The Birth of Globalization:
The World and the Beginnings of Philippine Sovereignty, 1565-1610

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by

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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In this dissertation, I argue that early Philippine sovereignty developed not only as a consequence of Spanish imperialism, but in a fuller sense, in relation to a convergence of global forces emanating out of the early modern Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and East Asian worlds. Before 1565, the place now known as the Philippines was an undefined extension of the Malay archipelago, populated by dozens of ethnic groups, living in a myriad of independent villages, scattered over thousands of islands. By 1610, however, a hybrid system of early modern power had unified hundreds of these villages into a blended network of colonial authority. This transformative process marked both the beginnings of the modern Philippine nation and also the completion of the birth of globalization.

I describe this dual process through three intersecting micro-histories: one of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, a Spanish conquistador, another of Miguel Banal, a Tagalog chieftain, and the third of Eng Kang, a Chinese merchant. In relation to globalization, each of these leaders—and the populations they represent—was a direct participant in a word-wide convergence, and each also engaged in the convergences of the other two. The first of these convergences was that of Spain and Portugal, the second was of Islam and Christianity, and the third was of Chinese silk and American silver. Collectively, these convergences finalized the birth of globalization by completing the first full-circle global network of power, culture, and commerce.

As these convergences stabilized, they also incorporated the emerging Philippine colony into three external systems of authority: the European imperial system, the Southeast Asian Moro system, and the Chinese tributary system. Meanwhile, Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang were also involved in three interrelated conquests: the conquest of Cebu, the conquest of Manila, and the conquest of the Parian. Together these conquests created a blended form internal authority over
the newly unifying colony, a blended structure of power that included elements of authority drawn from each of these men's native cultures. This blended internal structure of power complemented the above mentioned external systems of authority to form the beginnings of Philippine sovereignty, beginnings that were thus intertwined with the creation of the final link in the birth of globalization.
For my Dad, Daniel Leland Hawkley
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I do not feel I can describe the contributions that many dear friends and colleagues have made to this dissertation without telling a brief biographical story. On my twentieth birthday, I was living away from my family in the town of Baler, Aurora as a missionary, struggling to learn Tagalog among Filipino members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (a.k.a. Mormons). That morning, the Mormon community held a funeral for an eight-year-old boy who had drowned only a few days before. The boy had been the pride and joy of his family and of his community; and I too, having known the boy and being relatively young myself, felt very disturbed by his passing. In the evening, I was invited to the small home of a Filipina named 'Nanay' Baby Magno, where she presented me with a birthday cake. Then Nanay, her husband, and two other Filipino friends sang to me. I had not planned nor was I expecting any celebration, and our gathering was small and quiet. This was a simple gesture of kindness, and it did little to dispel the gloom of the day. But it nevertheless did a lot for me personally during a difficult time.

I tell this story for three reasons. First, I feel that it would be inappropriate for me to acknowledge anyone for the production of this work without first recognizing, in some measure, the exceptional generosity of numerous Filipino friends, people who have overwhelmed me with kindness time and again, even though they have consistently been in more difficult circumstances than I. Don Mayang, the Tanghal family, Gilbert Martinez, Baby Magno, Trinidad Ronato, Joel Valen Jr., Bishop Gonzales and family, Jimmy Doliente, the Francisco family, Celso and Florita Espiritu and family, Myrna Aragon and family, Mario and Maria Fe Aragon and family, Reynaldo and Florenita Bontilli and family, Hermenia and Danny Balucanag and family, Ramon and Corazon Gonzales and family, Danilo Ramirez, Orlan Dropite, Eric de Alday, Rey
Caparoso, Maria Lourdes Rodriguez, and innumerable others have demonstrated to me, through countless acts of hospitality and compassion, the undeniable importance and value of building friendships across cultural divides. This work was first born out of their kindness, and I hope that it ultimately contributes to their and their nation's self-understanding and welfare.

Nanay Magno's kindness also represents, to me, the professional support of many colleagues, people who have often given quality attention to my work despite other important demands on their time and focus. These have made numerous contributions that they might consider small; but as I have worked through this process, even brief emails and short conversations have frequently helped me redirect or refocus my attention and move forward. The support I received during my undergraduate career at Brigham Young University from Brian Cannon, Andrew Johns, Jenny Pulsipher, Dean Duncan, Jeff Parkin, and Kendall Wilcox guided me toward my pursuit of a Ph.D. Since the beginning of my graduate career at Northeastern University, several formal and informal advisors have continued to be a positive influence on the direction of my research. Many of this dissertation's central arguments began their formation in courses and conversations with Karin Vélez. Linda Rhoads' enthusiastic involvement in my writing, ideas, and development have also made irreplaceable contributions to this work. Katherine Luongo's methodological brilliance and high standards broke down my every assumption and then, thankfully and productively, helped me to re-form and rebuild my way of thinking about the past. The late Christina Gilmartin was always a concerned advocate, a wise mentor, and an unselfish supporter. She is someone I remain deeply indebted to, and I miss her. Tom Havens, who kindly stepped in to help after Chris' passing, has gone above and beyond what I might have expected in providing me with prompt and practical guidance, insightful
feedback, and helpful encouragement. Others from outside of the Northeastern community have likewise made important contributions to this dissertation. Richard Chu, of UMass, helped me to gain a solid footing in Southeast Asian/Philippine studies while also offering sustained interest and timely advise. Evelyn Hu-Dehart, of Brown University, has likewise contributed valuable perspective, consistent support, and practical help to this project. There are, of course, many other colleagues who read drafts, offered suggestions, and helped me to arrive at important conclusions including Harvey Green, Tim Brown, Zachary Scarlett, Samantha Christiansen, Yan Li, Burleigh Hendrickson, James Bradford, Colin Sargent, Ross Newton, Stacy Fahrenthold, Colleen McCormick, Tara Dixon, Joshua Sooter, Andrew Kuech, Allyssa Metzger, Matthew Williamson, David Albanese, Elizabeth Lehr, Omri Frenkel, Rose Marie Mendoza, Liberato Ramos, etc.

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Finally, the above story about Baby Magno's generosity demonstrates the too-often-unsung but foundational importance of my family and friends. During my time at Baler, I lived on the financial assistance of my dear parents, Dan and Renee Hawkley, and I also relied heavily on the emotional and spiritual support of other family members and friends. As I have pursued my Ph.D., these have continued to assist me in the most essential ways. The importance of the ongoing support from my mother and father to my education cannot be overstated. I am also grateful to Laura Vianna for her many sacrifices and for her steady encouragement. My siblings—Dan, Jill, Curtis, Clayton, Kyle, Anthony, and Janette—have always been close friends; and they have each done more than they know in helping me to get through many of the personal and professional challenges that I have faced during the years that it has taken to complete this project. The various spouses and children who have become part of our family—Randy, Rachel, d'Artagnan, Candice, Iris, Chime, Brandan, Roots, Mercedes, Lauren, Olivia, Cohen, Mike, and Lilly—have all likewise done more for me than I can even begin to say, as have Matthew Wyatt, Matthew Bodett, and the entire Revere Second Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Without these and numerous others, whom I believe that God has generously placed in my path, this project would never have been started or finished.

The cake I ate on my twentieth birthday is, in some ways, a terribly inadequate symbol of the overflowing generosity I have received from others over the years. Cake alone cannot sustain us through very much for long. But to me, it remains a symbol of comfort, an assertion that I never have been alone, either in my failures or in my successes. It is a humbling reminder to me of the countless times that others have unselfishly prioritized my goals and needs above some of their own. I have, throughout this process, been part of several supportive communities, and the
merits of my work belong as much to them as they do to me. The shortcomings of this dissertation, on the other hand, are entirely my own.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Like most births, rebirths, beginnings, and origins, the birth of globalization was accompanied by the giving of new names. Among those receiving names from this beginning were a Spanish conquistador, a Tagalog datu (or chieftain), and a Chinese merchant. The Spaniard, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, received a Philippine name: Basal; the Tagalog chieftain, Miguel Banal, took on a hybrid name, his first name being Spanish and his last name coming from his indigenous language; and the Chinese merchant, Eng Kang, was baptized into Catholicism and christened Juan Baptista de Vera. Together these three men, with their five separate names, helped to form a new power at the crossroads of various global forces, a crossroads that completed for the first time in history a truly global network of around-the-world political, economic, and religious flows. This new power, a new sovereignty, then gave definition, meaning, and political force to a final name, a name that represents both a modern nation and the birthplace of globalization. That final name was 'the Philippines.'

Before 1565, the place now known as the Philippines was an undefined extension of the Malay archipelago, a collection of islands populated by dozens of ethnic groups, living in a myriad of independent villages, scattered over thousands of islands; and power was similarly diverse, divided, and dispersed over the region in thousands of villages ruled by small independent pockets of chiefly authority. By 1610, however, hundreds of these uneven pockets had been linked together and stabilized into a unifying and expanding multiethnic network of blended sovereignty. This network of power, and its lands, came to be known after the name of a Spanish King, Philip II. But the network was, in reality, pressed together by various forces
emanating out of multiple world regions, and it was also governed by a blend of diverse authorities.

Modern Philippine sovereignty, in other words, emerged not just from Spanish expansion but from a convergence of forces coming out of the early modern Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and East Asian worlds; and despite this network's Spanish label, Philippine *datus* and Chinese merchants—like Miguel Banal and Eng Kang—also played crucial roles in the origins of stable Philippine governance. Between 1565-1610, the Philippine islands were not simply being colonized, they were being globalized, not merely being overrun and redefined by a single imperial power and community but by diverse forces and peoples that can only be fully understood when viewed on a truly global scale.

This dissertation describes the birth of globalization and the construction of Philippine sovereignty through the lives of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, Miguel Banal, and Eng Kang. These three leaders and their communities were thrust together by various global convergences, convergences that completed the first network of around-the-world authority, culture, and commerce. Legazpi, traveling from Mexico to Southeast Asia as a Spanish conquistador, represented the expansion of Atlantic forces into the archipelago, where he converged with Portuguese authorities who had migrated to the region through the Indian Ocean. The heritage of Miguel Banal included the precolonial expansion of Islamic influences into Manila, an expansion that, like the Portuguese empire, arrived in the islands from the Indian Ocean. When Legazpi arrived, the Islam of Banal's ancestors met European Christianity, a religious convergence that would have lasting effects on Southeast Asian spirituality. Eng Kang, furthermore, brought silk from China to Manila so that he could exchange it for the Spaniards' imported silver from the
Americas. This convergence of commodities influenced not only the Chinese and the Spanish but also the indigenous peoples of the archipelago, the Japanese, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and others. Indeed, the convergence of silk and silver at Manila influenced the entirety of the newly emerging global economy. The powers, beliefs, and products of these three men—and of the peoples that they represented—began, in short, the interconnection of three world regions, an unprecedented overlapping of world-wide forces.

This overlapping of global forces collectively produced the original blended configuration of early Philippine sovereignty. Legazpi, Banal, Eng Kang and their peoples assimilated the Philippine colony into three external systems of authority: the European imperial system, the Southeast Asian Moro (or Muslim) system, and the Chinese tribute system; and the collective internal power of these three leaders interlinked European, indigenous, and East Asian peoples into an interdependent political community, one under a new unified and hybrid authority. Legazpi, who became the first Spanish governor over the Philippines, exerted local influence in the islands not only through European forms of power, but he and his people also adopted specifically Southeast Asian practices in their relationships with indigenous Philippine peoples; Banal, a Tagalog datu, similarly formed a relationship with the Spaniards that incorporated Hispanic elements into his traditional methods of personal power; and Eng Kang, a Chinese merchant, likewise adapted earlier practices of authority among Chinese seafarers to fit the emerging colonial system. Collectively, these three leaders and their respective communities formed a new sovereignty. This is not to say that Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang were on structurally equal footing within the new blended colonial hierarchy. They were not. But each of
them, nevertheless, represented a layer of authority that could not be replaced, all three being essential to the formation and functioning of the larger whole.

An imagined meeting between these three leaders, and their multiple names, can help to explain how the birth of globalization was intertwined with the stabilization of early Philippine sovereignty. We might imagine each man coming to such a meeting with specific objectives, goals related to how he and his people might benefit most within their newly shared globalizing environment. As they negotiate with one another, the uneven nature of colonial authority causes each to emphasize his Spanish name—Legazpi, Miguel, and Juan Baptista de Vera. Eventually—as they discuss the convergences of Spain and Portugal, of Islam and Christianity, and of silk and silver—they come to a tense agreement about their various roles, the combined authority of a Spanish governor, an indigenous chieftain, and a powerful Chinese merchant thus coming to form the basis of joint colonial sovereignty, each individual's power within their new global reality thereby becoming interconnected with, and even dependent upon, the other two.

After their meeting, Miguel, the datu, returns to his people, enforcing this arrangement as Banal and referring to Legazpi as Basal; meanwhile Juan Baptista de Vera likewise goes back to Manila's Chinese immigrants, implementing colonial policy under the name of Eng Kang; and Legazpi similarly returns to his followers, where he assures them that the shared linguistic root of these three men's Spanish names is proof of both colonial unity and of Spanish domination. Indeed, the new name of the colony itself, "the Philippines," has continued to suggest and reaffirm through several centuries that the political unity of the archipelago was primarily a "Spanish" accomplishment. This unity, however, was more the result of a trinity of authority than
it was of a single expanding empire, the three blending into one sovereignty, and the one sovereignty also being divisible into three.

In reality, such a meeting was not possible, Legazpi having died in 1572 before Eng Kang's arrival; and the simplicity of this metaphor—with its neat divisions between the Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous communities, each listening to just one leader—also masks a much larger and far more chaotic reality, a reality that also included diverse Portuguese, Dutch, Japanese, Southeast Asian, Amerindian, and even African peoples, a reality wherein leadership over each of these groups was often contested and divided, a reality wherein individuals from these sundry communities intermingled with each other in thousands of daily transactions, a reality defined by a multitude of encounters that could never adequately be tracked or described, the complexity of each interaction being multiplied further by the diverse ways that participants perceived their various personal and communal relationships.

But rather than nullify the value of this imagined meeting, the complex reality of the early Philippines instead affirms the necessity of blended governance. While it was true that the European veneer over early Philippine sovereignty reflected Spanish dominance, this overarching layer did not represent the system itself. Early Philippine sovereignty, instead, reflected a simplified version of the islands' new multiethnic on-the-ground reality. Philippine sovereignty interacted with global and local complexities through diverse peoples and leaders; and the importance of these various ethnicities and officials to the formation and functioning of unified power was not entirely dependent on their rank within the collective hierarchy. Their significance to early Philippine sovereignty was, rather, more a matter of how essential their contributions were to the creation and survival of the whole.
In the face of such diversity, in other words, the blending of peoples and authorities were both probable and essential. As various peoples intermingled at Manila and beyond, Banal, and Eng Kang—the Philippine *Indios*, and the East Asians—became, without question, no less vital to the stabilization of colonial sovereignty than were Legazpi and the Spaniards. More than just one man or one people, these three leaders and their diverse communities—as they negotiated their places of power with one another—created, out of infantile globalization, a new form of authority in the early modern Philippines, a hybrid configuration that funneled three powers into one developing sovereignty, a blended system of governance that gave birth and global meaning to a new place and to that place's new name. In its entirety, this sovereignty represented two historical origins; it was a new entity that manifested the beginnings of a someday nation and also the birth of modern globalization.

*Early Globalization, Colonial Sovereignty, and Philippine History*

The histories of early globalization and colonial sovereignty remain visible in the Philippine islands, as does the region's precolonial past. The nation's precolonial heritage is evident in the diversity of its people. The country is often categorized into three subregions: Luzon, the nation's largest island to the north; Mindanao, its second largest island along its southern border; and the Visayas or Visayan islands scattered between Luzon and Mindanao. Each of these subregions is home to several distinct ethnic groups: Tagalog, Bikolano, Kapampangan, and Ilocano peoples, etc. on Luzon; Maguindanao, Tausug, Lutao, and Subanon groups, etc. around Mindanao; and Cebuano, Waray, and Ilongo speakers, etc. in the Visayas. All of these various ethnic groups have undergone significant changes since precolonial times, but this diversity nevertheless continues to reflect an earlier era when these diverse peoples were
politically divided, a time before 1565, when an estimated 1.5 million people lived throughout the Philippine islands in a myriad of small towns and villages, a time when local rule was monopolized by thousands of independent *datu* chieftains.

Map 1.1
Regions of the Philippines

Today, of course, the more than 95 million people living in the islands not only recognize themselves as members of distinct ethnic groups but also as citizens of a single nation, the Filipino nation, a nation ruled by the Philippine government. This unity, however, did not begin during the era of nationalism; it rather started in an earlier colonial era. Indeed, the layer of unity
that covers and binds together the various Philippine regions and peoples into one nation under one power was born out of early globalization. Dramatic changes have, of course, happened to and within this unified Philippine social and political entity since early modern times, just as various Philippine ethnic groups have undergone major changes since precolonial times. But through all of these changes—the eighteenth century Bourbon reforms, nineteenth century revolutions, U.S. colonization, Japanese occupation, and independence—Philippine unity has remained constant. The Philippines, despite its persistent diversity, has continued as a single place with a single name for more than four hundred years.

In this dissertation, I will describe the origins of this lasting unity, origins that were intertwined with the twin births of globalization and of Philippine sovereignty. As I alluded to above, the birth of globalization—not its conception—happened in Southeast Asia as several global forces from multiple world regions converged on the Philippine islands. Taken together, these forces permanently completed the world's first full-circle network of power, culture, and commerce. I should emphasize here that I am not the first or only historian to refer to the Philippines as the birthplace of globalization.¹ In this dissertation, however, I explore, more completely than my predecessors, the full array of global forces in the Philippines by focusing on the multilayered construction of early colonial Philippine sovereignty.

Through the lives of Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang, I will show how political, religious, and economic forces combined to begin shaping the islands into a unified place, one that is now recognized in every corner of the world, a place whose existence has been acknowledged for centuries by diverse peoples from both inside and outside of the islands. Through the early

¹ See, for examples, Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Born with a 'Silver Spoon': The Origin of World Trade in 1571," *Journal of World History* 6, no. 2 (Fall, 1995); and David R.M. Irving, *Colonial Counterpoint: Music in Early Modern Manila* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9.
formation and stabilization of colonial sovereignty, the islands began to acquire their unified identity within the world's emerging global network even as that network itself completed its initial around-the-world expansion in the Philippines. In order to understand better the relationship between the formation of colonial sovereignty and early globalization in the Philippines, it will be helpful to examine first why histories of sovereignty are often separate from histories of globalization, then how these two concepts could together be part of a single process; and finally, how this global history of early Philippine colonial authority fits into the larger global history of sovereignty itself.

The separation of globalization and sovereignty is, for some, embedded into the very definitions of these two terms. Indeed, certain definitions make it difficult to imagine the co-development of globalization and sovereignty in a single place. Some scholars, for example, define globalization as a process akin to "deterritorialization,"\(^2\) while sovereignty is frequently used to mean "supreme authority within a territory."\(^3\) These definitions pit recent globalization, the supposed erasure of borders, against the older concept of sovereignty, which signifies border construction and the making of territories. Within this framework, globalization is allegedly creating a new world of unrestricted flows, flows that seem to be destabilizing and destroying the old puzzle-like world of various sovereignties. Thinking historically in this way, one might surmise that an era of sovereignty is now being overrun by an era of globalization, not that these two concepts could be part of one process.

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The adverse side-effects of this conceptual separation are evident in histories of the early modern Philippines, some of which focus on globalization while others center on colonization. Scholarship about the early globalization of the Philippine islands either focus on the galleon trade or on the beginnings of global Philippine exports during the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, histories of early Philippine colonialism tend to suggest that Philippine sovereignty formed entirely within the confines of Spanish imperialism. This dichotomy has created two incompatible images of the early modern Philippines. On the one hand, galleon scholars have described early colonial Manila as a thriving center of world trade; while on the other hand, historians of political and cultural change have often portrayed the islands as a peripheral and relatively inconsequential outpost along the edge of the Spanish empire. A discussion of how I

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4 For galleon studies see William Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, inc., 1939); Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and James Sobredo, eds., European Entry into the Pacific: Spain and the Acapulco-Manila Galleons (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Globalization Began in 1571," in Globalization and Global History, ed. Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson (New York: Routledge, 2006); and Irving (2010). These studies contrast with older histories suggesting that globalization did not begin in the Philippines until the late 18th century. For examples of these see John A. Larkin, The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 39; and Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus, eds., Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982), 1. While it is true that the nature of globalization dramatically changed in the islands, and throughout the world, during this later era, this dissertation will demonstrate that global connectivity was also central to an earlier transformation, the transformation that first unified the islands geographically, socially, and culturally into a single place.

5 For examples of the extremely valuable but still limited imperial approach see John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959; Nicolas Cushner, Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1971); Vicente L. Rafael, Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993 [1988])); and Irving (2010). Irving's work is, notably, a study that emphasize both the global and colonial nature of the early modern Philippines. His pioneering analysis nevertheless continues to suggest that colonial sovereignty was only a two-toned system of authority, one formed wholly within Spanish imperialism by the colonizer and the colonized.

6 Textbook histories of the Philippines, of course, include information on both colonization and the galleon trade. These, however, appear side by side and are not truly integrated except insofar as they explain that the Spaniards could not have stayed in the colony without the galleon trade. Though political, cultural, and economic topics are covered in these works, they still tend to portray the islands primarily in relation to the Spanish empire, making the Philippines appear as a mere colonial appendage of Spain's world empire instead of an emerging global center and a place where political, economic, and cultural forces collided out of multiple world regions. For textbook examples see Renato Constantino, A History of the Philippines: From Spanish Colonization to the Second World War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 73; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th ed. (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), 85-87; James B. Goodno, The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1991), 20-21); and Luis H. Francia, A History of the Filipinos: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York: Overlook Press, 2010), 74.
will use the terms 'early globalization' and 'colonial sovereignty' will, however, show how these two seemingly opposing concepts were in fact interdependent parts of the same process. As I will argue throughout this dissertation, the formation of colonial sovereignty was not only threatened by early globalization; it was also, more importantly, dependent upon it.

Many observers have commented on the fashionable overuse of the word globalization; and some have even questioned whether or not this term—fraught with severe oversimplifications, indecipherable complexity, and confused ambiguity—is, in fact, useful to scholars at all. Objections to the globalization fad might appear especially appropriate for scholars, like myself, writing about sixteenth century Southeast Asia, a place that may seem peripheral to civilizational world centers, during a time that some would argue bears almost no resemblance to our current global age. Conscious of these concerns, I have tailored my use of the term to ensure that it references a limited—and therefore comprehensible—set of connections. But this set, I assert, though limited in speed and quantity, was nevertheless also unquestionably global in terms of scale and sustainability.

My use of the phrase 'early globalization' to describe the late sixteenth-century Philippines is appropriate for two reasons. First, the early modern Philippines occupies a prominent place within the history of globalization. Some claim that globalization has been a part of world history for more than 10,000 years; others argue that it began 500 years ago; several maintain that it started in the nineteenth century; and some others even assert that globalization is only a few decades old. These sometimes competing claims can be reconciled when they are described and studied as different global eras: e.g. the "premodern period" (3500

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7 See for example Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 91-112.
BCE-1500 CE), the "early modern period" also referred to by some as the "first global age" (1500-1750), the "modern period" (1750-1970); and "the contemporary period" (since 1970). Because the unification of the Philippines happened during the early modern era—a period of global interconnection that has been sustained up to the present time—I am using the phrase 'early globalization' to distinguish events near the turn of the seventeenth century from previous and later periods of global interconnectivity.

In this dissertation, I suggest, as have others, that the unification of the Philippines under a single political authority represented an important turning point within the longer history of globalization—the birth of economic, political, and cultural interactions on a truly global scale. The historians Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, paraphrasing the prolific scholar C.R. Boxer, argue that Manila was the birthplace of globalization. As they describe it, globalization was born when all heavily populated contents began to exchange products continuously – both with each other directly and indirectly via other continents – and on a scale that generated deep and lasting impacts on all trading partners. This intercontinental exchange, they explain, first became a global reality with the founding of colonial Manila. My analysis modifies this claim. I assert that sustained global interconnectivity

8 Steger, 17-37.
9 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Path Dependence, Time Lags and the Birth of Globalization: A Critique of O'Rourke and Williamson," European Review of Economic History 8, (2004): 83. This definition is part of a larger debate about the birth of globalization. In this debate Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson create a model and then assert that globalization did not begin until global prices on commodities began to converge in the early 1820s, according to their model. While this price convergence was certainly a major shift in the history of globalization, their argument nevertheless limits global analysis to only one type of flow, namely an economic one, and it further proposes that only one kind of measure should be used in relation to the global economy's interconnection. As Flynn and Giráldez and others have convincingly shown, early modern globalization, even within the limited sphere of trade, had significant effects on multiple world regions as it brought them together. I, furthermore, assert that globalization was evident not only in economic terms but also in the convergences of global political powers and religious affiliations.
in the Philippines actually began six years before the Spaniards settled at Manila. But I nevertheless support the underlying assertion proposed by Flynn and Giráldez. Globalization was born when a network of power, trade, and culture first stabilized its reach all the way around the world, a network that funneled various authorities, goods, and ideas into and out of the indigenous worlds of Europe, Africa, the Americas, China, Japan, India, Southeast Asia, etc. An amalgamation of global forces certainly conceived this global network before the founding of the Philippines. Globalization was, however, born into its infantile state with the completion of full-circle interconnectivity.

Prior to the arrival of the Spaniards in the Philippines, networks of interregional trade were moving products, peoples, powers, and ideas from one end of Eurasia to the other, and these networks had also been extended into both Africa and the Americas. There was, however, no direct and permanent link across the Pacific Ocean connecting the Americas and Asia. That final link in global trade was established with the Manila galleons; and the galleons maintained a monopoly over the transpacific route for some 250 years. The founding of the Manila galleons was, however, more than just a symbolic process of interconnectivity. Historians have shown that, as tens of millions of silver pesos and their equivalent in Chinese goods flowed in both directions through Manila, these commodities had a profound influence on both Asia and on the Spanish empire. Manila was, to borrow a metaphor from the ethnomusicologist David Irving,
the final belt buckle of global trade, a buckle "whose fastening," he adds, "presaged an unprecedented acceleration in global flows and exchanges of commodities and cultural practices."¹²

My research supports and expands on the claims of Boxer, Flynn, Giráldez, and Irving by showing that early globalization was evident, not only in the trade cycling through Manila, but also in the initial formation of Philippine sovereignty itself. Prior the galleon trade, long distance connections had, at other places, created methods for moving goods and peoples over vast distances; and globalization has since exponentially multiplied, reaching now into innumerable places throughout the world, having thus grown into full-blown and mature adulthood. But between the hyper-speed of our current age and the much slower long distance connections made during premodern times, there was the birth of truly global interconnectivity in the Philippines. Because my research focuses on sovereignty, this dissertation also shows that early globalization in the Philippines involved not only the forces of global trade but also other facets of globalization, including political and religious influences as well. Together these political, commercial, and cultural forces approached the Philippines from the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and East Asian worlds.

This multidirectional and multifaceted convergence provides a second justification for using the phrase 'early globalization' in this study. As stated above, the term "Philippines" suggests that the unification of the islands was primarily due to Spanish initiatives, or colonization; and most historians have repeated this assumption for centuries. But imperial authority did not reach or establish itself in the islands absent of other essential non-Hispanic

¹² Irving, 19.
forces. The histories of Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang were also driven by the demand for Chinese products throughout the world, the relationships that the Portuguese, Japanese, and later the Dutch had with each other and with Ming China, the spread of Islam across the Indian Ocean into Southeast Asia, and the discovery and mining of massive silver deposits in the Americas and in Japan. Though the histories of these various forces were not fully known to our three protagonists, each of them was, without question, concerned about and invested in all of these developments to one degree or another.

The complexities of this situation inform one important way that I will use the word globalization in this dissertation. Rather than employ it only as a reference to the entirety of world interconnectivity, I will also use the term in a way that is akin to the word colonization, which describes a process happening within a specified place. As I will demonstrate throughout this study, we cannot fully understand the the formation of the Philippine colony without considering the collision of Spain and Portugal in Southeast Asia, the meeting of Christianity and Islam in the archipelago, and the value of Chinese silk and American silver being traded at Manila, three developments that expand our vision from the Philippines to reach all the way around the world. Analyzed individually each of these convergences was a global process; and studied collectively, there is no term short of globalization that can encompass their joint influence on the formation of Philippine sovereignty. Through these three convergences, the early modern Philippine islands were, in short, globalized, not simply colonized; they became part of a globalizing world, not just of a single expanding empire.
An explanation of the phrase 'colonial sovereignty' will provide further valuable insight into how globalization was involved in the construction of early composite Philippine authority.

Daniel Philpott helpfully defines sovereignty in the following way.

Virtually all of the earth's land is parceled by lines, invisible lines that we call borders. Within these borders, supreme political authority typically lies in a single source—a liberal constitution, a military dictatorship, a theocracy, a communist regime. This is sovereignty.  

Rather than define this form of authority conceptually by saying that it must contain certain elements to qualify as "authentic" sovereignty, Philpott defines it historically by talking about it in practice. He, in other words, accepts sovereignty's existence before explaining what it is or how it came to be. This approach is useful for three important reasons that will also help to explain the meaning of the phrase 'colonial sovereignty.'

First, accepting sovereignty as a power that exists in practice allows us to study its corporeal history as implemented, as opposed to its conceptual history as imagined. Practical and conceptual histories of sovereignty are, without question, intimately interrelated, just as the Spanish political imagination was intimately related to the colonization of the Philippines. But power did not always operate in the colonial Philippines in strict accordance with European imperial structures; and sovereignty, likewise, did not and does not always flow in accordance with idealized concepts of how it should operate.

Beginning with the acceptance that diverse sovereignties exist in the present and then working from there enables us to interrogate the unique historical origins of these powers in specific places, recognizing that each developed along a different trajectory and according to

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different principles of power. This approach stands in stark contrast to other methods that study only the origins of certain elements of modern sovereignty. Whatever the origins of Philippine self-determination, territoriality, democratic processes, or other aspects deemed by some various theorists throughout history as fundamental to sovereignty, the power itself began with the political unification of the archipelago, the unification examined in this dissertation.

This is one reason why I use the term sovereignty to describe unified early modern Philippine power. Calling it anything else would suggest that sovereignty began at a later time, e.g. when self-determination, or territoriality, or democracy was added to this already existing composite authority. Such claims devalue the archipelago's colonial past by setting an artificial and teleological Western standard on Philippine national "progress." These conceptual standards furthermore portray sovereignty as primarily a Western creation, one that cannot seemingly be traced back to non-Western systems and practices of power. I assert, however, that Philippine political unity, the most basic principle of its modern sovereignty, began long before the artificial benchmarks that scholars sometimes claim define modern sovereignty; and I, furthermore, maintain that it began through a conglomeration of diverse forces and peoples, both European and Asian.

Other similar historical approaches to the study of sovereign power can help to clarify why I have affixed the term 'colonial' to sovereignty. John Elliott explains, for example, that early modern Spanish kings, even within the limits of their European domains, ruled multiple distinct territories according to the differing local systems of these territories; and he therefore labels these kingdoms "composite monarchies." 15 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper similarly

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describe imperial power as a multiethnic composite system engaged in "the politics of difference." They demonstrate that, as an inherent part of their structure, empires had to govern over and through diverse peoples. Following the lead of these and other scholars, I refer to blended Philippine sovereignty as 'colonial' because, as with imperial power, colonial authority likewise inherently involved multiethnic and blended governance. In this way, the word colonial suggests a blending of composite power and a form of Spanish dominance, both of which were true of early Philippine sovereignty.

A second virtue of Philpott's definition is that it descriptively enables us to see, at once, sovereignty's two most basic political components: internal authority and external influence. Philpott's definition emphasizes that sovereignty is exercised within certain delineated borders; but he also contextualizes that internal authority within a global system of sovereign states, a system that is governed by what he calls a "constitution of international society," or "the basic rules of authority that define international relations." This represents sovereignty's external power, its ability to operate within a system of other powers. Modern sovereignty, in other words, is not just the territorial power of a single nation-state within its own borders; it is also a means of partitioning and governing the entire world. It represents an overarching global system of governance. Despite differing definitions of sovereignty, scholars generally agree on this mutually reinforcing dichotomy of internal authority and external influence. My use of the term

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18 Philpott, 5.
sovereignty is, therefore, also appropriate because early Philippine composite power likewise contained both of these component parts.

Finally, Philpott's definition enables us to see the complementary development of sovereignty and globalization. Recent theorists of globalization have begun to recognize it as much more than the erasure of borders, pointing out that global interconnectivity instead creates both flows and blockages. Thomas Eriksen explains, for example, that "globalization does not entail the production of global uniformity or homogeneity"—the erasure of borders and of difference—"Rather, it can be seen as a way of organizing heterogeneity." In terms of global political power, this description helps to explain the near universal rise of sovereignty and the concurrent world-wide construction of political borders. The present global nation-state system defines the world and its people according to their relationships to recognized sovereignties—Kenyans are from Kenya, Brazilians from Brazil, and Filipinos come from the Philippines, etc. The heterogenous world and its people, through the globalization of sovereignty, have thereby been translated into a legible puzzle of heterogeneity and global differences.

This global puzzle, of course, does not always reflect realities on the ground. Various ethnic groups within several post-colonial states do not see themselves as part of a national unit, and this often leads to tensions and conflicts over which ethnic groups will control state sovereignty. But the all encompassing sovereignty puzzle nevertheless continues to dominate both world maps and the way that many have come to understand the idealized workings of state

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19 Cooper, 112.
21 The Philippines, like many other postcolonial nation-states, has a multiethnic population, and tensions exist between the archipelago's various ethnic groups. But, because of the long time that these groups have been united under a single political authority, these various ethnic groups generally identify themselves as part of a larger Filipino nation, and tensions among them are rarely manifested through violence, with the exception of some Muslim Filipinos, an exception which will be addressed fully in part two of this dissertation.
power on a global scale. Sovereignty, in other words, has become the near universal means of categorizing the world's diverse state powers and national peoples, a world-wide method of organizing heterogeneity.

This system of interaction and categorization has not grown up in opposition to globalization; it rather stabilized into its current form as part of globalization. The early globalization of the Philippines, therefore, also represents the initial inclusion of the archipelago into this developing way of organizing heterogenous powers and peoples. Every modern state, in other words, has its own unique historical relationship to the globalization of sovereignty, and this study focuses on the original incorporation of one state—the Philippines—into what would someday evolve into our contemporary world system of sovereignties. This is not to say that this evolution was inevitable. Indeed, global conceptions of power have differed throughout history. But the past has nevertheless placed us in this puzzle-like world of nation-states, and we ought to study and understand how this now global configuration of power came to be.

I will now overview briefly how colonial Philippine history fit into the larger global puzzle of emerging and stabilizing sovereignties. The Treaty (or Treaties) of Westphalia are universally recognized as a critical turning point in the history of sovereignty because, through these treaties, European powers agreed to honor one another's territorial integrity. Later, as European empires continued to extend their authority into every corner of the world, this method of organizing interstate relations also reached a global scale, and the concept of imperial sovereignty was later revised into its current national manifestation through anti-colonial revolutions. The Philippines, whose colonization began in 1565, followed this general pattern and the colony launched its movement for independence from Spain in the late nineteenth
century. After then being colonized for a second time, now by United States, the Philippines gained its independence in 1946, and eventually self determination also became a near universal and defining principle of state sovereignty almost everywhere in the world with the various decolonization movements of the 1960s.

Despite the obvious importance of Westphalia, many modern sovereignties began to form before 1648; and the current system of sovereignty, furthermore, was not the first or only option for the organization of modern inter-state relations. Modern Spain, for example, was first unified through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel in 1469; and prior to the nineteenth century, China had its own way of organizing international relations, through what is now known as the Chinese tributary system. Philippine sovereignty likewise predated Westphalia and its early modern foreign relations were organized according to multiple configurations of intergovernmental interaction. Europe's emerging society of states, China's tributary order, and a system of Southeast Asian Islamic sultanates—what I call the Moro system—all overlapped in the Philippines; and each of these three "constitutions of international society," as Philpott would call them, was part of early Philippine globalization.

Before the Westphalian system grew into a relatively flat and generalized global order during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, diverse peoples in the Philippines participated in these three distinct societies of intergovernmental association through interstate politics, commerce, and culture. Thus the three international systems were blended into Philippine sovereignty. Even now, when the Westphalian system of sovereignty has come to dominate the world's political imagination, echoes of the old Moro system and of the Chinese tributary order still reverberate along the borders of the Philippines. Islamic separatists continue, for example, to
periodically fight for independence along the nation-state's southern boundaries, while China aggressively claims territorial rights over oceanic regions along the archipelago's western frontier. Both of these disputes are historically tied to earlier colonial beginnings and to non-Westphalian systems of inter-state power.

The formation and stabilization of the internal authority within Philippine sovereignty was similarly related to the early globalization of the islands. The lives of Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang were all affected by various global forces. Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, indigenous, and other peoples, for example, all migrated to Manila from diverse locales, far and near, in response to the arrival of global trade. The challenge of governing this unprecedented collection of different peoples—a situation that has prompted one historian to call Manila the world's "first global city"—led to the creation of a unique system of internal authority. Within the colonial system, Philippine chieftains continued to rule over their followers, powerful Chinese merchants ruled over the Chinese immigrants, and Spanish elites similarly ruled over the Spaniards. The Spaniards, of course, tasked themselves with overseeing the entire structure, but this did not negate the forms of colonial authority exercised by non-Hispanic peoples.

One might argue that, because Spaniards sat atop the colonial hierarchy of authority, they were, despite this composite structure, the islands' true sovereigns. This assertion, though congruent with some definitions of sovereignty, nevertheless overshadows a complex system of authority in practice with a simple claim to supreme authority in principle. Describing sovereignty in practice shifts the value of various individuals and peoples within the larger power structure. In theory, one's importance within a hierarchy depends on their position, those atop the

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22 Irving, 19.
pyramid being more valuable than those farther down. In practice, on the other hand, the importance of a person or people to the construction of sovereignty has more to do with the indispensability of their contributions than it does with the level of their rank in a conceptual hierarchy.

It is attractively simple to describe the organization of colonial governance solely within the clearly delineated apparatus of the Spanish imperial imagination, a vision of a single king's sovereignty being distributed among his subjects in an easy-to-follow progression from top to bottom. As a composite structure, however, power bound Philippine sovereignty together by flowing in more than one direction, through more than one system of authority, and through more than one group of people. It was a colonial system, a blended sovereignty, one that included the Spaniards' claims to a hierarchical monopoly, but one that was not wholly defined by this claim. Philippine sovereignty, rather, also depended on indigenous and Chinese peoples who applied their own principles of political organization and power to the archipelago's emerging global situation. Collectively, these peoples and powers began to unify Philippine diversity into a single system of sovereignty, one that has been altered time and again over several centuries but one whose enduring unity also nevertheless remains.

Methodology and Overview

Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang represented three layers of blended sovereignty, layers that were eventually so tightly intertwined as to become interdependent parts of a single system. In order to examine this complex system of authority, this dissertation is organized into three parts, each part being devoted to one of our three main subjects—Legazpi, Banal, or Eng Kang. These parts are each subdivided further into an introduction, a two chapter micro-history, and a
conclusion. The introduction of each section provides an overview of one leader's life, a synopsis of that segment's main arguments, and a summary of its contents. The body of each part is then divided into two chapters that reflect the two components of sovereignty, the first chapter in each part examining the construction of external influence, and the second chapter describing the formation of internal authority. The conclusion then explains some of the ways that external influence and internal authority symbiotically reinforced one another to form one of three layers of authority, three layers that collectively stabilized one another into the beginnings of early Philippine sovereignty. In their entirety, I describe these three layers as part of a larger integrated and interdependent whole, a blended or 'colonial' sovereignty. A more detailed explanation of this methodology and an overview of my three sections will further clarify how this blended network of authority came to be.

I have organized this dissertation into micro-histories for three primary reasons. First, micro-histories tend to emphasize contingency and the importance of human agency in historical processes. By focusing in three individual leaders, I am therefore trying to convey that these processes did not have to happen as they did. That is not to say that Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang individually controlled their fates or the fate of the colony. But focusing on these three nevertheless demonstrates both the power and limitations of human choices within the newly emerging global environment of the Philippine islands. The second reason is that, in early colonial times, political leaders from the various ethnic groups in the Philippines—like Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang—were often what some would call "big men," or powerful individual patrons; and describing the formation of sovereignty through these three leaders and their networks of followers gives added emphasis to the centrality of personal patronage networks.
within the colonial governing structure. Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang were not, of course, the only powerful big men in the Philippines during their time, but their life stories can help us to imagine what the several other leaders in the archipelago may have done both to support and to defy the new system of Philippine power.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, my micro-historical approach enables us to see, more clearly, how the blending of multiple peoples, powers, and forces into a single stable system of governance depended, in large part, on the human ability to embody different roles and identities in different circumstances. The new names of Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang, as described above, represented this ability, these names helping to facilitate the formation of blended colonial sovereignty. Eng Kang, for example, could use his Christian name among the Spaniards and his Chinese name among the Chinese, his name becoming, in both situations, a means of communicating some level of camaraderie with his audience. Through his identification with multiple audiences, Eng Kang thus helped to bring the two together, his ability to shift from one community to another making him a bridge that aided in the creation of multiethnic political unification. This in-between ability was not limited to names, nor was it restricted to just three leaders. There were, rather, several different practices that facilitated the blending of powers into one, and these practices were used by people from every group within the emerging multiethnic colonial community. Illustrating the ability to shift between communities through micro-histories makes the widespread practice of this principle easier to comprehend while also adding emphasis and continuity to our understanding of the importance of 'being in-between.'

Some might argue that micro-histories are too narrow to encompass larger processes. But, when the choices of one individual are compared to the actions of others, micro-histories can enable us to see the larger map of historical possibilities within various situations. Comparing, for example, Banal's actions against those of his predecessors helps us both to understand Banal himself and to understand the larger range of possibilities available to early Philippine chieftains under colonial rule, the specific individual thereby illuminating the general situation and vice-versa. Each of this study's three main subjects thus represents not only himself but also other Spanish governors, indigenous chieftains, and East Asian merchants.

The main body of each part of this dissertation is subdivided into two sections in order to examine the development of both the external and internal components of sovereignty. The external influence of Philippine sovereignty on multiple intergovernmental systems were constructed through what I will call 'convergences,' the coming together of two or more outside forces. Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang each found themselves at the center of a distinct global convergence and their relationships to these convergences incorporated the Philippines into three distinct external systems of intergovernmental relations. Legazpi—at the center of the convergence of Spain and Portugal—helped to incorporate the Philippines into the European system of empires; Banal—at the collision point of global Christianity and global Islam—was involved in the reincorporation of the new colony into the Southeast Asian Moro system; and Eng Kang—at the hub of the convergence of Chinese silk and American silver—helped to assimilate the emerging Philippine colony into the changing East Asian and Chinese tribute systems. Though each of these convergences can be studied and explained individually, all three were ultimately interrelated. Eng Kang and his people, in other words, had a relationship to the...
convergence of Spain and Portugal; Banal was affected by the convergence of silk and silver; and Legazpi was influenced by the convergence of Islam and Christianity.

The second chapter within each of the three parts describes the formation of internal authority by using the term 'conquest.' It is important to emphasize here that my use of this term will deviate from how it is commonly understood. Often defined as "gaining by force of arms; acquisition by war; subjugating a country, etc.," the word conquest frequently assumes and creates in the mind a seemingly complete cause-and-effect explanation that translates military actions—"force of arms"—into the founding of new authority—"subjugating a country." These two are, of course, related; but they are not one and the same. As this study will show, the colony won several military victories, many that they even called 'conquests,' without maintaining permanent authority over the defeated. "Subjugating a country"—or creating lasting authority in a new place—therefore, involved more than a military victory or two. Conquest, because it suggests a lasting presence, was rather a process. In order to maintain the term conquest's important association with the construction of Philippine colonial sovereignty, I am defining the term as a process of establishing new and lasting internal authority. As with convergences, Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang were each central to a distinct layer of conquest. Legazpi was part of the conquest of Cebu; Banal was involved in the conquest of Manila; and Eng Kang was a participant in the conquest of the Chinese quarter of Manila called the Parian. Through these three conquests, the colony began to create a network of lasting internal authority over diverse peoples in the archipelago, including Europeans, Africans, Amerindians, merchants from China and Japan, as well as various indigenous Philippine peoples.

Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang, and their respective communities were, in other words, each central to the creation of one layer of Philippine sovereignty, a layer combining external influence with internal authority. Legazpi participating both in the convergence of Spain and Portugal and in the conquest of Cebu, helped to incorporate his clan of migrant Spaniards into the global European imperial system while also blending his authority into the indigenous barangay system of datu power. In this way, Legazpi and his original expedition anchored these two systems to one another and thus also prepared a way for Spanish migrants to be able to survive in the archipelago. By becoming part of both systems, Legazpi and his men were able to gain essential resources from both. From the imperial system they received critical military supplies, trade goods, and building materials; and from the barangay system they obtained food, other local supplies, and crucial allies. The colony's connection to these two worlds eventually provided the government with its two primary sources of income: tribute and a yearly subsidy form colonial Mexico known as the situado. Legazpi's layer of authority thus channeled support from one local and one global system into the beginnings of colonial power.

Banal's layer brought together the convergence of Islam and Christianity with the conquest of Manila. In precolonial times, Manila's datus were part of a global Islamic mercantile network that stretched from East Asia, through the straits of Malacca, as far as the east coast of Africa. With the arrival of Legazpi's expedition across the Pacific, Manila's datus confronted sustained contact with European Christianity. Initially, Manila's Moro (or Muslim) network was blended together with the expanding network of Catholic colonial authority. As the Spaniards' power increased, however, an antagonism was established between Islam and Christianity in the archipelago, one that was soon embedded into the Southeast Asian Moro system of politics. This
antagonism coincided with the conquest of Manila. Though colonial leaders first settled at Manila in 1571, their conquest of the town took several decades to complete. Through this conquest, Spanish imperial authority was elevated over and on top of the barangay system, forming a hierarchal network that, during this era, began to reach into every part of the archipelago. Banal, as a member of the third generation of power from the time of the Spaniards' arrival, demonstrated the completion of both of these processes. As part of the convergence, Banal was completely divorced from his precolonial Islamic heritage; and within the conquest, he was fully subject to the colonial system—two aspects of his personal authority that were not true of many Manila datus in either of the previous two generations.

Finally, Eng Kang combined the convergence of silk and silver with the conquest of the Parian. Eng Kang lived in the Philippines from 1574-1603 as Chinese immigrant, a 'Sangley' as his people were called in the islands. As a powerful merchant, he was one of many Sangleys that helped the new colony to negotiate its place within the Chinese tribute system and the larger East Asian system of political powers. By functioning as a buffer between China and the Spanish empire, the Sangleys enabled silk and silver to flow between the two without generating significant conflict. The necessity of this buffer was demonstrated by a massacre at Manila in 1603, one that took the lives of Manila's 20,000 Sangleys, including the life of Eng Kang. This massacre, however, also demonstrated the existence of an internal blend of Chinese authority, one that became fully subjugated to colonial power through the massacre. This layer of Chinese power was initially blended into the colonial system through economic, political, and religious channels; and Eng Kang—who was at once a merchant, a colonial official, and a Catholic convert—represented this blending process and also why it broke down in 1603.
As stated above, these three men represented three layers of sovereignty that stabilized one another into interdependent parts of a single whole. Indeed, their lives show how these global convergences were, by 1610, intimately interconnected into a single system of blended authority. During the early years of colonization, for example, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi's expedition came to rely on Moro merchants as trade partners that brought the Spaniards food; and the Moro merchants' desire to trade with the Spaniards came from their connection to the precolonial China trade. Meanwhile, by the time of Miguel Banal, Moro datu authority in Manila had been assimilated into the Christian colonial system partly through the transpacific galleon ships' takeover of the China trade. And finally, Eng Kang's ability to make profits in the Philippine islands depended on the maintenance of peaceful relations between not only the Sangleys and the Spaniards but also between the the colony and various other external Asian and European powers, a peace that depended further on the blending and stability of European and indigenous forms of authority.

As a whole, these three leaders represented not only the beginnings of Philippine sovereignty but also the birth of globalization. At the crossroads of various world-wide influences—the Spanish empire, Portugal, Islam, Christianity, silver, silk, etc.—Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang helped to channel and stabilize these converging global forces into a system of composite authority. Over a period of forty-five years, the transactions of power that occurred between these three leaders' previously separate systems of power blended these systems into a single colonial whole, one that was recognized internally by an increasingly diverse network of Philippine villages and peoples, and that was also acknowledged externally by three systems of intergovernmental relations. As a culmination of its initial full-circle expansion around the world,
the earth's emerging network of global authority, commerce, and culture participated in a twin birth of two very different but interconnected entities—the joint birth of globalization and of Philippine sovereignty.
Part 1 Introduction:

Miguel Lopez de Legazpi

"Por quanto…" This phrase began most of Philip II's royal decrees, including the one confirming Miguel Lopez de Legazpi as the first Spanish Governor in the Philippines. Translated into English the phrase means "Inasmuch as…," and it not only introduced the reasons for Philip's decree but also wrote an interpretation of history onto the landscape of Southeast Asia. Like any interpretation of the past, Philip's decree selected facts and then placed those facts into an order that gave them meaning and significance in his world. Inasmuch as Miguel Lopez de Legazpi had been chosen to lead an expedition to the "Western Islands" by the Viceroy of Mexico, Don Luis de Velasco, and inasmuch as he had landed and settled on the island of Cebu, had fought from his settlement against several other towns, had caused a fortress to be built to defend the island, and had used some of his own money to make the expedition possible, Philip II therefore decreed, in 1569, that Legazpi would and should be the Governor of Cebu. An interpretation of Legazpi's personal history was thereby translated by Philip from a series of events into an official and legally binding title, Governor, a title over a specific geographic space, Cebu. The decree underscored the relationship between historical interpretation and power with the words that concluded all royal commands. Making the appointment official—and thus endowing his version of Legazpi's history with political force—Philip signed his order with the words "El Rey," "The King."25

A month before Philip dictated this decree to his notary, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi wrote to the Viceroy of colonial Mexico, describing a very different series of events and asking for a

very different appointment. The previous year had been a disaster. A joint Portuguese-Malay fleet had blockaded the Spanish colony's lone settlement on Cebu for four months, attempting to force the Spaniards out of the islands; and as this enemy fleet sailed away, its leaders promised that they would return to attack again soon. Furthermore, a galleon sent to Mexico with critical cargo and information had been shipwrecked, its crew having returned to Cebu on a makeshift boat cobbled together from the remnants of their original vessel. The colony's base of indigenous supporters was also rapidly deteriorating; many of Legazpi's indigenous Philippine allies were realigning themselves with some of his indigenous adversaries. "Thus we are left surrounded on all sides," Legazpi wrote, "by water and by enemies."²⁶ Exhausted in the rainy heat of Cebu's tropical July, half a world away from his longtime home in colonial Mexico, Legazpi did not want to die in the Philippines. "Have compassion on me," he begged the Viceroy, "and kindly give me permission to go into retirement."²⁷

The King's decree and Legazpi's request told two very different stories about the beginnings of early Philippine sovereignty, stories that differed because of their respective points of origin. Viewed from the capital in Spain, sovereignty appeared to flow through a singular channel from the Crown to Legazpi, a perspective that confined the story of Philippine authority to a single historical trajectory, one defined wholly by the expansion of the Spanish Empire. Legazpi, in short, following orders, went to the Philippines and created a colonial settlement. Viewed from Cebu, however, the beginnings of Philippine sovereignty depended much more on Legazpi's ability to stay alive than it did on the words of the King. Indeed, Legazpi's survival was confronting several challenges all at once. These challenges included the

²⁶ Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Letter to Marqués de Falçes" (1569), BR 3, 49.
²⁷ Ibid., 53.
Portuguese empire, the political loyalties of local peoples in the Malay archipelago, and the full width of the Pacific Ocean. For centuries, the story of early Philippine sovereignty has been primarily told from the limited perspective of the King, a perspective emphasizing only one empire and only one form of authority. In part one of this dissertation, I will begin to challenge this conception by arguing that the making of Legazpi's authority in the Philippines—the origins of modern Philippine sovereignty—included multiple empires and the blending together of multiple systems of power. The first layer of Philippine authority was, put another way, formed by a global convergence and by a local conquest.

Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was born in Zumarraga, Gipuzkoa, Spain, a town in Basque country, just ten years after Columbus' initial voyage to the New World. When Hernan Cortés first arrived in Mexico, Legazpi was only sixteen years old; and the story of Cortés' "heroic" conquest spread through Europe during Legazpi's early years of adulthood. In 1528, just before Francisco Pizarro conquered the Inca Empire, Legazpi arrived colonial Mexico, where he became a town mayor, a high ranking financial officer, and a wealthy landowner. Within a few years of his arrival, Legazpi met and married his wife, Isabel Garcés; and the couple had nine children before Isabel died in the 1550s. By the 1560s, after several decades of service, Legazpi had become a well respected official in colonial New Spain. In 1561, at age 59, Legazpi was chosen by the Viceroy of colonial Mexico to lead an expedition across the Pacific Ocean.

There are exceptions to this general rule. Some histories aptly describe indigenous modes of power. But even these focus primarily on Spanish imperialism. This focus on Spanish imperialism causes them to overlook the larger picture, which also included the Portuguese, and it also tends to underemphasize the importance of blended European-Southeast Asian power. For examples see John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Nicolas Cushner, Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1971); Vicente Rafael, Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).


Legazpi's would be the fifth major Spanish imperial fleet to make the dangerous voyage to Southeast Asia, each of the previous efforts having failed to establish a permanent colony there. All of the captains of the those past four voyages had even died in the attempt. Legazpi nevertheless agreed to lead the expedition, which departed from Mexico in late 1564. The following year, Legazpi and his men settled at Cebu, and in 1569 the Spanish colony migrated to the Philippine island of Panay. Two years later, the Spaniards moved again, this time to Manila, where shortly thereafter Legazpi died in 1572.

Since his death, Legazpi has been known to many historians as an Adelantado, a Spanish title given to governors who pioneered the expansion of the imperial power into a new place, a title that underscores the King's perspective of Philippine history. One of the reasons for the endurance of the King's history is that it was partially true. Much of Legazpi's authority indeed originated with and flowed from the Crown. But this interpretation manifests only one type of authority—Spanish imperial authority—and this authority seemingly only moved one direction—from Spain to the Philippines. Legazpi's letter, however, showed that Philip's authority was only one strand in something bigger. The Portuguese blockade at Cebu demonstrated that Philip's claims to power in the Philippines were connected to a larger developing global network of European imperial authorities. Cebu was the place where this network first completed its permanent around-the-world expansion, a process that I will refer to as a convergence of Spain and Portugal.

Legazpi's letter furthermore showed that political power also flowed from the bottom up. Philip's authority in the Philippines depended on Legazpi's survival, and Legazpi's survival likewise depended on the support of local Philippine chieftains, or datus. If, as Legazpi's letter
warned, then Captain Legazpi lost his local allies, he would not be able to fulfill his commission and the colony would be lost. Legazpi maintained these allies not simply by imposing imperial authority on them but rather by blending his authority into the local Philippine system of chiefly power—an indigenous system called the barangay system—a blending of authority that I will refer to as the conquest of Cebu.

The challenges of settling at Cebu, in other words, came from two worlds, one global and the other local. Legazpi not only needed to blend his power into an unknown local environment of Philippine peoples, but he also had to negotiate his authority into a competitive global environment of European powers. Ultimately, the settlement of Legazpi and his followers at Cebu signaled his success in bringing these two worlds together, a feat he achieved by becoming part of both worlds at the same time. In the emerging global network of European powers, Legazpi became a governor, the highest ranking officer over a specific colony, one whose power was acknowledged not only by his own empire, but also by other imperial powers, even if only through opposition. To the peoples of the Philippine islands, Legazpi, receiving the name Basal, became a chieftain, or a datu, one who exercised political power over his own people, and who also extended that power to influence others. At once embodying both of these roles, governor and datu, Legazpi anchored these two systems to one another, fixing in place a previously vague claim of European authority while also locking the once free-floating system of Philippine power into an expanding world-wide network of European politics. As Legazpi and his people brought these two systems together they thus formed the first complete layer of Philippine sovereignty.

Chapter two of this dissertation will examine the convergence of Spain and Portugal in the islands, a convergence that began to incorporate the Philippine colony permanently into the
European imperial system. This convergence began almost a hundred years before Legazpi arrived in the islands. Following Columbus' first voyage to the Caribbean, the Spaniards and the Portuguese agreed, under the authority of the Pope, to divide the world into two "demarcations" of conquest by drawing a dividing line through the Atlantic Ocean. Everything to the west of the line was given to the Spaniards, and everything to the east went to the Portuguese. These two empires, thereafter, expanded in opposite directions, until they met on the opposite side of the world, in the Philippines, the one empire expanding across the Pacific Ocean out of the Atlantic world, and the other coming out of the Indian Ocean. Legazpi and his men completed the around-the-world expansion of these two European networks by establishing a permanent connection between the Philippines and Mexico. The formation and permanence of this connection required that Legazpi and his men do three things. First, they had to create a connect across the Pacific between Cebu and colonial New Spain (Mexico); second, they had to delay indefinitely an attack by the Portuguese; and third they had to find a way for profits to be made in the islands. As they achieved these objectives, Legazpi and his men began to incorporate their emerging colony into the external globalizing network of inter-imperial European powers.

Chapter three will describe the conquest of Cebu. Legazpi and his men established new and lasting internal authority at Cebu as they were blended into the local barangay system of authority. Chiefly power in the barangay system was constructed and elevated through three kinds of political practice—raiding, trading, and feasting. When Legazpi and his men first arrived in the islands, they desperately needed food and a place to settle. To obtain these necessities, they tried to use their own forms of trade and violence. Time and again, however, these tactics failed to penetrate the barangay system, and the Spaniards spent two months
hopping from one island to another, searching for a longterm home. It was not until they arrived at Cebu that the Spaniards began to assimilate themselves permanently into the local power structure, a development that coincided with the founding of their first lasting settlement. By happenstance, at Cebu the Spaniards began to blend themselves into the *barangay* system through raiding, trading, and feasting, three practices that channeled indigenous authority toward Legazpi. Once they had secured their settlement at Cebu, these practices then helped the Spaniards to expand their network of authority into other parts of the archipelago. Through this conquest the Spaniards did not immediately come to rule over the local *barangay* system, but they nevertheless became a lasting part of that system; not yet the power in the archipelago, Legazpi and his men nevertheless became a power there.

Legazpi's participation in the convergence of Spain and Portugal and in the conquest of Cebu demonstrated the importance of this foundational layer of sovereignty. The ability of the Spaniards to survive permanently in the Philippines depended both on the establishment of external authority within the European imperial system and on the formation of their internal authority among the peoples of the Philippines. Had Legazpi failed to create a link to Mexico or to fend off the Portuguese, essential imperial resources—including people, trade goods, and communications—could not have funneled safely across the Pacific into, and out of, the Philippine islands; and similarly, if Legazpi had not found a way to connect to the *barangay* system, his people would have been stranded and unable to access critical local resources, e.g. food, building materials, and allies. As Legazpi formed links between his people and these two networks—the one global and the other local—he became an anchor point that held together one external and one internal system of authority. He and the emerging colony thereby fixed these
two networks to one another, and they created, through the making of early sovereignty, the possibility of the Spaniards' continued survival.

Traditionally, Legazpi has studied within the confines of Philip's expanding empire; and this perception, coming from the vantage point of Spain, is partially accurate. Royal authority was bestowed on Legazpi and royal authority also flowed through him, two facts that were clear from Philip's royal decree of 1569. In this part of my dissertation, however, I will show that Philip was also part of Legazpi's emerging network of power, the King's authority in the new colony similarly being dependent on his chief officer there. Struggling to survive in 1569, Legazpi's letter showed that the founding Philippine sovereignty depended on much more than the simple bestowal of royal authority.

Facing several challenges, Legazpi requested retirement. Little did he know, as his request made its way east through the Pacific, Philip's decree was traveling west through the Atlantic, both headed simultaneously for colonial Mexico. In this clash of wills, the King of course won; his decree held Legazpi in the Philippines for the rest of the Governor's life. But Legazpi's letter, without question, reflected more accurately the construction of early Philippine colonial power. His request described a complex negotiation of powers that encompassed more than a single imperial authority. Beginning a new and lasting colonial structure of power depended just as much on how well Legazpi managed the Portuguese threat, on whether his men could safely travel to and from Mexico, and on his relationships with local Philippine chieftains and peoples. Legazpi was a central figure in a global convergence and a local conquest, a central figure at the origins of Philippine sovereignty.
Chapter 2

The Convergence of Spain and Portugal

In 1569, at Madrid, King Philip II dictated the above-mentioned decree conferring the governorship of Cebu on Miguel Lopez de Legazpi.\(^31\) One copy of the decree was stored in his royal archive, and Spanish sailors carried another across the Atlantic to Mexico, where the Viceroy of New Spain then forwarded it over the Pacific to the Philippines. A little over a year before, King Sebastian I of Portugal had a document pulled from his archive—the Treaty of Zaragosa—which he had copied. He then dictated a letter to accompany this treaty on its own voyage.\(^32\) Portuguese sailors carried Sebastian's letter and treaty south into the Atlantic, around Africa, through the Indian Ocean to Goa, then to Melaka, and finally to the Maluku islands, where the treaty and letter were delivered to Gonzalo Pereira, the captain-general over a Portuguese fleet on the island of Ternate. In the letter, Sebastian instructed Pereira to find Legazpi's settlement, to present him with a copy of the treaty—which Legazpi had violated—and then to demand that Legazpi and his men leave the Malay archipelago at once. Philip's decree and Sebastian's letter transmitted conflicting power in opposite directions, the two opposing forces eventually colliding on the opposite side of the world. Philip's decree promised Legazpi permanent authority, and Sebastian's letter demanded that Legazpi be stripped of his power. European forces were converging on Legazpi and on the Philippines.

Traditional histories of the Philippines and biographical descriptions of Legazpi portray both the place and the man as extensions of the Spanish empire. This portrayal is, of course, partly accurate. But even within the limited history of European global politics, Spanish

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\(^{31}\) Philip II, "Confirmation of Legazpi's Title as Governor and Captain-General," 14 August 1569, BR 3, 62-68.

imperialism told only half the story. The Philippine islands were at the far periphery of two
global empires, and the letters of Philip and Sebastian showed that both crowns claimed the right
to rule over them. Caught between these overlapping claims, Legazpi's authority at Cebu was, in
one sense, dependent on European imperial expansion, but in another sense his power was also
threatened by it. By the time of Legazpi's death, however, the Philippines' connection to Spain
and its relationship to Portugal were well on their way to becoming normalized elements of the
archipelago's developing sovereignty. The Philippine islands were incorporated into Spain's
empire under the viceroyalty of colonial New Spain, and the Portuguese threat gradually faded
away after 1569. The global flow of one imperial structure into Southeast Asia thus blocked the
expansion of another, creating a border at the point of convergence, a flow and a blockage that
became permanent fixtures in the archipelago's relationship to external European authority. One
dempire had triumphed over the other.

The triumph of Spanish authority in the Philippines had much more to do with survival
than it did with military victory. The colony's survival required that Legazpi and his people
extend Spanish authority from Mexico to the Philippines, and that they soften Sebastian's
demands and delay indefinitely a direct attack from the Portuguese. Legazpi and his followers
succeeded in extending Spain's empire into the Philippines by discovering a return route across
the Pacific from Asia to Mexico, by maintaining royal authority among the Spaniards at Cebu,
and by finding an economic means of support for the new colony. Meanwhile, Legazpi pacified
his Portuguese rivals in Southeast Asia with appeals to the two peoples' shared membership in a
globalizing imperial order. Legazpi and his men thus expanded European hierarchies of power to
reach permanently across the Pacific Ocean, and all the way around the world.
The Legazpi expedition thereby completed the first network of truly global authority, a less dominant precursor to our current international political order. During the late sixteenth century, the Portuguese and Spanish empires were the most prominent builders of this network. Then, in later years, other European powers also inserted themselves into and even came to dominate this global order. At the time of Legazpi, the European imperial network was powered and driven by what I will call the European imperial system, a system of growth that created hierarchical pyramids of power and patronage through expansion. Kings sat atop these pyramids and royal power was channeled downward to their subjects through various layers of imperial officials.

Similar to what others had done before, Legazpi and his men expanded Europe's imperial network by directing the power of its imperial system against the specific challenges they faced in the Philippine islands. Legazpi and his men implemented and worked within this European system both to construct a permanent link between Mexico and Cebu and to prevent a direct attack from the Portuguese. These two achievements incorporated the Philippines into the beginnings of a globalizing order of European authority, a network of competing empires that thereafter recognized the colony's membership in its large and dynamic web of political power. This was one of three external political systems that between 1565-1610 engaged in and recognized the creation of early Philippine sovereignty.

In order to understand how the Philippines fit into the European imperial network and how Legazpi worked through its corresponding system, we must first understand how the system itself functioned and spread. To begin with, I need to emphasize that my description of the European imperial system is not meant to encompass all European empires across time and
space. What I describe here does, however, provide a useful explanation of how Europe's power—through the Iberian empires of Spain and Portugal—began to spread during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During this era, the European imperial system acted, at once, as both a static structure of authority and also as the engine propelling that authority's expansion into new places. The imperial governance and expansion of both the Spanish and Portuguese empires, along with others of that time, depended on what Matthew Restall has identified as "networks of patronage." These networks, on almost any scale, consisted of two basic parts. Atop these networks were patrons—men with wealth and authority—and below them were dependents or *criados*—followers who relied on and supported their patrons.

Within imperial government structures, networks of patronage were layered over one another, meaning that lower level patrons were also dependents under higher level patrons. The multilayered structure of this system was, in a very simple way, evident in the communication chains that carried both Philip's decree and Sebastian's treaty to Legazpi in Southeast Asia. Philip was the patron over the viceroy of New Spain, who was a patron over Governor Legazpi, who was a patron over his people in the Philippines. Each of the men in this chain drew authority from patrons above him, and each also distributed power to dependents under him. Sebastian's letter traveled through a similar network to Pereira. These two empires were, described another way, diasporic pyramids of power. They were two hierarchical networks of viceroys, governors, city counselors, etc., these officers being scattered across multiple continents and layered over each other in two grand imperial scaffoldings, each under their own royal patron—one the King of Spain and the other the King of Portugal.

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Power within the European imperial system did not, however, simply flow from the top down. It also flowed in the opposite direction, from the bottom-up. As compliant dependents sent goods and communications back to their patrons, the Crowns of Spain and Portugal increased their wealth and deepened their archives. Precious metals from the Americas and spices from the Indian Ocean elevated the respective statuses of Philip and Sebastian in Europe. Meanwhile, the stories and information that their subjects collected from various parts of the world also provided a legal foundation for claiming authority in regions faraway from home. When, for example, Philip prepared to confer a governorship on Legazpi, he—or more likely his counselors—collected the necessary information from reports in his archives, reports that Legazpi and others had sent to the King from the Philippines; and they then reduced this information into a selective narrative of accomplishments, all proving Legazpi's loyalty and worthiness to serve as a governor. In this way, information—sent from the Philippines to Spain—was crafted into meaningful knowledge, translated into an official appointment, and finally sent back to the Philippines, where it became actionable authority. This bidirectional flow of goods and information between the imperial 'core' and 'periphery' thus also transported power in both directions, the overall system being supported by a reciprocity between royalty (power from above) and loyalty (power from below).

Beyond defining the structure of governance, the European imperial system also provided the impetus or fuel for expansion. Europe's early pyramid-like networks of authority expanded as dependents moved along a spectrum of formality. Again quoting from Restall, patronage networks bound people together through "social ties, political alliances, and economic
activities." Less formal networks were primarily social—including friendships and family relationships—while more formal networks were also economic and/or political. The most formal network of all was the King's own pyramid of official appointments. Movement along this spectrum, from informal and flexible beginnings toward formal and structured ends, motivated conquistador patrons and their dependents alike to expand royal authority into new places. When these were awarded with official appointments, they became permanent parts of the larger structure, a structure that not only funneled wealth and status to the King but also to his formal criados.

This formalization process left its remains in imperial archives. Spanish imperial expansion, for example, was documented, organized, and stored in official royal repositories. Through this documentation and organization, archives incorporated conquistadors, their followers, and the lands they conquered, into the King's official network of patronage. In the beginning, a king might authorize, in writing, a conquest along the periphery of his geographic power. This royal command would be taken up by one of his more influential criados, who would gather a group of his friends, family, acquaintances, etc.—his own informal network of associates—and then lead them on an expedition. If the expedition was successful, the leader might become a governor, like Legazpi, over his conquered lands; and his own informal network of dependents would also be rewarded with smaller units of official jurisdiction. The rewards given both to the new governor and to his followers were then recorded and stored in the official repository of documents. In this way, the entire group would be assimilated concurrently both

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34 Restall, 38.
into the formal government structure of the empire and into the empire's archives, the archives thereby becoming a way of guaranteeing and perpetuating imperial power.

Meanwhile, through this formalization process among networks of people, the empire would have also added a new appendage of authority to its geographic field of influence. Wherever a group of royal dependents went, as they elevated themselves into a king's official network and into his archive, that place and its indigenous peoples also became affiliated with the larger diaspora of royal patronage. Royal subjects thus expanded their empires by remolding themselves and their informal relationships into the very pillars of formal imperial power, pillars that expanded, and were also stabilized by, the larger structure itself, pillars that likewise added to, and were also sustained by, royal repositories of official documents.

This process of expansion and formalization was mutually beneficial to both kings and conquistadors. The king benefitted because conquerors and their dependents almost always used their private wealth and connections to provide manpower for imperial expeditions; and conquistadors benefitted from the legal justification and rewards that the crown provided. Iberian conquests were a way for kings to extend their authority and also for their subjects to earn a stable place in the official imperial hierarchy. "Companies" of conquistadors were thus more like private enterprises working to secure permanent government contracts than they were organized armies sent out by the Crown; they are better thought of as "armed entrepreneurs" than as well disciplined soldiers.35 They sought the wealth, prestige, and power that came with permanent inclusion in the Crown's official diaspora of authority; and the Crown, by authorizing and

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35 Ibid., 35.
recognizing their achievements, also added to his own wealth, prestige, and power. Loyalty enriched royalty, and royalty in return elevated and secured loyalty.

Legazpi's authority similarly expanded into the Philippines as he traveled along a spectrum of formality. Legazpi went from being a colonial official in Mexico—unmentioned in Spain's central archive—to becoming a captain over a group of men headed to the Philippines—the documented leader of an expedition—and then being named a governor in Cebu—a man with a permanent and prominent place in the empire's formal government structure and memory. All the while, the Philippines were, through this formalization process, being born into Europe's globalizing network of empires. Legazpi's journey along this general spectrum of formal authority was dependent on his and his peoples' abilities to overcome challenges specific to the Philippine islands. As noted above, the first of these challenges was to create a permanent and reliable link across the Pacific Ocean between Cebu and colonial Mexico, and the second was to prevent a direct attack from the Portuguese. As the remainder of this chapter will show, these developments, underscored by the European imperial system, first incorporated the Philippine colony into the emerging global network of European imperial powers.

After settling at Cebu, Legazpi sent his flagship, the San Pedro, back to New Spain over the Pacific Ocean with several reports and documents, including a request for supplies. The request explained that they colony needed military arms, trade goods, and building materials. Without more guns, gunpowder, pikes, armor, soldiers, and various other people to support the army, Legazpi and his men would not be able to establish and defend their new fort on Cebu; without more fine red Valencian cloth, European linens, silver coins, wine, sugar, oil, and iron hoops for barrels, the Spaniards would soon run out of goods to use for barter with indigenous
Philippine peoples; and if the colony did not receive ropes, anchors, saws, pitch, pulleys, bellows, skilled workmen, and unskilled laborers, the Spaniards would not be able to build the ships they needed to carry them from one island to the other. Legazpi's plea emphasized that these items needed to be "provided immediately" and "as soon as possible, on the first ships that sail."37

As this plea made clear, Legazpi's new colony needed a connection back to colonial Mexico in order to survive. By Legazpi's time, however, building a permanent link between Southeast Asia and New Spain had eluded would-be Spanish conquistadors for more than forty years. Legazpi succeeded, in part, because his expedition would be the first to find a return route east across the Pacific to Mexico. This discovery was not, however, purely a navigational accomplishment, neither was it the only necessary step in creating a permanent connection between Cebu and New Spain. Critical goods also had to be brought back to Legazpi from colonial Mexico; and Legazpi, furthermore, had to maintain imperial authority at Cebu during the interim. The discovery of a return route from the Philippines to New Spain, the carrying of goods back to Cebu from Mexico, and the survival of Legazpi's authority in the Philippines collectively revealed the powerful influence of the European imperial system on the formation of permanent Philippine authority.

Legazpi's simultaneous journey into the Philippines and into the Spanish empire's structure of authority began with the problem of discovering an ocean route from Asia to the Americas. Before 1565, at least four major Spanish expeditions had sailed to the Philippine islands, traveling west across the Pacific. But none had discovered a way to return. The winds

36 Guido Lavezaris, et al., "Letter from the royal officials of the Filipinas to the royal Audiencia at Mexico, accompanied by a memorandum of the necessary things to be sent to the colony" (28 May 1565), BR 2, 188. 37 Ibid., 192.
and the currents of the unknown ocean remained too much of a mystery. In the late 1550s, King Philip, recognizing the wealth that the Portuguese Crown generated from its trade in Southeast Asian spices, decided that he would send yet another expedition from Mexico to the Malay archipelago, hoping that this would be the one to discover the elusive return route. Putting his plan in motion, Philip wrote to two of his dependents. One of these was already a formal part of Philip's official governing network—the Viceroy of Mexico, Luis de Velasco—the other was a less formal dependent, but one whose expertise was absolutely critical to the expedition's success. He was an Augustinian friar named Andres de Urdaneta.

Urdaneta had traveled to Malay archipelago before, in the 1520s, with an expedition led by Garcia Jofre de Loaysa. After Loaysa died trying to find the return route, Urdaneta and his surviving companions returned to Europe on Portuguese ships, vessels that carried them home through the Indian Ocean, around Africa, and back to Spain. Urdaneta then journeyed again across the Atlantic and resettled in Mexico, where he joined the Augustinian order. Philip, aware of Urdaneta's experience and expertise, proposed in his letters that the Augustinian friar sail back to Southeast Asia from Mexico, believing that Urdaneta could then use the knowledge he had gained from his previous experience to find the return route. Urdaneta, however, was not to be the captain; he was to serve as the expedition's chief navigator. Philip asked the Friar and the Viceroy to find themselves another suitable leader to captain the expedition. Urdaneta and Velasco no doubt searched for a captain among colonial officials in Mexico and also among their friends and family. The man these two eventually settled on was Miguel Lopez de Legazpi.

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Legazpi was chosen, in large part, because of his informal relationship with Urdaneta. Urdaneta probably first met Legazpi in New Spain, shortly after the Friar's long journey around the world. Whenever or however they met, Viceroy Velasco described Legazpi and Urdaneta as "compatriots, relatives, and close friends." This closeness, no doubt, blossomed out of the two men's many similarities. Both men were natives of Guipúzcoa, a Basque province in Spain; they were roughly the same age, having grown into adulthood during the heady years when Cortés and Pizarro were famously conquering the Mexica and the Inca; and both had dedicated their lives to the service of the Empire.

After Legazpi was selected in 1561, he and Urdaneta spent the next three years gathering men and supplies. Both men recruited members of their own families to join the enterprise, along with many other friends and associates; and Legazpi spent a significant amount of money on food, clothing, munitions, travel, and recruitment. By 1564, Legazpi and Urdaneta had gathered a company of roughly 350 Spaniards to join them, which was no small task considering the reputation of the Pacific after so many failed voyages. Legazpi and these men thus took their first step toward formal incorporation into the King's network of patronage. Family, friends, acquaintances, and recruits of Legazpi and Urdaneta had become semi-formal dependents of now Captain Legazpi.

Legazpi's fleet included its flag ship, the San Pedro, a second smaller galleon, the San Juan, and a third ship, the San Lucas, the fastest of the three. These set sail on November 20, 1564 from La Navidad, a settlement on the western coast of Mexico. Early in the voyage, the San Lucas, captained by the Spaniard Alonso de Arellano and piloted by a mulatto named Lope

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40 "Méritos y servicios:Miguel López de Legazpi:Filipinas" (1605), PATRONATO,53,R.13, AGI.
Martin, deserted the other two ships, planning to arrive first in the Philippines.\footnote{Gaspar de San Agustin, \textit{Conquistas de Las Islas Filipinas}, trans., Luis Antonio Mañeru (Manila: San Agustín Museum, 1998 [1698]), 235-237.} Just under three months later, the remaining two Spanish ships sighted the island of Samar. Legazpi and his men had arrived in what we now call the Philippines.

For the next two months two remaining Spanish ships searched for a place to settle, and they eventually made a home for themselves at Cebu. Having been at sea for a total of five months, Legazpi and his men were running short on provisions. Shortly after settling on Cebu, they prepared the above mentioned plea for supplies to be sent from Mexico. But they were still uncertain as to whether or not a return route would be discovered. Without a return route, New Spain would not receive Legazpi's requests for aid, and a Spanish colonial expedition to Southeast Asia would, once again, fail to create a permanent connection back to the rest of Spain's empire.

Urdaneta set sail from Cebu for Mexico on June 1, 1565, with Felipe de Salcedo, one of Legazpi's grandsons, acting under his direction as the ship's pilot. Legazpi's friend and grandson guided the \textit{San Pedro} north, where they caught an eastward wind, sailed above Hawaii, continued on to the coast of present-day California, then headed south to Acapulco. During the difficult five month voyage, sixteen Spaniards died, and many more were sick when they landed in New Spain.\footnote{Ibid., 365.} The sailors next traveled overland to Mexico City, where Urdaneta was celebrated for his accomplishment.

Urdaneta, however, soon learned that he had not, in fact, been the first to sail east from the Philippine islands to the Americas. The \textit{San Lucas}, after deserting Legazpi's fleet, had sailed to Mindanao and then returned to colonial Mexico across the Pacific, bearing proof in the form
of commodities from the Malay archipelago. The Spaniards in Mexico told Urdaneta that Alonso de Arellano, the captain of the San Lucas, had arrived three months earlier. Arellano had informed the people of New Spain that Legazpi's fleet was lost; and he, furthermore, claimed that he was the discoverer of the return route. Arellano had since traveled to Spain, where he expected to receive a reward from the Crown for his discovery.

Urdaneta, upon hearing this news, continued almost immediately on to Spain. Once there, the Friar met with the King and personally delivered Legazpi's letters to the Crown. Through Urdaneta, Philip learned that Arellano, who had already come to the royal court seeking his reward, had disobeyed orders and deserted Legazpi's fleet. According to an early Augustinian history of the Philippines, Arellano's voyage had also suffered "great calamities, calms and severe storms," often being lost, "navigating around in circles," arriving in Mexico with "neither charts nor route plans." The Augustinian Friar Urdaneta, on the other hand, recorded all of the details of his journey, making it possible for others to follow the same route.\(^4^3\) Lacking proper charts, and having gone against the orders of Legazpi, Arellano was no longer celebrated but was rather imprisoned for his actions. Urdaneta was, on the other hand, recognized and rewarded as the 'rightful' discoverer of the eastward route across the Pacific. Royal power thus rewarded Urdaneta's loyalty and punished Arellano's treachery, an act underscoring the ideal that imperial power ought to flow through approved channels.

It should be recognized that Arellano's disobedience to orders was not unprecedented in Spain's imperial history, and it was even sometimes rewarded. Hernan Cortés, for example, like Arellano, circumvented the proper channels of authority. But Cortés succeeded in becoming a

\(^4^3\) Ibid., 367.
governor. Initially under the command of the governor of Cuba, Diego Velázquez, Cortés gathered a group of men—his criados—and was sent with them to the American mainland on a scouting expedition. His expedition was meant to gather information for a later conquest, a conquest to be led by his formal patron, Velázquez. But when Cortés landed on the coast of Mexico, before he had conquered anything, he sent one of his dependents, Francisco de Montejo, directly to Spain to request a license from the King, an official document that would grant Cortés a governorship over whatever lands he subjugated. Cortés, then, without orders to do so, began the process of conquering Mexico.

Hearing of Cortés actions, Velázquez sent a ship after Montejo, hoping to stop him from getting to the King, but the ship failed to overtake Montejo's vessel. Two years later—after Cortés had already conquered and was ruling over the former Mexica empire—Montejo succeeded in convincing the Crown to recognize Cortés as the governor of New Spain, a recognition that solidified the bond between Spain and Mexico by incorporating Cortés and his men directly into the King's official network of patronage. Arellano likewise sought an official reward through his entrepreneurial disobedience to Legazpi. Urdaneta, however, arrived and claimed the privileges for himself. Loyalty expanded royalty, and royalty rewarded loyalty.

Royal power also later adversely affected the fate of Lope Martin, the mulatto man who had piloted Arellano's voyage in both directions. After Urdaneta's arrival in colonial Mexico, New Spain's officials began to gather supplies to send to Legazpi. Once these were all collected, they were placed on the galleon San Geronimo. Martin Lope, no doubt because of his valuable experience, was chosen to pilot this vessel back to Cebu. On the return voyage to the Philippines,

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44 Restall, 38-40.
however, the *San Geronimo*'s original captain and his son were killed by a high ranking lieutenant and several of his friends. Lope Martin then began a mutiny against the lieutenant, who was hung on Martin's orders. Having usurped authority on the ship, Martin promised his followers great wealth if they would follow him and forgo traveling to Cebu, a plan that threatened to divert critical supplies away from Legazpi's colony.

The ship's men remained divided about what they should do and about who should lead the voyage. Martin imprisoned those who were openly against him, and he then guided the ship to an uninhabited island. Most of the men went ashore, and Martin planned to leave behind all of those who did not support him. Some Spaniards—seeing that "no one could speak in the King's name to punish so many crimes and so much betrayal" and that "no one trusted the other"—began to gather a faction of their own against Martin. These rose up against the mulatto pilot "in the name of his Majesty…and for Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, their captain general;" and they then took the *San Geronimo*, leaving Martin and his supporters stranded on the island. After defeating Martin, this group was again nearly overthrown by another faction before arriving in Cebu, but this last mutiny did not succeed. When the *San Geronimo* finally landed at Cebu in October 1566, almost a year and a half after the departure of the *San Pedro*, celebrations of Urdaneta's discovery were tempered by the news of what had happened on the voyage from Mexico. After an investigation was carried out, Legazpi condemned a notary to public execution and pardoned the rest. He also required all of the survivors to "swear fealty once again to their King."47

45 San Agustin, 447.
46 Ibid., 439-451.
The various mutinies that had occurred on the *San Geronimo* were not, however, the first or only rebellions to threaten the formation of a permanent connection between the Philippines and Mexico. While on Cebu, Legazpi and his colony of migrants had faced similar challenges. After the departure of Urdaneta, Legazpi and his men began to suffer from food shortages. They started to trade their silver for food with Muslim merchants from Manila and Borneo, but shortages nevertheless continued. Legazpi's men became so hungry that many resorted to eating grass, cats, rats, and palm leaves.48 Conditions became so bad that Legazpi, having nothing left of value to trade, had to procure his own individual rations from local chieftains by promising them future gifts, gifts that he swore would arrive on future galleons.49

Starving and frustrated, a Venetian member of the expedition, Pablo Hernandez, gathered together a group of discontented colonizers, including another Venetian, a few Frenchmen, a man from Greece and several Spaniards. In mid-November 1565, this crew planned an uprising that would have left Legazpi's followers destitute. Hernandez and his supporters intended to steal Legazpi's last remaining ship, the *San Juan*, to sail through the islands raiding indigenous merchant ships for supplies, and then to travel home either around South America or through Portuguese routes in the Indian Ocean. On the eve of the proposed mutiny, however, Hernandez' second in command changed his mind and betrayed his fellow conspirators. Hernandez fled, but was captured within a few days; and eventually, the rebel leader was publicly executed on Legazpi's order. Had the mutiny succeeded, as one witness explained, the Spaniards "would have all miserably perished."50 So many men were involved in the plot that Legazpi could not afford

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48 "Expedition of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi" (1564-1568), BR 2, 145; "Expedición de Legazpi, Documento 39" (1567), in Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Ultramar (Madrid: Impresos de la Real Casa, 1887), 139; San Agustín, 421; Cushner (1971), 57.

49 "Expedición de Legazpi, Documento 39," 140.

50 Guido de Lavezaris, et al., "Letter to Felipe II from the royal officials" (26 Jul 1567), BR 34, 216.
to punish all of them as harshly as he had Hernandez. He, therefore, still needing their labor and support, pardoned most of them completely. Shortages and frustrations nevertheless continued and early in 1566, after some men were whipped for forcibly taking food from some native Cebuano people—a crime that went against the express orders of the King—another smaller mutiny was organized by many of the same men. But this one was likewise put down "in accordance with the law."52

These mutinies showed that though Legazpi had organized, financed, and directed the expedition on its way to the Philippines, his control over his men was neither guaranteed nor absolute. Mutinies were only the most extreme and frightening example of Legazpi's limited influence over his followers; but they were frightening enough that Legazpi and the other leaders of his expedition often overlooked the Crown's explicit commands from Spain in favor of keeping the peace in the Philippines. They did this because they knew that their continued power depended as much on the cooperative submission of their Spanish criados as it did on royal decrees.

Legazpi, in other words, balanced his restraint on his men with the necessity of granting them permissions and favors.53 When legal abuses became widespread, the Captain believed that he had little choice but to allow those abuses to continue. From 1565-1569, for example, Legazpi's expedition constantly struggled to obtain enough food through legal means, leading many individual Spaniards to "rob in order to eat."54 Sometimes these Spaniards attacked, enslaved, and even killed indigenous people who refused to cooperate with their demands. When

52 Lavezaris, et al. (26 Jul 1567), 217.
54 quoted in Ibid., 61.
the Augustinian friar, Martin de Rada, approached Legazpi about these abuses, reminding Legazpi that these methods were forbidden by the King, the captain explained that strictly enforcing the law on everyone would require that all of his soldiers be hanged.\textsuperscript{55} This statement reflected his understanding of power’s bi-directional nature. Becoming a governor was not simply about following the orders of the King, it was rather a matter of balancing those orders against the demands made on him by his own dependents. Maintaining royal authority, even in proxy at lower levels, yet depended on maintaining loyalty.

The formation of the expedition, the discovery of the return route, the punishment of Arellano, the voyage of the \textit{San Geronimo}, and the maintenance of Legazpi’s authority at Cebu all showed the cooperation of both royal and loyal power in the expansion of the European imperial system. Royal power instigated the formation of the colonial expedition; it chose and assigned Urdaneta the task of finding the return route; it then credited and rewarded Urdaneta for having found a way east across the Pacific; it was called down by Spanish sailors to restore order when the \textit{San Geronimo} was beginning to chart a course away from the Philippines; and it provided Legazpi with the authority to punish dissidents among his dependents. Loyal power, on the other hand, exercised by Legazpi and Urdaneta, invested in and gathered the men necessary for the expedition; it mobilized, through Urdaneta, the expertise to find a way back to Mexico from Southeast Asia; it exposed Arellano’s disobedience; it redirected the \textit{San Geronimo} back toward Legazpi’s settlement; and it secured Legazpi’s authority over his men, even when that security depended on selective obedience to royal commands.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
Through this process, royal and loyal power began to flow between the Philippines and Mexico, the two complementary forces completing their first round-trip voyage from the Philippines to Mexico between 1564-1566. In this way, Legazpi and his men opened a corridor through which essential goods and information could flow back and forth between Philip's empire and the Philippines. The supplies that Legazpi requested and received from Mexico gave him and his people the ability to survive in a distant land, while the reports received by Philip gave the King license to send decrees and decisions back to his dependents in Southeast Asia. Philip also awaited word about the wealth and further authority that he and his empire might gain through this expansion into Asia.

Philip's empire was not, however, the only European power interested in Legazpi's expedition. A month after the arrival of the *San Geronimo* at Cebu, several members of Legazpi's company encountered a Portuguese vessel nearby, a symbol of what some considered to be the biggest threat to Spain's claims to the 'Western Islands.' The threat of Portugal had, in fact, been part of Legazpi's voyage from the very beginning. Among the original instructions given to Legazpi when he first left Mexico was an order from the King that he not trespass into Portuguese domains. What was and was not Portuguese territory, however, remained contested. Competing claims were, indeed, strong enough that, when Legazpi and his men first left *La Navidad*, they were unaware of their final destination.

Some, if they had known that the ships were heading for the Philippines, would not have joined the expedition, including Urdaneta himself. These believed that the Philippine islands rightfully belonged to Portugal. Urdaneta wanted to go to New Guinea, which he believed was
clearly among Spain's rightful imperial possessions. All the men, nevertheless, launched into the Pacific together, agreeing that, in accordance with the European imperial system, they would support the will of their royal patron. They were following instructions when, five days into their journey, they opened a sealed letter from the Crown telling them that they were to go to the Philippines. Those with objections were left with little choice but to follow orders. There was no turning back now.

Philip's orders that Legazpi and his men stay out of Portuguese domains and his command to open his letter five days into the voyage both expressed an overarching legal unity between his empire and that of Sebastian. This unity was born out of an agreement made in 1494. According to the early modern Catholic political order, both Philip and Sebastian were dependents of a single higher patron, the Pope, who was a dependent of the highest patron of all, God. Following the first voyage of Columbus to the Americas, Pope Alexander VI decided to divide political authority over the non-European earth into two halves, bequeathing one half to Spain and the other half to Portugal. He did this in hopes of keeping the peace between Spain and Portugal, Europe's two emerging ocean powers. As the Pope's political criados, the Kings of Spain and Portugal accepted this arrangement, and they signed the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), which formally recognized the Popes' political line through the Atlantic. Everything to the west of the line belonged to Spain and everything to the east to Portugal.

Eventually these two powers, one moving west and the other east, ran into each other on the opposite side of the world in Southeast Asia. After some legal disputes, the Kings of Spain and Portugal signed a second treaty in 1529, the Treaty of Zaragosa, which extended the Atlantic

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56 see "Expedition of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi," 101-102; and Cushner (1965), 175.
line over the North and South poles and through the Pacific Ocean, effectively dividing the world into two hemispheres of authority. These two treaties thus incorporated the Spanish and Portuguese world empires into a single network of patronage under the Pope. In European imperial fashion, power flowed downward to the Kings from the Pope as he assigned them international legal privileges, but it also flowed upward to the Pope as the two Kings and their subjects accepted and respected these mediated agreements. The problem with the Treaty of Zaragosa was that Europeans had yet to discover a reliable way to measure longitude; and because Southeast Asia was so far away from Europe, no one was completely sure which lands were on which side of the line. This ambiguity allowed Philip to give the contradictory orders that Legazpi stay out of Portuguese domains but that he also go to the Philippines. Philip certainly knew that many cosmographers, including Urdaneta, believed that the Philippines were in Portugal's "demarcation," but the ambiguity of longitude allowed him nevertheless to assert his own claim in the islands without openly violating the treaty.

The risk of violating the treaty, a matter of honor to Philip, was a matter of life and death to his dependent captains. Captain Ruy Lopez de Villalobos, for example, the captain of the Spanish expedition sent to the Philippines in the 1540s—the Spanish expedition that most recently predated Legazpi's own—had in fact died in a Portuguese dungeon on the island of Ambon after the Portuguese took him captive for trespassing into their domains. As stated above, Legazpi's expedition first encountered Portuguese ships in November of 1566, but the real danger posed by Portugal confronted Legazpi two years later. As described above, when King Sebastian of Portugal learned of Legazpi's settlement on Cebu, he sent Gonzalo Pereira to dislodge the Spaniards. Pereira arrived at Legazpi's settlement in September of 1568, leading a
fleet of ships manned by both Portuguese and indigenous Maluku sailors. The Portuguese captain then demanded that Legazpi leave the islands immediately; but Legazpi refused. For the next four months, Pereira laid siege to Cebu, believing that he could starve the Spaniards out. The Portuguese, however, could not sustain themselves at sea any better than the Spaniards could on land; and Pereira was forced to lift the siege on New Year's Day 1569. As he left, he promised to return and attack at a later date.

Pereira's decision to blockade Cebu instead of invading it made a pivotal difference in the history of the Philippines; and this decision was based on his and Legazpi's shared membership in a global network of papal patronage and inter-imperial legality. While Pereira blockaded Cebu, he sent no less than seven formal and direct messages to Legazpi threatening to attack if the Spanish captain did not leave the islands at once. Legazpi responded to each of these messages with explanations of why he could not or would not comply. The argument between these two imperial dependents, however, revealed more than just their disagreements. It also displayed the common foundation on which those disagreements were based.

In their back and forth argument, both men expressed a common membership within a larger political order, each threatening that, if violence broke out, the other would be to blame for violating the larger agreement between their Kings and for also going against the will of God. Pereira swore that "all the loss and damage which may ensue in this matter" would fall on Legazpi and that Legazpi would have to "give an account for [damages] to God and to the sovereigns our lords." Furthermore, if Legazpi did not comply "he and all his camp will be held and considered as suspected rebels against the mandates of his king." Legazpi echoed these

57 Fernando Riquel, et al., 248.
58 Ibid., 271.
sentiments, explaining that an attack by Pereira would violate the friendly relationship between "the kings our sovereigns," that it would be "a matter of very great displeasure to God our lord," and that Pereira too would have to "give an account therefor to God and to our sovereigns and lords." Both thus accused the other of violating the rules of their shared European imperial system, an order that, they agreed, included the Philippine islands into hierarchies of authority that reached in both directions as far to Europe and that also climbed upward as high as heaven itself.

The common membership of Legazpi and Pereira in a single system of European authority was also clear from their shared understanding of legal justifications for warfare. Pereira demanded that Legazpi leave because he was trespassing in Portugal's demarcation. But Legazpi, in his answers, was able to create enough doubt about the justness of a direct attack that Pereira settled for a blockade. In the first place, Legazpi explained that his patron, Philip, believed that the 'Western Islands'—a phrase often applied by Legazpi to the Philippines, and one that implied rightful Spanish possession—were, in fact, within the westward Spanish demarcation. Legazpi added that he was also searching for other Spanish sailors who had been left behind by previous expeditions, which gave him further the right to be there. Portugal, he added further, was not collecting tribute in the islands, showing that they had not subjected them, and the Spaniards were helping to spread the Christian religion among the indigenous peoples. When Pereira insisted that these reasons were not valid, Legazpi added more, explaining that he did not have enough ships to evacuate all of his men, and that his departure would have to be

59 Ibid., 256.
60 Ibid., 250.
61 Ibid., 251.
62 Ibid., 252-253.
delayed until reinforcements from the King of Spain might arrive. Violence between Christians, Legazpi continued, was uncalled for and uncivilized.

The point emphasized most by Legazpi was, however, based on the idea of patronage. Legazpi explained that he had been sent by the King and that he, therefore, had to do what the King wished. He, furthermore, asked proof from Pereira that Sebastian explicitly wanted him to make war on the Spaniards. Without a written document to that effect, Legazpi explained, "I find no cause or adequate reason, nor can I believe that his grace desires, to do me violence or any injury, in transgression of the peace and amity…between the kings our sovereigns." According to Legazpi, it was not up to himself and Pereira, several levels down in their respective pyramids of patronage, to negotiate the terms; that was, rather, the responsibility of the two competing Crowns. Legazpi would follow their will, but he would not decide it. This argument, like the others, was designed to buy Legazpi more time. It would take at least a year just to send and receive word from the Kings about an agreement, and negotiations would certainly prolong the process even further. The European imperial structure of patronage was thus, in and of itself, a tool that Legazpi used to solidify his authority in the face of Portuguese objections.

Faced with this barrage of discursive ambiguities, appeals for peace, and the risk of being blamed for a conflict, Pereira decided that he would only blockade Cebu. He would not attack the Spanish settlement directly. The Portuguese were, nevertheless, as stated above, unable to starve the Spaniards out. Legazpi's colony had survived its first global challenge. Had Pereira attacked, the much stronger Portuguese fleet almost certainly would have prevailed; Legazpi would have been forced to leave the islands; and the Philippine colony would have ended before

63 Ibid., 254.
64 Ibid., 293.
65 Ibid., 255-256.
it had really even begun. Pereira felt himself justified in attacking the Spanish settlement because these two empires belonged to a single system of inter-imperial authority, one that had allocated the islands to the Crown of Portugal. Because of these men’s shared understanding of that system, however, Legazpi was able to influence Portuguese military tactics by creating a buffer of legal ambiguities and uncertainties. Pereira's blockade, in the end, was Legazpi's victory.

The Portuguese, nevertheless, did more than oppose Spanish power in the Philippines. they were also critical to its formation, another point that was visible in the argument between Legazpi and Pereira. One of the prominent men in Legazpi's company, Guido de Lavezaris—who succeeded Legazpi as governor in 1572—had first come to the Malay archipelago on a previous Spanish expedition, the one led by Captain Villalobos. At one point in their argument, Pereira explained that Lavezaris could testify to the good treatment he had received from the Portuguese on his voyage back to Europe after Villalobos' death.66 As described above, Urdaneta, too, had returned to Spain on Portuguese ships through the Indian Ocean.

Without Portuguese vessels and trade routes, Urdaneta, Lavezaris, and anyone else with information about the islands or about Pacific Ocean navigation would not have been able to return to Spain or to the Americas to spread this knowledge. The Pacific would have been a sea of no return, and without the knowledge from the previous failed attempts, the Legazpi expedition could not have discovered a successful route back to Mexico, nor could they have acquired any knowledge of or about the Philippine islands. Despite the tensions between Portugal and Spain, in other words, cooperation on a global scale within this global European network also enabled the Spanish empire to extend itself into Southeast Asia. The same routes

66 Ibid., 263.
that carried conflicting instructions from Philip and Sebastian also made circumnavigation and the dissemination of global knowledge possible.

Having averted a direct attack from the Portuguese and their Malay allies, Legazpi and his men needed to accomplish one final objective in order to assure that the 'Western Islands' would be incorporated into Spain's expanding empire. They needed to find a source of profits. By the 1560s, the Portuguese were making substantial profits on the import of spices into Europe from Southeast Asia, spices that came from the Maluku islands (or Spice Islands), a collection of islands just south of the Philippines. As stated above, Philip, seeing the profits that the Portuguese Crown gained from this trade, first sent Legazpi to the Philippines hoping that these unexplored islands near the Malukus might also contain a wealth of spices. By 1569, however, after four years of searching, Legazpi had discovered that only one valuable spice was grown in the Philippine archipelago. "If his Majesty has an eye only on the Felipina islands," he wrote, "they ought to be considered of little importance, because at present the only article of profit which we can get from this land is cinnamon."[67]

But there was another way that profits could be made by the colony, a way that was introduced to Legazpi by the Muslim merchants from Manila. As I will describe in more detail in later chapters, when Legazpi and his men first arrived in the Malay archipelago, Chinese merchants came to Manila every year, where they traded with indigenous Tagalog Muslims. These Muslim merchants then traded Chinese goods with other settlements throughout the Philippine region. Legazpi called these Tagalog merchants Moros, the Spanish word for Muslims. As stated above, after Legazpi and his men settled at Cebu, several Moros came from

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67 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Letter to Marqués de Falçes" (7 Jul 1569), BR 3, 50.
Manila to the new Spanish camp to trade. These came for silver because they knew that silver was valued highly by the Chinese merchants who came to trade in Manila. Legazpi and his men, in desperate need of food at the time, happily traded the precious white metal for rice, an exchange that helped to keep them alive. The Moros then took the silver back to Manila and exchanged it for coveted Chinese imports. Chinese merchants, then, took the silver back to China, where the Ming dynasty was suffering from a severe currency shortage. Through this chain of trade, the Spaniards acquired food, Manila's Moros obtained Chinese commodities, Chinese merchants began to make profits, and the Chinese economy received much needed currency in the form of silver. The importance of this chain of trade will be detailed more fully in subsequent chapters.

What matters for the present is that the Moros, through this process, discovered the eventual means by which the colony could generate profits for Spanish merchants. The Spanish empire, having recently discovered the most lucrative silver mines in history in the Americas, had stumbled upon a wealth of silver at the same time that China suffered from a severe shortage. Meanwhile, peoples in the Americas, and throughout the world, coveted valuable Chinese manufactured goods, especially silk. By 1569, Legazpi realized that this trade could generate profits for Spanish settlers. A permanent Philippine colony, he wrote, would open up commerce with China "whence come silks, porcelains, benzoin, musk, and other articles. Thus partly through commerce, and partly through the articles of commerce, the [Spanish] settlers will increase the wealth of the land in a short time."\(^{68}\)

\(^{68}\) Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Relation of the Filipinas islands" (7 Jul 1569), BR 3, 58.
Following the Portuguese blockade, the Spaniards decided that they needed to resettle in a place with an easier-to-defend bay, a more consistent supply of food, and better prospects for economic profits. Initially Legazpi and his men moved to the island of Panay, where they remained only briefly before deciding to continue on to Manila, the center of the region's China trade. Once in they had settled at Manila in 1571, the Spaniards, no longer in need of Moro intermediaries, began to trade directly with the Chinese. As explained above, Urdaneta had already made it possible for goods to flow back and forth across the Pacific, but it was the opening up of direct trade between Chinese and Spanish merchants at Manila that gave the empire the funds necessary to carry commodities, peoples, and messages from one side of the Ocean to the other.

For the next 250 years, the galleon ships sailed across the Pacific between Acapulco and Manila. During the late sixteenth century, these ships helped to transport millions of silver pesos through Manila into China while carrying an equivalent value of Chinese products back into the Spanish empire through Mexico. What had begun with Moros trading American silver for Chinese products at Manila in 1565, a trade that had helped Legazpi and his men to obtain much needed food, later became the colony's economic foundation for survival. As the galleons began to sail yearly between Manila and Mexico, the economic and political connection between New Spain and the Philippines became increasingly strong. A market for Chinese goods imported through Manila, called the Parian, opened up in Mexico, and the Philippine colony was incorporated into Spain's imperial hierarchy under the viceroyalty of colonial New Spain. While some tried later to persuade the King to abandon the Philippine islands, the interest of Mexican merchants had a powerful influence on retaining the colony, even though the Crown had to send
a yearly subsidy to pay for its governance.\textsuperscript{69} The Philippines, thereby, connected the Spanish empire to Asia, and the galleon ships became, as the historian Katherine Bjork describes them, "link that kept the Philippines Spanish."\textsuperscript{70}

The Philippines also continued its involvement with other European powers. After Pereira's departure, conflicts between the two Iberian empires continued. A small group of Portuguese sailors attacked Panay in 1570, but they were again unable to overthrow the colony;\textsuperscript{71} in 1573, it was also rumored that the Portuguese were going to help a group of Bornean Moros to attack Manila;\textsuperscript{72} and furthermore, in 1578, the Portuguese assisted the Muslim sultan of Brunei to flee from a Spanish attack on his town.\textsuperscript{73} The Portuguese also did all they could to ensure that the Spaniards would not gain access to China. Having themselves established a colonial enclave at Macau, the Portuguese began spreading rumors among Ming authorities about Spanish intentions to conquer China.\textsuperscript{74} The Spaniards, for their part, planned to conquer the Portuguese Muluku islands during the 1570s. These later conflicts, however, demonstrated a change in the Portuguese objections to Spanish power in the Philippines. Their antagonism during these later disputes was focused not on the right of the Spaniards' to the Philippines; but they were focused rather on limiting the expansion of Spanish influence beyond the areas that they had already colonized. Meanwhile the Spaniards sought to expand that influence. During the 1570s, in other words, Portugal began to recognize the Philippine colony as a legitimate part of the global

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Letter to Felipe II" (25 Jul 1570), BR 3, 108-112.
\textsuperscript{72} Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Evidence regarding the Portuguese expedition against Cebu" (21 Oct 1570), BR 3, 113-120.
\textsuperscript{73} San Augustin, 805.
\textsuperscript{74} Guido de Lavezaris, "Affairs in the Philippines after the death of Legaspi" (29 Jun 1573), BR 3, 183; Domingo de Salazar, "The Chinese and the Parián at Manila" (1590), BR 7, 216.
European imperial system. In the 1570s, the Portuguese sought to limit the reach of Spain's Asian presence, not necessarily to end it.

This recognition was solidified further by later events in Europe. In 1578, King Sebastian of Portugal embarked on a crusade into Morocco, where he was killed in battle. Having left no heir, the Portuguese thrown lay vacant. Philip II, one of Sebastian's uncles, claimed and took the Crown of Portugal, thereby becoming the single ruler over both the Spanish and Portuguese empires, two empires that reached full-circle around the world. With the founding of this first truly global empire in 1580, any question of Spanish legitimacy in the Philippines became a moot point. For the next 60 years, the Kings of Spain ruled over both domains, nullifying any appeal to papal demarcations. By the time Portugal broke away again from Spain in 1640, the reality of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines was unassailable.

Other European powers, nevertheless, threatened the Philippine colony during the era of Iberian imperial unification. In the 1580s, British privateers attacked and captured two galleon ships—the wealthiest treasure ships in the world—sailing across the Pacific; and in the 1590s, the war of Dutch independence also expanded into Southeast Asia. By the late sixteenth century, Philip was devoting much of his time and many of his resources to fighting what would come to be known as the eighty years war between his empire and the Dutch (1568-1648). In the 1560s, the Netherlands had been part of Philip's European domains, but a revolt began in 1568, one that led to the establishment of a 'rebel' republic in the 1580s under William of Orange. Philip, nevertheless, continued to fight against the new republic. In 1594, Philip, now having control over the Portuguese spice trade, closed the Lisbon spice market to Dutch merchants, hoping that economic sanctions would compel their submission. Instead of surrendering to Philip, however,
the Dutch launched their own voyages beyond Europe. The new anti-Philip Dutch republic began commissioning ships to go to Southeast Asia for their own spices; and these sailed with express instructions to attack Portuguese and Spanish settlements, including Manila.

Within a few years the Dutch established a settlement at Batavia and formed the Dutch East India Company or the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC). Meanwhile, conflict continued sporadically in Europe. These conflicts were echoed in Southeast Asia, where Dutch power began to usurp and eclipse the power of the Portuguese empire. The Philippine colony was also targeted by the Dutch. Dutch ships, under the command of Oliver Van Noort, first attacked Manila in 1600. After Van Noort was repelled by the new colony, the Dutch attacked again in 1610, 1617, 1621-22, 1624, and 1645. Finally, after the signing of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648, which included an end of the eighty years war, the Dutch stopped attacking the colony. The Philippine colony was thus incorporated into Europe's emerging Westphalian system of separate and competing powers, a contentious and competitive inclusion of the Philippines that had begun with the Portuguese blockade of Cebu in 1568.

Ultimately, Legazpi's ability to create a lifeline back to New Spain involved two empires and the completion of the first around-the-world network of authority. The Spanish empire launched Legazpi's expedition in a way that mirrored previous conquests. Legazpi gathered together his own patronage network on behalf of a higher patron, the King, and led them into a new land. Due in large part to Urdaneta's accomplishment, Legazpi's patronage network was formally incorporated into the Spanish empire when he was named governor over Cebu in 1569. But the knowledge and experience of Urdaneta would not have been available to the Spaniards

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76 Ibid., 380-420.
had it not been for the rival Portuguese empire, which carried Urdaneta back to Europe after the failure of the Loaysa expedition. Furthermore, for Legazpi to remain on Cebu he had to avoid direct military conflict with the Portuguese. He accomplished this by highlighting ambiguities in Spain and Portugal's shared legal understanding about imperial expansion. These ambiguities caused Pereira to blockade—instead of attack—Cebu, which enabled the colony to survive its first global challenge.

Through this process, the Philippines became part not only of the Spanish empire but of an emerging global order of European imperial politics. The islands were beginning to be entangled into the histories of multiple global pyramids of European patronage. As goods flowed between Manila and Mexico, the Philippines and the wealth generated by the galleon trade not only created profits for Spaniards, but these also involved the islands in a larger inter-imperial European system, one defined by global warfare and global treaties. The colony, in other words, began to be influenced by this system while also starting to exert some influence back on this system in return. The Philippine colony would never again be as vulnerable to the European system as it had been in 1568, before steady profits had been realized and when it was directly confronting the threat of Pereira. As Legazpi and his men overcame these two challenges, they began the permanent assimilation of the Philippines into a globalizing network of European power. They began to construct external Philippine sovereignty.
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi and his men first made landfall in the Philippines in the Visayan subregion of the archipelago. After their long voyage across the Pacific, they were in desperate need of food and a place to settle, and the expedition spent its first two months in the Visayas sailing between various islands searching for these needs. They sailed to Samar, Leyte, Mindanao, Bohol, etc., running up against the same problems in every place. Visayan chieftains, also known as *datus*, either refused to interact with the Spaniards or they lacked the resources necessary to feed both their own people and Legazpi's men. The Spaniards tried time and again to build relationships with various Visayan *datus*, attempting both trade and violence, but these tactics yielded precious little in return. The few chickens and bags of rice that the Spaniards obtained at each of their stops lasted only a few days among the expedition's three hungry Spaniards, and their remaining rations from Mexico were also running out fast. In April, Legazpi learned of a well provisioned Visayan settlement on the island of Cebu, a place that might promise a consistent supply of food. When the Spaniards arrived at the settlement, they once again tried their previous tactics—trade and violence—but these again failed. It was not until Legazpi began to acquire authority in distinctly Southeast Asian ways that the Spanish immigrants started to obtain their much needed provisions. The only way for Legazpi to survive among the Visayan *datus* was, in short, to become one of them.

The conquest of Cebu differed significantly from the traditional definition of conquest. New and lasting colonial authority at Cebu was not built through military victories alone. Indeed, it was more than a month after Legazpi's military triumph against Cebu's *datus* before he first
began to exercise authority among them. Legazpi's lasting internal authority began not with a violent battle between two warring peoples; it started, instead, with a chance Spanish kidnapping of three prominent Cebuano women and one of their female slaves. Through the captivity of these four prisoners, Legazpi and his men began to blend their authority into the region's traditional barangay system of chiefly power. Shortly after the kidnapping, Visayan datus began to ally with Legazpi and his people; and these alliances were the first permanent interethnic links in the colony's emerging multiethnic network of authority. Shortly thereafter, these links began to multiply and spread into other parts of the archipelago, these connections starting to interlock the various Philippine islands into a unified place. Through the building of this early network, the Spaniards became a power in the region, though not yet the power over it. The conquest of Cebu, in other words, was not a take over the local barangay system; it was, rather, the blending of Spanish authority into that system.

To understand how Legazpi and his men blended themselves into the barangay system, we must first understand what that system was and what it was not. The term barangay comes from the indigenous word for boat, and it referred to a village or a settlement. These settlements usually consisted of one hundred to one thousand people. When the Spaniards arrived, tens of thousands of these barangays were spread throughout the Philippine islands. Barangays were ruled over by datus, or chieftains; and though most barangays were ruled separately from the others, the structure and practices of authority within and between these villages were all fairly similar. Authority was built by and structured around what I will call the barangay system.

Contrasting the barangay system against systems of European authority can help to explain both the core of its power and its overall structure. In early modern Europe, much of the social and political order was defined by the control of settlements and land. Whatever came out of the land rightfully belonged to the owner of that land, and those who did not own land (serfs) had to pay rent for the use of someone else's land, usually by growing crops on the land and then giving a percentage of those crops to the landlord. The landlord, in turn, might pay tribute to a higher noble, lord, or king for the protection of his lands; and conquest was understood as the taking of someone else's land.

In the Malay archipelago, however, where there was a continual shortage of labor, land was not formally deeded or owned in the same way. Instead, the crops and other resources taken from land and sea were the property of the individuals who planted, harvested, and extracted them. One could, for example, plant a crop and then sell their planting rights to someone else who would then harvest the crop, neither of them claiming the land itself. Obtaining large amounts of food and resources, therefore, depended not on how much land a person owned, but on how many supporters and slaves one had, not on how much one's land produced, but on how much one's people produced. Authority in the barangay system was, therefore, primarily measured by the network of dependents and slaves a chieftain acquired, not by the lands that he controlled. Wealth-in-people was more important than wealth-in-land.78

In further contrast to the rigid European imperial system, the Philippine barangay system did not create tall and clearly delineated pyramids of power. It was, nevertheless, also defined by

a social hierarchy. Power in barangays functioned through a complex system of slavery, dependence, and patronage, a system that divided precolonial Philippine society into three basic classes. There was the datu class, including chieftains and priestesses, elites who had many slaves and dependents; then there were the timawa, or freemen, who had few or no slaves; and finally there were alipin, who were the slaves. It is important to emphasize here that this system did not resemble Atlantic slavery. Relationships between datus, timawa, and alipin were, for example, often based on indebtedness, reciprocity, and even mutual consent, though most in each class began their lives by inheriting their social status from their parents. Timawa generally owed their datus little more than military support in times of conflict; and a slave's condition was dependent on how much that individual and their family owed, depended on, or had offended their datu patron. There were several different reasons for enslavement; and the various reasons for individual slavery meant that there were also varying degrees and types of slaves. Some slaves worked for their masters only a few hours a week, doing fairly easy work, while others were in constant servitude in a chieftain's home, performing the most difficult and degrading forms of labor.79

The barangay system also included varying levels of datu authority. Each datu had power over his own followers, and within a single village there were often several datus of various ranks, the rank of each depending on the number of dependents over which one had control. Many ruled over only a few households within a single settlement; others governed whole villages of lower-level datus and their followers; and some held authority that reached between

79 Scott, 133-134.
villages and even islands. Most shared power with other datus through pacts and alliances, and
<em>timawas</em> also pledged their support to various datus in exchange for protection and assistance.\textsuperscript{80}

The lack of documented formality between datus and within the barangay system made it fluid. An individual's rank could rise and fall within their class or even between classes for various reasons, the whole creating a landscape of authority defined not by stable pyramids of power, but by constantly flowing and fluctuating peaks and valleys of indebtedness, competition, and allegiances. <em>Datus</em> repeatedly challenged one another to rise to higher elevations of authority; and <em>alipin</em> also fell to varying depths of indebtedness depending on their family history, their needs, and their adherence to <em>datu</em> regulations. It is difficult to imagine how Legazpi could have blended himself into a system that operated so differently from his own, and one furthermore that was powered by such a fundamentally dissimilar core.

Legazpi's assimilation into this system was compounded by the surface manifestations of the Visayan barangay system. The Spaniards, after all, did not look anything like Visayan datus. If we, twenty-first century observers, looked at early modern Spaniards standing next to their Visayan counterparts, we might emphasize the racial differences between the two peoples, one group being 'white' and the other 'brown.' But these were likely secondary considerations among the Visayans themselves. The Visayans probably talked more about Legazpi's lack of tattoos and the color of his teeth than they did about the tone of his skin.\textsuperscript{81} They likely emphasized tattoos and teeth because these these were cultural means through which Visayans recorded and expressed their personal histories and identities; and they were also therefore—like the royal decrees of Philip II—means of communicating difference, social rank, and political authority.

\textsuperscript{80} Junker, 74.
\textsuperscript{81} Scott, 18.
Tattoos were enough of a distinguishing feature of native Visayans that the Spaniards called the people and the subregion the 'Pintados,' meaning the 'painted [ones],' in direct reference to these physical markings. They called the other non-tattooed peoples in the islands—peoples from Luzon, Borneo, and southern Mindanao—'Moros,' their word for Muslims. But Visayan tattoos were more than just pictures and shapes on skin, they were personal histories written on one's body. Each tattoo referenced a great deed of some kind, most often performed in battle. They were usually geometric shapes applied in a designated order: the first being drawn around the ankles, later moving up the legs toward the waist, then to the chest, one's back, and finally, for the bravest warriors, tattoos were applied to the face. Each new tattoo enhanced an individual's 'dungan,' or spiritual prowess, and they were meant to be displayed. Daily attire was even designed to keep them visible. One Spanish friar, for example, described common Visayan attire as consisting of nothing but "tattoos and a bahag, as they call that cloth they wrap around their waist." 

Tattooing was, in fact, so important in the Visayas that the local language included a verb, *kulmat*, meaning "to strut around showing off new tattoos." If someone got a tattoo without first performing a worthy deed, they were shamed and mocked as pretenders. Legazpi's body, however, had no history written on it. The great deeds that justified his authority were instead recorded on paper, dispersed throughout the Spanish empire, and archived in imperial and colonial repositories. Without any tattoos, Legazpi was, in the Visayan language, *mapuraw*, meaning 'natural,' or non-tattooed, a sign perhaps to the Visayans of his inferiority. 

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83 Pedro Chirino (1600) quoted in Scott, 22.
84 For a more complete discussion of Visayan tattoos see Scott, 18, 20-22.
If Visayan tattoos were used to record great deeds, then tooth color communicated a personal social history of smaller daily transactions. Visayan people of every social rank colored their teeth red or black. Colored teeth were signs of beauty and prestige, while undecorated teeth signified low social status. The deeper significance of tooth coloring was probably tied to the local importance of betel nut, the fruit of Southeast Asia's areca palm, which caused one's teeth to be colored red or black. According to the Philippine anthropologist-historian William H. Scott, "the preparation, exchange, and serving of betel nut was the most important social act among Visayans."85 People in the Visayas carried the nuts with them wherever they went, and they shared parts of the same nut, or kulo, with others, as a symbolic representation of mutual respect, before engaging in conversations or trade with them. Not offering betel nut to visitors was an insult; and on formal occasions, betel nut was served on expensive metal trays. Betel nut even played a role in Visayan romance. A man sending partially chewed betel nut to a woman was flirtatious; her sending back more in response was a way of accepting his advances; and a woman sending a partly chewed quid of betel nut unsolicited to a man was an invitation.

Dark teeth, therefore, communicated one's involvement in the various social networks of family, trade, and authority, a symbol of one's integration into the larger web of human relationships and exchange. It was likely for this reason that many dyed their teeth artificially with roots, a local tar, and/or ant eggs. Visayan peoples were likely using these other methods as a way to heighten their expressions of social integration. Visayans also filed their teeth flat and plated them with bits of gold to communicate their bravery and wealth. The act of tooth filing was, in fact, so closely related to bravery that the teeth of hunting dogs were often filed as a way

85 Ibid., 49.
to increase their valor.\textsuperscript{86} Legazpi's teeth were, however, un-filed and white—something the people of Cebu associated with the non-human and non-social world of wild monkeys, dogs, pigs, and other animals.\textsuperscript{87} This difference in dentistry influenced the way that the Visayan people viewed Legazpi and his companions; whereas one Spanish writer described traditional Visayan tooth coloring as "an ugly thing,"\textsuperscript{88} the people of Cebu, similarly unimpressed with a lack of cosmetic dentistry among the Spaniards, likened European white teeth to "the chaw of coconut meat."\textsuperscript{89}

Despite Legazpi's decidedly un-Visayan appearance, and despite his lack of familiarity with the core of \textit{datu} power and with that power's underlying social structure, he and his people nevertheless penetrated, assimilated, and blended their authority into the local \textit{barangay} system. They did this by inserting themselves, initially by happenstance, into the level of authority between the \textit{barangay} system's core and its cosmetic surface. They became \textit{datus} not by altering their appearance, or by simply complying with surface symbols of authority; nor did they do it by embracing fully the system's core value of wealth-in-people. Legazpi and his men, rather, entered the system through the intermediary layer of sociocultural political practice.

Philippine archaeologist and anthropologist Laura Junker has identified the three types of political practice that transmitted \textit{barangay} power from its core—i.e. wealth-in-people—to its surface—e.g. tattoos and teeth. These were raiding, trading, and feasting.\textsuperscript{90} As explained above, the power core of \textit{barangay} authority and of the local social structure was fueled by the acquisition of slaves and dependents. Raiding, trading, and feasting each helped \textit{datus} to obtain

\begin{footnotes}
\item[86] Ibid., 44.
\item[87] For a more complete discussion of "decorative dentistry" in the Visayas see Ibid.
\item[89] Scott, 18.
\item[90] Junker.
\end{footnotes}
this sought after wealth-in-people; and each of these practices was also manifested in the tattoos and teeth of Visayan peoples. Raiding, trading, and feasting, in other words, acted as the connective wiring that channeled power between the barangay system's energetic nucleus and its external shell.

Raiding provided perhaps the most direct channel between the acquisition of slaves and one's personal appearance. Because the barangay system was based on wealth-in-people, the greatest prizes in datu military expeditions were not lands or resources. Warfare was, instead, focused on the taking of captives. As Junker explains, because people were a more valuable asset than land, the "seizure of slaves…rather than territories" formed the "primary motivating factor" in datu raids.\footnote{Ibid., 336.} This focus on taking captives, in fact, defined methods of indigenous warfare. Rather than engage directly with an enemy, the peoples of the Philippines often fled from violence. Their flight, however, was not a sign of cowardice. It was, rather, a way of preserving one's wealth and of keeping that wealth away from one's enemies. If a datu and his people could not be found, he would be safe from losing his most important source of power, and his attacker would furthermore be unable to add to his own foundation of authority. Surprise thus also played an important part in local military conflicts, an element of local violence that increased one's probability of capturing new slaves. This also meant that Visayans were less likely to kill an enemy, hoping instead to take him/her captive.\footnote{Angeles, 14.} Raiding connected wealth-in-people to the appearance of Visayans through their various tattoos, symbols that as stated above were often affixed to the skin in remembrance of heroic deeds performed during these raids.
Trading, especially for valued foreign items, was a second way that datus acquired and enhanced their authority. As noted above, in the precolonial barangay network there was no single overarching political power unifying the Philippines, meaning also that no single government entity secured trade. Trade agreements were, instead, negotiated on an individual basis between individual merchants and datus, and the negotiation of continually peaceful trade was one sign of an alliance between the leaders of multiple barangays. Datus who acquired surplus goods from the labor of their dependents and slaves traded those goods to their commercial allies for valuable prestige items, like Chinese porcelains, which were often carried to Cebu by Moro merchants from Manila. These Chinese porcelains and other valuable goods could then either be kept by a datu and displayed as markers of his prestige, or they could be distributed to other datus and dependents as gifts, gifts that created and deepened the sense of indebtedness, obligation, and allegiance between the receiver and the giver. They could also be traded for other valuable items, including slaves. Trade in Southeast Asia, as Junker summarizes, "cemented political relationships between paramount chiefs and local chiefs, [and] between local chiefs and their cadre of supporters." Trading practices were connected to Visayan appearance through betel nut. As noted above, Visayan merchants ate betel nut before trade negotiations, a practice that reddened or blackened their teeth.

Finally, in the barangay system, datus also expressed and deepened their authority by throwing lavish and ritual-laden feasts. These feasts were celebrated for three reasons: to ceremonially bless elites during major life events (births, deaths, marriages, etc.), to mark critical times in the annual agricultural cycle (e.g. planting and harvesting times), and to commemorate

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93 Junker, 15.
irregular but important community events (such as the launching of a raiding expedition, the building of a datu's new house, or the making of an alliance with a former enemy). These feasts reflected and deepened the barangay system's political and social order; they enhanced the perceived spiritual prowess of their patrons; and they appeared to improve the supernatural wellbeing of the barangay community.\footnote{Ibid., 314.} Marriages were of particular importance to datus seeking to expand their regional influence. Contracting a marriage between one's kin and that of another datu was an additional way of forming alliances, and the marriage feast was crucial to solidifying and expressing the power of these agreements. The lavishness of feasts could also attract new followers to a datu because feasts were designed to showcase one's authority and spiritual prowess.\footnote{Ibid., 378.} Feasting was, again, apparent in Visayan appearances because of betel nut, which was commonly served at these ritualistic datu celebrations, again reddening or blackening one's teeth.

When Legazpi and his men first arrived in the Philippines, the barangay system was completely closed off to them; and their European tactics were unable either to usurp that system or to penetrate its surface. Instead, as the Spanish immigrants journeyed from Samar, to Leyte, to Bohol, to Mindanao, etc., they ricocheted time and again off of this surface, bouncing from one place to the next. Only when they came to Cebu did the Spaniards begin to tap permanently into the practices that defined datu authority. At Cebu, Legazpi, through raiding, trading, and feasting, began to blend himself and his people into the Philippine archipelago's network of chiefly authority, the only network that could provide the Spaniards with their many much-needed local resources, including food. The continued survival of Legazpi and of his people in
the Philippines, in other words, depended on their conquest of Cebu, or put another way, they depended on their assimilation into datu networks of power, an assimilation that marked the beginnings of internal Philippine sovereignty.

The difficulties that Legazpi and his men faced as they confronted the surface of the barangay system can be illustrated by two interethnic encounters that occurred during their early months in the archipelago. First, as Legazpi's ships approached a coastal village in southern Leyte, a Visayan lookout, living on a cliff, saw them coming, and yelled to ask them who they were. Upon hearing that they were Spaniards, the lookout burned down his house as a signal to others, and then fled inland to the hills. By the time Legazpi and his men had docked off the coast, the entire village was deserted, and the Spaniards had no idea where they might be able to find its inhabitants.96

Later, at a larger and more wealthy settlement on Samar, Legazpi sent several men ashore, and these returned with a powerful datu and some Visayan merchants, who traded some food to the Spaniards, promising that they would provide more at a later date. As the agreed upon day neared, the village's people packed their belongings and began to evacuate their homes, fleeing with their goods into the nearby highlands. When the day for the delivery of food arrived, the datu returned to Legazpi's ship and gave the Captain just one chicken and one egg. By then, the village was empty, and again, the Spaniards had gained nothing.97 These two incidents were representative of most of the Spaniards' early interactions with Visayan peoples. Wherever the Spaniards went, the Visayans refused to allow them to penetrate into their communities either by simply avoiding them, or by delaying and then avoiding them.

96 San Augustin, 277-279.
97 Juan de Medina, "History of the Augustinian order in the Filipinas Islands" (1630), BR 23, 144.
During these first months, Legazpi and his men developed two strategies for trying to break through this wall of avoidance, these also being well illustrated by two encounters. At one point the Spaniards docked off an island, where they were as before stalled by a datu promising to trade more food later. As the Spaniards waited in their ships, they noticed that the people appeared, again, to be gathering their things so that they could flee. Knowing that they would get nothing by waiting, the Spaniards attacked before the local villagers could finish gathering their food, forcing them to flee immediately. Under orders not to steal from indigenous peoples, the Spaniards took the food, calculated its value, and then sailed away, leaving several imported commodities as payment on the empty beach.98

Later, at a settlement on Bohol, after the Boholanos had fled from the Spaniards into the mountains, Legazpi encountered and employed an indigenous Moro merchant to go into the mountains to persuade the Boholanos to stop avoiding the Spaniards. The Moro succeeded in getting a few Boholano datus to come and trade with Legazpi and his men, but these datus remained suspicious of the Spanish and did not cooperate with them fully.99 Due to the size of these two small villages, neither approach produced enough food to last the hungry Spaniards for very long. In the end, the strategy to coerce trade through violence and the strategy of negotiating for trading partners both failed, each requiring too much time and effort for too little in return.

During Legazpi's time at Bohol, he learned why the Visayan people were so resistant to allowing the Spaniards to enter their communities, or in other words why he could not break through the surface of the barangay system. Two years before, in 1563, a fleet of ships from the Maluku islands, or 'Spice Islands,' led by the Portuguese and manned by both Portuguese and

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98 San Augustin, 273.
99 see Ibid., 297-303, 313-321.
Malay peoples, attacked some of the islands in the Philippines, raiding several villages and carrying away more than a thousand captives. Having perhaps heard rumors about Spain's plan to send another expedition to the archipelago, the marauding Portuguese spread the word that they were, in fact, Spaniards. The Portuguese thereby used these raids not only to enrich themselves and their native allies, but also as a preemptive strike against their as yet unestablished European rival. When Legazpi came in 1565, the Portuguese plan worked perfectly. The peoples of the Philippines were so fearful of European raids that they fled with whatever they could carry.\(^{100}\)

The convergence of Spain and Portugal thus also affected the Spaniards' internal relationships with Visayan peoples.

While Legazpi was on Bohol, he furthermore learned of a large and well provisioned settlement at Cebu. Still in need of food and other resources, he directed his fleet to the nearby island. When he and his men arrived there, however, they again encountered the same impenetrable wall of avoidance. At first, Tupas, the town's most powerful datu, sent a representative out to Legazpi, promising to trade with the Spaniards. But the Spaniards soon saw from their ship that Tupas and his people were preparing to flee inland. Rather than allow them time to gather their belongings, Legazpi again ordered an attack. As the Spaniards landed and began to fight, Tupas and his people fled inland, to the hills; and as they fled, their settlement was burned to the ground. What the Spaniards perceived as an act of cowardice was, in reality, the Cebuano datu's way of preserving their wealth-in-people, a way of avoiding capture. The Spaniards then began to build their own settlement on the ashes of the former town. Legazpi had

\(^{100}\) Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Relation of the voyage to the Philippines" (1565), BR 2, 207-208.
seemingly won the battle. But, still lacking food and provisions—most of which had been burned in the Cebu fire—he was still losing the war.\footnote{Ibid., (1565), 212-214.}

Having attempted coercive violence, Legazpi then turned to his second tactic. With his food supply rapidly dwindling away, Legazpi, as he had done on Bohol, encountered and sent a Moro merchant into the mountains to negotiate with Tupas and Cebu's other \textit{datus}. The Cebuano chieftains, however, refused time and again to descend from their mountain bases to talk with Legazpi. This continued for several weeks until finally, Legazpi's Moro ambassador succeeded. Tupas, probably suffering now from a food shortage himself and likely hoping to gather more information about the Spaniards, came down with a second \textit{datu} named Tamuyan, the two chieftains also being accompanied by thirty guards.\footnote{San Augustin, 353-357.}

Tupas and Tamuyan explained to Legazpi that they wanted peace, and as was commonly done among the Visayan people, they requested that Legazpi enter into a blood compact, called a \textit{sandugo}, meaning 'one blood.' The \textit{sandugo} was a ritual involving two leaders who each drew blood from their arm or chest, mixed their blood into a single container of wine or water, divided the drink between two cups, and then drank their cups empty at the same time. Legazpi had entered into a \textit{sandugo} before at Bohol; and, as he later explained, "all those who have not made a treaty of peace with them, or drawn blood with them, are considered enemies."\footnote{Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands and of the Character and Conditions of their Inhabitants" (1569), BR 3, 55. See also San Augustin, 259; and Medina, 142-143.}

At Cebu, Legazpi entered into one blood compact with Tupas and into another with Tamuyan, showing that he was beginning to understand the \textit{barangay} system's structure. At earlier stops, Legazpi had agreed to enter into blood compacts only with the chief \textit{datu} of an
island.\textsuperscript{104} This decision was based on a misguided assumption about the structure of political authority in the islands. Legazpi, assuming that his past experiences with European power structures could be applied universally, believed that datu authority was also layered in a pyramid like structure. Legazpi, as the chief officer over his expedition, therefore, agreed to enter only into a sandugo with the chief ruler of Bohol, and he allowed his lower level officers to enter into sandugos with other lower ranking chieftains. While it was true that some datus were more powerful than others, their political structure was not strictly hierarchical, meaning that an agreement with more powerful datus did not necessarily signify an agreement with their less powerful allies and neighbors. By performing one sandugo with Tupas and another with Tamuyan Legazpi symbolically made an agreement with both, something that, even though these two datus were allies, would not have happened if he had only drawn blood with one or the other.

The sandugos nevertheless failed to blend Legazpi permanently into the network of barangay authority. After the ritual, Tupas and Tamuyan went back to their inland forts, promising Legazpi that they would return later to the Spanish camp with other datus, datus who would likewise ally with the Spaniards. But they did not return. Legazpi and the Spaniards viewed this as an act of treachery. But the refusal to return was due more to incompatible understandings of power than it was to betrayal. A sandugo, like tooth coloring or tattooing, was a surface element of the barangay system; and Legazpi had not yet obtained any lasting barangay authority. The question to be asked therefore was not 'why didn't Tupas and Tamuyan honor their agreement?' but rather 'why should they?' They were dealing with a people who,

\textsuperscript{104} San Augustin, 273.
though powerful militarily, had failed, time and again, to amass the kind of authority that was necessary for longterm settlement. The Spaniards had no local dependents and no trade partners. Tupas and Tamuyan knew that if they waited long enough, Legazpi and his people would be forced to leave. The validity of *sandugos* depended on the deeper joint authority of the *datus* that entered into these agreements; and Legazpi had, thus far, failed to accumulate the kind of authority recognized by Tupas and Tamuyan.

As June approached, however, Legazpi, through an unanticipated series of events, began to latch onto the deeper channels of practice that funneled power through the *barangay* system; that is to say, he began to acquire *datu*-like authority. With food becoming increasingly scarce in the Spanish camp on Cebu, small Spanish expeditions were sent into nearby towns and villages, where the Spaniards continued to take food by force and to try trading for it. One day, a Spaniard, named Pedro de Arana, wandered far from camp, probably searching for other settlements where food could be obtained; and he was attacked by a group of Visayan warriors. The Visayans launched a spear through his body, cut off his head, and took it away with them as a prize. Shortly thereafter, the Spaniards discovered their compatriot's body. Furious, Legazpi ordered that a diligent search be made for the Visayan aggressors. Soon a tiny village of fourteen houses was discovered, and near it, a small boat covered in fresh blood. Concluding that the blood belonged to Arana, the Spaniards burned the village, and captured seven people, while the rest fled into the mountains for safety. Among these seven were four women—the wife of a Cebuano *datu*, two of her daughters, and one of her slaves.\(^{105}\)

This was not the Spaniards' first raid in the islands, and these were not the first prisoners that they had taken. But this raid and these people were nevertheless different from those of the past. Whereas previous attacks had focused on taking food and provisions, this raid was specifically designed to capture people. It was aimed at punishing them for their crime against Pedro de Arana. By striking at human beings, the Spanish raid was striking at the very core of barangay power, prestige, and wealth. It was speaking to the basic purpose underlying datu violence, to the foundation of local authority, and to the organizing principle and value defining Visayan society: the accumulation of slaves and dependents. This was, in short, understood by the Visayans as a barangay-type raid and captivity; and it was therefore the turning point that began to channel datu power toward Legazpi. This, the Spaniards' first barangay raid, was especially significant because of the status of Legazpi's captives. Higher ranking captives, like the wives and daughters of datus, could be ransomed at higher prices, or for more slaves, than could captives taken from lower levels of the social order.

This is not to say, however, that Legazpi was directly responsible for opening up this new channel of authority. Datu power, rather, began to flow to Legazpi through the actions of one of his captives. Being captured, the eldest of Legazpi's female Visayan captives, the wife of a datu, believing that her husband would pay a ransom for her, asked that her slave be sent inland to fetch him. Legazpi agreed to this request, thinking that the woman's husband may be able to explain why Tupas had not returned after the original pact had been made. And so, the slave girl went into the mountains. The next day a Moro messenger named Damit came down with a message from Tupas and the other datus. Damit explained that Cebu's datus would gladly pay gold for the ransom of the three remaining female prisoners. But Legazpi, sensing now that his
high ranking captives had given him leverage, sent Damit back into the highlands with the message that he did not want gold but rather 'friendship' and peace—two things that would hopefully lead to a steady supply of food.

Later that evening, twenty additional Cebuano women, Damit, and two other datus claiming to be Tupas' brothers approached the Spanish camp. One of the datus, a man named Maquio, was the husband and father of the three remaining female captives. He offered himself and the others as a ransom for his wife and daughters, explaining that he and his companions were willing to be made slaves, to be sold, sent to Spain, or to be treated however Legazpi desired in exchange for the freedom of his captive family members. Legazpi refused the offer of enslavement, reiterating instead his request for friendship.

Legazpi then permitted Maquio to visit his wife and daughters. When the small family was reunited, they wept and embraced one another, joining their hands and raising them to the heavens as a sign of gratitude. This show of gratitude displayed the powerful emotional component attached to raiding and captivity. Power flowed through the barangay system not only because of an abstract logic of wealth-in-people but also because of how slavery and dependence affected oneself and one's friends and family. Legazpi's raid thereby also drew barangay authority toward the Spaniards' from this locally prominent family's the desire for reunification.

Legazpi, after watching this display of affection, promised that he would release the captives to Maquio if and when Maquio convinced Tupas and the other Cebu datus to come down and negotiate with the Spaniards. In response, Maquio promised his personal allegiance

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106 "Expedición de Legazpi, Documento 39" (1567), in Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Ultramar (Madrid: Impresos de la Real Casa, 1887), 91-94.
107 Ibid., 95.
and friendship to Legazpi, and he pledged to discuss the matter with Tupas and the others. If they did not agree to come down, Maquio explained, he would join with Legazpi in war against them, capturing Tupas himself and bringing him down out of the hills by force if need be.¹⁰⁸ Maquio's promise was Legazpi's first enduring political connection on Cebu, and it was the beginning of his and the Spaniards' assimilation into the local network of datu authority. Through this chain of events, a raid and captivity began the formation of a bond between Legazpi and the datus of Cebu.

After making his promise to Legazpi, Maquio then returned to the mountains where he was able to convince Tupas to come down and negotiate with the Spaniards. For unknown reasons, Tupas was not able to come down the next day; and he sent his son, Pisuncan, with Maquio in his stead. The diplomatic act of sending a family member into the power of another datu was nevertheless an assurance of Tupa's intent to keep his promise. This practice, one common throughout the islands, was an additional expression of the local significance of raiding, captivity, and wealth-in-people. It showed that Tupas was beginning to recognize and respect the legitimacy of Legazpi's authority in the islands.

When Maquio and Pisuncan arrived in the camp, they found that Maquio's wife and daughters were dressed in beautiful shirts made of a fine cotton fabric from France. This fine dress spoke to the second practice underlying datu authority: trading. Seeing these valuable prestige goods on his family members, Maquio was "much pleased" and he requested permission to stay the night in the Spanish camp with Pisuncan and with his family, all of them expecting that Tupas would arrive on the morrow.¹⁰⁹ Legazpi then ordered that jackets, shirts, pants, and

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 95-96.
¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 97.
red caps also be given to Maquio and Pisuncan. Legazpi, furthermore, ordered six other sets of clothing to be made for Tupas and for any other datus that might accompany him. Legazpi wanted Tupas to see and experience the value of Spanish imports, as Maquio and Pisuncan had done.

The following morning, four of Tupas' followers came to the camp and told Legazpi that Tupas would be arriving at midday. When the four messengers saw Maquio and the others in their Spanish clothing they too "were very happy and rejoiced."10 True to his word, Tupas arrived around noon, bringing with him eight other datus. After discussing their past actions through interpreters, Tupas and Legazpi made an alliance with one another. Tupas knelt before Legazpi and kissed his hands. Each datu then followed suit, one at a time, doing as Tupas had done. Once this was finished, Legazpi showered his new allies with gifts including not only the clothing he had ordered to be made the previous night but also with pearls, silver, silk, and a great mirror.11 Having given these gifts to Tupas and the others, Legazpi explained that he needed to build a fort for the Spaniards. Then walking with the Cebuano datus to a palm tree, the Captain told them that the tree would mark the boundary of the Spanish settlement until a wall could be built. He also explained when the Indios would be permitted to cross that boundary and when they would not.12

As with raiding, it was, of course, no surprise to Legazpi that gift giving could lead to power. One of the principle purposes of gifts has always been to create bonds between people, and in this instance, the clothing that Legazpi gave to the Cebu elites also showcased some of the foreign commodities that the datus might have wanted to trade for later. But, again, the deeper

10 Ibid., 98.
11 Ibid., 104.
12 Ibid., 107.
local significance of Legazpi's actions were largely unknown to him. In a system of authority where trade was secured by a complex web of individual relationships between chieftains, not an overarching authority, the exchange of prestige commodities communicated far more than friendship and the possibilities of imports. In the barangay system, gift giving and economic exchange bound together prestigious families, helped to resolve conflicts between warring settlements, and symbolically cemented alliances between datus who lived in different villages and on different islands.

As part of these alliances, the exchange of "valuable nonsubsistence goods," like fine clothing, "served to establish and reinforce the political alliances necessary for carrying out… trade in mundane domestic items," like food. Furthermore, the giving of valuable gifts was a common way that datus maintained their personal "networks of patron-client relationships" with many of their own followers; they distributed gifts to those who became loyal to them.113 These many meanings were implicitly understood by the Visayans in the gifts that Legazpi gave to his captives, to Maquio, Pisuncan, Tupas, and the others. Legazpi's gifts of fine imported clothing thereby penetrated the barangay system and helped to create interethnic bonds between Legazpi and the Visayans, bonds that were forged according to traditional concepts of datu economic exchange.

The giving of these valuable gifts not only helped to solidify trade relationships between the Cebuano chieftains and the Spaniards, but gift giving also channeled authority to Legazpi through its link to indigenous feasting practices. In the barangay system, valuable foreign objects were often used in feasting rituals to communicate the prowess of a sponsoring datu, and

113 Junker, 303.
Legazpi's gifts were likely valued, in part, because they too could be used for this purpose. Feasts were, furthermore, like trade, a means of solidifying inter-datu and inter-barangay relationships. It is significant then that, after Legazpi established the border of his new settlement, he gave the Cebuano datus food and drink. Though Legazpi's food offering did not strictly follow indigenous feasting patterns, Tupas and the other datus, nevertheless, expressed "great reverence and honor to [Legazpi]" while they ate, and afterward they kissed his hands again "with much joy and happiness." Legazpi and his men certainly lacked a deep understanding of these datu actions, but this did not negate the importance of feasting in creating bonds between the two people. Beneath these datus’ expressions of feeling were their Visayan interpretations of feasting's local significance. The two people were, again, forming a blended relationship based largely on barangay norms.

Legazpi, furthermore, did not know that the status and value of his elite female captives were a direct outgrowth of barangay feasting practices. As Legazpi talked with Maquio about his wife and daughters, he referred to them only in relation to their husband and father, his own views on gender almost certainly being the underlying reason that these women's names were left unrecorded. But the sources suggest that, among their own people, these captive women were well known for their place in their community's spiritual economy. In the barangay system, where men ruled local villages as datus, the ritual specialists in the islands were almost always women. Known on Cebu as babaylans, priestesses performed blessings on crops, seances to call upon the dead, and sacrifices—all these rituals being done at community feasts. Feasting ceremonies, in other words, not only enhanced the status of male datus, but they also elevated

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115 Scott, 82-84.
the spiritual prowess of elite women. Indeed, femininity was such a critical part of feasting rituals that when, on rare occasions, men performed sacrifices, they dressed as women, affirming the local belief in a more direct and powerful connection between women and the world of spirits.¹¹⁶

Though Legazpi’s captives are not called babaylans in the historical record, there is significant evidence that they were, in fact, priestess to the Cebu community. Datus, for example, were often married to babaylans, forming an ideal and powerful union of male and female spiritual potency over a group of followers.¹¹⁷ Because these babaylans were, furthermore, organized into loosely affiliated female priestess communities, it is also significant that when Maquio first came to offer a ransom for his wife and daughters, he brought with him twenty women. These female spiritual orders were on display again in Cebu weeks later, when Tupas' wife explained to her husband that she too wanted to meet Legazpi. Clearly demonstrating distinct authority from her husband, Tupas' wife was then carried into the settlement on the shoulders of two other elite females at the back of a procession with more than sixty women "all singing loudly," most wearing hats made of palm, wreaths of diverse flowers, gold, other valuable jewelry, and various colorful shawls. Legazpi responded to this by throwing a feast in honor of Tupas' wife. In the days immediately following this first procession, the wives of other datus, including Maquio's once captive spouse, presented themselves to Legazpi in exactly the same manner.¹¹⁸ These later processions were, in fact, foreshadowed in the initial release of Maquio's wife and daughters; overjoyed at receiving the elite female captives unharmed, the

¹¹⁶ Carolyn Brewer, Shamanism, Catholicism and Gender Relations in the Colonial Philippines, 1521-1685 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 127-128.
¹¹⁷ Antonio Pigafetta, "Primo viaggio intorno al mondo" (1525), BR 33, 167-171.
¹¹⁸ "Expedición de Legazpi, Documento 39," 120-121.
people of Cebu "put [the women] on their shoulders…[and] carried them singing and with great
yells and rejoicing."\footnote{119} Powerful conduits to the world of spirits were being returned.

Having received their captive \textit{babaylans} without having to pay a ransom, Tupas and the
other \textit{datus} decided to resettle near their old village, beside Legazpi's new camp. Over the next
several days and weeks, Tupas and Legazpi's other new Cebuano allies brought more \textit{datus} to the
Spaniards, additional chieftains who likewise received gifts and promises of allegiance from the
new immigrants. With the Cebuano settlement near the Spanish fort, the two people began to
trade regularly and to form interethnic relationships with one another. Some of these interactions
were approved by Legazpi—for example, the purchase of provisions and a marriage between a
Greek man who came with Legazpi to a Cebuano woman—while others were forbidden—like
the Spanish purchase of indigenous palm wine, and unsanctioned sexual relationships between
European men and Cebuano women. Licit or illicit, these interactions formed individual
connections between the Spaniards and the Cebuano people, adding thickness to the Spanish
immigrant community's newly developing bond to the the \textit{barangay} system.

After Legazpi's female captives helped to form the Spaniards' initial links to the \textit{barangay}
system, Legazpi and his men continued to accumulate \textit{datu} power through raiding, trading, and
feasting. When the Cebuano people agreed to resettle near the new Spanish camp, the two people
entered into a formal treaty with one another. One condition of this treaty, one often emphasized
by Tupas and by Cebu's other chieftains, was Legazpi's promise to aid his Cebuano allies against
any other people who were "hostile to them."\footnote{120} Shortly after the Visayan resettlement of Cebu,
Tupas began imploring Legazpi "everyday to be given soldiers" so that he could wage war on
some of his other *datu* enemies, "alleging that [Legazpi] was obligated in accordance with the peace treaty" to help the people of Cebu.\textsuperscript{121}

Though Legazpi was, at first, resistant to this request, he eventually relented when he heard how other peoples mocked Cebu's *datu* for allying with the Spaniards. Legazpi sent fifty Spanish soldiers on this first joint Cebuano-Spanish colonial military venture, an attack led by Tupas, not by a Spaniard. These fifty Spanish soldiers proved so effective that the *datu* "again implored [Legazpi] for help in other battles."\textsuperscript{122} Within a few days, Legazpi sent one hundred Spanish soldiers to accompany five hundred of Tupas' men against another of the Cebu chieftain's enemies. After these first two joint Spanish-Cebuano raids, Tupas and the people of Cebu "returned to camp very happily" with their spoils, while Tupas' enemies began to fear and envy Legazpi's Cebuano allies "seeing how they were favored and helped" by the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{123}

An increasing number of indigenous peoples thereafter began to ally with Legazpi and his people. These alliances were made by these additional *datu* both to protect their communities from joint Spanish-Cebuano raids and also to give these other chieftains access to Spanish assistance in raids of their own.

Joint indigenous-Spanish raids eventually altered the way that the Spaniards waged war in the region. Felice Noelle Rodriguez has shown, for example, that by the time the first Spaniards came to Manila in 1570, five years after settling at Cebu, they had come to embrace distinctly Southeast Asian war tactics, tactics that they had learned during these earlier joint multiethnic campaigns. Rodriguez' analysis focuses on Juan de Salcedo, a prominent Spanish conquistador in the Philippines and a nephew of Legazpi. As Rodriguez shows, years later,

\textsuperscript{121} San Augustin, 393.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 399.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 401.
several *datu* from the island of Panay allied with Legazpi, who sent Salcedo to help them in an attack on other chieftains on Mindoro. These *datu* made alliances with Legazpi as a way of "building political connections" in preparation for their raid.124 During the raid, Salcedo used surprise tactics against Mindoro, tactics that were common among *datu* seeking captives, and afterward he and the other *datu* shared the spoils equally, suggesting that Salcedo was understood as just one *datu* among many who participated in the raid. Indigenous supporters also outnumbered the Spaniards during these and every other joint colonial raid. "From an indigenous viewpoint," Rodriguez summarizes, "Salcedo acted less like a Spanish commander and more like a powerful *datu*."125

Legazpi and his men similarly began to blend themselves into the *barangay* system's local network of trade. As explained above, Legazpi and his men arrived at Cebu with a shortage of food; and most of Cebu's reserves were, furthermore, burned up in the fire that accompanied Legazpi's initial attack. Immediately after the resettlement of Cebu's people near the Spanish camp, Legazpi, therefore, asked his new allies where he could go to trade for food. They told him that there was frequently a surplus of rice on the island of Panay, and some of Cebu's *datu* also offered to go there on his behalf, promising that they would be able to obtain food at a cheaper price. Legazpi agreed and sent Spanish trade goods with the *datu* Maquio to Panay. In this way, the Spaniards began to work their way into the indigenous trading system through both indigenous knowledge and indigenous merchants. Maquio's return was, nevertheless, delayed and, in the meantime, Legazpi began to make trade alliances with Moro merchants from Manila, merchants who traveled yearly to Cebu. Even after the Spaniards opened these new channels of

124 Felice Noelle Rodriguez, "Juan de Salcedo Joins the Native Form of Warfare," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 46, no., 2 (Jun 2003), 156.
125 Ibid., 149.
local trade, they continued to suffer heavy food shortages. They had, nevertheless, begun to insert themselves into the barangay world of economic exchange, procuring food and other necessities for imports from the Americas.

Spanish rituals were, furthermore, grafted into the local system of feasting and cultural expression. One of the most dramatic examples of this happened with the Spaniards' discovery of the Santo Niño. As Cebu was burning and Tupas' people were fleeing, a Spanish soldier discovered a statue of the Christ child in a Visayan hut. This image, the Spaniards concluded, had been brought to the settlement more than forty years before by Ferdinand Magellan. Since that time, the indigenous people had reverenced the image, treating it like a local god, one that could call forth rain during drought and that also assisted with fertility. It was said that when the people of Cebu needed rain, they would carry the Santo Niño in a procession to the sea, undress it, and then leave it partially submerged along the shore until rain came.

The Spaniards re-appropriated this image back into their Catholic traditions by building a church for it over the house in which it was discovered. Within a few days, two chieftains and thirty of their subjects came to Legazpi hoping to negotiate the return of the Santo Niño. Though they were denied their request, these Visayan witnesses entered the Spaniards' makeshift church and witnessed mass. Seeing the "reverence that the Spaniards had for the sacred image," they were "absorbed and struck with awe." The pomp of the Spaniards' ritualistic celebration, accompanied by communion, was no doubt interpreted by these witnesses according to their understanding of barangay prestige, prestige that was likewise enhanced.

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126 see San Agustin, 339; and Marcelo de Ribadeneira, O.F.M. Historia del Archipelago y otros Reynos (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1970 [1601]), 328.
127 San Augustin, 339.
128 Ibid., 347.
through rituals and eating. During the ensuing years, Christian rituals and the Catholic calendar of festivals were incorporated into barangay life at Cebu, rituals and festivals that intermingled with the continuation of indigenous feasts. Indigenous and European ritual practices were thus becoming blended into one system.

Indeed, Legazpi's indigenous name, Basal, is a Visayan term that refers to the ringing of bells, an action that accompanied all of the Spaniards' Catholic celebrations and rituals in the islands. Bell ringing, however, also had ritual significance among the Visayans. When, for example, illness struck, Visayans would call on their babalayans to offer food sacrifices, similar to those offered at feasts. These sacrifices were accompanied by
dancing to the sound of a bell; and it would happen...that in the most furious part of the dance and the bell-ringing, when the [babaylan] was exerting most force, all at once she stopped at the death of the sick person.

This Visayan cultural resonance with bell ringing certainly did not disappear behind the fact that Spanish bells were part of foreign Catholic rituals. The traditional feelings produced among the Visayans by bell ringing rather almost certainly enhanced, in their eyes, the prestige and spiritual prowess of Legazpi and his people. The meaning behind Legazpi's Visayan name—the ringing of bells—in other words, echoed in meaningful ways to Spaniards and Visayans alike, helping thereby to blend their two ritual worlds together.

During the Spaniards' time at Cebu, the practices of raiding, trading, and feasting continued to assimilate the Spaniards into the indigenous barangay system. Though all three of these practices were collectively present in the formation of Legazpi's initial relationship with the people of Cebu, his emerging connections with other settlements might include, periodically,

129 Alonso de Mentrida, Diccionario de la Lengua Bisaya, Hiligueina y Haraya de la Isla de Panay (Manila: D. Manuel y D. Felis Dayot, 1841), 57.
130 Pedro Chirino, S.J., "Relacion de las Islas Filipinas" (1602), BR 12, 302.
only one or the other of these three. As described above, for example, the Spaniards began their relationship with Panay by sending and trading their goods there through Cebuano merchant allies; and their trade with the Manila's Moro merchants at Cebu may have also included feasting together. Eventually, it is clear that the Spaniards began to raid alongside the people of Panay and to feast with them; and the same was also true of Manila's Moro merchants who came to Cebu to trade. These prominent examples show a pattern that unquestionably reached to several settlements that have since been lost to the historical record. Between 1565-1571, Legazpi and his men, through raiding, trading, and feasting, blended themselves into the Philippine network of barangay authority, a network that provided them with essential local resources.

During these early years, the indigenous peoples of the islands also began to catch their first glimpse of the more rigid European imperial system. Through his raiding, trading, and feasting relationships, Legazpi began, for example, to blend European and Latin American imports into the local barangay inter-island web of economic exchange. As these goods became coveted objects among datu leaders, the Spaniards' local power grew and so did their trade network. Philippine peoples thus began to experience the mercantile and economic power of Europe's expansion.

Blood compacts and treaties were another way that Philippine peoples began to see and experience a faint outline of the European imperial system. Though the sandugo was a Philippine barangay ritual, Legazpi drew up legal treaties to accompany Spanish-indigenous blood compacts; and he also gave paper licenses to the datus who entered into these agreements with the Spaniards, these licenses enabling him to easily identify his local allies. The legalistic

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131 For Panay example see San Augustin, 522-536. Manila will be discussed extensively in part two.
132 Ibid., 425.
paper world of Europe thereby became blended into the barangay system. Prior to Legazpi, sandugos had been more temporary and their terms less exact. Archived and recorded on licenses, however, European legal documents helped to create a formal network, one similar to Spain's global imperial network. This local network was, however, made up of local Philippine barangays, previously independent villages that were now becoming bound together through a blend of the traditional sandugo ritual and its new gloss of European legalistic documentation.

When Legazpi first arrived in the Visayan islands, he and his men attempted to use both violent coercion and peaceful trade to get food. These attempts, however, failed time and again. Legazpi and his expedition did not begin to obtain a steady supply of provisions until they started to exercise local authority in accordance with the barangay system, through native Philippine practices of power, that is through raiding, trading, and feasting. This effective use of barangay power to get food began at Cebu; and from there, the Spaniards started to project their authority through these practices into other parts of the Philippine islands. The conquest of Cebu, however, was not the process of taking over the archipelago or even the island itself. As yet, the Spaniards remained only one power among several both on Cebu and in the Philippine islands. Spanish authority over the barangay system would not be stabilized until the completion of the conquest of Manila. Yet in the first five years of colonization, Legazpi and his men nevertheless constructed new and lasting authority in the Philippines. They were part of the barangay system, new participants in local Philippine life, a people who had started the process of interlinking multiple powers and networks into an emerging sovereignty. By 1570, Legazpi himself, now also known as Basal, was acting as both a governor and a datu. Two roles and two systems were thereby being blended into one.
Part 1 Conclusion:
The First Layer of Philippine Sovereignty

On June 1, 1565, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi sent two critical messages from his newly established camp at Cebu, two messages that together began the formation of the first layer of Philippine sovereignty. The first message was directed to Mexico and was to be carried by Fray Andres de Urdaneta on his pioneering eastward voyage across the Pacific. This message, described above, was an urgent plea for supplies: guns, trade goods, equipment, etc. The second message was carried by a Cebuano slave woman, owned by one of Legazpi's prominent female captives. She was charged with informing the *datus* of Cebu that her master, a priestess, wanted her husband to come and ransom her from the Spaniards. Legazpi sent the slave with this message hoping that she could convince Cebu's chieftains to come down from their mountain fort. Legazpi might then be able to persuade them to become his allies, which he believed would open the way for him and his people to obtain much needed food.

These two messages—the first to Mexico and the second to the chieftains of Cebu—showed that Legazpi and his people depended for their continued survival in the Philippines on two sources of authority, powers that oversaw the global and local movement of essential resources. One of these sources, the Spanish empire, was part of a globalizing imperial European network of power; and the other, the local Philippine *barangay* system, was governed by a complex network of local *datus*. Both of these messages fulfilled their desired purposes. Spain's empire began sending resources to Legazpi, and the *datus* of Cebu eventually became his allies and helped him to obtain food.
Through these messages, Legazpi and his men also began to acquire authority within these two systems. Legazpi's letters to Mexico helped to incorporate him into the Spanish empire, while his message to the chieftains of Cebu was a first step toward exercising *datu* authority in the islands. As time passed, Legazpi's external European influence continued to increase and his internal Philippine power likewise grew, enabling the Spaniards to gather an increasingly large amount of support, in both resources and authority, from these two interlocking systems. Though the Spaniards moved their chief settlement from Cebu to Panay in 1569, then on to Manila in 1571, the joint external-internal layer of power they had begun to form at Cebu did not dissolve. During Legazpi's lifetime, rather, this authority migrated with the Spaniards from one spot to the next, and in the process it became increasingly stable and institutionalized. By the time of his death, Legazpi had made colonial authority a real power in the islands, though it was not yet the power over them. Legazpi and his men created this first layer of sovereignty by anchoring two systems to one another, fixing both in place, and making the two mutually dependent within an emerging framework of colonial power. Later governors inherited this dual system, and both the imperial and *barangay* networks—with their resources and power—continued to be essential to colonial governance for more than two hundred years.

The continued importance of this first layer of sovereignty was perhaps most apparent in the Philippine colonial government's two primary sources of income: the *situado*, and tribute. The *situado*, established in the late sixteenth century, was a yearly subsidy, sent from New Spain to the Philippines, a subsidy that paid the chronic deficits of the Philippine government's colonial treasury. It was provided by a tax on Chinese goods imported to Mexico from Manila, and during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the subsidy varied with each year depending on
the volume of imported goods and on how much money the Philippine government needed. Each year the *situado* amounted to approximately 20-25% of the value of imported goods. Eventually it was standardized at a staggering 250,000 pesos per year. This money was used to pay royal officials, finance military expenses, build fortifications, and to cover other public expenses in the Philippines. Though the *situado* was established after Legazpi's death, the flow of supplies from New Spain began with his letter written on June 1, 1565. Furthermore, the galleon trade—the means by which the *situado* was carried from New Spain to the Philippines—also began under Legazpi.

After 1580, the *situado* even helped to connect the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Southeast Asia. In 1575, the Portuguese were expelled by indigenous peoples from Ternate in the Maluku islands, where Pereira had been stationed. Then, as described above, Philip II took over the Portuguese Crown in 1580, thereby unifying the two Iberian empires under a single ruler. In the early 1600s, the Spaniards of Manila decided that they would help the Portuguese to retake Ternate, and together they conquered it in 1606, using the *situado* from colonial Mexico to fund their attack. The *situado* was then later used to support their new colonial possession in the Malukus. In this way, the subsidy from Mexico helped to build and support the Southeast Asian link between the empires of Portugal and Spain. Goods and power now flowed across what had once been an antagonism between Legazpi and Pereira. The unification lasted until 1640. After the split, the Philippines retained the Malukus, showing the importance of the Manila-Ternate connection within the European imperial network. This is not to say that the Portuguese and the Spanish fully cooperated with one another in Southeast and East Asia after 1580—the King ruled

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the two domains separately—but the two empires were nevertheless part of the same network, and their mutual support was partly institutionalized through the Mexican *situado*.

The Philippine colonial government's other major source of income was tribute. The Spaniards did not collect tribute from the people of Cebu during their settlement's early years, believing that tribute might cause friction between the two peoples. As time passed, however, and the colonial network of authority reached into other parts of the Philippines, tribute payments became part of the internal blended network of authority. When the Spaniards settled at Manila, Legazpi standardized tribute and the way it was collected. Each person was responsible to pay two *fanegas* of rice and one chicken per year to the Spaniards.¹³⁴ This food was collected from the *indios* as an extension of traditional *datu* authority. In precolonial times, *datus* got their food in tribute from their dependents. Under colonial rule, *datus* continued to get their foot in this way, only now they passed part of that tribute on to the colonial government, a practice that again demonstrated the hybrid nature of internal colonial authority. Food traveled from dependent to *datu* according to the *barangay* system, then from *datu* to colonial official based on the imperial system. Once Legazpi had moved to Manila and implemented this blended configuration of tribute collection, food shortages, among the Spaniards at least, became an exception rather than the norm.

June 1, 1565 was, without question, a pivotal date in Philippine history, not because Legazpi won a major military victory on that day, or because a major treaty. It was an important date rather, because on that day Legazpi began to construct, successfully, the first layer of Philippine sovereignty. His messages to Mexico and to Cebu's *datu* foreshadowed the eventual

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establishment of the galleon trade and of the colony's internal system of blended governance; and these messages also demonstrated early Philippine sovereignty's reliance both on Europe's global imperial network and on the Philippines' local barangay network. Legazpi acquired goods from these two networks by becoming part of their related systems of authority. Within the global system of European imperial power, he became a governor by creating a link back to New Spain and also by negotiating his way out of a direct Portuguese attack; and he became part of the local barangay system as raiding, trading, and feasting practices channeled datu power in his direction. As part of both systems, Legazpi's authority began the creation of a hybrid colonial authority, one that would be added to and deepened during subsequent decades at the new colonial capital in Manila.
Part 2

Miguel Banal

In 1609, Don Miguel Banal, a Tagalog chieftain, had his slaves and dependents build him a house in Quiapo, a village adjacent to Manila. Shortly after the home's completion, a Jesuit father, Brother Nieto, came to the new building, where he, with a group of Africans and 'indios' carrying pikes and swords, destroyed the house, probably burning it to the ground. They claimed that the land rightfully belonged to them. That same day, Banal complained to the Spanish mayor of Quiapo, Pedro de Chaves. Mayor Chavez responded by bringing his own group of armed Tagalog followers to the homesite, where he had a replacement dwelling built for Banal. The Jesuits, undeterred by the Mayor's action, later swore before Banal, Chaves, and Quiapo's parish priest that, as often as a house was built on that piece of land, they would destroy it. Banal then turned for help to King Philip III, begging him in a letter to "order the Jesuits not to molest me in the ancient possessions that I have inherited from my fathers and grandfathers, who were chiefs of this village."135

This was not the first time that Banal had quarreled with the Jesuits or written to the King of Spain. Seven years before, in 1602, the religious order had evicted many of Quiapo's people from their homes and farmlands, which the Jesuits then rented out to several Chinese immigrants, prompting Banal to write an earlier letter of complaint to Philip III.136 During this first dispute, Banal also convinced both Quiapo's parish priest, Pablo Ruiz de Talavera, and the

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136 For this first letter see Miguel Banal and Agustin Turingan,"Carta de Miguel Banal y Agustin Turingan sobre sus tierras" (1603), FILIPINAS,35,N.60, AGI.
Archbishop of Manila, Miguel de Benavides, to write to the Crown on his behalf. In response to these complaints, Philip III ordered his Royal Audiencia, the Philippine high court, to resolve the problem. In 1612, the Audiencia reported to the Crown that a decision was still pending but that justice would, of course, surely prevail. Unfortunately, all subsequent documents pertaining to Miguel's complaint have since been lost. We cannot know if Banal and his people—after at least a decade of trying—ever permanently recovered their lands, or even if the Tagalog chieftain received compensation for his destroyed property.

Miguel Banal's conflicts with the Jesuits, nevertheless, revealed the existence of a second layer of colonial sovereignty, one that had gradually risen above and usurped Legazpi's initial forms of power. It is important to note here that this second layer of authority, like the conflict between Banal and the Jesuits, was not strictly defined by ethnic, national, or racial groupings. Some Spaniards supported the Jesuits while others supported Banal; several Tagalog people likewise helped to burn down Banal's house while others were evicted from their own homes. In the same vein, in Banal's time, Manila's Spanish and Tagalog leaders were not segregated into two detached systems of authority. Both instead worked within a new blended configuration of power, one that shared a common figurehead and foundation. Atop this structure sat the King and his Audiencia—the Crown and his colonial judiciary; and at the bottom were the Tagalog commoners and slaves, everyday people who served Jesuits and Spanish mayors as well as indigenous chieftains. This second layer of sovereignty integrated the Tagalog people of Manila—known originally to the Spaniards as 'Moros'—into the colonial network; it elevated imperial

137 See Miguel de Benavides, "Letters to Felipe III" (1603), BR 12, 120.
138 Philippine Royal Audiencia, "Carta de la Audiencia de Manila contestando cédulas sobre Justicia" (1612), FILIPINAS,20,R.6,N.48, AGI.
authority over the indigenous barangay order; and it incorporated Manila anew into the Southeast Asian Moro system of politics, now as a Christian antagonist.

A brief overview of Banal's family history—his "fathers and grandfathers," as he described them—reveals his personal connection to the construction of this second layer of colonial sovereignty. As was repeatedly emphasized in various appeals to the Crown, Banal and his people were "the children, grandchildren, and relatives of the former king of this city…Rajah Soliman." Soliman was a 'Moro,' the Spanish word for Muslim; and Banal was married to Soliman's most prestigious granddaughter, Ines Dabitin. Banal's own heritage furthermore almost linked him to precolonial lineages of Moro authority. In 1589, Soliman's adopted son—another Manila datu who took the Christian name Agustin de Legazpi—was found guilty in a colonial court for leading a conspiracy to overthrow the Spaniards. One of Agustin's coconspirators was another chieftain named Juan Banal. Juan was probably a relative of Miguel, perhaps even his own father. During these three generations—from Soliman, to Agustin de Legazpi, to Miguel Banal—Spanish and indigenous colonial leaders usurped, altered, and redirected Manila's precolonial Moro authority into the second layer of early Philippine sovereignty.

Traditional histories of Philippine colonization generally treat all indigenous people as a single group; and though many mention the presence of Islam in precolonial Manila, none have recognized its central place in the story of early Philippine sovereignty. Prior to 1565, however, Moros and Visayans were part of two different groups. Though datu among both groups exercised power through traditional barangay practices, Moros had formed a distinct and

139 Benavides (1603), 120.
140 Banal and Turingan (1603), 1.
141 Santiago de Vera, et al., "Conspiracy against the Spaniards," (1589) BR 7, 97.
influential network throughout the Malay archipelago, a network that made them more wealthy and powerful than the Visayans; and Manila's Moros, having a privileged position in the region's China trade, were a prominent and powerful part of this network. Banal's three-generation family history shows how Spanish and indigenous peoples gradually usurped and redirected Muslim authority into the new blended system of colonial sovereignty. First, they took over Manila's external political and economic influence by taking over the China trade and also by attacking other nearby Muslim settlements; and second, they elevated imperial authority up and onto the barangay system through tribute, encomenderos, colonial courts, and religious authorities. These changes in both external influence and internal authority lifted colonial authority to a higher plane of power, one that now oversaw, from above, the formation of Philippine sovereignty's ever expanding network.

As was evident in Banal's conflicts with the Jesuits, the rise of colonial power at Manila involved both multiethnic collaboration and interethnic conflict. From the times of Soliman to Banal, many of Manila's Moros actively supported the building of the new colony, while several others sought opportunities to oppose and even to overthrow colonial rule. Multiethnic collaboration created a blended political system that included Spaniards, Moros, and other indigenous peoples; and the growing strength of this system was demonstrated and increased through the conflicts of Soliman, Agustin, and Banal. Prior to the time of Banal, when colonial authority threatened the power of Soliman and Agustin, both of these Tagalog chieftains planned to overthrow the new multiethnic colonial authority by mobilizing their remaining reserves of precolonial Moro power. They turned to their traditional followers, to other Islamic settlements, and to East Asian allies to assist them in their revolts.
The consequences of these revolts, however, demonstrated the rise of blended authority at Manila. After Soliman's revolt, he and his fellow Moro datu allies were pardoned. But in the following decade, Agustin and his companions were either publicly executed or exiled as slaves to colonial Mexico. From the first generation to the second, colonial authorities, due in large part to a growth in indigenous support, were able to increase the severity of their punishments. Banal, likewise, sought help in his disputes with the Jesuits, but his approach relied entirely on approved colonial channels. Rather than foment an internal rebellion among his followers and fellow chieftains, he appealed to colonial courts; and his external pleas were directed to the King of Spain, not to other Moro settlements or to East Asians. Unlike his predecessors, in other words, even when embroiled in a prolonged and politically significant conflict, Banal collaborated with the colonial system rather than opposing it, a choice that further reified and elevated the new blended structure of authority, a decision that supported its permanence.

The step-by-step ascension of colonial authority over the old Moro system involved both global and local forces. Globally, Banal and his ancestors were caught up in the convergence of Islam and Christianity; and locally they were participants in the conquest of Manila. Through these two processes, the emerging colony redefined Manila's relationship to other Islamic centers by changing and creating a new space for itself within the external Southeast Asian Moro system; and at the same time, Spaniards, Moros, and other indigenous peoples created the origins of a centralized and standardized internal colonial hierarchy, one that overlaid precolonial barangay authority with a corner of the imperial pyramid, a hierarchy of courts and of colonial officials, of parish priests and of religious orders, of archbishops and of kings.
As part of a global convergence of Islam and Christianity, Moros were among the most critical supporters of colonial sovereignty; but they were also, at the same time, among the colony's most threatening adversaries. Before 1565, Manila was a key commercial hub in a Southeast Asian Muslim network, a network bound together by familial ties, religious rituals, and trade, especially trade in Chinese and other foreign products. Indeed, the wealth and relationships generated through this mercantile network elevated and expanded the authority of Muslim chieftains at Manila, projecting their commercial and political influence into other nearby villages.

This influence grew both out of Manila's dominance of the area's China trade, and also from the town's relationship with other Moro settlements, e.g., those at Brunei, Maguindanao, Jolo, Ternate, Melaka, etc. By the time of Banal, however, Moro-Spanish collaboration had taken over Manila's China trade, which elevated colonial power's influence to new heights above the old Moro network; and conflicts between Manila's new authorities and the region's other Moro settlements created a border of Christian-Muslim antagonism, a boundary that separated Manila's people from the older network of Islamic rulers. Through this multiethnic process, Manila was re-incorporated into the inter-island Moro system as the hostile anti-Muslim seat of power.

In the context of internal colonial authority, Moros similarly both supported and opposed the colony's gradual conquest of Manila. This conquest, the construction of new and lasting internal authority, happened as both secular and religious colonial powers were blended into and over Manila's indigenous system of internal governance. As explained in part one, in precolonial times, internal datu authority throughout the Philippine islands was built on the barangay system of slaves and dependents. After the Spaniards settled at Manila in 1571, they began to elevate the
imperial system up over onto Manila's barangay system by appointing datus, like Soliman, to positions of power within the new blended colonial hierarchy. These datus continued to rule over their precolonial subjects, but their rule was also overseen and regulated by a hierarchy of colonial officials and courts. The now answered to encomenderos for the payment of tribute, to colonial courts for the regulation of justice, and to Spanish priests for the salvation of their souls. In this way, the imperial system was elevated over and on top of the older barangay order.

Ultimately, external authority in relation to the Moros of Southeast Asia coupled with internal authority over Manila's peoples blended together to form the second layer of Philippine colonial sovereignty, a layer of new external influence and internal authority. Externally, Manila was readopted as a Catholic capital into the Moro system through its control over the galleon trade and also through its persistent conflicts with nearby Moro villages; and internally, Manila began to take political control over other settlements in the archipelago, becoming thereby the core of a new network of power. Internal authority and external influence were, however, not strictly divided. Christian-Moro political antagonism helped to unify the colony internally against a common enemy; and the internal authority used to gather tribute also became the source of labor that built the galleon ships. Thus both Catholic relations with Islam and the China trade became part of internal authority and internal authority fed back into these two external elements of sovereignty. One central thread in the construction of this layer of sovereignty was the family history of the Tagalog chieftain, Miguel Banal.
The Convergence of Islam and Christianity

As Brother Nieto and his armed followers approached Miguel Banal's new house, "I did not raise my eyes to behold [the Jesuit] angered," the Tagalog chieftain reported to Philip III, "because of the respect that I know is due the ministers who teach us the law of God."\(^{142}\) Two generations before, Rajah Soliman, whose name was derived from the Arabic pronunciation for Solomon, had been a Moro datu in Manila, the word Moro being the Spanish term for Muslim. During the intervening generation, Soliman's adopted son was baptized, taking upon himself a Christian name, Agustin de Legazpi, a name suggesting that his Spanish godfather may well have been Miguel Lopez de Legazpi himself. But Agustin, an intermediary figure in the transition from Islam to Christianity, continued to engage in precolonial Moro rituals and practices of power. In 1585, for example, he was imprisoned with his siblings for giving their mother a Muslim burial; and he was also married to the Islamic Sultan of Brunei's daughter.\(^{143}\) Banal, in the third generation, however, appears to have had no direct association with Islam; and he repeatedly emphasized his Christian faith in his letters. He not only described his humility before his Jesuit adversary, but he also complemented the King's "exceedingly great Christian spirit;"\(^{144}\) he explained that his actions were "in accordance with the Holy Ghost;"\(^{145}\) and he called his people a "new Christian community,"\(^{146}\) expressing their collective faith to the Crown with the words, "confiamos en dios," or "we trust in God."\(^{147}\)

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\(^{142}\) Miguel Banal, "Petition of a Filipino chief for redress" (25 Jul 1609), BR 14, 328.
\(^{144}\) Banal, 329.
\(^{145}\) Miguel Banal and Agustin Turingan "Carta de Miguel Banal y Agustin Turingan sobre sus tierras," (1603), FILIPINAS, 35, N.60, AGI.
\(^{146}\) Banal, 329.
\(^{147}\) Banal and Turingan, 2.
Though the sincerity of Banal's Christian statements are difficult to verify, his words nevertheless clearly reflected a significant multigenerational conversion, the baptism of Manila out of an older global Muslim network and into an expanding Christian one. The authenticity of Banal's personal conversion is blurred by the relationship between Catholicism and Spanish imperial power. Banal, of course, knew that he had to use Christian language to get what he wanted from the Spaniards. At the same time, however, there is no reason to assume that utility was completely divorced from sincerity. Banal may have been a using Christianity purely as a vehicle for political persuasion, or he might have been communicating sincerely held beliefs, or he may have been doing both. Whatever his motivations, the multigenerational religious change that occurred between the generations of Soliman and Banal unquestionably represented a political shift in Manila's external influence, a shift away from the Islamic world and toward the Christian one.

The history of the convergence of Islam and Christianity in the Philippines involved both the blending of the colony into and over Manila's precolonial Moro system and also the simultaneous creation of a local boundary between Islam and Catholicism. Together this process of blending and boundary making redirected one external channel of Moro authority into colonial sovereignty while also cutting off and blocking another, a dual process that first weakened and then extinguished Manila's Muslim identity, replacing it even with an antagonism against Islam. The first external channel of Manila's Moro power was the China trade. The second channel flowed into Manila through the relationships of Manila's Moro rulers to other Muslim datus in the region—including those at Brunei, Mindoro, Maguindanao, Jolo, Ternate,
and Melaka—relationships that included Manila's rulers in powerful inter-island political alliances through marriages and trade.

During the three generations from Soliman to Banal, the emerging colony blended itself into the China trade and then took it over, a takeover that redirected this lucrative source of imported wealth toward colonial authorities and the Americas. Through this takeover, the colony also began to exert influence from their new capital onto other nearby settlements. Villages and towns that had once been externally influenced by Moro Manila were gradually brought under the authority of now colonial Manila. Meanwhile, the colony also constructed a violent border of difference that separated Manila from other nearby Muslim settlements. From Soliman to Banal, Islam was gradually expunged from Manila's datu culture, connections between Manila and other Moro centers were cut off, and eventually violence became common between Christian Manila and the remaining Moro villages and towns in the region. Through this dual process, the colony reconfigured the region's external Moro system of authority even as it reincorporated Manila anew into that system. In this chapter, I will describe this reconfiguration and reincorporation by first examining the colonial takeover of the China trade and by then describing the creation of an antagonistic relationship between Christianizing Manila and the region's other remaining Muslim settlements. This economic usurpation and violent blockage were both central to the convergence of Islam and Christianity at Manila.

In order to understand the colonial takeover of Moro Manila's China trade and its associated Moro network, we need to first understand the long and complementary relationship between this trade and Islam in Southeast Asia. Shortly after the founding of Islam on the Saudi peninsula, Muslim merchant-missionaries, seeking trade goods, began to spread the new religion
into the Indian Ocean world and beyond, creating in the process an Islamic network of economic
enclaves stretching from the Swahili coast of East Africa, to the Middle East, to India, to the
straits of Malacca, and by the ninth century, these merchants, seeking valuable Chinese
commodities, had arrived on the coasts of China, after passing through the islands of Southeast
Asia. As they establish commercial enclaves in East and Southeast Asia, these merchant-
missionaries took a flexible approach to local cultures. They used trade, intermarriage, and
preaching to blend Islam into the indigenous cultures of coastal peoples living in the Malay
archipelago and along the South China Sea. Muslim merchants thereby helped to create a
network of oceanic trade between China, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean, a network that
privileged those who embraced Islam.148

A few generations before Soliman, this macro-process manifested itself on a micro-scale
at Manila. As early as the thirteenth century, Chinese merchants, known in the Philippines as
Sangleys, began to trade at Manila.149 Sometime during the late fifteenth century, indigenous
Moro merchant-rulers from Brunei, a settlement on Borneo, were attracted to Manila by this pre-
Islamic China trade. Some of these merchant-rulers then resettled at Manila, where they
intermarried and intermingled with Manila's pre-Moro datu rulers; and these Bornean chieftains
also maintained their social and political connections to Brunei, thereby increasing the familial,
economic, and religious exchanges between the two towns.150 After this connection was
established, intermarriage between ruling families from Manila and Brunei became increasingly
common; Manila's Moros began to dominate the local China trade, which soon also included

148 Goeff Wade, "Early Muslim Expansion in South-East Asia, Eighth to Fifteenth Centuries," in *The New
Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 3, edited by David O. Morgan and Anthony Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 366-408.
149 See Chao Ju-kua "Description of the Philippines" (1280), BR 34, 183-194.
80-81.
Japanese merchants; and Muslim preachers were sent from Brunei to teach Islamic traditions to Manila's elites.\(^{151}\) Meanwhile, the China trade into Manila was expanded by the settlement's inclusion into a larger Muslim network of commercial exchange.

As the regional prestige and wealth of Manila's Moro datus increased, Muslim practices became more common in the town's culture of chiefly authority. Many rulers were ceremonially washed and circumcised, taking upon themselves new Islamic names; several traveled to Brunei to learn more about the new religion and to form relationships with the Moro rulers there; some began to abstain from pork; and many learned to reverence the Qur'an and the name of Muhammad.\(^{152}\) Manila's Moro chieftains also began to trade with other Moro settlements, including Melaka.\(^{153}\) As the Muslim trading enclave that connected China and Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean world, Melaka was the most important Islamic mercantile center in Southeast Asia. Through these developments, the influence of Manila's datus was incorporated into an external Moro system of authority, a system defined by two complementary channels of power—the one being relationships with other Islamic mercantile enclaves in the region, and the other being participation in the the China trade.

This is not to say that precolonial Moro centers were unified into a single political system of authority. They, instead, formed a network of affiliation that was part of and similar to the local barangay network of competing datu powers. As part of the barangay network, Moro datus not only allied with one another through intermarriage and commerce across islands and villages;

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151 Francisco de Sande, et al. "Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo, Mindanao" (1578-1579), BR 4, 151.
152 For mention of cleansing and naming rituals see Pedro de San Buenaventura, Vocabulario de Lengua Tagala (Laguna, Philippines: San Antonio de Padua College Foundation Inc, 2013 [1612]) http://sb.tagalogstudies.org/2010/10/427.html; Circumcision and abstaining from pork are noted in Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands and of the Character and Conditions of their Inhabitants" (1569), BR 3, 60; Travel to Brunei and abstaining from pork are described in "Conquest of the island of Luzón" (20 Apr 1572), BR 3, 165.
but they also competed with one another for followers, as was common throughout the barangay system. They, furthermore, allied and competed with various non-Moro chieftains, including those scattered throughout the Visayas. Unlike these other chieftains, however, Moros dominated the regions' inter-island trade, making them more wealthy and powerful than most non-Moro datus.

Muslim datus also competed with one another over the China trade. Every year, Chinese merchants came to the archipelago to exchange their fine goods for various Philippine products, including gold, wax, pearls, hardwoods, medicines, cotton, birds nests, animal skins, etc. Moro datus wanted these merchants to prioritize their settlements so that they could get first pick of the various Chinese imports carried by these merchants, including porcelain, stoneware, iron, silks, perfumes, and even cannons.154 When the Spaniards arrived, Manila apparently had more control over this trade than any other Moro settlement in the region. Indeed, ships from Manila were known throughout the region as the "China ships."155

Moro Manila's control of Chinese imports gave its leaders increased influence in the region. This influence was based on the high value of Chinese commodities in the Malay archipelago's culture of chiefly prestige and authority. As Laura Junker explains, by the sixteenth century, Chinese porcelains and other imported goods—the quality of which surpassed anything produced locally in the Philippines—had become "key symbols of social status and political power for the Philippine chiefly elite."156 The political influence of Chinese commodities was on display during the two centuries before the Spaniards' arrival. During that time, the islands

154 For more on the precolonial trade between the Chinese and the Moros see Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 196.
156 Junker, 183.
experienced a significant growth in Chinese imports, an increase that paralleled the concurrent construction of increasingly large chiefdoms throughout the archipelago; and these two developments were interrelated. The status and political authority of precolonial Philippine datus was elevated and expanded as they displayed fine Chinese commodities in their homes, utilized them in rituals and feasts, and distributed them to their most favored subjects, dependents, and allies. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these practices—all enhanced by Chinese imports—expanded datu authority by increasing the number of dependents that individual chieftains could accumulate.

Manila's large share of the China trade made them attractive allies to other chieftains; and they also sometimes used their economic dominance as leverage to influence datus in other villages. When, for example, a group of Spaniards from Legazpi's expedition arrived to trade at Butuan, on Mindanao, they met several Moro merchants from Manila. These Moros were "very much pleased" when they learned that the Spaniards carried silver in their ships; and refusing to trade with the Spaniards for anything else, the Moros persuaded the non-Moro villagers to do the same. Muslim Manila's network of trade was thus also a network of external influence, one that reached into nearby Moro and non-Moro villages alike.

In this way, Islam and the China trade worked together as cooperative external channels of authority, linked channels from two directions that fed power to Manila's precolonial Moro datus. Muslim merchants, having been initially attracted to the region by Chinese commodities, also first came to Manila because of the China trade; and Islam provided a means of including

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157 Ibid., 4.
158 Ibid., 3.
Manila's datus into a larger political network of Moro chieftains. As these alliances enhanced Manila's status, its Moro datus also gained increased control over the importation of coveted Chinese commodities, which in turn extended their power back into other Moro and non-Moro villages. The underlying association between Chinese goods and chiefly prestige meant that Manila's control over Chinese imports was also itself a form of external political influence, one that attracted allies and that even gave Manila's Moros some leverage over datus in other settlements.

Soliman and his generation exemplified the wealth and influence that flowed into Manila through these two external channels. Two generations later, however, the China trade had been redirected away from Manila's indigenous chieftains, leaving Banal in a position of relative poverty and isolation. When the Spaniards arrived, the China trade had made Manila's Moros much wealthier than the Visayans. One observer noted that "some chiefs...[at Manila] have on their persons ten or twelve ducats' worth of gold in jewels – to say nothing of the lands, slaves, and mines that they own." Soliman's house was another example of Moro wealth. Before it was burned down in 1570, it contained stores of silver, copper, iron, porcelain, blankets, wax, cotton, vats of brandy, and fine furniture. These valuable items were all either imported from China or were useful in the China trade. The Archbishop Miguel de Benavides, on the other hand, described the condition of Miguel Banal's people as "pitiful" and "poverty stricken." Banal, furthermore, complained that he lacked the money necessary even to defend his claims in court. By 1609, Banal's burned down home certainly contained far fewer valuables than

160 Guido de Lavezaris, "Reply to Fray Rada's 'Opinion'" (June 1574), BR 3, 267.
161 "Relation of the voyage to Luzón" (June 1570), BR 3, 102-103.
162 Miguel de Benavides, "Letters to Felipe III" (5-6 Jul 1603), BR 12, 120.
Soliman’s had almost forty years before; and whatever Chinese commodities he may have owned probably came to him through the Spaniards.

The difference between the wealth of Soliman and that of Banal resulted, in large part, from the colonial takeover of the China trade. This takeover began during the generation of Soliman. As described in part one, when Legazpi arrived in the Philippines, he and his men began to trade with local Moro merchants; and it was through this relationship that the Spaniards were first blended into the Moro's inter-island mercantile network and into the region's China trade. While the Spaniards resided at Cebu, Moros relayed Spanish silver between Cebu and Manila, where they then traded it to the Chinese. When the Spaniards settled at Manila, however, they began to trade their imported silver directly to the Chinese, a direct trade that eliminated the Moro middleman. Within a short time, the colony's silver imports usurped Manila's Moro China trade.

Contrary to traditional imperial narratives, the initial assimilation of the Spaniards into Southeast Asia's Moro network was driven as much or more by Moros themselves as it was by Spaniards. The Muslim contributions to this process are best exemplified by a man from Manila called Mahomar, his name being an indigenous rendering of the name Muhammad. Mahomar's first encounters with the Spaniards proved critical to the survival of the European immigrant community and by extension to the birth of the Philippine colony. When the Spaniards were desperate for food at Cebu—eating rats and palm leaves—Mahomar arrived from Luzon with a fleet of native ships, known as praus. Mahomar came to the Spanish camp at Cebu seeking silver.163 When he learned that the Spaniards needed food, he quickly dispatched his fleet,

163 San Agustin, 405.
manned by his personal slaves and dependents, to Panay, where he knew that there was a rice surplus.

When Mahomar's vessels came back with the food, they were accompanied by another Moro prau from Mindoro. Mahomar used his rice from Panay to trade for silver, but the Mindoro prau was not carrying any food, only tin, iron, porcelains, and cloth from China. In search of something that the Spaniards needed, the Mindoro Moros traded their goods to the Cebuano indios for chickens, goats, and other food, which they then traded to Legazpi for Spanish silver.¹⁶⁴ Mahomar, thereafter, traded often with the Spaniards at Cebu; and as had happened with the Mindoro Moros, he similarly convinced many other Moro merchants to trade with Legazpi.¹⁶⁵

Beyond helping Legazpi to survive, the purpose of Mahomar's visit to Cebu also illustrated the Moros' central role in founding the colony's main source of profit: the galleon trade. In the 1530s, silver—highly valuable in China—was being mined extensively in Japan. But Japanese merchants were not permitted by the Ming empire to trade directly with the Chinese or to trade on Chinese soil. Because of these restrictions, Japanese and Chinese merchant-pirates, like Limahong, traded with one another illegally at offshore locations, like Manila. Through this offshore exchange Moros learned the value of silver in China.¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the Spaniards began mining their own newly discovered and lucrative silver deposits in the Americas, and these mines produced the silver that they brought to Cebu.

¹⁶⁴ “Expedición de Legazpi, Documento 39” (1567) in Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Ultramar (Madrid: Impresos de la Real Casa, 1887), 135-136.
¹⁶⁵ San Agustin, 405-406.
¹⁶⁶ Diego de Artieda, "Relation of the Western Island called Filipinas," (1573) BR 3, 204.
Mahomar learned from the Moro merchants who had been to Butuan that the Spaniards carried the precious white metal; and as stated above, he came to Cebu for the express purpose of trading for this valuable commodity. Once he returned to Manila with Spanish silver, he traded the specie to the Sangleys for coveted Chinese goods. Mahomar and the Moros, in other words, did not seek silver for its own sake; they traded for silver, rather, as a means for obtaining Chinese prestige items, like porcelains, etc. The Chinese economy's demand for silver, thereby, provided the underlying magnetic force pulling the Spaniards', through Mahomar, into the local Moro network of trade.

Over the next five years, Mahomar traded for silver at Cebu and then carried it to Manila several times; and this short trade run completed a much larger global network of commerce, one stretching all the way around the world. After Columbus' 1492 voyage, a new network of world trade began to expand, one reaching from Europe to the Americas, to Africa, and to Asia, as far as China and Japan. With the trade of American silver for Chinese products in Manila, a trade first carried out by Mahomar and other Manila Moros, that network was extended permanently across the Pacific Ocean, completing for the first time a truly around-the-world system of commerce.

When the Spaniards decided to leave Cebu and search for a new colonial center somewhere else, Mahomar eventually guided them to Panay and then acted as a navigator on their ships leading them to Manila, where he helped them build their new capital. Mahomar's contributions during the early years of colonization prompted one early modern chronicler to call him "the key to all the islands," adding that "he was well known in them all; and so much faith

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167 "Relation of the voyage to Luzon," 92-93.
was put in him, that he was obeyed as little less than a king.\textsuperscript{168} When Legazpi arrived, Mahomar was an established and prominent part of Manila's inter-island Moro network, and as he traded with the Spaniards he also began to form a relationship with the newly arriving Christian empire. Mahomar and his family were, in fact, even baptized into Catholicism, though he never changed his explicitly Muslim name.\textsuperscript{169} By forming this relationship with the Spaniards, Mahomar began to blend the colony into the Moro system of trade and power, he himself becoming simultaneously part of both the old Muslim and the new Christian worlds.

Mahomar's contributions, however, also began the Manila Moros' exclusion from the China trade. Once the Spaniards were established at Manila, they began trading directly with the Sangleys, which eliminated the need for Moro intermediaries. During the Spaniards' first few years at Manila, the town's chieftains continued to trade with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{170} But as the galleon trade grew, trade between Spanish and Chinese merchants at Manila eclipsed and displaced the Moro's China trade, thus beginning the process of channeling the power of the China trade away from the Moros and toward the Spaniards.

During Soliman's time, the non-economic expertise of Moro merchants also played a key role in blending the Spaniards into the network of inter-island trade. As the region's primary and most prosperous inter-island merchants, the Moros served a unifying role in the islands even before the arrival of the Spaniards. Though the islands' various ethnic groups were culturally similar, there were (and are) still differences between them; and these differences are perhaps most obvious in the dozens of distinct languages spoken throughout the archipelago. In order to trade effectively among these various peoples, Moro merchants mastered several of these other

\textsuperscript{168} Juan de Medina, \textit{History of the Augustinian Order in the Philippine Islands} (1630), BR 23, 184.
\textsuperscript{169} "Relation of the voyage to Luzón," 78.
\textsuperscript{170} Guido de Lavezaris, "Affairs in the Philippines after the death of Legaspi" (1573), BR 3, 181-182.
languages, while also speaking the region's economic lingua franca: Malay. They likely also learned and used other cultural means of communication and persuasion to enhance their ability to trade with the islands' diverse peoples. In this way, the precolonial Moro network of trade and authority created a thin layer of economic and cultural connectivity throughout the region.

When Legazpi arrived in 1565, the Spaniards spoke to the region's other indigenous peoples through this thin Moro layer of cultural and economic interconnection. The Legazpi expedition brought with it an interpreter, Geronimo Pacheco, who spoke both Malay and Spanish. Pacheco had probably learned the Southeast Asian language at Portuguese Melaka several years before. But he could not understand most of the several dozen other languages spoken in the Philippine islands. Moro merchants, however, were able to communicate in these other languages as well as in Malay, making them essential intermediaries among the emerging colony's various peoples. In Cebu, for example, all the interethnic communication between the Spaniards and the Cebuano people traveled through two interpreters: a Moro, and Pacheco. A message would begin with a Cebuano person speaking to a Moro in Cebuano, then it would be translated by that Moro as he spoke to Pacheco in Malay, and finally the message was translated into Spanish by Pacheco, the same chain of communication also being used to send messages in the opposite direction.171

Moro translators played a similar role when the Spaniards began to trade directly with Japanese and Chinese merchants. Lacking their own translators of East Asian languages, the Spaniards almost certainly communicated with the Chinese and Japanese through the Moro interpreters who had, for trading purposes, already learned these languages too. When,

171 “Expedition de Legazpi, Documento 39,” 91.
furthermore, a group of Spanish missionaries went on a diplomatic mission to China in 1574 they took a twelve Moros with them, and one of the primary reasons for bringing these Moros was almost certainly their ability to communicate with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{172} Manila's Moros also provided the Spaniards with important information about China and Japan, information that the rival Portuguese tried to keep secret.\textsuperscript{173}

Beyond simple translation, Moros were also critical interethnic messengers and diplomats. During the colony's early years, the Moros helped Spaniards and various native peoples to do more than simply to communicate but also to negotiate with one another. They, for example, convinced Cebu's Visayan \textit{datus}, on behalf of the Spaniards, of the need to make peace with the Europeans; and they were likewise frequently sent by Visayan \textit{datus} from their mountain forts to discover what the Spaniards wanted. The importance of Moro translator-diplomats to the conquest of Cebu was clear in the envoys that Tupas sent from the mountains to Legazpi and in those that Legazpi sent in return. These envoys were led, in both instances, by a Moro named Damit.\textsuperscript{174} Later, when the Spaniards arrived at Manila, they again sent one of their influential Moro allies—Mahomar's brother—to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Soliman. After three days of negotiations—with no Spaniards present—the Moro diplomat returned and reported to Martin de Goiti, the Spanish master of camp, after which Goiti went ashore and entered into a blood compact with Soliman. It is important to emphasize that the agreement

\textsuperscript{172} C. R. Boxer, \textit{South China in the Sixteenth Century} (Nendeln, Germany: Hakluvt Society), 246.
\textsuperscript{173} Artieda, 204.
\textsuperscript{174} “Expedición De Legazpi, Document 39,” 91.
between Goiti and Soliman was based on terms that were decided between two Moros, not between a Spaniard and a Moro. As translators, messengers, and diplomats, Moro interpreters opened up the linguistic and cultural channels that enabled communication and cooperation among the emerging colonial community's several other ethnic groups—Spanish, Visayan, Japanese, Chinese, etc. In this way, the Moros helped to form the relationships connecting their precolonial multiethnic Muslim world to its newly arriving Christian replacement, and they themselves became a part of the latter as they linked it to the former. The Manila Moros' involvement in the China trade had caused them to form both economic and cultural relationships with the peoples of the Philippine islands; and in much the same way that Moros linked the Spaniards economically into the China trade, they also blended them into their inter-island network through translation and diplomacy. During Soliman's generation, the Spaniards were thus woven by Manila's Moro merchants and translators into the region's Muslim network of commerce, culture, and authority.

By the 1580s, however, the generation of Agustin, the colonial takeover of the Manila Moros' China trade and of its associated network of inter-island authority was well underway. Whereas the Spaniards had begun by being assimilated into this network, they were now beginning to dominate it. By the early 1580s, the Pacific galleon trade was becoming firmly established, carrying silver from the Americas to Manila, and returning in the opposite direction with various Chinese products, mainly silk. Indeed, in the 1580s, Manila's silver trade had grown to a staggering 300,000 pesos per year. Furthermore, as missionaries and others gradually

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175 "Relation of the voyage to Luzon," 93-95. After the Spaniards settled in Manila, Moro rulers were officially incorporated into the colonial system, and they continued to act in diplomatic roles on the colony's behalf. They worked with the Spaniards to pacify internal rebellious factions, and they also negotiated relationships with other Moros rulers.

learned the various languages spoken in the islands, Moro translators and diplomats became less necessary for conducting interethnic colonial business. By 1583, the colony had its own official cadre of Spanish interpreters that were becoming increasingly fluent in the colony's necessary indigenous and East Asian languages. The colony no longer depended on Moros for its incorporation into the China trade or into Manila's inter-island network of influence.

Agustin's financial and political condition suggested that as Sino-Spanish commerce grew in Manila, the indigenous Moro trade also declined, though Tagalog-Chinese commerce did not entirely disappear. As a result of this decline, Agustin himself complained that he was now "poor and cast down," a stark contrast to chieftains of the prior generation, like Soliman. In Agustin's time, Manila's chieftains, nevertheless, maintained independent connections to other merchants involved in the China trade, connections that continued to bring them some measure of wealth. In 1588, for example, Agustin formed an alliance with several Japanese merchants by inviting them to his house for elaborate feasts; and he spoke to them through a native translator. These Japanese merchants then gave Agustin fine swords as a token of their friendship. Agustin's wealth and influence had both suffered a dramatic decline, but neither was completely gone.

Meanwhile, the colonial authority had grown alongside its increasingly powerful hold on the China trade. In the same way that Chinese commodities had fed wealth and power into Moro Manila, these also fed later into the Philippine colony's foundation of authority. To fully understand this shift it must be recognized that silver not only gave the Spaniards control over Chinese imports, but it also gave them control over the easiest new way to obtain those imports.

As the galleon trade grew from the time of Soliman to the time of Agustin, the indigenous

177 Philip II, "Foundation of the Audiencia of Manila" (5 May 1583), BR 6, 38-41.
179 Ibid., 99.
peoples of Manila came to realize that the simplest way to obtain Chinese commodities, within the new global environment, was to serve or to "court the favor of" the Spaniards. Whereas Mahomar had obtained silver through trade, Tagalog peoples in Agustin's generation gained it by serving the Spaniards, who paid them in silver. These then traded this silver with Chinese merchants for coveted Chinese commodities. Through this process, silver became an incentive pushing Tagalog people to give labor in support of the colony. The galleon trade thus redirected the archipelago-wide desire for Chinese products away from the Manila's Moros and toward the Spaniards, who were the owners of the new 'China ships,' as the Manila galleons were called in colonial Mexico.

This change transformed the economic production of Manila's native people in a way that further decreased the authority of Manila's traditional datu class. The influx of silver into Manila not only provided a new means for Tagalog people to obtain Chinese goods, but it also drove down the local cost of Chinese commodities. This decline in price was so dramatic that the domestic market for Philippine products was affected. Within a few years, cheaper Chinese commodities were replacing goods that indigenous peoples had previously made locally; and this decreased domestic production in a way that simultaneously decreased datu authority. The abundance of silver arriving at Manila through the galleon trade, for example, decreased the cost of Chinese textiles to the extent that many indigenous peoples stopped producing their own cloth altogether, opting instead to work for silver and then to use that silver to purchase higher quality Chinese fabrics.

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180 Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "Ordinance forbidding the Indians to wear Chinese stuffs" (1591), BR 8, 81.
181 the "naos de China" in Spanish.
Datus in the region complained to the Spaniards that their subjects were no longer producing goods for trade, which undercut these chieftains' ability to acquire and trade their own locally produced commodities. As an early example of a problem that has since become ubiquitous with modern globalization, in other words, imported American silver effectively outsourced much of Manila's cloth production to China, and this decreased the wealth of local chieftains. Because of decreasing internal production, datu had fewer resources to trade with, which decreased their ability to participate in both local and global trade. Meanwhile, silver channeled indigenous labor toward the Spaniards.

This takeover of the China trade affected chieftains not only in Manila but also throughout the Moro network of inter-island authority. In precolonial times, for example, other Moro settlements had also participated directly in the China trade, even though Manila appears to have enjoyed the largest share of this trade. After the arrival of Spanish silver, however, Sangleys made it standard policy to trade at Manila first, before traveling to Brunei, Jolo, etc. Chinese merchants continued to trade at these other locations too, but the incredible increase in trade at Manila unquestionably altered the flow of Chinese commodities throughout the Moro network. Many Moros even began to come to Manila to trade.

In fact, the Moros were just one of many people attracted to Manila by the galleon trade. As an increasingly thick channel of Chinese products flowed through Manila from west to east, an equally large flow of silver flowed through the capital in the opposite direction; and the wealth generated by this bidirectional flow of goods attracted not only Spanish, Chinese, and Moro peoples, but also diverse other Southeast Asians, Japanese merchants, and Portuguese.

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182 Dasmariñas, 78-95.
183 Lavezaris, 181.
traders. Collectively, this group also brought with them Amerindians, Africans, and even some people from India. These peoples, furthermore, brought goods with them from all over the world. This unprecedented diversity made Manila not only the birthplace of globalization, but also the world's first "global city," a global condition that no doubt powerfully influenced the accumulation and exercise of power throughout the entire Southeast Asian Moro system.

By Banal's time, colonial authorities had completely taken over not only the China trade, but also the Moro role of redistributing trade goods to various other villages in the region. In 1600, for example, the Spanish galleon San Diego was sunk off the shore of Manila. The San Diego was a unique galleon because it was designed not to carry goods from Manila to Mexico, but rather to carry commodities between the various Philippine islands. Retrieved by archaeologists in 1992, the goods found on the galleon revealed the wealth of products that were being exported through colonial Manila to other settlements, many of these probably being given or traded to various datus. These items included porcelains, earthenware, cloth, etc. The inter-island network of trade that had carried goods to the Spaniards was now subject to them. Muslim Mahomar was replaced by the Christian galleons.

This replacement was evident both in the goods found in the wreckage of the San Diego and in the state of Miguel Banal. In Soliman's time, Manila's Moros were connected to various datus throughout the Philippine islands. Banal, however, appears to have been largely isolated; and he was, without question, very poor. With his people no longer producing goods for foreign trade and with the increase in silver imports from the Americas—imports that reached a


\[\text{(185) Shirley Fish, The Manila-Acapulco Galleons: The Treasure Ships of the Pacific (United Kingdom: AuthorHouse, 2011) 246.}\]
staggering 12 million pesos in 1597\textsuperscript{186}—the Spaniards had become the primary means of obtaining foreign prestige items, particularly Chinese items. Soliman's former source of wealth had been usurped and redirected toward the Americas and toward colonial officials. Though Banal made no reference to China in his 1609 letter, the loss of this trade was implicitly a part of how he described himself and his people to the Crown. Speaking of how difficult it would be for him to pay for court costs, Banal wrote simply, "we are a poor people;"\textsuperscript{187} and he asked later, speaking again about himself, that the King do something "for the protection of these poor [indios]."\textsuperscript{188}

Alongside this takeover of the China trade there was a corresponding decline in Moro power at Manila, one that was accompanied by a change in what the Spaniards called Manila's indigenous people. In Soliman's generation, Manila's people were known exclusively to the Spaniards as Moros, and Tagalog was referred to as the Moro tongue.\textsuperscript{189} As time passed, however, the people of Manila were increasingly referred to as indios and Tagalos. By the time of Banal, these latter words had entirely transplanted the previous Islamic label. In fact, by Banal's generation, the word Moro had become an insult in the city.\textsuperscript{190}

This change in labels mirrored a similar change in the relationship of Manila's people toward Islam. As the Spaniards and their native allies first blended their emerging colony into the Moro network of trade and then usurped it, they also started to build an antagonistic relationship with Islamic centers that refused to join the colony. These colonial supporters first diminished Manila's relationships with these other Moro towns; they then cut off Manila's datus from these

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 328.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 329.
\textsuperscript{189} Francisco de Sande, et al., "Expeditions to Borneo, Jolo, Mindanao" (1578-79), BR 4, 157-158.
same towns; and finally, Spanish and indigenous colonial peoples began to attack nearby Muslim settlements. This process walled off Manila's people from Islam. Manila, a one time member of a larger Muslim network, thereby reincorporated itself into the Southeast Asian Moro system as an antagonistic outsider, reinventing itself as the center of the region's new Catholic colonialism. Whereas one channel of Moro authority had been usurped and redirected, the other was concurrently first weakened, then blockaded, and finally violently assaulted.

The blockage of inter-island Moro connections between Manila and other Islamic centers was, like the Southeast Asian Muslim China trade, a continuation of a much longer global history, a history of Spanish Christianity. Shortly after the founding of Christianity in the first century, the religion spread to Europe, where it was adopted as the state religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century. During medieval times, as Islam spread east into the Indian Ocean, Muslim authority also expanded westward across north Africa and into western Europe, where Muslim rulers conquered much of the Iberian peninsula. As time passed, relations among Christians, Muslims, and Jews in present-day Spain and Portugal vacillated between periods of religious tolerance and times of violent conflict. Meanwhile, Europeans also began to participate in anti-Muslim crusades into the Holy Land.

On the Iberian peninsula, intensifying Christian-Muslim conflicts created an anti-Islamic movement of Christian 'reconquest,' or 'Reconquista,' a crusading movement dedicated to retaking the formerly Christian lands of Spain and Portugal. By the late fifteenth century, this Reconquista movement had spread through and retaken most of the Iberian peninsula; and in 1492, Spain's Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabel, defeated the final Islamic stronghold in Spain at Granada. In that same year, the rulers of Spain sponsored Columbus' first voyage across
the Atlantic, where the spirit of the Reconquista was then redirected into Spain's American conquests. When Spanish conquerors later crossed the Pacific, they continued to carry the powerful anti-Islamic association that their religion had acquired from the Reconquista. Through the generations of Soliman, Agustin, and Banal this Reconquista spirit was revived in Southeast Asia, with its center at Manila; and eventually it even came to be implemented according to Southeast Asian political norms.

The first Christian military victory to weaken the influence of Manila's Moros was not, however, a Spanish one. This first pivotal battle was, instead, won by the Portuguese. In 1511, the expanding Catholic Portuguese empire, having worked its way around Africa and through the Indian Ocean, sent shockwaves through the Muslim mercantile world when it conquered Melaka. As noted above, Melaka, sitting at the choke point between the China Seas and the Indian Ocean, was a powerful Islamic trading enclave, one that brought these two seas together; and its importance was reflected in the remarkably diverse array of merchants that came there to trade. When the Portuguese arrived, Malay, Arab, Persian, African, Chinese, and various other Southeast Asian peoples all traded with one another at Melaka, carrying with them goods from an equally diverse range of places in Eurasia and Africa.

Prominent among Melaka's Southeast Asian traders were Moro merchants from Manila. After the Portuguese conquest, the anti-Muslim attitude of Melaka's new rulers caused many Moros to flee Melaka and to establish a new Muslim settlement at Aceh, a town on the Indian Ocean side of the Malacca straits. From Aceh, these Muslims continued to resist Portuguese power and expansion. Other Muslims nevertheless remained at Melaka, and among these were some Moros from Manila. Soon after Melaka's conquest, the Portuguese even appointed a
Manila Moro to rule over the trading enclave's remaining Muslim population. Within a decade, however, trade at Melaka had decreased dramatically, and Manila merchants eventually stopped coming to trade at the now Christian enclave.\textsuperscript{191} Having once been connected to the most powerful Muslim settlement in the region, Manila was thus cut off from direct participation in the larger Islamic mercantile network of commerce. As a result, Moro Manila undoubtedly suffered a decline in foreign trade and a corresponding weakening of its regional influence, two developments that helped to pave the way for the arrival of Spanish Catholicism.

Legazpi first arrived in the Philippine islands during the generation of Soliman; and initially, as the Spaniards were incorporated into the Moro commercial network, they took no military action against the region's Muslims. Legazpi, in fact, explicitly forbade attacks on Moro vessels. As colonial authority stabilized, however, Christian-Moro conflicts became part of the Southeast Asian political environment. These conflicts began during the generation of Soliman and continued through the time of Banal. During Soliman's generation, the colony attacked Moros at Manila (1570-71), put down a Moro uprising (1574), and then attacked Brunei, Jolo, and Mindanao (1578-79). Then during the time of Agustin, the colony stifled a Moro plan to overthrow colonial authority. And finally, in Banal's generation of the colony mobilized its people several times to attack Mindanao, Ternate, and Jolo. These Moro centers then retaliated with yearly raids on colonial settlements, raids that began in 1599. Through this progression of violence, Manila's relationship with Islam was transformed from one of friendly affiliation to one of fierce opposition.

The first significant conflict between Moro *datus* and colonial authority happened at Manila. After Legazpi and his Spanish followers had, in response to the Portuguese blockade, moved from Cebu to Panay in 1569, they continued their search for a permanent capital. In 1570, Legazpi sent a multiethnic expedition comprised of roughly one hundred Spaniards and five to six hundred indigenous Visayans and Moros to Luzon, the island upon which Manila is located. This fleet was guided to Manila by Mahomar and other Moro merchants.\(^{192}\) As stated above, when the fleet arrived at its destination, the Spaniards, hoping to form a peaceful relationship with Manila's rulers, sent Mahomar's brother ashore to negotiate with Soliman. Mahomar's brother then, over the course of three days, came to an agreement with Soliman and with Manila's other chieftains. Mahomar's brother then returned to the colonial ships and invited the Spanish Master-of-Camp ashore so that the Spaniards could enter into a blood compact with Soliman.

After this agreement was made, tensions nevertheless remained high between Soliman's Moros and the multiethnic colonial expedition. One evening, Mahomar and a few other Moros went ashore to feast with their families and friends. For some unknown reason, a skirmish broke out at the feast, pitting Soliman and his followers against these Moro colonial supporters. This argument eventually became violent, and Moros even began to take one another hostage. The Spaniards got involved in this Moro dispute when Soliman's faction started firing on colonial ships. Angered by this attack, Spaniards, Moros, and Visayans came ashore from the colonial fleet and began to fight. This boost in colonial support quickly turned the tide against Soliman, who was forced to flee into the surrounding hills. Meanwhile, Manila was burned to the ground.

\(^{192}\) "Relation of the voyage to Luzon," 73 and 92.
The colonial expedition then departed and returned the following year, this time with a multiethnic force that was roughly double the size of the previous expedition; and this larger fleet was also led by Legazpi himself. Based on the events of 1570, Soliman and the town's other datus made peace with the multiethnic colonial force; and the town's once antagonistic Moros then allowed the Spaniards to establish a colonial settlement at Manila.\(^{193}\)

This series of events revealed the multiethnic nature of colonial support. The outbreak of violence, for example, began not between Spaniards and Moros, but rather between two factions of Moros. The Spaniards did not get directly involved until this dispute spilled over into the harbor. Even a few years after the events, the Moros continued to acknowledge "they themselves had begun the [conflict],"\(^{194}\) not the Spaniards. Visayan participation was also a definitive part of these events. Visayans and Moros were not only different from one another, as described above, but these two groups also maintained a tense relationship with each other. When, for example, Soliman entered into his blood compact with Goiti, he made sure to explain that he and his people were superior to the Visayans. Soliman's Moros, he explained, "were not [\textit{Pintados}]'' and they "would not tolerate any abuse, as had the others."\(^{195}\) Soliman's sense of superiority was, in fact, embedded into his language. Soliman, of course, did not use the Spanish word \textit{Pintados},'' he rather called Legazpi's tattooed companions \textit{Viseys}\(^{196}\)—the precolonial origin of the word Visayans. In the regional Moro vernacular, this term was used to refer not only to people living in the region between Luzon and Mindanao, but it was also applied to hunter-gatherer groups

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\(^{193}\) San Agustin, 547-549; and "Conquest of the island of Luzón" (20 Apr 1572), BR 3, 153-154.

\(^{194}\) Guido de Lavezaris, et al., "Reply to Fray Rada's 'Opinion'' (Jun 1574), BR 3, 263.

\(^{195}\) "Relation of the voyage to Luzon," 95; Moro superiority in Boxer Codex too.

\(^{196}\) "Conquest of the island of Luzón,"147.
living in the mountains, a people who were similarly perceived by the Moros to be less civilized.\textsuperscript{197}

The Spaniards' Visayan allies likewise had powerful antagonistic feelings toward Luzon's Moro peoples. After the Spaniards settled at Manila, they sent multiethnic colonial expeditions into other nearby Moro villages. An account of Visayan violence against one of these other villages demonstrates the antagonism among the \textit{Pintados} directed at the Moros.

\begin{quote}
when the [Visayans]…saw the enemy in retreat, they threw themselves into the water in pursuit, and caused great slaughter among them; for they are bitter enemies of the natives of this island of Luzon. And thus they attacked them on land, capturing all their boats and taking two hundred of the natives prisoners; and later they captured two or three hundred more.\textsuperscript{198}
\end{quote}

This account demonstrates not only the powerful antagonism between the Visayans and the Moros of Luzon, but it also shows that indigenous warriors among the Spaniards continued to fight according to \textit{barangay} norms, norms that emphasized the taking of captives. Thus the colony's victories over Soliman and over the Moros of the surrounding area were achieved not only through a blend of peoples, but also through a blend of systems, the \textit{barangay} system itself remaining an active part of colonial expansion.

Three years later, violence again divided Manila's population between those who supported colonial authority and those who opposed it. In 1574, a Chinese merchant-pirate named Limahong, hearing news of silver at Manila, brought his fleet of sixty two ships to the town and attacked.\textsuperscript{199} Seeing this as an opportunity to overthrow colonial authority, Soliman and several other Moro chieftains started a concurrent rebellion. Soon thousands of Moros had

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{197} Boxer Codex (1590), Boxer II, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 148.
\textsuperscript{198} "Conquest of the island of Luzón," 157.
\textsuperscript{199} Francisco de Sande, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands" (7 Jun 1576), BR 4, 25.
\end{footnotes}
gathered in boats and in the nearby highlands "ready to obey [Limahong's] commands." This rebellion spread to Mindoro and to other small Moro settlements near Manila, where several Moros captured Spanish priests, threatening them with death and robbing them of their possessions. It was even rumored that a fleet of Moros was coming from Brunei to assist Soliman, though no such fleet ever arrived.

Many Moros, however, also supported the colonial defense against Limahong's invasion and Soliman's uprising. The Spaniards recorded that the force they gathered against Limahong included approximately 2,500 indigenous allies, and many of these were Moros. The indigenous participants on the colonial side of this conflict, in other words, vastly outnumbered the 256 Spaniards who fought against the invasion and concurrent rebellion. After this multiethnic colonial force had successfully repelled Limahong, Soliman and his companions, once again, subjected themselves to colonial authority.

Four years later, in fact, Soliman even allied with the Spaniards against another Moro ruler in the region. In 1578, a Moro from Borneo, named Sirela, the brother of Brunei's most powerful chieftain, came to Manila with a proposal for the Spaniards. If the colonial community would help him to overthrow his brother, Seif ur-Rijal, he would swear allegiance to the King of Spain. Still rankled from the threat posed by the rumored Bornean fleet of 1574, the Governor of the Philippines, Francisco de Sande, agreed to help Sirela. Sande, no doubt, hoped that if he conquered Brunei, making it part of the colony, the Muslim settlement would no longer be able to threaten the colony's new capital. The Moros of Manila, including Soliman, and the Visayans,

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200 Ibid., 36.
201 Ibid., 35-36.
202 Majul, 124.
203 Sande, 38.
also had reasons to attack Brunei. According to one Tagalog witness, the Sultan of Brunei had captured some messengers that had been sent to him by Soliman, along with several other people who belonged to other indigenous communities that had allied with the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{204} Several Moros and Visayans therefore also offered their support.

Motivated by different reasons for participation in the expedition, 400 Spaniards and 1,500 indigenous Philippine troops accompanied Sirela's force of 300 Bornean Moros against the sultan of Brunei.\textsuperscript{205} This multiethnic force defeated Brunei's standing sultan, but it failed to capture or kill him. Sande, nevertheless, declared that Borneo was now part of the Philippine colony. Three years later, however, Seif ur-Rijal returned and reclaimed his thrown. Colonial forces then tried again in the early 1580s to reconquer Brunei, but they did not succeed. Permanent authority on Borneo, once again, eluded them.\textsuperscript{206}

After winning the initial 1578 colonial victory at Brunei, Sande returned to Manila. But as he departed from Borneo, he ordered a combined force of Spaniards, Visayans, and Moros to move on and attack other nearby Islamic settlements. In 1579, this colonial force won victories against the Moros at Maguindanao again and at Jolo. The colonial "conquests" at Jolo and Maguindanao were nevertheless, like the one at Brunei, also short lived. These Moro settlements' former leaders, like Seif ur-Rijal, all regained their authority and refused thereafter to become part of the emerging colonial community. These early multiethnic attacks from Manila against Brunei, Maguindanao, and Jolo began the formation of a political boundary between the Christian colony and the region's various Muslim centers, one that would become more pronounced in later generations.

\textsuperscript{204} Sande, et al., 149.  
\textsuperscript{205} San Agustin, 803.  
\textsuperscript{206} Majul, 124-125.
During Soliman's generation, the Spaniards had founded a settlement at Manila, but this action did not sever the ties of local chieftains to precolonial sources of power. As was made clear through the Limahong incident, Moros maintained the ability to ally with East Asian merchants, and they continued to have a relationship with the Moro rulers of Brunei. Soliman's generation of Moro chieftains, in other words, maintained independent channels to their precolonial external sources of power, even as they were being incorporated into a new Christian colony. The colony's later attacks on Brunei, Maguindanao, and Jolo, however, also began to change Manila's approach to Islam, but these nevertheless did not produce an immediate separation between Manila's *datus* and their external Muslim network of economic and political authority.

As stated above, even though Agustin de Legazpi had publicly allied himself with the Spaniards by taking on a Christian name, he remained married to the Brunei Sultan's daughter; and he also maintained the ability to form independent relationships with people who participated in the China trade. Though his connections to the China trade and to Brunei were certainly weaker than those of Soliman, they were far from inconsequential. Beginning in the late 1580s, Agustin began to use his remaining connections to these external sources of power to plan an overthrow of colonial authority. A decade after Manila's attack on the Moros of Borneo, Agustin sent representatives to the Sultan of Brunei; and he also feasted with a group of Japanese merchants who had come to Manila to participate in the China trade. Both of these connections then became central parts of his planned revolt. Agustin's plan was for the Sultan of Brunei to send a fleet to attack Manila. When the fleet arrived, the Spaniards would do what they always

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207 Majul, 80.
did in times of conflict—they would call on Manila's *datus* and on the Japanese for help. These allies would then enter the Spanish fort, pretending that they were coming to the Spaniards' aid; and once they were within gates, Agustin, his followers, and the Japanese would turn against the Spaniards, killing them all, a surprise that would put a decisive end to colonial sovereignty.

By Agustin's time the Spaniards had stopped referring to Manila's people as Moros, but Agustin's ability to draw independent support from Brunei and from Japanese merchants demonstrated a continuity with precolonial Moro authority. His plan was strikingly similar to Soliman's previous attempt. Like Soliman, Agustin tried to ally with East Asian merchants and he also turned to Brunei for help. He, in other words, turned to people associated with both the China trade and with nearby Muslim settlements. Despite the rise in Catholic authority and a clear weakening in Islamic influence, in other words, the similarities between Agustin's plan and Soliman's revolt also pointed to an underlying Moro continuity.

Another Tagalog chieftain, however, put a stop to Agustin's plan before it could even be set in motion. As Agustin's envoy was en route to Brunei, hidden among the ranks of Tagalog peoples traveling with a Spanish merchant ship, another Tagalog *datu*, named Antonio Surabao, revealed the plot to the Spanish captain of the ship, Pedro de Sarmiento. Sarmiento then returned to Manila, where Agustin and his companions were tried before the Royal Audiencia and found guilty. As punishment, Agustin was publicly executed. Most of the other guilty *datus* were exiled as slaves to Mexico, where they could no longer threaten the survival of the colony.208

The colony's punishment of Agustin and his companions demonstrated a new approach to the threat of Muslim Brunei. As described above, Four years after Soliman's 1574 revolt—with

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208 Santiago de Vera, "Letter to Felipe II" (1589), BR 7, 84.
the rumor of potential Bornean support—the colony attacked Brunei, hoping to conquer it. This course of action might have, had it succeeded, neutralized the threat that Moro Brunei posed to colonial Manila by assimilating the Moros on Borneo into the emerging colonial network. Despite losing a battle to colonial forces in 1578, Brunei's Moro rulers, however, successfully resisted longterm incorporation into the Philippine colony, meaning that they might still threaten Manila's emerging colonial authority.

Agustin's plan demonstrated that relationships between Bornean Moros and Manila's datus did indeed continue to endanger colonial sovereignty. But rather than attempting to neutralize this danger by trying again to conquer Brunei, the colony instead severed traditional ties between the two settlements by removing those ties from Manila. Executing or exiling those chieftains who maintained connections to Brunei all but extinguished the independent indigenous relationships between colonial Manila and Muslim Borneo. Those Manila datus who had continued to have relationships with Brunei's rulers were now either dead, shipped to Mexico, or at the very least intimidated by the apparent force of colonial power. Tagalog Manila, after more than a century of close ties with Brunei, was thus cut off from Borneo.

This break between Brunei and Manila also had significant religious consequences. Brunei, the settlement from whence Islam had first arrived in Manila, was also the Muslim religious capital of the region. The Spaniards observed during their first expedition to Manila that many Tagalog people living in the coastal villages of Luzon did not eat pork because Bornean merchant-preachers had told them that it was a sin, that others believed abstaining from pork was optional until one had personally traveled to Brunei, and that those who had been to Borneo were far more likely to be familiar with the Qur'an and to have a knowledge of Muhammad than those
who had not. Muslim preachers also came to preach on Luzon from Borneo, preachers who circumcised, ritualistically cleansed, and gave new names to Muslim converts. Permanently severing ties between Manila and Brunei was, therefore, also a way of permanently severing ties between Manila and Islam itself.

After the death of Agustin in 1589, during the generation of Miguel Banal, Manila's external relationship with Moro settlements in the region underwent a final change. As stated above, the colony's attacks on Brunei, Maguindanao, and Jolo during the 1570s-80s, began to create an antagonism between Muslims and Christians in the region; and this antagonism came to full fruition between 1590-1610. Due to the unification of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns in 1580, the Maluku islands, a Portuguese possession, also became involved in this process. On one of these islands, Ternate, a local Moro ruler had overthrown the Portuguese fort in 1575. During the 1590s, colonial Manila began to send military expeditions against Maguindanao, Jolo, and Ternate; and the Moro rulers of these settlements retaliated with raids into colonial villages. Through these attacks and raids, Manila's relationship with these nearby Moro villages stabilized into one of periodic violence, violence that maintained continuity with the barangay system.

Having failed to subjugate Maguindanao in the 1570s, colonial authorities decided, in 1591, that they would try again in the 1590s. Led by the Spaniard Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, a multiethnic force of 1,500 indios and 214 Spaniards departed Manila for Maguindanao in 1596. During their initial attack, many Moro enemies escaped inland, and Figueroa was killed. But the expedition nevertheless succeeded in establishing a base called La Caldera in Moro territory. La Caldera, became the colony's principal southern settlement; and

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209 "Conquest of the island of Luzón," 165.
colonial troops used this new base to attack the Muslim kingdom of Jolo. Within a few years, however, Moro resistance forced the Spaniards to abandon their new southern fort.\textsuperscript{211} During the 1580s and 1590s, the colony also prepared and sent expeditions against Moro Ternate, and in 1606, they succeeded in overturning the Moro ruler. They then captured and brought him back to Manila, where he died more than twenty years later.\textsuperscript{212}

In consequence of these attacks, Maguindanao, Jolo, and Ternate began to unify in opposition to the colony. After Figueroa's attack on Maguindanao, for example, Maguindanao's datus sent and envoy to Ternate requesting aid; and the Sultan of Ternate sent some 800 soldiers to assist them.\textsuperscript{213} In the late 1590s, the various Moro rulers of these settlements also began to send individual and joint expeditions of their own against the new Christian colony. In 1599, two Moro chieftains from Maguindanao sent 3,000 warriors to attack several of the Visayan islands, where they captured some 800 indigenous captives, an attack that was repeated the following year, again yielding another 800 captives. In 1602, another Moro fleet, this one from Ternate, similarly raided the Philippine colony, taking 1,400 captives, including Visayan chieftains, Christian priests, and Spanish \textit{encomenderos}.\textsuperscript{214}

The back and forth violence between the Moros and the multiethnic Philippine colony created a border of hostility between Muslims and Christians in the archipelago, one that combined Spain's Reconquista past with the traditional practice of \textit{barangay} raiding. As explained in part one, raiding was the central purpose of precolonial \textit{barangay} violence because it enhanced a datu's power by directly increasing his wealth-in-people. Through the expansion of

\textsuperscript{211} Majul, 128-129.
\textsuperscript{212} BR 22, 19.
\textsuperscript{213} Majul, 128.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., 131-134.
unified colonial authority, inter-village raiding among indigenous Spanish allies decreased and was virtually non-existent by the time of Miguel Banal. As a composite system, however, raiding became part of Manila's permanent relationship with Southeast Asia's remaining Moro settlements. Moros captured and released prisoners from the colony according to barangay norms,\textsuperscript{215} and colonial officials also allowed and encouraged Christian indio soldiers to capture Moro enemies during attacks and counter-raids.

These mutual raids thereby incorporated the Philippine colony and its people into barangay-like external relationships with Moro settlements in the Malay archipelago. Just as dependents relied on their datus in precolonial times to protect and ransom them from the raids of other chieftains, colonial subjects likewise learned to depend on the Christian colony to shelter and redeem them from Moro attackers. Indeed, after the raids of 1602, colonial officials negotiated the release not only of Spaniards but also of several indigenous chieftains who had been taken.\textsuperscript{216} The return of these chieftains to their people and families likely prompted emotional displays that were similar to the one Legazpi witnessed when he reunited Maquio with his captive family. As was true for Maquio's reunion, the emotional component of these later reunions no doubt channeled increased authority into the new blended colonial order.

Between the time of Soliman and Banal, the external relationships of Manila's datus with other Moro rulers were fundamentally transformed. In the beginning, Manila's chieftains had been part of a regional Muslim network of rulers, forming alliances with these other rulers through trade and intermarriage. As time passed, however, these connections were gradually weakened until, at the death of Agustin, they were completely cut off. Finally, in the generation

\textsuperscript{215} see for example Pedro de Acuña, et al., "The Sangley Insurrection," BR 12, 162-165.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
of Banal, Manila began to aggressively attack nearby Muslim settlements and these retaliated by raiding colonial villages, a practice the mirrored the precolonial barangay system. Through these three generations, in other words, the second channel of Moro power was weakened, blocked, and finally attacked.

The transition from Islam to Catholicism in Manila was reflected in more than just the internal beliefs of the new colonial capital's people. It also showed a change in their external relationship to the Southeast Asian Moro system. On the one hand, colonial Manila assimilated itself into and transformed the old Moro system by taking over the China trade, thus usurping and redirecting one of the Manila Moros' external channels of authority. But on the other hand, colonial officials, through violent conflicts with Moros also cut Manila off from other Muslim settlements; and colonialism even began to form an antagonistic relationship between Manila and the region's other Islamic settlements. As a relatively poor Christian datu appealing to the Catholic King of Spain for help, Miguel Banal represented the completion of both of these processes. He, unlike both Soliman and Agustin, appeared to have no relationship with these former channels of Moro authority. The transition from one religion to another, at least among his people, was complete.
Chapter 5

The Conquest of Manila

"The useless slave of your royal Majesty, Don Miguel Banal"—these are the words Miguel Banal used to close his 1609 epistle to Philip III. This phrase both paralleled and diverged from the way that Spaniards traditionally concluded their petitions to the Crown. Legazpi, for example, called himself "Your Sacred Royal Catholic Majesty's most humble and faithful servant, who kisses your royal feet and hands." Like Legazpi, Banal emphasized his humility before the King, but he did not strictly follow the common Spanish practice of referring to himself as a servant or a vassal. Banal, rather, called himself a slave.

This difference was due to the fact that, in Banal's apologetic words, his letter was written "by my own hand and in my own composition, and in the style of an [Indio] not well versed in the Spanish language." Banal's use of the word slave should not be understood in terms of human ownership outside of the Malay archipelago. His concluding words, instead, revealed that he continued to understand and experience power in part—even within the new colonial system—according to barangay tradition, a tradition based on a complex system of indigenous slavery and dependence. At the same time, however, his humble and submissive attitude toward the Crown coupled with the Hispanic form of his farewell also revealed adaptations to the new imperial system. In summary, Banal's words suggest that he was experiencing and exercising a new blended form of internal authority.

217 Miguel Banal, "Petition of a Filipino chief for redress" (25 Jul 1609), BR 14, 329.
218 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Letter to Felipe II" (25 Jul 1570), BR 3, 112.
219 For other examples see Guido de Lavezaris, "Letter to Felipe II" (5 Jun 1569), BR 3, 32; Andres de Mirandola, "Letter to Felipe II" (8 Jun 1569), BR 3, 43; Diego de Herrera, "Letter to Felipe II" (16 Jan 1570), BR 3, 72; Diego Aduarte, "Despatch of missionaries to the Philippines" (1608-1609), 336.
220 Banal, 329.
Proof of this blended authority went well beyond the insertion of a single barangay-related term into the Tagalog chieftain's epistle. Indeed, evidence was scattered throughout his letters, and his complaints showed that blended authority was widely practiced by both indigenous and Spanish peoples alike. It should not be thought, in other words, that the indios practiced barangay authority while the Spaniards employed only imperial power. Both, rather, contributed to the blending process. The Jesuits, for example, claiming a European-like title to Banal's lands, gathered and led a group of Tagalog and African followers to help them enforce their claim. Pedro de Chaves, Quiapo's mayor, similarly asserting his imperial position, re-secured Banal's homesite with his own group of Tagalog followers. Archbishop Benevides and the parish priest, Father Talavera, furthermore also used their imperial authority to try to secure Banal's claim to chiefly rule in Quiapo. Like these Spaniards, Banal—learning to work through the European imperial system from below while continuing to exercise datu authority over his own people from above—helped to fuse these two systems together into a new and lasting hierarchical colonial structure.

As described in part one, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi and his men blended rigid European imperial authority into the more fluid barangay system of indigenous datu power. Banal's letters show however that, by the early seventeenth century, Spain's imperial network was no longer just one power among many in the islands; the King's authority, exercised through his local officers, was now clearly sitting atop the barangay order. This elevation of European power over traditional datu authority happened through what I will refer to as the conquest of Manila.

Accounts of Philippine history traditionally state that the conquest of Manila happened in 1570-71, when the Spaniards and their indigenous allies first arrived at the settlement, defeated
Rajah Soliman in battle, and then formed their own replacement town. Though this sequence of events was pivotal, Soliman's surrender, on its own, only begins to describe the process and significance of colonial authority's arrival at Manila. In 1571, Legazpi's local power, though it had certainly grown since 1565, yet remained one power among many within the *barangay* network. During the ensuing decades, however, Spain's imperial pyramid would be elevated to a place above the *barangay* system. I argue here that the elevation of imperial power over *datu* authority was a step by step process, occurring over three generations. As indigenous and Spanish peoples pushed a corner of Spain's imperial pyramid up and over the *barangay* system, the pressure of this new weight fused *barangay* authority—through chieftains like Soliman, Agustin, and Banal—into the emerging hybrid configuration of colonial sovereignty, a hybrid system responsible for inserting the word slave into Banal's formulaic Spanish petition for imperial aid.

In order to understand how imperial authority was elevated above traditional *barangay* power, it will be helpful to see first how this blended system functioned in Banal's time, Banal himself acting again as an illustrative example. Like Legazpi, Banal embodied a role that anchored the imperial system to the *barangay* system through bidirectional flows of power. Though Philippine chieftains were most often referred to as *principales* by the Spaniards, Banal's role in colonial governance is best represented by the title 'cabeza de barangay' or a 'barangay head.' As a *barangay* head, Banal remained a ruler over his own cadre of Tagalog slaves and dependents, according to the *barangay* system, but he also answered to Spanish authorities above him, according to the European imperial system. From this intermediary position in the colonial hierarchy, Banal could still look down on his own people from above; but looking up, he now
saw a complex imperial apparatus from below. As currents of power flowed through him in both directions, he blended these two systems together.

Banal's assimilation into the imperial apparatus from below was clear in his letters to Philip III. By Banal's time, Legazpi's infantile network of royal patronage, one that began with only 300 Spaniards, had become a full fledged and multilayered matrix of positions and powers. Legazpi's original pillar of empire had become a pyramid unto itself, one that reflected the larger structure of Spanish imperial governance. Wherever it was established, Spain's imperial pyramid of power had a dual foundation; authority flowed between the Crown and his criados through two channels of patronage: one secular and the other religious. The Crown had the power to appoint governors, judges, and various other secular officials; and the King had also been granted ecclesiastical authority from the Pope—called the Patronato Real—to appoint bishops, priests, and other religious leaders within his imperial domains. Both halves of this pyramid functioned through royal patronage, the King being responsible for approving and confirming the appointments of secular and religious officials alike.

Within the blended colonial system, barangay heads were directly connected to both of these channels through two intermediary officials, one secular and the other religious. The secular officials appointed directly above barangay chieftains went by one of two titles, though both served similar functions. The first of these was 'encomendero.' As described above, conquistadors and their men joined imperial expeditions in order to obtain royal favors, including formal incorporation into the King's network of patronage. After a conquest, conquistadors were assimilated into this structure when the King granted them authority over the new lands that he had acquired through them.
This was done as he divided these new lands into "trusts" or *encomiendas*. The King then granted these trusts to the conquistadors. Conqueror dependents thus become *encomenderos*. *Encomenderos* were, among other things, responsible for maintaining peace among their people and for collecting tribute from their new subjects. In order to finance the colonial government, however, the Crown also kept some *encomiendas* for himself. The King's *encomiendas* were ruled by mayors (*alcalde-mayores*), who exercised authority in ways similar to *encomenderos*, except that their appointments were not permanent. Banal belonged to a royal *encomienda*; and he therefore appealed for help not to an *encomendero* but to his mayor, Pedro de Chaves.

In the same way that the King distributed secular authority over various indigenous peoples to *encomenderos*, he also divided spiritual authority in the colony among various religious orders. The Augustinians traveling with Legazpi, including Andres de Urdaneta, represented the first religious order to arrive in the Philippines. During the 1570s, the Crown then approved the sending of Franciscans, followed by the arrival of Dominicans and Jesuits in 1581. Like the granting of *encomiendas*, each of these orders was assigned its own distinct fields of labor, and they were not permitted to overlap into one another's territories. Domingo de Salazar, the King's first appointed Bishop of the Philippines, arrived with the Dominicans in 1581; and Miguel de Benavides, also a Dominican, was Manila's third archbishop. Within this structure, each settlement was supposed to have an appointed priest, and Quiapo's parish was overseen by Pablo Ruiz de Talavera, who wrote to the King on Banal's behalf in 1602 and then tried again to defend the chieftain against the Jesuits in 1609.

Banal's complaints to Philip showed that he had a thorough working knowledge of Spain's imperial pyramid, knowledge that he tried to mobilize against the Jesuits. In 1603, after
the religious order had taken some of his people's lands and rented them out to Chinese immigrants, Banal requested the help of his parish priest, Pablo Ruiz de Talavera, and of the Archbishop of Manila, Miguel de Benavides. Both of these ecclesiastical authorities wrote to the King on Banal's behalf; and the King referred the matter to the Philippine high court, the Royal Audiencia. Then later, in 1609, when Banal's house was demolished, he requested help from the mayor over his village, Pedro de Chaves, something he had probably also done in 1603. In his 1609 letter to the King, Banal, furthermore, explained that he had not yet heard back from the Royal Audiencia concerning his earlier complaint; and, he added, because Archbishop Benavides had passed away four years prior, the Tagalog chieftain could find no one else to write the Crown on his behalf. Banal, moreover, lamented that he lacked the personal funds necessary to mount a defense in colonial court and that he could "find no one to aid me in the suits that the fathers are about to begin against me." Banal's letters and actions, in other words, exhibited his understanding of the imperial system. He sought help through both secular and religious channels of authority.

Banal's complaint also demonstrated that these two channels of imperial power could be subdivided even further. Members of the Royal Audiencia served as judges, while mayors and governors acted in more executive roles. Individual Catholic religious orders, coming to the Philippines as missionaries, were likewise separate from the authority of the Archbishopric. The Jesuits, for example, whose appointment to the Philippines was approved by the Crown, had their own distinct governing structures, making them semi-independent from the jurisdiction of Archbishop Benevides and the parish priest, Talavera. It was for this reason that Bishop

[221] Banal, 329.
Benavides, the highest ranking ecclesiastical officer in the Philippines, could not simply order the Jesuits to return Banal's lands to him. The Bishop too had to appeal to the Crown on Banal's behalf.

Working through this system from below, Banal knew that the Bishop Benavides and the parish priests were not necessarily in league with the Jesuits, even though all of these people were Catholic fathers; he also understood that the will of his village's Spanish mayor could differ from that of the Royal Audiencia; and he further recognized the King's overarching authority over both secular and religious leaders in the Philippines. Banal's appeals to authorities above his direct superiors—including the Archbishop, the Audiencia, and the King—demonstrated his understanding of this larger pyramid system. He knew that internal divisions among officials might earn him more allies; and he therefore appealed his case directly not only to his immediate superiors but to every level of imperial authority. Banal's letters and his actions thus revealed his assimilation into a complex overarching pyramid of imperial power, a pyramid that had exercised only limited influence in the time of Soliman.

Less apparent in Banal's letters were the ways in which the new bidirectional flow of power had altered traditional *datu* authority. As a *cabeza de barangay*, Banal was responsible to colonial officials for collecting tribute, mobilizing labor, and mustering troops from among his people. *Datus* had done all of these things before Legazpi's arrival; but before 1565, indigenous chieftains had been at the apex of these authority-building practices. By Banal's time, however, *datus* had become a means to a higher end. Power—in the form of tribute, labor, and troops—flowed through them from below into a larger governing apparatus. This upward flow of power through chieftains formed the foundation of internal colonial governance by amassing, into a
larger whole, the resources of several previously independent villages. As several chieftains
joined the new network of colonial authority—both voluntarily and through coercion—their
individual pockets of power fed the creation of this larger collective whole, a collective whole
that was soon more powerful than any individual datu. Whereas in precolonial times datus might
challenge one another on relatively equal grounds; by Banal's day, one chieftain could not
possibly mount a competitive offensive against the combined datu power that formed the
foundation of internal colonial authority.

As power thus flowed upward into the colony's governing apparatus through barangay heads, the imperial pyramid also re-exerted increasing downward pressure from above, pressure that altered the barangay system in significant ways. In part one, I explained that precolonial barangay authority was based primarily on wealth-in-people and that datu exercised and elevated their power through raiding, trading, and feasting. Banal's complaints, involving disputed territory, showed an increased emphasis on wealth-in-lands; and in Banal's time, precolonial datu practices of authority had also been changed. Inter-barangay raiding had ceased among the settlements under colonial rule; Manila's datu also no longer controlled trade in foreign commodities; and traditional feasting practices were, furthermore, becoming overshadowed by Catholic rituals and celebrations. With these changes, colonial courts, encomenderos, and ecclesiastical officials had, furthermore, all begun to influence the authority that datu exercised over their slaves and dependents.

These alterations—products of the pressures exerted from above by the imperial pyramid—fused datu and the barangay system into the new hybrid colonial hierarchy. Whereas in precolonial times, datu authority rose and fell within the fluid barangay order through raiding,
trading, and feasting—exercises of authority practiced among a large population of co-equal chieftains; by Banal's time, datu authority had increasingly come to rely on approval from above, approval that introduced hardening agents into the once flexible barangay order. Among Banal's ancestors, one's chiefly power, with nothing above it to hold it in place, was more vulnerable to organic claims to authority from below. Dependents and other datus—through raiding, trading, and feasting—could elevate themselves to challenge the authority of more prominent chieftains, making the foundation of barangay power relatively fluid and unstable. When, however, a datu, like Banal, became a cabeza de barangay, his authority over his people was fixed in place by the weighty and overarching colonial apparatus. Said another way, the authority of barangay heads was now confirmed by power from above; and challenges to their power from below were no longer played out through traditional barangay practices. Colonial authority helped to secure the chiefly positions of datus; and effective challenges to their power could now only be mounted through colonial courts, encomenderos, and priests—authorities that, within the blended colonial structure, were in positions above barangay chieftains.

In summary, Banal's letters demonstrated the bi-directional flow of blended colonial authority. The Jesuits, relying in part on power from below, destroyed Banal's home with the help of their own set of Tagalog followers, indigenous people who were challenging Banal's barangay authority not through the traditional practices of raiding, trading, and feasting, but rather by allying with the Jesuits, members of the imperial pyramid; Pedro de Chavez, similarly, gathered Tagalog followers from below to support Banal's claim; and Banal himself even channeled authority upward by appealing for help to colonial officials, an action that reified the blended colonial order. Meanwhile, all of the participants in the dispute awaited a ruling from the King or
from his colonial court, authorities from above. These disputes mirrored the larger structure of interethnic colonial governance. Datus, like Banal or like those who supported the Jesuits, fed power upward into the imperial system and that power was then reflected back downward by imperial officials, into the barangay system, the two systems being blended together, one on top of the other, into a new and foundational internal component of colonial sovereignty.

Now that we have outlined the basic contours of Banal's blended authority, we can begin to examine the decades long process that created this new structure. Imperial authority was lifted and placed on top of the barangay system through the rise of encomenderos, the establishment of colonial courts, the collection of tribute, and the preaching of missionaries. Each of these interrelated strands of authority channeled power upward and downward between the imperial system and the barangay system. These changes, I emphasize, were not immediate. They happened over three generations, from Soliman to Banal. Neither was the ascension of imperial authority an exclusively "Spanish" accomplishment. The work of elevating the imperial system in the Philippines was, rather, done by both Spanish and indigenous Philippine peoples alike and together. The gradual and multiethnic nature of this process were both, again, evident in the conflicts that occurred during the generations of Soliman, Agustin, and Banal.

Before the Spaniards came to Manila, they were yet uncertain of their permanence in the archipelago. Philip's 1569 decree solidifying Legazpi's position as a governor did not arrive in the islands until 1570, and the Spaniards had still not found a viable way to extract profits from their emerging colony. While it was true that the Spaniards had started to collect tribute from some Visayan villages, this was not being done in a systematic manner; and it was almost certainly interpreted by local peoples according to barangay norms. The chieftains who paid
tribute to Legazpi, in fact, likely understood it to be a ransom payment that they were making on behalf of captives that had been returned to them, not as a permanent symbol of subjugation.222 During the first five years of Spain's presence in the Philippine islands, the missionaries had also only baptized one hundred or so indigenous individuals;223 and these baptisms appear to have been more a means of making alliances among equals than they were signs of permanent submission.224

After settling at Manila, however, colonial officials began to standardize and expand tribute collection; and they also started their efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples into the Catholic hierarchy. Once the Spaniards were settled at Manila, Legazpi, having received his governorship, began to grant encomiendas to his followers, something that he had not done while living at Cebu and Panay. As Spanish conquistadors, accompanied by Visayan and Moro military allies, spread out from Manila to "pacify" other nearby villages, they thus became encomenderos over their new acquisitions. They were granted both the power to extract tribute from these new possessions and also the responsibility to ensure that their peoples received Christian evangelization. Due to a lack of missionaries in the islands, many encomiendas had no standing priests. But missionaries nevertheless began to be assigned to preach in the encomiendas surrounding Manila and throughout the colony's other new possessions.

Beyond their assignments to already 'pacified' encomiendas, missionaries also had an independent way that they participated in the conquest process, through the formation of reducciones or doctrinas. In the precolonial Philippines, as in other places throughout the world,  

223 Nicolas Cushner, Spain in the Philippines: From Conquest to Revolution (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1971), 76.
224 For examples see "Relation of the voyage to Luzon" (1570), BR 3, 92; and "Expedición de Legazpi, Documento 39" (1567), in Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Ultramar (Madrid: Impresos de la Real Casa, 1887), 121.
lowland peoples—who were more likely to farm—lived a different lifestyle from their highland neighbors—who were more likely to be hunter-gatherers. Missionaries took it upon themselves to travel into the highlands and try to recruit these hunter-gatherers into towns that they called reducciones. These priests, however, did not act alone. They had indigenous helpers who guided their recruitment efforts and who also helped to indoctrinate those who were preparing for baptism. Just as Spanish conquistadors relied on native soldiers to help them pacify other peoples, so too did Spanish missionaries rely on the assistance of unordained indigenous preachers to help them in spreading the gospel and in bringing people down out of the highlands and into their doctrinas.225

But the ascension of imperial authority during the generation of Soliman, even after 1571, did not happen without significant friction and conflict. As explained above, within the blended colonial system, barangay heads continued to rule over their own people through traditional datu authority; but they, at the same time, became accountable to encomenderos for tribute, labor, and military obligations. Being at the point of contact between their two blending systems, frictions between datus and encomenderos were often heated and they could even lead to violence.

One early source of this inter-system friction was tribute. Encomenderos made their living through tribute collection, with much of what they collected belonging to them. This incentive to collect tribute caused encomenderos to begin to exert judicial authority over datus. In precolonial times, datus had wielded both executive and judicial forms of power over their people; they were both powerful kings and high judges. They ultimately determined and

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225 Vicente Rafael, Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society Under Early Spanish Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993 [1998]), 90. For an example of a missionary "reducing" native peoples to these doctrinas see Pedro Chirino, "Relacion de las Islas Filipinas" (1604), BR 13, 183.
enforced their own laws; and they mediated disputes between those who resided within their various *barangays*. As part of the emerging colonial system, however, *encomenderos* created a higher judicial authority over *datus* through tribute. They did this by building stocks and prisons. The number of slaves and dependents a *datu* had determined the amount of tribute he owed; and if *datus* failed to pay their tribute obligations in full, *encomenderos* would have them imprisoned or put into the stocks. Some chieftains, to avoid both tribute and the punishments for not paying it, resorted to demolishing their homes and fleeing to mountain bases at the time of collection. They would then return and rebuild once the Spaniards had gone.226

Tribute was also used, however, as an incentive to assist in establishing blended sovereignty. Though *barangay* heads were responsible for collecting the colonial tribute from their followers, those who allied with the Spaniards were themselves exempt from its demands.227 Whole villages and peoples that assisted the colony in significant military conflicts were also sometimes exempted from tribute.228 Thus as the colonial network became increasingly widespread and powerful, some *datus* no doubt joined the growing political community peacefully as a way of assuming a smaller tribute burden. Spanish coercion and *datu* resistance thereby caused friction between the two groups, but tribute was also a means of facilitating unity.

The ownership of slaves and dependents was another, and probably more significant, point of contention among *datus* and *encomenderos*. Conflicts over slaves likely began before the Spaniards arrived at Manila, among the peoples in the Visayan islands. As soon as the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, some began to take slaves. While at Cebu, the Spaniards

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226 Martin de Rada, "Opinion regarding tribute from the Indians" (21 Jun 1574), BR 3, 257.
228 Francisco Combes, "The Natives of the Southern Islands" (1667), BR 40, 120; and "Events in Manila" (1662-1663), BR 36, 240.
studied the local barangay system of slavery and dependence, and Legazpi recommended to the King that the Crown allow the Spaniards to purchase and use slaves according to local customs.\textsuperscript{229} Not receiving word back from the King until 1574, however, the Spaniards simply began to acquire them; and many also started using the subjects of their encomiend\textsuperscript{as} for their personal labor and support. When the King finally forbade Spaniards from having indigenous slaves in the Philippines, many encomenderos simply refused to follow the order, and the Crown had to repeat the command time and again for several decades.\textsuperscript{230} The lack of a clear distinction between a servant and a slave in the local barangay system, no doubt, also blurred the enforcement of this decree, the various types of local slavery and barter making it unclear whether a person or a person's services were in fact being purchased.

When encomenderos took slaves from indigenous datus, chieftains felt that they had been robbed; and this feeling fueled the Moro revolt that accompanied Limahong's attack in 1574. After Limahong retreated from Manila, Spanish colonial authorities had to renegotiate peace again with Soliman and with the other Moro datus who were now opposing colonial authority. Lakandula, one of the chieftains who revolted with Soliman, explained that he turned against the Spaniards because

the governor had given a soldier named Martín de la Rea [an encomienda] that included practically all Lakandula's slaves, some of which he inherited from his forebears while some were bought with his belongings. Furthermore, the encomendero not only made use of them, but would punish them if they went to see Lakandula and [brought] anything as a token of their recognition that they had belonged to him. This was an affront that Lakandula deeply felt.\textsuperscript{231}

\textsuperscript{229} Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Letter to Philip II" (1568), BR 2, 242.
\textsuperscript{230} Linda A. Newson, Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2009), 7.
\textsuperscript{231} Gaspar de San Agustin, Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas, trans., Luis Antonio Mañeru (Manila: San Agustin Museum, 1998 [1698]), 674-675. I have reinserted the words encomienda and encomendero from the original Spanish to replace "commission" and "commissioner" as written in the translation.
Martín de la Rea, in other words, was not simply overseeing Lakandula and collecting tribute, but he was also taking direct control over Lakandula's dependents and slaves, the datu's traditional foundation of authority. Lakandula agreed to rejoin the Spanish colonial system only after the Spanish Master-of-Camp agreed to "return all Lakandula's slaves."\textsuperscript{232} Four days later Soliman also surrendered to the Spaniards, apparently agreeing to the same conditions.\textsuperscript{233} The peace negotiations thus reaffirmed the traditional authority of Moro datus within the emerging colonial system by limiting encomendero interference into datus' personal networks of dependents.

Soliman's 1574 revolt also threatened Spanish priests and the establishment of the Empire's Catholic hierarchy. When the revolt spread to Mindoro, the Moros on that island stole whatever they could find and captured the two priests with the intention of killing them, but suspended the execution until they were properly informed of what happened in Manila. They brought the priests to a mountain, where they were held under guard for four days.\textsuperscript{234}

Meanwhile, several other Moros, "servants" of these captive friars—people who probably helped the friars to convert others—fled Mindoro because they believed that they too would be killed. These brought news of the incident to the Spaniards at Manila. This incident therefore manifested not only an attack on the religious side of imperial power, but also that Augustinian friars had begun to acquire authority themselves among some of their indigenous parishioners.

This incident at Mindoro likewise highlighted a division among the Moros of Soliman's generation. Soliman, his datu allies, and their people represented only part of Manila's total

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 674-675.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., 675.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 677, see also Juan de Medina, "History of the Augustinian order in the Filipinas Islands" (1630), BR 23, 224.
indigenous population; and as noted in the previous chapter, many others allied with the Spaniards and fought against Limahong's invasion and Soliman's revolt. Indeed, after the revolt was finished, colonial authorities determined that it would be necessary to strengthen the Spanish fort at Manila. This was done by mobilizing the chieftains in the nearby Pampanga region. These Pampangan datus gathered some two to three thousand laborers who cut wood and helped to build a stronger protective wall around the Spaniards' Manila settlement.235 As barangay channels of power were used to strengthen colonial Manila's wall, they also strengthened the colony's authority.

Together the Tagalog informants from Mindoro, the native soldiers who opposed Soliman, and the Pampangan chieftains who mustered labor for Spanish fortifications demonstrated the extensive reach and absolute necessity of local support. These indigenous colonial backers provided the crucial manpower required to begin to lift and elevate the Philippine corner of the imperial pyramid up over and on top of the older barangay order. By helping to create blended colonial power from below, these allies were almost certainly rewarded with assurances of their authority from above. Allying with the Spaniards, these became increasingly secure in their new intermediary positions within the emerging colonial network of Philippine villages. Soliman's generation was, in other words, one of both continued conflict between the two merging systems of authority and also one of early collaboration.

The conflict and collaboration involved in fusing a corner of the imperial pyramid onto the barangay system did not end, however, with the generation of Soliman. Agustin's 1588 conspiracy to overthrow the Spaniards was likewise a part of this contested process. His revolt,

235 San Agustin, 677.
however, also revealed a significant increase in colonial power, one that had been achieved through increased interethnic cooperation and the institutionalization of blended authority. By Agustin's time, the authority of *encomenderos* to punish *datus* for not paying tribute was being transferred to a colonial system of justice; indigenous slavery was likewise being regulated by colonial courts; and the commandments of Christian priests and missionaries were also being enforced more strictly. All of these new developments were related in one way or another to the blending of indigenous and Spanish authority; and Agustin, seeing his power decrease with the rise of sovereignty, set out to topple this increasingly stable and dominant colonial form of governance.

The origins of Agustin's planned revolt were most directly related to the rise of a new blended justice system. In precolonial times, justice was exercised by *datus* over their dependents based on debt obligations and the gravity of various offenses, *datus* themselves being both judge and jury in these cases. As stated above, during Soliman's generation, *encomenderos* began to imprison *barangay* heads that failed to collect a full tribute. This practice continued into Agustin's time; but the colony had also, by then, established a colonial court system that made *datus* accountable to a codified European form of justice. It is not entirely clear when colonial courts were initially formed in the Philippines, but the Philippine Royal Audiencia was established in 1584;\(^{236}\) and during the 1580s several Tagalog chieftains were tried and imprisoned for violating various colonial laws, including performing a Muslim rituals, transgressing Christian commandments, and again, failing to collect a full tribute.

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In the late 1580s, Agustin was tried and imprisoned for "accounts demanded of him at the time he was [cabeza de barangay] of Tondo." In other words, he had failed to collect a full tribute. The specific reason for his shortage is not clear from the record of his trial, but datu tribute collectors faced a few common difficulties that might have been the cause. The first of these was that, under the weight of the imperial system, a datu's dependents and slaves often ran away to avoid the demands of tribute and the abuses of the Spaniards. A few years before Agustin's imprisonment, several datus from Agustin's town of Tondo came to the new Bishop Domingo de Salazar complaining that, due to Spanish oppressions, many of their slaves "have gone to live in other provinces, which has occasioned much damage and loss to the chiefs." These chieftains stated that, of the three hundred that had previously lived in their domains, only two hundred remained; yet these barangay heads were nevertheless "obliged to pay the tribute for those who flee...[and] if they do not pay these, they are placed in stocks and flogged." Agustin may well have been unable to collect a full tribute because he no longer oversaw the number of dependents that the Spaniards had on record for him.

A second issue with tribute collection came from a common practice among encomenderos to increase the value of what they collected. Tribute for each family in a datu's care was supposed to amount to eight reales per year. But tribute was seldom collected in reales. Instead, the indios often paid a fixed price in rice, gold, cloth, or other commodities. In order to increase the value of the tribute that they collected, encomenderos began to demand payment in whatever goods seemed to be lacking during a given year. If there was a shortage of rice, they would demand eight reales worth of rice at the fixed price. During shortages, however, the fixed

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237 Santiago de Vera, et al., "Conspiracy against the Spaniards" (May-Jul 1589), BR 7, 100.
238 Domingo de Salazar, "Letter to Felipe II" (June 20, 1582), BR 5, 190.
price was well below the market price, meaning that the *encomenderos* were able to resell their rice at an inflated price, often to the very tributaries from whom they had acquired it.

Thus, where tribute is eight [*reales*], some collect fifteen, and others twenty, twenty-five, thirty, and more, on account of the value of the articles that they demand, which they compel the Indians to search for and bring from other districts.\(^{239}\)

It was reported in 1586, just two years before Agustin's plot was discovered, that this unfair practice had caused many smaller revolts within *encomiendas*, where people continued to refuse to pay, "except by force and with much disturbance."\(^{240}\) Agustin may well have also refused to pay a full tribute because of this unfair form of tribute collection.

Whatever the case, Agustin was imprisoned because of a tribute shortage, where he met other incarcerated *datu*. Some of these were imprisoned for the same reason, another was imprisoned for adultery, and some were confined no doubt for other offenses. But all were collectively angered by having to be prepared to "go to prison any day."\(^{241}\) This group of *datu* prisoners therefore swore to help one another within and against the colonial system; and these oaths formed the beginnings of Agustin's plan to overturn imperial power.

These chieftains' agreement, it needs to be emphasized, included an oath to help one another against their various slaves; and this reflected an important change that colonial courts had made to the traditional *barangay* system. Specifically, the *datu* swore that "if their slaves demanded liberty, they were to help one another against them."\(^{242}\) As stated above, after the arrival of the Spaniards at Manila, colonial authorities continued to permit indigenous chieftains to retain their slaves. By the middle of the 1580s, however, the colonial system had begun to

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\(^{239}\) Santiago de Vera, et al., "Memorial to the Council by citizens of the Filipinas Islands" (1586), BR 6, 191.

\(^{240}\) Ibid.

\(^{241}\) Ibid., 101.

\(^{242}\) Ibid.
tamper with the internal *datu* authority of various *barangay* heads. Missionaries, for example, tried to get chieftains to release their slaves. They would sometimes even deny *datus* baptism if they refused;\(^{243}\) and priests also likely encouraged slaves to seek their freedom. Indigenous slaves could also earn their freedom by indenturing themselves to the colony for three years, usually to serve on the galleys. After which time, they would be free from the demands of their *datu* overlords.\(^{244}\) Colonial courts, however, posed a much greater threat to the traditional *barangay* system of slavery than did missionaries or indentures. By the time of Agustin, Spanish colonial officials had studied and codified the *barangay* system so that courts could make rulings about the rightful ownership of specific *alipin*.\(^ {245}\) This codification, in other words, made a *datu's* authority legible to colonial judges, which enabled these officials to rule one way or the other on specific cases of enslavement.

By usurping the authority to liberate slaves, these courts began to draw power from below into the blended colonial system. Indigenous slaves and dependents under Agustin and the various other *datus* throughout the Philippines began, in the 1580s, to challenge their low status through the new colonial courts; and many of these were thereby able to liberate themselves and to elevate their station. Spanish judges would even make rulings on disputes that predated the Spaniards' settlement in the region. By the end of the decade, this method of self liberation through courts had become a very popular practice. It, in fact, became so widespread that by the early 1590s it was threatening the colony's food supply. So many cases were brought before colonial tribunals that a significant number of *indios*—acting as plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses—were absent from their fields during critical harvesting and planting seasons, forcing

\(^{243}\) Ibid., 192.
\(^{244}\) Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "Luzon menaced by Japanese" (1592, BR 8, 294.
\(^{245}\) See for example, Juan de Plasencia, "Customs of the Tagalogs" (1589), BR 7, 173-198.
the Philippine Governor-General to order the closure of courts at certain times of year.\textsuperscript{246} As datu slaves and dependents flocked to colonial courts to challenge their barangay status, they blended their support into the foundations of local imperial authority. Support of colonial courts from the lower classes thereby helped to bring the two systems of power together.

Just as Lakandula and Soliman had been angered by the intrusion of encomenderos into their barangay authority, Agustin and his contemporaries were similarly incensed by the intrusion of the court system into their relationships with their slaves. Self liberation through the courts, they complained, not only decreased their total wealth-in-people; but the rise of the colonial system also meant that, even among the slaves they retained, these chieftains "were not regarded or obeyed as before."\textsuperscript{247} They wanted a return to the old system, where they would rule again over their former slaves, who, in their words, were now "much favored by the Spaniards, being promoted to superior places by them."\textsuperscript{248} It was for this reason that they promised to help one another. If they testified together in court cases against their slaves, fewer would be liberated and they would retain more of their datu authority. After getting out of prison, however, Agustin and the others decided that they would try, instead, to adopt a more comprehensive way of regaining their precolonial power. They then redirected their oath toward the overthrow the entire colonial order, as described in the previous chapter.

Agustin's plot was, lastly, motivated in opposition to Catholicism. As noted above, among those datus imprisoned with Agustin was one who had committed adultery. This charge was, however, likely related to polygamy. During precolonial times, datus throughout the Philippines often took multiple wives as a way of increasing their prestige and of making marriage alliances

\textsuperscript{246} "Traslado de informaciones sobre pleitos de naturales," (1591), FILIPINAS,34,N.91, AGI.
\textsuperscript{247} Vera, et al. (1586), 101.
\textsuperscript{248} Vera, et al. (1589), 101.
with one another. Polygamy was, however, forbidden by the Catholic fathers, even as baptism was becoming a near universal requirement for political inclusion into the colonial system. It is likely, given the oaths taken in prison, that this prisoner was charged with adultery for having had sex with one of his former wives. In addition to their complaints about unfair tribute collection and about the liberation of their slaves, Agustin and the others, it was written, felt a "very keen" sorrow because "their wives were being taken away from them, and given to others." This emotional restructuring of datu families was also a restructuring of their ability to exercise power. Catholic doctrine was, through regulated sexuality, imposing limits on traditional datu modes of authority.

In summary Agustin's failed attempt at overthrowing the colony was directly related to the rise of the colonial court system; and his story ultimately also revealed the unequivocal power of these colonial courts. Courts had begun to regulate the collection of tribute, and it was because of a tribute shortage that Agustin was imprisoned just prior to his plot. Courts had also begun to liberate datu slaves, a practice that Agustin and his companions agreed to fight against and then to overthrow. And courts were also instrumental in enforcing Christian doctrines, like the abolition of polygamy, which curtailed further the traditional barangay authority of datus. In the end, Agustin was himself tried again before a colonial court and found guilty. As a warning to the colony and a symbol of the power that flowed through these courts, Agustin was sentenced to being dragged through the streets, hung, and decapitated, his head then being put into a square cage and displayed in public as a warning against other would be rebels.

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249 Junker.
250 Vera, et al. (1589), 101.
251 Ibid., 104.
Though the death of Agustin and the punishment of his companions was a powerful display of colonial power, it was not yet the completion of the conquest process. Agustin and his compatriots had been defeated, but they had also rebelled. Miguel Banal, however, took a very different approach to his conflict with the Jesuits. Frightened perhaps by the display of force exerted downward on Agustin and his allies—one of which was Juan Banal, likely an older member of Miguel's family—Banal did not attempt an overthrow of the system, as had been tried by both Soliman and Agustin before him. He rather tried to work through the blended colonial system to achieve his objectives. Banal sent whatever influence he could upward from his seat of barangay authority into the overarching imperial apparatus, hoping that power would reflect back downward again in his favor. He sought help from his priest, his mayor, the Archbishop, the Audiencia, and even from the King himself. Through these appeals, Banal exhibited some final changes in the emerging system of blended internal authority.

One of these changes was a shift in the foundation of local authority. Whereas Agustin and Soliman were both involved in disputes that involved their ownership of slaves, Banal's two disagreements with the Jesuits each centered on the ownership of land. In 1603, he opposed the Jesuit's legal right to rent out parts of Quiapo to several Chinese immigrants, and in 1609 he claimed the right to build his home on contested lands. This focus on land signified the beginnings of a major change in how land was understood and valued among the indigenous peoples of the Philippines. As explained in previous chapters, traditional barangay authority was measured in a chieftain's number of dependents and slaves, not on his landholdings. Though some land was owned by individual datus in precolonial times, it was not rarely deeded out to specific persons, nor did land ownership necessarily include independent control over how one's
lands were used. Landownership and the ability to work on lands were, rather, supervised and secured by *datus* who oversaw their individual *barangays*.

When the Spaniards arrived, however, they began to create documents pertaining to landownership; and colonial courts began to back those documents with legal force. By the late 1590s, the Spaniards started using landownership records to reward their *datu* allies by giving lands to those who helped them most.²⁵² Through this process, the Spaniards elevated land's value in relation to the value of slaves. As Banal's complaints demonstrated, *datu* authority was beginning to depend not only on one's collection of slaves and dependents, but also on one's possession of lands. Without both deeded land and followers, the authority of chieftains was now incomplete, especially because the Spaniards had come to control foreign trade.

Banal's disputes with the Jesuits are among the earliest recorded instances of legal squabbling over lands in Philippine colonial courts, something that would become far more common in later decades.²⁵³ During the generation of Banal, in other words, colonial courts were in the process of becoming the locus for resolving the inevitable disputes that came about from the implementation of a new landholding order, a colonial order that based the use of lands on archived documents, not on *datu* authority. By the second half of the seventeenth century, several decades after Banal's conflicts, much of the land around Manila had been sold and deeded out to religious orders, indigenous chieftains, and others,²⁵⁴ the collective whole being secured no longer by pockets of *datu* power, but by an overarching legal regime of documentation. As Banal

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²⁵³ Francisco Alcina noted that lawsuits over lands were common in the Tagalog region by the 1660s. See him quoted in Glenn Anthony May, "The Making of a Myth: John Leddy Phelan and the 'Hispanization' of Land Tenure in the Philippines," *Philippine Studies* 52, no. 3 (2004): 295.

²⁵⁴ For an example of the increasing use and importance of land records during the seventeenth century see “Papeles de los Tagalos,” Philippine MSS, Lilly Library, Bloomington, 60-111.
sought landownership through colonial courts, he began to affirm, from below, the relationship between Philippine lands and the new legal system.

Banal's new approach to obtaining land was, however, also coupled with an older approach that *datus* used to sway imperial authority in their favor. Since the time of Soliman, chieftains had appealed to religious authorities in order to curb the abuses of *encomenderos* and of other Spaniards, a tactic that Banal tried by appealing to the Archbishop and his parish priest. As shown above, many *datu* complaints were leveled against *encomenderos*; and these Catholic authorities provided a channel through which these complaints could be voiced. During the early years of colonization, missionaries and ecclesiastical leaders acted as the conscience of the imperial pyramid, continually fighting with *encomenderos* and Philippine governors in an attempt to lessen tribute demands on the *indios* and also to end abuses. Shortly after the first Bishop's arrival at Manila in 1581, he was named as the official protector of the *indios*; and the advocacy of the Bishop shortly thereafter drew many indigenous chieftains to the capital to voice their complaints. Often "a whole village, with their women and children" would come so that they could petition the Bishop for help, sometimes even from very far away.255

Though the Bishop could not put an end to the abuses of *encomenderos*, he and his priests nevertheless were able to exert pressure on secular authorities that sometimes lightened the imperial burden. In 1592, for example, the Governor-General of the Philippines complained that he could do nothing because of the opposition of the religious. If he needed to build galleys —"even when by order of his Majesty"—or to man them, or to collect rice, or supplies, or even when he sought paid indigenous labor, the Bishop and priests constantly sought to obstruct his

255 Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "The collection of tributes in the Filipinas Islands (concluded)" (1591), BR 8, 48.
actions, claiming that the country was too poor and the burden too great on the indigenous people. "In short," the Governor wrote, "there is contradiction and opposition to everything, and moreover, called by a name so serious as...condemnation of the soul." This opposition, he continued, left the Governor with his hands tied "by so many outcries in the pulpits."256 *Indio* concerns thus blended upward into the imperial apparatus through the religious, who then exerted influence on others to modify the power that they were exerting back downward on barangay chieftains and on their people. Banal's appeals to Bishop Benavides and Father Talavera attempted to mobilize this cycle of power. He hoped that his complaint would move upward into the imperial apparatus through the Bishop, where it would alter the power being exerted back downward on himself and on his people.

Ultimately, it is unclear whether Banal's strategy proved to be successful, but a ruling in his favor seems doubtful. Banal clearly had little faith in a decision from the Audiencia, unless the King somehow intervened. This was partly because he lacked the necessary funds to mount a proper defense.257 But, more importantly, Banal believed that colonial justices would be biased against him because they were "not willing to incur the displeasure of the religious."258 In a suit between an *indio* and the Jesuits—the latter being part of the higher imperial pyramid—Banal likely would not win, even though other Spaniards, both priests and laymen, supported his claims. The King, however, did little to intervene; he merely ordered that the Audiencia make a ruling. Banal's case was, by 1609, even more bleak because his most powerful colonial ally, Bishop Benavides had died; and his replacement had yet to arrive in the islands.

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256 Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "Luzón menaced by Japanese" (1593), BR 8, 294.
257 Banal, 327-328.
258 Miguel de Benavides, "Letters to Felipe III" (1603), BR 12, 120.
Win or lose, Banal's complaint represented the conclusion of Manila's conquest. With the passage of time, imperial authority had been gradually hoisted up over and on top of the barangay system. Chieftains and their subjects were partitioned into encomiendas; datus began collecting tribute on behalf of the colony; colonial courts grew in power; and missionary orders spread the gospel into their respective fields of labor. This process was accompanied by a clear and progressive increase in internal blended authority, one that was demonstrated by the relationships of Soliman, Agustin, and Banal to colonial justice. In 1574, after the revolt of Soliman, the Spaniards had only been at Manila for three years, and feeling that they might start another rebellion if they punished Soliman and the others too harshly, they pardoned those who had rebelled against them. Agustin's planned uprising, was nevertheless punished very harshly, with executions and exile. The Governor-General, perhaps expecting some sort of uprising in response to this punishment, happily reported that these sentences were carried out "without any disturbance whatever." Then finally, Banal ultimately tried to simply work through the system, rather than attempt to overthrow it, thereby demonstrating the completion of the submission process, the completion of conquest. Appealing for help as a slave to the King, Banal was both experiencing and expressing his allegiance to the new blend of colonial authority.

259 San Agustin, 675.
260 Santiago de Vera, "Letter to Felipe II," (1589), BR 7, 84.
Part 2: Conclusion

The Second Layer of Philippine Sovereignty

In 1616, only four years after the Royal Audiencia wrote to inform the King that they would soon be making a decision about Miguel Banal's lands, a Moro raid from Maguindanao attacked the Philippine colony's shipyards at Pantao, a small village in southern Luzon. The Moros burned the two galleons that were being constructed there; and they also took several indigenous colonial captives.261 By this time, Moro raids had become so common that little else was recorded about this incident. Though Banal himself was not, as far as we know, directly affected by this raid, the attack nevertheless demonstrated the larger importance of the second layer of Philippine sovereignty, one that was absolutely critical to the formation and stabilization of blended colonial authority.

This Moro raid revealed the combined inner workings of this second layer of sovereignty. For one thing, it indicated the existence of two rival political communities in the region—one Christian and the other Muslim; and the raid, furthermore, also highlighted the relationship between Philippine indigenous labor and the galleon trade. In sum, as this conclusion will show, this antagonism and the galleon trade were intertwined with both the convergence of Christianity and Islam and with the conquest of Manila. The raid, in other words, demonstrated the interdependent nature of internal and external authority. I will summarize this interdependence here by first describing how it related to the region's new religious antagonism and by then addressing how it was reflected in the galleon trade.

261 Francisco Combés, Historia de Mindanao y Joló (Madrid: Retana, 1897 [1667]), 117; Alonso Fajardo de Tenza, "Letter to Felipe III" (1618), BR 18, 116.
Though, as shown above, the antagonism between Catholics and Muslims in the Philippines grew out of the convergence of Christianity and Islam, it was also related to the conquest of Manila. The attack on Pantao not only showed that Moros and colonial peoples were at odds with one another; it also manifested a new relationship between Manila and various smaller villages throughout the archipelago. I described above that, in precolonial times, Manila's Moros exercised external influence over other nearby settlements, perhaps even Pantao. By 1616, however, this external influence toward these other places had now become internal authority over those places.

This internal authority was not, however, evenly distributed over these various other settlements. In chapter three, I explained that Manila was conquered over three generations through tribute, the rise of encomenderos, the establishment of colonial courts, and the preaching of missionaries. All of these developments were part of the imperial structure in the new capital. But these changes did not spread evenly into other colonial villages. In 1591, Bishop Salazar, for example, emphasizing a need for reforms to the collection of tribute, described three types of encomienda that existed in his time. The first type were those with religious instruction; the second were those that had no religious instruction, but that were, nevertheless, receiving some "temporal advantages" from colonial governance; and the third were those paying tribute without receiving anything in return from the Spaniards. As a Bishop, Salazar was clearly concerned about the spread of the gospel. But his categorization also reflected the uneven nature of power in Manila's new network of authority. Where there was both an encomienda and a priest, the imperial system's two forms of power were both being blended into the local barangay system;

262 Domingo de Salazar, et al., "The collection of tributes in the Filipinas Islands" (1591), BR 7, 269-270.
where villages received some non-religious "advantages"—protection, access to courts, etc.—only the secular arm of power was present; and where only tribute was being collected, the conquest process had only just begun. The whole, as painted by Salazar, was an uneven network of unity whose authority emanated out of Manila's central power.

In that same year, the Governor of the Philippines, Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, described this uneven and lumpy network in greater detail. Accounting to the Crown for all of the colony's encomiendas, Dasmariñas reported on the Philippine colony as having ten regions, which he then explained were subdivided into 267 encomiendas. His description of these regions, similar to that of the Bishop, showed that an uneven distribution of colonial authority was flowing through the larger whole. Of the ten regions, all but one had some ministers, but only two—Manila and nearby Pampanga—were not in need of more. As a way of measuring secular authority, Dasmariñas stated that six of the ten regions were at least "sufficiently governed." This phrase could, however, be applied to a province of 35,000 souls living in 32 encomiendas overseen by only two Spanish priests, one mayor, and one deputy mayor, showing the low standard that Dasmariñas used to measure the establishment of colonial authority, an authority that clearly required significant support from local chieftains.263 The Manila region was, on the other hand, "amply supplied with [religious] instruction, and even more than sufficiently"; and it was also sufficiently governed "under the judicial and civil jurisdictions of Manila and Tondo."264

Salazar and Dasmariñas, without question, disagreed about where and how much more religious instruction was needed and also about how well justice was being administered. But they both described the new colonial network of authority in a similar and uneven way. Both

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263 Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "Account of the encomiendas in the Philipinas Islands" (31 May 1591), BR 8, 132.  
264 Ibid., 101.
recognized that Philippine sovereignty was applied internally through a collection of encomiendas scattered throughout the region; and both acknowledged that colonial "advantages"—as they called the effects of imperial power—were unevenly distributed through this network. Manila, however, the core of colonial power, had become a stable capital.

For the next century, military and missionary conquests continued throughout the region—secular authorities continued to fight battles and missionaries continued to form doctrinas—and after these conquests the colony continued to incorporate these new pockets of colonial power into their larger system of blended authority through tribute, encomenderos, courts, and preaching. Formerly unstable encomiendas thereby also became more firmly connected to Manila. The conquest of Manila itself may have ended near the turn of the seventeenth century, but it was reenacted in these various other villages for another hundred years, and in some cases even longer.

By the turn of the seventeenth century, Moros too were forming their own composite community, one built in opposition to the colony. This inter-island Moro community, however, continued to operate more according to the barangay system, with no overarching head. Chieftains often allied with one another to oppose the colony—appealing to each other for mutual aid in the name of Islam—but they also became involved in factional warfare against one another from time to time, internal strife that gave the politically unified colony a distinct advantage over them. They, furthermore, continued the practice of barangay raiding as they incorporated Manila anew into their network of foreign relations.

What had once been a loosely affiliated network of Moro chieftains on Luzon, Mindoro, Borneo, Mindanao, Jolo, and Ternate, was now broken apart with the loss of Luzon and
Mindoro. But Islamic affiliations had also become stronger in opposition to the new Christian polity. Brunei, Maguindanao, Jolo, and Ternate, had become increasingly dependent on their shared Muslim identity as a means of repelling the colony's persistent attempts at conquest. Christianity in the Philippines, likewise, became more powerful through its antagonistic relationship with Southeast Asian Islam. As raids on the colony became identified almost exclusively with Muslims, the Moros came to be viewed by colonial subjects as dangerous and savage enemies.

For the next hundred years, colonial-Moro relations vacillated between times of conflict and times of peace. Raids from Moro towns and villages happened yearly from 1599-1604, then the colony conquered Ternate in 1606, followed by a short period of peace. Violence was revived in 1616, and periodically continued in the 1620s. Moro raids on the colony suddenly spiked during the mid-1630s, and the colony retaliated by "conquering" Maguindanao and Jolo in 1637-38. But these colonial victories were, again, short lived. The colony nevertheless succeeded in creating a permanent fort on Mindanao at Zamboanga, a fort designed to monitor Moro activities and to warn the colony of impending raids. Periodic violence continued into the 1640s and 1650s and beyond.265 Indeed, violence between Moros and Christians persisted into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it continued under U.S. and Japanese occupation. Even today, during the era of Philippine independence, there remain Islamist separatist movements in the southern islands. This relationship between the Moros and Philippine sovereignty began at the founding of the colony and is one clear evidence of Philippine sovereignty's persistent continuity in the face of dramatic change.

265 For complete details see Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999 [1973]), 121-190.
Meanwhile, the Moros' strategy of attacking the galleon shipyards revealed a second way that internal and external authority complemented each other within this second layer of colonial sovereignty. As described in chapter four, the colonial takeover and redirection of the China trade was part of the convergence of Islam and Christianity. This takeover not only reconfigured the Southeast Asian China trade, but it also incorporated Philippine colonial subjects into the emerging global economy. In Peru, Spanish imperialism extracted silver through the a forced-labor tax on colonized Incan peoples. These, in turn, mined silver at Potosí in horrendous conditions. Much of this silver then made its way onto the Manila galleons through Mexico. Indigenous Peruvian peoples, however, were not the only laborers required for the smooth operation of this global supply chain. The galleons that carried silver pesos from Mexico to the Philippines were also built and manned by indigenous Philippine peoples; and these galleons not only carried American silver, but also silk and other commodities from China—linking together labor performed in both Asia and Latin America.

Philippine shipbuilding labor, like mining in colonial Peru, was obtained through the imperial tribute system. Datus were required to give not only money and goods to the colony but also labor, a form of tribute known in the Philippines as the polo. This labor fulfilled many functions, and prominent among these was the building of the galleons. Wood was cut in Pampanga, then taken to shipyards where it was made into ships. Like the labor in Peru, this process involved excessive brutality; and many Spaniards, especially missionaries, tried to ease these conditions. Their attempts were, nevertheless, in vain. Many indigenous Philippine deckhands also suffered harsh conditions on the galleon voyages; and untold numbers died on the several voyages between Manila and Acapulco. This system did not, however, affect all
indigenous classes equally; *datus* and their families were, for example, exempt from these harsh forms of labor.266

This way of gathering labor for the galleons made plain the importance of blended internal authority to the flow of the galleon trade. *Datus* gathered labor from among their people and forwarded that labor on to imperial authorities; these authorities then directed that labor toward the building of the galleon ships, ships that made possible a lucrative source of global wealth. Through this hybrid process, *barangay* forms of power gathered labor and transferred it into the imperial system, which then fed the emerging global economy. Like indigenous Incan miners in colonial Peru, indigenous woodcutters and shipbuilders in the Philippines were not simply part of an imperial economy; they were part of a larger global system of supply and demand, one that relied just as much on the insatiable appetite of China for silver as it did on the Spaniards' own cravings for wealth and power.

The Moro attack on the galleon shipyards was a recognition of the importance of this global trade to the survival of the colony. The Moros knew that destroying the ships would affect the wealth pouring into Manila and by extension this would weaken colonial authority. The single Moro attack was not enough, however, to disrupt this second layer of sovereignty permanently. Blended authority had already taken too firm a hold in Manila and in its various subsidiary villages.

The persistent stability of this second layer of sovereignty came about during the generations of Soliman, Agustin, and Banal. From 1565-1610, these three *datus* were all involved in the convergence of Islam and Christianity in the Philippines and in the conquest of

Manila. Through the takeover of the China trade and anti-Moro violence, the colony redirected one channel of Moro authority—the China trade—toward its colonial replacement; and it weakened, blockaded, and then attacked the other—Islam. The concurrent conquest process came about through the collection of tribute, the rise of *encomenderos*, the formation of colonial courts, and the preaching of missionaries. Together these two processes reincorporated Manila into the Southeast Asian Moro system of authority, while also establishing internal imperial authority over and on top of the local *barangay* system.

Shortly after the completion of this process, the Moro attack on the galleon shipyard highlighted the interconnectivity between this layer's external and internal forms of authority. Externally, Manila's Christian influence was directed against the Moros, but it was also enhanced by the galleon trade; and internally the relationship between Islam and Christianity strengthened the dependence of colonial subjects on Catholicism, while imperial rule also provided the galleon trade with necessary labor. Importantly, this layer of authority was extended to settlements beyond Manila, like Pantao; and though this extension of authority remained uneven, its stable core ensured its continued existence and growth. The second layer of sovereignty, like the first, was at once part global and part local, part internal and part external, part *barangay* part imperial.
In December 1603, the Philippine Governor-General, Pedro de Acuña, sent out two urgent collections of letters from Manila, one to the King of Spain, and the other to China. His letters to the King could not wait for the departure of the galleon ships in July and were sent, instead, through the faster Indian Ocean route, a route that was open to the Governor because, by Acuña's time, the Portuguese and Spanish empires had been unified under the Crown of Spain for more than two decades. His letters to China similarly traveled through Portuguese channels, being delivered through Macau. Through these letters, Spain's global network of empire transmitted devastating news to two powerful political centers on the opposite ends of Eurasia. The letters described the massacre of some 20,000 Chinese immigrants, known in the Philippines as Sangleys. In the wake of a Sangley uprising at Manila, the Philippine colony, overcome by fear, retaliated by first driving the Chinese into the surrounding hills and then killing all but five hundred of them.

Philip III's immediate response to these letters was not recorded; but when the Wanli Emperor, the Emperor of China, received news of the incident, he reportedly wept and mourned, as did the family members and friends of the deceased, most of whom lived in the Southern Chinese province of Fujian. In Acuña's letters to Spain, the Governor expressed his fears that the sorrows and anger of both the Ming Emperor and of the Fujianese would further compound the disaster. What would happen if the Ming retaliated against Manila? or if the Fujianese refused to continue coming to the Philippines to trade? The answer: the reverberations

from the Sangley massacre would likely rebound to the destruction or dissolution of the Philippine colony. No one was certain that Manila could repel a direct attack from the world's wealthiest empire; and without merchants coming from Fujian to trade, the Philippines, Acuña explained, could "in no wise…be maintained," being completely cut off from China.\textsuperscript{269} The express purpose of Acuña's letters to China was to avert both disasters, and he succeeded. The Ming Emperor did not send an army to attack the Philippines; and the people of Fujian continued to trade at Manila. Within a few years, in fact, the Sangley population in the Philippines had returned to pre-massacre levels, making it seem almost as if nothing had happened.

The continuation of the China trade at Manila, even after the Sangley massacre of 1603, demonstrated the existence and persistence of a new and lasting layer of authority. This layer of sovereignty integrated the Sangleys into the colony's multiethnic political community while also incorporating the Philippines into the East Asian world of interstate relations. The Sangleys were attracted to Manila by the arrival of American silver on the yearly galleon ships, and they carried Chinese commodities with them, which were then shipped from Manila to Acapulco on those same galleons. Between 1565-1603, the growing volume of this commercial exchange transformed Manila into a thriving center of world trade, a place where both Sangleys and Spaniards reaped great profits. As these profits were being made, the funneling of goods through the capital also created trade frictions. Often, frictions resulted from the tractions necessary to move commodities through Manila. But, if unchecked, they could also become dangerously hot, even explosive, as demonstrated by the massacre. These frictions were generated by both global

\textsuperscript{269} Pedro de Acuña, "The Sangley insurrection" (1603), BR 12, 158-159.
and local forces, and the third layer of Philippine authority was constructed in response to these forces and frictions.

The Chinese man most responsible for the creation of the third layer of early Philippine sovereignty, a Sangley himself, was among the first to die when frictions overheated. This Sangley, standing accused of leading the uprising, was executed for treason at the outset of violence in early October 1603. His name was Eng Kang, and he was born and raised in Fujian, a mountainous coastal province known in China as the land of Min. Fujian's direct access to the sea, coupled with its mountainous interior and relative lack of good farmland, meant that many of its people made their living as fishermen, merchant-sailors, and pirates—several doing all of the above. The local importance of these occupations made the people of Min China's most effective and experienced seafarers and overseas merchants.270 Historians have already commented on many of the critical contributions made by Fujianese people to the Philippines.271 But the Sangleys—despite being aptly labeled "essential outsiders"272—still have not been fully integrated into the central narratives of Philippine colonial history; and the early relationship of the Philippine colony with East Asia has similarly not been addressed extensively by

historians.\textsuperscript{273} Focusing on Sangley contributions to Philippine sovereignty through the life of Eng Kang will help to fill in both of these gaps in Philippine and world historiography.

Sometime in the second half of the sixteenth century Eng Kang either voluntarily joined or was forced into the service of the merchant-pirate Limahong (Lin-Feng). Forced or not, Eng Kang apparently wanted to separate himself from Limahong's fleet; and so, during the pirate's attack on the Philippines in 1574, he deserted and settled near Manila, where he became a merchant. Though Eng Kang appears to have maintained a constant interest in Manila for the next thirty years, it is also likely that he periodically traveled back to the land of Min. Sometime between 1584 and 1590, Eng Kang was baptized, taking upon himself the name Juan Baptista de Vera. The Philippine Governor-General Santiago de Vera was his Catholic godfather.\textsuperscript{274} Eng Kang then served multiple terms as the colony's official Chinese governor over the Sangleys, a post that he was filling when he was accused, convicted, and executed for treason. Despite the evidence against him, Eng Kang never admitted to any involvement in the uprising, and to his death he continued to affirm his faith in Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{275}

Eng Kang's financial success or failure, even his life and death—like that of the other Sangleys—depended on how he and others adapted to the frictions surrounding the galleon trade. In the same way that all motion requires and generates friction, trade is always dependent on and subject to negotiations between peoples and powers. The frictions of negotiation are as much a part of commerce as are supply and demand. Trust between merchants, agreed upon values of

\textsuperscript{273} A dichotomous view of colonial history is responsible for these omissions. Because the Sangleys are "Chinese" they are seldom included as a central part of Philippine history, and because the Philippines was a "European" possession, its political relationships with East Asian nations are traditionally overshadowed by the actions of the Spaniards.

\textsuperscript{274} Bartolome Leonardo Argensola, \textit{Conquista de las Islas Malucas} (Madrid: Alonso Martin, 1609), 315.

\textsuperscript{275} Gregorio Lopez, "Copia de la carta del P. Gregorio Lopez de Abril de 1604 al Prór Grál, en que se hace la relacion del alzamiento de los Sangleyes," Ventura del Arco, vol 1., Newberry Library, Chicago, 130 and 137.
various commodities, protection of wealth and of lives, etc., produce necessary traction which helps to move goods between peoples, and this traction can enable, facilitate, speed up trade. But arguments over commodity values, litigation, the quality of goods, governmental regulations, violence etc., can also increase trade tensions, decrease profits, and in some circumstances completely undermine the purposes of trade. For thirty years, Eng Kang and the Sangleys maintained commercial traction by negotiating a place for themselves within the new colonial system; and at the same time they helped to make a place for that colonial system within East Asia. This arrangement remarkably endured even after frictions overheated and tragedy ensued. The necessary traction—which generated profits—and unpredictable tensions—which resulted in violence—were part of the same trade frictions, frictions that were both global and local.

From a global vantage point, the Sangleys became crucial intermediaries that helped to muscle Spain's empire into East Asia's system of economic and governmental interstate relations, a system that was undergoing significant changes during the sixteenth century; and locally, Eng Kang and his people blended themselves into the Philippine colony by forming essential commercial, political, and religious connections with Manila's Spaniards, connections that facilitated the beginnings of the galleon trade. As the Sangleys created productive commercial traction among both world powers and local peoples, they helped to build this third layer of sovereignty; and many of them, like Eng Kang, became wealthy. Yet these frictions also produced heated tensions, as demonstrated by the 1603 massacre. Because these productive tractions and dangerous tensions were part of the same trade frictions, a history of the Sangley massacre can reveal the concurrent benefits and threats that the Chinese faced when they ventured overseas to Manila.
On a global scale, Eng Kang's wealth was generated and threatened by the convergence of silk and silver, a convergence that pulled together the East Asian and European worlds of political authority. Between 1500-1600, changes within East Asia coupled with the arrival of the Portuguese and Spanish empires altered the mercantile and political landscape in the South China Sea. What had initially been a zone characterized by an illicit and relatively small group of smugglers trading Chinese goods for Japanese silver grew into an emporium of legal commercial activity, a growing system of trade that fed a major need of China's core economy, a system that by 1603 had come to include both the Portuguese and the Spaniards. The Sangleys, creating a space for themselves within the claimed territories of both East Asia and Europe, helped to form Philippine sovereignty's external authority relative to other East Asian commercial and political powers. They, in other words, helped to blend the expanding world of the West into the already established but changing world of the East. Indeed, Eng Kng himself—with his multiple names, his growing business, and his allegiances to multiple communities—was an example of how the Sangleys created a buffer between these worlds, a buffer that reduced political trade frictions and thereby enabled the large scale flow of commodities between East Asian and European domains. When Ming officials visited Manila in 1603, however, this buffer disappeared and political frictions sparked fears that led to the uprising and then to the massacre.

While Eng Kang and the Sangleys were participating in the convergence of silk and silver, they were also engaged in a process that I will refer to as the conquest of the Parian. The word Parian almost certainly has its linguistic origins in Tagalog, meaning either "a place of bargaining" (pali-an), or a command to "go there" (pa-diyan), a request that often meant "go to
the market."\textsuperscript{276} It was likely first used in precolonial times and was probably often applied to Sangley shops, which had existed in Manila before the Spaniards arrived. The term and concept were, however, readapted to new circumstances during the colony's early years, a symbol of how an older system was overturned by a new one.

The consistent flow of American silver into Manila rapidly increased Sangley trade and immigration. In 1582, the Spaniards therefore created a formal and segregated village beside their own Manila settlement for Sangley immigrants, calling it the Parian; and over the years, Sangley merchants adjusted to Spanish—as opposed to indigenous—methods of trading, ruling, and living. Eng Kang—as a merchant, a colonial official, and a Christian—provides a valuable example of the economic, political, and religious methods that the Sangleys used to blend themselves into the colony's emerging system of internal authority. Through commercial, governmental, and spiritual means, the old ways that had, in precolonial times, assimilated Sangley merchants into the Manila economy were revised to fit new circumstances. New adaptations formed a new and lasting layer of internal colonial authority, a conquest. As the Sangley population grew, however, outpacing Spanish immigration by a ratio of more than 20:1, fears generated significant tension between the Spaniards and the Chinese. After Ming officials visited Manila, suspicions and rumors exhausted these local tensions, leading ultimately to a military demonstration of supreme colonial authority over the people of the Parian, a massacre that could itself also be considered a type of conquest.

The interweaving of the Sangley convergence and conquest was not only on display in the visit of the Ming officials that led to the uprising, but also in the colonial response to the

Sangley revolt. After the departure of the Ming envoy, Governor Acuña ordered that indigenous chieftains and Japanese merchants throughout the colony prepare for a potential Ming invasion. As the colony prepared, a rumor spread among the Chinese that the Spaniards were not preparing for an invasion, but rather for an unprovoked assault on the Sangleys, a massacre. When these rumors and tensions sparked the Sangley uprising, the indigenous and Japanese peoples in the Philippines joined with the Spaniards in suppressing the Sangley revolt and then in massacring the Chinese immigrants. The mobilization of this multiethnic force helped to unify Spanish, Japanese, and indigenous peoples under colonial sovereignty, all of these coming together against a common enemy. Military opposition to a common external threat thereby reinforced internal political collaboration among diverse peoples, bringing together the external and internal aspects of Philippine sovereignty, uniting in essence the convergence and the conquest.
Chapter 6

The Convergence of Silver and Silk

On May 23, 1603, Eng Kang, the acting Chinese governor over the Philippine Sangleys, greeted a diplomatic envoy from the Ming Emperor to Manila. The envoy was led by three Chinese officials, known to the Spaniards as "Mandarins," all from Eng Kang's home province of Fujian. The first of these was a military leader, Gan Yi-chen, the second was a city magistrate, Wang Shi-ho, and the third was a eunuch, Gao Tsai.277 These Ming officials told the Spaniards, probably through the Sangley Governor, that they had come to the Philippines in search of a mountain of silver and gold, the existence of which had been reported to them by another Sangley, a man in their company named Tio Heng. After confirming that no such mountain existed, the Mandarins joined, or perhaps usurped, Eng Kang in one of his colonial duties, that of hearing cases and administering justice to the colony's Chinese immigrants. For the Spaniards, it made sense to have Chinese people resolving disputes among the Sangleys. Indeed, it was part of Eng Kang's job description as the Sangleys' governor to resolve internal problems. But many were alarmed by the idea of Ming officials performing this function within the territory of the Philippine colony.

The fears of the Spaniards were magnified further by the way the Chinese officials traveled through Manila. Wherever they went, the Mandarins were carried in sedan chairs on the shoulders of Chinese servants, accompanied by archers and guards in a parade with no fewer than forty-two other Chinese people, some in the procession carrying banners, vases, and staves with markings of Ming authority on them, and others playing musical instruments and beating

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drums, while a crier yelled out "make way for the mandarins are coming!" The Spanish governor of the colony, Pedro de Acuña was, at first, inclined to overlook these displays of Ming authority in Manila; but the royal Audiencia insisted that the Governor put a stop to them. Acuña therefore ordered that the Mandarins no longer be permitted to administer justice or to carry imperial symbols through the city. The man who was almost certainly tasked with bringing this news to the Ming officials was, again, the Philippines' Sangley Governor, Eng Kang.

The visit of the Mandarins to the colonial capital was a visible display of the commercial and political forces involved in the transportation of valuable global commodities—especially silk and silver—through Manila. In terms of commerce, the Mandarins' stated reason for coming to Manila was to investigate the existence of a mountain that would help to explain the massive imports of specie into China from the Philippines. Their visit, however, also revealed the perceptions and relationships that made this flow of global commodities through Manila possible and dangerous. The Chinese officials, administering justice and parading through the streets, were acting according to their view of the Ming tribute system, a system that radiated Chinese authority outward into surrounding polities. The Spaniards, on the other hand, perceiving the Mandarins' actions to be an affront to their territorial claims of absolute authority, understood the envoy as an aggressive Ming intrusion into Spanish imperial power. Eng Kang, moving back and forth between the Ming and Spanish officials, represented the role of the Sangleys in blending the Spanish empire into the world of East Asia. Making himself an intermediary between these two powers and systems, Eng Kang interacted directly with both, creating a connection between the two while also allowing them to keep their distance.

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278 Geronimo de Salazar y Salcedo, "Three Chinese Mandarins at Manila" (27 May 1603), BR 12, 95-96.
The Sangleys, in other words, by engaging directly with these two powers, enabled the Spanish empire and the Ming dynasty to interact with one another indirectly, thus creating a buffer that lessened the frictions between the two. As a buffer, the Sangleys enabled the Ming to maintain its self perception as the region's supreme hegemonic power while also allowing the Spaniards to view themselves as independent of China's international authority. Being part of both worlds, the Sangleys blended together these two otherwise incompatible perceptions of international authority by dealing with each at different times. While carrying silver into China, the Sangleys subjected themselves to Ming authority; and when trading in the Philippines, they showed deference to officials of the Spanish Crown. Eng Kang and the Sangleys thereby became critical intermediaries that assimilated the colonial Philippines into the world of East Asia.

Sangley profits also came from this intermediary role. The profits of Eng Kang and his people were, in fact, a direct result of how well these people filled both the economic and political gap that separated the Philippine colony from the much older world of East Asia.

When the Mandarins visited Manila, however, the Sangley buffer disappeared and frictions intensified. The Ming dynasty's displays of regional influence overlapped with the Spaniards' perception of absolute authority in their colony, a clash that then overheated the tensions between the Spaniards and the Sangleys. After the Ming officials departed, many Spaniards, fearing that China was planning to conquer the Philippines, became suspicious that the Sangleys had secretly agreed to join in a Ming invasion. As the Spaniards made preparations for an attack—fortifying the walls around the Spanish quarter of Manila, numbering potential troops, destroying some Sangley dwellings, etc.—rumors spread among the Chinese that the Spaniards were actually plotting to kill all of the Sangleys. Eventually suspicions and tensions
ignited into violence; the Sangleys revolted prematurely, and the colony retaliated brutally. The incompatibility of the Chinese and Spanish systems, which made the rise of Sangley merchants possible, had also sparked their downfall.

In this chapter I will examine the rise and fall of Eng Kang and the Sangleys by providing a history of the forces surrounding the convergence of silk and silver at Manila. I will begin by focusing on the economic forces that animated the sustained encounter between the Sangleys and the Spaniards; I will then incorporate the history of the Sangleys into the larger histories of East Asian political relations and of Spanish imperial expansion; and I will conclude by showing how the silk for silver trade was also related to non-Spanish and non-Chinese powers in East Asia. In the same way that Eng Kang moved back and forth between Ming and Spanish officials in Manila, the Sangleys formed a buffer between Ming China and the Philippines, a buffer that made possible the assimilation of the Philippines into the changing world of East Asia, a world of international relations that would, even after the massacre, continue to include the Philippine government and its peoples.

Europeans have long been credited with the making of the world's first truly global and around-the-world trade network. This idea, while partly accurate, also sometimes deceptively suggests that other peoples and polities were not direct participants in the first globalization. It overlooks, for example, that the original around-the-world web of trade was, in fact, first completed with the barter of American silver for Chinese goods between indigenous Moros and Chinese Sangleys at Manila in 1565, barter that was related to European expansion but that also had no direct European participants. Eng Kang's personal fortune provides further evidence of the irreplaceable contributions made by non-Europeans to the beginnings of modern
globalization. Though much remains unknown about the extent Eng Kang's properties, we do know that he had at least two houses in the Manila area; he owned some African slaves;\(^{279}\) and he had some 15,000 pesos in personal savings at the time of his death,\(^{280}\) an amount that was roughly equivalent to 2.5 million current US dollars.\(^{281}\) He, furthermore, probably owned assets or other properties in Fujian; there is evidence that he traveled to Mexico;\(^{282}\) and he had likely developed trading relationships with merchants from Japan. He was, in summary, the wealthy and powerful owner of an international business in the first global age, one that helped to extend early globalization across the Pacific Ocean.

Eng Kang's business, like much of the Philippine economy, was not based on the extraction of local resources; it rather depended on the funneling of global commodities through Manila, specifically Chinese silk and American silver. The profitability of this exchange—and therefore the origins of Eng Kang's wealth—began several years before Eng Kang's birth. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ming Emperor printed too much paper money, which led to inflation and resulted in the failure of paper currency in China. Shortly thereafter, silver began to fill the currency void that paper had left behind. There were, however, few active silver mines in China itself, and these did not produce enough specie to keep up with the currency demands of the growing Ming economy. As a result, silver became more valuable in China than anywhere else in the world.\(^{283}\) By 1560, silver in China was three times more valuable than it was in

\(^{279}\) Gregorio Lopez, "Copia de la carta del P. Gregorio Lopez de Abril de 1604 al Prôr Grâl, en que se hace la relacion del alzamiento de los Sangleyes," Ventura del Arco, Vol 1., Newberry Library, Chicago, 159.

\(^{280}\) Pedro de Acuña, "The Sangley insurrection" (1603), BR 12, 156.


\(^{282}\) "Caja de Acapulco. Cuentas de Real Hacienda" (1594-1595), CONTADURIA,900, AGI.

Mexico and Europe and more than double its value in both India and Japan.\textsuperscript{284} In other words, if a merchant carried silver from any of these places to China, he could double or triple his profits on each voyage. This discrepancy in values made China a global silver magnet, or as one historian has called it, the world's silver "suction pump."\textsuperscript{285}

In the early sixteenth century, an increasing number of silver deposits were mined in Japan, and due to demand in China, much of this silver was exported into Ming domains. But trade frictions, in the form of legal restrictions, limited the flow of silver between the two East Asian kingdoms. Meanwhile, only a few years before arriving at Manila, the Spanish empire discovered its own lucrative silver mines in Mexico, at Zacatecas, and in present-day Bolivia, at a mountain known as Potosí. When they brought this silver to the Philippines, they learned about its value in China from the Manila Moros, who started trading American silver to the Chinese at Manila in 1565. Once the Spaniards settled at Manila, they eliminated the Moro middleman from this emerging global chain of trade, and they began to barter American silver directly to the Sangleys themselves in exchange for Chinese products. By 1603, at least two million silver pesos per year were funneling from the Americas, through Manila, on to China, where these fed the insatiable currency appetite of the world's largest economy. As stated above, this silver provoked the visit of the Ming officials, who seem to have believed that it came from a local mountain.\textsuperscript{286} Some Chinese had perhaps confused Manila with things they had heard about Potosí.

The high value of silver in China was complemented by the high value of Chinese products everywhere else in the world. As the world's most powerful and advanced economy,

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\textsuperscript{284} Benito J. Legarda, \textit{After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change & Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines} (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), 31.
\textsuperscript{286} Barao, 26.
\end{flushleft}
Chinese artisans had developed technologies that produced goods whose quality could not be replicated elsewhere. Long before the arrival of Europeans, for example, the caliber of Chinese silks and porcelains made them highly coveted commodities among the peoples of the Philippine islands (as described in part two). The large scale manufacture of these goods and the technological expertise of Chinese artisans also decreased the cost of production, meaning that silk from China was not only of better quality than other textiles, but that it could also be sold at a lower price, especially when the higher value of silver in China was factored into the equation. The transport of American silver across the Pacific Ocean to Manila gave the Spanish empire direct access to these goods, and as silver flowed west out of Latin America, Chinese goods flowed back in return. A market in Mexico city for Asian products was built, called the Parian (named after the one in the Philippines); and the massive flow of Chinese silk funneled through Manila into Spanish America dropped the price of this luxury commodity so much that even poor Amerindians and African slaves in Peru could purchase it. 287 The flood of Chinese imports even altered fashion patterns in Mexico, eventually creating the style known as *china poblana*.

The Sangleys' goods also created labor industries in New Spain, as artisans in Mexico wove Chinese fabrics into clothing. 288 Chinese commodities, furthermore, benefitted Spanish missionaries in the Americas. In response to the Spanish demand for religious items, artisans in China learned to make images of Jesus and Mary, exporting these through the Sangleys to Manila and to the Americas. These artifacts of European culture were thus produced in China, exported through Manila, and then used to underscore and enhance the spiritual prowess of friars

287 Flynn and Giraldez (2001), xxx.
throughout Spain's colonial possessions. The emergence of this new global trade at Manila thus altered the landscape not only of China, but also that of the Spanish empire itself.

In fact, so much silk was funneled into Mexico from Manila that it affected markets in Europe. Silk producers in Seville, for example, saw a significant decrease in their export profits, and they even feared that the growth of the Manila silk trade might put them out of business. Indeed, Chinese silk was so cheap in the Philippines, that it could be imported through Mexico into Spain and still sold at a lower price than the silks made in Europe. Unable to compete with the low prices of higher quality Chinese silks, these merchants petitioned Philip II to set legal limits on imports to Mexico from Manila, which he did in 1593, declaring that only 250,000 pesos worth of goods could be shipped back to New Spain, a policy that he hoped would also decrease the rapid flow of silver out of his empire. This decree caused rampant smuggling on the galleons, and millions of pesos continued to flow across the Pacific each year. This law showed that the opening of a global market at Manila not only outsourced textile related jobs from the Philippines (as explained in part two), but that it also affected the textile industry in distant Europe.

As summarized by the historians Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, "just as Chinese silk exports rushed toward high silk prices in American markets, American silver simultaneously rushed toward high silver prices in China." In other words, for Chinese merchants, like Eng Kang, Manila became the cheapest place to obtain silver; while for their Spanish counterparts, the colonial capital was the empire's most inexpensive silk market. At the end of the sixteenth

289 Ibid., 199.
290 Legarda, 38.
291 Flynn and Giraldez (2001), xxxi.
century, silver in Manila was half as valuable as it was in China, and silk prices were ten times higher in Peru than they were in the Philippines. The individuals who benefitted most from this "double arbitrage" were the merchants who, like Eng Kang, transported goods from markets of lower value to markets of higher value, i.e. taking silver from the Philippines to China or transporting silk from Manila to Mexico. Doing this generated massive profits—30-40% profits for the Sangleys importing silver into China and perhaps as high as 300% for Spaniards transporting goods from Manila to Mexico. Eng Kang showed his unique acumen as a merchant in the 1590s when he, or one of his personal representatives, traveled on a galleon ship to Mexico. This trip suggests that Eng Kang was either consistently shipping goods between Manila and Acapulco or that he at least considered that possibility, something that would have certainly increased his wealth even further.

After Eng Kang's arrival in Manila in 1574, the galleon trade grew and Sangley-Spanish profits grew right along with it. In the early 1570s this trade accounted for approximately 30,000 Spanish pesos per year; ten years later, in the early 1580s it had increased to roughly 300,000 pesos annually, and in 1597 as many as twelve million silver pesos from the Americas were traded at Manila. This trade brought immense wealth to Fujian, and it greatly enriched Fujian's provincial government, which collected, in some years, as many as 100,000 pesos in import taxes. Manila's taxes on the trade also brought substantial wealth to the colonial government.

292 Legarda, 31.
293 Flynn and Giraldez (2001), xxx.
294 Mann, 199.
295 "Caja de Acapulco. Cuentas de Real Hacienda" (1594-1595), CONTADURIA,900, AGI.
298 Quiason, 170.
Acuña estimated, for example, that, in 1603, the massacre cost the colonial government 52,000 pesos in lost revenue.\textsuperscript{299} Through this flow of wealth, Sangleys elevated their status in China, and they also incorporated themselves into the Philippines. In China, Sangleys used their personal profits to build and expand their familial ancestral halls, to purchase valuable prestige goods, and also to support other commercial ventures, though most of these uses ultimately channeled wealth out of Fujian toward other parts of China and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{300} Chapter seven will explain how the Sangleys assimilated themselves into the Philippine colony.

Trade at Manila, furthermore, extended beyond the Ming and the Spanish empires. As the market grew in Manila, peoples and goods from throughout Southeast Asia, East Asia, Europe, India, and even Africa came or were brought to the colonial capital. In addition to silk, the Sangleys imported fruits, salted meats, porcelains, building materials, pots, pans, gunpowder, beds, tables, chairs, livestock, etc.\textsuperscript{301} Meanwhile, the global market at Manila also included flour, weapons, and fruit from Japan; cloves, cinnamon, and peppers from the Spice Islands; wine, weapons, and books from Europe; carpets from Persia and Turkey; fine furniture from Portuguese Macau; cotton, raisins, almonds, and jewels from India; ivory, and slaves from Africa; Southeast Asian slaves, palm mats, and sago from Borneo; and pepper, ivory, rhinoceros horns, and more slaves from Cambodia; etc.\textsuperscript{302} This extensive list of goods shows that Sangley imports, along with imports from other places, not only made mercantile profits possible in Manila, but also supplied the capital and the colony with essential resources. Moreover, it demonstrates that the Manila galleon system attracted more than just Spaniards and Sangleys, it

\textsuperscript{299} Acuña, 157.
\textsuperscript{300} Lucille Chia, "The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish Philippines and their Impact on Southern Fujian (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries)," \textit{Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient} 49, no. 4 (2006): 529-530.
\textsuperscript{301} Antonio de Morga, "Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas" (1609), BR 16, 177-179.
\textsuperscript{302} Ibid., 183-186.
attracted diverse goods and peoples from throughout the world, making Manila a truly global commercial center.

Through the visit of the Mandarins to the Philippines in 1603, the Ming acknowledged the growing importance of this new commercial center, thereby recognizing that Manila now had a place in East Asian affairs, if only a subservient one. The Ming envoy thus also demonstrated that the convergence of silk and silver involved not only the coming together of global commodities but also a meeting of previously separate world systems. These systems were the Ming tribute system and the system of Spanish imperial expansion. The Sangleys, becoming involved in both, created a buffer between the two systems, enabling these powers to interact within one another indirectly, through intermediaries. As part of both systems, the Sangleys were also part of two much larger histories. A long history of oceanic commerce defined the relationship of the Sangleys to Ming China; and through their interactions with the Spaniards, they became part of the history of Spanish imperial expansion. As part of both systems, the Sangleys also blended these two histories together, creating at their intersection a new interstate political relationship.

The Sangleys' relationship to China's history of overseas trade was clear in the events after the massacre. Upon receiving the terrible news of what had happened, many Ming officials urged the Emperor to retaliate against the Spaniards. In their appeals, they explained that the Philippine islands were formerly a "wretched land of little importance," but that as a result of the immigration there a few years ago of so many Sangleys to trade with the Castilians [the Spaniards], the country has been enriched to the extent to which the said Sangleys have labored therein. They have built the walls, and made houses and gardens, and other things of great advantage to the Castilians.
Nevertheless, the Castilians had no consideration for these things, and felt no gratitude for these good works, but have so cruelly slain all those people.\textsuperscript{303}

These appeals, however, did not achieve their intended result. After considering an attack, the Emperor decided against it for five reasons. First, according to the Ming's idea of international authority, the large scale commerce between China and Manila meant that Luzon was already basically subject to the Ming, and attacking Manila would therefore add little to Chinese power; second, the event took place outside of China itself; third, an expedition would drain the Ming's armed forces; fourth, the Sangleys were a poor people, not worth waging war for; and last, "the people slain…were a base people, ungrateful to China, their native country, to their parents, and to their relatives, since so many years had passed during which they had not returned to China."\textsuperscript{304}

This final statement by the Wanli Emperor reflected both a dominant attitude among China's ruling elite toward overseas migrants, one that grew out of Confucian ideals as well as the historical relationship of the Sangleys to the Ming tribute system. Confucian ideals placed great emphasis on filial piety and devotion to one's ancestors; and these ideals were translated by many, including the founder of the Ming dynasty, into a stigma against those who left their towns or homelands—where ancestral shrines had been built—to seek a new life somewhere else. In these new places, migrants could not perform the proper rites to their ancestors, meaning that these were perceived by elites as unfilial.

This cultural taboo was compounded in Eng Kang's case by the history of the Sangley community in relation to the Ming tribute system. The Ming tribute system was designed to

\textsuperscript{303} "Letter from a Chinese Official to Acuña" (1605), BR 13, 289-290.
\textsuperscript{304} All five reasons are given in the Chinese account but only three were given in the Ming letter to the Spaniards. For all five reasons see Barao, 32. For the direct quotation see "Letter from a Chinese Official to Acuña, 290.
regulate China's trade with its neighbors in a way that also elevated and sustained China's position of power as the 'Middle Kingdom.' In its strictest interpretation, the tribute system did not permit free trade with foreign merchants. Instead, approved foreign merchants accompanied tribute missions from other kingdoms to China, where they were allowed to trade imported goods for Chinese products. Favored kingdoms, like Korea, were granted the right to send more tribute missions to China, while less favored kingdoms, e.g. Japan, were restricted to fewer missions.

Through this system, the Ming emperor was able to use the value of Chinese commodities to enhance his regional authority. If other kingdoms wanted Chinese products, they needed to recognize the supremacy of the Ming Emperor, and they also had to maintain good relations with the Ming. Otherwise there would be fewer tribute missions and less trade, leaving less favored kingdoms with less access to coveted Chinese goods. This asymmetrical configuration of authority among polities in East Asia gave China power and influence throughout the region. Other kingdoms and their representatives, in order to gain access to China, adopted Confucian norms, used the Chinese calendar in communications with the Ming, and kowtowed before the Emperor.\footnote{For elaborations on the Chinese tribute system see John K. Fairbank, ed., \textit{The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); David C. Kang, \textit{East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 54-58; John E. Wills, "Relations with Maritime Europeans, 1514-1662," in \textit{The Cambridge History of China}, vol. 8, part 2, \textit{The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644}, eds. Denis C. Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 334.}

This system was, however, not implemented fully and it never operated perfectly. Some trade was allowed between independent foreign merchants and their Chinese counterparts, and smuggling by private Chinese merchants was also widespread. This was especially true in the coastal province of Fujian, where Eng Kang and most of the Sangleys were from. Fujian is a
mountainous province with relatively little arable land, meaning that much of its income had to come from the sea, either from fishing or from trading. It, therefore, became a center for ocean trade and sailing expertise. Well before the rise of the Ming in 1368, for example, Muslim merchants traded along the Fujian coast; and when, early in the fifteenth century, a Ming Emperor sent tribute missions into Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even as far as East Africa, he chose a Fujianese eunuch, Zheng He, to lead these expeditions, which included many other Fujianese people. The expenses of these voyages, however, made them unsustainable, and by the middle of the fifteenth century, no more tribute voyages were sent out from the China coast, though tribute missions of course continued to come to China from other kingdoms.

Sailing and overseas mercantile expertise, nevertheless, did not disappear from Fujian.

The tribute system also played a part in how silver was imported into China. As explained above, during the fifteenth century, Ming paper currency failed, which increased the value of silver, leading to silver imports from Japan. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, Japan was excluded entirely from the Ming tribute system, meaning that the Japanese were not allowed to send any tribute missions to China; and private Chinese traders were also banned from associating with Japanese merchants. In short, trade with Japan was illegal. Despite this prohibition, the value of silver in China prompted both Japanese and Chinese merchants—many from Fujian—to risk the punishments of smuggling for the promise of profits. These began to trade with one another at offshore locations, like Manila, beyond the reach of Ming authorities.

By the 1520s, these smugglers had begun to form bands of merchant-pirates that periodically attacked and raided the Chinese coast. These merchant-pirates were called wokou in
China, meaning "Japanese pirates," even though most of them were, in fact, from China itself. During the 1550s, the Ming government adopted multiple strategies to try to curb illegal *wokou* trading and raiding. They attacked the *wokou* directly, tried to recruit them into their own navy, and even attempted bribery; but these measures all failed.306 Finally, in 1567, the Ming Emperor decided that the only way to stop illicit activities along the coast was to legalize most of the private trade there. The Ming nevertheless maintained the prohibition on trade with Japan and continued to regulate mercantile activities.

This policy change, along with the arrival of Portuguese merchants, opened up legal channels for the flow of Japanese silver into China and thereby also reduced the amount of illicit activity along the Chinese coast. The Portuguese first arrived on the China coast in the early sixteenth century; and for several decades the Portuguese tried to gain official recognition in the Ming tribute system. But because the Portuguese had conquered Muslim Melaka—a kingdom that was already included in China's official tributary order—the Ming Emperor was reluctant to recognize them as legitimate rulers in Asia. The Portuguese were, instead, during their early years in the South China Sea, viewed by the Ming as part of the *wokou* disorder.

Through negotiations with local authorities in Guangdong, however, the Portuguese found a way, in the 1550s, to rent a small island off the coast, from which they would be able to trade with Chinese merchants. This island became Portuguese Macau. Because the Portuguese were, thereafter, able to trade legally with both the Japanese and the Chinese, they became middlemen who imported Japanese silver into China while exporting coveted Chinese goods to Japan. With the establishment of Portuguese Macau and the loosening of trade regulations,

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China's much needed silver imports could now move freely through legal channels, meaning that Chinese merchants could trade their goods to the Portuguese for Japanese silver without having to confront the risks of smuggling or of trading directly with the Japanese.

The arrival of the Portuguese and the loosening of Ming regulations did not, however, completely end illicit wokou activity. Merchant-pirates continued to operate in the South China Sea until the mid 1570s; and during this time, Eng Kang joined—either voluntarily or by force—with a wokou leader, known as Limahong (or Lin-Feng). As explained above, Limahong, attracted by news of silver imports to Manila, attacked the colonial capital in 1574; and he was repulsed from there by a multiethnic colonial force of Spanish and indigenous peoples. Limahong then fled, with his followers, and built a small fortress on another part of Luzon called Pangasinan. Later, another multiethnic colonial force surprised the merchant-pirate with an attack on his new base, the surprise enabling them to burn Limahong's fleet and blockade his fortifications. For some unknown reason, Eng Kang appears to have defected from Limahong at some time during this conflict, choosing to remain in Manila. When Eng Kang arrived at the colonial capital, there was already a small population of Sangley merchants living in the area. But Eng Kang's settlement at Manila, nevertheless, marked a symbolically significant moment in the history of overseas Chinese migration.

The notable historian of East Asian piracy Robert Antony has identified 1522-1574 as a distinct era of wokou activity, an era that ended with Limahong.³⁰⁷ Just as the rise of Macau helps to explain a decline in piracy after the 1550s, the founding of Manila helps to explain its end in the 1570s. The establishment and growth of a legal market for silver in Manila enabled Eng

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 19.
Kang and other Chinese merchants to enrich themselves, once again, without risking legal retaliation or direct opposition from Ming officials. In this way wokou "pirates" along the China coast, like Eng Kang, became Sangley merchants at Manila. This transition was known to the Chinese and explained well by one contemporary Chinese observer. "Pirates and merchants are all the same people." he wrote, "when markets are open the pirates become merchants, and when markets are closed merchants become pirates." 308

A recognition of this human continuity beneath the changing labels was implicit in the Emperor's reason for not avenging the death of the Sangleys. Despite the legality of the trade, a negative stigma was still attached by many elite Chinese leaders to this community of overseas merchants; and the security of these merchants was not worth the expense or risk of Ming resources, even though these people were critical to China's ongoing currency supply. As part of the continuing history of East Asia, the Sangleys fulfilled one of China's major economic needs—the import of silver—but they yet remained exempt from full cultural acceptance among Ming rulers, making them therefore also exempt from political protection, a fact that saved the Philippine colony from Chinese retaliation. The Sangleys were, in short, a people without a country.

As part of Limahong's fleet, Eng Kang was also involved in the developing history of European global expansion. While the Spaniards and their indigenous allies held Limahong under siege at Pangasinan, an envoy from Ming China arrived at Manila, led by an official named Omoncon, who was searching for the merchant-pirate's fleet. The Spaniards informed Omoncon that they had defeated Limahong and that they were now preparing to capture or kill

308 Quoted in Ibid., 24.
him. Omoncon, delighted by this news, developed a friendly relationship with the Spaniards. In previous years, the Spaniards had learned from the Portuguese that the Ming tribute system forbade foreigners from entering China and remaining there, and this Ming regulation effectively erected an impenetrable wall to their expansionist aspirations.\footnote{Domingo de Salazar, "The Chinese and the Parián at Manila" (1590), BR 7, 212-213.} Through the Limahong incident, however, the Spaniards were able to negotiate their first entry into the Middle Kingdom. In gratitude for the Spaniards' help with Limahong, Omoncon agreed to bring six Spaniards, led by the Augustinian friar Martin de Rada, and twelve Moro indios—including translators—with him back to Fujian, where the Spaniards hoped to establish official diplomatic relations with the Ming and to found a mission.

While in China, the Spaniards taught several Chinese people about Christianity; they compared their technology to that of East Asia; and they befriended the Chinese governor of Fujian. Because they could not remain longer in China without the Emperor's explicit permission, the Spaniards and their indigenous companions returned to Manila the following year, hoping that the capture or death of Limahong would persuade the Ming Emperor to grant them permanent passes. Much to their sorrow, however, upon returning to the Philippines, Rada and his companions were informed that Limahong had escaped. Escaping with him, perhaps, were the Spaniards' hopes for both inclusion into the Ming tribute system and for a mission in China. Rada, nevertheless, attempted to return to China with several Sangleys in 1576. Unfortunately for him, before arriving in Fujian, his Chinese hosts deserted him on a small island. Rada eventually made his way back to Manila, but he died two years later of a tropical disease, his dream of opening China for Spain remaining unfulfilled.
Despite the failures of these voyages, this first entry of the Spaniards into China was yet seen by many—both in the Philippines and beyond—as a providential step in what was certain to become a glorious chapter of Spanish imperial history. As explained in previous sections, the motivations for early modern European expansion were, at once, religious, commercial, and political. Some scholars have sought to isolate one of these as more important than the others, but this trinity was indivisible.\(^{310}\) Often the advancement of one objective was related to the advancement of all three; and where one Spanish migrant may have been more influenced by one of these motives, another was likely driven by one of the others—spiritual, economic, and imperial expansion thereby collectively permeating and animating the entire imperial diaspora of Spanish authority. Missionaries, for example, were of course primarily interested in the spread of the gospel, while merchants sought the opening of new markets. Despite the periodic conflicts between these two groups, both understood that the opening of a mission could lead to commerce; and commerce, conversely, might help to establish a mission. Political conquest, furthermore, could make possible all three.

Mobilizing this network, nevertheless, required commercial, political, and spiritual objects of desire. When Legazpi, for example, first came to the Philippines, the direct economic objective of his voyage was to obtain Southeast Asian spices, the immediate political incentive was imperial expansion, and the initial spiritual goal was the salvation of Southeast Asian souls. Looming in the background, however, were the much larger prizes of the Chinese economy, the Ming Dynasty, and the largest population of non-Christians in the world. Though ultimately

Spain's imperial expansion reached its farthest point in the Philippines, this was not the final vision of the colony's original Spanish immigrants.

Many Spaniards believed that the conquests of the Mexica and the Inca were destined to be repeated in East Asia. As had happened before in the Americas, by 1574 Spain had again established a small colony in a collection of islands just off the coast of a major empire; and many Spaniards—believing that God had ordained and opened the way for Cortés and Pizarro to spread Spain's power beyond the Caribbean into Mexico and Peru—saw the Limahong incident as the Creator's way of opening up Ming China to their growing commercial Catholic empire. China, moreover, was not just another object of early modern European imperial desire, it was, in many ways, the original object of that desire, the very kingdom that Columbus had hoped to find less than a century before. For many Spaniards, the Americas, in the words of historian John Headley, were "only preliminary to the real, and indeed original goal—China."311

Before Limahong's arrival, Spaniards in the Philippines had already been considering and pursuing other ways to access the commercial, political, religious riches of the Middle Kingdom. Legazpi, having a difficult time finding anything of great commercial value in the Philippine islands, suggested as early as 1568 that the Spaniards send ships to the China coast, where they might be able to trade for a profit in Chinese products;312 another colonial official wrote to Philip II in 1569, explaining that "all of us, your Majesty's servants and vassals, are quite sure that, in your time, China will be subject to your Majesty,"313 and after arriving in Manila, Martin de Rada offered himself as a slave to the Sangleys if they would but take him to China, an offer the

312 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, "Letters to Felipe II of Spain" (1567-1568), BR 2, 237.
313 Andres de Mirandola, "Letter to Felipe II," (1569), BR 3, 42.
Sangleys refused.\textsuperscript{314} The Limahong affair amplified the hopes of China's would be Spanish colonizers. Just as Rada sought a mission in China, others wanted trade to be established through the inclusion of Manila into the Ming tribute system; and Francisco de Sande, the man sent to replace Legazpi as governor, suggested in 1576 that Ming China could be conquered with four to six thousand men.\textsuperscript{315} Meanwhile another Spaniard asserted that he could do it "with less sixty good Spanish soldiers."\textsuperscript{316}

Spanish missionaries likewise continued to pine for China, many migrating to the Philippines believing that they would soon be reassigned to labor in the Middle Kingdom. Even the first Archbishop of the Manila, Domingo de Salazar, arriving in the Philippines in 1581, hoped that he would play a major role in the opening of a new China mission.\textsuperscript{317} Shortly after the Limahong affair, missionaries began to undertake independent and unsanctioned voyages to the Middle Kingdom, where they were turned away, often being sent to Macau. Due to these emigrations, and the resulting lack of missionaries laboring in the Philippines, colonial leaders ordered that no friars "should dare to leave [Manila] or any other place where said religious may be…except with express permission from [the Governor]." Those who disobeyed would have all of their property confiscated and would then be subjected to the full force of the law. A similar punishment awaited those who might assist the missionaries attempting to leave the Philippines for China.\textsuperscript{318}

\textsuperscript{314} Juan Gonzales de Mendoza, "History of the great kingdom of China (extracts relating to the Philippines)" (1586), BR 6, 91.
\textsuperscript{315} Francisco de Sande, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands" (1576), BR 4, 58.
\textsuperscript{316} Hernando Riquel, "Las nuevas qescriven de las yslas del Poniente" (11 Jan 1574), BR 3, 247.
\textsuperscript{317} Domingo de Salazar, "The Chinese and the Parían at Manila" (1590), 213.
\textsuperscript{318} Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa, "Ordinance restricting departure from the islands" (1582), BR 4, 308-309.
This command, however, did not quench missionary zeal. By 1586, two additional voyages of friars had ignored the Governor's prohibition, and a council of colonial leaders begged the King for help. The missionaries, they explained, whom his Majesty sends from España...declare, as soon as they have arrived here, that they do not come for the islands but for China; and therefore they do not give themselves to the language of the [Philippine indios], or intercourse with them.319

Accounts of the 1574 voyage from Manila to China had sparked missionary enthusiasm in the Americas and in Europe; and solving this problem, these colonial leaders explained, required that missionaries in Mexico, Spain, and Rome be convinced that the people of China "will not be converted." They therefore requested that the King inform the people of Europe and New Spain that mainland Asia was, as a result of disobedient missionaries who had escaped from the Philippines, "more tightly closed than ever."320

Yet even as this council complained about the misdirected enthusiasm of the missionaries, they too were fixated on imperial expansion into China. In 1586, the Philippine colony was struggling—few Spaniards were migrating to the islands; many of those who had come remained poor; and the colony was seemingly surrounded by hostile and threatening enemies. The council therefore proposed a military conquest of the Ming. This council, including the Governor-General, Santiago de Vera, the Bishop, and 30 other officials, asked that Philip II send them twelve thousand Spanish troops, who they explained would join five to six thousand indigenous people from the Philippines and also another five to six thousand Japanese troops in an invasion

319 Santiago de Vera, et al., "Memorial to the Council by citizens of the Filipinas Islands" (1586), BR 6, 195.
320 Ibid., 196.
of China. They assured the Crown that this conquest promised "the greatest conversion of souls and acquirement of riches that ever lay within the power of man".

They believed—having discussed life in China with many Sangleys, including perhaps Eng Kang, who was a personal friend of Governor de Vera—that when the Chinese people saw the impressive Spanish, indigenous, and Japanese force, they would rise up against the tyrannical Ming. They also argued that subjugating China would happen easily because of the gentleness and intelligence of the Chinese. These colonial leaders imagined that China, like the Spanish possessions in the Americas, would be divided into *encomiendas* and distributed to those who took part in the conquest. *Encomenderos* would become wealthy by acquiring and selling Chinese products, a reward that the colonial officials proposing the plan almost certainly believed would be their own.

Manila's council, furthermore, promised that the empire would be much more successful in China than it had been in the Americas. They viewed the Chinese as superior to the indigenous peoples of the Americas; and, for this reason, they imagined that marriages between Chinese women and Spanish men would produce a wonderful new race of subjects, subjects who would create a unity yet unknown in Spain's other colonial possessions, where indigenous women were less attractive, less virtuous, and less submissive than those in China. "The two peoples will mingle," they imagined, "and they will propagate and multiply the race; and will be, in short, united and fraternal, and Christian."

When this proposal reached Philip II in Spain, he had just lost his famous 1588 armada off the coasts of England, a major blow both to his pride and to his ability to wage war. Even

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321 Ibid., 215.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid., 219.
without this loss, however, it is very unlikely that the King would have sent such a large army of European soldiers to the other side of the world. As described in part one, Spanish imperial expansion traditionally relied on the colonies to muster troops. Spanish Kings did not send soldiers directly from the center to the empire's peripheries. The dangers and cost of such a voyage would have, furthermore, made it prohibitively risky and expensive.

This is not to say, however, that Philip II was prepared to surrender the possibility of someday entering China. Instead, he explained, "in order that [entry into China] be attained, it is necessary for the present that what has been pacified and conquered [i.e., the Philippines]. . . be looked after carefully." The plan would, in other words, not be carried out now, but the King was keeping his and his subjects' hopes alive for some future time, a time that never came. In summary, as an object of desire, entry into China—either through political, commercial, or spiritual conquest—attracted many to the Philippines, the islands being for them a perceived stepping stone to the glories of the Middle Kingdom. That these imaginary conquests were never realized does not negate their effect on the past. The promise of China, no doubt, inspired and drove many Spaniards to help extend their empire into the Philippines.

Though these dreams were never fully realized, they were nevertheless partially fulfilled through the Sangleys in Manila. Politically, the immigration of Chinese people into the Philippines placed these under the authority of the Spanish Crown. Spiritually, the conversion of Sangleys, like Juan Bautista de Vera, was a coveted assignment among Spanish missionaries. Indeed, with the various missionary orders being assigned to certain peoples and places, the Augustinians and Dominicans fought with one another for several decades, generating hundreds

324 Philip II, "Instructions to Gomez Perez Dasmariñas" (9 Aug 1589), BR 7, 142.
of pages of arguments, over whose right it was to preach to the Sangleys. And commercially, the colony not only gained much of its wealth from Sangley imports, but it came to depend on those imports for building materials, food, and clothing. The Sangley presence in Manila, in other words, provided at least some political, spiritual, and commercial access to China's people, a partial fulfillment of much loftier imperial aspirations.

This initial convergence of Spain's imperial expansion with the Ming tribute system demonstrated the limits of cooperation between the two powers. The European imperial system, with its emphasis on gaining territory—or at least on opening up diplomatic, commercial, and spiritual relations with other kingdoms—was stymied by the power of the Ming and its prohibition of foreign entry into China. Spanish desires were also halted by the Ming refusal to recognize the Philippines as an official Ming tributary, one that might have at least periodically sent representatives to China to pay respect to the Emperor and to trade. This refusal to include the Spaniards officially into the tribute system was a repeat of what the Ming had done before to the Portuguese. Unofficially, however, through non-tribute related trade, the Sangleys nevertheless made it possible for American silver to flow into China from Manila. The Ming dynasty and the Spanish empire thus existed side by side, drawing benefits from one another, through the Sangleys, without the need for frequent direct interaction.

On the other hand, the convergence of these two powers also showed important avenues of cooperation. As had happened with Limahong, the Ming dynasty and the Philippine colony were able to work together against illicit pirate activities, a collaboration that helped to end the wokou era in the region. The Chinese recognized the legality of trade channels flowing through

325 See "Cuestiones con lose PP. Agustinos sobre la division de fronteras entre el curato del Tondo y Binondo," Seccion de Baybay, Tomo Unico, University of Santo Tomas Archive, Manila, Fols. 141-232.
Manila, and the opposition of both to Limahong helped to secure that trade. This cooperation was renewed against the Dutch in the early seventeenth century. Immediately after the 1603 massacre, in fact, the Ming Emperor executed two Chinese merchants who had helped a Dutch fleet along the China coast, an act that the Ming expected the Spaniards in Manila to be grateful for.326 Other powers in the region also clamped down on illegal trade and piracy. In 1592, for example, Toyotomi Hideyoshi of Japan initiated a policy that gave red (or vermillion) seals to authorized merchants, thereby creating a means to identify some ships from Japan (those with red seals) as legitimate and those without the seal as criminal. The Portuguese also participated in attacks on merchant-pirates in the region.327 Collectively, as trade increased, these powers thereby began to regulate commerce in the South China Sea.

As demonstrated by united action against smugglers and pirates in the region, the Spanish and Ming powers were not the only ones participating in the construction of the new Manila market or in its incorporation into the world of East Asian politics. The actions of other European peoples, especially the Portuguese, and of the Japanese also contributed to both the continued multidirectional flow of goods through Manila and to the friction that was generated by those flows. The Spaniards, however, rather than the Sangleys, were primarily responsible for regulating the tensions of these frictions and for ensuring that these did not overheat and overwhelm Manila.

From the time of Legazpi's arrival, the Portuguese at Macau felt threatened by the Spanish presence in Southeast Asia. In fact, one of the reasons that Pereira attacked Legazpi at

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326 "Letter from a Chinese Official to Acuña" (1605), BR 13, 288-289.
327 Wills, 352.
Cebu in 1569 was so that the Portuguese could maintain their monopoly on the China trade.\textsuperscript{328} Even after the unification of the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns, tensions over the China trade continued between the Iberians. Maintaining both Manila and Macau required that the two settlements, like the Spanish and Portuguese empires, remain separate parts of separate domains, even though they were politically unified under the Spanish Crown. The maintenance of separation was critical to the continuation of trade at Manila.

The continued separation, and even opposition, of these two settlements was clearly demonstrated at Macau near the turn of the seventeenth century. Before the 1590s, the Portuguese and the Spanish maintained a balance between the trade at Macau and the trade at Manila. The Portuguese continued to import silver into China from Japan through Macau; and the Spaniards/Sangleys funneled silver from the Americas into China through Manila. In 1598, however, the Spaniards took an action that would have dramatically altered this system. In that year, the Spanish attempted to establish a their own base near Macau. As Guangdong had done for the Portuguese, they granted the Spaniards a small island off the coast, an island that the Spaniards named \textit{El Piñal}. Seeing this as an incursion on their trade, the Portuguese tried to persuade Guangdong authorities to change their minds. Failing in this attempt, the Portuguese attacked the Spanish ships that came to establish the new base. By the next year, 1599, this attack had deterred the arrival of any other Spanish ships; and the Spaniards, based at Manila, abandoned their plan to open a second market in Guangdong.\textsuperscript{329} Had the \textit{El Piñal} experiment succeeded, it could have had a profound effect on the trade of Eng Kang and on the destiny of Manila.

\textsuperscript{328} Gonzalo Pereira, "Negotiations between Legazpi and Pereira regarding the Spanish settlement at Cebù" (1568), 266.
\textsuperscript{329} Wills, 349.
Indeed, the potential effect of *El Piñal* had been dealt with and described by the Spaniards at Manila ten years before. In 1589, fewer Chinese ships than usual came to the colonial capital. The Sangleys that did come in that year explained that famines and sicknesses within China were the reason for the dearth in merchants; but the Spaniards suspected that a ship had sailed directly from the Americas to Macau, an occurrence that, as the Manila fiscal Gaspar de Ayala described it, would have "depopulated and ruined " the Philippine colony. If Peruvian or Mexican ships brought silver directly to China to trade, Ayala explained, "there would be no market or sale for goods brought from these islands. Neither would the Chinese come here with their ships to sell the goods."\textsuperscript{330} *El Piñal* likely would have produced a similar result. The galleon trade at Manila depended on two interconnected trade routes. The Spanish galleons brought silver across the Pacific, and the Sangley sampans carried it the rest of the way to China through the South China Sea. If the Spaniards carried silver directly to the coast of China, the galleon market would be relocated—or at least substantially altered—and the need for the Sangleys in Manila would decline or perhaps even disappear. Profits would, furthermore, transfer from Fujian to Guangdong. In fulfillment of Ayala's 1589 prediction, the Philippine colony, lacking its primary source of economic profit, may well have ceased to exist; and the potential for profits among the Fujianese Sangleys, like Eng Kang, probably would have also vanished.

Other European powers also threatened Eng Kang's profits and the continuation of the galleon trade. In the late 1590s, the Dutch began to expand into Southeast Asia, hoping like Spain and Portugal to take economic advantage of Asia's trade. They settled first in Java and in the Maluku islands beginning in 1598, later attempting to establish their own Macau-like fort on

\textsuperscript{330} Gaspar de Ayala, "Letter to Felipe II" (15 Jul 1589), BR 7, 120.
the Chinese coast and eventually extending their imperial network into Japan. The Dutch were, at the same time, also fighting a war for independence against Spain in Europe. As an extension of this conflict a Dutch fleet, led by Oliver Van Noort, sailed around South America and blockaded Manila in 1600, an tactic designed to halt the flow of Chinese goods into the colony. The plan to defeat the Philippines, in other words, was to attack the Sangley leg of the journey, between Manila and Fujian. Van Noort succeeded in capturing a few Sangley junk, but the colony—using a multiethnic fleet of ships and soldiers, a force that included Spanish, indigenous, and Japanese peoples—was eventually able to chase Van Noort's vessels from the archipelago. The Sangleys also sent a ship out against the Dutch, but this one did not attack. The Sangleys seemed, instead, to take a wait-and-see approach, planning to perhaps ally with the Dutch should the Spaniards fail.

Even though the Sangleys did not take direct military action against the Dutch, the Van Noort episode nevertheless demonstrated the reliance of the Sangleys on colonial power for their profits. As explained above, the creation of a legal market for silk and silver in Manila contributed to the end of the wokou era by decreasing unpredictable violence in the South China Sea. But the arrival of the Dutch revived problems with securing sea lanes between Manila and China. For the reasons explained above, Ming authorities were uninterested in protecting Chinese merchants beyond China's borders, leaving the Sangleys and their trade vulnerable. Van Noort's attack was an early manifestation of this vulnerability. The Dutch blockade not only threatened the Spaniards' Philippine profits, but also those of the Sangleys, who would no longer be able to barter their goods at Manila.
Within two years the Dutch established the Dutch East India Company (the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC), and the VOC would attack Manila, the galleons, and Sangley junks several more times during the seventeenth century. Each time, the colony rallied around Manila, repelled the Dutch enemy, and re-secured the galleon trade. The same was true for the few English ships that attacked and captured galleons in the Pacific. Though the Spaniards and the Sangleys both suffered losses from these attacks, multiethnic colonial power was yet able to maintain the security of the trade flowing between China, Manila, and Mexico, no small feat when one considers that the Manila galleons carried more wealth than any other ships in the world across the world's largest body of water. Without colonial forces securing Eng Kang's junks through the South China Sea and the Manila galleons across the Pacific Ocean, European political frictions might have also prematurely put an end to the flow of goods through the colony. Colonial protections, in short, likewise protected the galleon trade and the Sangleys' ability to generate profits.

Beyond these European powers, events in Japan also threatened to disrupt the political and economic balance upon which the Manila galleon trade depended. Roughly a hundred years before the arrival of Legazpi in the Philippines, political authority in Japan was broken apart, and multiple clans claimed power over the islands. This disorder, in fact, contributed to the exclusion of Japan from the Ming tributary order, an exclusion that began in the late fifteenth century. About the same time that Legazpi arrived in the Philippines, however, the period of warring kingdoms in Japan was coming to an end. A powerful Japanese ruler, named Oda Nobunaga, began a process of consolidating power in the 1560s; and after the death of Nobunaga in 1582, one of his followers, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, took over and became a prominent political leader.
throughout much of Japan. Recognizing the profits that could be made in the China trade, Hideyoshi began to invest in the export of Japanese silver.

Beyond unifying Japan, Hideyoshi also sought to elevate Japan into the region's most powerful kingdom. In 1591, he sent a letter to the Philippine Governor-General, Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, boasting about his growing political influence and demanding that Luzon supply him with an ambassador, telling the Governor that he was preparing to conquer China and Korea and that he would do the same to the Philippines unless the Governor showed the Japanese ruler the respect that he deserved.\(^{331}\) The following year, Hideyoshi sent an army of 150,000 men to invade Korea, an invasion that he hoped would eventually open his way into China. Meanwhile, the tense diplomatic conversation between Dasmariñas and Hideyoshi also continued. The Governor responded to Hideyoshi by sending him gifts and explaining that he was, most assuredly, a friend to Japan. Dasmariñas, however, also emphasized that Philip II was "the greatest monarch in the world."\(^{332}\)

In 1594, a second envoy from Hideyoshi arrived at Manila, this one again seeking to intimidate the leaders in the Philippines with his newly acquired power and military prowess. Hideyoshi explained to colonial officials that he had conquered Korea and that he had long been "destined...to be lord of all between the rising and the setting sun," adding that "all kingdoms must render me vassalage and bow down before my door; and unless they do it, I will destroy them with war."\(^{333}\) The Governor-General of the Philippines—now Luis Perez Dasmariñas, son of the deceased Gomez—responded by again explaining that he wanted to maintain peace and friendship with Japan, but that he would not agree to any form of vassalage under Hideyoshi.

\(^{331}\) Toyotomi Hideyoshi, "An embassy from Japan" (1591), BR 8, 260-261.
\(^{332}\) Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "An embassy from Japan" (1592), BR 8, 266.
\(^{333}\) Luis Perez Dasmariñas, et al., "Reply to the Japanese emperor's letter" (1594), BR 9, 123.
Furthermore, he emphasized that Philip II's power and authority was "so great and extensive… that they are beyond compare with the greatness of many kings, though these be most powerful each by himself."\footnote{Ibid., 134.}

Many in the Philippines feared a Japanese invasion, one that they were not certain they could repel, but Hideyoshi never made the attempt on Manila. The diplomatic back and forth between Hideyoshi and the Governors of the Philippines nevertheless revealed two important points about the status of the colony in the early 1590s. First, the Philippines was beginning to be recognized as a valuable participant along the periphery of the East Asian world. Even though it had been excluded from the Ming tribute system, another powerful kingdom was seeking to include the new colony into its own competing international order; and Japan, furthermore, was not the only Asian polity that was beginning to recognize the importance of Manila. In 1593, the Ming sent an envoy of seven officials to the city, who went about the region "attended by a great pomp and retinue" supposedly searching for Sangleys who had left China illegally;\footnote{Leonardo de Argensola, "Conqyista de las Islas Malvces" (1609), BR 16, 263-264;} and in that same year, diplomats from Cambodia came to the Philippine Governor requesting aid in their war against the King of Siam.\footnote{Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, "Letter to the king of Camboja" (1593), BR 9, 76-80.} The second point was that frictions from non-Chinese powers in East Asia also threatened the survival of the colony. If Hideyoshi had carried out an attack on Manila, he almost certainly would have defeated the much smaller colonial forces, and once again, Eng Kang's opportunities to profit from the exchange of American silver for Chinese silk would have been lost or transferred to a different location.

Just as the Sangleys became the buffer between Ming China and the Philippine colony, Spanish authorities likewise diffused other tensions in the region through diplomatic and military
means. The frictions between the Portuguese and the Spanish empires in East Asia created a necessary tension that halted Spanish attempts—through Portuguese violence—to establish a base near Macau, a base that might have fundamentally altered the role of Manila in relation to East Asia. Unified under a single Crown, but still divided, Macau and Manila thus maintained their distinct channels of importing silver into China. The Spaniards also dealt with frictions from the Dutch, which protected the galleon trade and the colony from pillaging and from robbery. And finally, colonial authorities' diplomatic correspondence with Toyotomi Hideyoshi similarly protected both the colony and its global source of economic profits.

By 1603, the Sangleys, the Spaniards, and others in Manila had succeeded in making the Philippines a permanent fixture of the East Asian political landscape. Buffered by the Spaniards against Portuguese economic interference, Dutch attacks, and Japanese threats, the colony managed several of the frictions attending the rise of the galleon trade. The most important buffer was, nevertheless, the one between the Spanish empire and the Ming dynasty. This buffer was created by Eng Kang and the Sangleys. Ultimately, frictions along any of these buffer zones threatened the survival of the colony, but it was the Sangle buffer with China that ultimately gave way to extreme violence. The arrival of the Mandarins at Manila in 1603 eliminated the buffer between China and the Spanish empire, creating suspicions between the Spaniards and Sangleys at Manila. These suspicions increased tensions between the two peoples, leading to violence, violence that was motivated not only by global flows but also local relationships, relationships that are the subject matter of the next chapter.
Chapter 7

The Conquest of the Parian

On October 11, 1603, Eng Kang was hanged, quartered, and decapitated in Manila for allegedly leading the Chinese uprising. His head was then put in a small cage and displayed in public as a warning of what would happen to those who might stage a revolt against the colony. Much of the evidence against Eng Kang came from the testimony of local Chinese witnesses, many of them likely under duress. These swore that Eng Kang had declared himself King of the islands, and that he had organized an army of Sangley supporters to violently overthrow the Spaniards. Each member of this army, it was said, promised their allegiance to Eng Kang by bringing him a single needle. These needles were all then gathered into a small box. By the time violence broke out, the box reportedly contained some 22,150 needles, representing more than enough supporters to wipe out the thousand or so Spaniards who were living in Manila at the time.\(^{337}\) To his dying breath, however, Eng Kang maintained his innocence, swearing that he was a faithful Christian, no doubt hoping to remind Spanish colonial authorities of how often he had helped and supported them. As to Eng Kang's actual guilt, the Jesuit witness Gregorio Lopez reported the thoughts of many, writing later, "God only knows."\(^{338}\)

The doubts over the justice of Eng Kang's sentence were almost certainly related not only to his adamant denial of wrong doing but also to his personal history, a thirty year history of assistance in what I will call the conquest of the Parian. The Parian was a segregated Chinese village and market adjacent to the Spaniards' Manila settlement, and it was the center of Sangley activity in the Philippines. As stated above, the term conquest in this study is used to mean the

\(^{337}\) Miguel Rodriguez de Maldonado, "The Sangley Insurrection of 1603" (1606), BR 14, 135.
\(^{338}\) Gregorio Lopez, "Copia de la carta del P. Gregorio Lopez de Abril de 1604 al Prôr Grâl, en que se hace la relacion del alzamiento de los Sangleyes," Ventura del Arco, vol 1., Newberry Library, Chicago, 130 and 137.
construction of new and lasting internal authority; and by 'the conquest of the Parian,' I mean the formation of new and lasting colonial authority over the Sangleys in the Philippines. Being a prominent Chinese merchant, an official in the colonial government, and a Christian, Eng Kang was a crucial intermediary that brought the Sangleys under colonial authority; and he was also representative of the three distinct ways that Chinese immigrants were blended into the emerging structure of colonial sovereignty—namely, economic exchange, political assimilation, and religious conversion.

Most Sangleys were not, like Eng Kang, merchants, government officials, and Catholics, but all of them were, almost certainly, at least one of these three, each Sangley thereby being assimilated, to one degree or another, into the internal system of governance centered on the Parian. The Sangley massacre temporarily depopulated the Parian system, and some may have even mistaken it for the complete destruction of that system; but as new Sangleys came to trade during subsequent years, their integration into Philippine sovereignty followed the same patterns as before. After 1603, new Sangley individuals did not build for themselves an entirely new layer of assimilation; they rather brought new life to the Parian's already formed, though now empty, economic, political, and religious skeleton of authority. By focusing on what is known of Eng Kang's guilt or innocence, this chapter will describe the initial formation and depopulation of the Parian system. On the one hand, economic, political, and religious frictions—frictions providing necessary traction—enabled the assimilation of Eng Kang and the Sangleys into the Philippine colony. But on the other hand, these same frictions—now producing dangerous tensions—were responsible for escalating a visit from a few Ming ambassadors into an all-or-nothing military conflict.
Eng Kang's execution, in the face of serious doubts about his guilt, was one illustration of the momentum that initiated and propelled the uprising and massacre forward. This momentum began when global frictions increased already powerful and dangerous local tensions. After the departure of the Ming officials, Governor Acuña, fearful of a Chinese invasion, commanded that the wall around Spanish Manila be fortified and that, in order to create a security buffer, several Sangley houses along the wall adjacent to the Parian be destroyed. In order to accomplish these tasks, Acuña consulted Eng Kang, who was the governor over the Manila Sangleys, and the Governor then hired several Sangley workmen. Within a short time, a rumor began to spread that Acuña was preparing to massacre the Chinese immigrants. Alarm spread among the Sangleys, and those who feared the Spaniards began to leave the Parian, gathering themselves on the opposite side of the Pasig river in Tondo, where they constructed a makeshift fort for themselves. Within a few weeks, this group had grown to number several thousand Sangleys. On October 3, Eng Kang came to Acuña and warned him that an uprising was about to begin.

That same night, the eve of St Francis day, violence began in Tondo. The Sangleys burned down the house of a prominent Spaniard, and they attacked Quiapo, the village of Miguel Banal. The next day, October 4, Luis Perez Dasmariñas, the son of a previous governor general, gathered 140 Spanish musketeers, and these crossed the Pasig River to engage with the rebel Sangleys. They met a force of 1,500 Sangleys and many of the Spaniards, including Dasmariñas himself were killed. The Sangleys remaining in the Parian were, on that same day, invited to enter the Spanish walled city, where the Governor promised to protect them; but they, still suspicious of the alleged secret plot to kill them, refused and remained in the Parian. The next day, Sunday October 5, the revolting Sangleys and the Spaniards both tried to persuade those in
the Parian to side with them. Overcome by stress and certain of mass violence, some Chinese, including a relative of Eng Kang, hanged themselves.

Then on Monday, the Sangley rebels attacked Spanish Manila directly. They were repulsed by a combined force of Japanese, Spanish, Tagalog, Visayan, and Pampangan soldiers. The rebel Sangleys next divided into three groups and fled into the mountains, where they built defensive forts. Meanwhile Japanese and indigenous soldiers were ordered to invade the Parian, which they did, killing all who remained there and burning the Chinese town to the ground.339 On the following Saturday, while the multiethnic colonial army was now surrounding and killing the remaining Sangleys in the mountains, Eng Kang was tried and executed. The violence finally ceased on October 22, leaving 20,000 Sangleys dead. Of the five hundred survivors, two hundred were sentenced to labor thereafter as rowers on the colony's galleys. Only three hundred were pardoned.

The perceived innocence or guilt of Eng Kang mirrored a larger set of Spanish perceptions toward the Chinese. At various times and in various circumstances, the Spaniards viewed the Chinese in one of two ways. They were either good or evil. When cooperation or the potential for cooperation between the two people was being emphasized, Spanish commentators praised the Chinese as "civilized," "humble," "intelligent," "industrious," "generous," "modest," etc. During times of tension and conflict, on the other hand, Spaniards called them "barbarous," "deceitful," "treacherous," "cowardly," "greedy," "vicious," "ignorant," "lustful," etc.340

To be sure, many Spaniards believed that the Sangley population was a mixture of these two opposing groups, containing some good people and some evil. Governor Acuña, for

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340 These examples are taken from the index of the Blair and Robertson document collection, see BR 54, 195.
example, blamed the spreading of rumors and the outbreak of violence on a "restless and vagabond" subgroup among the much larger population of productive and peaceful Chinese immigrants. When violence erupted, however, suspicions were equated with guilt and none were spared, even though the Spaniards were fully aware that many were indeed innocent. This parallel in Spanish perceptions toward both Eng Kang and the Sangleys allows us to use the one to talk about the other, while also being able to use the other to explain the one. Indeed, an imaginative reconstruction of possible arguments for and against Eng Kang at his trial can help to explain how the Sangleys blended themselves into the foundations of Philippine sovereignty, while also providing a window into the tensions that conversely nearly destroyed that sovereignty.

If there ever was a direct record of Eng Kang's trial, it has not survived to the present; and remaining accounts of what he said at the time of his death tell us very little. It is nevertheless almost certain that he, either formally or informally, pled his innocence on several fronts. He likely explained to the judges of the Royal Audiencia that it would have been against his economic interests to start an uprising; he, furthermore, almost certainly emphasized that he had warned Governor just prior to the start of violence; and, as referenced above, immediately before he was hanged, Eng Kang affirmed his faith in Catholicism, praying for redemption in Christ, and declaring that he was dying for his past sins, but also adding that he was free from the sin of treason.

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341 Pedro de Acuña, "The Sangley insurrection" (1603), BR 12, 154.
342 See for example Acuña's discussion of the Sangley "Avays," a term he used to distinguish peaceful merchants from the rebellious others. Acuña recognized that the Avays were not guilty but many were killed anyway. Ibid., 157.
343 Lopez, 136.
In other words, Eng Kang, if given a chance to speak even briefly for himself, could have easily pointed out that he—economically, politically, and religiously—supported the colonial government. Given more time, this three part defense could have included almost the entire thirty year history of the colonial capital itself, and it might have even been able to encompass the Sangleys as a whole. Indeed, a combined history of Eng Kang's and the Sangley's economic, political, and religious history would have not only served as a powerful defense, but it would have also shown how intertwined the Sangleys were in the construction of colonial sovereignty.

Eng Kang's wealth was an obvious demonstration of his effectiveness in forming a bond between himself and Manila's Spanish merchants. As explained above, the galleon trade was mutually beneficial to both the Sangleys and the Spaniards and this brought these two peoples together into a mercantile community of shared economic interests. From their earliest encounters, both Spanish and Sangley individuals sought to establish a friendly trading relationship with one another. The first direct contacts between the Spaniards and the Sangleys happened during the first colonial expedition to Luzon in 1570. Through this expedition, the two peoples began to learn about both the trade of the other and also about how the two might profitably coexist and cooperate.

The first meeting of Spaniards and Sangleys in the Philippines happened on May 8, 1570, when a lone colonial prau, headed by a few Spaniards, beyond the view of the expedition's leaders, met two Sangley ships. Both sides tried to intimidate the other, and hostilities quickly broke out between the two. The colonial vessel eventually defeated the Sangley junks, killing some twenty Sangleys in the process and taking another sixty captive. When these Spaniards returned with the junks and their captives to report to their authorities, they were strongly
reprimanded for attacking the Chinese. The Sangley captives were then freed, and one of their junks was returned to them. The expedition's leaders then sent the Chinese junk back to Panay, the Spanish base at the time, where it was repaired and provisioned for the voyage back to China. After losing a battle, this treatment "was highly appreciated by the Chinese, who, being very humble people, knelt down with loud utterances of joy."\textsuperscript{344}

The Spaniards' next encounter with the Sangleys shed further light on these expressions of gratitude. Several days after the Sangley junk was sent to Panay, the Manila expedition came to a village on Luzon called Balayan, just south of Manila Bay. At Balayan, the local people tried to prevent the landing of the colonial expedition, but to no avail. The Spaniards and their Visayan allies nevertheless launched an attack, docked their ships, and entered Balayan. Through this attack they also freed two Sangley prisoners. These two prisoners explained that only a few days before, they had been part of a much larger group of Chinese merchants trading at Balayan. When this group of Sangleys heard that the Spaniards were nearby, they had wanted to leave Balayan so that they could trade directly with the Spaniards. Balayan's \textit{datus}, however, refused to allow the merchants to leave. When the Sangleys tried to escape, the people of Balayan followed in hot pursuit, eventually overtaking the entire company, whom they tortured and executed, ultimately enslaving the last and only two survivors.\textsuperscript{345} The Sangleys were, no doubt, grateful that, even after losing a battle to the Spaniards, they would yet be able to return home, something that was not guaranteed among the indigenous peoples of the Philippines.

The dangers and difficulties of the Sangleys' precolonial trade in the Philippines were again on display when the Spaniards finally reached Manila. As Spanish vessels entered Manila

\textsuperscript{344} "Relation of the voyage to Luzón" (1570), BR 3, 76.  
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., 84-89.
Bay, they recognized Chinese junks docked in the harbor. Shortly thereafter, Sangleys from these ships came to the Spanish Master-of-Camp complaining about the treatment that they were receiving from Rajah Soliman and the other Moros. These, they complained, had taken away the Sangleys' best goods without paying for them; and they had also removed the helms of the Chinese junks as a way to force the merchants to trade all of their goods at Manila. The Moros refused to return the helms until they were satisfied with their gains and also perhaps with the prices of Chinese imports.

The Spaniards, hoping to form a friendly relationship with Soliman, refused to do anything about these complaints. But they nevertheless also sought to form a friendship with the Chinese. Once the Spanish had landed at Manila, they learned that there were about forty Sangley merchants living there, many of these having married indigenous wives. During the violent altercation between the colony and Soliman, some of the Sangleys' Tagalog wives were taken captive by colonial forces. After the violence was ended, as a sign of goodwill, the Spaniards freely returned these wives to the Sangleys, and they also restored the stolen helms to the Chinese vessels.\textsuperscript{346}

These early incidents provide valuable insights both into the Sangleys' precolonial trade in the Philippines and also into some of the benefits that the Spaniards brought to the overseas Chinese merchants. These encounters showed that, in precolonial times, Sangleys and Moros did not trade on an equal footing in the Philippines. Even though the Sangleys came from the more "developed" civilization, Luzon's Moro merchants were the ones who exercised political control over the terms of trade. The Sangleys had to respect and adapt to the power of Philippine \textit{datus}

\textsuperscript{346} Ibid., 101-102.
not only to be successful in their profession but also to survive. The Moros at Balayan were willing to kill the Sangleys if trade negotiations did not go well, and Soliman similarly used his political authority to force the Chinese merchants to trade more of their goods at Manila and probably at cheaper prices. The importance of military force as part of precolonial trade was further evident in the first encounter between the colonial prau and the Chinese junk. As the prau approached the junk, the Sangleys tried to intimidate the Spaniards by making a "war display." They beat on drums, played fifes, and fired rockets and guns into the air.347 These actions were similar to indigenous war displays, showing once again that in precolonial times trade was often accompanied by violence and force.

These three initial encounters also revealed the Spaniards' emphasis on forming a friendly trading partnership with Chinese merchants. In each case, the Spaniards set themselves apart from local merchants in the Philippines. They apologized and refurbished a junk that they had attacked; they liberated two Chinese captives; and they returned the masts to the Sangleys at Manila. In subsequent years, the Spaniards continued to emphasize good treatment toward the Chinese. In 1573, for example, one colonial official explained that "we have always tried to treat [the Sangleys] well. Therefore during the two years that we have spent on this island, they have come in greater numbers each year, and with more ships."348 The colony's chief notary also reported that, in 1573, three Sangley junks came to Manila and that before they would dock they sent a message asking for an "assurance of safety," which the Governor granted. The Spaniards then made sure to treat the Sangleys "very well."349 Due to the peaceful exchange between the Chinese and the Spaniards and also to the Sangleys' desire for silver, the notary added that the

347 Ibid., 75
348 Guido de Lavesaris, "Affairs in the Philippines after the death of Legaspi" (29 Jun 1573), BR 3, 182.
349 Hernando Riquel, et al., "Las nuevas queescriven de las yslas del Poniente" (11 Jan 1574), BR 3, 243.
Sangleys would "surely return in six or seven months, and will bring a great abundance of many very rare articles." The following year, Limahong attacked Manila and Eng Kang had his first contact with the Spaniards. Though Eng Kang's reasons for deserting from Limahong's fleet remain unclear, he likely benefitted from the Spaniards' continuing attempts to gain the trust of the Sangleys, trust that they hoped would further facilitate trade.

Helped along by the powerful forces of supply and demand, a sufficient level of trust and cooperation developed between the Spaniards and the Sangleys to allow for continued and profitable trade. As trade and economic opportunity in Manila grew, so too did the capital's Sangley population. At first, growth was steady and slow; but it suddenly jumped in later years with the Chinese realization of Manila's great economic potential. In 1570, there were approximately 40 Chinese merchants living in Manila. Within two years, this group had grown to 150. Roughly fifteen years later, in 1586, the population had ballooned to between four and five thousand; by 1590 there were between six and seven thousand; and as that decade progressed the Sangley population shot up to over twenty thousand. This population ballooned even further during the annual trading season, when many thousand Min merchants came to and then left Manila with their various trade goods.

Many Spaniards, fearful of this growing group—a people who outnumbered them twenty to one in Manila by the end of the 1590s—began to emphasize the need to limit Chinese immigration. In 1596, the colony refused to allow an additional thirteen thousand to settle in

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350 Ibid., 245.
352 Santiago de Vera, et al., "Memorial to the Council by citizens of the Filipinas Islands" (26 July 1586), BR 6, 183.
353 Domingo de Salazar, "The Chinese and the Parián at Manila" (24 Jun 1590), BR 7, 229.
354 In 1590, for example, this group of temporary Sangley residents was roughly 2,000 people (see Salazar (1590), 230). By 1603 this number of seasonal traders had reached as high as 6,000 (see Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola "Conqvista de las Islas Malvcas" (1609), BR 16, 296.)
Manila; and it was also decided that the number should be decreased to only three thousand. This lower number was still more than triple the population of Spaniards in Manila, but Spanish officials nevertheless determined that the colony needed at least that many for its continued survival. This estimate of necessary Chinese immigrants in Manila was a recognition of just how necessary the Sangleys had become not only to the global galleon trade but also to the Philippine colony's local economy; and it remains open to question whether this low number would have been indeed sufficient.

Most of the Sangleys were from poor families in Fujian, and they came to Manila seeking economic opportunities. These opportunities were of two types. There was the galleon trade; and there was also the demand in Manila for goods and services that were previously unknown in the islands, goods and services that could not feasibly be imported from Europe or the Americas. Building new lives for themselves, the Manila Sangleys opened shops that sold food, clothing, building materials, etc. As Acuña described in his reports on the massacre, the colony, unable to support itself fully on local food and materials, could not survive without these additional imports.

The Sangleys also fulfilled the colony's artisanal needs. They served the colonial economy as builders, bakers, barbers, cooks, tailors, publishers, farmers, druggists, silversmiths, shoe makers, masons, etc. The Sangleys were also lenders, and they often extended credit to the Spaniards, which further enabled the smooth flow of goods through Manila, even when specie from the Americas was in short supply. The indigenous peoples of the Philippines had not yet

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355 Luis Perez Dasmariñas, "Letter to Felipe II," (1597) BR 9, 320.
357 Acuña, 156-157.
358 Ibid., 158.
acquired, during these early years, the commercial and technological expertise to satisfy the
demands of the colony's Spanish leaders, Japanese immigrants, Chinese merchants, and new
class of colonial indigenous chieftains. These necessary internal economic functions were thus
performed by Sangley immigrants, who became in essence the colony's middle class.

In the late 1590s, with Spanish fears of the Sangleys on the rise, Luis Perez Dasmariñas,
a man who later died during the violence of 1603, surmised that the pursuit of wealth was "the
knot, tie, and strong bond between us and [the Sangleys]," adding further that "except for self-
interest as a medium, [the Spaniards and Sangleys would be] mutually contrary and hateful."359
In other words, profits motivated both sides to negotiate with the other. As will be shown below,
the economic bond between Spaniards and Sangleys was not always amicable; but even when
trade frictions produced heated tensions, there still remained an underlying spirit of cooperation,
one animated by mutual self interest, the basic language of all trade. This economic unification
began with Spanish efforts to treat the Sangleys with kindness, and it was powerful enough to
persist through the cataclysmic 1603 massacre.

The underlying spirit of mutual self interest also necessitated forms of political
cooperation; and Eng Kang was, again, an example of the Sangleys' political assimilation into
the Philippine colonial system. With an increasing Chinese immigrant population, the Spaniards
decided that it was necessary to appoint one Sangley to oversee the rest for the purposes of peace
and security, naming this Sangley as a 'governor' over his people. During these early years,
Sangleys even served in Manila's city council.360 Between 1574-1603, Eng Kang was appointed
multiple times to the post of Chinese governor over the Sangleys. Like the indigenous cabezas de

359 Dasmariñas, 321.
360 Francisco Tello, "Letters to Felipe II" (29 Apr-12 Aug 1597), BR 10, 42.
barangay, as the Sangley governor, it was Eng Kang's job to administer justice on a small scale, to collect tribute from his people, and to make requests on their behalf.\textsuperscript{361} Though the Sangleys' internal political structure remains unclear in the sources, it is almost certain that Eng Kang built and sustained his authority among the Sangleys in ways that were distinct to the Fujianese. He also, like Miguel Banal, answered to a Spanish mayor who was appointed over the his people.\textsuperscript{362} Eng Kang was, in fact, acting in this intermediary role when he came to warn Acuña about the imminent Sangley uprising. He ruled over the Sangleys as a Chinese man, but he did so under the umbrella of colonial authority.

Beyond the colony's official political structure, the Sangleys were also incorporated into colonial governance in other ways. As trade increased, the Spaniards' general "good treatment" policy was replaced by a system of import tariffs and other trade regulations. A three percent duty was placed on all Chinese imports and this was used to fund the colony.\textsuperscript{363} In addition to this import tax, each Sangley migrant had to purchase a license that allowed them to remain in the city. One of the reasons that the colony failed to regulate Chinese immigration was that these licenses were sold by corrupt officials at a profit. It was reported that in one year, these licenses brought in a revenue of 60,000 pesos.\textsuperscript{364} Through these two levies, the Sangleys provided one of the colonial government's primary sources of income. As Acuña explained in a letter to the King, he estimated that, in just one year's time, the massacre would cost the colonial government more than 52,000 pesos in revenue.\textsuperscript{365} The Sangleys were also able, within the blended colonial

\textsuperscript{362} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{363} Morga, BR 16, 181.
\textsuperscript{364} Acuña, 148-149.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 157.
system, to file complaints in colonial courts. These complaints, like those of Banal, helped to reify the blended colonial structure.

While this system forced the Sangleys to pay money to the colonial government it also decreased trade frictions because it was a relatively legible and reliable system. As shown above, in precolonial times, trade had to be negotiated with various individual datus and the terms of trade might be easily changed depending on specific circumstances, e.g. whether datus wanted more goods than the Chinese wanted to offer. But in the colonial system, however imperfect, the Sangleys had both some form of legal recourse and a Chinese advocate who was part of the colonial order. The Spaniards were unquestionably favored in the colonial system. But profitable trade had not been dependent on expectations of fairness prior to the Spaniards' arrival, and it certainly was not so afterward. The more institutionalized (though not fair) treatment of the Sangleys contributed to the growth in trade. This standardization of the Sangley-Spanish trade relationship at Manila, through the legal assimilation of the Chinese into the colonial system, provided the necessary political foundation for the increasing flow of commodities through the Philippines. Eng Kang, as a prominent longtime resident and governor, was a central part of this political inclusion.

Eng Kang's prominence in the colonial community was also related to his religious affiliation. Sometime during the late 1580s, he was baptized and Christened Juan Baptista de Vera. During this time, the Bishop of the Philippines, Domingo de Salazar, was concerned that Chinese conversions to Catholicism were motivated more by economic gain than by a desire to turn one's life over to God. He, therefore, ordered that prior to baptism Sangleys be require to cut their hair. "When I see one of them hesitate as to cutting off his hair," Salazar wrote, "it seems to
me that he has not come for baptism in the right spirit, and for that reason I do not admit him to baptism."³⁶⁶ In Ming times, long hair was more than just a fashion among men, it was a symbol of personal pride and cultural belonging. Indeed, years later, during the Ming-Qing transition, the new Qing emperor ordered that all men adopt a different hair style, the famous Manchu queue, a style that was forcibly imported by the conquering Manchus during the seventeenth century. Han Chinese who refused to shave most of their heads in the Manchu way, demonstrating thereby their loyalty to the fallen Ming regime, were executed.³⁶⁷

Salazar's logic similarly used hair cutting as a means of political control. Christian Sangleys were given certain benefits in the Philippines, and one of these was the right to marry indigenous women, something that was otherwise forbidden to their "heathen" brothers. Fearing that, after baptism and marriage, Christian Sangleys would return to China, thereby separating themselves permanently both from the church and from their new wives and families, Salazar made hair cutting a mandatory prerequisite for Sangley baptisms. Requiring the Chinese to cut their hair was a way of ensuring that Christian Sangleys would not return to China, where those with short hair were certain to be ostracized.

This Philippine Catholic tradition continued well into the seventeenth century and it dramatically decreased the number of Chinese converts in the Philippines. In fact, the Governor-General of the Philippines, Santiago de Vera, complained to the Crown that, "if their long hair were not cut off when they were baptized (according to the bishop's commands), there would already have been a general conversion in this land, and they would have received baptism."³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ Domingo de Salazar, "The collection of tributes in the Filipinas Islands" (1591), BR 7, 308.
³⁶⁸ Santiago de Vera "Letter to Felipe II" (1589), BR 7, 92.
Eng Kang's Christian name, Juan Baptista de Vera—coming in part from the Governor—
suggests that Eng Kang was probably also opposed to the Bishop's regulation. It is, indeed,
possible that Governor de Vera's idea of a general conversion originated with his friend Eng
Kang. From Eng Kang or not, this idea likely came from some one or more of the Chinese.

Though we cannot know directly from the sources if Eng Kang opposed the hair cutting
requirement, it is nevertheless clear that conversion brought him political, social, and economic
advantages. Only Chinese Christians, for example, were allowed to become the colonial
governor over the Sangleys. Furthermore, by recruiting Santiago de Vera to be his godfather, Eng
Kang was using Catholic god-parentage, or compadrazgo—a form of religious patronage—to
build a relationship between himself and Manila's Governor-General. This relationship—linking
Eng Kang as it did to colonial officials—was, without question, one of his most valuable
economic and social assets. Historian Christine Dobbin has described compadrazgo as an
innovative means used by Sangley merchants to bring together the Spanish and Chinese worlds.
Through god-parentage, she explains, Sangleys constructed a dual identity, "an overlap of
Hispanicism and Catholicism varnished on a South China entrepreneurial personality."369

In addition to being baptized, many Christian Sangleys sought to help Spanish
missionaries to extend their fields of labor into China. Whether Eng Kang himself tried to help
open a mission in China is unknown, but he clearly did help to facilitate conversions in the
Philippines. We know, for example, that he became a godfather to other Sangleys at the time of
their baptism; and in doing this, compadrazgo again served more than just religious ends. The
Chinese in the Philippines not only used god-parentage to build relationships with the Spaniards,

369 Christine Dobbin, Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities: Conjoint Communities in the Making of the World-Economy
(Britain: Curzon, 1996), 41.
but also to form relationships of patronage among themselves. In fact, one of the evidences used against Eng Kang at his trial was that one of his Chinese godchildren, Juan Untae, was clearly a leader in the Sangley rebellion.

The non-spiritual advantages of compadrazgo should not, however, lead us to conclude that Sangley conversions were always superficial and insincere. Indeed, Eng Kang's insistence on his Christian belief in the face of death suggests that Catholicism was more to him than just a means for economic, political, or social gain. It is nevertheless clear that baptism brought more than spiritual advantages. In addition to enabling the formation of patronage relationships among Spaniards and Sangleys alike, it also brought a decrease in the amount of tribute one owed to the colonial government and allowed for legal local marriage with indigenous women. Whatever unknowable combination of spiritual and corporeal benefits motivated Eng Kang's conversion, religion unquestionably helped him to gain the trust of colonial officials.

As a merchant, a colonial official, and a Christian, Eng Kang embodied all three means of Sangley assimilation into internal colonial authority. Economically, he and other Sangley merchants negotiated the foundation of the Manila galleon trade and also played several essential roles in the internal Philippine colonial economy; politically, Eng Kang, more than once, served as the colonial governor over the Sangleys, and other Sangleys also participated in colonial governance; and religiously, Eng Kang was not only converted himself, but he also sponsored the baptism of others. These three means of cooperation also demonstrated various levels of colonial assimilation among the Sangleys. Most of the Sangleys were, unlike Eng Kang, never baptized, but all were part of the commercial and political system that enabled the flow of goods from China into the Philippines and beyond. In these three ways, Eng Kang fulfilled an irreplaceable
and supportive role in the making of colonial sovereignty, a place that represented the larger
contributions of the Sangley community more generally.

These economic, political, and religious points of contact between the Spaniards and the
Sangleys, however, did more than just help to form a system of cooperation; they also generated
significant frictions, frictions that overheated in 1603 leading to extreme anti-Chinese violence.
As described above, the visit of Ming officials to Manila led many Spaniards to believe that
China was planning to invade the Philippines and that the Sangleys had been recruited to assist in
this invasion. This, of course, heightened tensions between the Spaniards and the Chinese in
Manila. But had it not been for the already warm friction between these two groups, this external
threat probably would not have been enough to spark such widespread violence. Long before the
arrival of the Mandarins, however, intensifying Spanish-Sangley contention had pushed Manila's
galleon market to the brink of disaster, where it sat teetering for several years, generating both
great wealth and great risk. This contention generated a spirit of mutual suspicion between the
two peoples. In one direction, suspicions caused the Sangleys to believe that the Spaniards were
planning to massacre them; and, in the other direction, suspicions fed Spanish fears about
Sangley involvement in a Ming plot to conquer Manila.

Eng Kang was, again, at the crossroads of these suspicions. It was reported that many of
the rebel Sangleys believed him to be an ally of the Spaniards, he having warned them of
impending violence. For their part, Spanish suspicions informed an opposite reading of Eng
Kang's involvement. Beyond the above referenced story told by terrified Sangley captives, the
Spaniards knew, for example, that one of Eng Kang's Chinese Catholic godsons, Juan Untae, was
a high ranking leader of the revolt, and that some of Eng Kang's African slaves had also joined
the uprising. Eng Kang, they assumed, had put them up to it. After Eng Kang's arrest the
Spaniards, furthermore, found gunpowder and fireworks in his home, items that the Sangleys
often sold at Manila, but that colonial leaders concluded were stashed there in preparation either
for the Sangley attack or for the supposed Ming military invasion. The suspicions that drove
the Spaniards' reading of the evidence against Eng Kang were likely also informed by
speculation about other incidents in his and the Sangleys' shared past, a history that not only
included the above described spirit of cooperation but also an interwoven spirit of contention.
Like the cooperative foundation of the galleon trade, the contentious frictions that threatened the
trade were economic, political, and religious.

Before outlining the history of these frictions, I should emphasize that contentions and
unequal relations of power are not evidence for the non-existence of a political community or for
an absence of cooperation. Political, social, and cultural communities at every scale are stratified
into various levels of unequal influence, and every cooperative relationship also includes
disagreements with varying degrees of contention. Though significant disputes were a longtime
part of Sangley-Spanish relations in Manila, they did not overpower avenues of cooperation until
the outbreak of violence in 1603, and even then mercantile cooperation reemerged. Despite
contentions, the Sangleys and the Spaniards were part of one common system of political
sovereignty. Persistent contentions—emerging as they did from habits of interaction—were
indeed a part of that system, not evidence of its non-existence. The construction of political
communities and of sovereignty are not just the result of creating commonalities between
peoples, but they are better thought of a result of persistent interactions over time, interactions

370 Lopez, 159, 164-165.
that define and often institutionalize interethnic relationships, leading to both assimilation and to differentiation, neither of which prevents some level of cooperation.

For the majority of colonial Manila's first thirty years, the Sangleys outnumbered the Spaniards several times over. Many Spaniards, however, were comforted by the idea that a Chinese uprising would run counter to the economic interests of the Sangleys, this idea assuring them that the Chinese would never revolt. Trade negotiations between the two people were, nevertheless, often tense and heated. In 1582, for example, a Spanish friar named Juan Bautista wrote a letter to the Crown on behalf of the Sangleys. Bautista explained in his letter that he had interviewed several Sangleys who spoke of bad treatment from the Spaniards. This friar—one of the very few Spaniards who had learned any Chinese by the early 1580s—was likely the second man from whom Eng Kang took his full Christian name, Juan Bautista de Vera. Bautista perhaps even taught Eng Kang the gospel. This connection suggests that Eng Kang may have been one of the Chinese who gave input to Bautista for his letter. Whether he was or not, the Sangleys told Bautista that they were often forced by the Spaniards to row for their galleys and to sell their merchandise at a low prices. The Spaniards, furthermore, sometimes forcibly entered the Sangleys' houses, where they searched for valuable goods that they would simply take, giving very little money in return. Because of this treatment, many Sangleys decided not to settle in Manila during these early years.371

Relations between the Spaniards and the Sangleys appear to have improved slightly during the 1590s, which accompanied an increase in trade and Sangley immigration. By 1598, Eng Kang was without question a prominent member of Manila's Chinese community; and he

371 Juan Bautista, "Carta de fray Juan Bautista sobre los agravios que reciben los sangleyes por lo que se vuelven sin querer poblar allí" (1582), FILÍPINAS,84,N.26, AGI.
almost certainly played a major role in drafting a letter from the Sangleys to the King of Spain. In that letter, the Sangleys explained that treatment was again getting worse. They were, as before, being forced to sell their goods at artificially low prices; colonial courts, furthermore, were refusing to hear their complaints; and bribery of Spanish officials had become a trading necessity. Spanish traders also threatened the Chinese with violence, insulted them, forcibly took their goods, and even sometimes physically assaulted them. Arguments, corruption, legal theft, and violence all increased trade frictions and decreased Sangleys profits. This adverse environment of trade did not prevent the Sangleys from making a profit anymore than it had in precolonial times among the Moros. But personal and interethnic abuses nevertheless did create hostilities between Spaniards and the Chinese; and these hostilities, no doubt, fed into the larger suspicions surrounding the revolt and massacre.

Events leading up to the massacre also revealed rising political tensions between the Sangleys and the Spaniards. In the 1590s, the Governor of the Philippines dismissed the Sangleys serving on Manila's city council, and there were also several court cases involving both Spaniards and Sangleys. These seemingly small disputes were also accompanied by much larger political tensions. Chinese historian John Wills has suggested that there may well have been a plot among the Sangleys to conquer Manila. Though a lack of direct Sangley sources makes it impossible to confirm such a plan, the events leading up to the massacre certainly

372 “Carta de los chinos infieles de Luzón a S.M., pidiendo remedio de los agravios y cohechos que sufrián en su comercio” (May 1598), MP-ESCRITURA_CIFRA,28, AGI.
374 Tello (1597), 42; Francisco Tello, et al., "Ordinances enacted by the Audiencia of Manila" (1598-1599), BR 11, 22.
suggest the distinct possibility of one. As suspected by the Spaniards, for example, there seems to have been little reason for the Sangley Tio Heng to have invited the Ming officials to Manila if not to persuade them that they should invade the city. Tio Heng almost certainly knew, after all, that there was no mountain of gold and silver in the area. Furthermore, when the Ming officials determined that there was no truth to the rumor, Tio Heng protested screaming "I tell you that you should cut off the heads of the Indians of this country, and you will find their necks all covered with chains and necklaces of gold; and this is the gold that I told you of," a statement that implies some intention of violence or of conquering local peoples.

Eng Kang provides another clue into what a Chinese conquest of Manila my have looked like. The Spaniards rightly believed that, as the owners of the Manila galleons, their presence in Manila was critical to Sangley profits. But, in 1595, Eng Kang—or one of his representatives—journeyed to Mexico, perhaps to test whether he alone or his people collectively could sustain trade over the Pacific without the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{377} Assuming that Eng Kang was a ring leader in the plan to conquer Manila, he might have considered sailing ships himself between Manila and Acapulco. Another indication that there may have been a larger plan to attack the Philippines was a dearth of trading junks from China in 1603. Many who came annually from Fujian to Manila to trade, presumably, did not come in that year because they suspected an outbreak of violence. Their annual journeys, however, always happened during the time of year when the Mandarins came to Manila, not after, meaning that these Min merchants seemed to believe that something might happen before the events were even set in motion. In any case, political tensions were clearly central to the final conflict. The Spaniards' fear alone of a planned political conquest from

\textsuperscript{376} Miguel de Benavides, "Letters to Felipe III" (1603), BR 12, 106.
\textsuperscript{377} "Caja de Acapulco. Cuentas de Real Hacienda" (1594-1595), CONTADURIA,900, AGI.
China, even if such a plan was a pure fabrication of their imagination, was a powerful force toppling one domino after another in the sequence of events leading up to the Sangley uprising.

Political fears and suspicions were further compounded by the involvement of Sangleys in previous episodes of violence. From the time of Limahong, many Spaniards always suspected that the Sangleys had no real loyalty to the colony, even though they benefitted economically from its existence. The first substantial political conflict between Spaniards and Sangleys was Limahong's attack in 1574. Though this attack had happened almost 30 years before the Sangley massacre, it was nevertheless related to the violence of 1603. Beginning in 1575, the colony celebrated November 30th every year in commemoration of the day that they had expelled Limahong from Manila. That date was, in fact, remembered by the Spaniards and the colony as the day that Manila was permanently founded. November 30th was even designated as a colony-wide day-off from trade and labor.\textsuperscript{378} It was, therefore, no coincidence that the Sangleys originally planned their uprising to begin on November 30, though necessity forced them to move the date up to October.\textsuperscript{379} Maybe the Sangleys chose that date because they felt some affinity with Limahong; or perhaps they did so because its celebration was so closely linked to the establishment of colonial sovereignty, which they hoped to dislodge; or maybe they had simply heard one too many times that Limahong's defeat proved the Spaniards' military superiority over the Chinese, and they wanted to spite the heady Europeans by selecting the very day on which they had supposedly been saved by divine intervention. Regardless of the reason, the ghost of Limahong had not gone away.

\textsuperscript{378} Alsonso de Mentrida, \textit{Ritual Para Administrar Los Sanctos Sacramentos Sacado Casi Todo Del Ritual Romano, I Lo De Mas Del Ritual Indico} (Manila: Colegio de Sancto Thomas, 1630), v.

\textsuperscript{379} The date of the uprising was, however, moved up when the Chinese leaders felt that they could wait no longer. Maldonado, 135-136. See chapter six complete details.
Between 1574 and 1603, other episodes of violence added further to suspicions against the Sangleys. In 1593, the Governor-General of the Philippines, Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, gathered a fleet of ships to conquer the Maluku Islands, or 'Spice Islands.' He, in need of rowers, demanded the support of the Sangleys. Reluctantly, five hundred of the Chinese immigrants were drafted into colonial service; and Dasmariñas promised to pay them for their work. One night, near midnight, as the fleet was journeying from Manila to the Malukus, the Sangley rowers awoke the Governor-General with his Spanish crew and killed all but one of them, a woman, who was left alive and alone on an island. These Sangleys then took the ship and escaped into present day Vietnam.380

Suspicions were compounded when the Sangleys offered only minimal military support against a Dutch attack on Manila in 1600. The Chinese did, indeed, prepare a junk for battle, and this ship even accompanied the other colonial ships when they went out to attack the Dutch. But the Sangley vessel did not engage the enemy. While Spanish and other vessels fought against the Dutch—employing Spanish, Japanese, and indigenous soldiers—the Sangleys seemed to be watching and waiting, preparing it seemed to the Spaniards to take the side of whoever proved to be the victor. For the Spaniards, a people who often measured greatness by one's military service, the betrayal in 1593 and the refusal to help the colony against the Dutch in 1600 fueled suspicions that the Chinese were treasonous, greedy, and perhaps worst of all simply cowardly. All of these qualities, in the Spaniards' view, depicted the Sangleys as a self interested people who did not care about the survival of the colony. Sangleys, like Eng Kang, may have served in

380 Argensola, 250.
official colonial positions, but their record of military service left lingering doubts about their political loyalties.

Finally, Eng Kang's life also exemplified some of the major religious tensions between the Spaniards and the Sangleys. As mentioned above, Eng Kang sponsored the baptisms of other Sangleys, becoming their Christian godfather. It might seem that this practice would have been welcomed by the Spaniards, but the Sangleys—both the unconverted and the converted—adopted the practice in ways that caused objections among colonial leaders. Prominent Sangleys, like Eng Kang, began

  receiving and having a great number of godchildren, both Christian and infidel, in order to have them ready for any emergency that may arise, and to employ them as false witnesses [in trials]...and for other evil purposes and intents, exchanging with them favors and assistance in their affairs.\(^{381}\)

Apparently, even those who were not baptized began to adopt the names of other Sangleys after the *compadrazgo* tradition. These practices created "partisan" Sangley groups who helped one another, dividing the Sangley community into "factions" that were, according to the Spaniards, ruining the Chinese district.

All godparent relationships among the Sangleys were, therefore, abolished by the Philippine governor in 1599, a legal action that attempted both to sever all previously contracted *compadrazgo* relationships and also to stop any future god-parentage relationships from forming. "Any Sangley, of any rank" who was found honoring past Chinese *compadrazgo* relationships or entering into new ones was to be condemned to row in the galleys without pay for four years.\(^{382}\)

While this ban was explicitly made to stop partisan strife among the Sangleys, it may have also

\(^{381}\) Tello, et al., (1598-1599), 76.
\(^{382}\) Ibid., 76-77.
been aimed at protecting the Spaniards from the formation of increasingly large Sangley patronage networks, factions that might be turned toward rebellious purposes.

Another religious prohibition similarly influenced the ability of the Sangleys to form informal communities of patronage among themselves. Among the people of Min, especially among those who lived on the seas, homosexuality was commonly practiced in a way that built bonds of patronage between male leaders and their male dependents. As explained by one early seventeenth century Chinese author,

The people of Min consider sexual attraction between men to be very important. Whether rich or poor, beautiful or ugly, each unites with his kind. The elder one is the sworn older brother, the younger the sworn younger brother. When the elder enters the younger's home, the younger one's parents cherish him as a son-in-law. The younger one's plans for later life, including his expenses for taking a wife, are all managed by the elder brother…

I have heard that this business began with sea pirates. It is forbidden to have women on the open seas for fear that their presence makes the boat capsize. So the pirates use male favorites as substitutes, and pirate captains are called 'contractual fathers.'

Taking younger sexual partners was known as "contracting a little brother," and this practice was used by wealthy and poor families alike to build and expand their networks of trade and power. Some remained in Fujian and contracted little brothers who went overseas on their behalf, while others contracted little brothers into their merchant-pirate fleets, traveling with them. Little brothers became dependents of their contractual father patrons, and might themselves elevate their status to become powerful seafarers and merchants. It was believed that Eng Kang was...

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385 The powerful patriarch of the Zheng family, Zheng Zhilong, for example was thought to have become a contractual little brother to a rich man of Min named Li Dan. See Ibid.
first contracted into the service of Limahong through homosexual relations, and this practice continued among many Sangleys even after they arrived in the Philippines.

The Spaniards first learned about homosexual sex among the Sangleys during their early encounters with the Chinese, but they did not become overly alarmed by it until the explosion of Sangley immigration during the 1590s. In 1597, one Spaniard, attempting to persuade the King to command the deportation of all Sangleys from the Philippines, wrote that all the Chinese, "from the sons of great mandarins down to the lowest class," were guilty of engaging in homosexual relations, including he believed even the Emperor himself. While this certainly overstated the extent of homosexuality in early modern China, the claim was a powerful example of how suspicions shaped perceptions. In 1599, the colonial governor, targeting the Sangleys, explicitly outlawed homosexuality. Those who violated this law were to be burned at the stake, a punishment that had already been meted out on at least a few Sangleys.

By 1603, fears about homosexuality and requests for the expulsion of the Sangleys had reached fever pitch among several of the Spaniards. Notable among these was the Archbishop of Manila, Miguel de Benavides. After the departure of the Ming officials, Benavides wrote that he feared the Philippine colony would be destroyed, in part because of the will of God. His main concern was not with the Ming invasion, though he was indeed concerned about that. In his eyes, the Sangleys needed to be expelled first and foremost because of the "continual sodomy" which they practiced, and which was being spread to the indigenous peoples of the Philippines. "God will consume us all with fire some day," he explained, "or in some other way destroy us, since

386 Bartolome Leonardo Argensola, Conquista de las Islas Malucas (Madrid: Alonso Martin, 1609), 315.
387 Francisco de Sande, "Relation and Description of the Phelipinas Islands" (8 Jun 1577), 51.
388 Dasmariñas, 319.
389 Francisco Tello, et al., (1598-1599), 57.
390 Dasmariñas, 319.
we, a Christian people, are tolerating and supporting in our own country a people so given to this vice." Indeed, during the year 1603, after the Mandarin's visit, half of Manila had burned to the ground, an event that was unquestionably perceived by many to be a punishment from God. As the day of the uprising neared and tensions increased between the Sangleys and the Spaniards, the anti-Sangley rhetoric of the Bishop only became increasingly inflammatory. This rhetoric became so heated that some even blamed Benavides directly for the outbreak of violence.

Though *compadrazgo* and homosexuality existed on opposite ends of the Catholic moral spectrum, the Spaniards' laws about both were similarly related to Sangley community cohesion. As described in chapter six, filial piety has long been a central feature of Chinese confucian culture, one that the Emperor used to justify his lack of action in the wake of the 1603 Sangley massacre. The people of Min, including Sangleys, however, were themselves very conscious of their ancestors. Indeed, lineage and family were central concepts of community organization among them. Many of the Sangleys, in fact, used their new wealth to rebuild and embellish their ancestral shrines in Fujian; and these investments were also a way of investing in one's familial community. Each shrine represented not only ancestors but also a community of people who revered those ancestors; and this community is what some now call a lineage organization. Aside from building temples together, lineage groups also owned collective lands,

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391 Benavides, 107.
392 Geronimo de Salazar y Salcedo, "Three Chinese Mandarins at Manila" (27 May 1603), BR 12, 85.
393 Pedro de Acuña, et al., "Complaints against the archbishop" (1605), BR 14, 32.
participated collectively in festivals and rituals, and invested in joint ventures. One such joint venture was overseas trade, like the silk-for-silver trade at Manila.

One important aspect of these lineage groups was that people could be adopted into them through rituals and sponsorship. As described above, homosexuality was one traditional Fujianese way of forming a family-like bond between a patron and his dependent; and it is clear that compadrazgo was likewise adapted to perform a similar function among both Christian and non-Christian Sangleys. Homosexual sex and compadrazgo built bonds between Sangleys that formed them into larger commercial communities. Laws relating to these two practices were, therefore, not simply religious regulations, they were laws that affected Sangley methods of forming commercial, social, and even familial bonds with one another. These laws likely weakened cohesion among the Sangleys, helping perhaps to keep these merchant groups independent from one another, a fragmented reality that helped the colony first to repel the Sangley attack and then to overwhelm the divided outsiders.

Innocent of treason, guilty, or perhaps some mixture of both, Eng Kang was unquestionably central to the incorporation of the Sangleys into the structure of internal colonial authority. As a merchant, a colonial official, and a Christian, he helped to build economic, political, and cultural bridges between the Spaniards and the Sangleys. During his thirty years in Manila, he also certainly contributed to the commercial, political, and religious tensions between the two groups, and he may well have planned the overthrow of colonial authority in the Philippines. He might have even intended to replace the Manila galleons with his own fleet of transpacific vessels.
For the next two hundred years, Chinese immigrants continued to straddle the line between colonial inclusion and exclusion, between being embraced as partners and being rejected as enemies, between prosperity and violence. Whichever role they were playing at any given moment, they were part of the colony's system of internal authority, a system that was first constructed between 1565-1610. As collaborators, their trade was foundational to the survival of the colony; and as enemies, other colonial ethnic groups—i.e. the Spanish, indigenous, and Japanese—became more unified in opposition to the Sangleys. In life, in other words, Eng Kang helped to conquer the Philippines with the Spaniards; in death, Eng Kang and his people were themselves conquered.
Part 3: Conclusion

The Third Layer of Colonial Sovereignty

The first violence of the Sangley uprising, like the initial defeat of Soliman, did not directly involve Europeans. It, instead, began between a group of Sangleys and a group of Tagalog people. This violence may have, in fact, been related to Miguel Banal's first petitions to the King. In 1603, Banal complained that the Jesuits had not only taken his lands, but that they were also renting them out to the Sangleys. Nothing explicit is recorded about Banal's relationship with the Chinese immigrants occupying what he claimed to be his territory. But a close look at the Sangley uprising suggests that the dispute over Banal's lands not only created antagonism between himself and the Jesuits but also between himself and the Sangleys. On the night when the uprising began, the eve of St. Francis, the first place that violence broke out was at or near the Tagalog village of Quiapo, Banal's village.

Because most of the surviving sources from the early modern times were written by and for Spaniards, much more was recorded about the Spanish relationship with the Chinese than about the relationships between the Sangleys and the various indigenous peoples of the Philippines. What is known about these relationships, nevertheless, provides valuable insights into the ways that the third layer of Philippine sovereignty was, and was not, blended into the larger composite system. As described above, the first two layers of Philippine authority involved the blending together of the European imperial system with the Philippine barangay system. This blending involved the creation of a permanent and relatively stable relationship between Spanish and indigenous peoples. The story of Eng Kang also shows blending between the Spanish and the Chinese peoples in the Philippines. The Sangleys and the indigenous peoples
of the islands, however, did not, during these early years, form a blended relationship with one another.

This lack of integration was evident in the violence of the Sangley massacre. If the Sangley massacre is viewed as a conflict between only two peoples—the Spaniards and the Sangleys—it is nearly impossible to imagine that the much smaller Spanish army was able not only to defeat the Sangleys but also to entirely wipe out a population more than twenty times its size, especially when we consider that Spanish and Chinese weapons at Manila did not differ significantly. One historian has recently suggested that the Spaniards inflated the number of Chinese in the massacre in order to show off their military prowess. But this assertion has two major problems. First, the Spaniards were not proud of what they had done. If anything they would have claimed a smaller number. They feared the retaliation of the Ming, and a smaller number would have made the massacre seem less severe. They also blamed the Royal Audiencia for allowing so much unchecked immigration. But the Audiencia offered no defense with regard to the actual population. They instead conceded that there were, indeed, approximately 20,000 dead. Second, the numbers used to support this claim were gathered by immigration officials before the massacre, officials who, everyone knew, reported lower numbers so that they could appear to be in accordance with the law, while also allowing rampant illegal immigration so that they could reap profits from the black-market sale of residential licenses to the Sangleys.\(^{396}\)

The actual reason for the colonial victory was multiethnic cooperation against the Sangleys. The Spaniards, of course, feature prominently in their own narratives of the events. But they also refer to support from thousands of Philippine and Japanese troops, troops that

outnumbered their own several times over. The Sangley massacre was, in other words, a cooperative multiethnic effort, not a simple "Spanish" one. The multiethnic nature of the anti-Sangley offensive was on display in the destruction of the Parian. For the first several days of the conflict, the Parian remained unaffiliated with either multiethnic colonial power or with its anti-colonial Sangley opposition. On October 7, however, the Sangley opposition launched a small offensive on Manila; and Spanish leaders, believing that part of the rebellion was being organized from within the Parian, authorized an attack on the Chinese quarter. This attack was led by a thousand Pampangan soldiers. These went into the Parian, with some Spaniards, and quickly killed more than a thousand Sangleys, then they set fire to the homes of the three hundred "most important and richest merchants," many of whom were burned alive. When the Japanese saw what was happening they too joined the Pampangans; and "together they killed all the Chinese whom they met, and went away, this man with a chest, this one with a pair of breeches, [and others with] bags filled with silk and rich articles."397

This multiethnic violence both demonstrated and perpetuated a sentiment of exclusion toward the Sangleys among the colony's various non-Chinese residents. In chapters six and seven, I described some of the reasons for antagonisms between the Spaniards and the Sangleys; and Japanese antagonisms likely grew out of a historically internalized sense of difference between the two peoples. But the near universal colonial support coming from the region's various indigenous peoples is much harder to explain. Why is there no mention of any indigenous peoples helping the Sangley rebels? Why was there no movement to overthrow the colony among the people of Manila? Why, in other words, didn't anyone try to do again what

397 Miguel Rodriguez de Maldonado, "The Sangley insurrection of 1603" (1606), BR 14, 129.
Soliman had attempted in the time of Limahong? Or what Agustin had tried during the 1580s? Given the scarcity of information about the relationships between the Sangleys and the various peoples of the Philippines, these questions are difficult to answer conclusively. But we can, nevertheless, provide some reasons behind the Sangley-\textit{indio} division.

Some historians have suggested that Philippine peoples joined with the Spaniards against the Sangleys because they were jealous of Chinese economic success. There appears, however, to be very little direct evidence to support this claim. It is likely that some Philippine participants attacked the Sangleys, in part, so that they could enjoy some of what was sure to provide a wealth of spoils. But there is little reason to assume other economic motives. Perhaps many of them accepted the fiery rhetoric of Bishop Benavides condemning homosexual practices among the Sangleys. They may have joined with the Spaniards because of the alliances that they had formed with the Europeans, or because they assumed that the Spaniards—due to their widespread support—would prove victorious.

Whatever the reasons for supporting the colony against the Sangleys, the division between the \textit{indios} and the Chinese was almost certainly related to Spanish efforts to keep the two separate. I explained in part two that, during precolonial times, the Moros and the Sangleys carried on a trade relationship with one another, and some Moros no doubt even spoke the Sangley's language. This linguistic ability and trade continued into the generation of Soliman and perhaps even endured into the late 1580s. Agustin, after all, was able to find himself a Tagalog man who could translate Japanese. But with the Spanish takeover of the China trade and the increasing fluency of missionaries in Chinese, the need for indigenous translators declined; and
the skill itself among indigenous people probably also became increasingly rare. This no doubt helped to create a division between Chinese and indigenous peoples.

The Spaniards also passed laws that were aimed at restricting contact between the two groups. They outlawed sexual relationships between non-Christian Sangleys and indigenous peoples; and they also outlawed trade between the two groups. Christians were permitted to marry indigenous women; but to be baptized the Sangleys also had to cut their hair, a provision that was designed to keep these Chinese in the Philippines and thus to remove them from the external world of China itself. The Spaniards also did all they could to eradicate homosexual relations between Sangleys and indios.

If pre-massacre actions helped to keep the indigenous peoples separate from the Sangleys, the violence itself made this division even more pronounced and permanent. Governor Acuña reported after the massacre that without these native troops "I know not what would have happened"; and he added that the Tagalog, Pampangan, and other indigenous warriors were "very proud of being soldiers and of serving your Majesty in military affairs." Many of these soldiers even served as musketeers for the colonial forces. The Governor rewarded these troops with presents; and even the King himself later expressed gratitude for the service of these indios in helping to put down the Sangleys. Through this massacre, Acuña added, these indios "lost their fear for the Sangleys, and have declared against them." The division even became apparent in Spanish-Tagalog dictionaries. In these dictionaries words were often accompanied by sentences that portrayed their meaning. For Spanish word "cuchillada," meaning "to slash with a knife," the

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398 Francisco Tello, et al., "Ordinances enacted by the Audiencia of Manila (concluded)" (1588-89), BR 11, 56-58.
399 Pedro de Acuña, et al., "The Sangley insurrection" (1603), BR 12, 160.
accompanying phrase that Tagalog speakers were meant to associate with this term was "back when the Sangleys rebelled, I slashed one [to death]." 400

This first massacre established a pattern that, for almost a hundred years, became a central aspect of the final layer of colonial sovereignty. During the seventeenth century, Manila's trade frictions produced a tragic cycle that was repeated three times. After 1603, the profits of the galleon trade again prompted tens of thousands of Fujianese merchants to move to the Philippines, where these new Sangleys, braving the dangers of migration, repopulated the empty layer of authority that Eng Kang and his generation had built and left behind. Following this first massacre and Sangley remigration, another massacre took place in 1639, followed again by another repopulation and then another massacre in 1662. These later massacres were not as complete as the first, but they similarly led to the deaths of tens of thousands.

These later massacres, like the one in 1603, involved external pressures adding to internal tensions; and they likewise continued to pitt indigenous peoples against the Sangleys, thereby blending together joint indigenous-Spanish power by wielding it against a shared enemy. Periodic anti-Sangley violence continued after 1662; but due to a decline in profits from the galleon trade, the completion of the transition from Ming to Qing authority in China, and no doubt fears of more violence, the Chinese immigrant population in the Philippines did not return to its early seventeenth century levels until the nineteenth century.

This cycle of violence can help to explain the relationship between the second and third layers of sovereignty. Both were blended upward into Spanish imperial authority, but they were not blended sideways into each other; and this division was partly responsible for colonial

survival. Had a significant number of indigenous peoples sided with the Sangleys instead of with the Spaniards, these military conflicts almost certainly would have turned out differently. But the persistent segregation between Sangley merchants and the indigenous peoples enabled colonial authorities to use the one against the other. In this way, the colonial authority was able to withstand this brutal and threatening cycle time and again; and after each massacre, Sangleys returned to Manila and re-assimilated themselves into the colonial positions of their predecessors. Shared economic interests bound the Sangleys and Spaniards together, and peace produced wealth and unity. Violence too produced unity, but this unity was among the Spanish, Japanese, and indigenous peoples of the Philippines, these uniting with one another to the exclusion of the Sangleys.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

The beginnings of Philippine sovereignty was itself evidence of the birth of globalization. As I have shown in this dissertation, between 1565-1610 forces from the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and East Asian worlds all collided in the Philippines, completing for the first time a full-circle multiethnic global network of power, commerce, and culture. Spain, expanding out of the Atlantic world, converged with Portugal, coming from the Indian Ocean; Christianity, traveling with the Spaniards, similarly converged with Indian Ocean Islam; silver, mined in the Americas and carried on the Spanish galleons converged with silk and other Chinese exports; and all of these convergences happened simultaneously in the Philippines, collectively contributing to the creation of sovereignty. These sundry forces, however, were not just present in the formation of sovereignty, they were also interconnected and interdependent. Take away any one of these convergences and Philippine sovereignty would have likely failed to become a reality.

The interdependence of these forces was evident in the lives of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, Miguel Banal, and Eng Kang—a Spanish conquistador, a Tagalog chieftain, and a Chinese merchant. These three individuals helped to create early Philippine sovereignty, and each also represented a people who were critical to the formation of the larger whole. As described above, Legazpi was a direct participant in the convergence of Spain and Portugal. But Islam and the China trade were no less essential to the formation of his initial layer of authority in the islands. Legazpi, when he and his men arrived in the Philippines, needing food, began to obtain provisions through Manila's Moros—the ancestors of Banal; and the chain of trade that brought food to Legazpi and his men was also directly connected to Manila's yearly commerce with
overseas Chinese merchants, a people represented here by Eng Kang. Banal's Moro predecessors traded with Legazpi because they had learned the value of silver in China by observing trade between Japanese and Chinese merchants in Manila. This trade was taking place at Manila because of Ming regulations banning direct trade between China and Japan. Banal's Moro ancestors therefore became allies to Legazpi, and they provided him with crucial assistance as he transported the colony's capital from Cebu to Manila. Without this Moro support, support that
came to Legazpi because of the China trade, Legazpi's expedition, like the four before it, probably would have failed.

Banal's family history also showed the interdependence of global forces in the formation of colonial sovereignty. Aside from its direct participation in the convergence of Islam and Christianity, the course Banal's family history was also redirected by the political expansion of European imperial system and by the arrival of silver. As described in chapter two, had it not been for the expansion of Portugal, Spanish sailors would not have had the necessary knowledge to discover the return route across the Pacific back to Mexico, a necessary discovery that enabled colonial permanence, one that incorporated Manila into Spain's imperial pyramid of authority. In his appeals to the Crown, Banal sent his requests simultaneously upward and eastward through that imperial hierarchy of patronage and also across the new ocean route. Silver's takeover of the Moro's precolonial China trade also contributed to Banal's subjugation to imperial power. Though his Moro ancestors first founded the galleon trade, when the Spaniards moved to Manila, they cut out these Muslim middlemen; and silver's value in China made the Spaniards the new chief importers of valuable Chinese products, including the prestige items most prized by Philippine datus. The Spaniards thereby usurped a major source of Moro influence over other settlements, a source of influence that they translated into a network of internal colonial authority.

Eng Kang's story—though centered on the convergence of silk and silver—likewise depended on Spain, Portugal, Islam and Christianity. As stated above, prior to the arrival of Europeans in East Asian waters, the Ming emperor had made trade with Japan illegal. But Japan was a major source of silver, a highly valued commodity in China. Fujianese merchant-pirates,
therefore, began to trade illegally for Japanese silver at offshore locations. With the arrival of the
Portuguese and the Spaniards, however, and the loosening of some Ming trade restrictions, a way
was opened up for Japanese silver—through Manila and Macau—to flow legally into China.
This legal flow of silver decreased and eventually helped to eliminate piracy in the South China
Sea; and through legal flows, Chinese mercantile activity in the region also increased. Eng
Kang's profits, however, also depended on the relationship between the Spaniards and the
indigenous peoples of the Philippines. Throughout early modern times, the valuable flow of
goods through Manila was threatened by various outside forces, including Dutch and Moro
attacks. The indigenous troops mustered through *datus* and *encomenderos* within the hybrid
colonial system protected the silver trade against these attacks, thereby securing Eng Kang's
source of wealth. In this way, the relationship between the Spaniards—Legazpi's successors—
and the *indios*—like Miguel Banal—proved critical to the continuation of Manila's silk-for-silver
trade.

In summary, Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang help us to see how multiethnic blended
sovereignty was created and stabilized through the contributions of various peoples. The 1565
arrival of the Spaniards—bringing with them European imperialism, Christianity, and silver—
was a pivotal moment in the transformation of the Philippines. But this transformation was not
driven entirely, or often even primarily, by the Spanish. It was, instead, a multiethnic endeavor,
one that required not only the support of the Spaniards and their empire, but also depended on
the assistance of Visayans, Moros, Sangleys, and others. Spanish imperialism was founded in the
Philippines not because the Spaniards willed it to be there, but because the political, cultural, and
commercial forces that propelled them across the Pacific met with complementary forces from
East Asia and the Indian Ocean in Southeast Asia. The Spanish and Portuguese empire were, importantly, part of one larger world-wide power structure; Islam paved the way for Christianity to establish its colonial capital at Manila; and the demand for silver in China created the economic incentives that pushed and pulled the Manila galleons across the Pacific. All of these formed the basis of sovereignty and of the incorporation of the Philippines into the globalizing world.

These global forces collectively helped to create an overarching layer of authority that began to unify the diverse Philippine islands into a single place with a single name, a unity that has changed over the centuries, but one that nevertheless also continues to exist into the present. This period of unification and stabilization witnessed, in short, the origins of the Philippines through sovereignty. This sovereignty was not born out of the expansion of a single isolated empire, but by the blending of that empire into the worlds of East and Southeast Asia; and this blending also completed the birth of globalization through the formation of the first around-the-world network of politics, economics, and culture. As central participants in this dual process, the meeting of Legazpi, Banal, and Eng Kang provides a valuable metaphor that describes how globalization and Philippine sovereignty were born together. These men and the communities that they represented began to interact with one another because of the global forces that pushed them together in Southeast Asia; and as they negotiated their relationships with one another within their emerging global environment they formed a new composite power in Southeast Asia, a trinity of authority, the one power being divisible into three, but the three also being united into one.
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