“And Be the Nation Again:
A Consideration of the Scottish Nationalist Movement and Scottish National Party”

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A thesis submitted to

The Faculty of
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Abstract of Thesis

This work considers the case of modern Scottish nationalism, its resurgence in the modern era, and the effects that the European Union and the process of Europeanization have had on the nationalist movement. Particular attention is paid to a specific actor in this process, namely the Scottish National Party as the embodiment of the nationalist movement and the chief way in which nationalists are able to engage the political process. This project contends that the Scottish National Party’s cooption of Scottish patriotism, use of an incrementalist approach to securing authority and devolved institutions within Scotland, as well as their engagement of instead of opposition to the European Union have enabled them to claim the center ground in the debate over Scotland’s future.
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Chapter I: Introduction

Nationalism, broadly, is the desire for a specific group of people to secure for a homeland of their own. For adherents of this ideology their aspirations range from autonomy from the central state to the creation of an independent political entity, or to break away from the existing state and join another dominated by their co-ethnics. A nation, a group of people who share common characteristics such as a language, a faith, a culture, or even simply share the same physical space, is defined by the sense of community which either exists naturally, or else is cultivated by groups of actors. The forms these actors take — whether societal elites, grassroots activists, or even parts of the state — vary from movement to movement, but all share a common goal. They aim to secure some measure of political autonomy for the people who are claimed as members of that nation.

Few nationalist movements in recent years have received as much attention and as much focus as that present in Scotland. For numerous reasons, the case of Scottish nationalism is capable of capturing the imagination and the minds of the general public. Some may attribute this to popular culture, to depictions of Scotland’s past being prominent in media and popular culture through movies like *Braveheart*. Others attribute it, in the United States, to its presence as a movement within a larger country (the United Kingdom) widely perceived to be culturally and economically close to our own. More attention was paid to the movement because of an ultimately failed effort at securing independence in 2014.
The scholarship within the field of nationalism generally has tended to focus on the role various actors have played in fomenting and creating national identity, and then taking the next steps towards securing the measure of political autonomy nationalist movements seek. Variously, authors and researchers have considered members of the intelligentsia, landed elites, trade union activists, culturalists and linguists, and even political parties. Different approaches have been taken in considering which of these actors is the most valuable, but this project will conclude that it is political parties and the elites and activists who comprise political parties that are most helpful in determining the history and future of a nationalist movement.

Much of the work in the field of Scottish nationalism has, indeed, focused on a specific political party, namely the Scottish National Party (SNP). Formed out of the merger of two smaller nationalist movements during the worldwide, interwar Depression era, the SNP has been the dominant driving force behind Scottish national sentiment for more than half a century. Since its initial electoral successes in the late 1960s, it has been an omnipresent player on the political stage ever since. While it has ebbed and flowed in terms of popular support, the advent of devolution — a policy of transferring power from the central government of the United Kingdom to a local government seated in the ancient Scottish capital of Edinburgh — has meant that its popularity has only increased in recent decades. Riding a wave of popular discontentment with British political parties, the SNP formed the government of Scotland in 2007 and was successfully re-elected with a majority in 2011. Seven years of governmental success enabled it to embark on a referendum campaign in pursuit of independence from the United Kingdom; while the refer-
endum was ultimately a failure in securing majority support for a status change, it represented only a likely short term setback for the party and the movement, rather than a crushing blow.

This work will assert that the Scottish National Party has succeeded in staying relevant on the British and Scottish political stage because it has made a series of carefully constructed, strategic calculations designed to broaden its appeal. Amongst these decisions are its initial choice to co-opt feelings of Scottish patriotism in the post-war era, its decision to bank to the left economically and socially in the 1960s and 1970s, and its dedication to incremental change rather than sudden change throughout its period of electoral activity. Special attention will be paid to the way in which the SNP has adapted its views regarding the European Union, going from a period of intense skepticism, if not outright opposition, to the EU and its predecessors, to embracing a policy of Scotland-in-Europe, where an independent Scotland would be a fully fledged member of the EU and participant in European bodies. In addition, the role that changing the face of the party through appeal to immigrant communities is considered. Rather than defining the Scottish nation on narrow ethnic terms, the SNP has seemingly made a strategic decision to instead embrace non-white and immigrant communities resident in Scotland. These specific shifts represent a unique case in Scottish politics aimed at securing the goal of the nationalist movement. Gravitating towards Europe and embracing a multiethnic society, all the while attempting to distance the would-be state from its current central government, is a unique strategy among the continent’s regional separatist movements in the early twenty-first century.
Chapter II: Review of the Scholarly Literature on Nationalism

Nationalism, as a concept, has traditionally been studied as a result of non-state actors seeking, through engagement, socialization, or even violent means to establish for themselves and others of their community a legitimate state. This phenomenon is not limited to so-called minorities. Indeed, although state majorities typically mask their aspirations in the name of ethnic neutrality, their policies are repeatedly designed to favor the dominant ethnic community. Legitimacy, in this context, centers on the coincidence of political boundaries with ethnic borders. Yet, states themselves have often taken on overtly nationalistic tones in an effort to promote national cohesion or to further some other realist state interest. The debate within nationalism studies, then, is often over which of these actors should take pride of place, or should be seen as the primary motivator behind nationalist movements. Various authors ascribe different weights to different actors, as is reasonable, but have varying success in proving the efficacy of state versus non-state actors.

State actors are easy to define, even across a wide range of scholarly work. Those who utilize the legitimate tools of the state — from government institutions to political violence in the name of public order — can easily be said to be acting on behalf of that state, assuming some measure of internal support. Typically the membership of the ruling elite is overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, comprised of members of the dominant ethnic community. Core state actors include political parties, government officials, or others with some measure of leverage on the instruments of state power. These elites are more
often than not more likely to take a slow, steady approach to any kind of change, assum-
ing they advocate any substantive change at all. Yet, as will be seen, they can also be the
most fervent supporters of nationalist sentiment and promoters of a national ideal once
one is developed or proposed.

Non-state actors, however, tend to be far more varied, and constitute the commu-
nities from which most nationalist movements spring. Yet, defining them is not as simple
as it would appear on the surface. While it is tempting to simply label all actors not acting
on behalf of a state as non-state actors, this is overly simplistic. Instead, it is useful to di-
vide non-state actors into two categories, and analyze the work of various authors with
these categories in mind.

On the one hand, non-state actors can be comprised of elites within a given soci-
ety or nation: the intelligentsia, the upper classes, or even the mercantile or artisan bour-
geoisie. Elites have the advantage of already occupying an elevated position in society
that is readily identifiable to the common man, as well as generally having the resources
needed to promote a shared message and to then diffuse that message through society. As
Rudé (1994, 5) contended: “…the native or traditional ideology of the common people
requires to be wedded to and merge with an ideology or a ‘theory’ (to repeat Marx’s term)
of a more sophisticated and more ‘forward-looking’ kind of coming from ‘within’ — that
is, from a higher social group”. In many cases, elites may be willing to sacrifice their po-
sition of economic and social privilege within a society in favor of developing a new so-
ciety, with the hope and belief that as the leaders of a movement, they will reclaim and
reoccupy the position of societal elites when victory (or a partial victory) is attained.
An alternate model of non-state actor can be found in the form of a ground-up or grassroots activist movement. Unlike elite actors, a grassroots actor seeks to create a social movement rather than secure immediate political change. Because they lack a privileged position in society, they generally risk less by engaging in nationalist behaviors; they have fewer social and economic benefits which could be jeopardized, for instance, if they fail to achieve their goal of eventual political change. Rather than focusing on encouraging the specifics of a movement, they may instead emphasize the broader strokes of identity and have a focus on social cohesion rather than direct action (Barreto 2009).

The focus of this particular study is the revival of the Scottish national movement — a timely and relevant case study. Nationalist movements vary widely in their territorial demands on the mother state, ranging from moderate calls for autonomy or devolution, all the way through separatism, secessionism, and irredentism. Among contemporary nationalist movements seeking to establish itself, Scotland is closer to achieving its goal of independence than most. While a recent referendum on secession from the United Kingdom may have failed, the issue itself has far from died or disappeared from the political radar.

One of the preeminent authors to study nationalism, Benedict Anderson, devotes much of his seminal *Imagined Communities* to describing the way in which local, creole, elite actors in Latin America shaped nationalist movements in their infancy. Latin Ameri-
ca, he finds, is where the first truly modern wave of nationalist efforts thrived.¹ The years immediately following the French Revolution witnessed a flourishing debate amongst the intelligentsia of liberal ideas and conceptualizations of what the state was and should be. European-born Spaniards looked down upon their American-born, white cousins; the proliferation of denigrating attitude of *peninsulares* (those from the Iberian peninsula) towards their fellow Spaniards across the Atlantic fueled a long-simmering resentment that eventually gave birth to independence movements, starting with Mexico in the 1810s. It encouraged local elites in Latin America to begin to develop visions of what their own states could be. The impetus for decolonization was strongest among local elites who were, ironically, direct descendants from the Spanish from whom they sought independence, rather than the racially-mixed, economically exploited, and socially marginalized mestizo and mulatto majority (Brading 1991; Lafaye 1976).

In imagining an independent Gran Colombia or Perú, these elites were forced to recognize that in separating from a colonizing power (Spain), which had given them their privileged position, would imply the loss of many of the perks associated with being a regional elite within a global empire. Anderson asserts that this was worthwhile to these elites because many made a calculation that they could form the core of a new elite in an

¹ Anderson’s notion of nations as *imagined communities* underscores its artificiality. However, the power of elites to fabricate national identities is not limitless. In point of fact, Motyl (2001, 59) emphasizes that elites cannot build identities out of thin air, but rely on preexisting socio-cultural building blocks.
independent state that creoles would run. In other words, they preferred to ascend in rank as a first-rate elite in a new and smaller state rather than remain as a second-rate elite in a larger realm. While not directly asserting a rational choice paradigm, this focus on elites making calculated decisions would certainly fall well within the parameters of that approach (Anderson 1980). While Anderson expounds later on the effect of other nationalist movements and the way in which they developed, he identifies elite-driven nationalism, through non-state actors, as the origins of modern nationalist sentiment.

Partha Chatterjee might be inclined to agree with Anderson’s focus on these elites as the drivers of nationalist endeavors. While he wrote about a vastly different time and place — Bengali nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries — there are many similar themes. The Bangla elites that he studied tended to be those with the most exposure to colonizing powers: they had been educated in the United Kingdom (the main colonial power in what became India and Bangladesh), socialized into British culture, and influenced by British political notions, including those of what a state was and how it could come to be formed. As in the case of Latin America, these rejected and peripheral elites were willing to jeopardize their relatively privileged positions within the empire in order to secure national status for themselves and those they identified as part of their community. As a step towards psychological emancipation decades before formal independence Bangla elites partitioned their society into a contaminated public sphere dominated by the colonial regime and a domestic and pure sphere centered around the home (Chatterjee 1980). Much of his work is devoted to describing the intricacies of the movement, as well as seeking to generalize it to non-Western nationalist movements, but
the pattern remains much the same as that seen in Anderson’s work: elites sacrifice short-term comfort in order to secure a long-term position amongst a new national elite.

Chatterjee and Anderson find company in the works of Morgan (1992) as well. The treatment of the revival of the Welsh language is a key example of elite-driven nationalist endeavors, and a relatively successful one at that. Rather than the revival of Welsh as a spoken and written language being driven by the common man or everyday speakers, the language was revived by elites living and working in London, the epicenter of the United Kingdom. Far removed from the language and culture which they sought to nationalize, they hitched on language as a powerful tool to forge a key component of identity: a visible marker of the difference between Welsh and English. These elites, similar to Chatterjee’s British-educated Bangla elites, were exposed to a culture they considered not only foreign but one in which they were looked down upon. They responded by promoting an invented identity which could unify both them and common individuals in the claimed Welsh territory (Morgan 1992). Unlike Anderson’s elites, however, they had little to lose by promoting the Welsh language and national identity; already being resident outside of the claimed homeland, they would have been easily perceived as alien to

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2 As various nationalism scholars have noted, successful language revival is quite rare. Urla’s (2010) analysis of the Basque country illustrates a partially successful, but incomplete revival. The only truly successful case of language revival is the case of Hebrew under British Palestine and the State of Israel (Ben-Yehuda 1993; Stavans 2008).
Welsh society. Crafting the language and allowing it to diffuse, then, was their best alternative.

The notion of crafting an identity from scratch as an effort to counter a colonizing power is not unique to any of these authors, least of all Hobsbawm and Ranger, who draw inspiration from a historical social tradition. Yet, crafting an identity is often most seen as an elite non-state actor-driven process. As Connor (1994, 158) noted: “By and large, one could say that the intelligentsia (whether of right or left) have been the most consistently prominent among the leadership of ethnonational movements.” Still, this point of view ignores the role that grassroots actors can often play, especially in the form of social movements. Indeed, even Connor himself admitted: “The essence of nationalism is not to be sought in the motives of elites who may manipulate nationalism for some ulterior end, but rather in the mass sentiment to which elites appeal” (Ibid., 161). Without a mass following, elite driven nationalist movements wither on the vine.

Prominent amongst those examining the social movement aspect of the debate is Jacqueline Urla's (2012) work describing linguistic nationalism and cultural movements amongst the Basque minority in Spain. Unlike Anderson or Chatterjee, she comes from an anthropological background, which goes a long way towards explaining her significantly different focus from the prior authors. Instead of focusing on elite interaction, she specifically chooses to use the grassroots, everyday efforts of Basque speakers to secure their unique linguistic heritage. Elites drove the early stages of the nationalist experience, she argues, through the development of institutions: a political party and a language academy foremost amongst them. Unlike in the cases studies by Chatterjee and Anderson,
however, the Basque native elite were forced to compete with elites from the Castilian (Spanish central government); this relegated the Basque elites to a kind of second-class citizenship within the wider Spanish society, even if they were privileged amongst the Basque. The same processes negatively impacted the country’s other major linguistic minorities — the Galicians and Catalans. As a result, it was difficult for Spain’s linguistic minorities, including the Basque, to gain the legitimacy of the Bengali or Latin American elites studied by prior authors (Urla 2012).

Yet, each of the movements so far addressed has had varying measures of success. Anderson’s Latin American elites were able to secure independence from their colonizer and did end up forming the core elites of the states and nations which they helped to establish. Chatterjee’s Bengali elites too formed the core of the new state formed in the name of the Bengali nation, despite the (reasonable) view that they had been corrupted by exposure to the colonizing power. The revival of the Welsh language, while an elite driven process, saw limited success among the grassroots masses. Even Urla’s case study of the Basque social movement and linguistic revival had some measure of success; while the Basque have, to date, failed to secure a state, the language is healthy and forms the

3 Subsequently Bangla nationalists would not enjoy the fruits of national unity under one state but two: East Pakistan for Bangla Muslims (later Bangladesh) and the Indian State of West Bengal, for Hindus. Bangla-dominated East Pakistan would not separate from Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan until 1971.
core of a distinct identity which challenges the identity to which the Spanish central government would prefer all its citizens adhere.

Does this mean, however, that non-state action is preferable to the actions of those in service to the state? Not necessarily — other authors have posited that without a state, a nationalist movement cannot fully form. In some ways, this assertion is reasonable. Anderson, in originally describing nationalism from a political science perspective, notes that the state is one of the essential components of any nationalist endeavor. Even for anthropologist Thomas Eriksen (1993, 6): “The distinguishing mark of nationalism is by definition its relationship to the state.” Thanks to the effects of the Enlightenment, legitimacy is now solely granted by the state and state institutions. Without a state, then, the full definition of a nation as an imagined community possessing real borders cannot be seen to have been fulfilled.

This view that the state must precede a nationalist movement or the development of nationalist sympathies was best expressed by Ernest Gellner. Writing after Anderson and contemporaneously with Hobbsbawm & Ranger, Gellner (2009) posits that the state must always come before any true sense of nationalism. Nationalism, he argues, is an expression of state desires and can and will be co-opted by the state once it begins to fully manifest. While much of Gellner’s argument focuses on elites through a focus on the dominance and superiority of high culture over low culture, he does give some cursory treatment to the notion of grassroots or non-state actors playing a role in fomenting a nationalist movement. His focus, however, remains on state encouragement. That the state
either encourages or promotes nationalist endeavors suggests that, in some cases, state actors play a more central role.

Several authors have gone further than Gellner’s postulation, however, and have sought to apply the notion of a state or its accompanying actors either encouraging or permitting the development of a nationalist movement. One of the most illustrative cases of state actors promoting nationalist behavior comes through Nadav Shelef’s study of Israel, and the varying strains of Zionism which underpin the state’s political system. Each one of these distinct schools of Zionist thought fashioned dissimilar notions of the ultimate territorial boundaries of the ideal Jewish state. Popular support for the creation of a sovereign state does not immunize that community from contentious debates over core facets of that state, such as its final borders and its concomitant relationship with its neighbors.

While Shelef would likely reject the notion that a state must exist in order for nationalist sentiments to develop — he devotes a significant amount of his work to describing the origins of the Zionist ideal — he would tend to agree that the state is central to nationalist goals. In describing the three major strains of Zionism — labor, religious, and revisionist — he finds different levels of engagement with the state, generally correlating to the amount of time that each strain and its associated political parties have spent in government. Labor Zionists, he finds, were most willing to sacrifice nationalist principles in favor of long-term gains; the pursuit of peace, while anathema to revisionist Zionists and undesirable to religious Zionists, could form a central part of a Labor Zionist’s thinking. Whether this was true rational choice calculation as in the case of Anderson’s Latin
American elites is up for debate, but whether it fit the model or not, it still remains a case that states are key actors promoting a national vision (Shelef 2010).

The same characterization, that state actors can be key actors in promoting a national vision, has been true of both religious and revisionist Zionists as well when they have been in government. These groups, Shelef finds, have a different definition of the nation, particularly with regards to the nation’s ideal cartographical parameters. As a result of their different image of the borders of the nation, of which individuals belong inside the nation, and of how the nation should be governed, they are less likely to compromise, and more likely to use the levers of the state to promote their viewpoint. In this case, they mirror Gellner’s belief that the state will manipulate a nationalist movement to its own end. While they are nationalist actors themselves, these rival nationalist camps are content to use state power to promote a vision of nationalism that is either similar to or at least compatible with their own (Shelef 2010).

Naturally, Israel is not the only case of state actors manipulating nationalist sentiment or nationalist actors for their own ends. Amílcar Barreto examined national identity and language politics in Puerto Rico, although the work reveals as much about the state of American nationalism as it does about the question of national status in the commonwealth itself. Similar to Urla, the question of language is central to the shape of identity in Puerto Rico. This island is unique in the American context, possessing a population whose language is almost completely alien to the majority of the colonizing power. While this is similar to earlier cases of colonial powers having different cultures than their
colonies, it is most similar to the Basque case in the modern era. An insular part of one nation possesses within its borders a nation which defines itself along far different lines.

Unlike Urla, however, Barreto examines state actors and societal elites through a focus on political parties. Each of the island’s three major political parties promotes a distinct vision of the national question. Studying political parties, and each of the major parties within that study, is a reasonable approach in seeking answers to questions of how actors approach national identity. It provides a fuller picture of a political system where identity issues are central to daily life, and is thus a more satisfactory approach than that taken in the Basque case. Within Puerto Rico, he finds, the question of national identity tends to fall along a continuum from those supporting independence, who could be considered hardline nationalists, those supporting the status quo, a kind of soft nationalism, and those supporting Puerto Rico becoming a full state within the United States, who could in a sense be seen as American nationalists rather than Puerto Rican nationalists. Each takes different views of the nationalist question, specifically though the lens of the language issue. Perhaps ironically, he finds that most of those who would identify with the hardline nationalist movement are the most bilingual, while those who define themselves as ardently pro-American often have far inferior English language skills (Barreto 2001).

These state actors seem likely to run into several of the problems that Urla’s Basque elites ran into — necessitating the formation of a social movement rather than an elite-driven process. If the hardline nationalist movement, namely those who seek independence at any cost, wishes to secure victory, it must be extremely cautious not to be
seen by its own supporters as too closely identified with the colonizing power. In general, the hardliners have avoided this trap solely by being one of the less popular forces on the island, but in the future, it is something of which to be wary. Urla’s description of the use of Castilian bringing any form of political discussion to a screeching halt seems applicable; it is easy to envision the use of English, common amongst those who have spent time on the American mainland, bringing even a heated debate over Puerto Rico’s future to a similar halt. State actors, in this case, are threading a delicate needle: utilize solely Spanish and risk alienating the community with ties to the mainland, but utilize solely English and face the wrath of a dedicated set of nationalist actors.

Political parties, as in the cases of Israel and Puerto Rico, are not the sole form of state actor. What happens when a state itself seeks to co-opt a nationalist movement, as Gellner (2009) suggests all states will eventually do when such a movement first rears its head? At least one author has addressed just this question of state sponsored, or at least state sanctioned, nationalist behavior. Loring Danforth, in *The Macedonian Conflict*, addresses the question of Macedonian nationalism, an issue that has driven a wedge between two Balkan neighbors, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (or FYROM) and Greece.

The question of Macedonian identity has driven the conflict between these states since FYROM became an independent state in 1991. Greek nationalists, acting by and through the Greek state, assert that the term Macedonian itself should not be applied to those residing in the state which seeks to use that name, in part thanks to historical territorial divisions. The modern Greek state asserts that it, and it alone, is the sole and legit-
imate copyright holder to the term *Macedonia*. The use of that name by another other polity, particularly a sovereign state, is interpreted by the government in Athens as an assault on Greece’s historic legacy and its territorial integrity.\(^4\) Recalling Anderson’s use of the map as the most potent symbol of nationalist sentiments, the Greek position seeks to claim that only that part of the historical Macedon that remains within Greece should be referred to by that title, and that Macedonians are therefore Greek. Naturally, FYROM and ethnic Macedonians living therein reject this assertion on its face. Seeking to apply the standard of nearly three millennia ago seems, to them, an almost laughable request (Danforth 1995).

Complicating the question of which state can lay claim to the legacy of Philip of Macedon and the right to call itself the homeland of the Macedonian people is the treatment of those people by the Greek state. Despite a belief that Macedonians should be Greek citizens, efforts to aid their assimilation have been mixed, and even those who make the effort *to* assimilate are still treated with some measure of skepticism. While this is in keeping with many nations’ treatment of ethnic minorities, it makes it more difficult

\(^4\) It is worth noting that Greece’s claim of exclusive rights over the name Macedonia, as an integral part of its Hellenic heritage, masks a problem common to other nationalist movements. The Greek state, a nineteenth-century creation populated by Christians, insists on exclusive rights to pre-Common Era regimes populated by polytheists. The unquestioned assumption of a direct and uninterrupted line between these politics is exceedingly problematic (Geary 2002).
for the Greek state to make a reasonable claim that ethnic Macedonians have a reason to treat that state with any sense of loyalty (Danforth 1995).

It is worth noting, however, that Macedonia has its own problems with ethnic minorities. Despite nearly a third of the country’s population considering itself to be ethnic Albanian, it is the Macedonian identity with which the state is defined. Yet, this is hardly unusual given the political geography of the region. The central cause for conflict among rival nations is territory, and claims as to what constitutes a specific nation’s territory. That both Macedonia and Greece are operating on an imagined map which has not existed in any real sense since the days of Alexander the Great only makes the conflict more difficult (Danforth 1995).

_**Literature on Scottish Nationalism**_

In a relatively ethnically homogeneous society, however, state actors can have some measure of success. While the Scottish case will be treated more thoroughly in a moment, some foundational literature regarding our unit of analysis is necessary at this juncture. It is only in the very modern era that Scottish nationalists have made the transition from grassroots pressure to state actor by taking control of the levers of government within Scotland itself. Prior to 2007, it was unheard of for an ardently nationalist party to take the reins of government in an English-speaking democracy.

James Mitchell, Lynn Bennie, and Rob Johns conducted an exhaustive study of the Scottish national movement’s primary actor, the Scottish National Party, in 2012,
seeking to better understand how a non-state actor transforms into a state actor. The SNP itself does not enjoy a lengthy history in the political world, at least compared to other political parties in Britain. Under its current name, it has only existed since 1934, when it formed as the result of a merger between two minor but similarly structured political parties. It was not until the late 1960s that it became truly prominent on the Scottish political scene, but once it secured that breakthrough, it became a permanent fixture. With the advent of devolution, the SNP’s prominence grew, to the point where it was able to form government by 2007, and secure a majority in the Scottish Parliament by 2011 (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

Mitchell and co-authors (2012) find that the SNP was able to successfully portray itself not just as a nationalist party, but as a party of effective government. This is something that is unique amongst the nationalist movements thus far considered. The majority of nationalist movements have been concerned with either securing the state or with promoting a vision of what that state can and should look like. This study, however, showed that it is entirely possible for a grassroots, non-state actor to take over the functions of the state through the ballot box, something few other non-state actors have ever been able to accomplish (Ibid.).

The different approaches taken by each of the authors considered, or in some cases of each group of authors considered, are important to understand when trying to determine whether state or non-state actors are most effective in fomenting a nationalist movement. In the case of state actors, the results have been mixed. Barreto’s study of nationalism in Puerto Rico offers a case of nationalists who have not yet secured the nation-
al dream, and who face linguistic challenges in the future. Shelef’s discussion of the varying strains of Zionism in Israel too shows the difficulties faced by nationalist actors; in agreeing to sacrifice some elements of the national ideal, Labor Zionism’s fortunes have waned in favor of rising religious and especially revisionist views of the nation. The case of Greece and Macedonia examined by Danforth shows the struggles inherent when states themselves seek to engage in promoting a nationalist vision. Gellner would be quite satisfied with this study, then, given the centrality of the state’s actions. Gellner might be even more satisfied with the study conducted by Mitchell and co-authors, however. There, a nationalist actor not only co-opted the state, but then used the functions of the state to promote a nationalist vision, all without being perceived as doing anything outside of the democratic mainstream.

Have non-state actors, then, had a better track record of sustaining a nationalist movement? The answer to that question depends on which form of non-state actor is being analyzed. On the one hand, Urla’s treatment of the Basque linguistic revival shows that social movements, or grassroots nationalist activism, can be effective but only up to a point. So far, the Basque have failed to realize their dreams of independent statehood, and while there are other factors at play, the relative weakness of the nationalist movement cannot be ignored. On the other hand, those nationalist movements driven by elites tend to have stood the test of time. The best example of elite, non-state actor-driven nationalism came via Anderson. His Latin American elites, articulating a distinct identity as Latin American creoles rather than mere Spaniards living in the Americas, secured statehood and secured for themselves positions of elite power within those new states, in addition to
being the driving force behind a new national identity. The Bengali elites that Chatterjee analyzed did much the same; they occupied positions of some privilege both in the pre- and post-independence worlds. The only exception to the pattern of elites having greater success seems to come from Morgan (1992). While the Welsh linguistic revival movement was driven by London-based elites, it was not until the ideas diffused to the general public that it was able to become a success (Ibid.).

Taken altogether, then, it would seem that non-state actors are the more effective actors in fomenting and creating a stable nationalist movement. But that explanation is too simple; instead of simply labeling non-state actors as more effective, it is necessary to break them down into the two categories previously discussed. While grassroots activism and efforts at national cohesion have, to some degree, created strong feelings of identity, a lack of elite leadership means that the final step in the process of nationalism — the securing of a sovereign state as envisioned by Anderson — remains out of reach. When the process is driven by elites, a nationalist movement will have more tools on hand to use in securing that state, as well as a better road map through the successful movements that have come before.

The counterexample to that conclusion, as will be supported below, is the Scottish case. Recall that Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns found that the Scottish National Party, the primary actor involved in Scottish nationalism, began as a grassroots movement which later developed into a state actor, in the form of an organized political party. Without the splits that were inherent in Shelef’s grassroots Zionist movements which later formed political parties, and with more organization than the Basque social movement studied by
Urla, Scottish nationalists were able to aggregate support without the elite domination that was seen in the works of both Anderson and Chatterjee, and were then able to utilize the levers of state power which Gellner sees as essential to the success of the nationalist cause. This was due to any number of reasons, chief amongst them the history of Scottish national sentiment and the way in which the institutions of government in Scotland were and are structured. It is also due to the different way in which Scottish nationalists differentiated themselves from the English; rather than focusing on a common linguistic heritage, as in the case of Irish or Welsh nationalists, they focused instead on a broader definition of who fit the nation. Residence, rather than specific cultural norms and values, was the defining characteristic.

As previously mentioned, once we understand the various ways in which a nationalist movement can form and the various approaches that different actors have taken, it becomes essential to compare those movements to other movements that exist in the modern era. In selecting a case, it helps to find one which can be easily compared to a variety of different nationalist movements, and for which there is a healthy base of scholarship considering the how and why of the selected movement’s workings. For comparison to the wide variety of case studies previously considered, the Scottish movement towards statehood and independence seems most appropriate, with a blended approach taken by different actors towards a nationalist end. While it is a case where much of the analysis comes through the lens of a state actor, that state actor has origins in a non-state actor social movement similar to Urla’s Basque case.
Chapter II: History and Modern Resurgence of Scottish Nationalism

Before addressing the fundamentals of the case itself, it is necessary to briefly understand the history and context of the Scottish nationalist movement. In a bid to justify modern nationalist movements ethnic entrepreneurs perennially justify their actions on the basis of a presumably ancient and glorious past (Geary 2002). Unlike many of the cases considered by authors within the field of nationalism, the glorious past to which Scottish nationalists hearken is not millennia old. Scotland as an independent state only ceased to exist in the first decade of the eighteenth century, with the adoption by the Scottish and English Parliaments of legislation known as the Act of Union 1707. For the previous century, Scotland and England had functioned as separate states, unified under a single crown (with a brief period of interruption as a result of the English Civil War). Compare this to the glorious past harkened to by the Macedonian or Zionist nationalists, a past that existed deep into antiquity, and the Scottish nationalist movement looks incredibly young.

The movement itself is even younger than the glorious past would suggest, though old enough that the first vestiges of nationalist sentiment in Scotland predate Anderson’s post-French Revolution model and time scale. These early nationalist actions, conducted in the mid part of the eighteenth century before the notion of a united kingdom had taken hold, tended to be aimed at restoring a separate, Catholic monarchy north of the border with England. In the pre-nationalist era confessional loyalties and fidelity to a ruling family trumped any ethnic connections with the monarch. Mainly funded and launched from
abroad (specifically France itself), the efforts met with little success, and while useful to understand in addressing the long-term existence of nationalist actors and sentiment, these early uprisings have tended not to inform much of the rhetoric of the Scottish nationalist movement of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Indeed, the only lasting effect it had on Scottish or British national character was that the mid-eighteenth century uprisings led directly to the composition of the British national anthem, *G-d Save the Queen*; while the verse has fallen into abeyance for obvious reasons, the original lyrics included the line “...rebellious Scots to crush” as a response to the Highland uprisings (Johnston 2008).

Historians of Scotland and the Scottish people see this eighteenth century era as critical to understanding why a nationalist undercurrent continued to exist even if it faded from prominence. While many scholars of nationalism allege that it only emerged in the wake of the French revolution, a cataclysmic event which saw identity be forged not by allegiance to a particular ruler but rather to the state itself, scholars of Scottish nationalism reject this assertion. They instead point to uprisings in the eighteenth century, or to the Scottish state's fierce preservation of its independence from the thirteenth century until the Act of Union with England in the early eighteenth century, as evidence of a kind of national consciousness lacking on the European continent (Walton 2006).

Scottish nationalism took something of a back seat in the nineteenth century, partially as a result of an intense focus by the British state on ensuring the adherence of Ireland to the Union. The empire London built was thoroughly *British* and not just English. Staffing an overseas empire with colonial officers from both sides of Hadrian’s Wall al-
ollowed Parliament and the House of Windsor to assuage most politico-centrifugal forces. Furthermore, efforts to integrate Scotland, partially by over-representing the Scottish electorate in the House of Commons and the Scottish peerage in the House of Lords, as well as the lack of legal barriers to Scottish participation in British public life, helped to ensure a general period of quiet and calm. While Scottish Members of Parliament tended to lean more on the side of Irish Home Rule than their English counterparts, splits rarely emerged during this period. At the same time, Scots played a key role in the expansion of the British Empire and the incredibly rapid industrialization of the whole of the United Kingdom.

There were, of course, efforts at some kind of cultural revival during this period, and these efforts are directly relevant to the modern nationalist movement. Earlier, the role of tradition and identity was discussed; indeed, every nationalist movement considered has been based around a common identity, and some kind of symbology has been essential, whether it be in the form of the claimed borders on a map, or something more cultural. In the case of the Scottish nationalists, the symbols most closely identified with them are the various clan tartans (Trevor-Roper 1992). While the kilt and other elements of costuming commonly identified with Scotland do have ancient origins, the patterns generally do not, or at least not in the sense that the modern public (and many nationalists) believe they do. Instead, the idea of ascribing certain fabric patterns to certain prominent (or not-so-prominent) families was a novel, nineteenth century invention. This potent symbol of Scotland, one of the few instantly identifiable with the nation, was a mar-
keting ploy developed not to promote a nationalist ideal, but to make its inventors money (Ibid.).

Since the only major development of the nineteenth century was the development of symbolism with spurious origins, one might expect the course of Scottish nationalism to continue to die out as the years continued. Fortunately for those seeking to examine Scotland in a nationalist context, however, events intervened to ensure the early revival of nationalist sentiment within the country. While the United Kingdom as a whole had been mostly immune to the nationalist revolutions which swept Europe and Latin America in the nineteenth century, it was not immune to the spread of ideas that came as a result of those revolutions and political discussions. That fact remained veiled until the following century.

The wake of the First World War, and the nationalist fervor which swept continental Europe, also effected in Scotland. The post-war Peace of Versailles implemented, in part, the Wilsonian concept of the self-determination of peoples with the concurrent partition of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman empires on the basis, ostensibly, on the basis of national identity. This right was, at first, intended only for Europeans. Subsequently it was extended globally in the wake of the Second World War. But in post-WWI Scotland, for the first time in over a century, there was a feeling of disconnect from the British state, partially borne out of the loss of an entire generation in the trenches of the European conflict. With nationalist movements gaining traction on the continent, the time seemed ripe for the development of a native one in Scotland itself.
Commencing in the 1920s, thinkers and would-be nationalist actors in Scotland were beginning to once again conceive of Scotland not just as a subsidiary part of Great Britain or the larger British Empire. Rather, they began to see Scotland as a nation unto itself, with similar rights to statehood as any of the nascent colonial nationalist movements. Connell (2004, 52) writes that by the late 1920s, the prevailing view amongst those with nationalist sentiments was that Scotland was “irreducibly discrete” from England, and that separation was not only desirable, but achievable in due course. Add to the mix a growing sentiment in some segments of the Scottish intelligentsia that Scotland had become little more than another English colony since the Act of Union, and the stars were aligned for the development of a formal political movement.

By 1930, Scottish political writers had begun to call for a “Home Rule Convention” designed to secure additional autonomy for Scotland. The first purely Scottish political parties, the Scottish Party and National Party of Scotland, merged to form the Scottish National Party by 1934, and quickly became a presence on the political stage, even if they failed to make much of an electoral impact immediately (Pittock 2013, 72-73).

The Scottish National Party rejected, however, some of the earlier views of Scotland as a mere English colony; this was largely the result of the National Party's influence, the National Party having been drawn from a more socially conservative and English-aligned faction of society. Instead, the SNP's early focus was on building a sense that a Scottish nation already existed, and that instead of forging it from above, it was necessary to forge belief from below (Connell 2004). This is important to note, because it sets up the future of the SNP's series of political shifts. It did not make the decision to reject
the colonialist argument lightly, but rather in an effort to portray Scotland and the future nationalist endeavor in a more positive light. While more difficult than making a populist case for independence, promoting a positive vision of the nation would ultimately pay vast dividends for the SNP.

However, it is the interwar era, and the decades that follow, that give us the true foundations of the Scottish national movement, and the institution that best exemplifies nationalism in a Scottish context. Unlike Urla’s Basque nationalists or Chatterjee’s Bengali nationalists, or even Anderson’s study of nationalists in Latin America, Scottish nationalism from the twentieth century forward has always manifested through the actions of one political party — the Scottish National Party. While other political parties, as will be addressed, have sometimes attempted to play on national pride, it has been this would-be state actor that has been the primary focus of the Scottish nationalist movement. In a way, this makes sense; few would dispute that the United Kingdom is a functioning, democratic society, and indeed, the SNP is not one to make an argument against this fact. As a result, the best way to secure change is by engaging democratic institutions. Beginning in the 1930s and proceeding to the present day, the chief institution engaged, then, was the electoral system and the Parliament to which those elected would then serve.

From its start in 1934, however, the Scottish National Party faced great challenges. The political system was then, as in England then and now, polarized along traditional left-right lines, with little room for an upstart political party attempting to compete in the political marketplace along the center-periphery divide. The left of the spectrum was occupied by Labour, already strong amongst working class Scots, while the right was
occupied by two parties, the federalist Liberals who had long had strength in the Highlands and outlying Shetland and Orkney Islands, and the Unionists, who were the Scottish branch of the national Conservative Party until formally changing names in the 1950s. Of these parties, it was paradoxically the Unionists who were most closely identified with a sense of Scottish identity. Pride in what was seen as Scotland’s place as a partner in the United Kingdom, rather than the subservient role that hardline nationalists saw, permitted the Unionists to claim that they were the party of Scotland (Pittock 2013).

This is a unique characteristic of the Scottish case not seen in any of the other cases considered. A political party, closely identified with the dominant partner in the national question, was initially seen as the more openly patriotic institution, despite a conservatism, in political terms, which did not necessarily match the values of a rapidly urbanizing Scottish population. The case that might come closest is that considered by Barreto, but even there, there are important differences. The party seen as most pro-American is not, generally, seen as safeguarding a sense of Puerto Rican identity, except as a part of an overall American identity. The Unionists, to the dismay of the nascent Scottish National Party, seemed able to thread a needle on the identity question, carefully balancing Scottish patriotism with adherence to the larger United Kingdom. That the Unionists

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5 One relic of the old Unionist party remains in Scotland; the formal name of the Conservative grouping at the Scottish Parliament remains the “Scottish Conservatives and Unionists,” though the party is in almost no way distinguishable from the national Conservative Party.
maintained some notional independence from the pan-British Conservatives also aided their cause (Pittock 2013).

This notional independence seemed to become less and less relevant in the wake of the Second World War, and as independence slowly waned, so too did the fortunes of the Unionists. Their embrace, Pittock (2013, 83) writes, of “...centralizing British policies inaugurated by Labour” in the immediate postwar era led to a fast “erosion” of support for the Unionists. The old standards of Scottish politics had been shaken up by an emerging postwar consensus, which provided a narrow window of opportunity for an SNP seeking to make its first breakthrough by peeling off formerly Unionist voters. Patriotism and nationalism, the leaders of the SNP realized, were two sides of the same coin. It would not take much to co-opt patriotic sympathies and slowly turn them towards a pro-independence frame of mind. After all, if the British state was taking a centralizing turn, it made more sense to have a state of one’s own rather than continue a partnership that felt more and more unequal with each passing year.

Given the modern (and accurate) perception of the Scottish National Party as a left-wing institution which identifies as a party of progressivism as well as nationalism, it is somewhat surprising that their earliest electoral successes should come as a result of attracting conservative, Unionist voters. But given the resistance to centralizing power in London, something promoted by Labour and then embraced by the national Conservatives and their Unionist allies, it makes some measure of sense. The appeal of a left-leaning party to otherwise conservative voters is indicative of an electorate interested less in the conservative-socialist axis than the center-periphery cleavage. This argument is borne
out by the historical context. Across the United Kingdom, the 1960s represented a period of electoral change, with the stable two-party system of Labour and Conservative partially upended. Public dissatisfaction with the options presented at general election after general election left an opening for a new party to make an impact (Lynch 2009).

At first, the squeeze was mostly felt on the right; the Conservatives lost votes to the Liberals, who had an ancestral claim to large swaths of the Scottish electorate and were finally able to cash in their historical political currency. Yet, in this same era, the Scottish National Party was able to begin securing more support. How then did this occur? The simplest answer lies in the notion of strategic voting. While it is easy to look at a political party and identify rational actors, the same thinking can be applied to the electorate as well. Sensing weakness on the right, voters could afford to vote their values (i.e., support for greater Scottish autonomy) rather than their preferred political ideology. With the Conservatives now on the run, voters no longer had to lend their support to Labour in order to prevent a Tory majority at Westminster (Lynch 2009).

By 1966, the Scottish National Party was able to poll five percent of the vote in Scotland for seats to the British Parliament, and saw its first electoral success at a 1967 by-election largely as a result of not posing a threat to the governance of the United Kingdom. While by-elections traditionally do not act as barometers of a wider feeling in the electorate any more than special elections for Congress do in an American context, the importance of that win cannot be understated; for the first time, the SNP had managed to convince a plurality of voters in any seat in Scotland to embrace their vision for an in-
dependent, home rule Scotland, and to reject the London-centric Conservative and Labour Parties (Pittock 2013).

In analyzing the growth of support for the Scottish National Party, the rate by which it grew is astounding. Looking only at the richly-studied elections for the British Parliament, the SNP grew from some five percent of the vote in 1966, the year before its monumental by-election victory, to thirty percent by 1974 (Lynch 2009). While this represented a high water mark in the party’s support which has yet to be duplicated, it is no less fascinating to consider. The idea of a party aggregating that much support in that fast a time was unheard of in the United Kingdom.

The Scottish National Party was aided, to a great extent, by the development of a kind of nationalist civil society. While the trade union movement was then, and remains, a bastion of support for the Labour Party, by the 1970s increasing numbers of trade and labor unionists had begun to look at the increasingly left wing SNP as an alternative. Recognizing that Labour would, by the electoral math, always be more likely to preference English labor groups and labor rights, the SNP’s promotion of Scottish industry seemed attractive. In 1967, the same year as the first by-election victory, the Association of Scottish Nationalist Trade Unionists was formed, lending the SNP a voice in the industrial world (Lynch 2009). It is, perhaps, not a coincidence that it was only after that organization was founded did the SNP tack hard left on the question of industrial relations.

What does the shift leftwards, and the resultant skyrocketing of support for the SNP tell us about their role as a party? On the one hand, it shows that it greatly to occupy a niche that no other party is seeking to occupy. As the Unionist message faded and Scot-
tish patriots engaged in a mildly uncomfortable affair with the SNP, the leadership of the SNP took a significant gamble. Up until this point, in keeping with British tradition, the Scottish National Party had been a cadre party, to borrow Duverger’s terminology (Duverger 1964). It was closely controlled by a group of central elites who dictated policy to the membership, and expected the membership to either obey those dictates or at least act to put them in place. As the party began to cultivate more members, there was a conscious decision by party elites to cede some authority, helping the SNP to transform into one of Duverger’s mass membership parties (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

This shift was not just unique amongst British political parties — even the ostensibly mass membership Labour party is run by a well-entrenched group of elites — but reflected a shift in the attitudes of the SNP itself. If it maintained an image as a centralized political party, it risked being seen as “going London,” or somehow selling out to the centralizing effect that Westminster seemed to have had on the Unionists before them. But if it engaged the Scottish public and its party membership in equal terms, emphasizing the role that individual members could play in shaping policy as well as its electoral performance, it had the opportunity to catch fire with a wider swath of the electorate. To put it simply, the party transformed (almost overnight) from an elite-driven institution to one which emphasized the grassroots, and in the process became the first truly grassroots, activist-oriented parties in the United Kingdom (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

With that shift from an elite-driven institution to one governed by grassroots activists, so too did the rhetoric of the party and its issue stances change. Recall that the SNP garnered much of its early support from disenchanted Unionist voters, those who
believed that the Unionist party was no longer the Scottish patriotic party, but rather had become too London-centric. Many of these voters, at first, were politically conservative. As other nationalist parties have learned, however, the issue of national identity is one which cuts across the traditional left/right scale; the SNP was happy to welcome these conservative voters into the fold given their patriotic views, and to accommodate them for so long as the party was elite dominated. Few words were devoted to socialist or social democratic principles in the early writings of the SNP; to do so would risk scaring the otherwise conservative patriotic voters, and risk losing them for a generation. Rather, the party deliberately chose a more neutral path, sticking to language which neither rejected nor embraced socialist or free market principles, but instead sought to find a middle ground (Lynch 2009).

Yet, conservative voters have traditionally only been a narrow swath of the electorate in Scotland; if the SNP was going to garner additional votes, it was going to have to tack left. That is precisely the direction which it took, following its initial electoral successes. It was aided by the fact that its grassroots activists were significantly to the left of the formerly dominating elite (Pittock 2013).

This leftward shift, gradual at first and with greater rapidity through the 1980s, enabled the Scottish public to have two center-left choices in electing Members of Parliament to Westminster or in electing local councilors, the Scottish Parliament not having been re-established at that point. Labour carefully avoided the national identity question, insisting that Scotland’s place was within the United Kingdom, using the same partnership model the Unionists had once used decades earlier. The attitude of the SNP, on the
other hand, was to shift from demanding immediate independence to a kind of increment-
talist approach. Secure some measure of home rule, for instance, and the public might get
used to the idea of native governance.

Home rule, as a concept, played heavily in the rhetoric of the SNP from 1974 to
2005. While the drive towards independence had periodic spikes, especially in the run-up
to the 1992 British general election, much of the focus was on obtaining as much power
for Scotland as was feasible. Proposals for a Scottish Assembly were mooted as early as
the 1970s, though it would take until the election of a Labour government in 1997 for a
Scottish Parliament to be formally established. The shifts after that establishment were
once again gradual; the focus became first on securing additional powers for the Scottish
Executive and the Parliament at Holyrood, with independence seeming to be something
of a far-off eventuality (Leith 2008).

In regards to this gradualist approach, the Scottish nationalists were doing little
more than the moderate Irish nationalists had done in the 19th century. Rather than agitat-
ing for immediate independence, the SNP envisioned statehood as a multi-step process: a
devolved Parliament, home rule, and then finally, formal statehood. Such a gradual ap-
proach has been a hallmark of many nationalist movements which start off as autonomist
and in time gravitate towards separatism. Unlike other movements, such as those present
in Ireland and the Basque areas of Spain, at no point did the SNP embrace a revolutionary
wing; indeed, it purged more militant members of the party in the run up to a late 1970s
referendum on a devolved Assembly for fear of alienating voters who were agnostic on
the national identity question. Presenting itself as a professional party, despite its gover-
nance by grassroots activists, enable the SNP to better appeal to wider swaths of the electorate (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

Recent years have only accelerated the nationalist movement, and the Scottish National Party in particular. While the early years were marked by periods of explosive growth, they tended to be followed by a period of contraction. Since the advent of the long fought-for Scottish Parliament, however, the fortunes of nationalists have risen. While billed by Labour as an effort to grant a measure of devolved responsibility to Scotland (and Wales, separately), nationalists hailed the creation of a new Scottish Parliament at Holyrood as a sign that they had successfully claimed the center of Scottish politics. Despite some protestations from hardline unionists, this is a fairly supportable claim. The presence of a devolved legislature with responsibility over a number of government competencies, elected solely by Scottish voters in Scottish electorates, is a step towards independent control of all levers of government. That it was a Parliament, rather than an assembly or unified council, is also significant; in creating a Scottish Parliament, the British government had embraced the idea of Scotland as a separate nation, rather than as simply a supplementary part of the British state (Pittock 2013).

The creation of a Scottish Parliament also helped to purge the last remaining vestiges of any rhetoric which saw Scotland as a colony of England, rather than a partner in the United Kingdom or some other form of quasi-state. An analysis of manifestos — in a British political context, a manifesto is identical to what Americans would call a party's platform — issued by the party between its 1974 high water mark and the 2005 general election for Westminster utterly fails to find colonialist rhetoric. Instead, the shift was to-
wards securing additional autonomy, and referring to Scotland's right to be a nation, even if that nation's specific definition was left purposefully vague (Leith 2008). The post-1997 shift, with the delivery of devolution, was even more pronounced. With an institution now extant in Edinburgh, the SNP could afford to campaign for election with manifesto commitments of claiming additional powers for the devolved institution, rather than needing to focus on securing that institution; the Scottish Parliament, after all, had now been secured. Any scholar of institutions will advise that once created, an institution of the scale and scope of a legislature is nearly impossible to abolish or change in a meaningful way. Indeed, the Scottish National Party continuously pledged to safeguard the devolved Parliament, even as they sought to create an independent state (Leith 2008).

For Scottish nationalists, and the SNP itself, the formation of a new Scottish Parliament was a defining moment, and a turning point, in the history of their movement. The glorious past was no longer something which was merely harkened to. A piece of it was once again living and breathing in the heart of the ancient Scottish capital of Edinburgh. The first session of the Scottish Parliament provided one illustration of just how central the institution was to the SNP’s existence, and to Scottish nationalists as a whole. Rarely have nationalists, in any context, invoked the idea of a glorious past more literally than Winnie Ewing. Ewing, the first post-war Scottish National Party MP elected to Westminster, running on a slogan of “Stop the World — Scotland Wants to Get On,” also had the privilege of being the eldest member of the Scottish Parliament elected at its first elections in 1999, and as a result presided over its first session. Invoking the pre-Union glorious past which the SNP strongly wished to portray, her first words in that body were
momentous: “I want to start with the words that I have always wanted either to say or to hear someone else say — the Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on March 25, 1707, is hereby reconvened” (Lydall 2009).

Scottish nationalism, then, entered a new chapter. It was no longer solely about the pressures of securing for Scotland some measure of home rule. The SNP had succeeded in that intermediate, incremental goal; there was now a formal lawmaking body accountable solely to the Scottish electorate, with little veto power from the Cabinet in London or the Westminster Parliament itself. This separate, uniquely Scottish institution had an effect on the public as well. By 2008, a decade after the establishment of the Parliament, sixty percent of the Scottish electorate thought of themselves as mostly Scottish or solely Scottish, a vast increase over previous decades. The proportion feeling more British or solely British, on the other hand, had declined to an all time low, with barely one in ten Scots identifying in that manner (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

This shift in identity is even more understandable when one realizes that, for the first time, the 2007 elections resolved with the Scottish National Party forming the government of Scotland. The incrementalism of the SNP, pushing first for devolution, and then for additional powers, had seemed to pay off; the Scottish Parliament was seen, by 2007, as a capable and trustworthy institution. Its most ardent supporters were then rewarded with the keys to the institution, and the inauguration of a Cabinet which comprised members of the Scottish National Party. Once in office, it was expected that the SNP would press hard and fast for a referendum on an independent Scotland. Yet, their tenuous grip on power at Holyrood — they only held a plurality, rather than a majority of
the seats — meant they needed to focus on governing before they could focus on securing a long-held party goal. Ironically, being forced to focus on something other than the party’s *raison d’être* may have enabled them to better make the argument that they could govern an independent Scotland when the day came (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

The party’s grassroots activists and general membership were willing to accommodate the SNP’s decision to focus on governing for a very simple reason: a vast majority agreed with the idea that incrementalism would ensure future success. Proving to moderate voters, those who were not necessarily ardent nationalists but who were open to a carefully thrown pitch by the SNP, that a Scotland governed by nationalist actors could be successful would help the ultimate goal of securing sovereign statehood. To an extent, the effort to appear to be a competent party of government, rather than just the party of the nationalist minority, seemed to pay off. The 2007 minority government (the term used for a government which does not possess a majority of the legislature’s support) turned into an unexpected majority government in the 2011 elections (Pittock 2013).

The grassroots base of the party, however, now had the upper hand over elites who may have preferred to continue acting as a governing party rather than as the voice of the nationalist forces present in the country. With a majority of the Scottish Parliament now being pledged to the cause of statehood and independence, elites within the party were bound to follow through; it was, in some ways, the perilous tradeoff the SNP had accepted when it handed over power to its grassroots in the party’s adolescent years. The actions of the Scottish government, again formed by the SNP, became irrelevant; the party could govern competently, but that no longer satisfied activists. A line had to be drawn
in the sand regarding statehood, and the only method to secure statehood in the eyes of
the SNP’s base was through a referendum vote taken by the whole of the Scottish elec-
torate (Pittock 2013).

Why would a party whose purpose was ostensibly to secure independence not
immediately attempt to secure statehood through legislative means? The SNP controlled a
majority in the Scottish Parliament, and it was clear that Westminster was too paralyzed
to block such an action were it to be passed at Holyrood. As much as the party was in fa-
vor of a Scottish state separate from the British state, it still was a fundamentally democ-
ocratic party.6 Since its inception, the Scottish National Party had been an institution de-
signed to engage the electoral process; it rejected separation by force of arms, and it re-
jected the idea that sovereignty could come from anyone other than the people of Scot-
land themselves. As early as 2008, when the idea of a referendum first seemed to be a
possibility if the SNP ever secured a Holyrood majority, large numbers of SNP members
were urging party decision-makers to consult the Scottish people, rather than make a uni-
lateral decision (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012).

The actions taken by the SNP government towards the holding of a referendum,
however, raise the specter of state action first envisioned by Gellner (2009) and by Dan-

6 An ideological commitment to a particular course of action does not negate the electoral
expediency of any vote-maximizing party (Downs 1957). The great exception, as Tsebelis
(1990) noted, is when the party’s leadership or a core faction favors maximizing a non-
electoral payoff rather than winning the next elections.
forth (1995), albeit in wildly different circumstances. Recognizing that a loss at the ballot box could be a tremendous blow to the future not only of the Scottish National Party but of the nationalist dream of sovereign statehood, the SNP embarked on a charm campaign designed to win over moderate Scots and make them more comfortable with the idea of an independent Scotland. The timing of the referendum was key; the SNP wanted to ensure it had a maximum amount of time before the next election in order to recover from a potential loss, but not so much time as to risk losing hardcore nationalists emboldened by a referendum campaign. In examining dates, SNP elites found one that would work appropriately: September of 2014. While seemingly arbitrary at first blush — three years into a five year term of the Scottish government — 2014 had an emotional significance to Scottish nationalists. The year marked the seven hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn, a momentous clash of armies between the Kingdoms of Scotland and England from which the Scots emerged victorious.

Anniversaries are, within any nationalist mythos, incredibly important. They allow nationalist actors to point to a specific moment in their claimed or actual glorious past, and focus the attention of the nation — and those outside the nation — upon them. As Zerubavel (1995, 9) observed: “The choice of a single event clearly provides a better opportunity for ritualized remembrance than a gradual process of transition does.” While Bannockburn itself did not play much of a role in the forthcoming campaign for independence, it was still nonetheless significant as a symbol of Scotland’s prior independence. Only an independent nation could have defeated a stronger state on the field of battle, and the thinking seemed to be that only by uniting as a nation could England again be defeat-
ed, this time at the ballot box. With events designed to promote feelings of patriotism and pride in one’s Scottish identity, the SNP calculated that the timing would be as good as it could conceivably get before the next election (Pittock 2013).

With a date in mind, and a question written by the Scottish government itself with little oversight from Westminster, the only variable left was the electorate itself. It had never been presented with such a stark question before, and the question of statehood was itself composed of a number of questions, all of which the SNP attempted to answer to varying degrees of success. The official campaign manifesto, authored almost entirely by SNP members and elites, was an effort to sway moderates to the side of independence. Despite the ostensibly republican nature of the party — it is rare, in nationalist movements, to find a party which advocates the retention of a non-native monarch — the SNP pledged to maintain the British monarchy; it was a symbol of national cohesion, they argued, and one which was not a priority for an independent Scotland (Scottish Government 2013). A more cynical view would suggest it was a sop to the sliver of the Scottish population which still stubbornly identified as more British than Scottish, pegged at a full ten percent as recently as 2008.

On paper, the SNP’s proposals for independence were nearly flawless. The Scottish Parliament would continue to operate much as it had over the past decade and a half. The head of state would not be changed. The currency would remain the pound sterling. European Union membership would be maintained. All the promises made by the Scottish government sounded plausible. As is the case with almost every effort by a political party, however, there were complications (Pittock 2013).
The referendum campaign alarmed state actors throughout the United Kingdom, not least of them the three Britain-wide political parties. Labour, formerly Scotland’s dominant party, the Liberal Democrats, and even the Conservatives banded together in order to counter the referendum and the possibility of independence. The three century partnership between England and Scotland, they argued, was too precious to both sides to be risked in the uncertain waters of independence. While attempting to counter the arguments of the SNP regarding the costs and practicalities of independence, the unionist parties in the United Kingdom offered a counter proposal. Reject independence, they argued, and additional powers would be granted to the Scottish Parliament. It would be similar to independence, but without the formal breakup of the Union (Pittock 2013).

The momentousness of this counter-offer cannot be understated, especially in the wake of the independence referendum’s failure. For decades, the Scottish National Party had argued for an incrementalist approach to independence: a devolved legislature, home rule, and then finally a sovereign state Scotland could call its own. Now, the ostensibly unionist nationwide parties were accepting the fundamental premise of this approach. The package of powers offered to the Scottish electorate both before and after the failure of the 2014 referendum amounted to nothing less than home rule. The power to alter the rate of income tax was included in the package. The power to alter the nature of the Scottish

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7 Interesting, this not-quite full independence bears remarkable resemblance to the platform of sovereignty-association proposed by its nationalist counterpart in Canada, the Parti Québécois (Chodos 2009).
The electorate by permitting young persons to vote was included. The Scottish Parliament would receive more rights to govern the oil and gas sector upon which the country’s economy was increasingly reliant. Even welfare benefits, long something over which the SNP had lusted for control, were offered up as the reward for a no vote on independence. Led by a widely-respected former businessman, the Smith Commission tabled before the British House of Commons a report authorizing all the changes pledged during the campaign. Home rule by another name: further devolution (Smith of Kelvin 2014).

The result of the referendum and the pledged powers for the Scottish Parliament and government force a question to be asked: has this state actor, once a non-state actor, known as the Scottish National Party snatched victory from the jaws of an apparent defeat? While the Scottish public may have rejected the hardline nationalist option, the SNP was rewarded with something it had seemed to seek for decades: another incremental step towards independence. At this point in time, presuming the British government acts on the promises made during the referendum campaign and on the Smith Commission that they themselves authorized, Scotland is a state in all but name. It has control over much of its economy, virtually all of its state spending, and control over social policy; foreign and defense policy are the only subject areas left where the Scottish Parliament has nearly no competency. It can even be argued that through its ability to promote trade within Scotland, it has foreign policy competency. The Scottish National Party may have lost the referendum, but by appearances, it has won a larger victory: independence is no longer unthinkable. Rather, it looks like the next logical step.
How, then, does this case study relate to the larger question of state and non-state action within a nationalist movement? The actions of party elites seem to mirror those of societal elites in the countries analyzed by both Chatterjee and Anderson; Scottish National Party elites sacrificed their position as guiding every action of the nationalist movement in order to ensure they would have a greater role down the line. In terms of its future as a governing party the SNP, in a manner of speaking, is haunted by the “shadow of future” (Topaloff 2012, 14). That this sacrifice transformed the Scottish National Party from a cadre party to one of mass membership, and thus made its adolescent years more mirror a social movement, ties in to the argument made by Urla; nationalist movements need not always be formed in smoke-filled rooms, and the actions of those nationalist actors can often take place on the street. Embracing grassroots activism, as well as shifting positions in order to garner a wider coalition of voters, is similar to some of the Zionist parties and movements studied by Shelef; one key point of difference, of course, is that Scottish nationalism has tended to be unified under one banner, at least since 1934. Differences in emphasis, however, make the comparison apt. Certainly not all actors, only a majority, were content with the SNP’s shift towards incrementalism, for instance. Even Hobsbawm and Ranger’s view of actors seeking to cultivate an identity is applicable to the SNP; their actions in the run up to the referendum, even if taken by state rather than non-state actors, mirrored those taken by Welsh revivalists. The effort was on creating a movement in favor of an ideal, and in the years leading to the referendum itself, the Scottish government was effective at promoting the ideal of a Scottish state.
It is in comparison to the state actors, however, that the Scottish case most aids our understanding of nationalist movements. It should be prefaced by saying that the Scottish government has not faced the crisis of identity that Danforth’s Greek and Macedonian actors faced; there is no longstanding animosity between England and Scotland that could lead to the extraordinarily petty squabbles that pervade Danforth’s work. Rather, there is a disagreement about the future of a state and of a portion of that state seeking its own measure of sovereignty. To that end, the Scottish quasi-state has sought to mirror the actions in Danforth’s study by promoting an image of Scottishness that cannot be countered by the British government. Gellner would approve as well of the way in which the SNP acted in order to press a nationalist advantage. In seeking an incremental road towards independence, and specifically in designing the referendum to fall during a time of heightened patriotic fervor, a fervor nurtured and encouraged by the Scottish quasi-state, the Scottish nationalist movement successfully co-opted the levers of state power and forced the state to promote the nationalist ideal.

It is, however, Barreto’s work that is most directly comparable to the Scottish case study. There, as in this case, the focus is on a state actor seeking to act as a vote aggregator. Like several of the political parties analyzed in Puerto Rico, the Scottish National Party set aside some short term victories in order to secure a long-term advantage. In the case of Puerto Rico, it was language policy. In the case of Scotland, it is the road to independence. Scottish National Party elites and parliamentarians, whether intentionally or not, used the referendum campaign to secure another incremental step forward on that
road. Home rule is now likely to be a reality, rather than the dream it seemed to be when the SNP first formed government in 1997.

The future of Scotland is, if anything, in more doubt than before the referendum campaign, and that can and will only strengthen the hand of Scottish nationalists as the years progress. Home rule is a satisfactory status for Scotland only for the moment; the trouble with incrementalism from a unionist perspective is that it never ceases to move forward. Having given the SNP its long-desired power over the purse north of the border, unionist actors in the United Kingdom may only have delayed the inevitable. Scotland is now independent in all but name, and the question then becomes very stark. How long can the British state hold out before the “all but name” is dropped, and Scotland is able to, in the words of its unofficial national anthem, “be the nation again?”
Understanding the history and political parties involved in the process of Scottish nationalism is, however, only one way to look at the resurgence of national sentiment in Scotland itself. As with almost all issues in comparative politics, an analysis which focused solely on history would be thoroughly lacking. That the Scottish National Party has successfully co-opted large segments of the electorate through rational choices and state institutions, building a movement inside the bounds of a political party, only tells half the story. To understand more of the story, it is necessary to understand the more global context, and to offer a potential explanation as to why nationalism is appealing now more than ever.

In any case study analyzing a modern European state, or would-be state in the case of Scotland, it is necessary to understand the pan-continental context. The traditional Westphalian state is no longer the sole source of state identity. Rather, there are now conscious efforts by state elites and elites on a multistate level to encourage the development of a new identity, one which replaces state loyalty with a loyalty to something larger. In a European context, that new identity is “Europeanness,” or an adherence to Europe rather than a specific nation-state. While politically controversial, as will be seen in the specific Scottish context, the process of forging this European identity helps to explain why nationalism is a recourse for many members of the European public.

First, as ever, it is necessary to define what this attempt to reform political attitudes and identities actually is. Termed *Europeanization*, at its simplest this process is an
effort to replace or complement existing national identities with an adherence to an identity as a European; rather than seeing oneself as a Scot, a Frenchman, or a Dane, the idea is to see oneself as a European, sharing values and ideals in common with all other men and women in the European Union. Driven by elites, the emphasis is on pan-European ideals and solutions to problems in the modern era. The European Union itself strongly perpetuates this process through its own state institutions, and the political parties which engage policy and decision making do likewise; it is a complicated process with many actors, though it is the way in which these political parties engage the process that is most illustrative for the chosen case (Jørgensen, Pollack, and Rosamond 2006).

But what is the identity being forged? Recalling Anderson’s definition of any nation or national identity as requiring the existence of a limited, invented, and political community, European identity seems to match all three requirements. Europe is limited both by geography and the imagination; outside of a small neoliberal or far-left fringe, few consider expansion beyond the bounds of the European continent to be a reasonable goal for the European Union. Even those on the fringe would not expand beyond the Mediterranean, and even then, to a handful of liberalizing or democratizing states. The imagined and envisioned borders of the European state are, fundamentally, the same as the continent itself (Jørgensen, Pollack, and Rosamond 2006). Much like Anderson’s map as a symbol of the state, or like Shelef’s competing visions of a state map, the map of Europe is a potent reminder of what the European identity is intended to unify.

The idea of the European Union is invented; indeed, prior to the Second World War, it was impossible to conceptualize a Europe in which the nation-states were united
by common ideals rather than by force of arms. The post-War era, and a common com-
mitment to preventing a third cataclysmic conflict during the twentieth century, saw an
embrace of an invented ideal: united Europe, free of military engagement, with a focus on
trade and common political aspirations. A liberal intergovernmental organization which
encourages its member states — and the European Union is careful to refer to its state
adherents as states, lest it upset nationalist groupings within them — to liberalize and in-
tegrate their economic futures, the European Union has been a grand experiment, but one
which was wholly invented (Nugent 2010).

Finally, the European community is an invented one. There is no European ethnic-
ity, no common European language, and while Christianity is prevalent, there is no singu-
lar European religion; the wars of the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras have ensured
that even Christianity is not a common unifying bond. Believing in Europe requires set-
ting aside one’s national identity in favor of an identity which focuses on the common
geographic bonds of the continent, as well as some sense of shared history. While the
history of Europe is hardly pacific, the post-War history of Europe has been an era free of
military conflict. This is in large part due to a value shift by elites. Rather than focusing
on military expenditure and expansion, elites focused state resources on economic suc-

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While acknowledging that a *European* identity crosses over classic nationalist identities
it is not without its challenges. Indeed, one could argue that this post-WWII elite-driven
identity is Christian-centric — a problematic identity in light of Europe’s dark anti-Sem-
itic past and its now considerable Muslim minorities.
cess and cooperation. Believing in this European identity, then, is to believe in a pacific ideal invented by those who sought not to repeat the mistakes of the past (Nugent 2010).

But what is Europe? What is the European Union which seeks to supplant national identity with this vaguely defined but important concept of European identity? To answer those questions, it is necessary to look at the organization itself, before then delving into how our chosen political actors engage with it.

The European Union emerged out of the ashes and devastation of the Second World War. That conflict, the second global war in a scant thirty years, left millions of military personnel and civilians dead, cities across the continent ruined, and the global order and status quo ante thoroughly ruined. The industrial powerhouses of the continent — France, Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom — lay in various states of ruin. The rebuilding process was impossible without foreign assistance, and the specter of a communist Europe dominated by the Soviet Union was a very real one. The political problems encountered by European states in the aftermath of the Second World War were, while difficult to solve, “essentially technical” and the public was focused instead on economic issues (Milward 2006, 100). To solve those problems, then, it made logical sense for like states to form some kind of cooperative organization which could solve economic problems while leaving political matters to individual states on the European Continent.

Integrating any economy is going to present unique challenges to a nationalist movement. Yielding control over any sector of society to an outside force is cause for skepticism even amongst cosmopolitan actors, let alone those who are seeking to take the
nation outside of its existing political and economic structure. The ties between economics and politics are strong enough that any action in one sphere is all but assured to have an effect on the other. Initially, there was opposition from those within the Scottish National Party to any kind of engagement with the integration process; it represented, to these actors, a very real and serious threat to the national experiment. Yet, as integration continued apace, it became clear that the Scottish electorate was less skeptical of functionalist endeavors. This resulted, as will be seen, in a clear strategic shift on the part of SNP elites (Bourne 2014; Hepburn 2006).

The process of economic integration began with the European Steel and Coal Community (ECSC), which was designed to do precisely what its name says: integrate and promote cooperation between the states of the European continent regarding steel and coal production. The industrial capacity of northern Europe had suffered greatly as a result of the Second World War, and without steel and coal, it is virtually impossible for a modern industrialized society to thrive. Coal to fuel furnaces in factories and homes alike, and the steel to construct new buildings or new goods for trade, is an essential part of a thriving economy. Rather than remain divided by former rivalries, continental European states instead agreed to cease competition between them regarding these essentials. While there are some precedents for free trade agreements, lowering the barriers between states in the realm of economic cooperation, this was the first time an industrial management experiment had been attempted at such a transnational level (Nugent 2010).

These first steps towards economic integration are important to consider in the context of Scottish nationalism because they present yet another opportunity for a politi-
cal shift. Initially, the attitude of the Scottish National Party was to oppose European integration; to trade a political master in London for one in Brussels seems a losing bargain. Yet, as will be seen, integration also presented unique opportunities for the SNP. As early as the 1970s, factions within the party were willing to mull a shift in policy should there be electoral dividends which could be reaped. Early hesitancy turned into a wait-and-see approach (Lynch 2009).

That wait-and-see approach seemed prudent. The ECSC was merely a first step in this process of integration. The specific details of how treaty negotiations were conducted, and even the treaties themselves, which followed are irrelevant to our questions of European identity and Europeanization itself. What is important, however, is the institutions and the frameworks which resulted from those further treaties. The European Economic Community was born out of a desire for further integration following the success of the coal and steel revival. Underpinned in theory which states that integrating economies and political systems leads to increasing interdependence of one state upon all others who participate, the idea was simple. By forcing the economies of Europe, in all sectors, to cooperate rather than compete, a future military conflict between the member states of the community would become unthinkable (Nugent 2010).

Naturally, this was from the start an elite-driven process. The average European citizen had little say over the process of economic integration, except in rare cases; important to the Scottish case to be considered shortly is that the United Kingdom was nearly unique in offering the public a vote on political and economic integration, albeit a vote which came years after the political elites had already acceded to membership in the or-
ganization. Instead, it was political parties and state leaders which made the decision to integrate through the treaty process; the public was forced, in most cases, to accept it as a fait accompli (Nugent 2010). This was seen as presenting a threat for nationalist actors, and one which the Scottish National Party in particular would seek to counter in the coming years, prior to a strategic shift in the way it approached the question of Europe.

But economic integration does not create the kind of interdependence that forges a lasting peace. If it did, there would have been no reason to take the European Economic Community any further. Naturally, however, the process of integration did not cease with the EEC. A new round of treaty negotiations ensued, more discussions were held between elites, and a greater interdependence was forged. Just as the ECSC had given way to the EEC — the alphabet soup of abbreviations to summarize transcontinental organizations may be one reason the public scarcely engaged this political process — so too did the EEC itself give way. In its place was forged the European Union, which was more a political than an economic body, designed to act as a kind of overarching superstate to which the member nation-states would adhere if they wished to continue to reap the economic benefits of integration (Nugent 2010).

Compelling adherence to this new political body, one which would possess the ability to make law which states belonging to it were required to adopt in their own national governments, was the final step in ensuring the organization and the ideal itself could and would survive. For elites, the beauty of functionalism and regional integration is that it is almost completely a one-way process. Integrating an economy is easy; states can alter regulation and trade policy to allow businesses to better access other markets or
to encourage healthy cooperation. But once that process has been undergone, reversing it becomes difficult. Adjusting to a more open marketplace is easy, but seeking to then close off parts of that market means running up against powerful nonpolitical interests and market forces.

It was once the European integration project had reached critical mass that we finally came to a formalized definition of Europeanization. It is, perhaps, ironic that it was not until the process had been underway for half a century or more that we had a cohesive definition for what had transpired. Instead of being defined prior to being conducted, it was only identified in hindsight. Rather than ascribe some sinister motivation to its identification coming late in the game, it is easier to look at the process in this way: because it had never been tried before, it was inherently difficult to study.

If it is difficult to study, or was difficult to study, then a cohesive definition must be the starting point. This definition, drawn from James Caporaso (2008, 27), is most illustrative for the case which we must consider shortly. Europeanization, to him and to other scholars of regional integration and functionalism in a European context, is “the process by which distinct structures of governance at the European level affect domestic structures and domestic policies.”

Unpacking this definition is relatively simple. We have already established that Europeanization was a process; beginning with the ECSC, becoming the EEC, and then forming the EU over a period of some fifty years was a slow yet methodical step towards a common goal. Distinct structures of governance exist; there is an elected European Parliament, an appointed European Commission, and a civil service bureaucracy charged
with carrying out European legislation and regulation at the state and interstate level. The
decisions made by and in these distinct structures of governance affect, directly, the do-
mestic decision making process; states cannot, except under limited circumstances, opt
out of European lawmaking or regulations, and must instead bring their domestic legal
codes into compliance with the dictates of Brussels. Domestic policies, as well as law it-
self, must also comport with the overall European agenda: the creation of a more liberal,
more open, but also unified and centrally organized superstate. The process, then, re-
mains complicated, even if it is better able to be identified.

Once the process had reached a point where it could be identified not just by aca-
demics and political elites but by the general public, it became far easier to study, both in
academic and lay terms. Some individuals found that they liked the process and the bene-
fits it afforded them; these tended to be individuals who were more willing to accept the
dictates of societal elites, or else those who preferred a more cosmopolitan view of hu-
man nature and of transcontinental governance. But others found that the process pre-
sented unique challenges to their identity, and in seeking to supplant that identity, they
resorted to ancient (or not so ancient) national and ethnic identities; these were, and are,
the nationalists and national conservatives who seek to claim in the future the same role
that the nation-state played in Europe’s past, albeit few seek to radically alter the struc-
ture of the European experiment so as to permit rampant militarization to once again
threaten domestic stability.

These purported benefits were the ones to which the Scottish National Party
looked when making its strategic shifts. Whereas the 1970s were an era of skepticism,
both soft and hardline, the 1980s saw the SNP more willing to embrace the idea that integration need not be a threat to the nationalist dream of statehood. Integration was no longer frightening, perhaps because the Scottish electorate saw benefits their English counterparts overlooked. These political issue shifts became vital by the mid-1980s in order to better help the SNP differentiate itself from its political rivals (Lynch 2009).

The political dividends the SNP sought — increased votes and increased seat counts at all levels of government — came as a result of this ideological shift. It was a process deemed “modernizing independence,” a process by which the idea of an independent Scotland no longer seemed like something from the past, but from the future (Lynch 2009). By 1992, the shift in issue profile was complete; as part of an anti-Conservative consensus in Scotland, the SNP produced a document outlining its embrace of Europe, the future European Union, and the idea of European identity. If not a one-hundred eighty degree turn — the SNP never opposed a pan-European political entity in the abstract, but rather approached it with caution — it was at least a ninety degree pivot. Where once it had described itself as simply a part of Europe, not it claimed to be within Europe itself.

The revival of nationalism in Scotland has both complemented and confounded the process of Europeanization. Traditionally, nationalist movements have seen national identity as the center of their existence, and that identity as paramount. Yet, in the Scottish nationalist case study, there seems to be an element of embracing the Europeanization process, the reasons for which may confound the researcher until they are examined in depth.
Questions of Scottish adherence to the European ideal are, by nature, wrapped up in the question of how one defines citizenship in a participatory democracy; this is not unique to the Scottish case, but is a question that crosses through all nationalist case studies. Eve Hepburn defines citizenship in a multilevel system — that is, one where there are multiple levels of governance, such as is the case in Scotland — as “defin[ing] the population to whom the state owes protection and the persons who owe the state loyalty” (Hepburn 2011, 506). This fits nicely with Andersonian conceptions of the state and nation, but it presents a complication: is the European Union seen as a state by the Scottish public, and is there a sense of Europeanness amongst the Scottish electorate? And if so, how do the various political parties — but especially the Scottish National Party — reconcile this adherence to the European state with their desire for a state of their own?

Multilevel governance is inherently complicated, and so a brief overview of Scottish structure as it relates to Europe is necessary. At the most basic level, Scotland is afforded some measure of limited self-government; the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, previously discussed as a devolutionary institution, has control over a wide variety of domestic policy portfolios. While there are currently proposals to expand this control, for the moment it does not extend to full budgetary control. Budgetary matters, as well as control over foreign policy and defense, remain at the national level, in the Parliament of the United Kingdom seated at Westminster. Sitting atop both those structures, however, is the European Union.
The various political parties in Scotland have taken differing approaches to this question. Remember that at various times, all of the major Scottish political parties have claimed to encompass and engender the nationalist movement; the old Unionist Party, and later the Conservative and Unionist Party, first claimed the mantle, only to lose it to the Scottish Nationalists and the Labour Party (Pittock 2013). Since that time, battles over Scottishness have been fought on a multilevel basis, and with that debate over just how multilevel Scottish identity has become, so too has the nature of Scottish identity changed.

While the Scottish National Party, as the chosen unit of analysis, has tended to invoke notions of a glorious past, it has made tremendous efforts in recent years to develop a more comprehensive idea of Scottish identity. This is in accordance with the emphasis on cosmopolitanism found within the European Union, and encouraged by the process of Europeanization. Hepburn notes that, despite the relative homogeneity of the Scottish electorate, there have been conscious efforts in recent years to incorporate non-white and ethnic residents of Scotland. Specifically, it is noted that the Scottish National Party, unique amongst parties seeking the mantle of Scottish identity, has encouraged South Asian membership both through party organizations and through the selection of candidates (Hepburn 2011, 514).

This embrace of the ‘other’ in society, matching the European ideal of a unified liberal continent which transcends national identity, had paid dividends according to survey data. Non-white or immigrant Scots find themselves far more likely to support the Scottish National Party as a result of these outreach efforts and, perhaps most importantly
of all, define themselves *primarily* Scottish, bypassing any notion of British identity (Hepburn 2011, 514). This is key, because it ties well with the idea of citizenship and national identity not necessarily being compatible despite the efforts of state elites, something which is both encouraged and discouraged by the process of Europeanization.

This shift is vital for another reason, above and beyond the role it played in Europeanization. Leith (2008, 85) writes that the shift from an ethnic and exclusive state to a civic and inclusive state was an essential part of the SNP's strategy for aggregating votes. Manifesto commitments became more inclusive, with the SNP clearly trying to position itself not only as a bastion of the left, but as a party capable of governing in the interests of all Scottish people, not only its core base of support. This is in keeping with a European emphasis on inclusivity rather than exclusivity; inviting immigrant communities to share in the future of the Scottish state builds the case for Scotland as a modern multiethnic community, where a sense of national identity is borne out of common residence and adherence, rather than a more artificial marker.

In encouraging individuals to disregard their national identity as it relates to citizenship — for instance, all member states of the EU must note such on the cover of passports as well as fly the EU flag at diplomatic missions — the Europeanization process in Scotland has played directly into the Scottish National Party’s hands. Delegitimizing the notion of identity and citizenship being permanently coupled means that the identity that the SNP wishes to cultivate, that of Scottish rather than British, becomes easier. With this new, superstate identity being crafted, the identity that falls in the mid-level — the identi-
ty which accompanies citizenship — becomes squeezed out as individuals begin to become less comfortable with it.

Ironically, at the same time as the Scottish National Party was shifting its emphasis from exclusivity to inclusivity, its main electoral rival was doing otherwise. Faced with a more conservative (though less homogenous) electorate in England, Labour tacked towards the center on immigrant rights and the future of immigration in Britain; that the United Kingdom shares one, single Parliament for all of its constituent parts means that parties contesting the whole country have little ability to tailor broad policies to a specific subset of the electorate. In so doing, Labour permitted the SNP to grab a slice of previously supportive voters, serving to undercut its electoral performance. While Labour’s policy reversal harmed the party, it benefitted the nationalists (Lynch 2009).

What the SNP has done, in effect, by embracing those who did not fit the traditional definition of Scottish is create a kind of “civic nationalism” (Hepburn 2011, 514). This civic nationalism, similar to Lynch’s idea of a civic inclusive society, takes the form of embracing civic life rather than just political life. Culture, and embracing different aspects of culture from all individuals who call Scotland their place of residence, helps to foster a stronger identity, albeit one that is cosmopolitan. The British identity, once strong, is thus disregarded in favor of that to which an individual feels a stronger civic connection, while the European identity can be embraced as somehow distant and less tangible. Aiding efforts to create a cohesive national identity in the face of Europeanization and the challenge of new identities arising is the lack of language politics. Unlike many of the nationalist movements considered in the literature review, or indeed many of
the nationalist movements in Europe which pre- and post-date the formation of the European Union, Scotland is characterized by linguistic homogeneity. While there is a Scottish Gaelic which nationalists identify in order to raise the specter of the glorious past, it is rarely spoken outside of a few isolated communities, mainly islands off the main coast itself. So thorough is the domination of English, the language of the occupier in a nationalist sense, that more than ninety-eight percent of Scots speak it as a primary language (Hepburn 2011, 523).

If Scottish society is marked by homogeneity, why then is the question of immigration, and the SNP’s efforts to attract the support of non-traditional Scots to their cause, so important? The answer lies in the way the party addresses one of the key developments in Europeanization, as well as Scotland’s lack of a policy-making role in that development. Recall that one of the purposes behind the European Union was the closer political adhesion of each member state to each other member state. One of the ways that the EU has encouraged this adhesion is through a policy of freedom of movement; citizens of EU states, or those authorized to live and work in an EU state, are free to travel between member states and seek residency or employment at their leisure, without the usual strictures of customs or immigration enforcement (Nugent 2010).

The right to set the regulations regarding this freedom of movement, where states are permitted to make such regulations, is reserved to national governments however. As a result, it is Westminster and not Holyrood which determines immigration policy in accordance with European law. The Scottish National Party, and Scotland itself, have little input over the way in which the decisions are made at that level; Scottish MPs have a
vote, certainly, on British law but are rarely enough to swing a decision in one direction or another. Control over immigration policy is one that has been demanded by the SNP, but as of the publication of the Scottish government white paper, there seems to be little political will to devolve this policy (Smith 2014).

As a result, Scottish nationalists are left with something of a dilemma. There is, to be sure, a national character which exists and which they have defined for themselves. There is a population which can be identified as quintessentially “Scottish” and a population which clearly does not fit that traditional definition. A choice, then, is present for the would-be nationalist: alter the national definition and the definition of Scottishness to incorporate these newcomers, or cling to a more firm definition of who fits the nation. The latter would be the traditional route for nationalist movements, but it seem the Scottish National Party has chosen the former route.

The explanation for this decision seems based on a logical conclusion: if the ultimate goal of a nationalist movement is to secure an independent state of one’s own, then in the modern era that nationalist movement cannot risk playing the politics of division within its own claimed borders. Seeking to make immigrants into an Other would only provide a distinct class of individuals with a motive to oppose independence. Cultivating allies in immigrant communities has paid enormous dividends for the SNP. Where once immigrants, specifically South Asian and Muslim immigrants or their descendants, were a bastion of support for the pro-London Labour Party, today that is no longer the case, and that segment of the electorate has been captured by the SNP. An outright majority of
these new Scots support an independent Scotland, and a plurality have become regular SNP voters (Hepburn 2011, 514).

This aggregation of ethnic voter support for the SNP’s ultimate goal is in line with the earlier stated goal of promoting civic nationalism, something that is not incompatible with a European identity. Indeed, much of the European project has been designed to encourage a multicultural approach to governance. European institutions dedicate themselves to the idea of a single Europe, and encourage member states to adhere to this ideal as well, to mixed results. In fostering this multicultural, European identity, one would expect it to challenge a pre-existing national identity like the one in Scotland. Yet, it has not; instead, the Europeanization process has merely encouraged shifts in thinking by Scottish political actors.

This can be seen through the changing language used by Scottish nationalists. Where once the focus was solely on Scottish culture, more recent textual analyses suggest there has been a shift. Manifestos for Scottish elections that have been put out by the SNP have since 1997 focused on a multicultural Scotland; citizenship in an independent Scotland, for instance, would be determined based on residency within the state’s borders, rather than national origin or being restricted to a *jus sanguinis* definition (Hepburn 2011, 514).

Efforts at integrating ethnic minorities into Scottish society, or seeking to portray ethnic communities as a natural part of the nationalist movement, is unlikely to secure the SNP permanent majority status. These groups are, when compared to the total population of Scotland, relatively small; as a proportion of the electorate, they are yet even smaller.
But embracing this multicultural element offers the Scottish National Party a “moral” victory; it is difficult to portray a multiethnic, multicultural political party as somehow the face of the other (Hepburn 2011).

But if the Scottish case has exemplified the process of a nationalist party using European ideals of integration and social cohesion to build a movement, how has the Europeanization process and relations with the European Union shaped the way the nationalist party looks to the future? The ultimate goal of any nationalist movement or political party, under an Andersonian analysis, is to secure a state for the claimed imagined community the party or movement seeks to represent. That means developing state institutions and using leverage from those institutions to secure home rule or independence.

The history of the fight for an independent Scotland has already been repeated at length. What is relevant now, however, is how European integrationism and the European Union have inadvertently promoted that fight and enabled Scottish nationalists to better envision not just their glorious past, but a kind of glorious future in which the dream of an independent Scottish state might be realized. At present, thinking within the Scottish nationalist movement, and the SNP in particular, is to continue embracing the European Union as a means to an end.

Policy of the Scottish Government, and thus of the Scottish National Party, has been to depend on continued membership in the European Union post-independence. The secession from the United Kingdom, they argue, would be more orderly if it took place in a framework where European Union membership were maintained (Bourne 2014). This is evidence that even the most diehard of nationalists do not see Scottish identity as incom-
patible with European identity and adherence to the European Union. In fact, it seems to be a desired aspect of the future of a Scottish state; while this makes sense from an economic perspective, it also makes sense from a nationalist’s political perspective. Giving up the benefits of the European Union would offer no tangible rewards if independence is truly the goal; Scottish nationalists seek a state, not complete and total isolation from the rest of the world.

Scottish nationalists sought to put forth an argument during the referendum campaign as well as during discussions of what a future Scottish state would look which all relied upon continued membership in the European Union. To the SNP, to be a European was a fundamental part of being a Scot, while being British was somehow irreconcilable as a national identity. Arguing that because Scotland, as a contingent part of the United Kingdom, had maintained membership in the European Union for more than forty years, there was no reason to assume that Scottish citizens would lose their rights as EU citizens immediately upon completing the process of seceding from the UK (Bourne 2014).

This argument, tying in to discussions of citizenship and nationality, was carefully constructed to avoid inserting a new aspect of the identity debate into the referendum campaign. Yet, it was countered early on by figures within the elite of the European Union. While proclaiming neutrality in the identity issue and what it deemed to be domestic affairs, the civil service rendered its opinion on Scottish membership within the European Union in the event of secession. The argument put forth by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso — the titular head of the EU’s enforcement arm — was that a newly independent Scotland would not be the beneficiary of a grandfather
clause or any other form of preferential treatment. It would be a “third state,” meaning someone who was neither a pre-existing member of the EU nor a state considered a candidate for immediate admission; the process it would have to follow would be the same as all other applicants. In the event secession were successful, Scottish nationalists would need to find another route to maintain EU membership (Bourne 2014, 106).

Even if the argument put forth by Scottish nationalists regarding EU membership was not supported by certain members of the European elite, it is still significant in that it represents a dedication to maintaining the framework of European economic integration. In the past, the SNP had been cautiously skeptical of embracing Europeanization and Europe as a whole. Integration, they posited, could challenge the nationalist dream of an independent state. Is it truly independence if a nationalist movement trades rule in London for rule in Brussels? For Scottish nationalists, however, a calculation had to be made. To shift away from this line of thinking, the line of thinking which saw Europe as a threat, would be a major shift which would require an incentive from the electorate (Hepburn 2006).

There is evidence that concerns over EU membership did not sway the Scottish electorate, however. Unlike their English counterparts, voters in Scotland are more Europhilic than Eurosceptic, and see membership in the European Union as benefitting to them, as well as complementing their identity. Even when half or a majority of English voters were expressing a desire to withdraw fully from the European Union, scarcely a third of Scots indicated likewise, with the numbers even lower for those who supported independence (Bourne 2014, 113-114). Anti-EU sentiment is likewise rarely expressed in
the political arena; the Scottish National Party, pro-European and pro-EU, remains the most popular party with the Scottish electorate. The United Kingdom Independence Party, chief amongst those parties towing the Eurosceptic line, performs relatively poorly as compared to England and Wales (Bourne 2014).

Embracing the European Union may have been a political tactic by the SNP in order to avoid a larger debate on the issue; debates over Europe have had the effect in England of removing the oxygen from a political campaign and allowing that singular issue to become a defining one. The already more pro-European electorate in Scotland has not been presented with a similar debate; indeed, all the major political parties, but especially the Scottish National Party, have made an effort to keep Europe out of Scotland, even as they call for a Scotland that is inside of Europe (Hepburn 2006).

This policy, deemed “independence-in-Europe,” lies at the heart of Scottish nationalist responses to Europeanization. Initially, the Scottish National Party viewed the European Economic Community, the forerunner to the European Union, with intense and inherent skepticism. Already wary of the Scottish public being controlled from Westminster, there were concerns about adding another level of governance which was even further removed from the centers of power north of the border. Europe was seen as “centralist and elitist,” with little place for the opinions or attitudes of regionalist actors (Hepburn 2006, 229). The Scottish electorate, however, seemed to disagree, and rejected the SNP’s efforts to block British accession to the EEC and to joining the European project.

This rejection led the party to reconsider its stances. Rather than continuing to place itself on the wrong side of the Scottish electorate, the SNP contested — and won —
Scottish Parliament elections beginning in 1979. It is, perhaps, telling that one of the first successful candidates the SNP sent to Brussels was Winnie Ewing, of prior fame for claiming the first Westminster seat. From that point on, SNP participation in the European Union was taken as a given, and the party began a process of embracing the idea of a Europe which had a place for regionalism and parties which advocated for change from within (Hepburn 2006).

One of the reasons, if not the paramount reason, for the Scottish National Party’s embrace of Europeanization and the European Union is that it provides an “alternative framework for security and trading opportunities” which stands in opposition to the framework of the United Kingdom (Hepburn 2006, 238). The European Union’s primary purpose, even with the expansion of its sectoral competencies, has always been mutual prosperity and security. Seceding from the United Kingdom becomes less frightening an option for both the public and elites within Scottish society. Removing Scotland from the United Kingdom, they submit, is no longer a guarantee of isolation thanks to the European framework.

Embracing Europe was part of a deliberate strategy on the part of the SNP, and with it, the Scottish nationalist movement. The policies enacted by the Scottish nationalists once they took office as the Government of Scotland in 2007 continued that strategic embrace. A Scottish presence was developed in Brussels, a portfolio was established within the Scottish Cabinet which focused on relations with the European Union and how best to implement EU dictates and policies, and reversed its prior course on considering the EU as antithetical to the idea of an independent Scotland. These changes, made ahead
of and following the 2007 election, represented the final shift by the SNP from Euroscep-
tic to Europhilic. Public opinion in Scotland since the Scottish National Party took office
has continued to embrace the idea of Europeanizing the country. Whereas once there
were concerns about a distant European Union being too remote for Scotland to influ-
ence, now there is a sentiment that Europe is more in line with Scottish views on social
affairs and territorial reform (Hepburn 2010, 83-97).

European law is made by a broader coalition of lawmakers, drawn from the multi-
tude of nations which comprise the EU itself; while beholden to voters at the national
level, the influence of non-Scottish but British members of the European Parliament is
muted. Whereas in Westminster, the voice of Scottish MPs and nationalist sympathizers
is reduced, in Brussels it is in some ways magnified. Scottish nationalist MEPs are able to
better organize themselves by joining with other regionalist parties to magnify the voice
of pro-independence voters, sitting in groupings (a kind of pan-European political party)
to ensure influence over legislation. The strategic shift has allowed these nationalist ac-
tors to exert pressure and ensure better outcomes. While independence has not been se-
cured as a result of these shifts, it is now easier to envision a future in which Scotland is
an independent part of Europe (Hepburn 2010).
Chapter IV: Conclusions and Opportunities for Further Study

Considering the history of nationalism in Scotland as well as the role that Europe has played in shaping Scottish identity allows us to paint a fuller picture of the Scottish nationalist movement, as well as to draw comparisons to similar movements worldwide. What makes the Scottish case particularly compelling, even in comparison to movements elsewhere in the world, is that it takes place within this new functionalist framework that sees integration as a positive, but which also seems to empower those who would prefer to integrate on their own terms. Ultimately, the Scottish case is a study in how nationalist actors are able to strategize and shift issue positions in order to secure larger and larger swaths of the electorate.

Scottish nationalists have done an incredible job of creating a nationalist movement that fits Anderson’s model of an imagined political community. They are aided in this effort by the fact that the glorious past to which they wish to harken is relatively tangible; it is easier to draw connections to a state which existed within the past three centuries, for instance, than it is for Macedonian nationalists to create connections to a state which existed on different terms some three millennia ago. The borders of a future Scottish state — should one be established — are not truly in doubt. Scotland as an entity is easy to define thanks to a longstanding, if meaningless for long stretches of time, border demarcating where the territory of England ended. In that sense, the imagined is very real, even if the ultimate goal of nationalists is yet to be achieved.
The main political actor in pursuing the dream of a Scottish state has been a single political party, the Scottish National Party, which has driven the nationalist conversation for the better part of a century. Initially a fringe group, it utilized strategic tools in order to claim for itself the mantle of Scottish patriotism. Rather than permitting another party to duplicate its success, it has remained steadfast and painted itself as the defender of Scottish interests against both English domination of the United Kingdom as well as domestic (internal to Scotland) actors who might seek to perpetuate the union (Pittock 2013).

The cooption of Scottish patriotism from the defunct Unionist Party is, in and of itself, a case study which other nationalist movements might consider emulating in the future. Rather than continue to remain a purist political operation, the SNP made a calculated decision to try and forge a better Scottish identity by making itself the party most opposed to the idea of centralization. While expressly rejecting anything but democratic means of separation, Scottish nationalists still were able to cast a kind of us-versus-them argument, pitting a future Scottish state against the pre-existing British state. This may be a classic example of how nationalist political actors engage politics, but it is one that has so far paid dividends for the Scottish movement. Rather than being relegated to the sidelines, Scottish nationalists have parlayed this battle of identities into being able to form a government and lead it in the name of the Scottish people.

Part of this strategy has been unique to the SNP. Whereas other movements sought to achieve immediate separation from the mother country, as in the case of the early Latin American movements and South Asian movements studied by Anderson and
Chatterjee, Scottish nationalists have been content to play a long game. The policy of incrementalism, of securing first a devolved Scottish Parliament, and then of forming government, and only then of seeking a referendum on independence, has led the Scottish electorate to view the prospect of independence as somehow less frightening. The incremental approach has allowed the dream of a Scottish state to have the nightmare elements — instability or international isolation — removed from consideration. Now that Holyrood holds competency over vast swaths of Scottish life, it is no longer difficult to envision the day when it might finally claim control over its own budget, foreign affairs, or defense policy. It is not only the nationalist who can dream of the future. It is the average Scot.

Indeed, it is worth noting that even when it comes to the question of who is a Scot and what identity the Scottish nationalists seek to put forward on the world stage, the movement and its SNP actors have differed from others nationalists. Rather than cling to a singular definition of Scottishness, the SNP has embraced a kind of multiculturalism that emphasizes residence in Scotland as the primary hallmark of identity, rather than specific attributes such as language, religion, or adherence to certain cultural norms. While the symbology of the movement may be similar to the invented traditions of the past, the faces of Scottish nationalism do not necessarily resemble the stereotypes. Active pursuit of ethnic minority support for independence, often paying dividends, provides the SNP with the kind of moral victory that it desires in order to further the nationalist goal (Hepburn 2011). Being able to claim a multiethnic, multicultural Scotland places the SNP in direct contravention of nationalist stereotypes. The Scottish race, as it were, is defined
as those who live in Scotland and desire its success, not simply as those who can claim a longstanding connection to the land or its traditional peoples.

Even the challenges a regionalist party faces in a multilevel system of government, where political actors exist at the local, national, and supranational level, have been well met by the Scottish National Party. The Europeanization process, that process by which political elites recognize the benefits of integration and seek to apply them within a domestic context, presents unique challenges for nationalist parties. It would be easy for a nationalist party to look to a project like the European Union and see nothing but a threat. Yet, the SNP and the Scottish nationalist movement have rejected that approach and instead see an opportunity for growth and to secure their ultimate goal.

The framework the European Union provides is one that provides comfort to the modern nationalist because it, once again, removes an element of uncertainty from the prospect of independence. Those concerned over the future of trade with the former mother country, or those who maintain an emotional connection to the mother country, can take some measure of comfort in the idea that there will still be some ties between an independent state and its former dominator. Within the functionalist framework of the European Union — presuming, of course, that the Scottish National Party’s argument regarding continued membership is correct — England and Scotland would still enjoy tremendous ties. Politically, there would still be cause for cooperation at the European level, and economically, there is little chance of trade barriers being erected. The European Union would not allow it in the first instance, and it would run counter to the
rhetoric and policies of the nationalist movement to erect such barriers merely because they are able to do so in an independent state.

This embrace of Europe represents another strategic shift on the part of Scottish nationalist elites. Recognizing that their electorate, and indeed those who ultimately hold the keys to the dream of independence, were more pro-European than their English counterparts and that continuing to treat the EU with skepticism would hinder rather than help their cause, the SNP was more than willing to embrace the European experiment (Hepburn 2010). Beginning with their policy shifts of the late 1970s and continuing to when they gained government at Holyrood in 2007, the SNP treated Europe as an opportunity rather than a challenge. By engaging Europe on a meaningful level, they can help to foster an identity which complements rather than challenges Scottish identity. European identity is still, to an extent, vaguely defined. It is a term that many use, but few understand, and this suits the needs of a would-be seeker of independence. Being part of Europe, they are able to argue, is part of being Scottish. After all, it is independence-in-Europe which the SNP now seeks.

Questions still remain, of course, about the future of the Scottish nationalist movement and about the SNP itself. The failure of Scottish nationalists to secure independence in the 2014 referendum was, in a sense, a setback. The incrementalist experiment had failed to establish a state — for the moment. What the independence referendum did do, however, was ensure a place for Scottish nationalists at the constitutional reform table. The response to the referendum by the British government was to offer up what amounts to home rule, something nationalists had desired since at least the 1960s.
The Smith Commission’s decision to embrace that nationalism was a legitimate political force in Scotland, even above and beyond the fact that a nationalist party held government, provides additional opportunities for Scotland’s future. Acting on that report is likely to take time, and a forthcoming general election in the United Kingdom—one which may, if current polls are to be believed, see the SNP in a position to determine the next government — only ensures that action will be delayed through the next year at least.

Moving forward, those who seek to study the Scottish nationalist movement have a depth of material to work from, as well as the beginnings of a model to which other movements worldwide might be compared. To gain a greater understanding of what direction the nationalist movement might take, it is possible to look at movements that have suffered similar setbacks. Quebec’s nationalist movement still thrives despite the repeated failure of their nationalist actors, the Bloc and Parti Québécois, to secure independence for that state. Instead, those nationalists seem content to bide their time for the moment, a strategy which the Scottish National Party seems likely to take in the foreseeable future. Scottish nationalists, however, seem ready to chart a different path than their Canadian cousins; the energy has not been drawn out of the nationalist movement by the referendum defeat. If anything, it appears to be stronger than ever.

The dream of a Scottish state is a relatively modern one, drawn in part by longtime satisfaction of the Scottish electorate with their position within the United Kingdom. Once it reared its head, however, a point of no return was reached. The incrementalist approach of the Scottish National Party, coupled with a resistance on the part of British actors to indulging nationalist visions until their hand is forced, have made the dream look
more and more like a tangible reality. The use of Europe as a tool, rather than as a bo-

geyman to be feared, enable those who dream of an independent Scotland to calm the

fears of those who see trouble ahead should a secessionist referendum ever succeed.

Whether Scotland can, in the words of the anthem of the country, be the nation again are

not yet certain. What is, however, certain is that unlike many nationalist movements, the

possibility is very real, the imagined political community as very tangible, and the future

is ripe with opportunities waiting for the right person or actor to exploit.
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