The evolution of cooperation in the Centipede Game with finite populations

Title:
The evolution of cooperation in the Centipede Game with finite populations
Creator:
Smead, Rory (Author)
Language:
English
Publisher:
April 01, 2008
Type of resource:
Text
Genre:
Articles
Format:
electronic
Digital origin:
born digital
Abstract/Description:
The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard models and gives us reason to be cautious when employing these otherwise helpful idealizations.
Comments:
Originally published in Philosophy of Science, 75 (April 2008) pp. 157-177. DOI: 10.1086/590197
Subjects and keywords:
cooperation
game theory
Centipede Game
infinite population
finite population
evolutionary models
Other Philosophy

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