village created community organizations named after their place of origin. That place could be as specific as their individual village — in many cases there were more inhabitants of that Greek village living in the US than back home — or as general as the greater geographic region that their village was a part of.

These organizations aimed at: building social relations, offering support to their members, and fundraising in order to contribute to the alleviation of the needs and in the development of their place of origin.

Clubs and societies establish communities, build churches and schools, create philanthropic organizations and care for those who are in need of help, and with the money that they collect through fundraising, they beautify the villages of their members’ motherland with public benefit works – churches, schools, roads, aqueducts, etc. (Kontargyris 1964: 143)

In addition to the Greek-American community organizations of a local or regional character, Pan-Hellenic associations were created to unite all the Greek-Americans, regardless of local origin. These organizations usually had chapters across the country. The most influential of those has been AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association). AHEPA, although it experienced the rivalry of similar Greek-American organizations, was recognized by the Greek-American community, by the Greek state, and by
the United States government as the major organizational representative of the Greek-Americans throughout the twentieth century, in addition to the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese.

AHEPA played a major role as an agent of development for Greece, funding numerous development projects. Among these were several medical centers across the country established in the 1940s and 1950s. The largest among them was the University Hospital in Thessaloniki, which was named AHEPA University Hospital (“Genikis Plirofories”). In addition to AHEPA, many other Greek-American organizations have funded development projects in Greece and continue to do so.

Besides past contributions towards Greek development, Pan-American federations of local organizations, for example, the Pan-Arcadian Federation or the Pan-Epirotic Federation, and other Greek-American organizations of local character, have held or have participated in conferences that took place at their places of origin. These conferences, which have been convened during the last twenty years, aim at exploring ways in which to strengthen the bonds between Greek towns, cities or regions and their global diasporas. They are co-organized with other local diaspora organizations from around the world, and with the support of municipal and state authorities. Sometimes these conferences are organized on the initiative of local or regional authorities. In the context of these meetings, emphasis is placed on the ways

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217 Numerous publications of these conference proceedings are found at the Library of the Council of Hellenes Abroad at its headquarters in Thessaloniki. I visited the library in the context of research for this dissertation in summer 2011. Examples of available relevant publications include the proceedings of the First International Conference of Achaians Abroad (1998) and of the First International Conference of the Magnesian Diaspora (2001). Announcements and advertisements of similar regional diaspora conferences taking place around Greece are also found across various local and diaspora media.
These collective efforts show that the development of particular localities in Greece is seen as an issue that affects all people who originate from them, including those who live in the diaspora and their descendants. At the same time, they reflect a common will to follow a collective approach to problem solving. Last, they reflect the dependence of local and regional authorities on the varied contributions that the diaspora can make, especially when local resources are rather poor.

The emotional connection and sense of duty that diasporans feel towards their particular place of origin is possibly stronger than similar emotions they have towards Greece in general. Therefore, actions that target the local diaspora — the diaspora that originates from a particular locality — with respect to investments, development and economic cooperation, may be even more successful than actions that target all of the Greek diaspora. However, the inherent problems of the Greek public sector and the systematic lack of follow-up and implementation of policy recommendations, may pose significant obstacles to what can actually be accomplished in the aftermath of these conferences. Moreover, development suggestions discussed in the context of these conferences have to be specific while cooperation with municipal and other Greek state authorities is essential for any relevant progress.

For decades after the entrance of Greece in the European Union (EU), numerous large scale and small scale development projects were funded by the EU. Hence, Greek-American
contribution was not as necessary as before. The current economic crisis, however, created new and immediate needs related to the funding of basic services in addition to the funding for long-term development. By the beginning of the crisis, the extensive period of major development funding by the European Union had already come to an end, although some form of it continues until today.

European funding during the crisis is primarily in the form of loans, in order for Greece to cover its debt and to sustain its basic financial operations. During this period, Greek-Americans started once more to contribute towards the financial and development needs of their homeland. However, although the U.S. government has been active in helping Greece by putting pressure on the Troika to continue the funding, there is no emphasis on how it can help development in Greece, especially with reference to the promotion of commerce and Greek exports in the United States (Larigakis 2014). The Greek-Americans could play an important role as bridges between the two governments in order to promote interstate cooperation for trade and development.

Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries

During periods of major crises in Greek society, the Greek-American community has always offered direct financial or in-kind humanitarian aid to Greek private and public organizations that have been active in alleviating pressing social problems. The most pronounced case of humanitarian assistance was during World War II. This was a period of unprecedented mobilization and successful organization on the part of Greek-Americans in support of their destitute brethren in Greece. It was a cause that united all Greek-Americans, their organizations and the Church.
A few days after the Greek-Italian war started on October 28, 1940, the Greek-Americans came together and enthusiastically established the Greek War Relief Association (G.W.R.A.), an umbrella organization that would cover all Greek-American organizations and individuals and which would be dedicated to offering humanitarian and financial assistance to the embattled people of Greece. George Papaioannou (1985: 154) describes it as something more than an organization: it was a movement.

The Greek War Relief Association was extremely successful in collecting and sending funds, food, and medications to the embattled Greeks while the harmonious cooperation of all Greek-Americans was unprecedented (Papaioannou 1985: 177-179). Community organizations, businesses and Church institutions were placed in the service of G.W.R.A. Within the first five months, G.W.R.A. sent $3,336,700 to Greece (Ibid.). This was a life-saving operation for the Greek people, especially once the German occupation started in April 1941 (Ibid.).

Following the conquest and the closing of traffic in Mediterranean Sea by the Allies, Greece which imported 35% of her food was faced with starvation. During the German occupation, the GWRA worked out a plan with the Allied Governments, whereby food purchased in Turkey was shipped to Greece and was distributed under the supervision of the International Red Cross. Between October 1941 and August 1942, more than 19,000 tons of food reached Greece. In addition to the aid to Greece during the war, the GWRA also sent food and clothing to thousands of Greek prisoners of war in Italy. (Ibid., 179)

The G.W.R.A., with the support of the Church, enlisted the help of the American people and government to help Greece in its time of need.
[Archbishop] Athenagoras made use of his office and contacts in order to solicit help from the American Government in shipping food, clothing and medical supplies to war torn Greece. He visited President Roosevelt several times; the President instructed the State Department to cooperate fully with the GWRA in securing the delivery of these supplies to Greece. (Papaioannou 1985: 179)

In the post-WWII period, other Greek-American organizations — besides the G.W.R.A., which continued its humanitarian operation — were also actively involved in alleviating the suffering of the Greek people during the Greek Civil War (1944-1949) and in its aftermath.

Following the war, A.H.E.P.A. took an active part in the reconstruction of Greece with fundraising drives to bring food, medicine and clothing to their suffering brothers, building hospitals and doing anything that could alleviate the suffering of that struggling nation. (Papaioannou 1985: 161)

AHEPA continued to come to the assistance of the Greek people during several national emergencies that occurred in the following decades. After the 1999 Athens earthquake, AHEPA raised over $220,000 to support the victims, by funding the purchase of sonar detection equipment, a hospital ambulance and the reconstruction of a day care center (“The AHEPA”). Following the devastating fires of 2007, AHEPA raised over $500,000 for its Greek Fire Emergency Relief Fund (Ibid.).

The Greek-Americans and the Economic Crisis in Greece

During the recent Greek economic crisis, the greatest financial crisis to hit the country since World War II, the Greek-American community was expected to come again to the
assistance of the Greek people. It, indeed, did so. The primary form of assistance that they offered was in terms of financial contributions to alleviate social and humanitarian problems that the high unemployment, the cuts in government spending, and the overall shrinking of the economy had caused. A primary organization through which this fundraising has taken place is the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America and its individual parishes and affiliated organizations across the United States.

At the same time, one of the major recipients of this aid has been the Church of Greece and its individual parishes, since the Church has been one of the most prominent organizations that offer social support programs, such as soup kitchens, food pantries, free medical and dental services, and free tutoring for children. Many other Greek-American organizations have, also, contributed large amounts of funds to a variety of organizations in Greece that are dedicated to helping those severely affected by the crisis, including children, the homeless, and the chronically unemployed.

Once again, AHEPA also came to the help of Greece, creating the Greece Humanitarian Relief Effort Fund. AHEPA helps Greece primarily through providing funding for food and medical supplies, and through offering support for food voucher programs in schools. It also requests donations of medical supplies from private partners. This course of action was chosen as the most effective one following communication with the Embassy of Greece in Washington, D.C. Many of the humanitarian problems that need to be addressed are identified by the local chapters of AHEPA in Greece, whose members also offer direct volunteer services (Mossaidis). The total amount collected so far to fund food purchases is close to $500,000, while the value of medical supplies that have been funded and shipped to Greece in cooperation with other organizations reaches $4 million.
Representatives of AHEPA came to Greece after the crisis began and met with the members of the Special Permanent Committee for the Diaspora Greeks at the Greek Parliament. Some of the topics that they came to discuss were the Diaspora bond, which ended up not materializing, and ways to support the Greek economy in the midst of the crisis (“Praktika” 2011e: 12). The supreme president of the AHEPA, Nikolaos Karacostas, stressed the commitment of the organization to helping Greece and the Greek-American community. He cited numerous community development projects that AHEPA has undertaken in its 89 years, in health care, Greek language and education and other areas both in Greece and in the United States. Moreover, he mentioned that “Most of us diaspora Greeks want to help, but we do not know exactly what to do. We are expecting you to inform us and to give us a chance to help, as well” (Ibid., 13).

Although the diasporans are not confident that the Greek state will honor its promises to the diaspora (“Praktika” 2011e: 13), they, nevertheless, continue to be committed to offering their assistance so that the crisis can be overcome. The supreme treasurer of AHEPA stated during the above mentioned meeting: “My origin is from Constantinople [Istanbul] and we ache for Greece and we will try to do whatever we can” (Ibid., 15). Encounters like this one between Greek state representatives and the organized Greek-American community, illustrate both the emotion that surrounds the diaspora’s relationship with Greece, and the inadequate planning on the part of the state in order to establish a real strategic partnership with the diaspora with clear, feasible and measurable goals.

In 2012, Greek-Americans and philhellenes launched The Hellenic Initiative (THI) in order to support the Greek people and the economy of Greece during this difficult time,
focusing specifically in the development of the country (“The Hellenic Initiative”). The inaugural meeting took place in Athens under the leadership of Bill Clinton, who is the organization’s Honorary Chairman (“Annual Report 2014”). THI is a global Greek diaspora organization “whose vision is to mobilize the Greek diaspora and philhellene community to invest in the future of Greece through programs focused on crisis relief, entrepreneurship and economic development” (“The Hellenic Initiative”).

It has been quite successful in raising funds for humanitarian and development purposes, having “committed or granted” $2 million in order to fund crisis relief and job creation programs, more than $6 million in order to support entrepreneurship programs, and close to $10 million for an investment fund focused on Greece (“The Hellenic Initiative”). It provides grants to non-profits, financial support for small businesses and mentoring of businessmen, while fostering the creation of jobs, and the long-term economic growth of the country (“Annual Report 2014”). THI, although based in the US and led primarily by Greek-Americans, aims at mobilizing the global Greek diaspora in order to create a massive effort to support the country’s development (Ibid.). This is illustrative of the leadership role that the Greek-American community plays within the global Greek diaspora. The organization’s inaugural banquet in New York in 2013, raised over $1.9 million, which was one of the most successful fundraising events in the history of the Greek-American community, while it

219 THI’s Board Members are top corporate Greek-American and American leaders. The Chairman is Andrew N. Liveris, President, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Dow Chemical Company, while the Executive Committee includes a representative of the Archdiocese, fr. Alexandros Karloutsos, and a top Turkish-American corporate leader, Muhtar Kent, who is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Coca-Cola Company (“The Hellenic Initiative”). Greek-born Arianna Huffington of Huffington Post is also a member of the organization’s Board (Ibid.).
featured such high profile speakers as Bill Clinton, Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, and George Stephanopoulos, as Master of Ceremonies (Ibid.).

The core beliefs of the organization are illustrative of how its founders and members view the Greek state, their responsibilities as members of the Greek diaspora and their vision for the future:

First, we are committed to Greece, faults and all. And we are dedicating our time, resources and networks to secure a different future.

Second, this is about investment, not handouts. We are focused on impact and outcomes, whether it’s a grant to a nonprofit organization, mentorship for an emerging entrepreneur, or investment in a small business. What matters is impact, not effort.

Third, we do not have all the answers. But we know that across our global community we have what it takes to create a 21st century powerhouse, both within Greece and across the diaspora. And we will build it together. (“The Hellenic Initiative”)

This is one of the rare, if not unique, development-centered efforts to support Greece. The founders’ letter points to a deep and realistic sense of commitment of the diaspora to the Greek state regardless of problematic mentalities and structures.

We acknowledge the mixed emotions wrought by these challenging times: despair, fear, disappointment, even anger. But we stand by Greece because we are confident the future can be different – because we are family. And because we never forget that we stand on the shoulders of giants who walked before us:
not just those from ancient times, but those of our parents and grandparents as well.

This is a long-term commitment. It is not enough to just regain lost ground. Greece must chart a new course, ambitious even before the crisis, and almost unthinkable today. But working together – Greeks, the diaspora and our friends – we can harness our collective vision, capabilities and resources to build a brighter future. If not us, who? Join us. (Ibid.)

Stressing the collective character of this effort, they sign the letter with the words “Oli Mazi,” meaning “all together” (Ibid.). Their letter points to a deep sense of duty and commitment, which stems not only from the will to honor a vague and distant heritage but rather from the will to honor their own immigrant families. This is what makes the diasporan advantage, the emotion-based commitment to the well-being of the family’s homeland. When this is coupled with unique skills, connections, resources and abilities that diasporans have, it can be quite a powerbase for the development of the homeland. However, such efforts can be truly successful if the Greek state supports, or at least does not create obstacles for, them. So far, Greek political leaders have been very positive and cooperative towards the Hellenic Initiative (“Annual Report 2014”).

Greece Debt Free is a unique Greek-American organization, which together with its Greek branch, helps Greece get out of the crisis in a different way. This organization raises funds in order to buy Greek national bonds in the international financial markets in prices which are significantly lower than the amount that the Greek state owes (“Greece Debt Free”). Then, it cancels the bonds, reducing Greek debt (Ibid.). According to the organization’s web-site, Greece Debt Free has bought bonds valued at a total of about €3.5 million Euros (Ibid.). The organization was created by Peter Nomikos, a Greek businessman who works in Greece, in the
United Kingdom and in the United States, following his study of the 1920s financial crisis of how the international private financial structures can help Greece (Ibid.). Although the Greek debt is very large, such contributions can support its viability significantly.

Although all these efforts to help Greece by reducing the Greek debt, and by supporting the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis and the country’s development are the outcomes of empathy, commitment and a sense of duty, there are several Americans who do not feel an obligation to help and who harbor different emotions towards the Greek state and the Greek crisis, as illustrated in a news report by a local New York newspaper. Although this study is not based on an extensive survey, it does give an insight into what several Greek-Americans think of the problems the Greek state is facing.

Based on the attitudes of those present at a local church festival, the journalist drew the conclusion that the Greek-Americans seem more committed to economic and social issues facing the United States and their own local communities than to the problems of Greece.

“I don’t think we have any obligations at all,” said John Callimanis, who recently returned from a trip to the Greek island of Ithaca. “Of course, we feel bad for what’s going on, but I don’t think it’s up to America to bail them out,” he added. Greeks should reform laws and curb spending rather than look to the outside world for assistance. It’s bad politics, bad people running the country. They spent like drunken sailors once they got in the euro. Judging from those who attended the festival, it seems that like Callimanis, many New Yorkers of Greek descent are nostalgic for the old country but do not feel an obligation to bail it out.

“They have to change their government. They have to change their structure and they have to change their laws so Greece becomes a place where you can do
business easily,” said John Demoleas, a third-generation Greek-American who stopped to eat at the festival after morning services at Saint Spyridon. And if the policy of the Ladies Philoptochos Society is any guide, contributing to solve the current economic chaos in America speaks more closely to the Greeks in New York than does the European crisis. “We try to make donations for a family that is here where we can be of some consistent presence,” said Elizabeth Katsivelos, the former president of the society. (Nadour 2011)

The relationship between the Greek-Americans and the Greek state has suffered a blow due to revelations about the state’s actions (or inactions) that have contributed or led to the economic crisis. This relationship is, further, impacted by the deep and historical lack of trust in the Greek state both by Greek-Americans and by Greeks in Greece. The Greek-Americans at this church festival share the view of many others that Greece brought the crisis upon itself and they blame the mismanagement, the lack of planning and organization, the over-spending and the corruption of the politicians, the government and the public administrators for the crisis.

Since many Greek-Americans may view Greece and its representatives negatively due to recent developments, Greek-American pride may have taken a hit. The Greek government and its representatives will not only have to make necessary changes in the structures, processes and mentalities of the Greek public sector but they will also have to address this negative attitude in the diaspora. Beyond taking measures to address the problem at home, an accurate public information strategy may be required in order to shed light on the economic issues surrounding the crisis which have become politicized, overdramatized and emotionalized through news coverage. Any successes in the struggle against the crisis, either at the level of economic indicators or of daily life in Greece, often do not reach the Greek-Americans, while the negative news have a much greater grasp on them and on any audience in general. The
restoration of a trust that may have never actually been there in the first place, will probably take a long time and will require a consistent and varied public communication approach.

Greek Governmental Appeal to the Diaspora, the Non-Case of the Diaspora Bond, and Foundations for a New Diaspora Policy

In the beginning of the Greek crisis, Prime Minister George Papandreou visited the United States and appealed for the support of both the American government and the Greek-American community in handling the crisis. He was also attempting to restore the image of Greece and of the Greek government in the eyes of Greek-Americans as he was reaching out for help. In his speech at an event organized by the Greek community in New York in his honor, he stated the following:

…We are creating a new Greece, we are creating a meritocratic Greece, a transparent Greece, an accountable Greece… And in this attempt, we call on all the Greeks and all the Hellenism of the Diaspora, to the extent possible, to the extent that you are able to do so, to contribute. We know that there is the will. We know that there is this will first and foremost from the daily support you give us, when you talk to your American compatriots but also from the support you give us daily, either through tourism, [or] through the Diaspora bond which we will institute. (Papandreou 2010)

As the crisis was evolving, the Greek government came up with the idea of a diaspora bond, which the diasporans would buy in order to support the Greek state. Prime Minister Papandreou mentioned this diaspora bond in his speech and hopes were high in those early years of the
crisis that this would be a partial solution to the problem. Deputy Minister Dimitrios Dollis stated the following regarding the diaspora bond in an interview to the Athens News Agency – Macedonian Press Agency:

The issuance of a [diaspora] bond is a very serious case…. Maybe it is something unprecedented and our diasporans want sincerely to contribute but its success has to be secured and each Greek should be able to say that this state is worthy to be supported, that he invested securely in the Greece of tomorrow.

(Riba 2010)

Despite initial plans, the diaspora bond was never materialized, although it was conceived as a fresh approach to dealing with the crisis by using the potential that the dedicated and successful Greek diaspora offered. The details of how the bond would work were not clear and the reasons why it did not become a reality have also not been clear.

A possible concern about the success of the bond, had it been initiated, would probably be the lack of trust that the Greek-Americans have developed towards the Greek state through historical experience, personal experience and news coverage. This lack of trust became even deeper when it was shown that, at least to a significant degree, it was the mismanagement and even corruption of the Greek state that made the country extremely more vulnerable in the face of an international economic crisis. Had the diaspora bond worked, it would have been an exceptional case of direct support to the Greek state and the Greek economy by the diaspora Greeks.

Beyond the diaspora bond, the current economic crisis has necessarily shed light on the great need for rebuilding and growing the Greek economy. The diaspora can indeed play a significant role in it, if such a role is clear and if there is good and trustworthy collaboration
between the parties involved: the Greek state, the Greek business world, Greek civil society, Greek-American businessmen, Greek-American civil society, and Greek-American professionals, academics and experts (in other words, a transnational Greek epistemic community). The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, stated in a press conference for the Greek-American media in New York in 2010 that “the Diaspora Greeks play a ‘decisive role’ in the empowerment and development of Greece” (“Synentefxi tou Prothypourgou” 2010).

The Prime Minister referred very warmly to the Diaspora Greeks, whom he thanked for the fact that “they always are supporting Greece,” as he specifically mentioned. Mr. Papandreou spoke of an “upgraded strategy” that the government has adopted as far as the Diaspora Greeks are concerned and of an “empowerment of the bonds” on a new basis, with emphasis on the transfer and use of the expertise of the diasporans for the realization of the necessary institutional reforms in Greece. (Ibid.)

What is particularly interesting regarding this interview is that the Prime Minister “informed the representatives of the Greek-American media of the developments in domestic as well as the foreign policy of Greece” (Ibid.). This action is another testament to the fact that the Greek state sees the Greek diaspora as a partner in the political issues that affect Greece, since it is common practice for the Greek Prime Minister or other representatives of the Greek state to inform the leaders and the media of the Greek-American diaspora about new political developments and about the government’s plans to address different issues. Moreover, George Papandreou stated:

Through the Greek-American media, I would like to thank the Diaspora Greeks for the support and contribution in a critical moment for our country. They are
always standing by Greece, in the difficult times, whether with respect to the
Cyprus problem, or Greek-Turkish relations, or Balkan issues regarding the
well-known problem of the name of FYROM. The Diaspora Hellenism, the
Hellenism of the United States has always been present for the support of our
country. Of course, I want also as a Prime Minister, to see an upgraded strategy
with respect to the Diaspora Greek. Because there are not only the cases when
we are in need of help or the cases where we can help, on our side, with respect
to issues like the language and contact with Greece, but, really, in a globalized
economy and society there are tremendous opportunities for close cooperation,
for transfer of the expertise of the Diaspora Hellenism, [which is] a world of its
own, from the academic area to the business world, from art and culture to
journalism, from sports to politics. There are diaspora Greeks […], whose
experience and knowledge we can easily [use to the benefit of Greece] but they
can also see what are the possibilities for their own interests in Greece. I believe,
then, that through the current crisis, we have the opportunity to strengthen these
bonds on a new basis, where the Hellenism of the Diaspora will play a decisive
role. […] We have already started to work on certain sectors of the economy
and we had a meeting with important businessmen of the Diaspora Hellenism a
few weeks ago. We will also have an initiative in October around the issue of
Green development, and we will continue this cooperation in several sectors
where the Greeks of the Diaspora can play an important role. For the first time
and through the process of open government, we have an open invitation for
positions of responsibility in the public sector. Among these applications, there
were also those from Diaspora Greeks and some of them were selected. […]
[Recently there was] a negative picture of Greece [due to the Athens riots],
while Greece is one of the safest countries, especially our islands which are hospitable. I would like to thank the Greek-Americans who have made an important attempt to change this [international] climate. (Ibid.)

The Greek state is recognizing the contributions of Greek-Americans and is requesting their support and assistance in the form of “the transfer and use of the expertise of the diasporans,” both in foreign policy and in the domestic realm. Papandreou has possibly been the most proactive among Greek political leaders in recruiting diaspora Greeks for positions in his government. Although the plans were very ambitious, their implementation has been more challenging due to the obstacles that the organizational and political culture of the Greek public sector presents.

A few years later, Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantinos Tsiaras framed the crisis in a different way during his visit in the United States. In his speech at Hellenic College and Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology in Brookline, Massachusetts, he mentioned that he wanted the Greek-Americans to think of the Greek crisis as part of the European problem rather than as a uniquely Greek problem (Tsiaras 2012). He also stressed that this European problem was a temporary problem that is an example of periodic phenomena that happen in the global economy (Ibid.). According to the Deputy Minister, Greece was the weak link (Ibid.). This approach puts the Greek problem in a European dimension and takes some of the pressure off Greek authorities. Nevertheless, Tsiaras did speak of legal and other reforms that need to take place in order to boost the Greek economy.
According to Papandreous’s statements, a new policy area where the Greek state is envisioning a partnership with the Diaspora is Green technologies and Green development, areas in which Greece has certain comparative advantages and which can boost the development of the country. In these areas, Greece depends on the experience of the diaspora from which it could greatly benefit. In general, the future seems very fertile for a productive and mutually beneficial cooperation between the diaspora and the Greek state. However, the details of the new strategy have not been publicly disclosed and it is unclear whether there was adequate and effective follow-up in the context of this ambitious strategy, partly due to the fact that soon following the Prime Minister’s speech, a new government was formed, while the crisis deepened.

The Deputy Foreign Minister, Spyros Kouvelis, elaborating on the diaspora’s involvement in Green development in Greece, stated in an article in Greek Diaspora magazine the following:

The empowerment of our country’s presence abroad is one of the major goals of the Government. In the context of Green development… this can happen through the mobilization of the Greeks who are in every country in the world. […] Greece has to contact all Greeks, regardless of their professional sector, their social role and their place of residence. With a consistent and continuous communication […], it has the responsibility to instill [in them Greek] pride for their place of origin and to mobilize them with a dual goal: on the one hand, as a source of support and knowledge for the realization of the vision of a modern Greece with emphasis on Green development, to the extent and in the way that each one can help, and, on the other hand, by taking advantage of the
human capital as ambassadors of our country for the promotion of Greece and
of its comparative advantages around the world.

The countries where our expatriates reside, have expertise, both in [the]
technical as well as [the] political realm, and have a long history in the
application of comprehensive programs in the management and protection of
the environment and they can become the starting point for finding solutions in
our country in the context of a policy of “green development.” The Greeks of
the Diaspora are the uniting bond between the country of residence and the
motherland, and they can, therefore, transfer these ideas and knowledge to our
country. It is necessary that we have contact with scientists, researchers and
academics, with politicians of Greek origin who are found in many countries.
We can also take advantage in a positive way of businessmen who play an
important role for economic cooperation and of course [we have to emphasize
the importance of] the cooperation with the [diaspora] youth, who are the most
important element in the relationship between Greece and the Greeks abroad.
Second, third, fourth generation Greeks, who have to feel that Greece is close
to them, [is standing by them]. It is important to ensure that the children and the
youth of the diaspora Hellenism do not stop speaking Greek. […]

We have to have a constant contact, because the diaspora Greeks want to see
continuity and consistency on our side. They have to feel but also to know that
Greece is standing by them. (“Arthro YFYPEX” 2010)

Kouvelis discusses the comparative advantages of the diaspora and the numerous ways in
which it can support Greek development, especially in areas that require technical and scientific
expertise. He also connects all this activity and cooperation to the promise of the diaspora
youth, and to basic elements of Greek identity, the Greek language being dominant among them, which create the necessary background against which such a partnership will take place.

The connection of Greek identity markers to the willingness of the diaspora to help Greece is a very common theme in all relevant rhetoric.

The Deputy Foreign Minister also stressed the role that diaspora Greeks can play in the context of economic diplomacy. He emphasized the dependence of Greece on the diaspora as it is rebuilding its economy and is attempting to create a positive international image for itself.

We have to take advantage in a positive way of our relationship with the diaspora Greeks, not to use them but to take advantage of them in a positive way as real ambassadors of Greece in order to change the [negative international] image of Greece. With these two things, the economy and the diaspora Greeks, [Greece will have] a complete image as a reliable interlocutor in the international community. (“Synentefxi YYPEX” 2010)

The Greek state emphasizes the need to build strategic partnerships with the diaspora in the area of economic diplomacy as another means to boost Greek economy and development. The Special Permanent Committee for the Diaspora Greeks also stresses the need to develop a diplomatic strategy that will actively engage the diasporans. In its 2011 Report to the Greek Parliament, it argued:

Especially during these difficult times for our homeland, Greece should be able to rely on the diaspora Hellenism and on the essential help that Greeks anywhere around the world can offer. On our side, a targeted economic diplomatic effort is necessary, as well as a dynamic campaign in order to inform and advertise the prospects that are taking shape in Greece for the Diaspora businessmen. (“Ekthesi” 2011: 44)
The diaspora is a major part of Greece’s human and social capital as far as the country’s international presence is concerned. Nevertheless, the Greek state seems to sabotage itself by not paying adequate attention to its relationship with the diaspora or not undertaking several necessary structural and legal reforms. Deputy Foreign Minister Spyros Kouvelis, recognizing the shortcomings of the current policy framework, argued that:

[The Diaspora Greeks] ask for continuity and consistency. They complain that Greece remembers them only when it needs them. We have to take advantage of this Greek human capital as ambassadors, as a force of green development also beyond our borders. The diaspora Greeks are the unifying bond between their country of residence and the motherland, and they can, therefore, disseminate ideas and knowledge to our country. (“Synentefxi YPYPEX” 2009)

The diaspora is, often, not helping not because it does not want to help but rather because “it considers Greece a lost cause” due to the inherent problems of the Greek political structures and mentalities (Professor B 2014). The concerns of the Greek-Americans regarding the trustworthiness of the Greek state also raise another question.²²⁰ What is the starting point of any action? Is it that the diaspora Greeks have to act first, promoting a new, improved international image of Greece which will support the country’s economy? Or, is it that the Greek state has to implement major changes first in order to gain the trust of the diaspora and

²²⁰ The business-oriented Greek-American community was not seeing the Greek state in a positive light when socialist PASOK was ruling the country. There was a gap between the predominantly conservative ideology of the diaspora and the socialist ideology of the Greek government. However, successive PASOK governments became gradually more interested in attracting foreign investments and in economic cooperation with the diaspora, especially during the crisis. In general, differences in the economic ideology of the diaspora and the homeland can affect the potential for cooperation between the two.
to have its support in creating a new international image for Greece? Possibly, both can happen simultaneously.

However, the specific actions that would be necessary in order to turn the situation around and the type of coordination that would be required for effective action are rather unclear, while a basic question still remains: is the state responsible for the diaspora’s attitude toward it? Or, is the diaspora itself primarily responsible for its attitude towards the Greek state? Does the diaspora have a responsibility towards the Greek state regardless of the state’s actions? Some Greek-Americans tend to think that it does, while others think that it does not.

**Diasporas as Agents of Development in Comparative perspective: Lessons Learned for Greece from Global Experience**

Like Greece, many nations around the world try to reach out to their diasporas in order to enlist their help, primarily in terms of expertise but also financially, in promoting development at home. An important example is African nations, where both the national governments and the international organizations are trying to support development at home through a heavy reliance on a mobilized diaspora.

African governments are reaching out to diasporas. Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa have launched several plans to incorporate their diaspora communities as partners in development projects. Several African countries (among them Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda) have established institutions (at the agency or ministerial level) to interact with the Diaspora. (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program)
It seems that there is a new paradigm shift in how diasporas are viewed by their homelands: not so much as a loss but rather as a gain.

There has been a shift in the discussion from seeing the emigration of skilled people as a loss, to seeing skilled migration as an opportunity to get remittances, trade, investment projects and new knowledge. China; India; Israel; Japan; the Republic of Korea; and Taiwan, China are examples of economies that have tapped into their diasporas as a source of knowledge. (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program)

Comparing the Greek case with those of diasporas of African countries, we see that governments in both cases aim at strengthening the bond between their states and their diasporas and encourage their diasporas to use their “skills, knowledge or financial capital” (Ibid.) for the development of their homelands.

The ability of diasporas to acquire and retain a dual citizenship, that of their country of origin or descent, and that of the country they currently live in, may be important for a sense of loyalty and national pride but is also proven to have a positive effect on the diasporans’ financial and social upward mobility in the countries where they reside. Therefore, diasporans who have dual citizenships can be better sources of development support for their countries of origin (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program). In the case of Greece and the United States, dual citizenship is allowed by both states, unlike other pairs of countries. As a result, Greek-Americans are fully and legally members of both nations and societies.

Naturalization of Greeks as American citizens ensured their participation in mainstream American society and their upward mobility, since they could take advantage of all the financial, social and educational benefits that Americans had access to. Most Greek-Americans, even the first generation ones, have American citizenship or permanent resident
status. Recently, second to fourth generation Greek-Americans have been applying for Greek citizenship in order to have the benefits of a European Union citizenship.\textsuperscript{221} The fact that we increasingly see Greek-Americans with dual citizenships can be very fruitful for the development of Greece, since the diasporans can work, invest and otherwise involve themselves in the Greek economy as Greek citizens.

Similar to what is happening in the case of Greece, several proposals have taken place regarding the involvement of African diasporas in the development of their home countries. Such plans often have detailed descriptions of how this involvement will take place, unlike the Greek case which tends to be dominated by more general statements and ideas regarding the role of the Greek diaspora, at least as far as state-driven initiatives are concerned. African countries and regional African organizations have created or proposed specific financial mechanisms that enable the direct funding and involvement by diasporas in their countries’ development.\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{221} American citizenship is based on the legal principle of the \textit{jus soli}, the right of the soil, meaning that whoever is born on American soil is automatically granted citizenship. Naturalized citizens are usually family members of American citizens or permanent residents (green card holders) who applied for citizenship after living in the country for a number of years. In Greek legal code, which follows a European model, citizenship is based on the \textit{jus sanguinis}, the right of the blood, meaning that whoever is the child of citizens automatically becomes a citizen despite where he was born, while children of foreigners born in Greece do not automatically get Greek citizenship. Greek-Americans can easily acquire Greek citizenship, if they have the paperwork to prove that their ancestor was of Greek citizenship. However, the situation is more complicated for those Greeks who came to the United States from areas outside of the Greek state, primarily from Asia Minor in Turkey and elsewhere. Those Greeks were usually Ottoman citizens or had the citizenship of another country, and, therefore, it is more complicated for their descendants today to prove that their ancestors were Greek and, hence, to acquire the Greek citizenship — although they may be obviously ethnically Greek, primarily as their name suggests. \textit{Jus sanguinis} also applies to American citizenship, since children of American citizens who are born outside of the country can also acquire American citizenship. However, this implementation of \textit{Jus sanguinis} does not have an ethnic character.

\textsuperscript{222} “The African Union Summit in 2012 was dedicated to the discussion on the impact and the role of the African diaspora. The AU decided to start a new chapter in its activity by involving
The Economic Community of West African states has proposed establishing a dedicated financial instrument at a regional level to facilitate business contributions of the diaspora to the region. […] Some African governments are providing incentives to attract investment from the diasporas. For example […] Ethiopia grants a yellow card to diaspora members, profiting from the same benefits and rights as domestic investors. (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program)

Ethiopia offers additional incentives to diaspora investors, including tax exemptions, import duty exemptions, customs exemptions.

All these incentives have led to diaspora investment in small businesses in Ethiopia (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program). In Greece we do not see diaspora investment to the degree that would be possible based on the affluence and entrepreneurship of the Greek-American community. Although the Greek state is trying to attract diaspora investments, the political culture, the lack of adequate financial incentives and bureaucratic obstacles have created more problems than they have solved with respect to diaspora involvement in Greece.

In addition to African case-studies, many countries around the world are focusing their attention on how diasporas can contribute in the development of their homelands. International organizations working in development have urged for a greater role for the diasporas. The
World Bank, the U.S. State Department’s and USAID’s IdEA, International Diaspora Engagement Alliance, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have recently focused their attention on diasporas as significant sources of assistance to countries in need of development. An illustrative example is UNDP’s project for the involvement of the Kosovar diaspora in Kosovo’s development; the “Diaspora Engagement in Economic Development Project” was launched in July 2012 by the UNDP, in cooperation with the IOM, the International Organization for Migration, and Kosovo’s Ministry of the Diaspora (UNDP).

Global Lessons for Diaspora Engagement in Human Development

Diasporas can contribute to human and community development of their homelands in three ways: 1) through financial contributions of relevant projects and activities, 2) through offering their professional and academic expertise in the planning and setting up of relevant programs, and 3) through direct involvement in the delivery of services as volunteers or low-paid professionals for high-skill or low-skill service posts, ex. medical professionals, educators, trainers, environmental scientists, administrators, etc. (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program). Remittances from the diaspora also support the improvement of living conditions and support human development at home (Ibid.). An important advantage of diaspora “remittance funding […] over foreign aid funding is that these remittance funds go directly to the remittance targets, the recipients most of the time. These funds help pay school fees, build houses, and support growing businesses” (Ibid.).

See the World Bank’s “African Diaspora Program” (since 2007) “that focuses on formulation and implementation of policies that facilitate exchange between diaspora and homeland” (The ICD “Experience Africa” Program). Also, the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance holds an annual Global Diaspora Forum as well as the Global Diaspora Week.
Greece has not initiated programs of direct involvement of the diaspora in the provision of services to its population. However, especially at the current time of economic crisis, when the whole social service system is in danger of collapse and national service industries, such as health care and education, are experiencing severe problems, the involvement of the diaspora could help substantially. Channels could be created through which the willing Greek-Americans could have the opportunity to help Greece.

A Greek-American organization, called Reinventing Greece, has partly taken over the task of connecting the diaspora to service opportunities in Greece. The account of how the organization was launched gives an important insight into the current policy shortcomings and into the great potential of a partnership between Greece and the diaspora, especially the diaspora youth, with respect to the alleviation of social problems in Greece.

Reinventing Greece was launched after in-depth research found that young Greek-Americans overwhelmingly expressed an interest in traveling to Greece for volunteer, internship, study, and work opportunities. Despite such strong interest, there is a gap between this demand and the supply of available opportunities. Students and young professionals report that it is challenging to find information in English on community organizations or businesses in Greece that offer volunteer, internship, or partnership opportunities for diaspora youth. This leaves a distance between Greeks and those in the diaspora that would like to support or join their efforts, and it makes discussions on building partnerships more difficult. (Bouikidis 2012)

In the area of education, young Greek-Americans can be particularly helpful. Student-teachers could go to teach in Greece and offer free help while they are getting experience (Professor B 2014). They can, particularly, contribute in the Greek educational system through the
introduction of educational methods that are used in the United States, especially in specialized areas, such as Teaching English as a Second Language or special education (Ibid.).

These young educators have to practice teaching anyway and they want to go to Greece and teach there (Professor B 2014). However, an inherent problem with respect to any attempted educational innovation in Greece, is that Greeks are a “tradition-bound group of people” that often resist innovation: “whatever has worked for them, will work for their kids” (Ibid.). This view is not shared by all Greeks and, possibly, it might be less dominant in the younger and more educated generations.

Other countries have followed similar programs which were met with success. A small-scale example is the Rwandan diaspora’s contribution to human development in the country through the TOKEN program.

Rwandan TOKEN program in 2005-07 is an example of a contribution made to human development. It involved visits by 47 volunteers to teach and provide technical assistance. The average stay was of less than two months and the variety of responsibilities constrained the transfer of knowledge to counterparts in host institutions. (The ICD “Experience Diaspora” Program)

Building on the experiences of African countries, it is suggested that “governments can also mobilize resources from Diasporas by encouraging their participation in social security, housing, and microfinance programs” (Ibid.).

Diasporans have the potential to support human development in their old homelands through offering their skills, knowledge, connections and funds. Hence, they can contribute towards the design of human development projects and the introduction of successful policies based on their experience in those particular sectors in their countries of residence. As
development scholar and practitioner Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie (2011: 272-273) has argued, this involvement can happen either as an independent path to development that engages the diaspora exclusively or it can be incorporated in an overall planning for human development in the country.

In the Greek case, there is a wealth of organizational experience by diasporans in human services and development. Combined with their perceived desire to assist their own or their ancestors’ homeland, these diasporan advantages render the diaspora a very promising partner for Greek development. In the words of George Logothetis, founding member of The Hellenic Initiative and a member of its Executive Committee,

The Greek Diaspora has constantly appeared to do the impossible and achieve the improbable, thriving from making something out of nothing and flourishing globally….But for those to whom much opportunity has been given or granted along with it comes responsibility. As ambassadors of our culture we have a duty to fight together for the solution, and not surrender to the temptation of cynicism….We have the possibility to reinvent ourselves, to prove people wrong, to emerge stronger and of course to affirm our collective culture. (“Annual Report 2014”: 19)
CHAPTER 7
THE ROLE OF GREEK-AMERICANS IN GREEK FOREIGN POLICY I: ISSUES AND ACTORS

A major role that the Greek-American community is playing, or is expected to play, is influencing American foreign policy with respect to Greek foreign policy issues. Greek-Americans are mobilizing — most often out of an emotional connection to Greek people and Greek culture — as concerned American citizens who want to bring attention to issues that are significant both for Greece and for the United States in terms of international politics, values, and economic benefits. Although there are different evaluations as to the effectiveness of the Greek-American community in its policy advocacy role as well as to the degree of its organization in the form of a lobby or interest group, Greek-American organizations have been particularly active in foreign policy issues and they have helped shape American foreign policy in the region, although not as much as they would like to.

The political activism and advocacy of the Greek-American community is, according to Prévélakis (2000: 180), part of a general phenomenon of the “ politicization of networks of diasporas.” Moreover, through this activity, especially in the post-1974 period, the Greek American community has reclaimed a political role for the Greek diaspora.

Alongside a nation-state whose economic and political influence is modest, there exists a Greek diaspora that can be found on every continent. Since the disappearance of the Greek Ottoman diaspora, it had ceased to play a political role. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 brought about a mobilization of the Greek-American diaspora and led to the composition of a Greek pressure
The Issues: Cyprus, Patriarchate, F.Y.R.O.M. and Beyond

There are a number of major Greek foreign policy issues, often called “national issues” in Greek political rhetoric, where the role of the United States is quite significant: Cyprus, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other aspects of Greek-Turkish relations (the Aegean, armament, etc.), the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.), and, usually less prominently, the rights of Greeks living in Albania and the recognition of the genocide of the Pontian Greeks. \(^ {224} \)

a. Cyprus: A Divided Island

The Cypriot issue is the biggest “thorn” in Greek foreign policy. Cyprus, an island very close to the Levant and even closer to the southeast Turkish coast, is populated primarily by two ethnic communities: a large Greek-Cypriot community (approximately 77% of the population) and a smaller Turkish-Cypriot community (approximately 18% of the island’s population) (The World Factbook 2014b). \(^ {225} \) Although Cyprus has been a member of the

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\(^{224}\) Another significant aspect of Greek-Turkish relations is the Muslim Minority in Greece. However, this issue is not really present in Greek-American mobilization except in a very marginal and occasional way. Therefore, it is not included in this chapter. Also, in addition to the issues mentioned in this section, another foreign policy issue that has drawn the attention of Greeks and Greek-Americans recently is the fate of Orthodox Christians around the world. However, because this is not placed among the list of major Greek foreign policy issues, it is not discussed in length in this chapter.

\(^{225}\) These percentages are based on 2001 estimations. Greek-Cypriots are estimated to number around 650,000 on the island of Cyprus (Cole 2011: 92). There is also a significant Greek-Cypriot diaspora, primarily in Greece, the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa,
European Union since 2004, it remains a divided island with a divided capital, Nicosia. The northern part, almost exclusively inhabited by Turkish-Cypriots, is the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (T.R.N.C.) — a “state” officially recognized only by Turkey.

The T.R.N.C. is not recognized by international organizations or other countries, since it was created through a unilateral proclamation by the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in 1983 — a move which the UN proclaimed illegal (Encyclopedia Britannica 2014). The Greek-Cypriot government of the south is recognized internationally as the de jure official government of the whole island (Ibid.), while the northern part is considered to be under Turkish occupation (Permanent Mission 2012). The continuing division of the island, and the numerous problems with which it is associated, continue to dominate both the politics of the Republic of Cyprus and that of Greece and Turkey.

Cyprus was British colony until 1960. Decolonization was preceded by a Cypriot armed struggle against British rule. During that colonial era the British cultivated enmity between the two ethnic communities on the island: the Greek-Cypriot majority and the Turkish-Cypriot minority (Loizos 1988: 643). Anti-colonial and inter-communal violence erupted in the 1950s with E.O.K.A. being the major actor. E.O.K.A. (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was a nationalist Greek-Cypriot resistance

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Canada and Australia. Estimations for Turkish Cypriots vary. According to a 2011 report by the International Crisis Group, there are approximately 150,000 — half of the approximately 300,000 inhabitants of the north. The remaining half of the northern population is comprised, primarily, of settlers from Turkey (International Crisis Group 2010). A small Turkish-Cypriot community lives in the south and an even smaller Greek community, the so-called “enclaved,” lives in the north. Additional small ethnic communities on the island are the Maronite Arabs and the Armenians.

Nicosia is called “Lefkosia” in Greek and “Lefkosa” in Turkish. The southern part of the city is the capital of the Republic of Cyprus and the northern part is the capital of the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”
organization against colonial rule. E.O.K.A.’s ultimate goal was Union, or Enosis, with Greece and its members targeted those whom they considered national enemies of Cyprus: the British colonial rulers and the Turkish-Cypriots who were seen as an obstacle to union with Greece (Ibid., 640).

The Turkish-Cypriots, who supported a policy of taksim (partition) of Cyprus and promoted a version of Turkish nationalism on the island, responded with the creation of their own paramilitary group, the TMT (Turk Mukavamet Teskilati, or Turkish Resistance Organization) in 1957 (Souter 1984: 659-660). Shortly after independence the original constitution, a compact that called for a power-sharing agreement, fell apart leading to a violent constitutional crisis (Ibid., 662). American and Soviet influence prevented a Turkish invasion and bombing of the island in 1964 (Coufoudakis 1985: 197), while the UN established UNFICYP, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, in the same year to prevent further fighting (UNFICYP).

Violence between the two communities continued throughout the 1960’s leading to the creation of areas under either Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot control and bringing Greece and Turkey to the brink of war (Souter 1984: 663). By 1968 Makarios, the President and Archbishop of Cyprus, moved away from supporting the idea of union with Greece and started constitutional negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriots. This development prompted a nationalist faction to create a new organization, E.O.K.A. B (EOKA VITA), which continued to support Enosis with Greece while targeting Turkish-Cypriots who opposed this aspiration (Loizos 1988: 640). E.O.K.A. B also turned against Greek-Cypriots who favored independence over

union with Greece and who sympathized with Turkish-Cypriots. It accused “the majority of Greek-Cypriots for ‘betrayal’ of the ‘sacred’ goal of Union” (Ibid.). The Turkish-Cypriots responded in a similar way and violence erupted once more and continued through the early 1970’s.

Finally, in July 1974, the junta regime that was governing Greece at the time, orchestrated a coup against the democratically elected President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. This involvement triggered a response by Turkey, a guarantor power for Cyprus under the independence agreement, which invaded the island (Souter 1984: 664). There was a brief Greek-Turkish military conflict, which did not turn into a full scale war due to US and international intervention. The Turkish troops ended up occupying about 40% of the island and ousted almost all Greek population from the occupied lands causing a humanitarian crisis. These refugees fled to the Greek-controlled south.

Regardless of repeated attempts by the UN to find common ground and a solution to the Cyprus problem, no agreement has been reached so far. The last UN peace plan for Cyprus, one that was highly publicized and held out hope for resolution to the conflict, was the 2004 Annan Plan. However, Greek-Cypriots found its provisions unacceptable and they refused to endorse the plan in a 2004 referendum (Wright 2004). Today, the island, including its capital Nicosia, remains divided in two parts, separated by a buffer zone. The UNFICYP, is still on the island supervising the ceasefire and patrolling the buffer zone (UNFICYP). Although no solution has been achieved so far, an important recent development has been the 2003 opening of checkpoints along the dividing line that has allowed Greek-Cypriot refugees and other visitors from the south to visit areas in the north, and Turkish-Cypriots and other residents and visitors from the north to visit the south. This initiation of free movement between the two sides led journalists to argue that “the impossible was happening” (Morgan 2003).
Regardless of a lack of a permanent solution, Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 as a whole island under the recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus. The EU membership benefits and regulations have been suspended for the north, since that area is not administered by the official Cypriot government, except for the personal rights of Turkish-Cypriots as European Union citizens (European Commission Representation).

While there are ongoing negotiations between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots at the United Nations, Greeks and Greek-Cypriots continue to protest Turkey’s occupation of the north and the presence of its military on the island. The UN has adopted a series of resolutions calling for an end to the occupation and a removal of the Turkish troops, but to no avail.\footnote{The UN Security Council has adopted more than 100 resolutions since 1974 and more than a dozen were adopted by the UN General Assembly, including resolutions on missing persons and on human rights. A list of all the relevant resolutions can be found on the web-site of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations at \url{http://www.cyprusun.org/?cat=52}.} The Turkish invasion and occupation has led to a series of human rights violations, according to the European Court of Human Rights, including the case of missing persons, the displacement of persons and loss of their property, and the violation of human rights of the “enclaved” population, the small community of Greek-Cypriots who have remained in the occupied north (European Court of Human Rights 2001).

The desecration of churches and the destruction of other Greek-Cypriot cultural heritage in northern Cyprus is another issue that has gotten the attention of advocates (“Destruction of Cultural Heritage”). The issue of Turkish settlers from Anatolia has long been highly controversial as Greek-Cypriots argue that Turkey has been perpetrating an illegal colonization of northern Cyprus (“Turkey’s illegal policy”), and Turkish-Cypriots complain that they are becoming marginalized in their own homeland (Morgan 2002). The UN-sponsored
Commission on Missing Persons (CMP), which has bi-communal — Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot — membership, is working in the buffer zone to address another human rights issue. Its research aims at solving forensic mysteries that can explain what happened to the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot missing persons (Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus).

b. The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey

The Greek-Orthodox community of Anatolia has ancient roots in what is now Turkish territory. The Ancient Greek cities of the Ionian coast preserved their Greek character throughout the Roman times. As the Roman Empire split into a Greek-speaking Orthodox East and a Latin-speaking Catholic West, the Eastern Roman Empire, known as Byzantine Empire, became essentially a Greek medieval Empire that weaved together elements of Ancient Greek culture with the Christian faith. The head of the Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire was the Patriarch of Constantinople. Throughout the Byzantine era, church and state enjoyed a very close relationship.229 The institution of the Patriarchate was created in the early Christian centuries, while its roots are found in the first years of Christianity. Saint Andrew is considered the founder of the Patriarchate and his feast day is also celebrated as a commemoration of the founding of the institution.

229 Interestingly, this close relationship and cooperation between church and state continues to the present time in countries with a dominant Orthodox Church, like in Greece, and even more so in the special case of ethno-national and ethno-religious diasporas, such as the Greek diaspora in the United States, where the relationship among the church, the secular leadership of the diaspora and the Greek state is a very close one and the lines dividing the roles of one diaspora entity vis-à-vis the other are often blurred.
The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, being at the center of political authority in the Byzantine Empire, has long been the primate of all the Orthodox Churches, having a status of first among equals with respect to the other autocephalous Orthodox churches and Patriarchates ("Syntomon Istorikon" 2014). With the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century, the Patriarch acquired a political role, in addition to his spiritual one. Mehmet the Conqueror personally vested Patriarch Gennadius Scholarius with administrative duties and authority vis-à-vis the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{230}

Hence, the Patriarch became the leader of the conquered Greek Orthodox faithful, the Orthodox millet, as the Ottomans incorporated Byzantine communal structures into their state administration (Barkey 2005: 14, 16-17). Since the Patriarch was considered the leader of the Greek genos, when the Greek revolution started in 1821, the Ottoman authorities hung Gregorios V, the Patriarch of Constantinople at the time, as punishment for the uprising (Frazee 1969: 30-31). This action reinforced the Greek national connection to the Patriarchate, since Gregorios V was proclaimed ethnomartys, somebody who was martyred for the cause of the nation.

Following Greece’s independence from Ottoman rule in 1830, the Bavarian-born rulers of the newly established Greek state wanted to have a national church administration that would be disconnected from the areas that were still part of the Ottoman Empire, including Constantinople. The establishment of a national church would be a significant nation-building component of the state. According to Roudometof (2008: 71-72), this move led to the

\textsuperscript{230} A mosaic featuring Ottoman Sultan Mehmet the II, conqueror of Constantinople, handing a proclamation to Patriarch Gennadius Scholarius through which he assigned to the Patriarchate its special administrative status is located inside the main building of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul.
incorporation of Orthodox markers into Greek nationalism and, by extension, to the nationalization of Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{231} Therefore, the autocephalous Church of Greece was created in 1833, and, after a brief period of problematic relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Patriarchate recognized the Church of Greece as a canonical autocephalous Orthodox Church, ceding to it control of the territories under Patriarchal jurisdiction within the newly established Greek state in 1850 ("Syntomon Istorikon" 2014).

Today, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is still predominantly Greek-speaking and primarily staffed by ethnic Greeks, although it is the symbolic primate of all Orthodox Christians around the world. Its character is indeed cosmopolitan Orthodox, although based on solid Greek cultural foundations. Constantinople was renamed Istanbul after the Republic of Turkey was created out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire but the official name of the Patriarchate is still Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The territories and communities under the direct spiritual jurisdiction of the Patriarchate currently include: certain areas inside the Greek territory (Mount Athos, Crete, Dodecanese, and the New Lands), the small Greek-Orthodox community living in Turkey, and Greek-Orthodox Churches in the diaspora: Europe, North and South America, Australia and Asia.

\textsuperscript{231} In the Greek Diaspora, especially in the United States, there is a conflict between this version of Greek Orthodox nationalism, associated with the Greek state of the nineteenth and twentieth century (and still present in Greece today), and a more cosmopolitan and ecumenical version of Hellenism and Orthodoxy. The latter is closely associated with a Greek/Greek-Orthodox identity chronologically and territorially disconnected from the modern Greek state, and centered on cultural, rather than national, markers — most dominant among them being the Greek-Orthodox faith. Being Greek/Greek-Orthodox in America can represent a very narrow conceptualization of a national Greek Orthodoxy, a very broad ecumenical one where the Greek culture is seen in its spiritual and ecumenical dimension, or, paradoxically, both at the same time. In the case of the diaspora, we encounter the parallel existence of modern, post-modern, and, possibly, pre-modern identities.
The Greek-American community, which is under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, is the largest and most powerful part of the Patriarchal flock. It is this community that is in a position to offer a lifeline to the Patriarchate in difficult times.

The relationship between the Patriarchate and Turkish authorities and society, although symbiotic, is not without problems. Turkey sets a number of limitations on the religious freedoms of the Patriarchate as well as of other religious communities. It does not allow the use of the term “Ecumenical” by the Patriarchate — a centuries old term that signifies that it has the status of first among equals with respect to all Orthodox churches (Russian-Orthodox, Slav-Orthodox, Syrian-Orthodox, etc.). Instead, Turkey officially recognizes the Patriarchate only as a Turkish institution that serves the Greek-Orthodox population in Turkey (The Archon 2013b).

In addition, there are serious concerns about government interference in elections of Patriarchs. The Turkish government requires that the Patriarch is a Turkish citizen (The Archon 2013a). This has posed a severe limitation in the ability of the Patriarchate to elect its Patriarchs, since the Greek-Orthodox community in Turkey is extremely small. The Turkish government has recently made an opening with respect to this issue, extending the right to acquire Turkish citizenship to diaspora hierarchs who belong to the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. Nevertheless, the election of the Patriarch is still not a genuinely free process (U.S. Commission 2014: 146).

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232 The New Lands refer to the Greek territories that were incorporated in the Greek state several years after independence. They primarily make up the northern half of the country. The Ecumenical Patriarchate also has jurisdiction over the Orthodox churches in the diaspora (in non-Orthodox countries) according to Canon 28 of the Chalcedonian Council.
The issue that probably attracts most international attention and has been the focus of Greek-American mobilization is the reopening of the Holy Theological School of Halki, usually referred to as the Halki Theological School or as Halki. The Theological School, located on the Hill of Hope on the island of Halki (in Greek) or Heybeliada (in Turkish) in the Sea of Marmara, belongs to the Patriarchate and is the only Greek-Orthodox seminary in Turkey. Despite its long history of operation since 1844, the seminary has been closed since 1971 due to a Turkish law that did not allow private higher education. The Turkish government has promised repeatedly that it will allow the reopening of Halki, but none of the promises was kept (“The Holy Theological School”). Similarly to the extremely small pool of candidates for the position of the Patriarch, the limitations on the education of future priests due to the shutdown of Halki pose a serious threat to the continuity of the Patriarchate (The Archon 2013d).

Issues regarding the administrative and financial control of the holdings of the Patriarchate, of the Greek-Orthodox churches and of the Greek community in Turkey are also being raised. The Patriarchate lacks a legal identity or *bona fide* legal personality in Turkey and is, thus, limited in its ability to own property — including its own churches, the Patriarchal house and the Girls and Boys Orphanage Foundation for which it holds a 1902 deed — or issue work permits for non-Turkish priests (The Archon 2013c).

The concern about the Patriarchate is also connected to concerns about the small Greek community that has remained in Istanbul and on the Turkish islands of Imvros and Tenedos. Tension in Cyprus was used as an excuse for the 1964 Turkish Ministerial Decrees (No. 6/3807/1964 and 3706/1964) that “ordered the seizure of all real property and bank accounts belonging to Greek citizens” and “prohibited Greek citizens from acquiring real property in Turkey” (Skenderis 2003: 566). Properties of both the Patriarchate and the Greek-Orthodox
community have been confiscated, including churches, monasteries, schools, institutions, homes, apartment buildings, and land (The Archon 2013e).

Despite its ancient roots, the Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey is, today, almost extinct. Following persecution of Christian Orthodox and other Christian populations in the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, waves of Greek-Orthodox left the country for Greece, Russia or the Diaspora, primarily America. Although there have been several instances of organized violence against the Greek population, like the attacks on the Greeks in the Smyrna area during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 (Leven 1998: 407), the large scale and systematic character of the persecution, killing and expulsion of Greek Pontian populations that started in 1913-1914 has led the descendants of that population to advocate for the recognition of what amounts to a Greek genocide by the Ottoman Empire (Center for the Study of Genocide). This genocide refers primarily to the Pontian Greeks but also to the Greeks of Asia Minor. This advocacy follows the model of the advocacy for recognition of the Armenian genocide, which was perpetrated during the same time by the Ottoman Turks. Turkey is extremely sensitive to accusations that it committed genocide and is not even willing to discuss or look into these allegations.

The Greek-Orthodox populations of Turkey suffered great losses in the twentieth century. In the aftermath of World War I, Greece, implementing the policy of *Megali Idea*

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233 For the Greek-Orthodox of Turkey, there is hardly any distinction between being Greek and being Greek-Orthodox, since identity has been primarily religiously based, both in terms of how they think of themselves and in terms of how the Turkish or the Greek state views them. The Greeks of Turkey are called *Rum*, which refers to their heritage as citizens of the Eastern Roman Empire (Ergul 2012: 630). The same word is also encountered in centuries-old Greek tradition. Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and in the newly independent Greek state were using the term *romioi* rather than *Ellines (Greek)* to identify themselves. *Rum*, referring to the Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey, is distinct from *Yunan* (meaning ‘Ionian’), the Turkish word for ‘Greek,’ which is associated with the Modern Greek state (*Yunanistan*) (Ibid., 638).
(Great Idea), attempted to continue its irredentist and expansionist actions, with the aim of incorporating Ottoman areas with high concentrations of Greek-Orthodox populations and/or areas that had played a significant role in Greek history. Since Turkey was on the losing side in World War I, it suffered significant territorial losses. The allies, including Greece, essentially split up control of Turkish territory under the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, which Turkey was forced to sign. Greece was given control over Eastern Thrace (European Turkey), with the exception of Constantinople-Istanbul, and the area surrounding the heavily Greek-populated port-city of Smyrna (Izmir) on the Aegean coast (Skenderis 2003: 553).

This arrangement lasted from 1919-1922. Although the plan was for a plebiscite to take place at the end of this period, the Greek leadership at the time decided to move forward with a grandiose version of Megali Idea and to invade as much of Turkey as possible but with no ally support. The Greek military campaign was extremely miscalculated and the end result was catastrophic for the Greek army and a critical turning point in Greek history (Fokas 2006: 44). The Turkish army responded very strongly and pushed back the Greek invasion.

Not only did Greece lose the Turkish areas that it briefly had under its control but it suffered a catastrophic military defeat and, even worse, its actions led to a violent Turkish response against the Greek-Orthodox population, ultimately leading to its near extinction. The loss of life and property among the Greek-Orthodox population was devastating. Much of the Greek population was violently ousted from the country and those who survived sought refuge in Greece or the diaspora, primarily the United States. Elftherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime-Minister at the time, and Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the victorious Turkish army, who became the founder and first leader of the Republic of Turkey, signed the Convention Concerning the
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations and Protocol in Lausanne on January 30, 1923.\textsuperscript{234}

The Convention required a compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

While Venizelos was counting on the transfer of the Muslim population out of Greece in order to accommodate the Greek refugees flooding the country (Barutciski 2008: 30) and hoped that the exchange would stop the destruction of the Greek-Orthodox population of Turkey, both leaders were consolidating the ethno-national character of their modern nation-states through the exchange of populations, thus moving away symbolically and literally from the era of multicultural, multiethnic state formations in the southern Balkans and Asia Minor. The identification of the populations to be exchanged was based on religion: the Greek-Orthodox populations of Turkey would be transferred to Greece — including the non-Greek speakers like the Karamanlis — while the Muslim populations of Greece — including the non-Turkish speakers of Crete known as Tourkokritikoi (Institute for Neohellenic Research 2007) — would be transferred to Turkey. One and a half million of Greeks left Turkey for Greece and less than half a million of Muslims left Greece for Turkey (Blanchard 1925: 452, 455).\textsuperscript{235}

Compulsory population exchanges like this one can be catastrophic psychologically, emotionally, socially, and economically for the population that is being transferred but they can also be culturally catastrophic since they stop the continuous cultural presence of a community in its ancient home. Only two groups were excluded from the population exchange: the Greek Orthodox communities of Istanbul, including the Patriarchate, and of the Turkish islands of Imvros and Tenedos in northeastern Aegean, and the Muslim minority of Western

\textsuperscript{234} The full original text of the Convention is available through the World Legal Information Institute at \url{http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1925/14.html} [accessed on 12/2/2014].

\textsuperscript{235} The only exception to the Orthodox character of the Greek population in the Ottoman Empire, and later in the Republic of Turkey, would be a small community of Greeks who became protestant in the nineteenth century primarily due to American protestant proselytization (Augustinos 1986: 139).
Thrace in northeastern Greece. However, although the numbers of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace increased from 86,000 at the time of the Lausanne Treaty to 120,000 in the late 1990s, the size of the Greek minority in Istanbul was reduced from 130,000 to less than 3,000 in the same period while the Greek population of Imvros and Tenedos was reduced from 10,000 to a few hundred (Stephanopoulos 1998: 21).

The reasons for this decrease are the continuous discrimination against the minority, the lack of certain freedoms, and the violent attacks which were perpetrated in the past. In response to Greek-Cypriot attacks against Turkish-Cypriots in a tense period of the Cyprus problem, Turkish government-inspired violent riots against the Greek minority took place in April 1955 (Skenderis 2003: 565). The Turks also deemed a bomb attack at the house of Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki a Greek provocation, inciting violence against the Greeks in Turkey. In September 1955 there were systematic and extensive violent riots against the Greek population of Istanbul that included loss of life, destruction of property and desecration of churches and cemeteries, leading an exodus of thousands of Greeks for Greece (Ibid.).

There was evidence that the Turkish government not only did not stop the attacks but it even inspired them. Subsequently Adnan Menderes, Turkey’s Prime-Minister at the time of the riots, was found responsible for ordering the bombing attack on Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki in order to incite violence against the Greeks in Istanbul (Skenderis 2003: 565). Again in response to tension in Cyprus, and using the excuse that the Greek government had been unfriendly towards Turkey, the Turkish government expelled in 1964 all members of the minority that had Greek citizenship, including those who were born in Turkey. Afterwards, many other Greeks also left Turkey being afraid for their life and property (Ibid., 566). The result of all the past and current persecution and violations of human rights has been the
dramatic dwindling of the Greek-Orthodox community since 1955 from 100,000 to 1,700 (Ibid., 564).

Turkey today is considered in violation of international human rights conventions and treaties to which it is a member for violating the religious freedoms of its minorities (Prodromou 2013b: 2). According to the Treaty of Lausanne, both Greece and Turkey have obligations towards their respective minorities, including the protection of their human rights and liberties. Turkey violated the Treaty of Lausanne since it had an active role in the destruction and virtual elimination of the Greek community of Istanbul (Skenderis 2003: 566).

It has also not honored the obligations stemming from its own constitution that requires the state to protect the liberties and the human rights of all its citizens. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom designated Turkey a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) in 2012, meaning that the Commission considers Turkey to “engage in ‘means systematic, ongoing egregious violations of religious freedom’” (Prodromou 2013a: 1). The Commission’s 2014 Report outlines the above mentioned violations, which are based on its findings, and urges the American government to follow a policy of pressure on Turkey to grant religious freedom to the Greek-Orthodox community and the Patriarchate, as well as to other religious minorities in the country, particularly stressing the need to immediately reopen the Halki Theological School (U.S. Commission 2014: 145-147).

c. Disputes over the Aegean

Although Cyprus and the Patriarchate are the major issues in Greek-Turkish relations, especially with respect to Greek-American mobilization, a number of other issues often arise. Conflicts have surfaced despite the fact that Greece and Turkey are cooperating in areas across
the board (business, education, culture, etc.) and both are NATO members. The conflictual past still burdens the relationship while new points of disagreement never cease to exist. The Aegean is a common point of contention. Turkey challenges Greek control over the Aegean territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace and islands. Overall, with respect to the disputes regarding the Aegean, Turkey sees them as political issues that require bilateral negotiations while Greece sees them as judicial and legal issues that require clarification from international bodies (Paulenoff 2009: 3-4).

The two countries interpret international law differently regarding whether the Eastern Aegean islands should be militarized. Greece argues that it has the right to militarize the Eastern Aegean islands. The government in Athens states there are no international requirements against its militarization, and it also points to Turkey’s aggressiveness in the recent past, especially with respect to Cyprus and provocations in the Aegean. Alternatively, Turkey argues that international law does not permit the militarization of the islands whose status, it claims, is uncertain (Stephanopoulos 1998: 21).

Furthermore, Turkey argues that there are “grey zones” in the Aegean Sea, i.e. areas whose sovereignty is unclear. These areas include even inhabited islands, like Gavdos, to the south of Crete (Stephanopoulos 1998: 21). This revisionism of the status of the Aegean is highly problematic within an international legal framework since the Treaty of Lausanne states that Turkey shall have no rights on any islands or islets beyond 3 nautical miles from its coast with the exception of Imvros, Tenedos and the Rabbitt Island. However, many of these islands lie beyond 3 nautical miles from the Turkish coast and have been considered to be in Greek possession (Ibid., 18).
Turkey argues that if an island, islet or rock was not specifically mentioned as belonging to Greece in one of the international treaties, it should be considered part of the “grey zone” and its sovereignty is undetermined. Occasionally, there is a so-called “hot episode” over the Aegean like the 1996 Imia crisis (Stephanopoulos 1998: 20). Questions about whether the Imia (Kardak in Turkish), which are uninhabited islets in the Eastern Aegean, belong to one or the other country, brought the two countries once more to the brink of war for a few days in 1996. The crisis was resolved with international mediation.

The dispute over national territorial waters is connected to different interpretations of the International Law of the Sea and is related to strategic and economic interests in the Aegean. Turkey considers the extension of Greek territorial waters from 6 to 12 nautical miles — an extension allowed under international law — a cause for war between the two countries (casus belli) (Vassalotti 2011: 398). Turkey is concerned that such a development would put over 70% of the Aegean waters under Greek jurisdiction, extending to Greece all the economic benefits that come out of this control of the sea, and obliging Turkish ships to pass through Greek territorial waters as they go from the Mediterranean to Istanbul (Ortolland 2009).

Control over the sea offers strategic advantages, a sense of national pride, and significant economic benefits. The latter are realized through the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), areas in which a state has fishery and other economic rights, and through access to undersea resources, such as Aegean oil reserves, located within the national continental shelf. The issue of who has jurisdiction over different parts of the continental shelf in the Aegean, and, thus, access to the undersea resources, has been very controversial. It was first raised

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236 Greece signed and ratified the Law of the Sea Convention which allows extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles (Vassalotti 2011: 397). Turkey, which has not signed the convention, has extended its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles on its other coasts but argues that there should be an exception to this rule for the case of the Aegean (Ibid., 398).
during Greek oil exploration expeditions in the 1960s which were followed by similar Turkish operations in 1974 (Vassalotti 2011: 390). The two countries came to the brink of war in 1974 when Turkey sent another vessel for seismic research in what Greece considered its jurisdiction. Greece took the issue to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice (Ibid., 391).

In 1987, attempts by both countries to explore oil in the Aegean created additional tensions; ultimately they were diffused through international involvement, but this involvement also put a halt to further exploration (Vassalotti 2011: 391). Greece’s position is that each of the Aegean islands has a continental shelf (Ortolland 2009). For Turkey, the Greek islands do not have jurisdiction over the continental shelf, since they are located within the Turkish continental shelf (Ibid.).

Although international law tends to favor the Greek position, Turkey uses a different interpretation in order support its own claims (Ortolland 2009). Tension arises from time to time when, in support of its position, Turkey sends vessels or operates in one way or another within Greek territorial waters or continental shelf. Recently, a similar incident happened regarding the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus vis-à-vis Turkey, creating diplomatic tension among the three countries, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.\(^{237}\)

The national airspace and the Athens FIR are other issues of dispute. Countries have a national airspace where free civil air navigation is allowed but foreign state and military aircrafts do not have a free pass. Although national airspace is usually as extensive as the

\(^{237}\) Regarding the October 2014 violation of Cyprus’ EEZ by Turkey, the European Parliament passed a Resolution on November 10, 2014 upholding the legality of the Cypriot EEZ and Cyprus’ right to operate and have economic benefits from its EEZ while urging Turkey to show restraint and to stop its threats and provocations against Cyprus (Natural Gas Europe 2014).
territorial waters, Greece has extended its airspace via presidential degree in 1931 to 10 nautical miles despite the fact that its territorial waters were only 6 nautical miles (Stephanopoulos 1998: 20). This extension also falls within the legal parameters of the extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles.

The two countries’ differing interpretations of the extent of Greece’s national airspace have created frequent tensions — tensions exacerbated by Turkish military aircraft flying within the 4 outer miles of the Greek airspace in order to challenge the idea of Greek control over that area. These frequent provocations have led to dangerous maneuvers between Turkish aircraft and Greek ones that try to intercept them (Stephanopoulos 1998: 20).

The Athens FIR (Flight Information Region) refers not to national rights but to the national responsibility to regulate flights in a specific airspace (Embassy of Greece in Hungary). The dispute surrounding the Athens FIR, which covers all of the Aegean and extends to the high seas, is whether plans should be submitted to Athens for foreign military flights as is the case with civilian flights. Turkey refuses to inform the Greek authorities when its military aircrafts enter the Greek FIR (Stephanopoulos 1998: 20), arguing that international law and regulations offer exceptions for military flights (Bölükbaşi 2004: 657).

Greece requires Turkish military flights to submit flight plans based on international practice associated with air safety. Consequently, Turkish military flights within the Athens FIR that have not submitted flight plans are considered by Greece as violating international aviation rules and Greek aircraft are sent to intercept them (Embassy of Greece in Hungary). FIR violations by Turkish military aircraft have led to dangerous mock air fights as a consequence of the interception.
The Greek state and Greek-American advocates protest Turkish actions that question Greek sovereignty on land, in the sea and in the air over the Aegean and considers such actions provocative and against international law.

d. F.Y.R.O.M.: the “Macedonian” question

In the early 1990s the most dominant issue in Greek foreign policy was the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had just declared its independence as Yugoslavia was falling apart. During the decades that Yugoslavia was a united country, this administrative region was called the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (Danforth 1995: 4), since part of its area belonged historically to a greater Macedonian territory that had its roots in Ancient Greece. However, a large northern region in Greece that borders the said former Yugoslav Republic is also called Macedonia. The independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would signify the first time in history that the name Macedonia would be used for a Slavic national state (Zahariadis 1994: 656).

The Macedonian name symbolizes the continuity of Greek culture through the ages, since the modern region of Macedonia in Greece was also home to Alexander the Great’s Ancient Macedonia. The borders of what constituted Macedonia as a geographic and administrative region kept changing through time while, in addition to the Greeks, an ethnic mix inhabited the area including the newcomer Slav populations of the sixth century. By the late nineteenth century, the greater Macedonian region included a mix of Greek, Slav (primarily Bulgarian but also Serb), Turkish, Jewish, Vlach and Gypsy populations (Zahariadis 1994: 656).
During this time, Greek and Slav populations vied for control of the region and mobilized declared and undeclared wars that would last into the beginning of the twentieth century. The conflict was primarily between Greeks and Bulgarians with some involvement by Serbs as well, with support from their respective national centers in independent Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, which sent irregular fighters, teachers and priests to propagate their respective national causes (Danforth 1995: 58-59). All three of them considered the greater Macedonian region to be their own and argued that their populations — identified as Greek-, Bulgarian- or Serbian-speaking or having Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian national identity — were the majority in the area.

To make matters even more complicated, the language was not the only major distinguishing characteristic of the pro-Greek and pro-Bulgarian inhabitants of Macedonia. They were also divided by ecclesiastical allegiance: those faithful to the culturally Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople and those committed to the Bulgarian Exarchate, the self-proclaimed autocephalous Church of Bulgaria. Slav-speakers were claimed by the Bulgarians in terms of language affiliation but they were also claimed by the Greeks if they had a religious affiliation with the Patriarchate (Danforth 1995: 60). As a result, religious affiliation often trumped linguistic affiliation in Macedonia.

The first time that the name Macedonia was associated with a Slavic (hence, non-Greek) political movement was in 1893, when the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was founded by Macedonia-born Bulgarians. The aim of most of its members was the liberation of Macedonia from Ottoman rule and annexation by Bulgaria; however, some supported the region’s autonomy (Zahariadis 1994: 656). In the midst of the various ethnic struggles for the liberation of Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire, a split emerged within the Slav front. One side argued that the Slav-Macedonians were Bulgarians, since they contended
that the Macedonian language was essentially Bulgarian (Parkas 1997: 105). Their rivals supported the existence of a Slav Macedonian ethnicity and a Slav Macedonian nation that were separate from the Bulgarian ones. The Macedonian language, they contended, was distinct from Bulgarian.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the conflict took the form of the Macedonian Struggle of 1904-1908 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The end result of the Balkans Wars was the creation of the current borders: the vast majority of what was known as Macedonia became Greek territory, a smaller region became part of the newly created Yugoslavia, and the smallest parcel became part of southwestern Bulgaria (Parkas 1997: 104). The inhabitants of the new Yugoslav region of Macedonia were Slavs speaking a local “Macedonian” language, which is so close to Bulgarian that there was linguistic controversy for a long time over whether it is a separate language or not.\textsuperscript{238}

In the first decades of the twentieth century, IMRO leaders gained the support of the international communist organizations in their fight for an independent Macedonia, which would be made up of territories that belong to Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Zahariadis 1994: 657). What politicized the whole issue even more was Tito’s decision to name the southernmost republic of Yugoslavia “People’s Republic of Macedonia” in 1944. This action was accompanied by a revisionist Macedonian history (Parkas 1997: 103) that led to political claims based on a conceptualization of history and identity through a “Macedonian”

\textsuperscript{238} The most extreme Slav-Macedonian nationalists argue that the Macedonians are not Slavs but the direct descendants of the Ancient Macedonians (Danforth 1995: 46). This account also claimed the ancient Macedonians were not Greek. The more moderate, and probably dominant, version of Slav-Macedonian nationalists argue they are indeed Slavs (Ibid.). But they often argue also that the Ancient Macedonians were not Greek (Ibid.). A third nationalist version argues that modern Macedonians are the descendants of both the Slavs and the indigenous Ancient Macedonians who intermarried in the ninth century (Ibid.).
perspective. Official Yugoslav policy was to cultivate a Macedonian culture that would boost Macedonian nationalism which required a cut of the strong linguistic, cultural and religious bonds with other Slavs (Zahariadis 1994: 655).

The Greek-Slav conflict over Macedonia continued during World War II and during the Greek civil war (1944-1949). During the Nazi occupation of Greece, Bulgaria occupied the eastern part of Macedonia as an Axis ally while Tito attempted three times to gain control of Greek Macedonia during World War II and the subsequent Greek civil war (Parkas 1997: 106). During Tito’s leadership, the Greek state was not active in countering either the revisionist history or Slav-Macedonian nationalism and expansionism, because the Western powers deemed Tito an important anti-Soviet player (Zahariadis 1994: 658).

The issue became particularly “hot” for Greek politics and foreign policy upon the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Greece denied that the Slav-Macedonians of the region had the right as a nation and as a state to a name and a heritage that was its own. The Slav-Macedonians argued for the right to use their name as part of their self-determination and local tradition and started to promote their national project which was based on the Ancient Macedonian glory to which they laid claim (Parkas 1997: 103). The issue became more complicated when certain Slav-Macedonians implied or clearly stated their belief that theirs was the only free Macedonia

239 A stronger Greek response during this period came in 1962 with the unilateral suspension of a joint border agreement in response to Yugoslav interference in the Slavic-speaking communities in Greek Macedonia (Zahariadis 1994: 660). The issue of a Slavic speaking so-called “Macedonian” minority in Greece is very controversial for Greek politics and society. The Greek government’s approach to the issue is that there is no Macedonian minority in Greece: even if people in certain areas close to the northern border speak a local Slavic dialect, their identity is still Greek. Both Yugoslavia (and later FYROM) and Turkey raised the issue of treatment of the “Macedonian” and Muslim (ethnically Turkish) minorities in Greece (Ibid., 670).
and their intention to “liberate” one day the Greek part (Ibid.). Greeks resisted both the use of the Macedonian name and identity, and the irredentist claims by F.Y.R.O.M.:

Greeks do not dispute the existence of a nation, language, or a republic after 1944; but they refute the legitimacy of appropriating the Macedonian name to define a Slavic population in the Balkans. Furthermore, they argue that diplomatic recognition of the former republic under the term Macedonia perpetuates the residual designs of the Skopje regime on the adjoining Greek province by the same name (Zahariadis 1994: 663).

With the name came national symbols of the new state that were clearly irredentist or laying claim to Greek cultural heritage, such as the “Macedonian” flag with the Vergina star, a symbol found in the royal tomb of Philip the II, Alexander the Great’s father, in the Greek region of Macedonia, or the depiction of the White Tower, the characteristic monument of the Greek city of Thessaloniki on its currency, and maps widely distributed showing Greek Macedonia as enslaved (Ibid., 661-662). These actions led to Greek government protests and some of these irredentist symbols were removed (Ibid., 662).

The name issue is still unresolved and is being negotiated at the UN. Since its independence, the country is recognized internationally as F.Y.R.O.M., the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although it is using the name Macedonia as its official name and it is recognized with this name by many individual states around the world, including the US. The US policy of recognition of F.Y.R.O.M. with the name “Republic of Macedonia,” which came as a shock and was felt as a betrayal by the Greeks (Parkas 1997: 107), and its political support of the country and its diaspora in the United States, signifies the adoption of a US policy of
recognition of a single Macedonian identity associated with F.Y.R.O.M., ignoring the Greek Macedonian identity in the process (Ibid., 105).

e. The Greek minority in Albania

An issue that is not as dominant but is still important in Greek foreign policy and in the Greek diaspora is the rights of the Greek minority in Albania.\(^\text{240}\) When Albania was created in the end of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, the region known as Northern Epirus, which was heavily inhabited by Greeks, became part of the Albanian state, despite Greek diplomatic efforts to include it in Greek territory. Northern Epirus, a term that the Albanians reject, was a contested region in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.

In 1914 it was declared an autonomous region controlled by the local Greek population, and during World War I it was under the control of Greek, Italian, French and German troops (Budina & Hart 1995). Until 1923, there were violent clashes for control of Northern Epirus by pro-Greek and pro-Albanian forces with the involvement of other international forces (Ibid.). In the 1930’s, in violation of the League of Nations Minority Treaty, Greek schools were closed in an effort to reduce foreign, especially Greek, influence (Ibid.).

Greece, after a long fight that lasted until the 1950s to persuade international courts to review the issue of Northern Epirus, officially revoked the 1942 state of war between Greece

\(^\text{240}\) The issue of identity in the Balkans is often very complex. In this case, there are many Greek-speakers with a strong Greek ethno-national identity in Southern Albania, Northern Epirus. There are also Albanians of Greek origin “who see themselves as ‘Greek in origin and Albanian in spirit’” (Budina & Hart 1995). According to INSTAT, Albania’s National Institute of Statistics, the percentage of Greeks in Albania is 0.87% and the percentage of Albanians who speak Greek is 0.54% (Likmeta 2012). In the same census, however, 14% of the population refused to provide an answer about their nationality. The Greek minority is still the largest ethnic group in Albania. Since the population of Albania is 3,020,209 (2011 est.) (The World Factbook 2014a), then the Greek population should be about 26,276.
and Albania in 1987 (Budina & Hart 1995). Nationalist aspirations both in Greece and Albania have challenged the 1913 border and have included competing irredentist claims: Greek claims for Northern Epirus and Albanian claims for Epirus, the northwestern region of Greece. These claims are not adopted as official policy in either of the two states but are still popular in nationalist rhetoric, web-sites and blogs.

Albania had a brutal and repressive communist regime for decades after World War II under dictator Enver Hoxha (Budina & Hart 1995), who closed off the borders of the country to the outside world. Throughout the communist decades, the Greek minority suffered along with the rest of the Albanians but discrimination against it was even stronger due to its strong ethno-national identity, which the communist Albanian state targeted through forced “albanization,” and to its strong religiosity, which was met with persecution, especially after the regime’s decision in 1967 to make “religious expression illegal” (Ibid.). 241

The Greek government protested the “denationalization” of the Greek minority and the crack down on Greek education and freedom of religion during this period (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Wheeler 1998: 35). Nick Gage, the famous Greek-American journalist and author who was born in the Greek region of Epirus, gives an account of numerous human rights violations against the Greeks during the communist period, including a disproportionately high Greek presence in the Albanian gulag, a system of prisons and labor camps for enemies of the state (Gage 1993: 19).

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241 The Albanian view is that the Greeks did not suffer more than the rest of the Albanians, all of whom were highly oppressed, but rather enjoyed some rights that Hoxha, coming from the Northern Epirus region himself, extended to them, such as the right to schooling in Greek and some political representation (Miall 1995: 15). The communist regime of Enver Hoxha tried to eliminate all ethnic and tribal differentiations within the Albanian society. It promoted the albanization of the whole society in order to promote his image of “social unity” (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Wheeler 1998: 35).
Upon the dissolution of the communist regime in the 1990s, the borders between Greece and Albania opened after many decades and the Greeks of Albania along with other Albanians emigrated in large numbers to Greece. However, many Greeks remained in Albania, especially in the south. The ethnic identity of the Greeks of Albania — which goes beyond the language to include affiliation with Greek Orthodoxy and with Hellenic civilization — is seen as antithetical to the Albanian national consciousness and, consequently, as anti-Albanian (Budina & Hart 1995). This is typical of all nationalist movements, which see minorities as a potential threat for failing to adopt the official language, religion or other trait.

Although Albania is democratizing and modernizing, there is still tension with respect to its minorities, including the Greeks, and serious grievances by them regarding violations of their ethnic and religious rights (Budina & Hart 1995). At the same time, large numbers of Albanian legal and illegal immigrants live in Greece. The issues facing the Albanians in Greece have been linked to the issues of the Greek community in Albania since the early 1990s (Ibid.). Since 1991, minority rights and human rights groups have been concerned about a series of incidents “involving ethnic Greeks [living in Albania] and the Albanian state” (Budina & Hart 1995). The Greek minority created the ethnically-based political party Omonia, with a minority rights agenda. When ethnic political parties were not allowed to participate in the elections, the Greek minority created a new party, the “Union for Human Rights” with a broader agenda and ethnic base. The radical wing of Omonia called for Enosis, union of Northern Epirus with Greece, while the head of the organization called for autonomy in the new post-communist framework (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Wheeler 1998: 38).

With the creation of the Albanian Orthodox Church in the same period, Greek clergy moved to Albania from Greece in order to staff the Orthodox Church. The Archbishop of Albania, Anastasios, is Greek and, although he has been the target of literal and figurative
attacks throughout his tenure, he has won the love and respect of a large segment of the Albanian population. While Archbishop Anastasios remains the head of the Albanian Orthodox Church, the Albanian state expelled members of the clergy who were seen as involved in anti-Albanian Greek irredentist activities. During the expulsion of a priest, the police attacked and beat many Northern Epirotes, including elderly women, who protested the expulsion, according to a 1994 Minority Rights Report. Although it seems that some clergy were indeed involved in activities supporting Greek irredentism, the overall response of the Albanian state gave the “sense” that an ethnic cleansing and expropriation have begun, according to the Minority Rights Report (Budina & Hart 1995).

State actions that have created this impression involve discrimination against ethnic Greeks in employment, economic discrimination and minority police surveillance (Budina & Hart 1995). Albania sees significant Greek and Greek-American investment in the country, especially in the south, as controversial and possibly associated with Greek nationalistic ulterior motives (Ibid.). Reports of police abuse of Albanians in Greece has led to attacks at businesses owned by Greek citizens in Albania (Ibid.).

The most serious incident against the minority followed a deadly attack on Albanian soldiers, possibly by Greek paramilitaries. This led to a strong reaction by the Albanian state, which detained and imprisoned members of the Omonia minority party, confiscating their property, according to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, without proper regard for the law. They were sentenced to six to eight years for espionage and illegal possession of firearms but the trial was found to be in violation of both the Albanian and international laws, and was neither impartial nor fair, according to human rights organizations (Budina & Hart 1995).

The Greek response was strong. The government in Athens deported 70,000 illegal Albanian immigrants from Greece and demanded officially the protection of the rights of the
Greek minority (Budina & Hart 1995). The Albanian government responded by raising the issue of the properties of the Cams, the Albanian-Muslims who lived in the Greek region of Epirus and who were expelled before and after World War II, arguing that there is an indigenous (non-immigrant) Albanian minority in Greece, a fact that the Greek government denies, and that its rights are being violated (Ibid.). Eventually, the Omonia members were freed and relations between the two countries improved (Ibid.). The Greek government also arrested members of a Greek paramilitary group Liberation Front of Northern Epirus (MAVI), stressing that such organizations run counter to Greek national interest and destabilize the region (Ibid.).

Interethnic relations at the grass-roots are generally not hostile but there are occasional tensions. According to post-1990 fieldwork, Albanians tend to be resentful of the Greek minority and Greece because the minority experiences better living conditions compared to those experienced by Albanians within the same town or region (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Wheeler 1998: 39). The Albanians in the south tend to work the land while the Greeks can easily get working visas for Greece and emigrate, boosting their income and living conditions.

Albanians were also resentful that the land redistribution policy under the Berisha government tended to favor the Greek minority, due to either political influence of the Greeks in the post-communist regime or willingness on the part of the government to improve relations with Greece and the minority. The Greeks were awarded better lands for cultivation compared to the ones local Albanians got, although they opt for working in Greece rather than cultivating the land (Lastarria-Cornhiel & Wheeler 1998: 40).

The issue of the Greek minority in Albania today is primarily a human rights issue and not a political one as far as official states and international organizations are concerned. However, there is a Greek nationalistic fringe, represented also in Greek diaspora
organizations, that wants to promote the issue of autonomy of Northern Epirus or even union with Greece. The Greek state is framing the issue only in terms of human rights and has somewhat disassociated it from its historical connection to Northern Epirus, although nationalistic voices are still concentrated on the particular geographic region.

The Greek government is widening the geographic scope of minority rights and rejects any self-determination implications. It is concerned with the human rights of the Greek minority wherever it is located across the country and not only in Northern Epirus, since many members of the minority have moved from their ancestral homes, usually to the capital or urban centers. The human rights issues that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs raises are: lack of access to Greek education for members of the minority dispersed throughout the country, outside of the Northern Epirus region, the fact that the Greek language is not used in public life, the lack of Greek presence in public administration, and violations of property rights ("Elliniki Ethniki Meionotita").

According to the State Department’s 2008 Human Rights report, Greeks are the only ethnic minority in Albania represented in parliament and the Council of Ministers. Several members of the minority serve in the People’s Assembly and in ministerial and sub-ministerial positions (US Department of State 2009). However, occasional incidents, even violent ones, happen that target the Greek minority.

Most recently, a large group of Albanians holding Albanian flags and banners that carried nationalist messages destroyed stores and cars in a Greek minority village until the police stopped them. This happened after a soccer game was stopped in Belgrade following the flying of a drone over the pitch that carried a map of Greater Albania, portraying areas of
Greece and neighboring countries as belonging to Albania. The Greek state protested and asked the Albanian government to protect the Greek minority (“Greece sends demarche” 2014).

Greek-American Foreign Policy Advocacy Actors: Organizations, Lobbyists and Politicians

I. Greek-American Advocacy Organizations

According to opensecrets.org, the web-site of the Center for Responsive Government, 22 Greek-American organizations lobbied in Congress for an issue that included the word ‘Greece’ in its title since 1998. These organizations include the Greek-American lobbying firm Manatos & Manatos, the National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes, the United Hellenic American Congress, Hellenic-American Heritage Council, the American branch of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad, AHEPA, the American Hellenic Institute, and Daughters of Penelope. This list includes some of the most prominent Greek organizations but even

242 These results can be accessed through the “Issue Lookup” option in the Lobbying section of opensecrets.org.

243 This organization has not been as dominant as the other Greek-American organizations but it lobbied through Manatos & Manatos under the general lobbying issue “Congressional or Executive Branch actions that help build stronger ties between the U.S. and Greece through the promotion of U.S.-Greek relations” (see 2004-2011 Lobbying Reports available through opensecrets.org). The following bills on appropriations for foreign operations are also included as lobbying issues in reports throughout this period: H.R.5522 and S.600 in 2006, H.R.3057 and S.600 in 2005, and S.2812 in 2004.

244 Daughters of Penelope is the women’s branch of the American Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association (AHEPA) which has only male membership. For more information on Daughters of Penelope, see http://www.daughtersofpenelope.org/.
more community organizations have advocated for Greek issues in various ways and continue to do so, even if this is not done as an official lobbying activity.245

A unique characteristic of all of these organizations is not only their collaborative work but also their overlapping membership. For example, we find AHEPA members being also Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, members of the Archdiocese’s Leadership 100, leaders of the Pan-Macedonian Association and professional lobbyists for Greek issues. This section will offer a brief description of the Greek-American organizations which are involved in foreign policy advocacy while activity on particular issues is covered in the following chapter.

a. The Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese

The Greek-American community has a long tradition of mobilization through the Church regarding issues that are important locally, to Greece, Cyprus, and Orthodoxy. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese has assumed the role of leader of the community. Interestingly, the Greek Orthodox Church had a similar role during the Ottoman Empire, when it was the institutional leader of the Greek-Orthodox millet and was vested with special administrative rights and responsibilities. The role that the Archdiocese has today is reminiscent of its role during the Ottoman times: it has certain administrative duties vis-à-vis the Greek-American community, primarily operating the Greek school system; it functions as the center for

245 Searching for ‘Greek’ under “Issue Lookup,” revealed one additional organization, the Ad Hoc Committee on Temporary Employment of Greeks in America lobbying since the summer of 2014 for opportunities to Greeks for temporary employment in America.
community organization, socialization and mobilization; and is the primary point of reference with respect to Greek-American identity.

As an institutional community leader, the Archdiocese has assumed the role of representing the community within the American political system in cases that directly affect it both in terms of domestic and, primarily, foreign policy. The Archdiocese, directly or indirectly, has been active in all Greek foreign policy issues and in issues that affect Orthodox churches around the world. Although it does not lobby in Congress officially, it advocates on behalf of the community through alliances and collaborations with various other Greek-American community and advocacy organizations as well as through personal networks, connections and contacts between the hierarchy of the Church and American politicians, including Congress members, members of the Administration and, even, Presidents. The Archbishop often urges the faithful to advocate on behalf of certain issues through his letters to parishes and his encyclicals. At the local level, the priest and the parish council may also mobilize the parishioners into action.

The Church, and in particular, the Archbishop, have led numerous activist and advocacy campaigns. The late Archbishop Iakovos, who led the Church from 1959-1996, was very active politically, although his predecessors and successors have also been advocates for Greek issues. He initiated a massive campaign to support the Greek-Cypriot refugees following the 1974 invasion by Turkey (“Biography of Archbishop”) and was instrumental in influencing American foreign policy in support of Greek positions in Cyprus.

Archbishop Iakovos was vocal on several political and international issues. He used his personal connections and mobilized the Church and the community network in order to promote these issues. He opposed the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus,
the use of the name “Macedonia” by F.Y.R.O.M. and the continuing presence of the military junta in Greece (Severo 2005).\textsuperscript{246} Many of his encyclicals were urging the flock to be active and vigilant regarding national issues, merging Christian with ethno-national duties and responsibilities. In one of these encyclicals, he wrote: “We have so many national issues before us: the Cypriot, the Albanian, the Skopje, and many more…We will succeed if we fill our lungs with faith in God and in human rights…Stand firm and with conviction. Be worthy of the martyrs of Christianity and of our nation.” and signed it “with the wish that we will not neglect our Christian and ethnic obligations” (Iakovos 1999: 189-190).

He was also active in non-Greek political issues. He was one of the most outspoken supporters of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in his civil rights campaign, and he was vocal about the Vietnam War, and peace and security in the Middle East. He argued that the Orthodox Church in America “must be an active church and an activist church because the world today needs to be rearranged” (Severo 2005).

The current Archbishop, Demetrios, is also vocal on foreign policy issues, continuing the political activism of previous Archbishops. He is primarily concerned with the issue of religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in addition to other issues of Greek interest. Although Demetrios continues the tradition of advocacy on national issues through his communication with the parishioners, his support for community mobilization, and his personal contacts and connections with high level officials, he, nevertheless, abstains from giving explicitly theological guise to national issues like Iakovos did, preferring instead to separate the two in his speeches and writings (Morrow 2012).

\textsuperscript{246} The military junta governed Greece in 1967-1974.
The U.S. government recognizes the advocacy role of the Archdiocese with respect to foreign policy, as official meetings and communication between Presidents, high-level administration officials and Archbishops in the last 80 years illustrate. In the last biennial clergy-laity congress, Vice-President Joe Biden expressed his support to the Archdiocese and the Greek-American community on the protection of human rights and religious freedoms of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2014a). He also mentioned that Greece and the United States have long enjoyed an intellectual connection that continues through the Greek-American community, and that America will participate in the economic reinvigoration of Greece which has started to happen. Last, he appeared cautiously optimistic about Cyprus. The Vice-President’s presence in the clergy-laity congress and the content of his speech testify to the fact that the U.S. government has a high regard for the Archdiocese, that it considers it a political actor with respect to Greek and Greek-American issues, and that it has a deep understanding of which issues are particularly important to it and to the community.

In another instance, in the context of the commemoration of Greek Independence Day on March 25, 2014, President Barack Obama met with Archbishop Demetrios, recognizing him as the leader of the Greek-American community. Other representatives of the Greek-American community and of the governments of Greece and Cyprus were also present at the meeting with the President in order to commemorate the Greek fight for liberty. These meetings between the President, the Archbishop and leaders of the Greek state and the Greek-American community on the occasion of the Greek national celebration have been happening for several years now and illustrate the recognition by the American state of the organic relationship between the Greek-American community, led by the Archdiocese, and the Greek state, represented by its diplomats.
The Archbishop, fulfilling his role as policy advocate, noted in his address to the President during this recent meeting:

There are still for us Greek-Americans areas of serious concern, areas which need the fullness of freedom, both religious and political. We are sure that you are aware of and care for these areas as you do for other places where liberty is absent. (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2014b)

Communication between the Archbishop and the U.S. President is not a rare phenomenon. A recent example was Archbishop Demetrios’ letter to President Obama in May 2013 in which he requested the President’s protection for the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in the face of recent reports about a possible assassination plot against him. He urged the President “to exercise his good offices to ensure the safety of His All Holiness,” who is “the highest Christian presence of a Christian leader in a Muslim country,” while also noting the continuous crisis and victimization of Orthodox in Syria, where local Orthodox Bishops were abducted (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2013a).

Another recent example of communication between the two was also in 2013. The Archbishop received a message from President Obama and the First Lady on the occasion of Greek Orthodox Easter in 2013 in which the President sends his wishes for the religious feast and also stresses the U.S. commitment to religious freedom as a universal human right in the face of persecution and violence that Orthodox Christians experience in the Middle East (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2013b).

247 The Archdiocese has also been very vocal independently as well as through the Assembly of Canonical Bishops, which is chaired by Archbishop Demetrios, on other international issues, such as the persecution of Christians, including the disappearance of Orthodox Bishops, the violence in the Middle East, condemning the actions of the Islamic State in the region, and the violent developments in Ukraine (Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops 2014a). The
The political role of the Church is also recognized by the Greek and Cypriot states. The heads and representatives of the governments of the two countries always meet with the Archbishop during their visits in New York and discuss with him the important political and social issues facing the people of Greece and Cyprus. They inform him of latest political developments, ask for his and the Greek-American community’s support, and hear from the Archbishop about the work that the Archdiocese and the community has been doing in support of Greek issues. A recent example of such interaction was the visit of the President of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades at the Archdiocese in 2013.

During the meeting [between Archbishop Demetrios and the President of the Republic of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades on September 24, 2013 in New York,]
Archbishop Demetrios outlined for President Anastasiades the efforts of the Archdiocese and the Greek-American community in support for Cyprus throughout the years, and especially after the recent economic crisis which hit the people of Cyprus. In turn the President expressed the gratitude of the people of Cyprus for all the help and relief assistance and presented an overview of the efforts of his government to overcome the crisis and reach a just and fair solution to the problem of Cyprus. (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2013c)

Assembly of Canonical Bishops elaborates on its opposition to violence and fanaticism in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Israel and Palestine in its September 2014 “Statement on the Middle East,” which has a subtitle taken from scripture, “Blessed are the peacemakers (Matthew 5.9)” (Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops 2014b). This subtitle illustrates the perceived role of the Church as a peacemaker in global affairs.
b. American Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association (AHEPA)

In addition to mobilization by and through the Church, Greek-Americans have also been active in advocacy campaigns through a number of Greek-American organizations. The first large scale Greek-American organization that was politically active within the American political system was the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA). AHEPA was established in Georgia in 1922 with the purpose of countering discrimination against Greek immigrants and helping Greek-Americans enter mainstream American society.

Its activities included assistance to immigrants, especially newcomers, assistance to the development of the Greek homeland, and involvement in the American political process in order to support issues of special interest to the Greek-American community. Such issues were primarily foreign policy issues that were related to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The involvement of AHEPA was particularly significant following the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974, when it worked with other Greek-American organizations to protest the invasion and occupation of the island.

AHEPA has created a committee that is dedicated to the promotion of Hellenic issues, including those pertaining to Cyprus. The Cyprus and Hellenic Affairs Committee (CHAC) aims at increasing the Congressional Grassroots Contact Network which would include advocates in every AHEPA branch and contacts in every congressional district, and at growing the Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues (“Cyprus and Hellenic Affairs”). In addition, its goals include getting co-sponsors for bills that pertain to Hellenic issues, voter education, and creating and distributing a Congressional scorecard (Macris 2011: 6).

According to the organization’s recent document entitled AHEPA Family – Issue Areas, 114th Congress, “The AHEPA Family’s mission — founded on our cultural heritage and
community service programs — guides our 114th Congress agenda” (“AHEPA Family-Issue Areas”). The first policy goal in the agenda, according to the document, was to “Strengthen relations with Greece — longtime NATO ally” through protecting “Greece’s sovereignty in the Aegean,” and supporting “a mutually-acceptable solution to the name recognition issue of FYROM.”

The second policy goal was to “Secure religious freedom and protection for the Ecumenical Patriarchate — the world’s oldest Christian church.” This is to be achieved through actions to “Reopen the Orthodox Seminary in Halki,” and to “Urge Turkey to respect the rights and religious freedoms of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.”

The third policy goal is to “End the near 40-year illegal occupation of the Republic of Cyprus-A member of the European Union.” For this purpose AHEPA cautions that the “Economic crisis [should not be] a means to impose a settlement,” calls “for the removal of 40,000+ illegal Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus,” and stresses that “U.S. policy affirms Cyprus’s sovereign right to explore within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).” The section closes with the general policy goal to “Advance reconciliation and rapprochement in the Eastern Mediterranean.” In the Foreign Aid Oversight section, AHEPA states that “U.S. aid to former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia must not be utilized to promulgate hate propaganda towards Greece or contribute to further provocations against Greece.”

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248 Support for H.Res.477 on the issue of FYROM is also included in the agenda. Another issue on the agenda was the following: “AHEPA Family has mobilized to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Greece during economic crisis. AHEPA has [publicly] expressed concern about rise of extremism in Greece; condemned it in the U.S.”

249 This goal required the support of H.Res.188 on Halki, according to the Agenda.

250 This goal required the support of H.Res.136 on the religious freedoms of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

251 This goal required the support of H.Res.187 on Cyprus.
AHEPA has also initiated a campaign to build a partnership between Greek-American and Jewish American organizations. This partnership was launched through an AHEPA-organized conference entitled “Emerging Greek-Israeli Relations: What are the next steps?” in 2010 in Washington, DC with the participation of Greek-American and Jewish American community leaders, academics and diplomats (Macris 2011: 2). This inter-ethnic cooperation has culminated in the creation of the Congressional Caucus on Greece-Cyprus-Israel, which is discussed below.

AHEPA also holds an annual AHEPA Capitol Hill Day when AHEPA Family members visit Senators and members of Congress.252 The organization urges its members to participate in the event: “Educate your legislators about issues of importance to American Hellenic Community! Help build the Hellenic Caucus!” (“AHEPA Family Capitol” 2015). The Capitol Hill Day is followed by a Congressional Banquet. In 2015, the 41st Congressional Banquet will take place (“41st Biennial National” 2015). AHEPA also aims at strengthening its relationship with Greece through official visits. For example, a 2011 visit by AHEPA members to Greece, Cyprus and Israel included testimony in the Greek Parliament’s Special Permanent Committee on Diaspora Greeks and meetings with the Greek Prime Minister, the President of the Hellenic Republic and the President of the Republic of Cyprus (Macris 2011: 2-3).

In 2010 AHEPA also created the AHEPA PAC (Political Action Committee) in response to the growth of the Turkish American PACs:

The PAC will enhance the organization’s leadership on behalf of the entire Hellenic American community and the mission of AHEPA. We’ve witnessed

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252 The AHEPA Family includes its female organization Daughters of Penelope and its youth organizations.
the tremendous growth of Turkish American PACs recently and we have a long way to go to match their size and strength. (Macris 2011: 3)

The domestic influence of actors with opposing policy goals and interests to the Greek ones has also gotten the attention of AHEPA

The AHEPA expresses concern about the infiltration of Turkish and FYROM revisionist propaganda that has made its way into our public school systems, specifically in textbooks, and will explore the matter going forward. (Macris et al. 2010: 1)

Regardless of all the significant political work that the Cyprus and Hellenic Affairs Committee is doing, possibly not all members of AHEPA consider it a priority. According to the 2011 Committee Report:

Over the past four years, the Committee has sought formal budgetary funding for its work. Such funding has regrettably not been forthcoming, and the Committee has found itself in the position of continuously soliciting funds for its work from one event and/or project to another. This condition reflects poorly on AHEPA and shows a lack of serious intent as regards the goals of the Committee. (Macris 2011: 6)

c. United Hellenic American Congress

The United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC), based in Chicago, aimed at uniting Greek-Americans in their fight for Cyprus and other issues pertaining to Greece. It was closely connected to the Archdiocese and acted as an umbrella organization that coordinated the efforts
of Greek-Americans (Moskos 1990: 121). Currently, the organization does not have an active
digital presence — a factor that is compromising its presence in the community — but it
continues to lobby at Congress and it continues to raise funds.\footnote{According to ProPublica’s Nonprofit Explorer, UHAC had $84,000 in revenues and $81,069 in functional expenses. Information is available at http://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362956403 [accessed on 1/15/2015]}  

The organization was founded by the late Andrew Athens, its National President, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Athens, a second generation Greek-American, was a legendary figure in the Greek-American community and in the world-wide Greek diaspora. He was a successful businessman who became deeply involved in humanitarian and Greek-American community activities.\footnote{Andrew Athens was also one of the founders of the Coordinated Effort of the Hellenes and of the World Council of Greeks Abroad, and was a prominent member of other Greek-American organizations. Moreover, he was also the president of the Archdiocesan Council (Moskos 1990: 167).}

Under Athens’ leadership, UHAC worked successfully with other Greek-American activist organizations. The UHAC worked with the American Hellenic Alliance (AHA) and the Pancyprian Association of American creating a loose consortium (Moskos 1990: 167). The American Hellenic Alliance was headed by shipping magnate George Livanos of New York (Ibid.). These organizations have raised funds for congressional races for candidates that support their causes (Ibid.). Athens, together with other Greek-American leaders, was instrumental in getting the 7 to 10 ratio of U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey in the years following the Cyprus invasion (“Meet our Founder”).

Since 1983, Andrew Manatos lobbies the Congress on behalf of the UHAC. For the period since 1998 for which there are online data, relevant lobbying reports on Manatos’
lobbying for the UHAC most often cite as lobbying issue “Congressional or Executive Branch actions that help build stronger ties between the U.S. and Greece, and the U.S. and Cyprus, through the promotion of U.S.-Greece and U.S.-Cyprus relations.”

During certain years the lobbying reports also refer to specific bills that the organization is lobbying for, usually for Cyprus and FYROM. For example, in 2008 it also lobbied in support of H.Res. 1024 on honoring Greek Independence Day, H.Res. 356 on FYROM, and H.Res. 405, H.Res. 407, H.Res. 620, H.Res. 627 on Cyprus.

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**d. World Council of Hellenes Abroad, North American Branch**

In 1995, a life-long dream of several diaspora and homeland Greeks was fulfilled through the initiative of the Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigoris Niotis: an organization to unite all diaspora Greeks was created with the name World Council of Greeks Abroad (*Symvoulio Apodimou Ellinismou or SAE*). The world headquarters of the organization were to be based in Thessaloniki, Greece and it would be an independent organization, yet having a special relationship with the Greek state since it would be funded by it and it would have the role of advisor to the state with respect to issues that were important for the diaspora Greeks (“SAE Visions”). Each continent (region) would be represented by a different branch of SAE and all members of the organization would meet annually together in Thessaloniki. The SAE project, although very popular and ambitious as a concept, was found to have many

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problems once it started operating. Recently, SAE has reduced its activity — the American branch, in particular, appears to be almost non-existent — partly due to the economic crisis and partly due to concerns about its overall efficiency, organization and effectiveness, prompting the need to redesign the whole project if it is to be kept alive.

The organization’s founding and honorary president was Andrew Athens of Chicago and the North American branch was to be based in Chicago. Through Andrew Athens, Greek-Americans have played a leading role within the Greek diaspora and became major players within SAE. However, not everyone in the Greek-American community saw SAE as a positive development. Many Greek-Americans felt that the community already had its organizations that were representing its interests and, as a result, there was no need for an overarching organization that would undermine the independence of the pre-existing grassroots organizations, especially since it was seen also as a possible attempt by the state to control independent diaspora activity.

The active presence of Athens helped to mitigate concerns and bridge this gap since he was a leading figure both in the Greek-American community and in the worldwide SAE. The first years of the organization were very active with the participation and support of local organizations. However, the inherent problems of the organization started to become apparent, causing some to question the need for it in the first place.

During the years of high activity, the North American Branch of SAE joined other Greek-American organizations in the pursuit of various political, social and cultural objectives. SAE enlisted the help of Manatos & Manatos to lobby Congress for Greek issues. The 2004 Lobbying Reports for SAE indicate that the organization lobbied for S. 2812 and H.R. 4818 (bills on foreign operations and export financing), and, in general, for “Congressional or
executive branch actions that effect foreign affairs and human rights issues of concern to the Greek-American community and issues that effect the countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey” (Lobbying Report 2005a). For 2005, the same phrasing is repeated and bills S.600, H.R.3057 (on appropriations for foreign operations) are added as lobbying issues (Lobbying Report 2005b). In 2006, while the same lobbying issue description continues to be present, the reports also include a few more lobbying issues: “Congressional and Executive Branch actions that affect the sale or transfer of U.S. military equipment to Turkey, Greece or Cyprus,” H.R.5522 and S.600 on appropriations for foreign operations (Lobbying Report 2007).

e. American Hellenic Institute (A.H.I.)

In addition to the United Hellenic American Congress, another advocacy organization, American Hellenic Institute, was created in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus which would be dedicated to upholding the rule of law in issues related to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey (“About AHI”). AHI was originally conceived in 1973 as an organization that would promote trade between the United States and Greece by former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eugene S. Rossides but evolved into a lobbying organization within days of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 (Moskos 1990: 121, 167). In 1975, it created its Political Action Committee (AHI-PAC) which combines information gathering and dissemination with a grassroots network provided by AHEPA (Ibid., 167). Main goals of the organization have been the framing of the Cyprus issue as a “rule of law” problem and making “American aid to Turkey conditional on resolution of the Cyprus problem” (Ibid.).

AHI was instrumental in persuading Congress to uphold U.S. federal law with respect to the Turkish invasion, namely the prohibition of the use of US-supplied arms for aggressive
actions, managing to enforce an arms embargo against Turkey which lasted several years (“About AHI”). AHI plays a leading role in Greek-American advocacy, having its headquarters at the Hellenic House in Washington, D.C. (Ibid.). It is self-described primarily as a lobby and a think-tank, which is active in policy research, in raising public awareness, and in policy advocacy (Ibid.). With a broad agenda covering all foreign policy issues that affect Greece and Cyprus, “AHI initiates congressional legislation, issues policy statements, and serves as an effective watchdog on issues affecting U.S. relations in Southeastern Europe” (Ibid.). The annual policy statements regarding various issues of Greek interest that AHI prepares and distributes to legislators and members of the executive branch, express positions that “are based on the best interests of the United States” (“AHI Annual Report 2012” 2012: 2).

f. Hellenic American National Council (HANC)

The great majority of Greek-American organizations have a local character as either local branches of Pan-American organizations, like the AHEPA, or as independent organizations. In order to better organize, coordinate and empower the local Greek-American communities through their organizations, regional federations of Greek-American organizations were created in each American region. In 1992, the Hellenic American National Council (HANC) was established to bring all of these federations under one institutional body. HANC works closely with AHI for the promotion of all foreign policy issues of interest to Greece and Cyprus. HANC organized a rally in front of the United Nations in New York in January 1993 with the participation of numerous Greek-American organizations to protest the use of the name “Macedonia” by FYROM (“Our History”). However, besides that mobilization, HANC has not been active in policy advocacy (Vidalis 2014). During a recent
meeting of the organization, the need to restructure it and to adapt it so that it addresses new needs was stressed (Hellenic News 2014).

g. Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC)

Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC), based in Chicago, is one of the newest Greek American organizations but probably a very popular one, at least as far as its presence in social media is concerned; its Facebook page has over 46,000 likes, the most among similar Greek-American community and advocacy organizations (Hellenic American 2015a). HALC was launched in January 2012 with lawyer Endy Zemenides as its Executive Director and politician Alexi Giannoulias as its Board President (Logothetis 2012b). The organization was founded by long-term advocates of Greek American issues who had been active through other major advocacy organizations but realized that there was a need to blend the past advocacy experience with new leadership and mobilization tools in order to engage much larger numbers of Greek-Americans (Ibid.).

A significant characteristic of HALC is that its overall digital presence is probably the most professional-looking, appealing and user-friendly among Greek-American advocacy organizations. But even more important, it is the only one among Greek-American organizations that includes a digital platform for direct action. This interactive platform is wide-spread among American and global advocacy organizations, making policy advocacy a matter of a few seconds and a few clicks. Following the tab “Take Action Online” on HALC’s

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257 The organization’s web-site can be found at www.hellenicleaders.org.
web-site, you can directly sign petitions, write letters to editors of your local newspapers, and send ready-made e-mails to your representatives in Congress.

HALC is similar to but also different from other Greek-American organizations. It is membership-based and it utilizes a network of distinguished Greek-American community members. Both of these characteristics have also been adopted in one way or another by several Greek-American organizations. However, HALC connects the leadership network to grassroots participation through the user-friendly advocacy tools that were described above and which also include information about the issues (“About HALC”). Moreover, HALC uses “innovative leadership training curriculum” to empower its constituent community (Ibid.).

**h. Greek Cypriots organizing: Cyprus Federation of America and PSEKA**

The Greek Cypriots in America are represented by a number of Cypriot organizations across the country, most of which were established before 1974. Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Pancyprian Association, one of the larger Cypriot organizations, was created with the purpose of “protecting and assisting the struggle of the Cypriot people for freedom and justice” (“Pancyprian Association”). Pancyprian is considered one of the chapters of the umbrella organization Cyprus Federation of America, the ultimate organizational representative of the Greek Cypriot people in the United States. The mission of Cyprus Federation of America is “To promote the rights, and freedoms of the Cypriot people, and work towards the termination of the illegal occupation of Cyprus from Turkey” (“Mission Statement”). Interestingly, the Cyprus Federation of America together with the Federation of Hellenic Societies of Greater New York has marched in the “Celebrate Israel Parade” in New
York in order to show its support to Israel and to stress the shared democratic values of the two nations (Cyprus Federation 2013).

In 1975, Archbishop and President of Cyprus Makarios created the International Coordinating Committee “Justice for Cyprus,” known as PSEKA, with headquarters in Nicosia. The North American headquarters are located in New York. PSEKA members and supporters work across the United States and in coordination with the world-wide chapters of the organization and other Greek-Cypriot and Greek-American organizations in the United States for the promotion of a solution to the political issue of Cyprus (The International Coordinating Committee).

i. Greek Macedonians organizing: Pan-Macedonian Association

The Pan-Macedonian Association was created in 1946 by immigrants from Macedonia, the northern region of Greece, in order to support the fellow immigrants from the same region, and to assist Macedonia in any way they could (Gatzoulis). However, their most important goal was to organize in order to counter the Slavic “Macedonian” movement for recognition of the “Macedonian” language, ethnicity and right to self-determination, all of which would constitute threats to Greek Macedonian identity, culture and sovereignty (Ibid.). U.S. government authorities saw the Slav-Macedonian movement with suspicion and considered its rhetoric and actions as propaganda (Ibid.).

President Truman even informed Fr. Thomas Daniels, a Greek-Orthodox priest in the Washington D.C. area who hailed from Western Macedonia and was a close friend of Truman, that there is talk of the creation of an autonomous Macedonian nation (Gatzoulis). Fr. Daniels informed Archbishop Athenagoras and the mobilization of Greek-Americans than ensued led
to the creation of the Pan-Macedonian Association in Detroit (Ibid.). The first General Pan-
Macedonian Provisional Committee was created and held its first convention in 1947 (Ibid.).

Among the goals of the organization as stated in its by-laws is the projection of
Macedonian history and culture and the information of the American (and Canadian) public in
order to counter any misinformation campaign regarding Macedonia (Gatzoulis). Pan-
Macedonian considers the issue not political but rather historical, ethnic, cultural and linguistic
(Ibid.). A number of the organization’s committees deal with the issues regarding FYROM and
Macedonian history. However, the National Issues Committee focuses specifically on the
political promotion of the issue:

The promotion of our positions on the Macedonian issue, in cooperation with
the lobbies of the House and Senate committees and officials of the American
government is the primary responsibility of this committee. Also, it has the
responsibility of placing advertisements in the American press, which will seek
to inform and shape public opinion. (Ibid.)

In addition to the issue of Macedonia, Pan-Macedonian also states its position of strong
support regarding other issues of Greek interest in its resolutions and declarations. Among
these issues are Cyprus, the Patriarchate, Greek sovereignty over the Aegean, the Greek
minority in Albania, and the Pontian genocide (Pan-Macedonian 2014). In the 2014
Declaration, the Pan-Macedonian also stresses its recognition of the Kalash, a tribe in Pakistan,
as Greeks who have carried the traditions of Ancient Macedonians through the centuries.
Kalash is a tribe that is believed to be descended from Alexander the Great’s soldiers during
his campaign to Asia and which has preserved certain Ancient Greek cultural traditions. Pan-
Macedonian is supporting their struggle to preserve their ethnicity and culture (Ibid.).
In 1992 Pan-Macedonian created the International Institute of Alexander the Great at the foot of Mount Olympus in Macedonia in Northern Greece. One of the primary goals of the Institute is to disseminate the Greek Macedonian culture, history and heritage (International Institute of Alexander). The Center has recently become particularly active and has plans for more projects in the future (Spiliakos 2014).

j. Epirots organizing: Panepirotic Federation

Panepirotic Federation is the umbrella organization that represents all Epirot and Northern Epirot Greek-American organizations. The organization was founded in 1942 in Worcester, Massachusetts with the mission to: “improve the economic situation and quality of life of the people living in Epirus as well as to protect the human rights of ethnic Greeks living in Southern Albania” (Panepirotic Federation). Its member organizations (or chapters) represent both the Greek-Americans who hail from the Epirus region in northwestern Greece and those who hail from the adjacent region of Northern Epirus in Southern Albania.

The only exclusively Northern Epirot society that is a member of Panepirotic is the National Northern Epirotic Society of Greater Boston “Northern Epirus.” The primary foreign policy interest of these organizations is the status of Northern Epirus and the rights of the Greek minority in Albania. Panepirotic functioned as one of the major Greek-American advocacy organizations in its early years promoting a number of Greek foreign policy issues besides those related to Northern Epirus.
Descendants of the Pontian Greeks, the residents of Pontos region of Turkey, have created numerous Pontian associations across the United States. These organizations are members of and are represented by the Pan-Pontian Association of USA and Canada. Besides cultural and social activities, the Pontian organizations have launched a campaign for the recognition of the Pontian genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire. In this effort they are supported by the other Greek American organizations with whom they work on promoting the issue. An important strategic partnership has also taken place between Greek-American and Armenian American organizations, since they both support the recognition of the genocide of Christian communities (Armenians, Pontian Greeks, Assyrians and others) by Turkish authorities and have created a strong joint advocacy front.

Pontian organizations try to lobby the recognition of the genocide of Pontians and Asia Minor Greeks while also raising awareness of the issue. For example, the Pontian Greek Society of Chicago, which is particularly active, has a special section for educators on its website (pontiangreeks.org) with ample material on teaching about the historical aspects of the Pontian genocide. In addition to online educational resources, it also organizes lectures, conferences and teaching seminars for social studies teachers on the issue. Its Youth Awareness conferences aim at teaching its youth about the history of the Pontian genocide in addition to teaching them about the Pontian culture and fostering social bonds among them.

II. Greek-American Lobbying Firms

A unique case among the various Greek-American entities is Manatos & Manatos, a three-generation Greek-American lobbying firm. It was created by Andrew Manatos, a former
Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the administration of Jimmy Carter, and his father, Mike Manatos, a former White House Assistant for Senate Liaison, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Manatos & Manatos, founded in 1983, describes itself as “a government relations and public policy company which utilizes established relationships of trust to deliver powerful results for clients.” Manatos & Manatos has been recognized for its influential role in Congress both by the Greek-American community and by the American political establishment.

Last January the Washington Post called Manatos & Manatos “One of Washington’s most powerful lobbying firms.” The key is that Manatos has developed rock solid credibility with member[s] of Congress, and other government officials over the decades. But because those people come and go in Washington, it is a constant, huge effort to keep rebuilding it. (Huling 2012: 2)

Beyond involvement in American foreign policy-making related to Greece, Cyprus and the Patriarchate, Manatos & Manatos also “created Congressional legislation and worked with the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and others to establish the annual White House celebration of Greek Independence Day” (Manato & Manatos 2014a). The establishment of this celebration was neither easy nor without significance, since the Greek-American community is the only ethnic group other than the Irish-Americans with whom the American President meets every year (Huling 2012: 4). The Manatos family recently also established the Washington OXI Day Foundation to raise awareness of the role that Greece played in World

258 This is the description according to the company’s web-site which can be found at manatos.com/aboutus [accessed 11/5/2014].
War II for protecting democracy and freedom and to honor individuals who follow the same mission today (“Mission”).

According to Michael Dukakis, Andy Manatos has played a major role in shaping the Greek-American political landscape:

I think Andy in particular, more than the rest of us, has had a lot to do with making the Greek community a very significant political force in this country, which was not the case several years ago. And I think Andy’s played an enormously important role in doing that. (Huling 2012: 2)

Dukakis, further, explained what Manatos’ contribution has been in the context of the complex lobbying process.

… “Essentially what you are trying to do is build, develop an effort in which Greek Americans are actively involved, making contact with their elected officials, especially folks of whatever administration is in office, and members of Congress, obviously Greek-Americans in Congress but not exclusively,” Dukakis noted. “And that work which all of us participated in, has been going on now for several years, and I think it’s had real impact. But Andy has been at the heart of all of this. He’s the guy that keeps us informed, makes sure we know what’s going on, calls on us when he needs us; you’ve got to have somebody like Andy who essentially quarterbacks this effort.” (Ibid., 4)

Andrew and Mike Manatos also chair the National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH), which was created in 1983 to promote a resolution to the Cyprus issue. The CEH issues press releases on Cyprus and other foreign policy issues and holds an annual Cyprus and Hellenic Leadership Conference in cooperation with PSEKA in Washington, D.C. where
Greek-American community leaders have the opportunity to meet and interact with State Department officials and members of Congress (Morrow 2012).

According to official Lobbying Reports, Manatos & Manatos represented most Greek-American organizations that lobbied on Capitol Hill primarily with respect to foreign policy issues affecting Greece, Cyprus, the Patriarchate and FYROM.²⁵⁹ Manatos & Manatos sometimes represented Greek-American organizations as clients and other times it lobbied for itself, without representing a particular client. In both cases it lobbied for the same issues.²⁶⁰ Lobbying Reports of 2006-2014 state Manatos & Manatos as lobbying for themselves under the lobbying issue “Congressional or Executive Branch actions that help build stronger ties between the U.S. and Greece, and the US and Cyprus, through the promotion of U.S.-Greece and U.S.-Cyprus relations.”²⁶¹ Throughout the years, Manatos & Manatos has consistently lobbied for the end of Turkish occupation and for the reunification of Cyprus, in opposition to the use of the name “Macedonia” and to acts of hostility by FYROM, and for honoring Greek

²⁵⁹ According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the Manatos & Manatos firm is lobbying on behalf of most Greek-American organizations, including the Coordinated Effort of the Hellenes, with lobbying expenditures that are below the $10,000 threshold that would allow the reporting organization to create a financial profile. Hence, most relevant lobbying expenditures are listed as $0. See relevant Lobbying Reports under “National Coordinated Efforts of the Hellenes” in “Client Lookup” and under Manatos & Manatos in “Lobbyist Lookup” on the Center’s web-site, www.opensecrets.org [accessed on 1/19/2015].

²⁶⁰ The official Lobbying Reports disclose information about lobbying activities in accordance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (section 5) and do not have an identification number. In several such Reports, Manatos & Manatos is presented as both the registrant (“organization/lobbying firm”) and as the client. An example of these reports can be found at http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=478A3AFB-BB50-424D-AB44-700ABBE3E40D&filingTypeID=51. Reports since 2001 are available but the files for 2001-2003 cannot be found through opensecrets.org.

²⁶¹ Additional lobbying issues for Manatos & Manatos are: “Legislation making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2013, and for other purposes,” (repeated and adjusted to reflect different fiscal years each year) and “Congressional and Executive Branch actions that affect the sale or transfer of U.S. military equipment to Turkey, Greece, or Cyprus.”
Independence Day in the US.\textsuperscript{262} Lobbying reports for similar issues are available also for 2007 and 2005.\textsuperscript{263}

Andy Manatos describes how the lobbying process is developed:

\textsuperscript{262} In the 2008 Lobbying Reports, in addition to the three lobbying issues stated above, a series of others were added. One was related to honoring Greek Independence Day in the US through the “H.RES.1024 Recognizing the 187th anniversary of the independence of Greece and celebrating Greek and American democracy” and the other was related to FYROM through “H.RES.356 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) should stop the utilization of materials that violate provisions of the United Nations-brokered Interim Agreement between the FYROM and Greece regarding "hostile activities or propaganda" and should work with the United Nations and Greece to achieve longstanding United States and United Nations policy goals of finding a mutually-acceptable official name for the FYROM.” Cyprus, dominated the lobbying issues for that year through “H.RES.405 Expressing the strong support of the House of Representatives for implementation of the July 8, 2006, United Nations-brokered agreement between President of the Republic of Cyprus Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehment Ali Tarat relating to the reunification of Cyprus,” through “H.RES.407 Expressing the strong support of the House of Representatives for the positive actions by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at opening additional crossing points along the cease-fire line, thereby contributing to efforts for the reunification of the island,” through “H.RES.620 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Turkey should end its military occupation of the Republic of Cyprus, particularly because Turkey's pretext has been refuted by over 13,000,000 crossings by Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots into each other's communities without incident,” and through “H.RES.627 Supporting the removal of Turkish occupation troops from the Republic of Cyprus.”

\textsuperscript{263} Lobbying on H.R. 356, 405 and 407 was also included in 2007 Lobbying Reports in addition to “S.Res. 95 A resolution designating March 25, 2007, as “Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration of Greek And American Democracy” and “H.Res. 228 Recognizing the 186\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of the independence of Greece and celebrating Greek and American democracy.” Lobbying Report is available at \url{http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=478A3AFB-BB50-424D-AB44-700ABBE3E40D&filingTypeID=51} [accessed on 11/6/2014]. In 2005, a different phrasing is used for one of the regular lobbying issues of Manatos & Manatos: “Congressional or executive branch actions that effect foreign affairs and human rights issues of concern \textit{[sic]} to the Greek-American community and issues that [affect] the countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey.” Lobbying Report is available at \url{http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=CBF52727-747C-4E25-B9ED-FA599F38A62C&filingTypeID=3} [accessed on 11/6/2014].
…you’ve got to first get some constituent interest; we’ve got to activate our Greek-Americans to communicate to that senator or member, and then we’ve got to take that communication and make sure it gets to the eyes of that senator, that it doesn’t get lost with all of the other paper coming in, we’ve got to come forth with all the data to back it up, and show him why it makes sense, and why he’s got to do it, and then we’ve got to put the pressure on him, to help him understand that there may even be a down side to this if he doesn’t do it. (Huling 2012: 9)

Andrew and Mike Manatos bring their insights into the workings of the American political system to Cyprus and other Greek issues by stressing two important and deciding factors for successful lobbying: demonstrating to members of Congress how voting on the particular issues would benefit them, and framing the issue through terminology. In the words of Andy Manatos

If I want a senator to introduce an amendment for something, he’s got to perceive he’s doing me that favor, but it’s also got to somehow benefit him. And that’s the hard part, is to find ways that these issues can also benefit him. (Huling 2012: 3-4)

Realizing that American politicians and the American people see foreign policy issues through the perspective of American national interests and American values and sensitivities, Manatos stresses the need to use terminology that highlights these two concepts with respect to Greek foreign policy issues.

Therefore, he suggests that stressing the colonial aspect of Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus as well as the fact that Cyprus is the only non-Muslim country in the immediate area
around Israel, can strengthen the Greek position on the issue (Manatos & Manatos 2012). He argues that Turkey used exactly the same technique of framing and terminology by calling the updates of what was happening in Cyprus as “Turkey bashing” and saw progress for its interests in the Cyprus issue (Ibid.). In the same manner, framing the attacks and discrimination against the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an issue of religious freedom, a change that the Manatos family was involved in, helped greatly in advancing the issues related to the Patriarchate in the American political context (Ibid.).

In addition to Manatos & Manatos, another Greek-American lobbying company has emerged in the Washington political scene and has served important Greek-American organizations: A.G. Kaffes and Associates. Kaffes, having worked as a public relations director and as interim executive director of AHEPA in the past, has also represented the historic organization on Capitol Hill. Among his accomplishments he includes “executing a legislative strategy that propelled implementation of a Homeland Security policy in support of U.S. — Greece relations [and] garnering support to restore funding for Voice of America’s Greece Desk” (Greek America Foundation 2012).

AHEPA recognized the role that Kaffes played in promoting the visa waiver program for Greek citizens, a project that AHEPA had initiated and supported all the way (Mossaidis 2010: 8). AHEPA’s Cyprus and Hellenic Affairs Committee is relying on Kaffes in its attempt to influence Congress with respect to issues pertaining to Greece and Cyprus (Hollister 2014: 1).
Regardless of the presence of Greek-American professional lobbyists, the Greek Government hired an American lobbying firm, Clark and Weinstock, for its 2001 lobbying activity related to 2004 Olympic Games in Greece.\textsuperscript{264}

### III. Greek-American politicians and Hellenic caucuses

Greek-Americans started to enter politics slowly in the first decades of the twentieth century, leading the way for younger generations to run for office, most often for a seat in Congress. Greek-American Senators and Congressmen have consistently been supportive of Hellenic issues (for a list of past and current Greek-American legislators, see Appendix B). In addition to the politicians of Greek heritage, other philhellene politicians have joined caucuses that center on Greek issues, and have sponsored, co-sponsored or voted for relevant bills. Currently, several Greek-American politicians serve at the local, state and federal level, in both the legislative and executive branches. There are two caucuses focusing on Hellenic issues in Congress: the Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues (or Hellenic Caucus) and the Hellenic-Israeli Alliance Caucus.

The Hellenic Caucus is co-chaired by Greek-American Congressman Gus Bilirakis and Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, and the Hellenic-Israeli Alliance Caucus (Greece-Cyprus-Israel Caucus) is founded and co-chaired by Gus Bilirakis and Ted Deutch. Congressman Gus Bilirakis, a Republican, has been representing Florida since 2007 following in his father’s footsteps.

\textsuperscript{264} According to the Lobbying Report dated 2/13/2002, the lobbyists “Met with Members of Congress and the Executive Branch on general issues pertaining to Greece, including the upcoming Olympics in Greece,” and the cost to the Greek government for this lobbying activity was $140,000. The report is available at [http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=41A6E2B4-C287-48CF-B02A-06CCDC19280C&filingTypeID=9](http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=41A6E2B4-C287-48CF-B02A-06CCDC19280C&filingTypeID=9) [accessed on 1/7/2015].
footsteps. The elder Bilirakis, Michael, was a U.S. Representative for Florida from 1983-2007. Bilirakis has a strong record of introducing legislation in support of Hellenic issues. Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, a Democrat representing New York, is not of Greek origin but due to the fact that she represents the district that includes Astoria, which has the greatest concentration of Greek-Americans in the country, she strongly supports Greek issues. Congressman Ted Deutch is a Democrat representing Florida.

The Hellenic caucuses aim at countering the influence of other caucuses with possibly opposing interests and goals, such as the Turkish Caucus, the Macedonian Caucus and the Albanian Caucus. As of January 2015, the Hellenic Caucus is made up of 116 members of Congress, some of which are of Greek origin. Members of the caucus have a particular interest in Greek foreign policy issues and are positively inclined towards the Greek and Greek-American positions.

The creation of the Hellenic-Israeli Alliance Caucus, which was inspired by AHEPA and AHI, was very strategic since the alliance highlights the common interests of Greece, Cyprus and Israel, being the only non-Muslim countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Greek advocacy benefits from the support of the highly influential Jewish American political actors in Washington, D.C. (Spiliakos 2014). The Jewish American advocacy had long been compared to Greek advocacy and has been looked upon as a model for Greek-American mobilization (Moskos 1990: 122).

The Greek-state cultivates its relationship with the Greek-American members of Congress through the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary Association (WHIA), which was created on the initiative of the Greek Parliament. The members of WHIA are politicians of Greek-origin who serve in legislatures around the world. Through the WHIA, the Greek-state
informs the Greek-American politicians about the issues of Greek interest in order to have their support on these in Congress. Moreover, the state attempts to reconnect the senators and congressmen to their family’s homeland and to cultivate their emotional, inter-personal and cultural bonds with it and with politicians of Greek origin in the diaspora. The cultivation of the politicians’ Greek pride is an important component in this effort.
CHAPTER 8

THE ROLE OF GREEK-AMERICANS IN GREEK FOREIGN POLICY II: MOBILIZATION AND ADVOCACY

In the period prior to 1974, the main advocacy institutions of the Greek-American community were the Archdiocese and AHEPA (Moskos 1990). Following the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, a new era in Greek-American mobilization was launched and with it several new advocacy organizations. The issues that these organizations work on include Cyprus, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the rights of the Greek minority in Turkey, the Macedonian issue, the rights of the Greek minority in Albania, and the recognition of the genocide of Pontian and Asia Minor Greeks. The so-called “Greek lobby” is a loose network of organizations working on Greek advocacy issues.

The lobby works in two general ways. One is through lobbying in Congress and raising campaign funds for politicians who support Greek positions is foreign policy issues affecting Greece, Turkey and Cyprus (Moskos 1990: 166). The other way is through mobilizing the Greek-American grassroots and American supporters (Ibid., 166-167). Some organizations work in the former way and others in the latter. Despite differences in political strategy and personality conflicts, organizations that promote the issues in the two different ways “generally complement rather than compete with one another” (Ibid., 167). Among advocacy activities are letter writing campaigns, petitions, high-level and grassroots communication with elected officials, personal lobbying on Capitol Hill, activation of personal contacts and networks, public awareness campaigns through advertisements and coverage of the issues in the media, and testifying at Congressional hearings.
The first large scale mobilization of the Greek-American community was through the Greek War Relief Association which aimed at the provision of humanitarian aid to embattled Greece during World War II. Although this was primarily a fundraising effort for a humanitarian purpose it still required not only efficient and effective massive mobilization but also lobbying the American government in order to acquire permission for shipments of food, and building alliances with foreign governments and international organizations for the safe passage of ships carrying the aid and for its effective dissemination at the final destination (Morrow 2012). Greek-American political scientist Harry Psomiades called this first Greek-American mobilization through the Greek War Relief Association “the first Greek lobby” (Ibid., 84). The second largest Greek-American mobilization, and its first large scale political mobilization, happened in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

a. Working on the Cyprus issue

Greek-American mobilization regarding Cyprus had started in the 1950s and 1960s when Greek-Americans lobbied the U.S. government to support a free Cyprus that would be united with Greece (Morrow 2012). The Greek-Americans wanted the United States to save Cyprus as it had saved Greece from communism a few years earlier (Ibid.). Archbishop Iakovos urged the parishioners to contact their senators and representatives in support of the Cypriot people in light of violent incidents on the island in 1964 (Ibid.). His role was to raise awareness, promote advocacy and mobilize resources for humanitarian aid (Ibid.).

When Turkey invaded Cyprus in the summer of 1974, a new massive Greek-American mobilization campaign was launched to protest the invasion. Existing Greek-American organizations joined their efforts while new organizations that were dedicated exclusively or
primarily to the Cyprus issue were created, some within days of the invasion. The American Hellenic Institute (AHI), the United Hellenic American Congress and the Coordinated Effort of the Hellenes were some of the major advocacy organizations. Others included the Hellenic Council of America, which mobilized primarily professional and academic Greek-Americans, and the local committees of PSEKA “Justice for Cyprus,” which were active in letter writing campaigns (Moskos 1990: 121).

Several local organizations were also set up spontaneously around the country, such as the Panhellenic Emergency Committee in New York, the Minnesota Friends of Cyprus in Minneapolis, and the Save Cyprus Council of Southern California (Kitroeff 1994: 22-23). Local committees in places with low concentrations of Greek-Americans could still effectively influence legislators while those located in cities with large Greek-American concentrations coordinated the spontaneous activities of the local community (Ibid., 23). The characteristics of the local Greek-American communities defined the form of activism that was undertaken by the local committees; overall, first generation Greek-Americans tended to be more militant with respect to the responsibilities of the administration towards Cyprus (Ibid.).

The case of the mobilization of the New York community is particularly interesting. In a meeting in New York a few days after the Turkish invasion, representatives of Greek-American federations, the AHEPA, the Archdiocese and other organizations came together and decided to create the Pan-American Committee of Struggle for Cyprus, an umbrella organization for all Greek-American federations which would be based in Washington, D.C. and would coordinate the community-wide mobilization (Kitroeff 1994: 25). The Committee would be placed under the auspices of AHEPA (Ibid.). However, the grassroots protest movement lacked leadership and the know-how that is essential in running a massive
mobilization campaign while there was the tendency, especially among the first generation, to use Greek nationalistic and anti-American slogans (Ibid., 26-27).

The Panhellenic Emergency Committee was launched in order to counter these shortcomings of the protest movement in New York (Kitroeff 1994: 27). The Committee worked with rather than against other Greek-American organizations that were mobilized on Cyprus, supported their actions and mediated on their behalf becoming “a pressure group within a pressure group” (Ibid., 28). The Committee was active in public education regarding Cyprus, in introducing effective lobbying strategies to the community, in reaching out to American politicians and in organizing fundraising events for Greek-American and American politicians supportive of Greek causes (Kitroeff 1994).

The first generation immigrants, most of them newcomers following the 1965 immigration legislation, mobilized on the issue of Cyprus primarily through local organizations and federations rather than through AHEPA and the Archdiocese (Kitroeff 1994: 23-24). They opted for forms of activism that they were more familiar with such as rallies and public demonstrations, especially outside of the United Nations in New York but also in front of the White House (Ibid.). Their reaction was also more intense due to their strong links to Greece and Cyprus (Ibid.). Greek-Cypriots had, actually, already started their mobilization prior to the Turkish invasion, when the Greek government attempted to overthrow Makarios’ government in June 1974 (Ibid.). Greek-American reaction to the Cyprus events was varied, sometimes spontaneous and other times planned and calculated (Kitroeff 1994: 24-25). The grassroots reaction, especially by the first generation Greek-Americans, was more bold and forceful than the cautious actions of AHEPA and the Archdiocese (Ibid.).
The first massive rally in Washington was organized by the Panhellenic Emergency Committee and other grassroots organizations in New York and elsewhere, and reached 20,000 Greek-American participants, according to the press (Kitroeff 1994: 31). This rally was not endorsed by the major communal organizations but because it had high participation, these organizations became more open to using public rallies as a form of mobilization (Ibid.). The rally brought closer together the “militant rank and file of the community” and the more traditional community organizations and their leadership (Ibid., 31-32).

Political activism in support of Cyprus involved a systematic lobbying effort which turned against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for his failure to act in the aftermath of the invasion. Although Greek-Americans did not manage to push Turkey back, they won a significant victory in Congress with the imposition of an American arms embargo against Turkey. AHI played a significant role acting as a professional advocacy organization while coordinating its actions with those of the other Greek-American organizations.

When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the United States Congress would not act to enforce U.S. laws following Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, AHI called on some of its friends in Congress. AHI wrote to them on August 28, 1974, setting forth Turkey’s violations of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) in its invasion of Cyprus with the illegal use of American supplied arms and equipment.

Our friends in Congress adopted our arguments and sent a letter to Secretary Kissinger on August 29, 1974. Thus the rule of law issue was born. It should have been born the very day Turkey invaded Cyprus — July 20, 1974 — and if
it had been, there would have been no second aggression on August 14, 1974.
Kissinger violated the FAA and FMSA and his constitutional oath of office to
faithfully carry out the laws of the land when he refused to declare Turkey
“immediately ineligible” for further U.S. aid and sales as required by law. (“AHI
History”)

While official lobbying activities were taking place in Congress in support of an arms embargo,
a second rally took place in Washington under the leadership of Free Cyprus Committee to
promote the issue. The rally was followed by a seminar offered by Eugene Rossides of AHI
and others which trained Greek-American activists in lobbying methods (Kitroeff 1994: 32-
33). Following the seminar, its participants visited legislators on Capitol Hill in order to
promote the arms embargo putting in action their newly acquired lobbying skills (Ibid.).

Activism in support of the arms embargo against Turkey was, eventually, successful,
marking a significant political victory for the Greek-American community.

After a dozen major votes in the Congress between September and December
1974, in which the entire community was active in support of the rule of law,
Congress passed an arms embargo against Turkey. AHI coordinated the effort
in the community, kept a vote count on a daily basis and provided the
information to key supporters in the House and Senate. It was an historic success
that should never be forgotten. It proved what could and can be done when we
are in the right and united on policy. Fundamental to the success was the fact
that we stood for the rule of law in international affairs as in the best interests
of the U.S. (“AHI History”)

The arms embargo was a significant, although limited, victory of the Greek-Americans. In addition to the wide cooperation among members and organizations of the community and the passionate and massive mobilization, what aided in the effectiveness of the Greek lobby was the high regard in which Senator Paul S. Sarbanes and U.S. Representative John Brademas were held in Congress (Moskos 1990: 167). The mobilization gave birth to a politically active and empowered Greek-American community. They emerged as a political force in American politics.

The *Time* of July 17, 1975, in its article titled “New Lobby in Town: the Greeks,” it stated: “one of the most effective lobbies in Washington today is that of Greek Americans” (as cited in Moskos 1990: 120). This effort required the successful grassroots mobilization of the Greek-American community and the cooperation of its organizations, including the Archdiocese, Greek-American lobbyists and politicians. Although the campaign was not free of infighting and backbiting (Ibid., 121), the passion and commitment of Greek-Americans and the cooperation among them were keys for the success of the mobilization campaign. The image of communal unity was unprecedented since the massive efforts on behalf of the Greek War Relief Association during World War II (Ibid.).

After the invasion of Cyprus, Manatos remembered, the Greek-American community displayed extraordinary energy, something that was essential to bringing about the 1975 arms embargo against Turkey. “The number one element behind our legislation on Capitol Hill was that in 1974, Greek-Americans came alive, out in the states and the districts,” he said. “Our people went wild. With our Washington instigation and direction, our people lobbied the Cyprus issue constantly.” Congress voted to place an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975, which President Gerald Ford vetoed. Then Congressmen Paul
Sarbanes and John Brademas in House, and Manatos, working for Senator
Eagleton in the Senate led the effort to persuade Congress to overturn the veto.

[...] “It was the first and only time in modern history that the Congress has
overruled the Executive Branch on a foreign policy issue,” said Manatos.

(Huling 2012: 3-4)

Support for the arms embargo put Greek-Americans for the first time on a path of
collision with official American policy (Moskos 1990: 121). The mobilization campaign was
also illustrative of the maturation of the Greek-American community, as it worked within the
American political system (Ibid.). The administration was strongly against the embargo and
waited for an opportunity to revoke it. The Greek-American community acting as an American
political actor fed a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches: “In short,
Congress became the enemy, whose mass forces were the Greek-American community and
whose allies were the Greek and Cypriot governments” (Hackett 1980: 140).

The policy experts in the state department could not understand congressional politics,
while Kissinger and his staff assumed that ethnic politics played by ethnic politicians were
compromising an important foreign policy issue (Hackett 1980: 141). However, neither the
Greek-American Congressmen leading the fight in Congress, John Brademas (D-Ind.) and Paul
Sarbanes (D-Md.), nor major American political supporters, like Senator Eagleton and
Congressman Rosenthal, depended on Greek-American votes (Ibid.). According to Clifford
Hackett (Ibid., 142), it was a combination of mobilization of the large, cohesive and influential
Greek-American community through the Church, the lobbying by the AHEPA and AHI in
Congress, and the proclivity of Greek-American to political activism that were crucial for the
success the Greek-American efforts. Greek-Americans were effective both in their lobbying
and in their grassroots organizing but they were also favored by the fact that there was no
massive Turkish-American grassroots mobilization (Ibid.). The success of the embargo was also due to the fact that political attitudes on Capitol Hill at the time coincided with Greek views on the particular issue (Moskos 1990: 121).

Greek-American mobilization “never meant to test dual loyalty;” it, rather, posed the issue “as the parallel of Hellenic interests and American legal morality” (Moskos 1990: 122). Nevertheless, members of the administrations had a hostile attitude towards the Greek-American community because of its mobilization, accusing Greek-American of being disloyal to the United States. Both the Ford and the Carter administrations

...attacked the “Greek Lobby” through allegations of actions against American national interests, charges of corruption, and nineteenth century chauvinism. Attempts were also made to exploit the differences between the many groups making up the Greek Lobby and to bring them in conflict with the Greek government. In fact, the popularization of the term Greek Lobby placed a broad issue, such as that of Cyprus, within the narrow confines of the nationalistic feelings of a specific ethnic group and thus made it easier for both administrations to condemn its activities as being against the interests of the United States. (Coufoudakis 1980: 123)

Although the community was at the core of the mobilization, the success of the embargo campaign depended on a broad support for the issue beyond the Greek-American community.

In the aftermath of the decision on the arms embargo, the grassroots protest movement continued to be active through public demonstrations. The third Greek-American rally in DC was organized in July 1975, marking the anniversary of the Turkish invasion (Kitroeff 1994: 33). The fourth rally happened in 1978 with a renewed sense of urgency since President Carter
was about to revoke the arms embargo against Turkey; hence, the rally had a broad organizational support, featuring the Archbishop as one of the speakers, had 20,000 participants and was held under the auspices of the Federation of Hellenic Societies (Ibid., 34). The fourth rally and the subsequent reversal of the embargo and its replacement by the 7:10 ratio of military aid to Greece and Turkey launched a new era in Greek-American advocacy which would be centered around professional lobbying in DC rather than on grassroots mobilization (Ibid.).

Although there was cooperation, there was no conformity across the protest movement and different approaches were weaved together reflecting the generational and geographic differences within the community (Kitroeff 1994: 38). The organizational and tactic variety proved beneficial for Greek-American mobilization; it offered flexibility while the strategy could adapt to the specific skills of the members of different organizations (Ibid.). Mobilization was primarily the result of local activity while Greek-American organizations had autonomy of action (Ibid., 39).

Following the reversal of the arms embargo under the Carter administration in 1978, a new Greek-American victory was marked with respect to military aid to Greece and Turkey; the 7:10 ratio of American military aid to Greece and Turkey was, therefore, established in 1980.

Eventually, Turkey convinced Carter that they would withdraw from Cyprus if he would just give them a “face-saving mechanism” — lifting the arms embargo. [...] The embargo was lifted. Turkey did not keep its word to Carter. But the Greek-American community fought back, and in 1980 managed to persuade Congress to vote for the 7:10 ratio; for every $10 in American military
aid given to Turkey, Greece would receive $7. […] The 7:10 arrangement lasted until 1997. (Huling 2012: 3-4)

A few years later, Greek-Americans scored another political victory. They influenced the American government to put pressure in support of the ascension of Cyprus to the European Union regardless of whether a solution to the Cyprus issue were achieved.

Prior to Cyprus’ accession [to the EU], everybody on Cyprus assumed that the Turks would take the rest of the island when they got an opportunity, and they are just biding their time until something would happen, and they would use it as an excuse to take the rest of the island,” Manatos said. “[“] And we convinced [then-Assistant Secretary of State Dick] Holbrooke and [President Bill] Clinton that, if Cyprus became part of the EU, that would eliminate that possibility.” (Ibid.)

Greek-American organizations continue to support Cyprus by lobbying the issue, raising awareness, mobilizing the community, and by being vocal regarding their support for Greek-Cypriots and for the reunification of the island. These organizations continue to be important players in American foreign policy in the region and their role is recognized by the governments of the United States, Greece and Cyprus. They protest the continuing occupation, the destruction and desecration of Greek properties in the North, and the violation of the human rights of Greek-Cypriots, including freedom of religion.

An example of the violation of human rights of Greek-Cypriots by Turkish-Cypriot authorities has recently been the demolition of a Greek-Orthodox church and the cancelation of church services in the occupied North. In 2010, AHEPA protested against the demolition of a 200-year-old chapel in the Turkish-occupied areas and wrote a letter to Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton expressing concern regarding “the interruption and forced cancelation of Christmas Day Liturgy by Turkish-occupying forces,” which was followed by a reply by Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon who described the actions the State Department took to bring the issue to the attention of Turkish-Cypriot leader Eroglu (Macris 2011: 4-5).

Greek-American organizations continue to pursue the issue through legislative and executive channels. Recent actions by AHEPA are illustrative in this respect. Following recent remarks by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who argued that “There is no country named Cyprus,” AHEPA’s Supreme President, Anthony Kouzounis, wrote a letter expressing his concern to Secretary of State John Kerry (Hollister 2014: 1-3). AHEPA’s executive director, Basil Mossaidis, participated in briefings held by the Vice-President, Joe Biden, and his staff on national security before and after the Vice-President’s trip to Cyprus (Ibid.). AHEPA also communicated with participants in a congressional trip to Cyprus about steps to be taken on the issue following their trip (Ibid.). Last, during this period, AHEPA assisted with a congressional letter regarding appropriations for funding of programs in Cyprus (Ibid.).

The Archdiocese has always been very active in support of Cyprus and continues to be so. A recent visit in October 2014 of Archbishop Demetrios to Cyprus is illustrative of the role that the Greek-American community, and in particular the Archdiocese, is playing and is expected to play regarding the issue of Cyprus. The Cypriot hierarch called Demetrios “an angel of peace” and Demetrios stated the following:

Our pilgrimage here starts with a very deep feeling of duty, so that the days we spend on this island will give us additional data for when we return to America it will enable us to continue this struggle that we do all these years with the support of the Greek American community and especially with the Greek
Cypriot American Community. It is a struggle we undertake regardless of results and it will continue because we believe that the God of justice and of love will at the end justify this blessed and pained people and will grant to all the people who live on this island a life of creativity and peace, as they continue to offer culture and peace to the whole world. (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2014c)

During that visit, the Archbishop visited the occupied North accompanied by the American Ambassador (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2014d). They met with the small community of enclaved Greek-Cypriots in the occupied areas and Archbishop Demetrios did a memorial service for a Greek-Cypriot who was among the missing Greek-Cypriots following the Turkish invasion in 1974. Talking to the mother of the young missing Greek-Cypriot, he said:

You have to know that we are with you always and that we are fighting so that one day Rizokarpaso [the enclaved village in the occupied area] will be once more a free territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Now that we see the images and we have the experience of being with you, we will continue and intensify our fight. (Ibid.)

The Archbishop was also accompanied by the heads of the Cyprus Federation of America. This is a testament to the collaborative work between Greek-American organizations with respect to the issue of Cyprus.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁵ The American ambassador to Cyprus, John Koenig, addressed the enclaved in Greek saying that “Since my first tenure in Cyprus, I have always been close to the enclaved Greek-Cypriots of Karpasia [peninsula] and I think that that we have to do everything we can to support you because you are a nucleus of hope for reunified Cyprus” (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2014d).
Greek-American organizations have recently focused on building a strategic partnership among Greece, Cyprus and Israel, partnering up for this purpose with American Jewish organizations. The Greece-Cyprus-Israel Congressional Caucus was the outcome of this partnership and the leaders of Greek-American organizations (including AHEPA and AHI), Greek-Cypriot organizations, and Jewish American organizations participated in a Joint Leadership mission to the three countries in January 2014 (Hollister 2014: 4).

Greek-American organizations have worked together and have effectively mobilized the Greek-American community with respect to the Cyprus issue since 1974, although their campaigns have been met with limited success. Nevertheless, the post-1974 Greek-American mobilization, which Prévélakis (1998: 6) describes as spectacular, gave a new dimension to the relationship between the Greek state and the Greek-American community.

[The] perception of "Greeks Abroad", as a cow to be [financially] milked by the Greek State, acquired an additional political dimension after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the amorphous mass of Greek-Americans became mobilised and intervened in the U.S. political arena in favour of the Greek-Cypriot cause. From that moment on, the Greek-American lobby became one of the major issues in the relationship between Greece, Turkey and the U.S.A. (Ibid.)

b. Protecting the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Turkey

Activity regarding the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the protection of its religious freedom started several decades ago with the participation of numerous Greek-American
organizations; the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese, Manatos & Manatos, and AHEPA have been prominent among them. The earliest form of Greek-American lobbying on behalf of the Patriarchate and the Greek-Orthodox populations in Turkey took place in the early 1920’s, when Archbishop Meletios lobbied officials in the U.S. government and in Congress on behalf of the Greek Orthodox Church in America urging them to protect the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire, offering documents that testified on the atrocities perpetrated against Greeks, Armenians and other Christians under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk (Morrow 2012).

In 1921, the New York Times wrote about the mobilization of the outraged Greek-American community of New York, after they were informed of the massacres perpetrated by Turks against the Greeks of Pontus. Greek-American businessman and activist Alexander Kehaya of New York said to the New York Times reporter:

“Protests against these horrors have been sent to our Government here, but the reply has been that since this government has no relations with the Kemalist Government, it finds itself unable to take any steps toward lessening or halting the sufferings of these unfortunate people, doomed as they are to be buried alive by the most barbarous and cruel people who ever lived.

“The Greeks of New York, waving aside their political affiliations, plan a mass meeting in protest, at which Congressmen and Senators will be invited to speak. We Greeks of Pontus, as good American citizens, will urge the civilized nations of the world to put an end to these horrible massacres…” (The New York Times 1921)
Following the departure of Meletios who assumed the Patriarchal throne, lobbying on behalf of the Patriarchate and the Christians of Turkey continued, while funds were being raised to support relief efforts (Morrow 2012).

During the attacks against the Patriarchate and the Greek minority of Turkey in the 1950’s, Archbishop Michael led an advocacy campaign in Congress in order to inform its members of what was happening in Turkey (Morrow 2012). This campaign contributed, in combination with other factors, to bringing the atrocities to an end (Ibid.). Archbishop Iakovos, Michael’s successor, while continuing the lobbying efforts, kept urging the faithful to raise public awareness about the plight of their Greek brethren and the Patriarchate in Turkey (Ibid.). In 1977 he sent packets of information to each member of Congress to alert them to the situation of the Greek-Orthodox in Istanbul and to urge them to act (Ibid.). He launched several public information and lobbying campaigns on the issues throughout his tenure (Morrow 2012).

This mobilization eventually led to the organization of official trips of the last two Patriarchs to the U.S. — the first ever official trips of Ecumenical Patriarchs to the U.S. — to official meetings of U.S. Presidents with the Patriarch in Istanbul, and to the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. The interpersonal contacts between Patriarchs and U.S. Presidents have promoted the issue significantly, increasing awareness of the problems facing the Patriarchate both among American politicians and within the greater American society.

Andrew Manatos led a long and painstaking, but successful lobbying campaign to convince the Congress to award the Congressional Gold Medal to the Patriarch. This was a turning point in American foreign policy towards the Patriarchate.
All that work did reap rewards in turning the United States policy, Manatos said. Immediately after those major efforts were launched, President George W. Bush began to appreciate who the Ecumenical Patriarch is and why he requires religious freedom. In the presidential discussions with the Greek-American community and with Turkish leaders, it became apparent. Turkish officials began to hear about the importance of the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate routinely. (Huling 2012: 9)

According to Manatos, the decision to award this Congressional Medal to the Patriarch “had more cosponsors in the House than any other bill on record at that time” (Ibid., 7). This award changed the status of the discussion regarding the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the context of American politics. In the words of the Archdiocese’s spokesman, Fr. Alex Karloutsos,

[The award] helped raise the profile of the Ecumenical Patriarch, so therefore when you talk about the Ecumenical Patriarch, it was not a foreign entity, it was actually an honored entity by the United States government itself. (Ibid.)

One of the church organizations that has primarily undertaken the advocacy on the issue of the religious freedoms of the Patriarchate and the Greek-Orthodox population of Turkey is the Order of Saint Andrew Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The organization was created in 1966 to support the Patriarchate but it soon became involved in advocacy on its behalf (Murrow 2012). Archbishop Demetrios intensified the church’s advocacy on behalf of the Patriarchate, making it the primary advocacy issue for the Greek-American community (Ibid.). He also systematically promotes the issue with the President on the occasion of his annual presence at the White House for the commemoration of Greek Independence Day. During his address to the President in the context of these commemorations, he has named the
religious freedoms of the Patriarchate as the first issue of concern to Greek-Americans, followed by Cyprus and the “Macedonian” issue (Ibid.).

The Greek-American advocacy campaign on behalf of religious freedom for the Ecumenical Patriarchate has produced results (Huling 2012: 9). It led to American pressure on the Turkish government to relax restrictions on who could become Patriarch (Ibid.). The Turkish government restricted the right to become Patriarch only to those who are Turkish citizens, without offering naturalization to candidates outside of Turkey. Since the Greek community in Turkey is extremely small, the prospects of finding suitable Patriarchs and extending the life of the Patriarchate were very bleak.

Following Greek-American mobilization, this Turkish policy started to change. Turkey now allows possible external candidates for the patriarchal throne — Greek Orthodox bishops and metropolitanans from all the regions around the world that are under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate — the right to become naturalized Turkish citizens (Huling 2012: 9). Additional changes in the Turkish policy towards the Patriarchate have recently been noted with respect to the confiscated properties of the Patriarchate and the Greek-Orthodox organizations which are starting to be returned and regarding a perceived ease about using the “Ecumenical” designation in the title of the Patriarchate (Ibid.).

On November 20, 2013, Congressman Gus Billirakis (R-FL) initiated a congressional briefing on the violations of religious freedoms of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the continuation of the closure of the Halki Theological School in Turkey (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2013d). Archbishop Demetrios was one of the three presenters at the briefing, elaborating on the current situation of the Patriarchate and the Theological School.
Congressman Bilirakis was reintroducing a House resolution for the immediate opening of the Theological School of Halki without any limitations or preconditions.

Another presenter at the briefing was Dr. Elizabeth Prodromou, an expert on religious freedoms and current member of the Secretary of State’s Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group who presented all the Turkish violations of religious freedom with respect to the Patriarchate and Halki which threaten the continuation of the Patriarchal institution. Last presenter was Dr. Anthony Liberakis, national commander of the order of Saint Andrew, Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Dr. Liberakis talked on behalf of the archons, the global corps of active supporters of the Patriarchate, and about the work they have been doing.

The Congressmen present expressed their solidarity for the reopening of the Theological School of Halki. The words of Congressman Bilirakis are a statement to the commitment of Greek-Americans in general and Greek-American politicians in particular, in promoting Greek and Orthodox foreign policy issues: “We will not rest until we open our Schole again. It is important to Orthodox Christians in the U.S. and around the world. This is a bipartisan bill and we are not going to rest until is done” (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2013d).

Greek-American organizations lend their assistance to the Patriarchate in various ways and their leadership, effectiveness and expertise on the issue is also recognized by American politicians. The following incident is very illustrative. When Senator John McCain was the last person who had not signed a Foreign Affairs Committee letter on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the office of Senator Chris Murphy, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, did an outreach to AHEPA to enlist their assistance with getting Senator

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266 Schole means “school” in Greek and refers to the Theological School of Halki in Turkey.
McCain to sign. AHEPA mobilized its grassroots network which contacted Senator McCain’s office. Following this mobilization, the Senator signed the letter (Hollister 2014: 3).

Recently the status of Hagia Sofia, the most celebrated church in the history of Orthodoxy, came under discussion. The church, turned into a mosque following the taking of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453, became a museum in the 1920s. However, recently, in the context of tendencies to “Islamize” Turkey, some members of the Turkish political establishment have raised the issue of restoring Hagia Sofia as a mosque, a development that has caused a strong reaction by Greek and non-Greek actors. AHEPA has been in communication with UNESCO regarding the issue, trying to ensure UNESCO’s World Heritage Center’s protection of the status of Hagia Sofia (Hollister 2014: 3). Archbishop Demetrios also expressed his “grave concern” about the possibility of turning Hagia Sofia back to a mosque stating:

If any shift should occur from the current use of Hagia Sophia as a museum, then, the Turkish government should allow it to operate as originally intended and as it functioned for almost 1000 years, as a Christian Cathedral and not as a mosque. (Greek Orthodox Archdiocese 2013e)

The Archdiocese and other Greek-American organizations have also assisted the members of the Greek minority of the island of Imvros with respect to the violations of their human rights. In a 2011 presentation to the Special Permanent Committee of Diaspora Greeks at the Greek Parliament, Paris Asanakis, President of the Society of Imvriots, referred to the Greek-American mobilization against the violations of the human rights of the Greek Imvriots (“Praktika” 2011c: 19-20). More specifically, he referred to the trip of representatives of the Imvriot Society in January 2010 to the United States with the purpose of informing and
mobilizing both the Greek-American community and the U.S. government and organizations to support the religious and legal rights of the Greek Imvriots.

Mr. Asanakis mentioned the support, including financial support, which the Imvriots received from the Greek-American community and the personal involvement of Archbishop Demetrios in the issue, which prompted him to visit the island of Imvros that summer. The result of these contacts in the United States was fruitful for the Imvriots, who managed to have the violations of their educational and property rights recognized by the US Commission for International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which then informs the relevant report of the State Department. Hence, the Greek-American community played an important role as an effective advocate for the human rights of the Greek minority in Turkey.

d. Mobilizing for the Macedonian issue

Although the Greek-American community has been somewhat effective on putting pressure on Turkey to protect the religious freedom of the Patriarchate, in other issues it has not been quite as effective. The Pan-Macedonian Association and other Greek-American organizations were not able to halt President George W. Bush’s decision to recognize FYROM with the contested name “Macedonia,” right after his reelection. The President’s action disappointed his Greek voters very deeply.

Regardless of that decision, the Pan-Macedonian continues to lead a political fight that aims at preventing FYROM from having a name that includes the word “Macedonia” or any of its derivatives. Greek-American organizations continue to be vocal about the so-called “Macedonian” issue but the position of the Pan-Macedonian is a difficult one, since the American government has already recognized FYROM as Macedonia, and the Greek
government disagrees with Pan-Macedonian on the specifics of the policy regarding the name. The organization tries to influence not only the American Congress, the U.S. administration, and international organizations with respect to this goal, but also, uniquely so, the Greek government.

In the early 1990s Greek-Americans launched an advocacy campaign to protest the use of the name “Macedonia” by FYROM through the organization of public rallies, letter writing, petitions, lobbying and public education activities, including the placement of advertisements in newspapers (Morrow 2012). Greek-American advocacy against recognition of FYROM upon the dissolution of Yugoslavia was effective in temporarily preventing the U.S. government from recognizing the country when it recognized the other states that were created out of the remnants of Yugoslavia (Ibid.). Lobbying was led by U.S. Representative Michael Bilirakis and Senator Paul Sarbanes, and by the Pan-Macedonian Association, the Coordinated Efforts of the Hellenes, the American Hellenic Institute, AHEPA, and the Greek-Orthodox Archdiocese (Ibid.). The Clinton administration was particularly sensitive to Greek concerns.

The administration would ask for Senator Sarbanes’ opinion on any FYROM-related issue while Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff was considered to be the “in-house ‘gate-keeper’ for ethnic Greek concerns” (Swigert 1994: 5). Actions by the administration to normalize relations with FYROM were put on hold under Greek-American pressure; lobbying activities also involved a meeting between President Clinton, Andrew Manatos and prominent members of the community (Morrow 2012). However, Greek-American pressure was effective only until 2014, when the U.S. government announced that it would recognize FYROM as “The Republic of Macedonia.”

This announcement, immediately following President George W. Bush’s reelection, was quite disappointing to Greek-Americans, who protested strongly against it. They launched
a new lobbying and mobilization campaign but to no avail, despite bills introduced in Congress by Greek-American and philhellene politicians to this effect (Morrow 2012). Shortly after the recognition, a delegation of representatives of the Greek-American community under the leadership of Archbishop Demetrios met with Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Ibid.). The delegation included the leaders of AHEPA, the Pan-Macedonian, the UHAC, the SAE, the Archdiocese, and the Coordinated Effort of the Hellenes (Ibid.).

Although there has not been any significant progress since then, the Pan-Macedonian and other Greek-American organizations continue their advocacy on the issue. According to a 2010 resolution of the Pan-Macedonian, the organization expects the Greek, the U.S. and other international governments to support a name that is not connected in any way with Macedonia, which is “unquestionably a historical and cultural heritage of Greece” (Pan-Macedonian 2010). They want a name that will differentiate FYROM and its citizens, who are ethnically mixed, from Macedonians, who are the inhabitants of the northern Greek region: “the Macedonian identity is historically and culturally Hellenic; thusly we do not accept any concept of a “Macedonian” ethnicity and “Macedonian” language.”

They have very strong convictions, stressing that: “the history of Macedonia and particularly its name are NOT NEGOTIABLE and as a paternal legacy they cannot be ceded to third parties,” and “history demands that it is our sacred duty to continue our struggle for the rights of Macedonia.” In order to clarify that their position of disagreement with FYROM lies only in the realm of the name, they state:

…we fully support the existence of a country north of Greece with the interim name of The FYROM, as we support its efforts to join the EU and NATO, provided its official name does not include the term “Macedonia” or its
derivatives and furthermore we harbor no animosity or any ill feelings towards its citizens or its Diaspora, as we expect good neighboring relations as an additional criterion for its Euro-Atlantic integration. (Pan-Macedonian 2010)

They complete the resolution as follows: “Let it be resolved that we shall never accept for the country of The FYROM any name that will include the term Macedonia or any of its derivatives” (Ibid.).

c. **Protecting the human rights of Greeks in Albania**

The position of the Panepirotic and the rest of the Epirot organizations is that the Greeks of Northern Epirus are “unredeemed” and “under Albanian occupation” (Budina & Hart 1995), while that of the Greek state is not to raise the issue of self-government in Northern Epirus and to abstain from referring to Northern Epirus as under occupation and in need of liberation.

Whatever the position of the Greek government may be, a vocal irredentist minority both abroad and within Greece — particularly among conservative clergy — considers Northern Epiros "unredeemed:" the American-based Pan Epirotic League has described the Greeks of Northern Epiros as "under Albanian occupation." The most extreme advocates of the Greek nationalist position deny that Albania has any legitimate claim to the status of nation-state. (Ibid.)

In Greek Independence Day parades taking place across America, the Panepirotic and other Epirot organizations participating in the parades have carried banners with relevant political messages; examples of these are “Autonomy for Northern Epirus” and “For 100 years Albania breached the accord of the Protocol of Corfu and Northern Epirus is still suffering.” Although
in their rhetoric and public appearances these organizations favor the reopening of the case for autonomy of Northern Epirus, in their official proclamations, primarily in the resolutions of their conventions, they appear more reserved.

Every two years, the Panepirotic and its member organizations hold a convention which produces a resolution. In the resolution of the 37th convention, which took place in Saint Louis in 2011, the Panepirotic frames the issue of the Greeks in Albania primarily as a human rights issue referring to Albania’s international and bilateral commitments to protect the rights of the Greek minority which it violates. It, further, urges all international entities, including the United States, the European Union, and the United States, to pressure Albania to protect the human rights of the Greek minority while asking the Albanian government to restore to “its full all educational, religious, political, linguistic and cultural rights due them under bilateral and international agreements signed by its representatives since the country was created in 1913” (Panepirotic 2011).

Political rights can take on different interpretations since they may refer to rights of political organization and representation in public administration, or they may refer to self-government and autonomy. The resolution also addresses the Greek government of which it requests “to adopt a resolution that it will not approve Albania’s membership in the European Union unless it first grants all rights to the ethnic Greek minority in the country” (Panepirotic 2011). Last, it ties together all Greek foreign policy issues in the final paragraph of the resolution, which states the following.

We call on the United States to do everything in its power to end the occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkish troops; to press the Turkish government to end harassment of the Patriarchate, re-open the School of Halki, and acknowledge
the Pontian and Armenian genocide and to press FYROM to stop expropriating the name Macedonia, which has been identified with Greece throughout its history. (Ibid.)

d. Working for the recognition of the Pontian Greek Genocide

The organizations that lead the campaign to recognize the systematic attacks against Greek Orthodox Christians of the Pontos region of Turkey in the early twentieth century, are the Greek-American Pontian organizations. Other Greek-American organizations have been working with them on this issue. AHEPA is one of these organizations that has lend its support to the Pontian goal working both in cooperation with the Pontian societies and independently. Greek-American organizations work closely with Armenian American and other organizations with the common goal of recognition of the genocides of all Christian populations (Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians, etc.) by the Ottoman Empire.

The AHEPA will seek to explore ways in which it can create awareness of the Pontian Genocide. The [Cyprus and Hellenic Affairs] committee salutes the recent decision of the Swedish parliament to recognize the genocides of the Armenians, the Pontian Greeks, and other Christian populations of Asia Minor. […] The committee will pursue closer cooperation with Armenian national organizations in order to obtain recognition of the genocide carried out by the Ottomans of the Christian population of Asia Minor. The AHEPA furthermore supports the Pontian Greek American community’s efforts to secure full recognition and proper commemoration of the Greek Pontian Genocide. (Macris et al. 2010: 1)
A catalyst in the campaign for recognition has been the popular biographical novel by Thea Halo “Not even my name,” which narrates her family’s struggles through the genocide. The mobilization around the issue prompted several states to adopt resolutions with which they recognize and commemorate the genocide of Pontian Greeks. New York State recognized the genocide of Pontian Greeks and Greeks of Asia Minor through Governor Pataki’s proclamation and New York’s Senate’s resolution in 2002. The same year New Jersey’s Senate and State Assembly recognized the genocide with a joint resolution (Not even my name).

Other states that have issued similar resolutions or proclamations are South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Florida. Overall, since 1998, thirteen States and City Councils in the United States have recognized the genocide of the Pontian Greeks through the work of the Pontian organizations (“Ekthesi” 2013: 34). In 2007, the International Genocide Scholars Association officially recognized the genocides of the Greek and Assyrian people by the Ottoman Turks between 1914 and 1923 (Not even my name).

e. **Working on Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean**

From time to time, especially when a “hot episode” happens between Greece and Turkey with respect to the Aegean, Greek-Americans raise their voice protesting against Turkish actions that challenge Greek sovereignty in the sea, on islets and islands, on the continental shelf and in the airspace. Greek-American organizations have lobbied on these issues and occasionally launch mobilization campaigns that address them. Since these issues are related to individual incidents that happen every now and then, they are not associated with an on-going long-term advocacy; instead, they lead to a series of interrelated advocacy actions. These include letter writings, petitions or lobbying with respect to individual incidents.
This advocacy action criticizes the on-going Turkish strategy of causing such incidences in order to promote the ultimate political goal of expanding Turkish sovereignty in the Aegean. Most recently, Hellenic American Leadership Council launched a mobilization campaign to protest recent Turkish provocations towards Greece over the Aegean through a petition that would be submitted to Secretary of State John F. Kerry (“Take Action”).

An analysis of Greek-American mobilization and advocacy: opportunities, challenges and successes

According to research by the Migration Policy Institute, the success of diaspora advocacy “hinges on smart policy, rooted in unity, commitment and focus” (Newland 2010: 2). Greek-American advocacy exhibits these characteristics and has achieved some victories. The successes have been based on cooperation among individuals and organizations, on strong commitment, and on effective strategies. However, the community is not characterized by uniformity in organization, approaches or even objectives; rather it is marked by a plurality of organizational forms, of foreign policy goals and of ways to achieve them (Kitroeff 1994: 39-40). Looking forward, smarter policies, greater unity, stronger commitment and focus, a more expanded network of activists and supporters, and more external alliances would probably make Greek-American advocacy more fruitful.

A crucial characteristic of Greek-American mobilization which has been primarily responsible for its success is framing the Greek issues in terms of the interests and principles of the United States (Moskos 1990: 167).

As one dispassionate (non-Greek) commentator put it, the lobby was able ‘to marshall impressive information and sound justifications for serious
examination of United States policies’; and its success ‘rested on the fact the Greek Americans were able to convince a large number of policymakers that the administration’s policies deserved to be critically assessed.’ (Ibid.)

Greek-American advocates “feel” the issues as Greeks but they advocate on them as Americans. The American political system is much more responsive to domestic pressure coming from American citizens than to pressure coming from international citizens living in the country. Both in order to convince the Greek-Americans to get on board with different campaigns, and, most importantly, in order to be able to convince American politicians and officials, foreign policy issues have to be seen through the American point of view.

This approach involves focusing on American values and American interests.267 Greek-American organizations, like AHI, stress that they approach the Greek issues through the perspective of American interests (Larigakis 2014). For example, AHI promotes peace and stability in Eastern Mediterranean which are important for US interests, while Turkish actions destabilize it (Ibid.). Stressing mutual benefits and mutual losses is another effective way to frame the issues. Unless an issue is framed as going against American norms and values or against American interests, it will not be adequately supported in the American political system. Greek-American advocacy has incorporated this basic principal in its operations; its successes have been primarily associated with this approach.

The strong Greek identity of the Greek-Americans and their mobilization on the basis of this identity and with respect to issues that affect Greece and Cyprus, are testaments to the

267 For example, instead of being emotional about discrimination against Greeks in any international context, the advocacy becomes more effective when the issue is framed as a human rights violation that goes both against the law and against American values and international norms.
existence of what Danforth calls “a transnational national community” (Danforth 1995: 12). As a “transnational national community” with influence and expertise, the Greek-Americans are playing a unique diplomatic and policy advising/advocacy role in their diasporic capacity. They are not only bridges between the two countries politically and diplomatically, mostly in an informal way but often in a formal one as well. They are also the carriers of a fusion of the two cultures, identities and political experiences: the Greek and the American one.

Therefore, they are in a very unique position, politically, because they share the concerns, interests, goals, and ways of thinking of both Greece and the United States. Through their policy advocacy, they offer a unique insider’s point of view which is valuable for American policy-making, since they are aware of the complexities of issues, often unknown to the American politicians, that affect the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean regions. They probably can play an even more important role with respect to Greek foreign policy making, since they know deeply the American political system, to which they belong. Hence, they know how to approach, analyze, and promote from an American perspective certain issues that are of central concern to the Greek government.

268 This term was an outcome of his research on Greek and Slav Macedonian diasporic communities, primarily in Australia and Canada.

269 The unique role that the Greek-American community plays as an unofficial ambassador, a bridge between the two countries was also illustrated through the actions that Greek-Americans took to improve relations between the two countries when the anti-American rhetoric of Greek socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou brought the bilateral relationship to its lowest point in the 1980s. Although they are working hard at improving the image of Greece in the U.S., Greek-Americans are not as involved or as successful at promoting the image of America in Greece, where, although Greeks are strongly connected to the U.S. in many ways — through emigration of family and friends, American culture, American products, American tourists, American education, etc. — they easily fall prey to popular anti-American conspiracy theories, not unlike other nations in the region. They have a deep distrust of American actions and policies, since they always see American interests, primarily financial, behind them and they consider any American interest in helping others and in human rights as misleading, superficial and opportunistic.
Major mobilization for Greek foreign policy issues has been limited to the case of Cyprus following the Turkish invasion of 1974, and the Macedonian issue in the early 1990s. The embargo against Turkey was the last successful effort of political mobilization and it was successful because Greek-Americans were angry and, as a result, highly motivated (Larigakis 2014). The more we move away from those instances, the less massive mobilization we see, regardless of a continuous strong sense of Greek identity. Greek-Americans are generally very passionate and vocal about their support for Greek causes but are not necessarily eager to actively participate in an advocacy campaign.

Although there are strongly committed community leaders, the greater Greek-American public remains rather not too involved. A break in this tradition of non-involvement has taken place when the issue in question was associated with direct human suffering; the Greek-American community has historically been highly mobilized in cases of human suffering of the Greek people (Larigakis 2014). World War II, the invasion of Cyprus and the current economic crisis represent cases of intense human suffering and have all led to massive mobilization for humanitarian aid and other forms of assistance to Greece or Cyprus.

According to Nick Larigakis (2014), President of AHI, the biggest challenge of Greek-American advocacy is grassroots mobilization, since for any effective advocacy, the grassroots have to be vocal about Greek issues at a local level — after all, according to Larigakis, all politics is local. The President of AHI points to two reasons why such a mobilization is difficult. First, the Greek-American community is changing, it is not exclusively tied to Greece, it is not an immigrant community; it has merged with the greater American community through mixed marriages (Ibid.) and through Americanization. The second reason is that a large part of the community does not understand the issues (Ibid.). This is where community organizations can contribute by educating and energizing the community (Ibid.).
Although Greek-Americans have a strong sense of identity and pride, and many of them speak Greek and are carriers of Greek culture, they are not equally involved in activities that support Greek foreign policy issues. Larigakis (2014) argues that promoting Greek culture in the United States may not necessarily help in the area of policy advocacy. However, this point does not undermine this study’s argument that education and culture have a diplomatic and political potential. Building on Larigakis’ accurate observation, I would argue that Greek culture is not a sufficient factor in the promotion of Greek foreign policy issues. Although knowledge and love of Greek culture are important and definitely contribute to a positive attitude towards Greece, there are also other factors that influence grassroots mobilization, as mentioned earlier, some of which can be addressed and some of which cannot.

Larigakis (2014) also points out to another reason for the low level of mobilization. Many Greek-Americans often do not want to use up all their political leverage by asking politicians to whom they are connected to support a Greek issue. Instead, they would prefer to preserve this leverage for future use with respect to their personal interests. The fact that this lack of adequate mobilization is common does not mean that there are no Greek-Americans for whom these issues are priorities and who do use their political networks to influence relevant decisions. The unwillingness to be more proactive regarding Greek issues may also be associated with the fact that, due to historical experience, in Modern Greek culture there is a distrust of collective institutions, including the state and, even, community organizations. For this reason, there is the tendency to place personal benefit above collective benefit, and not to have faith in the political system.

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270 Hence, the hypothesis that a strong identity, associated with good knowledge of the Greek language and Greek culture, is sufficient for a strong community-wide activism in support of Greek issues, cannot be supported.
Other diasporas that are very effective, for example, the Jewish-American community, are not only very committed to acting on behalf of their home-state but they are also highly organized in their mobilization campaigns. Although Greek-American advocacy organizations are numerous and have strong connections to the American political system, they have not adequately organized their support base. Probably a higher level of organization, a stronger outreach strategy, and a wider public awareness campaign would mobilize more people.

A number of additional strategies can enrich and empower Greek-American advocacy. Distinguished Greek-American academic Dan Georgakas (2011: 4) suggests that the parish council is “the sleeping giant of Greek-American politics.” He suggests that church festivals, which attract large numbers of Americans and Greek-Americans alike, should include an advocacy table through which the festival visitors would be informed of the issues of religious freedom that the Patriarchate is facing, especially with respect to the reopening of the Halki seminary (Ibid.). Petition signing on these issues at every church festival around the country could reach about half a million signatures making it a strong advocacy tool at a national and at a local level for further action (Ibid.). According to Georgakas local organizations and parishes could create a relationship with local representatives by inviting them to speak on issues of concern to the Greek-Americans and informing them about them (Ibid.).

A long-time suggestion by Eugene Rossides has been the creation of political committees of five to ten Greek-Americans and philhellenes in each electoral district that could impact congressional decisions significantly (Georgakas 2011: 4). These committees should have a regular contact with their local representatives and their aides such as holding annual luncheons or visiting them in DC (Ibid.). Georgakas (Ibid.) also suggests that a public education and awareness strategy should be undertaken in order to inform politicians and the American public about the Greek foreign policy issues and about the realities of the Greek crisis in order
to counter the biased and negative image of Greeks in the media. Moreover, he suggests that in the context of building a stronger relationship and partnership with the Jewish Americans, public education targeted towards the Jewish and the greater American public should include information on the significant protection that Greeks provided to the Greek-Jewish population during World War II (Georgakas 2011).

Often, the actions of the Greek-American organizations attempt to respond to or mirror the actions of other diaspora groups with opposing political goals, namely the Turkish-Americans, the Albanian-Americans and the Slav-Macedonians in the United States. A race takes place among diaspora groups for congressional influence and votes, as they all try to include as many members of Congress as they can to their respective Congressional Caucuses, the Greek, Turkish, Albanian or “Macedonian” ones. As the voices of all the other diasporic communities become stronger, it is more difficult for the Greek-American organizations to promote their point of view. Congress does not only honor Greece by celebrating Greek Independence Day. It also honors other groups with opposing political objectives, such as Turkish-Americans and Turkish-Cypriots through Turkish Cypriot Day.\footnote{The first Turkish Cypriot Day was celebrated at Congress in 2012. It was hosted by the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), Turkish American Community Centers (TACC), American Turkish Association of Washington, D.C. (ATADC), Maryland American Turkish Association (MATA), Mobile Turkish Coffee House and Northern Cyprus Cultural Society (NCCS) (Anadolu Agency 2012). The guests at the congressional events enjoyed Turkish cuisine and Turkish music (Ibid.).}

In the past, in addition to Greek-Americans enlisting in the Greek army during the Balkans Wars to help Greece against Turkey and Bulgaria, Turkish-Americans also enlisted in the Turkish army that fought for the Turkish War of Independence against Greece and the allies who had occupied parts of Turkey (Akcpar 2009: 174). These diasporas who are quasi
political opponents of the Greek diaspora have only recently become strong voices in the American political system and they are expected to become even stronger in the future. This is a new challenge for the Greek-American organizations in the pursuit of their political objectives.

The relatively recent emergence of highly organized Turkish-American organizations create a challenge to Greek-American organizations since the former aim at protecting the interests of Turkish-Americans and Turkey, consequently contradicting the Greek-American and Greek interests in many respects, especially on Cyprus, the Patriarchate and the Aegean. The Assembly of Turkish American Associations is an umbrella organization of Turkish-American organizations from throughout the United States. It is based in Washington D.C., a home base that offers particular advantages to influencing American policy-making. Their activities are political, social and cultural and they are funded through fees and donations as well as an endowment fund (Assembly of Turkish American).

Apparently for Turkish Americans, just like for Greek Americans, some of the older organizations, like the Federation of Turkish American Associations established in 1956, are taken over as primary community organizations by newer, more modern, highly digitized organizations with a professional character, like the Assembly of Turkish American Organizations and the Turkish Coalition of America established in 2007, both based in DC. Although the trend of moving away from primarily social and cultural organizations to more professionally organized activist organizations started much earlier for the Greek American community, other diasporas of interest to the Greek-Americans are catching up. For Greek Americans, older and historical organizations such as AHEPA and the Pan-Macedonian, may
be less attractive to younger generations who opt for digital age organizations, like the Hellenic American Leadership Council.\footnote{The popularity of the said organizations’ Facebook pages is indicative of that. Hellenic American Leadership Council has 46,486 likes (Hellenic American 2015a) as of January 15, 2015, while the central page of The Order of AHEPA (Order of AHEPA 2015) has only 3,342 likes. However, AHEPA also has Facebook pages for its regional branches. Nevertheless, even adding the number of likes of all AHEPA-affiliated Facebook pages, HALC still is probably ahead.}

With respect to the Macedonian issue, the newly created United Macedonian Diaspora, the first organization aiming at uniting the Slav-Macedonians and in promoting their issues through the American political system, proves a new and vibrant domestic political opponent to Pan-Macedonian and the other Greek-American organizations. Although the latter have had a long-term and relatively influential role in the American political system, the emergence of new opponent diaspora organizations that try to frame their own objectives as pragmatic and beneficial for the United States, appears to be rather problematic for Greek-American organizations.

In the United States, only recently has there been a strong Slav-Macedonian diaspora voice, unlike Australia and Canada where conflict between the two diaspora communities has been taking place for a long time,

Because the largest number of Slavic-speaking immigrants from Macedonia came to the United States during the first decade of the twentieth century, at which time they identified themselves as Bulgarians or as Macedonian-Bulgarians. (Danforth 1995: 87)

The work of the United Macedonian Diaspora has led to the creation of the Congressional Caucus on Macedonia, rivaling the objectives of the Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues.
The President of FYROM, Gjorge Ivanov, recognized the work of the “Macedonian” diaspora in general and of the United Macedonian Diaspora in particular, calling them “Ambassadors for their homeland, Macedonia” (Koloski 2014). The United Macedonian Diaspora, active for the last 10 years, seems to play the role of diaspora partner for American governmental authorities in a way that could prove to be more influential than the path Pan-Macedonian has taken.

The U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Calvert Foundation have created a public-private partnership that manages a newly created organization, the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA) that organizes and supports diaspora-centered initiatives for economic and social development of the countries of origin of the diaspora (International Diaspora Engagement). The motto of the IdEA is “Engaging diasporas in development and diplomacy” (Ibid.). The United Macedonian Diaspora appears to be a prominent partner in the activities of IdEA while Greek-American organizations seem to be non-existent within the framework of this international diaspora initiative, with the exception of the work of Repowering Greece Media Project highlighted in the IdEA’s web-site (Ibid.).

Moreover, the United Macedonian Diaspora, similarly to the Pan-Macedonian, appears to hold more extreme views than the government of FYROM. Just like the Pan-Macedonian is unwilling to accept the more inclusive views of the Greek state regarding the name of the country, the United Macedonian Diaspora urges its home government to cease negotiations with Greece about the name altogether (United Macedonian Diaspora 2010). Consequently, a new conflict front between Greeks and Slav-Macedonians starts to appear in the American political scene.
Looking at the Greek-American organizations as well as the organizations of the other diasporas of southeastern Europe — and probably beyond — we see that there is no distinct line between cultural and political when it comes to organizations that are identity-based. Thus, we often see organizations with a mission statement that focuses on culture and heritage, working on political issues. In the case of diasporas we see this fusion of the cultural and the political which seems to be associated with a fusion of the private and the public. In the Greek case, numerous community leaders have dedicated their life to their organizations and the goals they are serving. The line between what constitutes the organization, the community, the parish, and the family becomes extremely blurry for members of the community that are active in its organizations. And this can also explain the strong emotions surrounding the issues, goals and objectives: they constitute part of the individual and the collective existence of the diasporan.

The Greek state and Greek-American foreign policy advocacy

Although Greek-Americans are acting as American citizens with a special interest, and operate through official U.S. decision-making channels, their foreign policy goals are most often closely aligned with those of the Greek government. Indeed the Greek lobby even has a significant indirect influence in foreign policy making in Greece (Kitroeff 1994: 20). The relationship between the Greek-American community and the Greek state has fluctuated between times of convergence of opinions on foreign policy goals and times of divergence. Three such cases of divergence that followed convergence will be discussed here.

The first and most obvious case has been in recent years that of the disagreement between the Greek state and the Pan-Macedonian Association. The views of the Greek
government coincided with the views of the diasporic organization during the culmination of the “Macedonian problem” around the time of independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 1991. At that time, there was massive mobilization both inside and outside Greece in support of the Greek position regarding the new country’s name, i.e. the Greek disapproval on historical, cultural and political basis of the use of the name “Macedonia” or any of its derivatives by the newly independent former Yugoslav state.

Over time, possibly partly due to a close economic cooperation between Greece and FYROM which has led to the virtual domination of FYROM’s economy by Greek businesses, official relations between FYROM and Greece acquired a more conciliatory character and the official Greek position softened. The Greek government was for the first time willing to accept a name that would be either a compound word or a list of words that would include the name Macedonia or its derivatives. Currently the Greek state has abandoned its earlier policy of excluding the word “Macedonia” and all its derivatives from FYROM’s name and is willing to accept a qualifier to the word “Macedonia” that would differentiate between the Greek Macedonian and the Slav Macedonian identity and heritage (Parkas 1997: 106).

This shift in the approach towards the name of FYROM was not observed, however, among the diasporic communities of Greeks, especially in the United States, where the Pan-Macedonian Association remains one of the most vocal opponents of any use of ‘Macedonia’ either in compound or periphrastic form in the name of FYROM. This has created a clash between the highly mobilized diasporic organization and the Greek state, in particular, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the office of the Prime Minister. Moreover, it
caused the leaders of the Pan-Macedonians to feel disappointed in the Greek state, whose philosophy they consider to be Athens-centered (Spiliakos 2014).

Greek state representatives have met with members of the Pan-Macedonian and have discussed their policy differences. During their official visits to the United States, Greek MPs who are members of the Special Permanent Committee on Diaspora Greeks explained the logic behind the policy change towards the name of FYROM (“Praktika” 2011b). They tried to explain why the new policy is rational and beneficial to Greece, as opposed to its characterization almost as national treason by the hardliners. In a recent Resolution, the Pan-Macedonian suggests that: “a referendum which is ratified by the Greek people is the only legitimate means to accept any solution which would be contrary to this resolution” (Pan-Macedonian 2010). This point is illustrative of the fact that they recognize the Greek government as having diminished legitimacy with respect to this issue since, according to the Pan-Macedonian, it does not reflect the opinion of the people of Greek Macedonia, which would be the ultimate source of political legitimacy with respect to the particular issue.

The second case is that of the Epirot associations which argue for liberation of Northern Epirus. This is another instance where, like the Pan-Macedonian case, the diaspora organizations seem more hardline than the Greek government, arguing for a solution to the problem that the Greek government supported only in the past. In this particular case, it could be argued that the diaspora organizations take a nationalist stance supporting the possible redrawing of borders in the Balkans. In their eyes, the Greek government has not only forgotten but also betrayed Northern Epirus. The members and leadership of these organizations have no

273 The latter criticism against the Greek state does not only refer to the state’s perceived indifference towards the diaspora but, primarily, to its indifference towards the periphery, which essentially includes all Greek territory beyond Athens.
political cost in promoting these issues within the American political system. However, an official state entity, like Greece, favors stability in the region and sees the whole issue as more complex, being pragmatic about international and regional norms and realities and focusing on other arenas in which it promotes the Greek interests in Albania such as economy and education, while also promoting the issues of the Greek minority on a human rights platform rather than an irredentist one.

The third case is that of the 1975 arms embargo against Turkey. Although the Greek-American community worked in partnership with the Greek state in order to promote the embargo, later the Greek government was less supportive of it and it did not protest its repeal (Hackett 1980). However, the Greek-American community remained supportive of the arms embargo, which was, after all, its achievement. Not only the Greek state and the Greek-American community had different policy goals but the community was also disappointed in the U.S. administration, which, eventually, was successful in repealing the arms embargo, despite President Carter's promises to support Greek positions in his search for Greek-American votes in 1976 (Coufoudakis 1980: 121).

What we learn from the first two cases is that policy and norm changes in the homeland may come to the diaspora delayed, if at all. This is not unlike what happens in the homeland culture as it is experienced in the diaspora. The diaspora preserves older versions of the homeland’s culture, including an older version of the homeland’s language, which are

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274 The overwhelming Greek-American support for Carter on the basis of his pro-Cyprus stance, may have had an impact on the close election, including his success in Ohio where he won the Greek-American vote (Moskos 1990: 122). The result of the election was a source of joy for Greek-Americans and Greek-Cypriots alike based on false hopes: “In Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots danced in the streets when Carter’s victory became known. They praised Greeks in America for making the victory possible” (Ibid.). Soon after, his policies on Cyprus became aligned with the previous administrations’ policies, causing the Greek-Americans to feel let down by the American government.
reflective of the time of departure. What is illustrative in all three cases is that the diaspora often does not compromise as easy as the homeland and may hold what could be considered more extreme views. Last, the first and third cases show that throughout their history, Greek-Americans have often been left alone, without the support of either the Greek or the American government for the goals they were pursuing.

Official meetings between representatives of the Greek state and Greek-American advocacy organizations occur quite often. The meetings between Parliamentary Committees, and Greek-American advocates discussed here are illustrative of the homeland-diaspora partnership dynamic vis-à-vis foreign policy issues. In December 2010, Nick Larigakis, President of AHI, gave a presentation at the Special Permanent Committee for the Diaspora Greeks and the Continuous Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs at the Greek Parliament. He presented jointly with the Vice-President of the Defense Studies and Foreign Policy Department of the CATO Institute regarding foreign policy in Eastern Mediterranean (“Ekthesi” 2011: 3).

In April 2011, the leadership of AHEPA and its affiliate organizations made a presentation to the Committee on Diaspora Greeks on their work (“Ekthesi” 2011: 5). AHEPA has met with the Committee and has presented its work and ideas to them on several occasions. Such visits promote communication and cooperation between the Greek-American organizations and the Greek state, although a common concern is that there is not adequate follow up on issues that have been discussed — which is a common complaint regarding Greek state action, or lack thereof, not only with respect to the diaspora and but also to other pressing public issues.
In conclusion, we should stress that the analysis of Greek-American advocacy shows that the Greek-American community acts independently although in cooperation with the Greek state. Greek-American advocates are not paid lobbyists of the Greek state although they meet, cooperate and exchange views with Greek politicians and diplomats (Larigakis 2014). The community organizations get their mandate from their members and funders (Ibid.). Occasionally, they are even opposed to the Greek state’s policies, which is a testament to their autonomous existence from the national center.

Differences in the policy goals pursued by the homeland state and by the diaspora raises an important question: how viable is a policy that is promoted by the diaspora, a non-state entity, when this policy is opposed by the homeland, a state entity in a world where states are the primary actors. Moreover, how probable is it that a diaspora can influence a policy in the American Congress or in the American administration with respect to the interests of its homeland if the homeland disagrees that these are indeed its interests?

Homeland governments are not single-issued organization like diaspora organizations may be. They have to be pragmatic and balance various needs and make compromises while having access to classified information that non-governmental organizations often do not. The complexities of pragmatic considerations, real-world power, strong emotions and political influence in the context of international relations also raise the question of who can speak for the nation in a transnational global construct. Could legitimacy lie with the diaspora rather than the homeland government? After all, you cannot have Hellenism without the Greek state (Larigakis 2014). Or, can you?

Both the state and the diaspora organizations pursue the goals that they consider legitimate and realistic, and they may even try to persuade each other of the correctness of their
views. However, the diverging opinions on the same issue are probably undermining the prospects of this issue, while a united policy front would probably empower all players involved. At the same time, the American political system may be responsive to its own Greek-American citizens rather than to a foreign government; this enhances the position of diaspora organizations.

Nevertheless, the positions of the Greek government may be taken even more into consideration in the design of American foreign policy, especially in the executive branch, since they influence the global political dynamics. In that respect, if there is disagreement between the community and the Greek government, the Greek-American community may be marginalized, since it is only a domestic actor in a policy area that is primarily influenced by what international actors do. However, if there is an agreement, the weight of Greece as a foreign state coupled with pressure from a domestic actor, the Greek-American community, can lead to a powerful partnership.

The policy goals of such a partnership have to be consistent with, or not be against, American national interests, have to be reflective of American and global norms and values, and have to be pursued in a coordinated and systematic way that is based on extensive grassroots participation with the incorporation of influential community networks. Hence, strategic planning is necessary both with respect to Greek policy-making and to the mobilization of the Greek-American community.

In a characteristic presentation at the Committee for Diaspora Greeks, MP and member of the parliamentary committee Alexandros Chrysanthakopoulos expressed his concern about a lack of a comprehensive strategy by the Greek state regarding mobilizing the diaspora with respect to foreign policy issues.
The mobilization of Hellenism outside of Greece is not consistent as far as the [Greek] state and the government, any [Greek] government, is concerned. Our lobby has no strategy, because we, in Greece, do not have a strategy to fight regarding these issues. If we gave the management of issues [to the diaspora] in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they would be very dynamic and almost unanimous in the way that they would deal with the issues. They have access and can influence the decision making, as long as we […] give them a specific plan and a national strategy. (“Praktika” 2011e: 9)

Although these comments do raise an important issue regarding the lack of comprehensive mobilization strategy, it is problematic to connect the diaspora to the Greek state in a way that they act in coordination with the Ministry. They may have similar goals most of the time but creating a very close relationship between the two and placing the diaspora in the direct service of the Ministry would violate the independence of the diaspora and would render the diaspora quasi-official representative of a foreign country.

Such a strategy would not be effective within the American political system which responds to its domestic constituents. However, this does not mean that communication and cooperation cannot take place or advice and ideas cannot be exchanged in an unofficial manner. Larigakis (2014) in contrast to the MP’s views, stresses that the Greek state should take on the responsibility of lobbying for its foreign policy issues, for its public relations, for access to newspapers and for the creation of Greek academic centers and think-tanks and not be dependent on the community for pushing a Greek agenda.

As distinguished Greek-American sociologist Charles C. Moskos (1990: 169) argues, the Greek-Americans’ support of Greek issues stems “from a deep and abiding belief that what
is good for America is good for Greece and vice versa. In this central way, the old-country immigrants and their American progeny are cut from the same cloth.”
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

I. Research Findings

This study contributes to the understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between the Greek state and the Greek-American community, offering insights into the ideas, structures and processes dominant in Greece and in the diaspora. On the one hand, it explores the dynamics of the particular case connecting various fields where the Greek state and the diaspora interact: from education to economic cooperation and from development assistance to foreign policy advocacy. Therefore, it contributes to the study of Greek politics and to the study of the Greek-American community, and, thus, to Modern Greek Studies and to Greek-American Studies. On the other hand, it enhances our understanding of the general phenomenon of homeland-diaspora relations, contributing in this way to Diaspora Studies, Ethnic Studies and Transnational Studies, and to the more general areas of Comparative Politics and International Relations.

Contrary to the assumption of many scholars, the evidence here suggests that the homeland-diaspora relationship is bidirectional. Homelands expect assistance from the diaspora in areas where the diaspora has high capacity and expertise, and the diaspora expects support from the homeland in areas where the homeland appears dominant. In the case of the Greek-American community and its relationship with the Greek state, this relational model acquires the following form:
Although the major directions of assistance between the two entities are as depicted, there is an internal bidirectional relationship in each one of these areas, since relevant actions are often the products of bilateral communication and cooperation. This diagram also illustrates the interdependent nature of the relationship, where one side needs support in certain areas and the other side needs support in others.

The relationship has evolved from earlier attempts by the Greek state to control the Greek-American community and meddle in its affairs in the early twentieth century, to its dependency on the Greek-American community in World War II and in its aftermath. Recent attempts by the Greek state to organize the diaspora may also lead to a compromise of the diaspora’s independence. These attempts have proven to be quite ineffective and counter-productive. In the last one hundred years, the community has matured, has become independent, has been empowered and has cultivated its own unique identity dynamic.

The current framework of the homeland-diaspora relationship has a strong element of interdependence, although the economic crisis may increase once again the dependency of Greece on its diaspora. This development highlights an important dynamic in the homeland-diaspora relations. Although there is a partnership between the two entities, when the homeland...
is in crisis, it becomes more dependent on the diaspora. Despite the fact that the Greek state may view the diaspora as its extension, the diaspora is strong and independent enough to counter this state approach.

The Greek state sees itself — and is seen by the Diaspora — as the protector of worldwide Hellenism as well as the depository of Hellenic culture. The traditional homeland is deemed the ultimate guardian of cultural authenticity. This reinforces its political role vis-à-vis both its domestic and its diasporic constituents. This image of the Greek state is evident in Greek foreign policy goals, which are not limited to the pursuit of certain benefits — economic and strategic — but also include the protection of people and symbols that belong to Hellenism: from the diaspora to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and from the Macedonian issue to Cyprus. Such goals can be interpreted as political expressions of fundamental emotional bonds of the Greek people with fellow members of their ethno-national community beyond the Greek borders and with Hellenic cultural symbols and identity.

Moreover, the distinction between the political elite and the people either in the homeland or in the diaspora, is to a certain extent artificial with respect to how they, as individuals and not as representatives of political structures, view the diaspora-homeland relationship. The emotional bond between people and elites of the homeland and the diaspora is reflected in political structures, including state institutions and diaspora organizations. For example, the rhetoric used in the Special Parliamentary Committee on Diaspora Greeks at the Greek Parliament is filled with emotional remarks during committee meetings; this rhetoric will make its way into diaspora policy design. However, pragmatic considerations regarding economic or foreign policy goals also play a dominant role in how Greece perceives of its role with the diaspora. Hence, the relational model between the Greek state and the Greek-American
community has an impact well beyond the bilateral relationship and into the arena of international politics.

The connection and relationship between Greece and its diaspora displays some positive characteristics of Greek relational and organizational mentality. The strong emotional bond between Greece and its diaspora, which is not unique among countries with diasporas, offers a strong basis on which cooperation can thrive. The instant familiarity between Greeks from Greece, including state representatives, and the diaspora attests to the kinship bonds felt within the Greek transnational nation. However, strong emotions without adequate planning, organization, continuity and implementation undermine the positive conditions in place for a fruitful relationship.

The familial connections felt among members of the Greek nation also extend to state and diaspora institutions, which, often, replicate familial-type interpersonal conflicts which are associated with strong negative emotions. Thus, the sense of kinship both benefits and harms the institutions of the state and the diaspora, and, by extension, the homeland-diaspora relationship. The deep and historical mistrust of the Greek state by independent-minded Greek-Americans further complicates the situation.

Despite the rhetorical emphasis on the role of the Greek diaspora, Greek diaspora policy lacks a comprehensive, strategic and systematic framework. The current policy is characterized

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275 A student at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, someone of non-Hellenic descent who converted to Orthodoxy, mentioned recently how amazed he was with how Greeks react towards a fellow Greek they have just met, once they realize that both their grandparents hail from the same village in Greece. The enthusiasm and the instant familial bonds felt left the student, who was of northern European heritage, speechless. He said he would never expect two people of northern European heritage to have this reaction if they realized they both hailed from the same village in Ireland a few generations back. Although this comment cannot lead to generalizations it, nevertheless, offers an insight into comparative intracultural behaviors.
by fragmentation, inconsistency, poor implementation, and lack of clearly set and measurable goals. Furthermore, there is no adequate follow-up with respect to the requests, suggestions and concerns of the Greek diaspora. The Greek state essentially sabotages itself by creating obstacles for the diaspora in its attempts to support and be engaged with the homeland. Such policy problems reflect deeper pathologies of the Greek public administration apparatus, organizational culture and policy-making processes.

Problems associated with Greek state actions (or inactions) continue to feed the all-too-common complaint of the Greek-Americans that the Greek state remembers them “only when it needs them” (“Praktika” 2009: 5). At a more fundamental level, the idea of diaspora policy itself has some inherent challenges. As the state tries to use the diaspora to promote its goals, the independent existence and organization of the diaspora is threatened by attempts of the state to control it. At the same time, existing state rhetoric and policy towards the diaspora may appear paternalistic. The Greek state has attempted to impose a centralized form of organization on the diaspora, bringing it under its control and threatening its independence and vitality. The diaspora is a network and a network form of organization best reflects its reality.

At the same time, as an outcome of modern Greek political culture of over-dependence on the state for all expressions of one’s life, the diaspora does become willingly dependent on the state, at least to a certain extent, on issues of language and culture — although not with respect to the administration of educational structures. Although the Greek-American community has an independent church-based system of education and local Greek cultural production, it looks to Greece, the depository of historical and contemporary Greek culture, for inspiration, support and guidance. Since the diaspora needs to connect with Greece in this way, probably the most productive form of cooperation would be the creation of a partnership between the diaspora and cultural actors in Greece: Greek intellectuals and professionals, the
Greek private sector, relevant state institutions and the Greek civil society. The state should be the facilitator rather than the controller of such a relationship.

The internal dynamics of both the homeland and the diaspora play a significant role in the relationship between the two. Neither the Greek state nor the diaspora is a unitary actor. Different voices, attitudes and approaches are encountered within each entity. The Greek state lacks adequate knowledge of who the Greek-Americans are, what they went through and what their current reality is. The government and the people of Greece often consider the Greeks of America the same as themselves. They do not fully recognize the existence of a spectrum of Greek identity, the hybridity and fluidity of Greek-American identity and culture, and the fluctuation of significance associated with certain cultural markers. The fact that most Greek-Americans have multiple ethnic identities is also not readily understood. The great majority is only partly Greek, but it, nevertheless, is usually proud of its Greek heritage. At the same time the United States has become the “battlefield” among contested versions of Greek/Greek-American identity.

Overall, the Greek-American community, although it is close to the Greek state, has been to a great extent self-sufficient and independent in its views and actions. Its large size, its wealth and resources, and its distance from Greece have certainly contributed to the empowerment of the community. Moreover, the American culture of participatory democracy and community mobilization was also a significant factor.

Although the community is united, primarily through the Archdiocese, it is also quite fragmented. This points to the need for connection and cooperation among the segments of the community. Additionally, most members of the broader Greek-American community are not actively involved in its organizations. Therefore, organizations have to either adapt to the
current realities or change their outreach strategy, or both. These internal dynamics are generally not adequately understood by the Greek state; sometimes the needs are not even realized by the leaders of the community themselves.

The community has control over its own affairs, including operating its own system of Greek education and pursuing the foreign policy goals that it considers important, even when these are different from those supported by the Greek state. Often it appears — at least as far as its advocacy organizations are concerned — to hold uncompromising positions in foreign policy issues or to support positions that the Greek government supported in the past. Community organizations would benefit from better organized structures and more effective operations.

Although Greek education is recognized as a priority of the community, certain improvements are necessary, primarily in the form of professionalization of the educational structures which would be supported by higher investment. Regardless of the efforts of the Church and individual teachers, structural and other problems plaguing Greek education have historically led not only to a lack of effectiveness but also to a negative overall educational experience for students for generations. The Archdiocesan Greek school system has preserved the language in the last 100 years but it has also stifled its potential and undermined its appeal.

At the same time, policy advocacy organizations have noted certain successes in the past, primarily due to their unity and mobilization with respect to specific goals, and to their ability to work effectively within the American political system. However, they can further advance their goals through more effective strategies of public education, outreach, and mobilization. The analysis of Greek-American advocacy points to the fact that Greek cultural
identity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the political mobilization of the diaspora.

Greek-American cultural identity has its own set of challenges. Most often, Greek-American identity, although being centered on Greek pride, does not adequately reflect knowledge of the broader Greek culture. Community institutions, which are the primary vehicle for the transmission of culture and identity, do not adequately reflect the broad spectrum of historical and contemporary Greek culture. For many Greek-Americans Greek culture is limited to the cultural markers that usually dominate diasporic life, primarily Greek dance and food as well as the commemoration of the struggle for Greek Independence, coupled with a pride in a vague understanding of Ancient Greek civilization. Attachment to the Greek Orthodox Church is one of the strongest Greek cultural elements in the community. A broader knowledge of Greek culture would deepen the diaspora’s understanding and appreciation of Greece and would contribute to a more productive cooperation between Greece and the diaspora as well as to a more effective dissemination of Greek culture in the United States through the diaspora.

The contributions of the Greek-American community to Greece have been numerous. Greek-Americans have used their skills, connections, and resources to support Greece in the past and are willing to do so at any opportunity. Some of the most successful contributions to the development of the Greek state and to humanitarian assistance to the Greek people were initiatives of Greek-American organizations.

Often, these projects required the successful, systematic and productive collaboration among various actors of the Greek-American community. Cooperation with the Greek state in these areas has also been crucial. Greek foreign policy goals have been promoted due to
successful collaboration among Greek-American organizations and individuals, all of whom appeared united in their support of certain causes, despite some infighting and disagreements on tactics, and used an extensive network of resources and connections to achieve their goals. Although several past successes have been noted, the potential of the Greek-American community’s contribution Greece as well as of a productive cooperation between Greece and the diaspora is still untapped.

II. Policy Recommendations

The Greek-American community has the potential to be a bridge between the two nations, a cultural ambassador of Greece in the U.S, and an agent of positive change domestically and internationally. The unique role the diaspora can play lies in the fact that it shares in both cultures. It shares simultaneously a Greek and an American mentality and identity, and is genuinely interested in the well-being of both nations. However, its independence from interference from any of the two states is very important in order to preserve its agency.

The cultural education of the diaspora is the key to its role as a cultural bridge between the two nations. Greek-Americans are overwhelmingly willing to assist Greece in anything that requires their skills and resources. They have a wealth of skills, capacities and connections. They only need the opportunity to help. A relationship of trust between the Greek-Americans and the Greek state is a requirement for any cooperative activity. They hope that the Greek state honors its commitments and supports rather than impedes diaspora engagement, as it has happened repeatedly in the past especially with respect to Greek-American investments.
Based on the above mentioned research findings, on the advice of practitioners and scholars, and on comparative diaspora policy models, the following general recommendations aim at restructuring and empowering the homeland-diaspora relationship:

First, the creation of a strategic, systematic and comprehensive diaspora policy framework is necessary. Such a framework should take into consideration diaspora resources — knowledge/skills to transfer, connections/networks/human capital, capital funds (as investment capital or aid) — set goals and include provisions for the measurement and evaluation of outcomes. The policy should capitalize on the strengths of Greece and the diaspora, understand the constraints, and address problem areas. The diaspora should be seen as the partner of the Greek state, as a bridge that will connect Greece to the American government and public. Its independence should be respected and preserved. The state should facilitate rather than control the diaspora’s engagement.

Moreover, the Greek state needs to have a deeper understanding of the Greek-American community, while the Greek-American community needs a better understanding of Greece (culture, history, etc.). The Greek state’s awareness of a global, diasporic and cosmopolitan dimension of Greek identity that differs from the state-centered one is a requirement for a successful interaction with the diaspora. On the other hand, educational and cultural diplomacy targeting the diaspora is crucial for expanding its cultural horizons. However, the concept of Greek identity and culture employed in this form of public diplomacy should not be limited to a state-centered understanding of Greek culture and identity.

276 The following list is partly inspired, among others, by Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie’s (2011) suggestions for African diaspora involvement in development in Africa.
Communication and collaboration are keys in the homeland-diaspora relationship. The Greek-American community should be seen as a partner in a multi-lateral relationship that involves the Greek state, the Greek private sector, the Greek civil society, the American state, American private sector, and American civil society. Building private-public and transnational partnerships is essential. Professionalism rather than patronage, a common phenomenon of Greek political and social life, should be the dominant characteristic of such partnerships. At the same time, the American organizational experience that the diaspora most often brings to the relationship, can greatly contribute towards shortcomings in Greek organizational culture.

The diaspora can play a more active diplomatic role as a civil society actor, without acting as an extension of the Greek state but rather as its partner. Hence, it can act as intermediary between the American government and society, and the people and government of Greece. Moreover, the reality of American society requires the diaspora to play the role not only of connecting Greece to the U.S. but also of connecting Greece to other ethnic communities and cultures within the U.S. The diaspora has unrecognized and underutilized diplomatic potential in various fields: economic diplomacy and development, human and community development, inter-state relations, human rights, cultural and educational diplomacy.

The Greek state can enrich the partnership between Greece and the Greek-American community: a) by outsourcing Greek diplomatic services with respect to culture to Greek-Americans, especially when missions are severely understaffed and underfunded, and b) by building opportunities for diaspora involvement in Greece. In the context of the economic crisis there is immediate need for a new policy for diaspora involvement, including engaging the diaspora youth, in areas severely affected such as social services, healthcare, education, etc.
A policy encouraging diaspora involvement in long-term strategic development in Greece can be quite beneficial. The Greek state can also collaborate with the diaspora in building the capacity of diaspora organizations while preserving their independence. Reforms that enable greater diaspora involvement in the Greek economy and development would also be quite beneficial for Greece. Last, the Open Government platform that Greece is currently using for public comments and deliberations on certain pieces of legislation could be used with respect to the diaspora in order to open a productive stream of communication between the diaspora and the state.277

Greek education has a central role in Greek-American community and in its relationship with the Greek state. Greek language and culture education should be professionalized through teacher training, new curriculum, new methods, new educational activities and material, and a new form of structure and organization of the network of Greek schools. All of this requires a greater investment in the area of Greek education on the part of the diaspora.

When the Greek state is in the financial position to do so, it should be involved in investment in Greek diaspora education. Such an investment should happen in the context of a specific educational strategy that would build on and enhance the comparative advantage of Greek culture. Moreover, it should be associated with specific targets and steps to achieve them. The diaspora educational model has to acquire more the character of educational diplomacy and less that of a Greek national education model that is simply adjusted and exported abroad.

277 The Open Government platform offers domestic reformers in different countries with the ability to increase transparency, accountability and citizen engagement. The Greek Government joined in the initiative and uses the Open Government platform in order to promote these three concepts. More information is available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/greece [accessed on 1/20/2014].
III. Generalizations of the Greek-American Study

The study of the homeland-diaspora relationship offers a unique perspective to domestic and global political dynamics since it merges comparative politics with international affairs. This study takes a concept that is central in comparative politics, i.e. ethnic/ethno-national identity, and transfers it to the realm of international relations, therefore, merging the two fields of political science. The international dimension of this relationship is highlighted through the transnational actions of the state, through the transnational actions of the diaspora, through the bilateral relationship between Greece and the United States, and through the diaspora’s advocacy for Greek foreign policy issues involving numerous international actors.

In the context of the homeland-diaspora relationship several conceptual lines are blurry or fade away all together. No distinct lines exist between what is domestic and what is foreign, what is national and what is international, what is private and what is public, what is local and what is global, what is family-centered and what is nation-centered, what is secular and what is spiritual. The dynamics uncovered in this case-study are not unique. It is hypothesized that the general findings can be applied to other cases as well. Further study can test this hypothesis.

Based on this case, and with limited evidence from comparative cases, it is hypothesized that homelands rely on their diasporas for the transfer of skills, know-how, financial and political resources, in order to support the development of the homeland. They also expect and get support from the diaspora for the promotion of their interests in certain foreign policy issues. Consequently, overall the homeland expects certain benefits from the diaspora. The homeland government’s connection with the diaspora enhances its political role as a national government with a transnational constituency. On the other hand, the diaspora is
generally willing, and able, to come to the assistance of the homeland. Political structures may enable or create obstacles for diaspora engagement.

This form of homeland-diaspora relationship can apply to cases where the diasporic country of residence enjoys a higher level of development compared to the homeland. In the diaspora’s eyes, the homeland is still the depository of its heritage and it is connected emotionally with it through successive generations of diasporans, even though their sense of identity, culture and bonds with the homeland may differ from those of the first generation. The independence of the diaspora is important for its ability to preserve its agency. Its institutions are essential in the preservation of the individual and the collective diasporic identity.

Diasporas are bridges between two cultures and can potentially play a bidirectional diplomatic role as such. This potential leads to the emergence of the concept of diaspora diplomacy, which reflects the diplomatic capacity of diasporas. The US Department of State as well as other international organizations have realized this potential of the diasporas. The rhetoric of the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance launched by the State Department and USAID is dominated by the role diasporas have as agents of diplomacy and development (International Diaspora Engagement). These attempts by national and international organizations, as well as this study and other studies on homeland-diaspora relations, point to the important role that diasporas can have as transnational contributors in their homeland’s well-being while also acting as connectors between their old and new homelands.

The comparative advantage of the diasporas is not only that they carry significant knowledge that can support the homeland in its economic, political and diplomatic endeavors. This is something that foreign specialists could also offer. The comparative advantage of the
diaspora lies in the fact that it has a personal investment and deep commitment to offering its knowledge and resources for the betterment of the homeland due to its emotional ties to it. Moreover, the knowledge of the homeland’s culture and mentality is also a unique asset in any attempt to bring forth domestic changes.

Based on this case, we can also hypothesize that homelands probably attempt to control their diasporas while the diasporas probably resist this control. Although diasporas tend to have an independent existence, certain organizations within them may be more under the control of the homeland state than others. The numerous cases of differences in the views of the diasporas and those of the homelands, as illustrated both in the Greek-American case and in other comparative cases, testify to the fact that the diasporas act primarily as independent actors. Although they have the interests of their homelands in mind, they define or interpret these interests in ways that are sometimes consistent with and other times opposed to what the homeland government supports.

The positions of the diaspora advocacy organizations tend, at times, to be uncompromising on issues that the homeland government is willing to compromise. Most often the diasporas trace their own political path and take initiative for their own political actions within their countries of residence. A comparative approach also shows that the interest of homeland states in their diasporas has often become institutionalized, in the form of diaspora ministries or administrative departments of the government that focus on diaspora issues. This institutionalization also points to the fact that homelands have realized the potential benefit from the diasporas. This benefit is not only associated with economic or foreign policy goals.

Diaspora involvement can also empower the state. Such empowerment could be both with respect to its domestic constituency and with respect to global politics; in both cases, the
role of the homeland becomes enhanced through a transnational diasporic network. This diasporic realm offers homeland states the opportunity to extend their control not in a geographic sense but rather in a deterritorialized one based on ethnic, cultural and emotional ties.

The diasporic experience qualifies the ethnic/ethno-national identity and gives it a varied, hybrid content. There is a spectrum of ethnic identity in the diaspora and different significance is assigned to different cultural markers for sub-groups within it. The temporal and spatial dimension of identity through the lens of diasporic experience, show it is a fluid continuum rather than a static, limited and rigid concept. Moreover, identity is neither a uni-dimensional nor a mutually exclusive way of categorization but rather a multi-dimensional, layered and nested notion that is associated with different ethnic categories simultaneously. State institutions need to adapt to that reality in order to preserve a connection and a relationship with their broadly defined diaspora.

The diaspora is not a unitary actor, it has different voices, different organizational structures and different ways of approaching concepts and actions related to identity. What remains fairly constant is the role of the homeland as the romantic cradle of the diaspora’s civilization and identity. However, the diasporic community and experience take a life and a path of their own. At the same time, the homeland state (or any state for that matter) is a not a unitary actor either. Different voices, interests and approaches may come from various state institutions reflecting a variety of political and bureaucratic interests despite an overarching united approach towards the diaspora.

Revolutionary changes in communication technology and transportation empower the relationship between diasporas and homelands by strengthening the bonds between them but
at the same time they may personalize the diaspora’s connection to the homeland with negative effects on diasporic communal organization. Through the internet, social media, skype and satellite or web-TV, diasporans may no longer feel as strongly the need to organize in communities to keep the connection to the homeland alive. In order to benefit from the communications revolution, diasporic organizations have to embrace the changes and adapt the new technology tools offered to suit their needs and goals.

This study points to the existence of a gap between the level of ethnic identification and the level of political activism in diaspora groups. Only relatively few of the numerous ethno-national/ethno-cultural groups in the United States are politically active on issues related to their diasporic identity. The most active diaspora is the Jewish American community which offers a model for organization and political engagement. The Greek diaspora, together with the Armenian diaspora, are still probably more organized and politically active than other diasporas. These three diasporas are examples of the oldest global diasporas and have a long history of political activism in various forms. With the use of modern technology tools within the current normative framework of domestic and international politics, modern diasporas, newer and older alike, can have a significant impact on the international political arena as civil society actors, if they are adequately united, motivated and well-organized.

Due to their unique placement in-between two cultures and countries, diasporas can have a very insightful role in policy advising, bringing successful policy models from one country to the other. Their knowledge of both languages and cultures is a great advantage in that respect. Most often, especially with respect to the relationship between the U.S. and Greece, we tend to think that it is the U.S. that should export its more sophisticated policies to other countries in need of policy innovation. However, in many areas, the U.S. is struggling
with certain public issues, for example, education, health-care, or other social problems, that its current policies are not adequately addressing.

In those cases, diasporas in the U.S., especially those diaspora members who have relevant professional expertise, can offer an insight into their old homeland’s policies and programs that could benefit the U.S. Along these lines, the French-American Foundation of the United States, created, governed and supported by American Francophiles and French-Americans, has worked for 20 years in research on the French public pre-school system, considered to be one of the best in the world, and has produced relevant reports in order to inform American policy makers of the characteristics of the French policy model of early education, in the hope that such information can help improve the early education system in the United States (French-American 2004).

The French-American Foundation enables transatlantic exchanges in various policy issues with the purpose of informing policy decisions by looking at successful policy models of other countries (French-American 2004). Therefore, diasporas can be policy bridges that enable bidirectional communication and exchange of ideas through a comparative policy perspective. In this manner they can play a constructive role in their country of residence in addition to their (or their family’s) country of origin.

The study of diasporas in the United States reveals a microcosm where different nationalities and ethnicities are represented through organizations that are active in the realms of education, culture, political advocacy and development assistance to the homeland. Their objectives may or may not be mutually exclusive. Although they may focus many of their activities on their respective diasporic communities, they all also vie for the attention of the greater American public. Hence, the world is represented at a micro climax within the
American society, with diasporic representations of ethno-national actors trying to influence the American political system through the activation of the emotions and talents of their diasporans.

A special breed of global citizens, the diasporans, may be increasingly influential in political life. This group carries a spectrum of hybrid identities: an American identity, the identity of the homeland, a diasporic fusion of the two, and, possibly, the addition of/fusion with other ethno-national identities that may make up the family’s background.

IV. For Further Research

This study is limited both in breadth, as it focuses on a particular case study, and in depth, since it attempts to survey different areas of activity in the context of homeland-diaspora relations rather than focusing on a single one. Additional case-studies and comparative studies of homeland-diaspora relations can shed more light into the dynamics of this phenomenon. This study has focused on policies and activities related to education, economics, development and foreign policy. But it does not cover another important area: cultural policy. Further research is required into how cultural policy impacts and is impacted by the relationship between homeland and diaspora and what relevant policy recommendations could be made.

Moreover, areas that are covered in this study would benefit from more in-depth research. For example, Greek diaspora education could be examined through a policy analysis framework and through the use of quantitative methods that are based on the outcomes of large N surveys. In the case of economic cooperation, development assistance, humanitarian aid, and foreign policy advocacy, each type of activity, for example, the contribution of Greek-
American organizations to community development projects or the advocacy on the Macedonian issue, could be studied and analyzed in depth.

Comparative studies of the relationship of the Greek state to its diasporas around the world would shed light in the factors that affect homeland-diaspora dynamics across time and space. Moreover, comparative studies of homelands and their diasporas in the United States would highlight general characteristics of the relationship between homelands and U.S.-based diasporas and would contribute to our understanding of the transnational dynamics taking place within American politics and society. A study of homeland-diaspora relations from the perspective of the U.S. or other countries of residence would offer a different and quite significant perspective to the phenomenon. Additional insights can be offered by comparing ethnic vs. civic nations and developed vs. developing countries in their role both as homelands and as diasporas in the context of the homeland-diaspora relationship.

A particularly interesting and important topic for further study is the role of diasporas in ethnic/international conflict and conflict resolution. This study points to the fact that diasporas often have more extremist views on ethnic conflict that the homeland governments. However, the question is whether the ethnic mixing and fusion that takes place in the diaspora, coupled with the cosmopolitan influences that the diaspora may have, can contribute in creating a role for the diaspora promoting conflict resolution rather than conflict accentuation. Could diasporans whose identity and family background represents both sides of an ethnic conflict — for example, children of a Greek father and a Turkish mother — carry a certain promise for offering insights into the conflict dynamic and for acting as a bridge between conflicting sides?

The study of diasporas and their relationship to their homelands can also benefit from the application of theories and concepts of international relations that focus on the role of
diasporas as global actors. Diasporas are, actually, the oldest global actors who have pursued some of the oldest forms of transnational activities. Their potential political and diplomatic role is significant. Other concepts, such as sociology’s glocalization, may also be applied to the study of diasporas and their role in international affairs.

In the case of diasporas, we may even have reverse glocalization; instead of global forces encountering and becoming adjusted to local forces, we see local forces (ethnic or sub-ethnic groups and cultures) encountering global forces through migration and diasporism. These local forces may, thus, become themselves global forces, influencing the culture of their new homelands in the process. An example would be, the dissemination of Greek cuisine — or of Cretan cuisine to have an even more specific local example — through global networks of Greek diasporan restaurateurs. The global phenomenon of diaspora-operated Greek restaurants and the Greek cuisine that they feature, becomes, in turn, adjusted to the local cuisines of the new homelands of the diasporans.

We are in an era where traditional political institutions and forms of organization are challenged and connection to territory becomes less relevant in all forms of communication and cooperation. These changes may present challenges for nation-states but they also present opportunities to non-state actors and transnational networks, like diasporas. Hence, we may be entering an era characterized by an enhanced and empowered role for the diasporas (Prévélakis 1998: 7). Of course this requires a strong diasporic identity, a live bond with the homeland, which may be weakened with successive generations of diasporans, especially in cases of mixed marriages. Diasporas may even contribute to an expansion and reinvention of the content of ethnonational identity. Thus, they may lead the way to a hybrid-national or post-national global world where the role of networks is dominant.
### APPENDIX A

#### GREEK DAY SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES

### Table 5.1 Massachusetts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High-School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little Halos</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Arlington</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellenic American Academy</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.2 New York

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High-School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Cathedral School of Holy Trinity</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Spyridon Parochial School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Demetrios Greek-American School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Astoria</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>635</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

278 Enrollment figures for Greek parochial schools come from the web-site of the Office of Greek Education of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese (reflecting enrollments as of 2014), unless noted otherwise.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>Cap</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sotirios Ellenas School of Kimisis tis Theotokou Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Fantis Parochial School of Sts. Constantine and Helen Cathedral</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. &amp; G. Kaloidis Parochial School of Holy Cross Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Hierarchs Parochial School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellenic American Classical Charter School</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-American Institute of Zoodohos Peghe Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Bronx</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School of the Transfiguration</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Corona</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George and Evlavia Doulaveris Pre-school of St. Nicholas Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Flushing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Spyropoulos Greek-American Day School of St. Nicholas</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Flushing</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archangel Michael Preschool</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Port Washington</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

279 Up to 9th grade.
Table 5.3 Pennsylvania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High-School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Day School of St. Demetrios Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efstathios &amp; Vasiliki Valiotis Greek-American Day School of Holy Cross Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Whitestone</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Three Hierarchs Eastern Orthodox School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High-School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three Hierarchs Eastern Orthodox School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Heidelberg</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

280 Up to 2nd grade.

281 Enrollment figures for Greek parochial schools come from the web-site of the Office of Greek Education of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, unless noted otherwise

282 Up to 4th grade.
Table 5.4 Maryland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Demetrios Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x²⁸³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Day School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5 North Carolina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socrates Academy</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Matthews</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁸³ Up to 5th grade.
### Table 5.6 Delaware

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odyssey Charter School (Upper School and Lower School)</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x284</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5.7 Georgia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annunciation Cathedral Day School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x285</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

284 Up to 7th grade.

285 Up to 3rd grade.
Table 5.8 Florida

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Preschool</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Athenian Academy of Pinellas</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Dunedin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenian Academy of Pasco County</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>New Port Richey</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy Clearwater</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Clearwater</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy Palm Harbor</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Palm Harbor</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy Seminole</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Largo</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy Largo</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Largo</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy Tarpon Springs</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Tarpon Springs</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy St Petersburg</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archimedean Schools</td>
<td>Charter</td>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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286 Up to 7th grade.

287 Up to 2nd grade.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Preschool</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Solon” Bilingual-Prep Of Saint Demetrios</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Aristotle” Preschool and Kindergarten of Holy Taxiarchae-Saint Haralambos Church</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Niles</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Socrates” Hellenic-American Day School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Deerfield</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. John the Baptist Guardian Angel Orthodox Day School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Des Plaines</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x&lt;sup&gt;288&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Koraes” Elementary School of Sts. Constantine and Helen</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Palos Hills</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>188</td>
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</table>

<sup>288</sup> Up to 5<sup>th</sup> grade.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Pythagoras” Children's Academy of St. Demetrios Church</th>
<th>Parochial</th>
<th>Elmhurst</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>x</th>
<th>x\textsuperscript{289}</th>
<th>91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plato Academy</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Des Plaines</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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</table>

**Table 5.10 Texas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holy Trinity Academy</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annunciation Orthodox School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>695</td>
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**Table 5.11 Utah**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
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<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\textsuperscript{289} Up to 2\textsuperscript{nd} grade.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saint Sophia Orthodox School</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x&lt;sup&gt;290&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.12 Arizona

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holy Trinity Academy</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Table 5.13 California

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saint Nicholas Schools</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Northridge</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>191</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>290</sup> Up to 5<sup>th</sup> grade.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>School Type</th>
<th>City/Town</th>
<th>Nursery/Pre-school</th>
<th>Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agia Sofia Academy</td>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>Beaverton</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

291 Up to 5th grade.
APPENDIX B
GREEK-AMERICAN LEGISLATORS
(as of April 2015)

Current U.S. Representatives
- Gus Bilirakis (R, Florida) (since 2007)
- John Sarbanes (D, Maryland) (since 2007)
- Constantine “Dina” Titus (D, Nevada) (since 2013)
- Niki Tsongas (D, Massachusetts) (since 2007)

Current U.S. Senators
- None

Past U.S. Representatives
- Nick Galifianakis (D, North Carolina) (1967-1973)
- Ronald “Ron” Klink (D, Pennsylvania) (1993-2001)
- Shelley Berkley (D, Nevada) (1999-2013) (of Greek Sephardic Jewish heritage)
- Nicholas Mavroulis (D, Massachusetts) (1979-1993)
- Paul Sarbanes (D, Maryland) (1971-1977)
- Zach Space (D, Ohio) (2007-2011)
- Paul Tsongas (D, Massachusetts) (1975-1979)

Past U.S. Senators
- Paul Sarbanes (D, Maryland) (1977-2007)
- Olympia Snowe (R, Maine) (1995-2013)
- Paul Tsongas (D, Massachusetts) (1979-1985)


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