The leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Chapter\(^1\) has been analyzed extensively with respect to its dangerous intellectual property protections and enhanced enforcement mechanisms\(^2\) and its equally dangerous extra-judicial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions.\(^3\) In contrast, this analysis focuses on the particular risks of the Investment Chapter with respect to access to medicines because of the direct and indirect inclusion of IPRs in the Chapter’s coverage. These risks are cumulative because of other provisions in the proposed US IP chapter that would strengthen, broaden, and lengthen intellectual property rights with respect to pharmaceutical patent, data, and pricing provisions and that would expand both private IP enforcement mechanisms via mandatory injunctions and expanded damages and impose new enforcement obligations on governments in terms of border measures and criminal enforcement. In essence, the IP-Chapter gives IP-“investors” new substantive “investment rights” upon which to base their abusive ISDS claims against sovereign governments’ regulations and adjudicatory decisions.

There are four main dangers in the Investment Chapter that threaten access to medicines:

- **First**, the *minimum standard of treatment, including fair and equitable treatment, and indirect expropriation concepts contain significant ambiguities* that could greatly restrict countries’ ability to enact, use, and defend flexibilities that enhance access to medicines.
- **Second**, it is *dangerous to include IP rights at all in the investment chapter*, given the extensive private enforcement rights that rightholders already have, including administrative remedies at borders and judicial remedies for infringing conduct, and given drug companies’ proclivities to bring suits against governments.\(^4\)
- **Third**, the *bracketed limited exception to IP-related investment rights for compulsory licenses does not provide the security against investor claims* that TPP Parties might need to safeguard TRIPS-compliant measures that promote access to affordable medicines for all as promised by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.\(^5\)
- **Finally**, the *Investment Chapter prevents certain performance requirements* that in the IP context might give developing countries the leeway to develop domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in order to ensure a self-sufficient and uninterrupted supply of medicines and to legitimately promote their own industrial development.

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4. Bayer unsuccessfully sued India to achieve judicially mandated patent-registration linkage, and is suing again to reversed a properly issued compulsory license on a cancer medicine. Novartis sued India to invalidate Section 3(d) of the Indian Amended (2005) Patents Act.
5. Available at [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindcl_trips_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindcl_trips_e.htm).
1. The “minimum standard of treatment/fair and equitable treatment” standard and indirect expropriation standard contain dangerous interpretive ambiguities that could negatively impact government policies and decisions affecting access to medicines.

Article 12.6.1 requires that, as a “minimum standard of treatment,” “Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Although paragraph 1 does not require treatment in addition to or beyond that required by customary international law, paragraph 2(a) interprets “fair and equitable treatment” to include “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.” In addition, tribunals have used increasingly expansive interpretations of this “minimum standard of treatment” that depart further and further from the “customary international law” practiced by States, despite an annex defining customary international law as the “general and consistent practice of States” (compare Annex 12-B in the TPP Investment Chapter). Indeed, in the recent ruling on the Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala case, the tribunal explicitly rejected arguments that the minimum standard for investors needed to be based on state practice, opting instead to borrow a more expansive interpretation of the standard from yet another tribunal.

That more elastic interpretation of the minimum standard of treatment came from the 2004 NAFTA case known as Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States II. In its award, the tribunal defined a violation of the minimum standard of treatment as entailing state conduct that is “arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety.” The tribunal noted that this might be the case where there has been a “manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency or candor in an administrative process.” More problematically, the tribunal decided that if a state breaches “representations” that were “reasonably relied upon” by investors at the time of investment, that breach constitutes evidence of unfair or inequitable treatment that violates the minimum standard of treatment. Some commentators, citing other expansive tribunal decisions, argue that the minimum standard of treatment goes so far as to protect the “reasonable expectations” of an investor even in the absence of direct representations, let alone binding commitments allowing potential market participation or profit-making opportunities. Such expansive interpretations of the “minimum standard of treatment” have made such claims the most successful basis for investor-state suits. In nearly 75% of the investor-state cases that a U.S. investor has “won,” the tribunal cited a “minimum standard” violation to rule against the respondent Party.

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6 For a chronology of tribunals’ elastic interpretations of the minimum standard of treatment, see Public Citizen’s memo: http://www.citizen.org/documents/MST-Memo.pdf?iframe=true&width=100%&height=100%.
7 For more information on the case and its expansive interpretation of the minimum standard, see Public Citizen’s memo: http://www.citizen.org/RDC-vs-Guatemala#!/prettyPhoto/[frame]/0/.
8 Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf.
9 Id. ¶ 89.
10 Id.
11 Id.
13 See, Public Citizen’s memo: http://www.citizen.org/documents/MST-Memo.pdf?iframe=true&width=100%&height=100%.
In the pharmaceutical context, companies might claim that the “minimum standard” covers their reasonable expectations about future profits arising from the granting or even filing of intellectual property claims. Changing or re-interpreting substantive IP standards or guidelines judicially, administratively deciding pre- or post-grant patent challenges, or adjudicating exceptions to granted rights (e.g., contested compulsory licenses or exceptions to data protections) might be interpreted as violating those minimum standards (discussed further below). Where IP rightsholders disagree with judicial or administrative decisions or think that those decisions were insufficiently transparent or candid, the rightsholder could potentially bring investment chapter claims directly against the government without ever being required to even exhaust their appeal mechanisms.

Article 12.12 of the Investment Chapter separately prohibits “indirect expropriation” of a covered investment, which includes failure to pay full market value upon expropriation. Although there is an exception in subsection 5 with respect to “compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement,” this exception would not appear to cover exceptions to data exclusivity or patent-registration linkage rights (discussed further below). Even the broader bracketed portion of subsection 5, which includes “the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter _ (Intellectual Property Rights),” does not give rights to create novel exceptions to intellectual property rights in the absence of full remuneration. Pursuant to the indirect expropriation rule, it would become unlawful, arguably, to create a new public health exception to data exclusivity or to require disclosure of the international proprietary name of active pharmaceutical ingredients on medicines-related patents. Partial liability payments or royalties would not suffice. Likewise, the subsection 5 language would not prevent the IP-investor from claiming novel interpretations of what is “consistent” with the IP Chapter in ISDS arbitration.

The possible meanings of indirect expropriation are addressed further in proposed Annexes 12-B, C, and D and also include the likelihood of protecting investor expectations. Annex 12-C is the most far reaching clarification and requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: “4(a) (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations (emphasis added); and (iii) the character of the government action.” Subparagraph (b) clarifies that “Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect the legitimate public welfare objectives [23 For greater certainty, the list of legitimate public welfare objective in this subparagraph is not exhaustive] such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.” Although this public welfare exception helpful, it is not an absolute privilege. Investors can claim: (1) that their cases are the rare ones where even non-discriminatory regulation is not permitted, (2) that the regulatory actions are discriminatory, e.g., targeted solely at or disproportionately applied to pharmaceutical investors, or (3) that the interests being protected are not legitimate.

To give concrete examples, if a compulsory licensing regime were to have a local capacity building option, a pharmaceutical investor might claim this objective was a rare, challengeable circumstance. Likewise, if facially neutral compulsory licensing rights were used more routinely to grant pharmaceutical-related licenses, the pharmaceutical investor might claim “discrimination.” Finally, if a price-control or formulary measure did not adequately “respect” innovation according to a drug company’s perspective, the control measure’s purpose might be deemed not legitimate.
2. The implicit and explicit inclusion of IP rights as protected investments is deeply problematic with respect to medicines

The Article 12.2 definition of “investment” is broad enough to cover medicines-related intellectual property rights (patents, data and other trade secrets) as an investment only requires “commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.” Pharmaceutical inventions typically involve investment of capital or other resources during the research and development process. Similarly, by granting rights to exclude others, IPRs certainly create an expectation of gain or profit – indeed an expectation of monopoly rents. Accordingly, unless IP rights are expressly excluded from the investment chapter and from the term “investment,” there is a risk that IPRs, which routinely require both commitments of capital and an expectation of profit, would be implicitly covered. However, the proposed definition of investment goes further to directly reference: (g) “intellectual property rights [which are conferred pursuant to domestic laws of each Party].” The unbracketed text protecting any and all intellectual property rights is problematic in at least five ways, given uncertainty about the intended breadth of its coverage:

- First, “intellectual property rights” could be interpreted over broadly to include all of the IPRs codified in the loose language of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, TRIPS Agreement Art. 39.3 currently provides data protection against “unfair commercial use” for undisclosed data compiled at consideration expense and submitted to regulatory authorities. Big Pharma and EU and US trade negotiators have consistently interpreted this language as requiring data exclusivity – monopoly control over the data so as to prevent regulatory reliance on or reference to the data when considering a generic company’s attempt to register an equivalent product. Many other countries and leading expert commentators believe that Art. 39.3 does not require data exclusivity, a protection explicitly rejected during the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement. At present, the only way that this interpretive battle can be decided multilaterally is for an aggrieved WTO Member to bring a WTO complaint against another Member, such as India, which refuses to provide data exclusivity. However, despite intense industry lobbying on this issue, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has initiated only one such complaint against Argentina and subsequently abandoned it because of concerns that it would lose and because of other complex political calculations that structure a Member’s decision to fully prosecute a WTO complaint or not. However, if the Investment Chapter is adopted, even if the US proposal for data exclusivity in its IP Chapter were to be rejected, a pharmaceutical company could bring an extra-judicial arbitral claim (e.g. violation of reasonable expectations covered by the minimum standard of treatment) against a TPP Party based on a judicial dispute over whether TRIPS requires data exclusivity (in fact, Bayer sought a related, judicially imposed rule on patent-registration linkage in India and lost.16) The company would hope that the revolving-door trade lawyers selected to lead the investor-state dispute resolution tribunal would adopt the company’s position despite convincing expert opinion and

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15 The United States brought a complaint before the dispute resolution body of the WTO against Argentina, on the grounds that Argentinean law had no exclusivity for test data. (30) After almost 2 years, the dispute was settled at the consultation stage and without a hearing. On May 2002, the Governments of the U.S and Argentina agreed “should Argentinean law be inconsistent with Article 39.3 ... Argentina agrees to submit to the National Congress within one year an amendment to Argentinean law, as necessary, to put its legislation in conformity with its obligations under Article 39.3.” See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement, 20 June 2002, (IP/D/18/Add. 1, IP/D/22/Add. 1), available at www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=18205. As expected, Argentina did not accept the U.S. claim that exclusive rights should be granted for test data and left its law unchanged.

widespread state practice to the contrary. In essence, the investor will have gained an alternative forum for seeking to enforce novel interpretations of TRIPS and thereby gain new data monopolies. The foreign pharmaceutical IP-investor, in all probability from the US or Europe, would have rights that no domestic pharmaceutical company would have. The IP-investor could choose to appeal an adjudicatory loss and thereafter still seek separate ISDS or it could avoid the appeal process entirely and go straight to ISDS.

- Second, not only might the loose and sometimes ambiguous language of TRIPS be interpreted expansively by Big Pharma so as to justify an ISDS arbitral proceeding, but that same IP investor might over-strenuously interpret the expanded IP rights conferred by the TPP itself. For example, a Party might decide that it had a public health flexibility – and a human rights need – to enact an exception to TPP-based data exclusivity rights in the event of the issuance of a TRIPS- or TPP-compliant compulsory license. The adversely affected “investor” might conclude that the express language of the TPP IP chapter does not authorize such an exception and that the failure to pay total compensation (not a mere royalty) is an indirect expropriation or alternatively, if the decision were adjudicatory, that its reasonable expectations of data-based market exclusivity has been violated. This latter, minimum-standard-of-treatment claim would be strengthened since there is little international state practice at present of enacting exceptions to data exclusivity. Once again a U.S.-based foreign investor would not need to convince the USTR to file a WTO or even a TPP state-to-state dispute--it could do so unilaterally; moreover, it could bypass the Party's judicial procedures and jump straight into pro-industry arbitral proceedings. The company would bet that the revolving door justice of non-democratically selected arbitrators, who move seamlessly from representing IP rightholders, advising and representing governments, and putting on the false cloak of arbitral neutrality, would prevail. Worse yet, the mere threat of such a lawsuit could deter Parties from adopting lawful public health flexibilities that they might otherwise believe exist in the TPP because of the prohibitive costs of arbitral hearings and the risk of excessive judgments should they lose.

- Third, a pharmaceutical investor might simply rely on the TPP-compliant law of the TPP Party and claim that its investor rights had been infringed by an adverse decision on a pending IP claim, especially if the bracketed text of Art. 12.12.5 is not adopted. For example, if the TPP IP chapter requires countries to allow patents on new forms of existing medicines, a patent office might still conclude that a particular new polymorph form lacks an inventive step. The pharmaceutical company could argue that the TPP-compliant national law actually creates a presumption in favor of patentability of new forms and thus that it has an expectation of profit from exclusive rights on an evergreened patent. Instead of challenging the denial of its secondary patent application in court, the company could jump over that step and immediately charge dilution of its putative – but not yet granted – IP rights and expectations of profit in an ISDS proceeding.

- Fourth, there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring claims because of what it considers to be inadequate enforcement, e.g., the failure to criminally prosecute a trademark counterfeiter because of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources or a failure to impose the level of damages that the IP rightholder proposes. Although the TRIPS Agreement mainly relies upon private enforcement, e.g., the creation of a procedurally fair judicial system for the private prosecution of IP infringement claims, the proposed IP Chapter creates multiple new enforcement rights with respect to civil remedies, criminal sanctions, and border measures. Failure to provide “fair and equitable treatment” in “criminal, civil, or administrative

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17 This possibility has strong support in another section of the Investment Chapter, Art. 12.12.5, which, in bracketed text, creates an exception with respect to remedies for direct or indirect expropriation pertaining to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with the IP chapter.
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principles of due process” constitutes an actionable minimum standard of treatment violation under Article 12.6.2(a). Paradoxically, a government could face investor claims for failure to unilaterally enforce what are fundamentally private rights – no longer could Parties use their TRIPS-compliant right not to give priority to publicly funded and initiated IP enforcement. 18 Note as well, how cumulative, Big Pharma IP-investors rights now are: (1) they can bring private claims based on longer, broader, easier-to-obtain, and longer patents rights and on new data exclusivity rights and they can get enhanced damages, injunctions, and seizure orders; (2) they can seek border party-initiated border measures; (3) they can rely on ex parte, sua sponte border measures by customs officials and seek criminal enforcement of IP rights; (4) when frustrated, they can seek state-to-state dispute resolution under the TPP; and (5) they can now challenge the state directly with ISDS. Although IP right-holders already have unique and special enforcement rights under TPP IP Chapter Proposals, now they get super-sized enforcement via ISDS.

Fifth, there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a failure to intercept alleged IP-infringing, in transit medicines via stringent border measures. This too might violate the right to “fair and equitable treatment” in administrative border measures. In the pharmaceutical context, drug companies have initiated seizures of medicines-in-transit on multiple occasions in Europe, not because they violated IP rights in the countries of origin or destination, but because they interfered with fictional patent rights in the transit country. 20 Admittedly, the TPP border measures Art. 14.1 instructs customs official to apply the law of the importing country, as required by TRIPS, but trademark-related IP rights might be enforced through ISDS proceedings based on misunderstanding of the governing law and of trademark status in the importing country.

3. The compulsory licensing exceptions in the TPP Investment Chapter are insufficient to protect Parties’ legitimate interests to access affordable medicines

Bracketed subparagraph 1(f) of Art. 12.7 prohibits a TPP Party from imposing or enforcing any investment-related requirement or enforcing any investment-related commitment or undertaking “to transfer a particular technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory.” If left in this form, such a provision could eliminate the right to issue compulsory or government use licenses. To partially remedy this problem, subparagraph 12.7.3(b)(i) eliminates this requirement where a TRIPS Art. 31, unauthorized-use license (or alternatively a TPP-compliant unauthorized-use license 21) has been issued. 22 Similarly, with

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18 Article 41.5: “It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in general.” (Emphasis added.)

19 The US’s proposed IP Chapter expressly covers goods in transit, Art. 14.4. Note, although Article 14 does not directly cover patent or data rights, medicines can get caught up in border measures based on claims that they their markings are confusingly similar to a registered trademark. One such case involved the seizure of medicines bearing the international non-proprietary name amoxicillin, which German border agents considered to be confusingly similar to the brand name drug, Amoxil. Christian Wagner-Ahls, Seizure of Indian generic amoxicillin in Frankfurt, ESSENTIALDRUGS.ORG, available at http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200906/msg00014.php.


21 The proponent of this bracketed alternative, presumably, the US, would seem to hope that TPP-compliant unauthorized uses might be narrower than TRIPS Art. 31-compliant unauthorized uses. By using the “unauthorized use” language, the
respect to Art. 12.12, which prohibits the expropriation or nationalization of a covered investment either directly or indirectly, subparagraph 5 creates an exception for the issuance of compulsory licenses granted pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, there is a bracketed addition to subparagraph 5 that extends the exception against prohibited expropriation or nationalization to other IP-related acts: “or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of IP rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter __ (IP rights).”

These provisions collectively create a partial but incomplete safe haven for only some of the government action that is entirely lawful under TRIPS. For example, TRIPS Article 31, referenced in the bracketed language of TPP Art. 12.7.3(b)(i) and Art. 12.12.5, covers only a portion of legally issued licenses under TRIPS. Specifically, the referenced TRIPS-CL language does not directly reference proposed TRIPS Article 31bis or the current waiver of Article 31(f) found in the WTO Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Likewise, the bracketed TPP compulsory licensing language in subparagraph 3(b)(i) and the unbracketed TRIPS-CL language in Art. 12.12.5 do not allow the possibility of judicially authorized compulsory licenses such as those granted in the U.S. in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) and its progeny and in India in Roche v. Cipla, CS (OS) No.89/2008. Such judicial licenses are directly authorized by Article 44.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. As discussed, previously, the bracketed subsection (5), does not completely preclude challenges to adverse IP-related decisions or policy changes.

4. The limitations on performance requirements will interfere with ensuring redundant sources of medicines and legitimate technology transfer and industrial development

Article 12.7.1(b), subject to certain exceptions, prohibits a Party, with respect to investor rights, from imposing requirements in order to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content. Many countries have used such provisions in the past as a development strategy to grow their economies via local content rules and related technology transfer/local working rules. To similar effect, Article 12.7.1(h) prohibits Parties from purchasing, using, or according preferences to their own domestic technologies. Most developed countries, including the US, achieved industrial development in part by fostering rules requiring local content, by favoring local industries, and by procuring and purchasing domestically. Now the US is intent on kicking away the technology

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22 Subparagraph 3(b)(ii) creates an exception to permit remedies for anti-competitive practices. There are additional limited exceptions for environmental measures, subparagraph 3(c), government procurement, subparagraph 3(e), and other matters.
23 Note, there are additional exceptions for non-conforming performance requirement measures detailed in Article 12.9. Pursuant to Article 12.9.2, performance requirements for specific sectors, subsectors, or activities are permissible via a negotiated negative list.
24 TRIPS currently allows many other flexibilities including limitations and exceptions, exemptions, opposition procedures, exhaustion rules, definitions of patentability, etc.
26 “Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a government, without the authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members may limit the remedies available against such use to payment of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be available.” (Emphasis added.)
ladder and preventing countries from also developing industrial policy to grow their technological base and industrial capacity.\textsuperscript{27}

The TRIPS Agreement has vague and largely unenforced obligations to ensure technology transfer to least developed countries,\textsuperscript{28} but some countries have taken matters into their own hands to try to preserve sovereign rights to promote technological advancement, particularly in important areas like pharmaceuticals. For example, both India and Brazil have local production/local working rules in their compulsory licensing schemes that authorize the grant of compulsory licenses when local working, other than by importation, is not achieved. The U.S. filed a WTO complaint against Brazil on this issue in 2001, but the complaint was voluntarily dismissed in accordance with a consultation compromise.\textsuperscript{29} Although Brazil has never used the challenged local-working provision, India has just granted its first statutory compulsory license based in part on Bayer's failure to produce any content locally.\textsuperscript{30}

Preserving sovereign rights to try to maintain or to develop local pharmaceutical capacity is critical to access to medicines not only for industrialization. When a rightholder has exclusive rights to a single source of supply, not only are there monopoly-based affordability problems, there are also high risks of interrupted supply if manufacturing, capacity, or quality assurance problems occur. Many countries choose to develop local pharmaceutical capacity precisely in order to ensure that they have locally managed sources of supply of essential life-saving medicines to supplement potentially fragile supplies available from only one or a small number of producers on the global market.

**Conclusion: Strike the Investment Chapter or Otherwise Limits its Application to IPRs**

There are many reasons to strike the Investment Chapter from the TPP, a chapter that dramatically increases corporate power at the same time that it restricts government sovereignty to regulate foreign and domestic business activities and to afford the enforcement of claims on an even-handed basis in domestic courts. However, little attention has been given to the grave risks that the Investment Chapter poses to access to medicines. Big Pharma has had a big hand in the US's proposed IP Chapter and now in the Investment Chapter as well. Negotiating Parties should reject both TRIPS-plus IP standards and enforcement measures and substantive investment clause provisions and ISDS that will needlessly tie their hands in helping to safeguard the health of their people. Accordingly, the best solution with respect to IP-specific investment claims, and to the broader risks of investor-state claims altogether, is to delete the Investment Chapter entirely. There is no compelling reason why foreign investors should have rights that are not available to domestic investors nor are investments so different in kind from trade in goods and services that they are entitled to special substantive and enforcement protections.

The second-best solution to the risk of dangerous investor-state arbitral proceedings is to explicitly exclude IPRs from the Investment Chapter and to clarify that IPRs are not even indirectly protected by the broader language of the TPP definition of “investment.” This solution could best be accomplished by an addition to Art. 12.3: “4. This Chapter does not apply with respect to the enforcement of any rights conferred pursuant to Chapter __ (Intellectual Property).” Either of these

\textsuperscript{27} See Ha Joon Chang, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (London, Anthem Press 2002).
\textsuperscript{28} See Articles 7 and 66.2.
\textsuperscript{29} See \url{http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm}.
\textsuperscript{30} Natco Pharma Ltd v Bayer Corporation—Compulsory Licence Application No 1 of 2011 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai), 9 March 2012, available at \url{http://ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf}. 
solutions would force IP rightholders to assert their IP-related claims in domestic courts, just as domestic IP companies must do; there would as well be supplemental protection pursuant to state-to-state dispute resolution. By excluding investor-state IPR claims, Parties could obtain sovereign control over the adjudication of IP rights, retain freedom to develop their own IP jurisprudence, and relegate rightholders to previously established private rights and remedies, including claim in country courts alleging administrative, expropriatory, or other government wrongdoing.

The third-best solution is to adopt the bracketed language that allows investor claims only with respect to IP rights actually granted by the Party under its existing IP laws. Limiting IP “investors” to their firmly established IP rights rather than their wish-list of rights could avoid abusive suits by investors seeking to enforce ephemeral claims and yet unrealized rights under TRIPS, the TPPA, or even the national law of Parties.31

31 The author appreciates the comments and suggestions of Peter Maybarduk, Sanya Smith, and Ben Beachy.