# ARTICLES

**THE DIGNITY OF SEX**

Libby Adler†

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I. Introduction

The ideal of human dignity is making increasingly frequent appearances across national jurisdictions and in a wide range of juridical arenas. Recent case law and scholarship suggest the possibility that regard for human dignity implies basic socio-economic rights such as the right to decent housing and running water,¹ or that the infirm are entitled to health care,² or that governments should not execute their most marginalized citizens as punishment for a crime.³ Dignity also has shown up in a handful of cases regarding sex, where the question has been about the extent to which sexual practices such as sodomy or prostitution should be entitled to constitutional protection. A careful reading of the sex cases reveals some risks associated with uncritical reliance on the dignity ideal. This Article reviews the concept of dignity historically, examines contemporary sex cases from a few different national jurisdictions for possible historical and transnational continuities, and urges that dignity poses unique legal hazards to reformist efforts to gain constitutional protection for a wide array of sexual practices.

Dignity, for a long time, has stood for at least two broad ideas. The first idea is that all human beings innately have dignity. This idea has a theological incarnation, according to which human beings have dignity because they were created in the image of God, as well as a secular incarnation, according to which human beings have dignity because they have rationality. I will refer to dignity’s first meaning—whether its religious or secular origins are implicated—as “universalist” or “egalitarian.”

Dignity’s second meaning diverges radically from its first. Rather than being a universal trait, dignity in its second usage derives from social rank. It distinguishes rather than equalizes us. Dignity is what the aristocracy has on the unwashed masses.

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². See id.
³. See, e.g., Russell Miller, The Shared Transatlantic Jurisprudence of Dignity, 4 German L.J. 925 (2003) (suggesting that the shared value of dignity holds some promise for eradicating the death penalty); cf. Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 Hastings L.J. 693, 726 (2006) (urging that dignity requires that mitigation evidence be presented at sentencing even over the objections of the capital defendant who wants to acquiesce to the death penalty).
I will refer to dignity's non-universal, anti-egalitarian meaning as "aristocratic" or "hierarchical." 4

This Article argues that while aristocratic dignity might appear outdated in modern legal systems with an egalitarian ethos, it is still very much alive, if sometimes difficult to discern. While universalist and aristocratic dignity appear at first blush to stand in stark opposition to one another, the former analytically relies on the latter; an assertion of egalitarian dignity is one side of a coin, the other side of which is necessarily degradation of something excluded and therefore the establishment of a hierarchy. When universalist dignity is invoked, therefore, it is worth investigating the basis for the assertion of dignity, and what—lacking that basis—is excluded from dignity's domain. This will tell us what hierarchy has been produced or maintained.

In the context of constitutional protection for certain sexual practices on dignity grounds, constitutional courts have dignified some practices, thereby degrading others and producing a sexual hierarchy. This is not inherently bad, but the specific hierarchy should be highlighted and evaluated for its desirability.

A key basis that appears across a handful of national jurisdictions for dignifying constitutionally protected sexual practices is the nature of the relationship in which the sex occurs. This distinction produces a hierarchy between sex that occurs in the context of a normatively privileged relationship and sex that occurs outside of that context. This Article highlights the under-acknowledged importance of relationship in constitutional law governing sex and then proposes and skeptically evaluates reasons for this preoccupation. The Article also examines dignity's connection to rationality and situates that connection historically,

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4. The taxonomy of dignity elaborated in this Article is not the only possible or useful one. For example, Alan Gewirth sets forth two types of dignity which he calls empirical and inherent, the former being a trait that one might exhibit ("[s]he generally comport[s] herself with dignity"), while the latter is intrinsic to all human beings. Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values 10, 12 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992). Gewirth's taxonomy is not wholly unrelated to the one used in this Article, but it raises a slightly different set of theoretical questions on which I will not focus, such as whether rights must be deserved, and whether it is theoretically possible to be deprived of one's dignity. See id. at 10–11. Moreover, if dignity is conceptualized as empirical, and if rationality provides the basis for dignity (i.e., it is human rationality that entitles human beings to dignity-based rights), then the question arises whether young children or mentally disabled persons lack entitlement to rights. This Article will not delve into this set of questions, but suffice it to say that dignity can be conceptualized in more than one way and that different quandaries result.
devoting particular attention to developments that occurred at the time of the Enlightenment and after World War II, and finds that the interplay among dignity, rationality, and sex presents a formidable obstacle to achieving broad constitutional protection for sexual practices. The Article concludes that attaching the dignity of sex to the relational context in which it occurs has injurious consequences for sex generally—not merely for the degraded varieties.

II. Two Strands of Meaning

In one sense, the term *dignity* can be understood to contain a contradiction. As Michael Warner explains:

Dignity has at least two radically different meanings in our culture. One is ancient, closely related to honor, and fundamentally an ethic of rank. It is historically a value of nobility. It requires soap. (Real estate doesn’t hurt, either.) The other is modern and democratic. Dignity in the latter sense is not pomp and distinction; it is inherent in the human. You can’t, in a way, not have it. At worst, others can simply fail to recognize your dignity.5

Warner observes that the two meanings are “radically different,” which is undoubtedly correct. On an axis of egalitarianism-to-hierarchy we might even go so far as to observe their opposition. It is difficult to imagine how such apparently conflicting meanings could coexist in a single word,6 but they have done so, as it turns out, for a very long time.

A conference at Hebrew University celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights resulted in a helpful volume on the meaning and origins of dignity in human rights thought and practice.7 This book (hereinafter, the Kretzmer-Klein volume) brings together legal, philosophical, psychological, historical, and theological perspectives on the topic, mainly by enthusiasts. In their foreword, the editors mark the pertinence of their efforts by reviewing some of the important legal instruments in which dignity is a central precept, including various international declarations as well as Israeli,

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6. In some of the material that I have come across in my research, the single term *dignity* contains these meanings, but a few authors draw a distinction between *dignity* and *dignity of man* or *human dignity*, and a few siphon off dignity’s aristocratic meaning into the term *honor*.
7. See David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein, Foreword to The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, at v, vi (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
German, and South African basic laws and constitutions, and offer to launch a multi-disciplinary dialogue on dignity’s meaning.

The first few essays in the collection begin with dignity’s roots.

A. Ancient Sources

According to Hubert Cancik, while there likely was a Greek predecessor, Cicero provides our earliest recorded references to the “dignity of man.” In his use of the term dignitas, Cicero usually meant “rank or worth,” Cancik explains. Cancik translates Cicero’s definition as follows: “Dignity is someone’s virtuous authority which makes him worthy to be honored with regard and respect.” Reflecting on the Latin common usage, Cancik elaborates by noting that Cicero’s definition “brings social aspects, like rank and prestige, into the foreground.”

But, as the next section of Cancik’s essay shows, Cicero made another claim, also associated with the Latin term dignitas. “Human dignity, Cicero claims, resides ‘in human nature,’ and it is Nature herself who . . . gave reason and freedom of moral decision to all human beings.” Recalling the centrality of both nature and reason to Stoicism, Cancik explains that Cicero and the Stoics understood “natural law, rule of reason, and natural rights, equal for all men, [to be] linked together.”

Cancik’s reading is easily supported by the text of Cicero’s political work De Officiis.

Each of us is endowed by nature with two characters: the first is common to all, in that we share that reason and dignity which is the mark of our superiority over the animal kingdom, and from which is derived all that is good and fitting as well as

8. See id. at v–vi.
10. The likely predecessor on whom Cicero often relied was Panaetius of Rhodes. See id. at 22.
11. See id.; see also Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1903, 1905 (2000) (crediting Cicero with the earliest use of the term dignity to refer to “[m]an’s special, inherent quality as a rational being”).
12. See Cancik, supra note 9, at 20.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 24.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 25.
the capacity for discovering our duty; the second is particular to each individual . . . [because] in characters there are . . . many . . . differences.\textsuperscript{19}

As Thomas Mitchell explains, \textit{dignitas} in this second context "denoted the esteem and standing enjoyed by an individual because of the merit that was perceived to exist in him."\textsuperscript{20} It mitigated Cicero’s egalitarianism by recognizing gradations in individual capacity.\textsuperscript{21} This should not, however, be read as purely meritocratic. Mitchell clarifies Cicero’s position by pointing to the importance of birth: "\textit{[D]ignitas} did not seem to [Cicero to be] compatible with the world of the poor and the humbly employed. . . . [It] belonged for him in the loftier ambience of those whose wealth liberated them from the necessity of . . . hiring their services."\textsuperscript{22} As Mitchell concludes, Cicero’s concept of \textit{dignitas} contained both merit and heredity, "derive[d] from \textit{genus} as well as from personal worth."\textsuperscript{23}

It is this dual-stranded etymological history that evidently accounts for the contradiction that appears from the outset of Cancik’s essay in the Kretzmer-Klein volume: "The original Latin term \textit{dignitas hominis} denotes worthiness, the outer aspect of a person’s social role which evokes respect, and embodies the charisma and the esteem presiding in office, rank or personality. It is concrete dignity inherent in the rational persona, given by Nature and to all human beings."\textsuperscript{24} "Well, which is it?" one might fairly inquire after reading Cancik’s opening paragraph. Is dignity something that accompanies social rank, or something that is inherent in being a human being? The answer is that as far back as Cicero, dignity seems to have contained both meanings. Cancik’s first paragraph reflects this duality.\textsuperscript{25}

Another author in the Kretzmer-Klein volume, Joern Eckert, observes this same phenomenon relying on Cicero and the

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{20} \textsc{Thomas N. Mitchell}, \textsc{Cicero: The Senior Statesman} 47 (1991).

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Id.} at 48–49.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Id.} at 50.

\textsuperscript{24} Cancik, \textit{supra} note 9, at 19.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{See id.} Cancik’s essay proceeds to trace dignity’s travels from pre-Christian Rome through parts of Europe and the United States. His timeline concludes with the work of Kant, who, Cancik maintains, owes a debt to Cicero and the Stoics. \textit{See id.} at 33–37.
Stoics, as well as some additional ancient sources.26 “In ancient history, the concept of human dignity had two different meanings,”27 Eckert writes. “On the one hand, it referred to the social rank of a person, and on the other hand, to the distinction between human beings and other creatures.”28 Eckert points to Cicero’s “critici[sm of] democracy for not respecting the necessary differentiations of dignity according to rank,”29 but then also to an early Greek idea that “the essential equality of all men was based on ‘decency and law,’ the gifts of Zeus . . . bestowed upon all men . . . differ[entiating men] from the animals,”30 a differentiation noted in the Cicero excerpt above, as well.

One need not, therefore, choose between dignity’s two meanings. While the hierarchical (or aristocratic) and egalitarian (or universalist) meanings of dignity appear at first to exist in a contradictory or alternative relationship, the two meanings can be performed simultaneously. If rationality is what dignifies human beings according to the egalitarian meaning, it also places human beings in the upper stratum of a hierarchy between human beings and other species.

The Kretzmer-Klein volume portrays the religious foundations of dignity similarly. In Christianity, the creation of man in God’s image, the apparent dominion of man over other creatures, and the incarnation of Christ all cut in favor of a universalist meaning,31 though Saint Thomas Aquinas “considered dignity differentiated according to rank as a principle of God.”32 Two other essays in the volume together demonstrate a virtually identical structure within Judaism. The first posits that human dignity comes from a “democratiz[ed]” reading of the Book of Genesis according to which “every human being . . . is created . . . in

27. Id. at 43.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 43–44.
32. Id. at 44. See also Englard, supra note 11, at 1908, on the Christian conception, especially as found in the work of Aquinas and Luther, both of which include egalitarian and hierarchical dimensions. See also John Witte, Jr., Between Sanctity and Depravity: Human Dignity in Protestant Perspective, in In Defense of Human Dignity: Essays for Our Times 119–38 (Robert P. Kraynak & Glenn E. Tinder eds., 2004), for a reading of Luther that distinguishes between the hierarchical dignity of the priesthood and the egalitarian dignity of the Christian.
[God’s] image.” The second, though, concludes from the relevant Rabbinic literature that dignity (kavod, in Hebrew) vacillates between the abstract . . . and the more concrete higher status and respect that are due to the upper hierarchical entities within any social structure. Thus, intrinsic in the Rabbinical system of thought is a concept of dignity that contradicts any . . . absolute principle of human dignity. Human dignity in rabbinical perspective derives . . . from the higher divine dignity, and as such is also subordinated.

Kavod, this second writer explains, like its English counterpart, “stands for both dignity in its most abstract and lofty meaning as well as the most degenerated hierarchical concept of status and demand for subordination.” Note, however, that even the egalitarian version within Judaism, like Cicero’s, relies on elevating human beings above those creatures which were not created in God’s image.

The ancient sources, therefore, support the idea of a long-standing contradiction contained in the term dignity—that is, either all human beings have it or only those of high social rank have it. It is also the case, however, that even the egalitarian version of dignity among human beings was enabled by a hierarchy that denied dignity to other animals.

B. Conceptual Changes Around the Time of the Enlightenment

Moving ahead in time, Eckert cites the natural law thinker Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) as representative of the increasing emphasis on the gift of reason as the basis for human dignity, pointing out that Pufendorf was “translated into all the national European languages” and that his work apparently “in-

35. Id. at 100; see also Englard, supra note 11, at 1908 (“[I]n Judaism, human dignity is the result of our being created in the image of God.”). But also see Englard’s alternative translation of kavod to mean honor, which connotes self-aggrandizement and was “viewed suspiciously by the sages.” Id. at 1904.
36. See also Englard, supra note 11, at 1917–19, for a strikingly similar account of developments during and after the Enlightenment, emphasizing the contributions of Pufendorf, Locke, and Kant. Englard sees the Enlightenment ideas as building on “the Renaissance reaction against the pessimistic medieval vision of humanity.” Id. at 1910. Petrarch was a key link in the chain, extolling the virtues of man over animal and “engender[ing] a whole literary genre dedicated to the dignity of man.” Id. at 1910–12.
fluenced the author's [sic] of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776.’’

Around this time, a shift in conceptual priority away from rank and toward universal access to reason can be seen, Eckert argues, in the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and a general “loss of legitimacy for the traditional orders based on dignity according to hierarchial [sic] ranks.”

Eckert also credits the major British Enlightenment figures with conceptual development in the direction of natural rights, equality, and—with John Locke—a place for these concepts in governance.

On the Continent, Kant is a major figure, as well, drawing on the ideals of the French Revolution but “emphasiz[ing] moral autonomy,” and so is Savigny, for “his doctrine of legal personality and subjective right.”

Eckert observed, “Under the influences of Natural Law and Enlightenment, the idea of innate rights of all human beings gained acceptance in Germany. At that time, the traditional idea that man is a person because God is a person and man is created in his image became secularized.”

The Enlightenment and its devotion to reason were therefore crucial to the evolution of the secular universalist version of dignity, having landed on the fertile soil of pre-existing acceptance of universal dignity, albeit based on creationism. As the ideas of the Enlightenment spread, the aristocratic version of dignity was less in evidence. In an essay pointedly entitled Dignity as a (Modern) Virtue, Michael J. Meyer proposes that modernity itself can be characterized as the general tendency to reject . . . the ideology of aristocracy. Otherwise put, modern thought generally tends to reject (natural or hereditary) moral and political hierarchies as normative ideals. This aspect of modern thought is, for example, displayed in

37. Eckert, supra note 26, at 44.
38. See id. at 44–45.
39. See id. at 45–46.
40. Id. at 46; see also Edward J. Eberle, Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions in Germany and the United States 43 (2002) (“In the dignitarian jurisprudence of the [German] Constitutional Court, the Court has mainly followed Kant’s theory of moral autonomy.”). There is a rich literature on Kantian dignity which I will not review here. One interesting point that England raises, however, is that for Kant, “dignity was not a right to be protected, but a moral achievement—man obeying the self-imposed laws of reason. . . . The shift to a notion of dignity as a fundamental human right could therefore be achieved only by renouncing the actuality of moral freedom in persons, and replacing it with its general and equal potentiality in human beings.” England, supra note 11, at 1921.
41. Eckert, supra note 26, at 50.
42. Id. at 49.
Kant’s moral philosophy as opposed to, say, Aristotle or Burke.”

So, during the Enlightenment, the universality of the capacity for reason as a basis for dignity displaced the pre-Enlightenment commitment to rank and hierarchy. Dignity seemed to evolve into an egalitarian, universalizing, Enlightenment concept. This recognition of “universal and equal human dignity” came to have “political and legal effect” in German law, and eventually also took the form “of universal human rights.”

C. The Aftermath of Fascism in Europe

Skipping ahead to the second half of the twentieth century, Eckert concludes with the apparently obvious: “The idea of human dignity was decisively strengthened by developments after the Second World War. After the terrible crimes and contempt towards mankind by the Nazis, there was a sudden surge for stronger protection of human dignity.”

As evidence, Eckert points to key provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, and post-war German constitutional texts. Other authors in the Kretzmer-Klein volume, such as Yehoshua Arieli, underscore Eckert’s final point: “[T]he invocation of the dignity and rights of man has to be seen as a counter-thesis and counter-ideology of the Free World to the ideologies of the Axis Powers and in particular to National Socialism.” Arieli’s essay echoes many of the points already made above. He sees dignity and its embrace in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as “the direct offspring of the great ideas of the 18th century Enlightenment, of the American and French revolutions, of the movement toward democracy and of liberalism,” and also as directly responsive to the Holocaust. His understanding of dignity is uni-

44. Eckert, *supra* note 26, at 45.
45. *Id.* at 51–52.
46. *Id.* at 45.
47. *Id.* at 52.
48. *See id.* at 52–53.
50. *Id.* at 5.
51. *See id.* at 1.
D. Revisiting the Key Points in the Conventional Narrative

The first purpose of my review of these accounts exemplified by the Kretzmer-Klein volume is to demonstrate that the concept of dignity can be traced back quite a long way along two etymological strands. One strand is universalist and egalitarian, sometimes theological and sometimes secular, and the other is oriented toward hierarchy and distinction based on social status. While the two meanings were in some sense conflicting (did all people or just aristocrats have dignity?), the egalitarian version relied on a hierarchy between human beings and other species.

Next, I offer this summary to demonstrate two conventions, each related to the importance of a particular historical juncture: First, I want to show the extent to which the Enlightenment and related historical events (American and French Revolutions and the Protestant Reformation) have been credited not only with secularizing the universalist version of dignity by stressing access to reason over creationism, but also with *delegitimizing and edging out the aristocratic version of the concept*. As one writer sees it:

> Human dignity is man’s position in the world, his uniqueness in the cosmos, and no longer essentially his position in a social-functional relationship vis-à-vis his peers. . . . The shift to the cosmic aspect is a shift from the functional or performing character of dignity to the given and inherent status of man. It is pari passu a shift from certain particular individuals to the universal texture of human existence.  

So the first convention—found in the Kretzmer-Klein volume and beyond—is that during the Enlightenment there was a shift in the meaning of dignity from hierarchical to universal.

Second, I want to air the commonly held view that the Nazis’ total abandonment of the universalist principle demanded a resurgence of universal dignity and that the Universal Declaration

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52. *See id.* at 8, 16.
54. As Englund points out, however, “it should be noted that the original meaning of dignity as a function of the individual’s social rank continued to be widely used alongside this relatively newer sense of humanity’s intrinsic value.” Englund, *supra* note 11, at 1906 (citing Michael J. Meyer, Kant’s Concept of Dignity and Modern Political Thought, 8 HISTORY EUR. IDEAS 319, 330 n.10 (1987)). This is a point I hope to make elaborately as the Article proceeds.
of Human Rights and a number of European and other national constitutions and basic laws asserted preeminence of the concept in the post-war years precisely because of the Nazis’ disregard for it.  

This second convention has been taken up by James Q. Whitman, who offers a more complex account. Whitman argues that rather than understanding post-war European dignity as an abrupt resurgence following a period of hibernation, the concept can be traced back through the Nazi era and owes some of its post-war characteristics to developments that occurred during that time.  

He observes:

The new Europe is founded on a forthright rejection of the fascist past. This is a commonplace. . . . Perhaps most of all it is a commonplace that we repeat when we discuss the European embrace of the values of ‘dignity,’ and . . . human dig-

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55. Of course this idea can be found in sources well beyond the Kretzmer-Klein volume. See EBERLE, supra note 40, at 41 (‘Human dignity is the central value of the [German] Basic Law. This determination reflects the conscious intention to elevate modern Germany beyond the inhumanity of Nazism, signaling a new constitutional order.’); Englard, supra note 11, at 1920–21 (‘Ferdinand Lasalle . . . relat[ed] dignity to the material conditions of the working classes. He demanded that these conditions be improved in order to achieve for them a ‘dignified’ human existence. . . . It was . . . in this sense that the notion of dignity was first introduced into the Weimar Constitution of 1919. . . . [But] it was the Kantian notion of dignity’s absolute and intrinsic character that promoted its inclusion into modern constitutions and human rights conventions in the wake of Nazi Germany’s crimes during World War II.’).

Even the dignity guarantee in Montana’s state constitution has been traced to events in Europe that took place decades earlier. Montana, which adopted its provision in 1972, was apparently influenced by a similar provision in the Puerto Rican Constitution of 1951, which in turn “was part of a wave of post World War II constitution making,” and drew on “language and ideas” from international human rights documents. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 25 (2004).

Cf. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). Central to Kagan’s thesis regarding the conflicting tendencies of Europe and the United States with regard to the use of unilateral force is that Europe is ideologically and psychologically inclined toward the constraints of international law, diplomacy, and persuasion and that European nations have largely declined to devote the resources necessary to make themselves powerful in the military sense because of the European experience during World War II. Kagan’s book is not about constitutional law or the legal concept of dignity, but his view is consistent with the “second convention,” especially his attribution of the European preference for international liberal legalism to the legacy of the fascist era. See, e.g., id. at 55.


57. See id.
nity.' . . . In the literature on all these areas of law we find forthright rejection of the legacy of the fascist era, and especially of the horrors of Nazism. 58

But, Whitman contends, the history is "messier" than this narrative suggests. 59 Whitman locates important pieces of dignity's history in "Nazi law aimed to vindicate claims of 'honour.'" 60 He sets forth a richer narrative according to which "old norms of 'honour,' norms that applied only to aristocrats and a few other high-status categories of persons in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have gradually been extended to the entire population." 61

For example, Whitman examines the contemporary German law of "insult"—including the cause of action available to Germans who have been insulted individually (e.g., by an obscene gesture), as well as the cause of action for "collective insult," which protects minorities from insulting or degrading treatment (i.e., "hate speech")—and finds doctrinal roots in laws from the Nazi era designed to protect the SS from disrespect. 62 These laws find their antecedents in an earlier law of insult, which followed in turn from the norms attendant upon the practice of dueling. 63

Like its predecessor, the law of insult that grew out of dueling norms "was careful to distinguish between persons who were 'satisfaktionsfähig' [honorable enough to engage in a duel] and persons who were not." 64 Though it was a slow historical process, Whitman asserts that it was finally with the advent of Nazism that the "right to take offence [was] . . . generalised throughout German society," 65 so that, beginning in the 1930's

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 245. Whitman argues that the history of European dignity is not always pretty, but he has suggested elsewhere that he is still something of a fan of the concept. See, e.g., Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 243 (2003) (expressing a preference for an emphasis on dignity in harassment law); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1160, 1219 (2004) (appearing to disapprove of traces of parochialism in American thinking about privacy, which does not take dignity concerns as seriously as European privacy law does).
61. Whitman, supra note 56, at 245.
62. See id. at 249–51.
63. See id. at 249.
64. Id. at 247, 250.
65. Id. at 250.
and continuing today, even low-status Germans can assert claims under the law of insult.66

This development, as Whitman explains, was entirely consistent with Nazi populism. “Everybody who counted as a member of the Volk-community was a person of ‘honour,’ in Nazi ideology.”67 Relying on examples related to the contemporary law of insult as well as to developments in German labor law, Whitman makes a compelling case that Europe’s dignity “is the latest stage in [a] long process of the social extension of norms of honour: ‘human dignity’ for everybody, as it exists at the end of the twentieth century, means definitive admission to high social status for everybody.”68 Put even more starkly, “[I]low-status Germans who learned to believe that they were ‘honourable’ persons in the 1930s became Europeans who believed they [were] entitled to ‘human dignity’ after 1945.”69

Whitman writes to problematize the second convention, according to which dignity’s post-Holocaust revival constituted a total rebuke of Nazism.70 The advent of post-war European dignity was not abrupt, but evolved before, during, and after the Nazi era.

I appropriate Whitman’s analysis, however, to problematize as well the first convention drawn from the accounts above: that during the Enlightenment, when the universalist version of dignity assumed a position in the fore, the aristocratic strand withered. The Nazi promise to extend access to honor to the entire German Volk was seductive to ordinary Germans precisely because they imagined themselves to be rising in social status.

66. See id.
67. Id. at 246.
68. Id.
69. Id. But see Gerald L. Neuman, On Fascist Honour and Human Dignity: A Skeptical Response, in DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 56, at 267, 267. “It is unclear how strong an explanatory force Professor Whitman claims for his central thesis, how much of human dignity would be ‘best understood, from the sociological point of view, as a generalization of old norms of social honour.’ Undoubtedly, there is some connection between human dignity and honour. . . . [But Neuman believes that] some concerns . . . would arise if [Whitman’s thesis] were overextended.” Id. at 272.
70. Whitman, supra note 56, at 243. Neuman confirms Whitman’s observation that there is a “prevailing assumption that the post-War ascendency of the value of human dignity resulted from a reaction against Fascism.” Neuman, supra note 69, at 268.
It probably strikes the contemporary reader as absurd, the notion that high status could possibly be extended to everyone, but, as Whitman sensitively observes, [W]e have lost much of our capacity to really empathise with the yearning for respectability that gripped people eighty years ago. This makes it very hard for us to grasp the power of what the Nazis said, when they spoke, as they did so incessantly, about 'honour' for all Germans. People cared intensely about whether they were treated as persons of 'honour' or not; and a political formula, like the Nazi formula, that promised honour for everybody had real potency.\textsuperscript{71}

Even as populism reigned, therefore, aristocratic values remained very much alive in the fantasy of social ascent. Whitman’s argument that post-war European dignity evolved out of this populism suggests that post-war European dignity contains aristocratic elements, as well.\textsuperscript{72}

Of course—crucially—not everyone counted as a member of the German Volk-community. We can understand those who did not as serving the same analytic purpose that animals served in the older sources, i.e., as constituting the lower stratum of a hierarchy that enables egalitarianism within the upper stratum.\textsuperscript{73} Invocation of dignity even as an egalitarian concept establishes a structure whereby something is degraded as a matter of analytic necessity.

III. THE SEX CASES

This part discusses a handful of constitutional cases governing sex that, read closely, evidence a parallel structure. My analysis of those cases is an effort to show that even in a legal culture in which the notion of aristocratic dignity is likely to be viewed as quaint at best and morally backward at worst, the hierarchical dimension of dignity remains in play in powerful and subtle ways.

The Stoics, the Greeks, the Christians, and the Jews all emphasized that dignity was reserved for human beings only. Rationality distinguishes us from the animals, over which we are

\textsuperscript{71} Whitman, supra note 56, at 248.

\textsuperscript{72} Neuman also “agree[s] that historically the modern commitment to human dignity derives from interaction of egalitarianism with the differential dignity of a stratified society.” Neuman, supra note 69, at 267–68.

\textsuperscript{73} In fact, “the anthropocentric Kantian notion of dignity has been attacked by animal rights advocates on the ground of its ‘speciesism.’” Englard, supra note 11, at 1922.
supposed to exercise dominion. Moreover, human beings, unlike beasts, can control their drives; they can choose between sensuality and reason. Cicero urged:

We should never forget . . . how much the nature of man transcends that of the rest of the animal kingdom. Animals are motivated solely by physical pleasure, and all their impulses tend to that end; man on the other hand has a rational mind which is fed by thought and learning . . . . But if a man is too prone to succumb to sensual pleasures, he should beware of becoming an animal. There are in fact those who are human in name only . . . . It is thus apparent that physical pleasure is quite unworthy of human dignity and should be scorned and rejected.74

One might predict, reading this history, a tendency in contemporary law to regard sex as undignified, belonging to man’s baser, more animalistic aspect. Yet the materials that my research turned up suggest that courts are more inclined to imagine sex as dignified, and to protect the dignity of sex—against the sundry species of threats that sex faces.

The cases discussed in this part are drawn exclusively from “modern” legal cultures, in the sense of having at least ostensibly embraced the Enlightenment value of egalitarianism and rejected aristocracy and related ideas of natural or familial hierarchy, at least as an aspirational matter. I have concerned myself only with cases in which there is a resort to the notion of dignity—presumably in its egalitarian-universalist valence—as a (not necessarily the) basis for providing or denying constitutional protection to a sexual practice. My claim is not that dignity will be used the same way in every case, nor that judicial decisions would be certain to come out differently if the notion of dignity were removed or redefined. Still, the transhistorical and transnational usage of dignity in an ostensibly egalitarian valence without explicit recognition of its aristocratic current suggests the possibility of an underestimated discursive force.

Consider, to begin with, Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 decision of the United States Supreme Court that struck down a state sodomy prohibition on substantive due process grounds.75 Dignity—hardly a staple in American jurisprudence76—makes an

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74. Cicero, supra note 18, at 75–76; see also Cancik, supra note 9, at 25–26.
75. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
76. It has shown up a few times in Supreme Court decisions on matters of criminal law and punishment, especially regarding the Eighth Amendment, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring), and at least once in a case regarding the right to die, see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 457
appearance in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority when he states that anti-sodomy statutes
seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. . . . This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries. . . . [A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but it is important for my purposes to observe that the “relationship” to which Justice Kennedy repeatedly refers is the physical relationship of oral-genital or genital-anal contact, or one person penetrating another with an object, any of which he might have described strictly as “engaging in an activity,” rather than “enter[ing] upon [a] relationship.” The opinion continues, “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” You will find no assertion that the two men appealing their sodomy convictions had any plans to form an enduring personal bond; still, that a long-term relationship might provide the context for sodomy seems important to Justice Kennedy, though he does not tell us why or state this forthrightly.

U.S. 261, 289 (1990), but does not rise to the level of a doctrine in American law, at least not at the federal level. See also Luis Aníbal Avilés Pagán, Human Dignity, Privacy and Personality Rights in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 343, 360 (1998) (“The presence of the phrase human dignity in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is, at most, very tenuous; it is relegated to a background of extra-constitutional principles. Its mention surfaces most of the time in the glosses some Justices add to their dissenting opinions, and then, most notably, in cases involving the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the 8th Amendment. The main reason the values of human dignity and autonomy do not arise in constitutional litigation is that they are not explicitly contained in the text of the Constitution.”); Friedman & Whitman, supra note 60, at 245 (“European sexual harassment law came to revolve around concepts of ‘dignity’ that have never mustered any real interest, or even sustained attention, in American law.”). The constitutions of a few states and Puerto Rico, however, do contain dignity clauses. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1.

78. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
79. Id. at 563 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)).
80. Id. at 567.
Moreover, in criticizing Bowers v. Hardwick,81 which Lawrence purports to overrule,82 Justice Kennedy employs a marital analogy. In Bowers, Justice White infamously stated that “[t]he issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”83 His answer, of course, was no.84 “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct,” Justice Kennedy rebuked him in Lawrence, “demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”85

I have written elsewhere that it is unclear why a claim is “demeaned” for being understood to regard sex alone.86 Justice Kennedy never squarely confronts whether a one-night stand and a sexual act that takes place in the course of an enduring personal bond are equally entitled to constitutional protection, though to be sure, the case does not exclude one-night stands from its purview. Here, though, I want to zero in on the nature of the threat that Justice Kennedy identifies to the dignity of persons who engage in acts of sodomy. The sexual acts themselves are not the threat; the sexual actors do not demean themselves. Persons who engage in sodomy “still retain their dignity.” The threat, the demeaning force, is Justice White’s characterization of the issue in Bowers, specifically—as the marital analogy makes clear—the dissociation of the sexual act from the intimate relationship in which it might occur.87

As a case note in the journal Law and Sexuality88 explains, “[i]n contrast to Bowers, the Court characterized the claim [in Lawrence] as the right of adults to define the meaning of their

82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. I say “purports to overrule” because, as Justice Scalia observed in his dissent, Lawrence does not explicitly create a fundamental right to engage in sodomy and so may leave intact a central holding of Bowers. Id. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
84. Id. at 191.
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
87. Justice Kennedy’s marriage analogy skips carelessly between demeaning a claim and demeaning the claimants, but I do not think that very much rides on his (or my) being precise in that regard.
relationships."89 In furtherance of its analysis, the Lawrence Court characterized Griswold as holding that a privacy right . . . protects the marital relation . . . [It then found in Eisenstadt that privacy] applies equally to nonmarital relationships . . . [The court concluded that] the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment include the right to make decisions concerning the most intimate and personal of choices—those that serve to define a person and her relationships and those needed to retain autonomy and dignity.90

This commentator surmised that Lawrence "may represent an emerging doctrine where laws cannot be said to be drawn to a legitimate state interest if their primary effect and purpose is to demean, stigmatize, and control private and intimate relationships."91

Regardless of the accuracy of this doctrinal prediction, the marriage analogy combined with Justice Kennedy's raising the possibility of an enduring personal bond even where none was asserted suggests that an apologist's burden weighed on Justice Kennedy. It seems he felt that if he were going to speak in the language of dignity, two men meeting at a bar or a cruising spot and going home to one man's house for a one-time encounter was not going to serve him well.92 The threat to the dignity of the sexual actors is the suggestion that their acts are merely sex, rather than one facet of a broader relationship. By invoking the image of an enduring bond—actual or potential—Justice Kennedy plausibly lends dignity to the enterprise of sodomy.

In Jordan v. State,93 three criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of various provisions of South Africa's Sexual Offences Act.94 Section 20(1)(aA) of the Act provides that

89. Id. at 734.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 736.
92. Cf. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (holding that licensing restrictions on motel room rentals for ten or fewer hours did not impose "an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association recognized in Roberts v. United States Jaycees" because the Court did not believe that said restrictions "will have any discernable effect on the sorts of traditional bonds to which we referred in Roberts").
94. There was some question in the case about whether South Africa's Constitution or Interim Constitution should be applied. The Court determined that the question was of no material consequence to the case, but applied the Interim Constitution based on the dates of the facts giving rise to the case. Id. at para. 4.

In Jordan, one of the defendants owned a brothel and was thus most concerned with the prohibition against running such a business, another appeared to have been
"[a]ny person who . . . has unlawful carnal intercourse, or commits acts of indecency, with any other person for reward . . . shall be guilty of an offence." This section was struck down by South Africa's High Court, which determined that it discriminated against women in violation of the constitutional right to equality because it targets the purveyor of sex to the exclusion of the purchaser. The South African Constitutional Court reversed, however, finding the terms of the Act to be gender-neutral and suggesting that the provision could easily have been designed for the sensible purpose of targeting the more likely repeat-offender in a sex-for-reward bargain. The Constitutional Court rejected appellants' other constitutional claims as well, including claims related to freedom and security of the person, privacy, the right to engage in economic activity, and the right to human dignity.

In their separate opinion, Justices O'Regan and Sachs concurred with the majority in all respects except one: in accord with the High Court, they would have found that the sex-for-reward provision, "to the extent that it renders criminal the conduct of the prostitutes, but not that of customers," discriminates unconstitutionally on the basis of gender. To reach their conclusion, they first considered "whether the impugned provision differentiates between people or categories of people and, if it does, whether it does so rationally." Finding that "[i]t cannot be said that it is irrational for the Legislature to criminalise the conduct of only one group and not the other," they proceeded to their second step: "whether a differentiation is made, directly or indirectly, on a ground which could be said to have the potential to impair human dignity." If the answer to the second inquiry is yes, "the question that then arises is whether it is unfair." employed as a cashier of sorts, and the third performed a sexual act for pay, and so was likely most concerned with the section of the Act that prohibited the sale of sex. My analysis will focus on the third defendant's concern.

95. Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 s. 20(1)(aA) (S. Afr.).
96. Jordan 2002 (11) BCLR at para. 5 (S. Afr.).
97. Id. at para. 9.
98. Id. at para. 10.
99. Id. at paras. 31–33; see also id. at para. 51 (O'Regan & Sachs, JJ., concurring).
100. Id. at para. 71. The customer could face criminal liability as an "accomplice or accessory," but this did not rescue the statute in the view of the dissenting justices. Id. at para. 58 n.21.
101. Id. at para. 57.
102. Id. at para. 58.
103. Id. at para. 57.
104. Id.
It is important to observe that this portion of the opinion does not regard the constitutional provision guaranteeing a right to human dignity. The Act’s sustainability under that constitutional provision will be taken up by these two justices later. Here, Justices O’Regan and Sachs are concerned with the constitutional guarantee of equality, which as an interpretive matter, involves the question of “whether a differentiation . . . [might] impair human dignity.”

The gender-neutral language of the statute notwithstanding, Justices O’Regan and Sachs were “satisfied that . . . this is a case where an apparently neutral differentiating criterion producing a marked differential impact on a listed ground [i.e., gender] results in indirect discrimination on that ground.” Nor were Justices O’Regan and Sachs persuaded by the idea that law enforcement attention was simply being directed toward the more likely repeat-offender:

We see no reason why the plier of sex for money should be treated as more blameworthy than the client. If anything, the fact that the male customers will generally come from a class that is more economically powerful might suggest the reverse. To suggest . . . that women may be targeted for prosecution because they are merchants of sex and not patrons is to turn the real-life sociological situation upside-down.

But it was not merely this sociological reversal that troubled the two justices. The provision’s exclusive focus on the purveyor,

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105. Id. (emphasis added). South Africans have debated the utility of the concept of dignity to constitutional analysis under the equality guarantee. Some argue that reliance on the concept of dignity undermines the redistributive potential of the equality provision. See, e.g., D.M. Davis, Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. Afr. L.J. 398 (1999). But see Susie Cowen, Can ‘Dignity’ Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence?, 17 S. Afr. J. ON HUM. RTS. 34 (2001) for a contrary view. More broadly, South Africans also have struggled over the extent to which the separate constitutional clause guaranteeing dignity requires the affirmative provision of such necessities as decent housing even where state resources are not adequate to the task. See Chaskalson, supra note 1, at 202. The debate over dignity’s relationship to socio-economic rights has traction even beyond the South African context. See, e.g., Heinz Klug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence Lead the Way to an Expanded Interpretation?, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 133, 134 (2003) (proposing that Montana’s inclusion of a dignity clause in its state constitution “provides a basis for possible claims to a limited core of socio-economic rights”). Socio-economic rights are not the topic of this Article, but it is possible that socio-economics and sex (conceived as acts taken by and upon bodies, as opposed to expressions of love) raise parallel issues in relation to the concept of dignity, which is sometimes invoked with a tendency toward the abstract that may obscure material concerns. Cf. infra Parts V, VI.

106. Jordan (11) BCLR at para. 60 (O’Regan & Sachs, JJ., concurring).

107. Id. at para. 68.
“brand[ing] the prostitute as the primary offender,” imposes a “social stigma”: 108

The female prostitute has been the social outcast, the male patron has been accepted or ignored. She is visible and denounced, her existence tainted by her activity. He is faceless, a mere ingredient in her offence rather than a criminal in his own right, who returns to respectability after the encounter. . . . The difference . . . tracks a pattern of applying different standards to the sexuality of men and women. . . . The inference is that the primary cause of the problem is not the man who creates the demand but the woman who responds to it: she is fallen, he is at best virile, at worst weak. Such discrimination, therefore, has the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity and personhood of women. 109

Noting that many women “become involved in prostitution because they have few or no alternatives,” 110 and that “the differentiation [in the Act] tracks and reinforces in a profound way double standards regarding the expression of male and female sexuality,” 111 Justices O’Regan and Sachs concluded that the suggestion that “male patrons . . . are somehow . . . less blameworthy” is unfair. 112

The two justices were careful not to excuse entirely the prostitute’s behavior. 113 Still, in the equality analysis, while considering women as a class that is disproportionately affected by the criminal prohibition, their opinion treats prostitutes as passive objects of stigmatization, victimized by some combination of social, economic, and legal forces. It is this stigmatization, in comparison with the easy anonymity enjoyed by male clientele, along with the entrenchment of “double standards” regarding sexual behavior, that constitute the impairment to the dignity of women.

Justices O’Regan and Sachs have performed a feminist analysis, focusing on the relative financial and social power of most men compared with that of most women 114—something that is

108. Id. at para. 63.
109. Id. at paras. 64–65.
110. Id. at para. 66. Interestingly, while Justices O’Regan and Sachs appear sympathetic in the equality analysis regarding the possibility that prostitutes “have few or no alternatives,” the two justices nonetheless concurred with the majority that the prostitutes could not succeed on their claim under the constitutional provision guaranteeing South Africans the right to earn a living. Id. at para. 56.
111. Id. at para. 67.
112. Id. at para. 68.
113. Id. at para. 66.
114. This is only one feminist analysis, of course. Some feminists might object instead to the justices’ presentation of the prostitutes as passive objects of stigmati-
ipso facto unfair. They have also shown the law to be participating in this unfairness by its quiet, ostensibly neutral reproduction of women’s blameworthiness and men’s blamelessness.

Recall, however, that Justices O’Regan and Sachs dissented only from the majority’s equality holding. They concurred in rejecting appellants’ claim regarding the constitutional provision guaranteeing that “[e]very person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity.” In analyzing whether the sex-for-reward provision violated the constitutional right to dignity, the two justices reasoned:

Our Constitution values human dignity which inheres in various aspects of what it means to be a human being. One of these aspects is the fundamental dignity of the human body which is not simply organic. Neither is it something to be commodified. Our Constitution requires that it be respected. We do not believe that section 20(1)(aA) can be said to be the cause of any limitation on the dignity of the prostitute. To the extent that the dignity of prostitutes is diminished, the diminution arises from the character of prostitution itself. The very nature of prostitution is the commodification of one’s body. Even though we accept that prostitutes may have few alternatives to prostitution, the dignity of prostitutes is diminished not by section 20(1)(aA) but by their engaging in commercial sex work. The very character of the work they undertake
devalues the respect that the Constitution regards as inherent in the human body.\footnote{116}

Observe how differently the prostitutes are portrayed here, and also how differently the law is portrayed. In their equality analysis, where the treatment of a group consisting mainly of women (prostitutes) is compared to the treatment of a group consisting mainly of men (customers), Justices O’Regan and Sachs depicted women as passive objects, and the law as unfairly complicit in the stigmatization of and discrimination against women. Here, the prostitutes are themselves responsible for any loss of dignity they suffer because they have undertaken work that commodifies their bodies. The law is no longer a force that acts in conjunction with economic and social forces to impair women’s dignity. Women who sell sex do that to themselves.

In a footnote, the two justices explain their sudden shift:

We have already dealt with the impact on the dignity of prostitutes caused by their being treated differently from their male patrons. The very fact of differential treatment by the criminal law of prostitutes and customers implicates the dignity of all women, and results in indirect discrimination. Here we are concerned not with differential impact as between customers and prostitutes, but with the question of whether the criminal prohibition on its own and regardless of whether it also criminalizes the conduct of customers results in a diminution of the dignity of prostitutes.\footnote{117}

The dignity of all women is impaired by the differential impact of the sex-for-reward provision. When extricated from the question of equality, however, the sale of sex itself, its “very character,” brings indignity on the purveyor. It is the sale of sex that causes the indignity; there is no suggestion that sex itself impairs human dignity. In fact, the statute protects sex and bodies against the threat posed by commodification. This point is made additionally clear in the privacy discussion.

In their argument that the sex-for-reward provision contravenes the constitutionally guaranteed “right to . . . personal privacy,”\footnote{118} the “appellants relied heavily on [the] decision in the

\footnote{116} Jordan (11) BCLR at para. 74 (O’Regan & Sachs, JJ., concurring).

\footnote{117} Id. at para. 74 n.30. One piece of the debate over whether dignity ought to underlie the equality provision is the question whether, absent a dignity conception, equality is merely a comparative concept, devoid of any independent content. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 105, at 400 (citing, but ultimately rejecting, the thesis of Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 547 (1982)).

Gay and Lesbian Coalition (Sodomy) case."119 There, the South African Constitutional Court struck down the common law offense of sodomy occurring between men as well as some related statutory provisions,120 on equality, privacy, and dignity grounds.121 Majority and concurring justices in that case devoted significant space to anti-gay discrimination and its relationship to the privacy and dignity of homosexuals.122 The opinions are lengthy and rich on those points. I wish to direct attention only to one small piece.

In an effort to draw the connection between privacy and dignity, the majority explains: "[p]rivacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside community. The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy."123 Observe the similarity to Justice Kennedy’s image of sodomy in Lawrence—i.e., as incident to a broader relationship. Moreover, the majority in the South African sodomy case points out that the challenged prohibition “criminalises all sexual intercourse per anum between men: regardless of the relationship of the couple who engage therein, of the age of such couple, of the place where it occurs, or indeed of any other circumstances whatsoever.”124 The Court discusses the prohibition against non-consensual sodomy elsewhere in the opinion,125 and of course privacy is amply discussed as well, but this leaves open the question of in what “relationship” or “other circumstances” the justices thought sodomy might be properly restricted. Perhaps they were thinking about incest, teacher-student sex, or doctor-patient sex—or perhaps they were contemplating the lesser injustice of the prohibition against same-sex sodomy when applied to strangers as compared with intimates. There is no way to know for sure. What is clear from the opinion, however, is the Court’s emphasis on intimacy and the establishment and nurturance of human relationships as the link between dignity and privacy.

119. Id. at para. 82.
120. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice (Sodomy Case) 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at para. 106 (S. Afr.).
121. Id. at para. 30.
122. Id. at paras. 15–27, 107–138.
123. Id. at para. 32.
124. Id. at para. 28.
125. Id. at paras. 65–73.
But "that case highlights points of contrast rather than of correspondence,"126 with the challenge to the sex-for-reward provision, in the view of Justices O'Regan and Sachs. For starters, the sodomy case had gay identity going for it. "[W]hat was at stake in that matter was not just a privacy interest, but an equality one. Indeed, the principal complaint of the gay community was that they were being subjected by the law to unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation."127 Justices O'Regan and Sachs also observed that the sodomy decision employs overlapping conceptions of "equality, dignity and privacy in relation to a community that had been discriminated against on the basis of closely-held personal characteristics. Furthermore," (and more significantly for my purposes), the sodomy decision "stresses that the protected sphere of private intimacy and autonomy relates to establishing and nurturing human relationships."128 Not so in the case of prostitution:

[I]t is the very institution of commercial sex that serves to reinforce patterns of inequality. Moreover, central to the character of prostitution is that it is indiscriminate and loveless. It is accordingly not the form of intimate sexual expression that is penalized, nor the fact that the parties possess a certain identity. It is that the sex is both indiscriminate and for reward. The privacy element falls far short of 'deep attachment and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one's life.' By making her sexual services available for hire to strangers in the marketplace, the sex worker empties the sex act of much of its private and intimate character. She is not nurturing relationships or taking life-affirming decisions about birth, marriage or family; she is making money.129

Justices O'Regan and Sachs reached essentially the same conclusion as the majority on this claim, though their precise take is that the Act does limit the prostitute's privacy right, but—unlike in the South African sodomy case—not much, and not unjustifiably.130 The majority's analysis, including its distinguishing the

126. Jordan (11) BCLR at para. 82 (O'Regan, & Sachs, JJ., concurring).
127. Id. The prostitutes in Jordan made an equality claim as well, but again, the question in this part of the case regards the constitutionality of the ban on prostitution generally, rather than whether purveyors and clients are equally targeted by the law.
128. Id.
129. Id. at para. 83.
130. Id. at paras. 84, 94.
prostitutes' privacy claim from the one made in the sodomy case, was brief, but nearly the same:

There the offence that was the subject of the constitutional challenge infringed the right of gay people not to be discriminated against unfairly and also their right to dignity. It intruded into ‘the sphere of private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside community’ and in doing so affected the sexuality of gay people ‘at the core of the area of private intimacy.’ None of those considerations are present here.

This case is concerned with the commercial exploitation of sex, which as I have found, involves neither an infringement of dignity nor unfair discrimination. 131

The key piece for my purposes is that sex itself is not the culprit in the derogation of the claimants’ dignity. The sale of sex is, because once the prostitute makes sex available in the marketplace, she removes it from its normatively desirable context as elaborated by Justices O’Regan and Sachs: love, deep attachment, intimacy, marriage, and family. 132 As both they and the majority conclude, while same-sex sodomy might take place as part of what their colleague on the United States Supreme Court would call an “enduring personal bond,” 133 warranting the overlapping constitutional protections of equality, privacy, and dig-

131. Id. at paras. 27–28.
132. The Court’s holding is consistent with the construction of the African humanist idea of ubuntu, which has been translated by the South African court to include the concept of dignity and which has been read to encompass respect for “interpersonal relationships at family level.” Mqkele, supra note 115, at 369 (citing S v. Mmakwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para. 263 (S. Afr.)) (emphasis added).
133. It is important to note that just because the leading cases of the United States and South Africa strike down sodomy prohibitions relying at least in part on a concept of dignity that involves a strong relational component, that does not mean that sodomy cannot be constitutionally protected, even using a dignity ideal, in any other way. In 1957, in a much criticized decision, the German Constitutional Court upheld a sodomy prohibition on morality grounds. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constutional Court] 1957, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfasungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 389 (432–33), (1957) (F.R.G.). This case is no longer considered to be good law. Subsequent German case law rejects the morality rationale and the sodomy prohibition was itself repealed. See Eberle, supra note 40, at 137–38, 156 n.81. See also the governing precedent from the European Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (rejecting sodomy prohibitions based on morality rationales). As Eberle argues, however, sodomy could be protected on the basis of German law’s “emphasis on human dignity and the free unfolding of personality.” Eberle, supra note 40, at 138. Eberle’s vision centers on the autonomy dimensions of dignity, using the language of “sexual autonomy” and associating the concept with individual self-actualization in the Kantian mode. Id.
nity—prostitution, by its very character, cannot. Sex itself is not portrayed as undignified in Jordan. To the contrary, the dignity of sex and sexual actors must be protected against the threats posed by commercialization, lovelessness, indiscriminateness, and the divorce of sex from family. It is the absence of a broader relationship that impugns sex-for-reward and renders it unworthy of the constitutional protection afforded by the South African dignity provision.

A German case known as the “Peep Show Decision,”134 while operating with altogether different expectations for the “dignified” relationship, nonetheless shares this general preoccupation. Citing the constitutional value of human dignity, a federal administrative tribunal refused to license a peep show in which a naked woman would be seen by individual “spectators sitting in one-person cabins placed around the stage.”135 According to the tribunal’s own account, the star of the show could have participated willingly, but this did not obviate the dignity violation.136 As a result, the case has gained attention for running dignity against consent or autonomy.137 What has drawn less notice (at least in my reading) is the anti-relational aspect of the peep show. The tribunal stated that

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\text{[t]he mere display of the naked female body does not violate human dignity, so that, at least as regards a violation of human dignity, no objections exist in principle against the usual striptease performances. . . . Peep shows are fundamentally different from striptease performances. The actions of a woman performing a striptease in front of an audience she can see are in line with the traditional stage and dance show and leave the personal individuality of the performer intact . . . . In a peep show, however, the woman is placed in a degrading position, she is treated like an object . . . for the stimulation of [the spectators’] sexual interests.138}
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136. Id. at 105.

137. See, e.g., id. at 105–06. See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 146 (2004) (thinking the tribunal was on to something in its consideration of the woman’s dignity, but noting she would have given more weight to autonomy considerations).

This last line is a strange way to explain the distinction between a striptease and a peep show. Surely women are treated as "object[s] . . . for the stimulation of . . . sexual interests" in either case. It is arguably true, as critics charge, that in this case the tribunal has dignity and consent/autonomy running counter to one another. But why would the woman's consent be overridden by dignity concerns for purposes of licensing one kind of performance but not the other? What seems to bother the tribunal, driving articulation of this distinction, is that in the peep show, the gaze travels in only one direction, from audience to performer. Unlike a stripper, the star of a peep show cannot interact with, respond to, or relate to her audience. The indignity, one could conclude from the tribunal's analysis, lies there.

IV. EXILING SHAME

But why? Why is it that the same physical acts are dignified in one context, but undignified in another? Why does the dignity of sexual acts turn on the extent of the relationship between the participants? And in Jordan specifically, why do commerce and lovelessness defeat the dignity of sex?

Recall Whitman's discussion of the origins of European dignity in the customs associated with dueling. The Nazis' rhetorical success, which Whitman contends was not entirely repudiated in the post-war conception of dignity, was in the promise of widespread access to high status norms. Of course, the extension of high status to all Germans is more than simply a hollow proposition and a logical impossibility; it reflects shame. A preposterous belief that one has high status is best read as an instance of overcompensation, or, in Freudian terms, a reaction-formation—that is, an unconscious defense against the shame of having low status.

A couple of the authors in the Kretzmer-Klein volume appear to share this intuition. David Weisstub, in a particularly lucid essay, observes that dignity has its own "stylistics." He believes that the term still signifies "[t]he aristocratic attributes of being 'above the crowd,' being able to control excessive sentiment or emotion, being un-needy materially (or apparently so),

139. See Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 384 (Joan Riviere trans., 1943).
140. David N. Weisstub, Honor, Dignity and the Framing of Multiculturalist Values, in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, supra note 7, at 263, 270.
[and] looking like the product of good breeding in dress and mannerisms."141 These stylistics cannot help but precipitate a minor crisis when the term is applied to “persons in involuntary states of committal, the mentally and medically incapacitated . . . and the under-classes . . . . [because while] one’s ‘liberal’ instinct is to avow the human dignity of all these groups[,] . . . . this flies in the face of popular use.”142

As a psychological matter, Weisstub maintains,143 the humiliated person often “becomes morally incapacitated . . . . [triggering] instincts such as revenge and desire to reconstitute the psyche through acts of distancing.”144 The revenge point is interesting enough,145 but I am more concerned with distancing as a way of managing shame. What a humiliated person experiences as dignity, Weisstub contends, might instead be “identification with the aggressor [or] spurious notions of elitist or aristocratic affect.”146

141. Id. at 269.
142. Id.
143. Weisstub “holds the Philippe Pinel Chair of Legal Psychiatry and Biomedical Ethics at the University of Montreal Faculty of Medicine.” Id. at 296.
144. Id. at 279–80.
145. Weisstub calls on Shakespeare’s Shylock to demonstrate this point, making particular reference to the famous speech in which Shylock asks “if you prick us doe wee not bleed,” noting Shylock’s complaint that he has been disgraced and that his nation has been scorned, and swearing that “[t]he villainy you teach me I will execute.” Id. at 280.
146. Id. at 281. A good illustration of Weisstub’s point comes from Orit Kamir, Honor and Dignity Cultures: The Case of Kavod and Kvod Ha-Adam In Israeli Society and Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, supra note 7, at 231. Kamir offers a helpful taxonomy of meanings for the Hebrew kavod, which she translates as glory, honor, dignity, or respect, depending on the context, see id. at 236–37, and argues that political Zionism began principally as an honor discourse. See id. at 245.

Zionism transformed pain, widely felt by European Jews as a result of the continuous assault on their dignity and human rights, into anger in the context of national honor. The honor code, eagerly adopted from European and especially from German culture by Zionists and presented as authentically Hebrew, made it possible to present Jewish life in Europe as degrading and humiliating to the collective entity. The national state in Palestine was presented as an honorable solution to a dishonorable existence in exile.

Id. An interesting historical note cited by Kamir in support of her position is that the writings of Theodor Herzl, the father of political Zionism, apparently “reveal him [to be] obsessively concerned with issues of honor . . . . The first solution Herzl devised for the problem of Europe’s Jews was a public duel between a leading anti-Semite and himself, or another Jewish leader.” Id. at 247 (citing 1 HERZL, HERZL’S WRITINGS IN TEN VOLUMES 5 (1960)). Note in this example the Jewish identification with the European aggressor, a point made by Weisstub, as well as the proposal that the Jews redeem their honor through a practice associated with the aristocracy.
Dignity is a reaction-formation against shame or humiliation, when a humiliated person’s response to the condition of humiliation is to distance herself from that experience, to don an aristocratic affect, and to adopt the pretentious stylistics of a higher social status, the exclusion from which caused the humiliation in the first place. This reaction is unconscious and therefore difficult to reach and engage, lending dignity the tremendous power of psychic intransigence.

An analogous reading explains the judicial inclination to protect the dignity of sex from threats posed by anonymity, lovelessness, and commerce. A crucial piece of my argument is that when a court dignifies some judicially favored brand of sex, it simultaneously and inherently degrades sex that occurs outside of the normatively prized context. That conclusion, it seems to me, is logically required and is exemplified by the pairing of the two South African cases. I want to push forward one more step, though, and urge that labors on the part of courts to protect the dignity of sex from the threat posed by that which takes place outside of the ideal, loving, intimate, and familial setting are evidence of a reaction-formation. The reaction is not unlike the reaction against being lower-class and the desire to distance oneself from that indignity; it is a reaction against—and desire to distance oneself from—the shame, terrors, and anxieties associated with sex.

A. Aloneness

In his Is the Rectum a Grave?, Leo Bersani argues that the problem with phallocentrism is its “denial of the value of powerlessness.”147 He explains:

In making this suggestion I’m also thinking of Freud’s somewhat reluctant speculation . . . that sexual pleasure occurs whenever a certain threshold of intensity is reached, when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed by sensations or affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ those connected with psychic organization. Reluctant because . . . this definition removes the sexual from the intersubjective. . . . For on the one hand Freud outlines a normative sexual development that finds its natural goal in the post-Oedipal, genitally centered desire for someone of the opposite sex, while on the other hand he suggests not only the irrelevance of the object in sexuality but also, and even more radically, a shattering of the

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psychic structures themselves that are the precondition for the
very establishment of a relation to others.148

At a certain point on the arc of a sexual encounter, Bersani
seems to be suggesting, the desired object becomes virtually irrele-
vant.149 At the moment when psychic organization is disrupted,
sexual orientation and gender identity become moot and—as the
sexual is “remove[d] . . . from the intersubjective,”—sex is the
province of the solo practitioner.

Bersani is zeroing in on that facet of sex which implicates
power. He continues: “[T]he self which the sexual shatters pro-
vides the basis on which sexuality is associated with power. . . .
For it is perhaps primarily the degeneration of the sexual into a
relationship that condemns sexuality to becoming a struggle for
power. As soon as persons are posited, the war begins.”150

Ian Halley elucidates Bersani’s argument this way:

The self-shattering which Bersani finds in our sexual intensi-
ties is to be valued as a political project because it gestures to a
state of being in which the self/other structure of social life is
suspended and the political will to dominate rendered inarticu-
late and helpless. The social and the political inevitably in-
volve domination or at least the struggle for it, but sexuality
has a fleeting existence prior to and free of them . . . .

[Bersani] argues that the very self respect which, in liberal the-
ory, is supposed to check social subordinations in the sexual
domain—homophobia, misogyny and sexual moralism being
his examples—actually produces them and every form of
power struggle. They cannot be traced to mastery or submit-
sion, but to the self which would transcend its own relentless
problematic. Sexual abjection with its momentary disorienta-
tion of the self offers to interrupt this generation of social
dominance through the self, and constitutes a vast critique of
political and social power.151

Bersani’s purpose is to discern political value in sexual practice—
he sees the disruption of the self in sex as a disruption of the
relationship and the attendant struggle for power that occurs in-
tersubjectively resulting in domination and subordination. My
purpose in appropriating Bersani’s idea is less ambitious. I wish
mainly to direct attention to that facet of sex which occurs
outside of relation.

148.  Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
149.  See Ian Halley, Queer Theory By Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7,
14–27 (2004), for a meticulous and helpful reading of Bersani’s essay.
150.  Bersani, supra note 147, at 218.
151.  Halley, supra note 149, at 21.
Consider this account of the sexual arc by psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas, noting the importance of both relatedness and anti-relatedness:

In lovemaking, foreplay begins as an act of relating. Lovers attend to mutual erotic interests. As the economic factor increases, this element of lovemaking will recede somewhat (though not disappear) as the lovers surrender to that ruthlessness inherent in erotic excitement. This ruthlessness has something to do with a joint loss of consciousness, a thoughtlessness which is incremental to erotic intensity. It is a necessary ruthlessness as both lovers destroy the relationship in order to plunge into a reciprocal orgasmic use. Indeed the destruction of relationship is itself pleasurable . . . [as is] the conversion of relating to using . . . .152

While the Lawrence and Jordan courts extol the virtues of intimacy and struggle to defend the dignity of sex that occurs in the context of an enduring relation, they seem less inclined to highlight the unrelated facet of sex. Perhaps anonymous, loveless, and commercial sex reveal something about even the most loving, marital brand of sex that judges do not want to see. Bersani’s essay begins, “[t]here is a big secret about sex: most people don’t like it.”153 I take him to be referring to the imminent disaggregation of the self, which can be terrifying, as can the loneliness implicit in both the Bersani and Bollas accounts. By emphasizing the relationship, though, this terrifying aspect of sex can be discursively exiled.

The German Peep Show Decision highlights this anxiety around anti-relational sexuality, as well. Some shame, anxiety, or terror was triggered by the lack of relating that occurs in the peep show, prompting the tribunal to distinguish the peep show from the striptease on dignity grounds. That the same act of nude dancing was seen as sufficiently dignified when the dancer could see her audience but contrary to the constitutional value of dignity when she could not, suggests that dignity was acting as a textual/doctrinal container for an anxiety about anti-relatedness.

In Halley’s explication of Bersani, he writes, “the very self respect which, in liberal theory, is supposed to check social subordinations . . . actually produces them.”154 Once we bring in the

153. Bersani, supra note 147, at 197.
idea of reaction-formation, we might add that the liberal ideal of dignity (a consummate expression of liberal self-respect) when conceptually tied to a morally privileged relationship, not only undermines its own egalitarian ethic, but also obscures fear and shame about aloneness in sex. In other words, the particular moralism expressed in the normative privileging of the enduring relationship reflects (and deflects) unconscious feelings about aloneness.

B. Intimacy

On the flip side, paradoxically, are shame, anxiety, and fear regarding intimacy. In Philip Roth’s novel, *The Human Stain*, the protagonist’s lover ruminates on “[w]hat the hookers told her, the whores’ great wisdom: ‘Men don’t pay you to sleep with them. They pay you to go home.’”155 Sex, Roth’s hookers seemed to intuit, is not that hard to come by. By itself, it might not sustain the prostitution market. But the escape that the prostitutes offer men from having to perform intimacy afterwards—now that’s worth something.

“[H]uman intimacy,” as Susan Miller writes, “is risky business and often very costly.”156 Miller’s book, *Disgust: The Gatekeeper Emotion*, examines the role of disgust in regulating intimacy, and guarding against the many risks intimacy poses, including the risk of a total collapse of the self into another.157 (Roth’s hookers provide a quite low-cost alternative by comparison.) According to Miller, sex and disgust are partners in a dance,158 playing out “our conflicting desires for union and separateness.”159 Disgust, as Miller’s title indicates, acts as a gatekeeper, mediating between our need for, and fear of, intimacy. While the Bersani and Bollas accounts depict an aloneness in sex that can be terrifying, Roth and Miller suggest that intimacy can be equally frightening. Judicial prizing of the nicety of the “en-

156. SUSAN B. MILLER, DISGUST: THE GATEKEEPER EMOTION 98 (2004). Susan Miller is not to be confused with a perhaps more well-known Miller who has taken up the same subject matter. See generally WILLIAM I. MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997).
157. SUSAN B. MILLER, supra note 156, at 97–110.
158. Id. at 110. She is drawing on but slightly modifying Freud, who “understood disgust—along with shame and morality—to be a reaction-formation against desire, meaning it is an expression of aversion that disguises a desire or an appetite.” Id. at 110–11.
159. Id. at 97.
during bond” brand of intimacy—a one-dimensional account that raises none of the psychic complexities but dignifies morally privileged sex at the expense of the more disreputable varieties—avoids confrontation with that difficulty.

C. Animality

As discussed above, one can discern, in the history of human dignity, an emphasis on the distinction between human beings and non-human animals. In the Kretzmer-Klein volume, for example, Hubert Cancik explains:

It is ratio (mind, reason) through which man excels beasts. Reason is, according to Stoic anthropology, the distinctive quality of man. . . . The mind . . . controls the drives . . . and represses the irrational affects . . . . It is from this rule of reason over the irrational forces that Cicero derived the ‘dignity of our nature.’

He goes on to say, “[s]ince animals, according to Stoic assumptions, have only senses and sensuality, they are fixed in the present and have only a limited foresight and memory. Man should rule over beasts as over his own sensuality, emotions, drives.”

Human beings, according to this conceptualization, live with the capacity for both rationality and irrationality, dignity glorifying the former to the exclusion of the latter, which one imagines to encompass our unglamorous bodily desires. Sex, one could take from the Stoic formulation, is a domain in which we are our less rational, more animalistic selves.

Susan Miller also has observed the existence of a certain “anxiety associated with sexual behavior [due to] its underscoring of our membership in the animal kingdom.” Michael Warner has similarly surmised that “[p]erhaps because sex is an occasion for losing control, for merging one’s consciousness with the lower orders of animal desire and sensation, for raw confrontations of power and demand, it fills people with aversion and

160. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
161. Cancik, supra note 9, at 25.
162. Id. at 26.
163. MILLER, supra note 156, at 114. Miller adds, “the homophobic reaction is not necessarily the response to same-sex body contact per se, but may be the response to the animal nature of all sexual passions, seen more clearly when looking at something less familiar and slightly alien.” Id. She goes further to suggest that “[f]or many men, the humiliation associated with surrendering adult sensibilities and reverting to infantile anality may be compounded by the humiliation of assuming the passive, stereotypically feminine role of being penetrated [or by] the idea of penetration from behind, which connotes for both genders animal sexuality.” Id.
These commentators are picking up on vestiges of the Stoic view (and of some analogous religious views) discernable in contemporary conceptions that observe a sharp dichotomy between the rational mind and the beastly drives, only the former meriting dignified regard.

In her recent book *Hiding from Humanity*, Martha Nussbaum suggests that disgust “has to do with our interest in policing the boundary between ourselves and nonhuman animals, or our own animality” and with a “fantasy of self-transcendence [or of] impossible strength or purity.” She argues that through the mechanism of projection, disgust has the dangerous capacity to produce subordination:

So powerful is the desire to cordon ourselves off from our animality that we often don’t stop at feces, cockroaches, and slimy animals. We need a group of humans to bound ourselves against, who will come to exemplify the boundary line between the truly human and the basely animal. Thus, throughout history, certain disgust properties—sliminess, bad smell, stickiness, decay, foulness—have repeatedly and monotonously been associated with, indeed projected onto, groups by reference to whom privileged groups seek to define their superior human status. Jews, women, homosexuals, untouchables, lower-class people—all these are imagined as tainted by the dirt of the body.

Nussbaum posits that “[d]isgust at the body and its products has collaborated with the maintenance of injurious social hierarchies,” and urges the dismantling of social formations that result from an unhealthy relationship to human animality.


165. On the religious side, Orit Kamir reports that “[r]elying on the biblical portrayal of Man as created in the image of god, Rabbinical Judaism attributes some of god’s kavod—glory to mankind.” *Kamir, supra* note 146, at 244. This godly element “precludes suicide, abortion, homosexual intercourse and masturbation among other ‘unglorified’ treatments of a person’s body.” *Id.* Kamir distinguishes between kavod as glory and kavod as dignity, contending that the former refers not to “people’s human essence, but to the godly element within them.” *Id.* While her taxonomy of the Hebrew term is useful for her purposes, I do not see this distinction as crucial here, except perhaps insofar as she asserts that a compromise of kavod as glory is regarded as sin, rather than with shame. *Id.*

166. *Nussbaum, supra* note 137.

167. *Id.* at 89 (citations omitted). Nussbaum treats disgust and shame separately, but I do not see a reason to adhere to her separation for purposes of this sub-part or the next.

168. *Id.* at 106.

169. *Id.* at 107–08.

170. *Id.* at 117.
In the domain of sex, in particular, Nussbaum is troubled by "the time-honored view that sex itself has something disgusting about it."\textsuperscript{171} She appears to endorse the idea that "a healthy society would be one that comes to grips with its own mortal bodily nature and does not shrink from it in disgust."\textsuperscript{172} At moments such as these in Nussbaum’s book, her thinking grows utopian,\textsuperscript{173} and it is not clear to me that the eradication of disgust around sex and the human body is an avenue worth pursuing.\textsuperscript{174} Still valid and important to my argument, however, are her observations regarding the fantasy of purity, the projection of disgust to create hierarchy,\textsuperscript{175} and the general anxiety surrounding reminders of human membership in the animal kingdom.\textsuperscript{176} My interest is in the explanatory contribution of animality in trying to understand the judicial application of dignity to a subset of sexual practices.

One might expect judges to regard sex as belonging to the beastly domain within the Stoic formulation and therefore to treat sex as undignified, but the cases discussed in this Article defy this expectation. Instead, judges who cannot seem to find any dignity in the thought of human beings on the prowl for ut-

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\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 137. Nussbaum is highly suspicious of disgust as a guide to the regulation of sex. She sees it as a “red herring in the law of pornography,” for example, and believes it does not justify sodomy prohibitions. Id. at 75.

\textsuperscript{172} Id. at 138 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{173} James Q. Whitman also has criticized Nussbaum’s book as utopian, but on a different point. James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2698, 2709 (2005) (reviewing Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (2004)). Whitman accepts hierarchy as probably inevitable and would have liked to see Nussbaum engage some of the difficult questions regarding the exercise of power under hierarchical conditions. See id. at 2720–24.

\textsuperscript{174} A “healthy society” that has conquered disgust at the human body strikes me as neither possible nor unequivocally desirable. Some sex might be exciting precisely because of the risk of disgust that it just barely skirts.

\textsuperscript{175} To avoid subjecting myself to the criticism levied at Nussbaum by Whitman, see supra note 173 and accompanying text, I note that this paper is not an argument against hierarchy in all its forms; it is an argument identifying a specific hierarchy and evaluating that hierarchy for its desirability.

\textsuperscript{176} See also Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents 53 n.3 (James Strachey trans., 1961) (“[W]ith the assumption of an erect posture by man and with the depreciation of his sense of smell, it was not only his anal eroticism which threatened to fall a victim to organic repression, but the whole of his sexuality; so that since this, the sexual function has been accompanied by a repugnance which cannot further be accounted for, and which prevents its complete satisfaction and forces it away from the sexual aim into sublimations and libidinal displacements. . . . Thus we should find that the deepest root of the sexual repression which advances along with civilization is the organic defense of the new form of life achieved with man’s erect gait against his earlier animal existence.”).
terly self-regarding, unrelated, animalistic sex can siphon off sex that occurs in the context of an enduring relation from its deprivileged counterpart. In so doing, they foist the shame and anxiety of animalism onto the latter and move the former into the realm of dignity—if only by ignoring its animalistic, irrational aspects.

D. Need

The deep hunger or sense of need associated with sex might also be expected to produce feelings of vulnerability and shame. To the extent that unrelated sex foregrounds the base sexual need, shame might prompt a person (such as a judge) to draw a sharp distinction between anonymous sex and its more respectable counterparts.

In her discussion of shame, Nussbaum finds origins in infantile helplessness and the wish for omnipotence and comfort, and links sexual shame to “a more general neediness and vulnerability.” The danger then comes when one cannot manage one’s feelings about neediness internally, but must externalize them by shaming others:

[People who inflict shame are very often not expressing virtuous motives or high ideals, but rather a shrinking from their own human weakness and a rage against the very limits of human life. Their anger is not really, or at least not only, anger at immorality and vice. Behind the moralism is something much more primitive, something that inherently involves the humiliation and dehumanization of others . . . .]

In the area of sex in particular, “insecurity” and “lack of control” lead to hierarchy and “scapegoating, in which some vulnerable minority bears the burden of the fears of the majority.” Nussbaum explains:

In sexual relations all human beings feel deeply exposed, and sex is a particular site of both physical and emotional vulnerability, but if normals can brand a certain group as sexually deviant, this helps them to avoid the shame that they are prone to feel. In short, by casting shame outwards, by branding the faces and the bodies of others, normals achieve a type of sur-

177. Nussbaum, supra note 137, at 173.
178. Id. at 183.
179. Id. at 232.
180. Id. at 296. Nussbaum’s utopianism shows up in this discussion as well, particularly where she describes a “good development” in which an “infant learns not to be ashamed of neediness.” Id. at 191. She mitigates this somewhat later, however in an admission of the inevitability of shame. See id. at 336.
rogate bliss; they satisfy their infantile wish for control and invulnerability.\textsuperscript{181}

Shame over one’s need, therefore, like disgust at one’s own animality, poses the risk of projection, and might, for example, find its way into a judicial opinion that is intent on distinguishing between privileged sex and a deprivileged variety in which need, vulnerability, and hunger are more vivid.

E. The Other Side of the Dignity Coin

So, if sex has an anti-relational dimension—and of course I cannot prove that this is always or necessarily so\textsuperscript{182}—or if intimacy is characterized by high costs and high risks, or if in sex we are our most animalistic selves (i.e., irrational and sensual), or if sex is a domain of vulnerability and need, and if any or all of these facets of sex provoke fear, anxiety, or shame, then one could conclude that by conceptually fastening dignity to relatedness, courts are effectively proposing that practitioners of anonymous, loveless, and commercial sex bear the shame and anxiety that attends to sex generally. Exiling some forms of sex from the realm of dignity plainly degrades those forms, but if you are persuaded that sex in general comes with some dimensions that provoke shame, fright, or anxiety, then the degradation produced by the Lawrence and Jordan courts by their preoccupied protection of dignified relatedness attaches not only to the exiled varieties of sex, but to sex in general. In the short term, some sex benefits from the constitutional shelter befitting such a dignified endeavor, but play out these implications, and sex in general is degraded.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{181} Id. at 219.

\textsuperscript{182} This part contains a number of psychoanalytically-oriented assertions, none of which, as far as I know, can be proven in the strictest sense. As Nussbaum concedes, “many people do not have a high regard for psychoanalysis.” Id. at 342. My best pitch to the skeptically inclined is this: There is no need to buy into psychoanalysis wholesale, no need, for example, to find purchase in the Oedipal triangle, the death drive, or the meaning of dreams. My argument in this part relies mainly on the existence of unconscious motivation and the possibility of projection. My hope is that when faced with the conceptual linkage in the cases between dignity and relationship, as well as the non-inevitability of said linkage (e.g., there is the option of linking dignity to absence of harm), few alternative explanations for the judicial conception will present themselves, and the suggestions offered in this part will come to seem like the most plausible, if not the only, explanation.

\textsuperscript{183} Avishai Margalit has argued that the concept of human dignity comes with two hazards: kitsch and deification. Avishai Margalit, Human Dignity: Between Kitsch and Deification, Address at Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study Dean’s Lecture Series (Feb. 17, 2005) (video available at http://www.radcliffe.edu/events/
In short, the dignity of sex reflects the shame of sex. Like the extension of dueling norms to low-status Germans, dignity is the cover story, shame and distancing the painful undercurrents.

Observe for example the similarity between the shame of sexual need and the shame of having low social status. As Weissstub observed, a “stylistic” of aristocracy to be mimicked by those with a longing for upper-class respectability is that of “being un-needy materially.”\textsuperscript{184} The impulse to distance oneself from one kind of neediness is highly reminiscent of the impulse to distance oneself from the other kind.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{184} lectures/2005_margalit.php). He defined “kitsch”—fabulously—as “the absolute denial of shit in our life.” \textit{Id.} His concern about dignity is that it is easily sentimentalized so that vulnerability and innocence (“kitsch”) or Kantian moral autonomy (“deification”) serve as justifications for a universal principle of human dignity. \textit{Id.} His preference is that human dignity be premised on the notion that human beings are “icons of each other.” \textit{Id.} Mere universality of humanness, without the need for further justification in human traits or conduct, seems to Margalit to contain more promise for tapping into the concept when it is most needed. He cited the treatment of Saddam Hussein, hardly an innocent or noble figure, as an example. \textit{Id.} Rather than focusing on Saddam’s deservedness, Margalit argued, we should treat him with human dignity because he is an icon of all of us. \textit{Id.}

This formulation holds significant appeal for me because my concern is the implicit drawing of a boundary between innocent, deserving sex (relational, marital, intimate, etc.) and guilty, undeserving sex (anonymous, commercial, and otherwise depraved). The sideling of undeserving sex has consequences for all sex, I have argued. It is not entirely different from Margalit’s idea that indignities committed against Saddam Hussein are indignities to an icon of all of us.

Margalit’s argument broke down, however, during the question-answer period. He could not offer a reason to draw the line at human beings, for example. \textit{See id.} Why is a pet dog not equally a universal icon? He could not offer a justification for his inclination not to intervene where someone has consented to be humiliated. \textit{See id.} Most importantly, for my purposes, after making frequent use of forced nudity as an example of a plain violation of human dignity, he could not say why his obsessive return to the indignity of nudity was not a reproduction of the problem of “the absolute denial of shit in our life.” \textit{See id.}

This is not to say that I favor parading prisoners around naked. Rather, I mean to point out that in the answers to each of these questions, not only does even Margalit’s refined conception of dignity reveal itself to be an abstraction rife with all of the predictable problems of indeterminacy, but even this critic of kitsch and deification feels compelled to extricate dignity from the horror of bare naked animality. \textit{See also Nussbaum, supra note 137, at 186 (“Why has shame been so often connected to the sexual and to a desire to cover our bodily organs from view?””).

\textsuperscript{184} Weissstub, supra note 140, at 269–71.

\textsuperscript{185} Susan Miller identifies a parallel between the disgust associated with sex (remaining mindful of both the fear and desire implicated) and the disgust associated with carnivals, where people go to watch “the interplay between the desirable and the revolting.” She points out that this “duality . . . often associates with other dualities, such as upper class and lower class.” \textit{Miller, supra note 156, at 111 (citations omitted).} For Miller, the analogy encompasses the tense coexistence of desire and aversion in relation to sex and oddities, and this recalls for her the duality of
Observe further the similarity between Nussbaum’s idea about projecting shame onto some deviant class and Whitman’s account of the power of Nazi rhetoric that appealed to the ordinary German’s wish to be included in the aristocracy, and the concomitant requirement of a low-status outcast onto whom one could unload one’s shame.

Even when the dignity of sexual relatedness blankets some range of practices in a manner that seems egalitarian, it is performing a hierarchical function by foisting the shame somewhere else. It may be true that the nature of constitutional line-drawing requires that some hierarchy be produced, but in this part I have urged that the particular hierarchy produced by the exiling of sex that occurs outside of the context of a normatively privileged relationship is a bad one,\(^186\) both because we might see more of the kind of concrete legal consequences seen in Jordan,\(^187\) and because even that sex which, by virtue of its relational context, looks as if it were safe under the blanket of dignity, is subject to degradation.

class. The analogy I mean to draw is close though not identical. It encompasses shame over sexual need and shame over material need. Both might easily produce the wish to distance oneself from the indignity of need by adopting an aristocratic “stylistic” of “being un-needy.”

186. This Article is written in the mode of critique, and I wish it to remain that way, but anticipating that some readers at a moment such as this will want to know what hierarchy I would deem more desirable, I will digress briefly here to the prescriptive. My views are best described as “pro-sex,” a position I explained in detail in The Future of Sodomy, supra note 86, at 199–203. It is not, at least as I understand it, an “anything goes,” libertarian position. I favor prohibition of some sexual activities, such as rape and child abuse. A pro-sex position does, however, encompass some tendencies that affect how I would construe those terms. Among those tendencies are: opposition to an overreaching suspicion about sex according to which sex always begins by having to justify itself, a general attitude of tolerance and pluralism around sex, refusal to permit the difficulties of power in sex to lead to a position that all power differentials in sex are inherently wrong, willingness to engage in a cost-benefit analysis around the regulation of sex that takes into account costs associated with excess enforcement against sex, and wariness of externalizing the shame of one’s own sex by shaming others. See id. (citations to Gayle Rubin, Judith Butler, Duncan Kennedy, and Michael Warner omitted). These tendencies still leave plenty of room for context-specific analyses that place consent and harm concerns at the center. Consent and harm, of course, are both concepts that have been subject to critique, including by me. See id. at 207–15. I do not, however, propose them as litmus tests with plain meanings, but as concepts with heuristic value, to be employed with vigilant attention to the distributive implications (i.e., the costs and benefits to a wide range of interests) of their use in each case.

187. Hopefully, it is clear from the preceding note why I view the concrete legal consequences seen in Jordan as evidence of danger.