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by

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States of America experienced a crime wave that peaked in 1991 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005c). However, not all Americans felt its impact. Only the few who lived in large urban centers experienced a disproportionate number of the homicides that drove the crime wave (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006f). In other words, the crime wave was largely limited to large cities, as homicide levels in small cities, suburban areas and rural districts remained steady (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006f). More specifically that literature showed that youths aged 14 to 24 were disproportionately involved (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a), particularly black males (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006e). The data indicate, then, that the crime wave largely involved young black males killing, with handguns, other young black males.

With the nature of the crime wave in mind, the analytical goal of the dissertation was to examine how the public, print media, federal government, and local youth violence prevention programs reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In other words, this dissertation examined the relationships between the public’s fear of and concern for crime, newspapers reporting on crime and President Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign. Furthermore, the dissertation examined how the relationship between the public’s fear of and concern for crime, the print media’s reporting of crime and President Bill Clinton’s campaign for president influenced the federal government’s response to the crime wave. Moreover, the dissertation examined the relationship between the federal government’s reaction to the crime wave and the development of local youth violence prevention programs. Furthermore, the dissertation documented the
attributes of the local youth violence prevention programs that were a reaction to the crime wave. Additionally, the dissertation analyzed the attributes of the local youth violence prevention programs that were a reaction to the crime wave to determine if the federal response to the crime wave changed the attributes of local youth violence prevention programs.

The initial analysis determined that there was not a significant relationship between, the public’s fear and concern of crime, media reports on murder and violence, media reports on juvenile violence, and media reports on violence prevention programs and the overall national homicide rate. However, a more in depth analysis found that 1994 was the year that that public’s fear and concern of crime peaked. 1994 also featured a significant number media stories on youth violence prevention programs. Thus, the analysis concluded that public’s peak levels of fear and concern for crime in 1994 and the statistically significant number of media stories on youth violence prevention programs in 1994 was a reaction to youth homicide, which peaked nationally in 1993. As a reaction to record high levels of youth violence, and public fear and concern for crime, the Clinton administration and Congress feverously worked together to pass the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. As a response to the federal government’s implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, local communities reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s with local youth violence prevention programs.

When analyzing the attributes of the local youth violence prevention programs that were a response to the 1994 Federal Crime Bill it can be concluded that the program objective of recreation was the most common programs objective. The social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was the most common policy
orientation. Lastly, non-profits were the most common institutional affiliation. Finally it can be concluded that the introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill did not affect the objectives nor did it affect the policy orientations of local youth violence prevention programs. However, it can be concluded that the introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill led to a significant increase in the percentage of youth violence prevention programs that were affiliated with non-profits.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States of America experienced a crime wave that peaked in 1991 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005c). Not all Americans, however, felt its impact. The few who lived in large urban centers experienced a disproportionate number of the homicides that drove the crime wave (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006f). The crime wave was largely limited to large cities, as homicide levels in small cities, suburban areas and rural districts remained steady (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006f). Furthermore, data show that not only was the crime wave limited to large cities, but it was limited to homicides committed with handguns.

The handgun homicides that drove crime wave increased during the late 1980s and peaked in the early 1990s, while homicides involving all other weapons held steady or decreased slightly (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006b). As handgun violence reached all-time highs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, large American cities were dangerous places. The majority of those living in large cities were not part of the violence, as the data show that only a small segment of urban populations was swept up in the crime wave. Youths aged 14 to 24, black males in particular, (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006e) were disproportionately involved (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a). The data indicate that the crime wave largely involved young black males using handguns to kill other young black males.

As during previous national crime waves, the U.S. government took steps to reduce the rising homicides. In order to reduce the increasing violence, the U.S. sought
to incarcerate greater numbers of offenders than it had before. The government’s primary means of accomplishing this were truth in sentencing (Rosich and Kane 2005) and mandatory minimum sentences (Sorensen and Stemen 2002; Weinstein 2003; Schwarzer 1992). Although these were early attempts to curb the rising violence, the federal government did not make a concerted effort to fight the crime wave until, three years after the wave’s peak, it implemented the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (The 1994 Crime Bill). The 1994 Crime Bill was the nation’s most expansive crime bill to date (Donziger 1996; Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Worrall and Zhao 2003; Choi et al. 2002; Roth and Ryan 2000) and focused most of its $30 billion budget on law and order initiatives (Berger et al. 2005); It did, however, budget $2 billion on social programs designed to prevent crime.

Of the programs the 1994 Crime Bill put in place, the largest and best known is Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). This program put 100,000 new community policing officers onto America's streets (Teasley and O'Bryant 2003). Other federal programs designed to reduce violence focused on federal-local collaboration and upon creating environments in which federal agencies and local law enforcement could work together to solve local, typically urban, crime problems (Russell-Einhorn 2003). The best known and most documented federal collaboration is the Weed and Seed program, which tackled local urban violence by implementing Weeding and Seeding strategies. Weeding is finding, apprehending and prosecuting criminals considered to be the most violent offenders (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al. 1996; Miller 2001). In complement, Seeding is the implementation of social services and social programs so that
people in a neighborhood can get the help they need, rather than turning to crime (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al. 1996; Miller 2001).

Very little of the reviewed sociological literature focuses upon the social programs that were part of the reaction to the crime wave of the 1990s. We know that social programs entered the mix because the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized $2 billion dollars during its first year for social programs designed to prevent crime (U.S. Department of Justice 1994). The Weed and Seed program, for its part, devoted tens of millions of dollars to social programs designed to prevent crime. To the extent that sociological and criminological literature mentions social programs, it is in the form of program evaluations (Chaiken 1997; Sherman et al. 1998; Dunworth and Mills, 1999; Roehl et al., 1996; Roth and Ryan, 2000; Koper et al., 2002). Not only does the sociological and criminological literature lack research on the social programming that was a response to the crime wave, it also lacks evidence of how the American public, newspapers, political campaigns and Congress responded to the crime wave. Furthermore, the existing sociological and criminological literature does not discuss whether there was any sort of relationship between the reaction of the public, print media and political campaigns that may have influenced the reaction of the federal government and/or local communities.

**Purpose of the Dissertation**

This dissertation will attempt to fill the above stated gap in the literature. The dissertation will examine the relationships between the public’s fear of and concern for crime, newspapers’ reporting on crime, and President Bill Clinton’s presidential
This dissertation will then examine how the relationship between the public’s fear of and concern for crime, the print media's reporting of crime and President Bill Clinton’s campaign for president influenced the federal government’s response to the crime wave. The dissertation will furthermore examine the relationship between the federal government’s reaction to the crime wave and the development of local youth violence prevention programs. The dissertation will document the attributes of the local youth violence prevention programs that were a reaction to the crime wave. Additionally, the dissertation will analyze the attributes of the local youth violence prevention programs created as a reaction to the crime wave to determine if the federal response to the crime wave changed the attributes of local youth violence prevention programs.

I will fill these gaps in the literature by performing research that addresses the following areas: (a) the public’s fear of and concern for crime, (b) the nature of newspaper reporting on overall violence and youth violence, (c) President Clinton’s presidential campaign's reaction to the crime wave, (d) the federal government’s reaction to the crime wave, (e) federal crime prevention programs and (f) local youth violence prevention programs. The dissertation will address the public's fear of and concern for crime by examining Bureau of Justice Statistics public opinion data on how safe Americans felt walking alone at night, and whether they believed that too little was being spent on crime. The study will address newspaper reporting of violence by performing a content analyses of the newspapers of major American cities as a means of determining how newspaper reporting on murder as well as youth violence varied throughout the 1990s. The study will address President Clinton’s presidential campaign's reaction to the
crime wave by performing a content analysis on existing documentation. The paper will address the federal government’s reaction to the crime wave, and federal crime prevention programs, by performing a content analysis of official government documents. The paper will finally address local youth violence prevention programs via a second content analysis of the newspapers of America’s largest cities.

**Importance of the Dissertation**

By documenting how murder, violence, and youth violence were reported in newspapers during the late 1980s and early 1990s crime wave, this dissertation will enable researchers to determine how crime waves affect newspaper reporting. The dissertation will enable researchers to discern whether reporting reflects the rise and fall of a crime wave, other issues that coincide with the crime wave, and/or other topics and issues not relevant to the crime wave. Furthermore, the dissertation will enable researchers to determine whether the public’s fear of and concern for crime are associated with the reporting of overall violence and youth violence. In addition, the dissertation will enable researchers to determine whether the public's fear of crime is associated with federal crime prevention policies. Regarding federal crime prevention policy, the dissertation will show whether there is an association between federal crime prevention policy and local youth violence prevention programs. Furthermore, the dissertation will document local youth violence prevention programs' policy orientations, objectives and institutional affiliations. By documenting the attributes of youth violence prevention programs that arose as a reaction to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers will learn what types of programs were the most common reactions to this
crime wave. If it turns out that most of the programs had an institutional affiliation of non-profits and a program objective of recreation it will then be clear that non-profits were the most common institutional affiliations and that recreation was the most common policy objective. Finally, this dissertation will enable researchers to follow how changes in federal funding affect crime prevention programs' attributes. For instance, if the increased funding in the mid-1990s led to more education-based programs than before, then future funding increases can be geared toward such programs, knowing that they were better equipped than other programs to deal with the introductions of new funding pools. This dissertation will tell researchers what, if any, changes occur to programming when new money enters the mix.

**Outline of Chapters**

Chapter 1, “Introduction” introduces readers to the topics covered by the dissertation. The chapter familiarizes readers with the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and describes the U.S. response. The chapter also introduces readers to the dissertation's purpose and importance. Finally, it outlines the dissertation's other chapters.

Chapter 2, “The Crime Problem,” begins with an in-depth explanation of the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The chapter continues by offering an overview of the explanations given for what caused this crime wave. These include crack cocaine markets, handgun availability, weakened social institutions, and the economy. The chapter also discusses the how media reports on violence continued to increase as the nation’s homicide rate peaked in 1991 and decreased over the rest of the decade. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the public’s reaction to the crime wave, which consisted of a fear of and concern for crime. These reactions peaked in 1994 three years after the nation’s homicide rate peaked in 1991.

Chapter 3, “Theoretical Framework” provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives that influenced the policy orientations of the youth violence prevention programs created as a reaction to the crime wave. The chapter discusses the opportunity theoretical perspective's attributes and explains how it led to the creation of programs that increased educational and economic opportunities. The chapter also discusses the social bonding theoretical perspective's aspects and shows how this perspective led to programs that increased community members’ level of bonding. The chapter also covers the social disorganization theoretical perspective and how it led to programs that increased social ties and quality of life in communities. Finally, the chapter discusses the social learning theoretical perspective and how it led to programs that taught people how to avoid violence.

Chapter 4, “Methodology and Research Questions,” states the five research questions that the dissertation sets out to answer, and explains how the data was gathered. The chapter shows that crime data were derived from the Uniform Crime Report; data on newspaper coverage on violence and violence prevention programs came from newspaper articles; data on America’s fear of and concern for crime came from public opinion polls; and data on the government’s reaction to the crime wave and federal crime prevention programs came from government documents.

Chapter 5, “The Federal Response to the Crime Problem,” outlines how the federal government reacted to the crime wave, including its implementation of “get tough
policies” such as mandatory minimum sentences and truth in sentencing guidelines.

The 1994 Federal Crime Bill was another result of the government’s reaction to the crime wave. The 1994 Crime Bill authorized billions of dollars in the form of grants with the intention of fighting and preventing crime by addressing the areas of law and order, community crime prevention, domestic and sexual violence, and drug treatment. The largest and most widely researched program that spawned from the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was the COPS initiative, which is covered in some depth. Furthermore, the chapter also covers federal-local collaborations. The Weed and Seed federal-local collaboration was the most documented federal-local collaboration; therefore, it is discussed at length in this chapter.

Chapter 6, “The Relationship between the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, Public Policy and Violence Prevention Programs” begins by presenting an analysis that examines the extent to which the public’s concern for crime varies over time. Next, the chapter sets out to examine the extent to which variations in crime are associated with the level of newspaper reports on murder and violence. Subsequently, the chapter analyzes whether there is a connection between American’s fear of and concern of crime, media reports on crime and the federal government’s reaction to the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Finally, the chapter analyzes whether there is a connection between crime rates and media reporting on general crime prevention programs, and youth violence prevention programs.

Chapter 7, “The Impact of Public Policy on the Policy Orientations, Program Objectives and Institutional Affiliation of Youth Violence Prevention Programs Following the Crime Wave of the Late 1980s and Early 1990s” begins by examining the
frequencies and counts of the program objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliation of local youth crime prevention programs started as a reaction to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The chapter then analyzes the potential effect of the introduction of federal crime prevention and crime fighting programs on local youth violence prevention programs' policy orientations, program objectives and institutional affiliations.

Finally, Chapter 8, “Conclusion and Policy Implications” revisits the research questions and draws conclusions in relation to each of them. More specifically, this chapter draws conclusions about how the public, the media, political campaigns and the federal government reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, this chapter draws conclusions about possible connections between how the public, the media and the government reacted to the crime wave. This chapter finally takes the conclusions drawn and discusses their implications for crime control and prevention policy.
Chapter 2

The Crime Problem

Crime at a national level – an overview

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a rapid increase in the level of violent crime in the U.S. (Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2005b). By the early 1990s however, crime leveled off and began to show regular decreases. By the late 1990s, we saw the nation’s lowest rates of violence since the mid-1960s (Blumstein 2000). The violence problem was centered in large urban places. In major American cities, an increase in the gun related murder rate lead the overall increase in violence. In fact, murder committed with firearms was the only crime category of homicide that drastically increased during this period. Within the category of firearm homicides, juvenile and young black males were overwhelmingly responsible for committing the gun murders in urban centers that led to spike in the violence rate. The evidence substantiating these statements is laid out below.

Historically, homicide trends have shown significant variation in the U.S. Figure 1 shows that the 20th century homicide rates hovered just below 5 per 100,000 inhabitants. Between 1910 and 1930 the homicide rates increased steadily until they reached just under 10 around 1930 as the nation was feeling the effects of the Great Depression. The mid 1930s saw homicide rates begin to decrease, followed by a period with a relatively low homicide rate that lasted until the middle of the 1960s. During the middle of the 1960s, as the baby boomer generation entered its late teens and early twenties, homicide rate increased once. After the middle of the 1960s the homicide rate increased and remained high with noticeable peaks in the middle of the 1970s, around 1980 and in the early 1990s. The increase of homicide rates in the 1990s was especially troublesome.
because traditional explanations like an increase in the violence prone population did not explain its rapid increase and decrease. However, after the mid-1990s, the homicide rate declined for the remainder of the decade. This dissertation will focus on the changes that lead to the increase and subsequent decrease of the homicide rate during the 1990s.

**Figure 1**

Homicide Rates From 1900-2002 (Rate per 100,000 population)

Homicide is an important indicator of long-term crime trends because almost all homicides tend to be reported to the police, and since most homicides end in arrest, homicide is considered a very reliable statistic when measuring violent crime (Cook and Laub 1998). In addition, some research indicates that homicide reflects long-term trends in most other street crimes rather well (Donohue 1998). Moreover, criminologists tend to rely specifically on the homicide rate when discussing violent crime because what is

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1 Figure source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2005c. Homicide rates recently declined to levels last seen in the late 1960s. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs. [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/hmrt.htm](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/hmrt.htm)
defined as a homicide is rather well accepted by everyone has remained the same over time (Blumstein 2000).

Today we have a significant amount of data on crime including the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), and more detailed information collected in the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Report (SHR). The UCR is the oldest crime dataset in the United States dating back to 1929 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2006). The UCR collects incident and arrest statistics from a total of 17,000 law enforcement agencies throughout the nation (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2006). The FBI publishes UCR statistics annually in a report titled Crime in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2006). The NCVS is the nation’s second oldest crime dataset dating back to 1973 (National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 2006). The NCVS is a survey that collects data on personal and household victimization (National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 2006). The NCVS includes a nationally representative sample of households that documents crimes not reported to law enforcement authorities (National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 2006). The FBI’S SHR is the newest of the three major crime datasets dating back to 1976 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006g). The SHR is part of the UCR, however, its only focus is homicide. The SHR is data that is received from law enforcement agencies that details specific characteristics of homicides. The details provided by the SHR include information on demographics, types of homicides, victims and offenders, weapons, circumstances, and geographic area (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006g). As a result we are able to examine crime trends in more detail than ever possible in the past.
The crime data sources above have shown that there were changes in the homicide rate beginning in the middle 1980s. In 1985, the American homicide rate stood at 7.9 cases per 100,000 people. The homicide rate then rose drastically by 24 percent to its peak of 9.8 per 100,000 in the year 1991 and dropped again to a low of 6.3 per 100,000 in 1998 (Blumstein 2000). There were 18,980 homicides in the U.S. in 1985 and that this number jumped to 23,310 by 1994 (Lattimore et al 1997). Furthermore, the data and research shows that the homicide rate peaked in the early 1990s and dropped continuously the rest of the decade (Blumstein and Cork 1996; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005c). Clearly the transition from the mid 1980s to mid 1990s brought significant changes to the U.S. homicide rate. The sections below will document these changes, discuss what researchers said caused the changes, and address the way in which the federal government reacted to the changes.

The Nature of the Crime Wave

Analysis of homicide statistics shows that the increase in violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s was largely an urban issue, predominantly affecting large cities (Blumstein et al 2000). Homicide data shows that by 1991 large cities had 15,247 homicides, while small cities had 2,748 homicides (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003). Further examination of the data found that in 1991, only seven cities accounted for 25% of all American homicides (Blumstein et al 2000). By contrast, in the year 1999, large cities had 8,967 homicides while small cities had 1,904 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,

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2 By definition, “Large cities have a population of 100,000 or more while small cities have a population of less than 100,000” (Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2006f).
Other research found that America’s 77 largest cities account for a significant portion of the increase in violence in the 1980s. America’s 77 largest cities are home to 20% of the American population and 50% of the nation’s homicides during the crime wave of the late 1980s (Lattimore et al 1997). The homicide peak in the early 1990s and the subsequent fall through the end of the decade was concentrated in large cities.

**Figure 2**

**Homicides in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Areas, 1976-2004**

The availability of guns was seen as a major factor in driving up homicides rates. Data show that crimes committed with a gun peaked at nearly 600,000 in the early 1990s – around 1993 – and then declined for the remainder of the decade (Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2005d). The key to examining violent crime statistics is the influence of the handgun. The handgun variable is represented in the figure below.

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3 America’s largest cities are defined as places with a population of over 200,000 (Lattimore et al 1997).

4 Figure Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2006f. Changes in homicide trends have been driven by changes in the number of homicides in large American cities. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs. [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/city.htm#city](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/city.htm#city)
The data shows that handguns were far and away used in more homicides than any other method. The data shows that handgun homicides peaked in the early 1990s and then declined over the remainder of the 1990s. Moreover the data and research show that homicides committed using other weapons did not peak in the early 1990s (Blumstein 1995; Cook and Laub 1998; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006b). In fact, research shows that between the middle 1980s and the early 1990s, non-gun homicides saw a slight downward trend (Blumstein 1995; Blumstein and Cork 1996). Homicides involving guns other than handguns, or knives, blunt objects or other methods, all remain relatively steady or even decline through the 1980s and the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a). Furthermore juveniles and youth were largely responsible for the peak of the violence problem. Figure 4 shows this trend.

Figure 3

Homicide by Weapon Type, 1976-2004

The data shows that handguns were far and away used in more homicides than any other method. The data shows that handgun homicides peaked in the early 1990s and then declined over the remainder of the 1990s. Moreover the data and research show that homicides committed using other weapons did not peak in the early 1990s (Blumstein 1995; Cook and Laub 1998; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006b). In fact, research shows that between the middle 1980s and the early 1990s, non-gun homicides saw a slight downward trend (Blumstein 1995; Blumstein and Cork 1996). Homicides involving guns other than handguns, or knives, blunt objects or other methods, all remain relatively steady or even decline through the 1980s and the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a). Furthermore juveniles and youth were largely responsible for the peak of the violence problem. Figure 4 shows this trend.

Figure Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2006b. Homicides are most often committed with guns, especially handguns. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/weapons.htm#weaponsage
The drastic increase in juvenile violent crime began in the middle 1980s (Blumstein 1995,1996), ended with a peak in the early 1990s, and then declined by 23% by the mid-1990s (Cook and Laub 1998). The problem goes beyond juvenile violence. In order to fully understand the effect young people had on the violent crime rate, the 18-24-year-old age group needs to be considered as well. The data indicates that when the category of “youth” enters into the mix the peak and decline trend already established does not change, but rather it becomes far more complicated. The term youth refers to individuals between the ages of 18-24 (Cork 1999; Blumstein 2000). Research states that youth accounted for a larger portion of overall violence than did other age groups (Cook and Laub 1998). Youth also had the highest homicide rate during the peak of violent crimes in early 1990s (Blumstein 1995; Cook and Laub 1998; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a) and then had a rather sizable decline in homicide rate as the overall violence rate.

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Figure 4[^6]

Homicide Offending by Age, 1976-2004

[^6]: Figure Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2006a. Older teens and young adults have the highest homicide victimization and offending rates. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs.

[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/teens.htm#vage](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/teens.htm#vage)
dropped during the rest of the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a). In fact, the research states that the youth offenders’ homicide rate nearly doubled between 1985 and the peak in 1993 (Blumstein 1995,1996; Blumstein and Cork 1996; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006a). As can be inferred from the information above the upward trend in juvenile and youth homicide was committed with guns.

1985 began a definitive upward trend in the amount of firearms used by both youth (18-24-year-olds) (Blumstein 1996,2000; Cook and Laub 1998; Blumstein and Cork 1996) and juveniles (17 and under) (Blumstein 1995,1996,2000; Cook and Laub 1998; Hemenway et al 1996; Wilkinson and Fagan 1996; Blumstein and Cork 1996). In fact, the research shows that the number of homicides committed with firearms by both juveniles and youth between the start of the upswing in 1985 and its peak in the early 1990s more than doubled (Blumstein 1996; Blumstein and Cork 1996). Bureau of Justice Statistics numbers compliment the cited research by showing that homicides committed by 14-17year-olds jumped from 954 in 1985 to a peak of 3,630 in 1994, and that homicides committed by youth jumped from 3,649 in 1985 to a peak of 8,559 in 1993 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006b). The evidence shows that this trend seems to be limited to handguns for both groups (Blumstein 2000; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006b). For youth, the use of handguns in homicides grew by 128% from 1885 to 1993, and the use of handguns by juveniles increased almost 4 times between 1985 and 1993 (Blumstein 2000). In fact, the increase and subsequent decrease of gun homicides by juveniles and youth is considered significant enough that research suggests it is responsible for the overall increase and decrease of the homicide rate during the late
Males with handguns were overwhelmingly responsible for committing acts of violence. The homicide rate for males climbed during the 1980s, peaked in the early 1990s, and dropped during the rest of the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006c). Moreover, data shows that the vast majority of homicides committed by males (91.2%) involved a gun, (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006c.); This data also shows that the vast majority firearm homicides are committed using handguns. Similar evidence shows that black males were involved in violence far more frequently than white males.

Statistics and research show that blacks are more likely to be victims as well as perpetrators of homicides (Cook and Laub 1998; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006d). The black homicide rate began to rise in the mid-1980s, peaked in the early 1990s (Blumstein 1995; Cook and Laub 1998; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006d), and declined during the rest of the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006d). This data and research indicates that both white male juveniles and youths, and black male juveniles and youths, had peak rates of homicide offences during the early 1990s (Blumstein 1995; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006e). But the rates are quite different. During the violent crime rate peak, the rate for white male juveniles was above 20 per every 100,000, and the rate for white male youths was just above 30 per 100,000; but the rate for black male juveniles was, over 200 per 100,000, and the rate for black youths was over 300 per 100,000. The following figure provides a concise summary of the violence problem as documented thus far. Data show that most homicides are white on white or black on black. Statistics indicate that
86% of white victims were killed by whites and 94% of black victims were killed by blacks (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006d).

Figure 5

Homicide Offending by Age, Gender, and Race, 1976-2004

A closer look at the data shows that black-on-black homicides peaked in the early 1990s and dropped off the rest of the decade (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006d). However, the same cannot be said for white-on-white homicides. The white-on-white homicide rate dropped during the late 1980s and mid-1990s, and slightly increased during the late

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7 Figure Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2006e. Dramatic increases in both homicide victimization and offending rates were experienced by young males, particularly young black males, in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs. [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/ageracesex.htm#vars](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/ageracesex.htm#vars)
1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006d). Thus, the violent crime peak of the early 1990s was largely black male juveniles and youths killing other black male juvenile and youths with handguns.

The violent crime problem that peaked in the early 1990s was centered in America’s largest cities, driven by homicides of young black males by other young black males using handguns. According to Wilkinson and Fagan, “There appears to be a process of self-annihilation among African-American teens in inner cities that is unprecedented in American history” (1996:55).

**What Caused the Crime Problem: The Role of Crack Cocaine**

One of the most compelling and earliest explanations for the violent crime peak involved a combination of young people, guns, and illegal drugs. Scholars argue that the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s and early 1990s was uniquely violent (Blumstein 1995,1996; Cook and Laub 1998; Lattimore et al 1997; Donohue 1998). According to Wilkinson and Fagan, 89% of convicted drug dealers carried guns, and that 75% of dealers who were still students had carried guns (Wilkinson and Fagan 1996). The premise of the crack cocaine argument is that as juveniles were brought into the drug trade, there was an increase in gun exchange and dissemination through new trade recruits to other young people as a means of protection (Blumstein 1996; Blumstein and Cork 1996).

One explanation for the multitude of young people entering the drug trade is the premise of basic economics. The middle 1980s brought in an era of high demand for crack cocaine (Blumstein and Cork 1996; Blumstein 1996; Cork 1999), for several
reasons. Crack cocaine opened the world of traditional powder cocaine to lower class and poor people in urban centers (Blumstein and Cork 1996; Cork 1999). When crack cocaine was introduced, there was an overabundant supply sold “one hit at a time” for the relatively low cost of 5 to 10 dollars (Blumstein and Cork 1996). The growing demand for crack and growing markets in turn led to the drug industry recruiting new sellers to keep up with the demand (Blumstein 1996; Donohue 1998). The newly hired drug sellers were predominantly young blacks (Blumstein 1996; Cook and Laub 1998; Donohue 1998).

Why did the crack trade turn to young people when looking to fill the demand for new dealers? For two main reasons: earlier laws did not apply to juveniles, and juveniles perceived the risk differently than adults. First, juveniles were not susceptible to the same harsh punishments leveled against adults due to mandatory minimum sentence laws for drug offences (Blumstein and Cork 1996; Cork 1999). Second, juveniles did not perceive entering the new drug market as significant a risk as did adults; thus juveniles required less of a return on their risk (Blumstein and Cork 1996; Cork 1999).

Furthermore, other research finds that crack was predominantly a problem in urban black neighborhoods.

Data from the Drug Use Forecasting program indicated that crack cocaine was indeed causing problems in some of America’s largest cites (Lattimore et al 1997). First of all, research states that crack cocaine usage was up considerably in the early 1990s from the mid-1980s rates, and that this was specifically true in crime prone neighborhoods (Blumstein 1995). Furthermore, data showed that as the use of crack cocaine rate and the homicide rate increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s and
then dropped there after (Lattimore et al 1997). Moreover, crack cocaine was the only drug that showed a correlation with the homicide rate in a sample of America’s largest cities (Lattimore et al 1997).

Research states that the violence associated with crack cocaine markets is due to their participatory structural nature. Crack cocaine markets are outdoors (Lattimore et al 1997), thus lending themselves to a sort of “first come first served” approach to dealing. The “first come first served” component to the crack trade was expedited by the fact that crack was being sold to a plethora of new buyers “one hit at a time,” multiple times per week per buyer (Blumstein and Cork 1996). By contrast, in a traditional drug market, customers make acquaintances with a regular dealer whom they frequent on a regular basis; whereas in a crack cocaine market customers are less likely to establish a regular relationship with the same dealer, leading to less trust and more violence among individuals active in crack cocaine markets (Lattimore et al 1997). Thus, the crack cocaine marketplace is inhabited with people – dealers and customers alike – who turn to violence because they do not form trusting relationships. Since crack cocaine markets can be found in neighborhoods were ordinary people live, non-involved individuals feel the need to arm themselves for protection from the threat of violence presented in their neighborhoods (Blumstein 1995; Cook and Laub 1998; Hemenway et al 1996; Wilkinson and Fagan 1996; Blumstein and Cork 1996). In other words, the use of guns spreads from drug markets to the rest of the neighborhood.

A fear of gun-toting drug dealers leads to non-involved people carrying guns, and a drugs-and-guns street culture leads to non-involved individuals using guns to settle issues that have nothing to do with the activity that takes place in the crack cocaine
markets. Research has shown that those individuals who fear the threat of guns and violence are also the most likely individuals to carry a gun (Wilkinson and Fagan 1996). Moreover, research from the early to mid-1990s has found that carrying a gun correlates to knowing people who have been associated with violence, having been threatened with or victimized by a gun, and having friends and family who carry guns (Hemenway et al 1996). The violent crime epidemic is not just about the emerging crack markets but about guns becoming an acceptable means of solving problems for drug dealers and non-drug dealers alike. Hence, one word can sum up why killings with handguns were so prominent even outside of the drug trade – fear (Cook and Laub 1998). Fear then leads to the formation of new gangs for protection. In instances where new gangs form, the members arm themselves with guns, and this leads to members of other gangs arming themselves, and the diffusion of guns into the neighborhood continues (Blumstein and Cork 1996).

The Role of Gun Availability

Evidence shows that the gun-related homicide rate grew in all homicide categories, thus leading to the argument that while crack markets were largely responsible for the peaking homicide rate, the prevalence and easy availability of firearms was also a major factor. According to this argument there are two major trends that should develop when there is an increase in gun homicides. The first is that if there is greater access to guns, then the number of homicides that involve guns should go up in all homicide categories (Cook and Laub 1998). The second is that if the access to guns does not go up, but rather circumstances related to certain types of homicides change,
then it would be expected that only those types of homicides will see a drastic rate change (Cook and Laub 1998). In the case of the violent crime peak of the early 1990s, gun homicides in all categories increased – from guns used in 55% of all cases in the mid-1980s, to guns used in 72% of all cases in the early 1990s (Cook and Laub 1998). This finding proves that a major factor in the crime wave that peaked in the early 1990s was an increase in the access and availability of guns.

A second – but just as valid and important argument – focuses on the rates of suicides and homicides. The argument states that there are two potential causes for increases in the homicide rates of the late 1980s and early 1990s: an increase in the availability of guns, or an increase in violent tendencies of youthful offenders (Blumstein and Cork 1996). If the former was the case, then only gun homicides and suicides should see a rise; and if the later the case, then there should also be a rise in non-gun homicides and suicides (Blumstein and Cork 1996). The evidence shows that there was a statistically significant rise in gun homicides and suicides, a rise that was not found in non-gun homicides and suicides, thus leading to the conclusion that an increase in gun availability was indeed a major factor in the rise and peak of the violence rate during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.

Regardless of how convincing the above arguments are, the most stringent of critics would say that they are pointless without highly reliable quantitative tests. Cork (1999) uses the Bass model of innovation diffusion\(^8\) to test the idea that crack markets

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\(^8\) The Bass model of innovation diffusion is an analytical tool used to quantitatively determine how a physical item – such as a gun or a washer machine – becomes owned by many people. The model states that people’s decisions to want an item is determined in one of two ways: innovation or imitation. Innovation is a response to influences such as the media, while imitators respond largely to word of mouth and peer groups (Cork
preceded and led to the influx and easy access of guns into inner cities and ultimately into the hands of both drug involved and non-drug-involved youths. The Bass model of innovation diffusion was validates the hypothesis that the crack cocaine markets led to the diffusion of guns into the hands of youth in urban places (Cork 1999). More specifically, it was quantitatively shown that crack markets entered cities before the upswing of gun homicides; furthermore, statistically significant evidence shows that drug markets led to an influx of guns into cities and that crack cocaine markets made access to guns easier, thereby making diffusion of guns into the hands of youth a statistically significant reality (Cork 1999). These findings became even stronger when the model was run on non-gun homicides, resulting in non-significant conclusions (Cork 1999).

In sum, the introduction of crack created a new demand for sellers. Juveniles, not prone to strict laws and willing to take serious risks without high rewards, became the main players on the street. Due to the inherent dangers of such a fast-growing drug trade, the new juvenile sellers armed themselves with handguns, further spreading a fear of violence to non-involved citizens. This development led to a diffusion of guns in urban centers and a tendency of violence becoming a more tolerated means of settling disputes.

**Alternative Explanations of the Crime Problem**

As can be noted from the sections above, the dominant explanation as to what caused the spike in the violence rate is a lethal combination of crack cocaine and guns. Not only is this the dominant explanation, it is also the topic of an overwhelming amount

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1999). Imitation seems the be the most important mechanism regarding the spread of guns among youth in inner cities.
of the research presented on the violence epidemic of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. However, there are other explanations in the literature.

Researchers point to the fact that throughout this period, violent crime rates were constantly higher in areas where the non-white population outnumbered the white population (Liska and Bellair 1995). This finding lays the groundwork for the argument that race and the concentration of racial minorities in an area is more important to violent crime rates than crack cocaine markets and guns alone. As mentioned above, the proponents of the “drugs and guns” perspective state that blacks were overwhelmingly involved in crack cocaine markets and the ensuing availability and distribution of handguns. In fact research has shown that the connection between racial concentration (percentage non-white) and violence was more significant in 1990 – as violence began to peak – than at the start of any other postwar decade (Liska and Bellair 1995). While the drugs and guns perspective and the racial concentration perspective have some similarities, other researchers argue that the cause of the crime problem of the late 1980s and early 1990s was caused by weak or dysfunctional social institutions.

Research has shown that peaks in crime and violence are preceded by a period of weakened trust in traditional social institutions (LaFave 1998). Particularly, family, political, and economic institutions are seen as historically important in explaining why crime and violence rates rise and decline (LaFave 1998). While these social institutions are considered key variables in understanding historic crime waves, three more institutions are considered key to understanding the crime epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s: criminal justice, welfare, and education institutions (LaFave 1998). It is further stated that the six institutions mentioned above can best explain the crime
Regarding political and criminal justice institutions, research found that Americans expressed very low levels of confidence in the American government beginning in the mid-to-late 1960s and continuing all the way thorough the 1980s. A primary reason why Americans lacked confidence in their government’s ability to deal with crime is largely due to rhetoric and political attempts to sway public opinion. Literature states that the “get tough” stance began as a reaction to the civil rights movement. Southern politicians saw advances in civil rights as what they were—a challenge to the status quo. As a means of influencing public opinion southern governors characterized the actions of civil rights activists as criminal. As a means of criminalizing the activities of civil rights activists southern governors began emphasizing that a “law and order” approach is the only way to deal with civil rights activists since they were no different than common criminals (Beckett and Sasson 2004).

This rhetoric quickly reached a national scale in 1963 when President Kennedy was labeled as siding with criminals when he gave his support to civil rights legislation (Beckett and Sasson 2004). President Nixon in 1968 was the first modern era president to convince the American people that the American government was being soft on crime and that the only way to attack the crime problem was via a “get tough/law and order” approach (Berger et al 2005; Beckett and Sasson 2004). The next American president to bring crime back to the forefront was President Reagan. Even though the Reagan administration enhanced the “get tough ear” evoked by Nixon by incorporating the “war
on drugs” Americans were still convinced that the government needed to get tougher on crime (Berger et al. 2005; Beckett and Sasson 2004). Knowing that the next American president would have to prove strong on crime presidential candidate George H.W. Bush used the media to convince American voters that his opponent, Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis was weak on crime during the 1988 campaign (Berger et al. 2005; Beckett and Sasson 2004). Bush was able to use the media to convince Americans that if elected president, Dukakis would be soft on crime since, Willie Horton, a man convicted of armed robbery that resulted in a death was able to brutally assault a married couple and rape the wife after he escaped from a temporary prison release program while Dukakis was governor of Massachusetts (Berger et al. 2005; Beckett and Sasson 2004). Bush’s scare tactic worked as he was elected president in a landslide victory.

This conservative rhetoric was able to weaken the confidence the American people had in their government to combat crime beginning in the middle 1960s and lasting until the George H.W. Bush administration. Furthermore spending on criminal justice and incarceration rates did not reach very high levels until the mid-1990s (Lafree 1998). In other words, crime increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s because American’s lack of trust in their government weakened the informal control of political institutions, while insufficient criminal justice spending (not reaching astronomically high rates until the 1990s) weakened the formal control of the criminal justice system.

Regarding the economic and welfare institutions, research found that a weak economy and economic deprivation were associated with the increase of violence and crime during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lafree 1998; Liska and Bellair 1995; Fox 1996; Arvanites and Defina 2006). More specifically it was found that
deindustrialization, globalization, job outsourcing, and corporate downsizing that began in the 1960s and continued through the 1980s led to lower wages and increased inequality (Lafree 1998). Affects of deindustrialization include unemployment, low wages and unstable work in many U.S. cities (Krivo and Peterson 2004; Wilson 1996). Moreover, one of the largest affects of deindustrialization was that poor urban blacks were left behind in urban centers where sustainable employment was lacking (Wilson 1996). Deindustrialization had direct affects on crime and violence.

Research indicates that spatial concentration of disadvantaged black males and a shifting away of manufacturing jobs are both associated with increased black male homicide (Parker 2004). Other research echoes this realization finding that people who work in the unstable and low paying secondary job market are more likely to be involved in violence or crime than people who are employed in the primary labor market (Crutchfield and Pitchford 1997; Weiss and Reid 2005). Related research found that youth living in neighborhoods with large amounts of low skill and low paying service sector jobs were more likely to be involved in violence (Bellair and Roscigno 2000). Moreover it was found that youth employed in low paying service sector jobs – that replaced traditional manufacturing jobs in many urban places – were more likely to participate in violence (Bellair et al. 2003; Krivo and Peterson 2004). A majority of the research on the shifting economy focused on how decreasing manufacturing jobs and increasing service sector jobs affected crime and violence rates. However there is research that found that increased levels joblessness is significantly related to increased levels of arrests for violence among the overall population and particularly among young adults (Krivo and Peterson 2004). It has been theorized that a reason why concentrated
disadvantage, participation in the secondary labor market including low paying service sector jobs is associated with violence is because of the opportunity structure. Literature states that people who experience a lack of opportunity, particularly in the service sector, loose faith in expanded employment opportunities and future mobility, thus becoming high risk for criminal or delinquent activities (Bellair et al. 2003). The affects of a deindustrializing economy, coupled with decreasing welfare support in the 1980s, led to increased crime and violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lafree 1998). A weakened economy and welfare state led to Americans having less trust in these institutions, which led to a weakening of informal social controls.

Regarding family and education institutions, it was found that beginning in the 1960s the divorce rate climbed, and single-parent households became more prevalent (Lafree 1998; Fox 1996; Ashbee 2000). Higher divorce rates and increased single-parent households lead to more and more children not having a fulltime parent at home, which means children are becoming under-supervised and under-socialized (Lafree 1998; Fox 1996). Moreover, nontraditional families, including cohabitating couples, began to increase and become more socially acceptable; and this in conjunction with increased numbers of women – including mothers – entering the labor market led to schools taking on many of the responsibilities that the traditional American family once provided (Lafree 1998). According to this explanation, crime increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s because disrupted families and alternative household structures weakened informal social control; and it was not until the mid-1990s that greater numbers of students were enrolled in schools to help reverse the negative effects of a weakened family structure on crime rates.
Schools are not the only institutions that take on the burden of under-socialized children. After-school programs also take on roles that families once did, and the 1980s brought funding cuts to these programs, which led to more under-supervised and under-socialized kids in the streets; consequently crime and violence increased (Fox 1996). Evidence of this causal relationship lies in the crime data showing that under-supervised and under-socialized kids are prone to committing crimes during the after-school hours of 3 P.M. to 8 P.M. (Fox 1996). Clearly, then, the disruption of the family is leading to a situation where schools and after-school institutions need to pick up the slack in after-school care.

In summation, there is solid research demonstrating that factors other than crack cocaine markets and handgun diffusion led to the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. These factors include the racial composition of urban neighborhoods, a lack of trust in government, under-funded criminal justice systems, poor economic conditions of urban center, a weak welfare state, disrupted families, and under-funded after-school programs.

**Reaction by the media and the public**

Research has shown that media reports typically focus on violent crime and that reporting on crime tends to increase as crime rates decrease (Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001). These tendencies did not change when the media reported on the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Researchers have found that even as crime declined during most of the 1990s, TV news broadcasts featured a disproportionately high number of reports focusing on crime and violence (Chiricos et al 1997; Chiricos et al 2000; Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001). Increased television news coverage of violence began in
1987 (Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001), about the same time the crime wave became apparent. TV coverage of violence doubled from 1992 to 1993 (Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001), making the escalation undeniable. However, coverage of violence in the media did not peak until 1994. The literature shows that reports on violence on major television networks and in newspapers increased more than 400% between 1993 and 1994 (Chiricos et al 1997). These findings alone are startling; however the statistics become even more astonishing when homicide – the least occurring violent crime – is isolated.

Figure 6


The above figure shows that the national homicide rate dropped 32.9% from 1990 to 1998, yet network news coverage of homicide increased by 437%. This clearly shows that television networks expanded homicide coverage by shocking amounts even though

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the national homicide rate was reaching its lowest levels in some thirty years. The media was not the only segment of America overly conscious of the crime wave.

Americans reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s with fear and concern. In 1994, Americans ranked crime and violence as America’s most significant problems (Chiricos et al 1997). Furthermore the percentage of Americans who felt that too little was being spent on crime peaked in 1994 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003d). Not only did Americans feel that crime and violence were the country’s main problems, but statistics show that America’s fear of crime grew steadily from 1987 to 1994. This fear peaked in 1994 as 47% of Americans feared walking alone in their neighborhoods at night (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003b). Clearly then the public’s fear of and concern for crime reflected the media’s coverage of violence as the public’s fear of and concern for crime and the media’s coverage of violence both peaked in 1994 three years after the national homicide rate peaked in 1991.

Conclusions

During the late 1980s and the early 1990s the U.S. experienced a crime wave that featured record high rates of homicide in 1991. This was followed by an unprecedented decrease in homicides reaching lows not seen in nearly thirty years. However, saying that the crime wave affected Americans proportionately would be naïve. The crime wave disproportionately affected Americans living in large cities. While knowledge of location was important to understanding the crime wave so was knowledge of the types of weapons most commonly used by offenders in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The crime wave was overwhelmingly driven by homicides committed with handguns. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s the number of homicides
committed with handguns dramatically increased while the number of homicides committed using all other weapons (including other types of firearms) decreased or remained relatively steady. In addition to being driven by handguns, the crime wave was also driven by youthful offenders. While offenders aged 14 - 17 and offenders aged 18 – 24 became involved in homicides at an increasingly alarming rate during the late 1980s and early 1990s, all other age groups experienced a decline in homicide offenses.

The story, however, becomes more interesting when the element of race enters the discussion. The crime wave was not affecting all youth equally. While both white and black male youths saw an increase in their rate of homicide, offending black youths experienced the greatest increase in their rate of homicide offenses. Moreover, as young black males frequently killed other young black males it can be concluded that the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s was in part driven by young, hand-gun toting, black males from America’s largest cites. While criminologists largely agree as to the characteristics of the crime wave there is no shortage of debate over what caused the crime wave.

While criminologists disagree as to the causes of the crime wave, the most widely accepted causes revolve around crack cocaine markets and unprecedented access to illegal handguns. Some criminologists argue that the crack cocaine drug epidemic has been more violent than any other drug epidemic. The argument follows that young black males were recruited to sell drugs as a means of avoiding the new harsher penalties levied against adult drug dealers as a result of the new war on drugs. Simultaneously, the new young black dealers were given handguns as a means of protecting themselves, the product, and as a method of resolving disputes with agitated or disgruntled customers.
Naturally, the young drug dealers still associated with other youngsters in their communities. Local youths not involved with drugs then had to arm themselves with handguns as a means of protection. While the arguments that crack cocaine markets and the use of handguns are the dominant perspectives that caused the crime wave, there are alternative causal explanations that revolve around social institutions, and economic conditions.

An alternative explanation that does not revolve around crack markets and guns focuses on society’s trust in traditional social institutions. Some criminologists argue that the crime wave occurred around the same time as when Americans lost trust in institutions such as the family, political institutions, economic institutions, criminal justice institutions, the institution of welfare, and educational institutions. As a result, society’s weakened trust in the family, the economy, welfare, and educational institutions led to the weakening of the informal social controls these institutions provided against crime and violence. Additionally, this perspective also argues that America’s weakened trust in institutions such as political institutions, and criminal justice institutions has led to a weakening of formal social controls and their ability to prevent crime and violence. As valuable as this causal explanation is there are criminologists who focus on the economy as the cause of the crime wave.

Another perspective focuses on deindustrialization and the economic shift to a service based economy. According to this point of view, black males were disproportionately affected by the instabilities of the secondary labor market. The low wages of the secondary segment of the service economy combined with the lack of stability provided by the secondary service economy led to black males
disproportionately involved in the crime wave. Regardless of what is said to be the cause of the crime wave, the media and the public reacted to it in a way that implores discussion.

One may assume that the media would react to the rising crime rate as it was accruing. However, historical trends show that the media tends to increase coverage of violence after the rates of violence peak and begin to decrease. The crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s was no different. The media’s coverage of violence increased throughout the 1990s even though the nation’s homicide rate had peaked in 1991 and then decreased throughout the remainder of the decade. The American public reacted to the crime wave with fear and concern. The public’s fear and concern over crime increased until its peak in 1994, three years after the nation’s homicide rate peaked in 1991. Thus, the media reacted to the crime wave by increasing the coverage of violence throughout the entire decade even though the nation’s homicide rate had peaked in 1991, the public’s peak fear and concern for crime was in 1994.
Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

Introduction

History shows that crime problems often lead to new policy and crime prevention programs and initiatives. Since the Chicago School of Sociology made the connection between social ecology and crime, policy makers have considered social causes of crime when crafting solutions to contemporary crime problems (Schmalleger 1999). At the root of any social solution to a crime problem lie the principles of sociological and criminological theory. The crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s has not changed the way social causes of crime influences the creation of crime prevention policy. Criminological theory influenced how the federal government and local communities reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Opportunity theory influenced the creation of new jobs, job creation programs, job training, and new education enhancement programs. The social bonding theoretical perspective influenced new programs and activities that enhanced a youth’s conformity to mainstream society. The social disorganization theoretical perspective influenced programs that brought a renewed sense of community and a better standard of living to neighborhoods. The social learning theoretical perspective influenced programs that taught individuals how to solve their problems and avoid violence. All of these theoretical perspectives have brought change to society in the past, led to changes in the mid-1990s, and will no doubt lead to social changes in the future.
Opportunity Theory:

Ronald L. Akers (2000) sums up the effect opportunity theories have on social policy by saying:

The policy guidelines provided by anomie theory are clear. If blocked legitimate opportunities motivate persons to achieve through criminal activity, then the activity can be countered by the changes to society that offer greater access to legitimate opportunities for those groups that have been relatively deprived of that access. (157)

This perspective originated with the work of Robert K Merton’s 1938 theory, “Anomie and the Social Structure.” While this theory has been one of criminology’s most influential pieces to this day, its heyday was during the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Even though Merton’s theory is rarely empirically tested in contemporary criminology, it is still alive and well as an ideology and paradigm for current criminological thought and policy.

Merton’s summarizes his theory in the table below.

Table 1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merton’s Theoretical Typology</th>
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<tr>
<td>I Conformity</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td>III Ritualism</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV Retreatism</td>
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<td>V Rebellion</td>
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The table above indicates that Merton felt that there are five different types of people. His first category is “conformity.” A person who is a conformist adheres to both society’s goals and means. They believe in monetary goals and means of an education and employment. The category of “innovation” is a category that describes a typical

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street criminal. People in the “innovation” category believe in monetary goals, but they do not participate in traditional means such as a quality education or a good job. Rather they innovate, or partake in crimes to reach their monetary goal. The category of “ritualism” is a category of people who live by society’s norms and values but do not care about the monetary goal. However, they still believe in traditional means, hence they have educations and work regular jobs. The category of “retreatism” refers to people who drop out of mainstream society. In other words these are people who do not care about society’s monetary goals or means of reaching those goals. The last category, “rebellion,” was more of an afterthought for Merton than an active part of his typology. Merton wanted to include people who were determined to change the social structure (such as a Marxist rebel). Regarding this category Merton stated: “It thus involves efforts to change the existing structure rather than perform accommodative actions within this structure, and introduces additional problems with which we are not at the moment concerned” (1938:676).

As can be deduced from the above summary of Merton’s theory, the existence of anomie in lower classes has to be a reality if the theory is to be proven accurate. One condition that must be present among lower-class people for anomie to exist is the aspiration or drive and ambition to succeed. Research shows that the populations who are most likely to remain in the lower ranks on the SES ladder also tend to have high aspirations (Rhodes 1964; Mizruchi 1960; Keller and Zavalloni, 1964, Spergel, 1963). Research also found that there is a clear and apparent association between social class and anomie (Mizruchi, 1960; Bell, 1957; Meier and Bell 1959; Rhodes 1964, Rushing, 1971). In other words anomie and high aspirations are associated with low SES.
Therefore when SES is low, anomie and aspirations are high and legitimate opportunities for success are blocked people turn to crime to as their means of achieving society’s goals. Merton’s theory was first expanded upon by Cloward (1959) and latter by Cloward and Ohlin (1961).

Cloward (1959) stated in reference to both legitimate and illegitimate means, “Both systems of opportunity are (1) limited, rather than infinitely available, and (2) differentially available depending on the location of persons in the social structure” (168). His statement is rather straightforward, there are a limited number of legitimate opportunities and there are also a limited number of criminal opportunities. In other words, one can only become a criminal if the opportunity is there and one can only get a legitimate job if the opportunity is there. Clearly Cloward’s (1959) discussion focuses on crime and delinquency, and as with most criminologists working in this paradigm there is a focus on social class. Cloward (1959) states that the opportunities available to a particular criminal depend on their social class. Very simply put, the social structure limits a poor person’s opportunity to commit crime to typical street crimes, for two main reasons: (1) their mentors are schooled in traditional street crimes and (2) they are ecologically bound to city streets (Cloward 1959). On the other hand members of the middle or upper classes who commit crimes are limited to opportunities that are regulated to the white-collar crime category (Cloward 1959). This is true for essentially the same reasons poor people are regulated to street crimes. Middle- and upper-class people are mentored by criminals who commit white-collar crimes, and due to their position in the social structure, they are limited to opportunities to committing crime in business and the professions (Cloward 1959).
Cloward and Ohlin (1961) expand on Merton by introducing the variables of ethnicity, and gangs. They state that delinquents not only understand that there are SES barriers that prevent them from achieving legitimate means, but that there are also ethnic barriers. This understanding that they cannot achieve legitimately leads to a feeling of frustration, which ultimately leads to groups of youth who are dealing with frustration to form gangs as collective means of dealing with their situation. Since blocked opportunities are what leads to frustration and the formation of gangs, then the opening of legitimate opportunities is what is needed to prevent the formation of gangs and the subsequent delinquency (Cloward and Ohlin 1961). Based on the original theorizing by Merton and the expansions by Cloward and Ohlin programs that focused on increased opportunities incorporated opening educational and employment roadblocks.

Programs such as the Great Society and New York City’s Mobilization for Youth during the 1960s operated in the tradition of opportunity theories by establishing policies and programs that “increased opportunities” for at-risk and disadvantaged youth in hopes of weakening the social conditions that lead to gang activity (Hagedorn 2006; Akers 2000; Helfgot 1974; Messner and Resenfeld, 2001). Social opportunities designed to remove structural roadblocks and increase the opportunities for at-risk and disadvantaged youth include programs that increased employment and educational opportunities (Schmalleger 1999; Messner and Rosenfeld 2001). For instance, research has shown that when the Mobilization for Youth initiative was put in place in New York City, a significant amount of the program’s funding was directed towards education and vocational advancement indicatives (Helfgot 1974). Approximately 40 years after New York City’s Mobilization for Youth initiative the federal government’s Weed and Seed
program implemented similar programs by starting basic education and skills development programs, self-employment programs, and farmer markets. Clearly, literature illustrates that programs that focus their efforts on increasing one’s ability to gain an education and one’s capacity to get a job or the skills needed for employment, fall into the opportunity theory paradigm.

**Bonding Theory**

Travis Hirschi is widely viewed as the most noted social bonding or social control theorist. It has been argued that the central tenant of his theory is: the more individuals conform, the better equipped they are to “fend off” deviant behavior (Hirschi 1969; Meisenhelder 1977; Lyerly and Skipper 1981; Costello and Vowell 1999; Chapple et al. 2005). Based on this premise Hirschi’s (1969) theory explains why people conform rather that why people deviate. Travis Hirschi (1969) states that it is not deviance that needs to be explained; it is conformity. Conformity depends on the strength of one’s bonds to society. His theory begins with the proposition that delinquent acts result when an individual’s bond to society is weak or broken (Hirschi, 1969). This theory states that attachment, commitment, involvement, and beliefs combine to prevent delinquent behavior (Hirschi, 1969). The stronger these elements of social bonding with parents, adults, school teachers, and peers, the more the individual’s behavior will be controlled in the direction of conformity. The weakening of one element will most likely lead to the weakening of another.

Research has found that attachment to meaningful conventional members of society is important (Horney et al. 1995; Meisenhelder 1977; Wiatrowski et al. 1981;
Generally speaking, research also has shown that attachment to other family members and to friends was very important to maintaining a life away from crime or illegal behavior (Meisenhelder 1977; Wade and Brannigan 1998; Costello and Vowell 1999). Research that involved attachment to school found that an attachment to both parents and school were strong indicators of bonds that prevented delinquency or risk-taking behavior (Wiatrowski, et al. 1981; Wade and Brannigan 1998).

Commitment is the extent to which individuals have built up an investment in conventionality, or a stake in conformity (Hirschi, 1969). This stake in conformity would be jeopardized or lost by engaging in law violation or other forms of deviance. Going to conventional schools and working in conventional jobs builds up this commitment. The cost of losing one’s investment in conformity prevents one from violating norms. In general terms it was found that commitment to conventional goals decreased the likelihood of delinquency (Costello and Vowell 1999). More specifically, the conventional goal of employment or a job was discussed in the literature. Research stated that that one of the most important mechanisms involved in keeping offenders from re-offending is a commitment to a conventional job (Meisenhelder 1977; De Li and MacKenzie 2003). It was found that commitment to school, church, conventional peers and legal authority led to strong social bonds that prevented delinquency, while a commitment to family did not (Lyerly and Skipper 1981). Other research partly agreed with Lyerly and Skipper (1981) when it found that commitment to school reduced the chances of partaking in a crime (De Li and MacKenzie 2003; Horney et al 1995; Chapple et al. 2005).
Involvement in the context of this study refers to engrossment in conventional activities, such as studying, spending time with one’s family, and participating in extra-curricular activities. One is restrained from delinquent behavior because one is too busy, too preoccupied, or too consumed in conforming pursuits to become involved in non-conforming pursuits. There is research that provides empirical support for the bond of involvement (Wiatrowski, et al. 1981; Huebner and Betts 2002). Huebner and Betts (2002) found that boys’ involvement in school-based extracurricular activities, time in after-school clubs or hobbies, hours spent studying, and hours spent doing chores, reduced their chances of participating in delinquency. It was also found that the involvement of girls in school-based extra extracurricular activities, time spent studying, and time spent doing chores reduced their chances of becoming delinquent (Huebner and Betts 2002:135).

Belief is the endorsement of general conventional values and norms, especially the belief that laws and society’s rules in general are morally correct and should be obeyed (Hirschi, 1969). There is research that supports the idea that the bond of belief—a youth’s acceptance of society’s norms, values, and laws—prevents delinquency (Wiatrowski, et al 1981, Costello and Vowell 1999; Chapple et al 2005). One study found that, regarding the crime of theft, the bond of belief is the most important in reducing delinquency (Chapple et al. 2005). In fact other research has shown that a strong belief bond does more to prevent delinquency than delinquent definitions (see social learning theory) and interaction with delinquent friends (Costello and Vowell 1999). Costello and Vowell (1999) state, “In short, these results support the social control theory claim that tolerant attitudes toward law violation are more likely reflective
of a lack of social integration than the result of learning definitions through integration into deviant groups.”

While there is a lot of evidence supporting the overall theoretical predictions of social bonding theory, there is very little available research on social bonding theory and community organizations such as the ones represented in this research. Most relevant for my analysis is work done by Weber et al. (2001). Up until Weber et al.’s (2001) piece on social bonding and youth organizations, the most relevant literature on social bonding and youth organizations was the literature on school-based sports teams (Weber et al. 2001). Moreover, much of the youth and sports team literature reflected how the bonds formed while participating with their teams affected the individuals’ performance and bonds formed in school (Weber et al. 2001).

While there are differences between sports teams and community organizations, Weber et al. (2001) found that the bonds formed on sports teams were similar enough to the bonds formed in youth organizations, that the sports teams literature is relevant to the study of social bonding and youth community organizations. It is important to note that Weber et al. did not include any sports recreation in their study of youth organizations, however this research considers sports as a major feature of community organizations. Consequently it seems apparent that the sports team literature is even more important to the research on hand.

Taking a closer look, the sports team literature shows that the most important bond is that of attachment. It was found that athletes receive advice and encouragement from coaches and other conforming adults. The advice and encouragement that athletes receive from coaches translates into an attachment to conforming adults and a
commitment to the team as a whole. The bond of commitment demonstrated that athletes would not risk losing their ability to play on the team by participating in a delinquent act. The sports team literature also found that the involvement bond was promising. Not only were athletes involved in their sports, thus lacking the time to commit crime, but they also became so enthralled by their sport that they lost interest in participating in other activities (Weber et al. 2001).

When it comes to youth organizations it was found that some but not all of the bonds were the same as on sports teams. Weber et al. (2001) argues that:

Our reliability and validity analysis support the applicability of social bonding theory to the experiences of youth in their clubs. The reliability analysis demonstrates the moderate to strong stability of these institutional specific bonding components. The validity information derived from the factor analytic technique provides support for Hirschi’s proposition that attachment, commitment, involvement and belief are distinct components of the social bond. (333)

In other words, Weber et al. found that the social bonds made by the youth in their community organizations truly did meet the standard set forth by Hirschi’s theory. The strongest bond found in the youth community organizations was that of belief. It was found that the youth had a profound desire to follow the rules set forth by their organization. In the end Weber et al. (2001) find that:

Clearly social bonding theory is applicable to the study of youth organizations and its member’s experiences. Attachment, commitment, involvement and belief were shown to be reliable and valid indicators for the conceptualization of youth’s linkage to the organizational structure. The provision of opportunities for social bonding in youth organizations is one viable way for youth organizations, especially youth clubs, to promote normative and positive social experiences that may assist in the reduction of delinquency. (335-336)
In sum, programs that strengthen a youth’s bond to conventional groups, peers or adults fall under the social bonding category. Regarding the national Weed and Seed programs this would include Safe Havens, Boys and Girls Clubs, and scouting programs.

**Social Disorganization Theory:**

The social disorganization theoretical perspective is among the most influential paradigms in contemporary criminology. To quote the paradigm’s most notable contemporary Robert J. Sampson and his colleague W. Byron Groves (1989), “One of the most fundamental sociological approaches to the study of crime and delinquency emanates from the Chicago-school research of Shaw and McKay” (1989:774). The social disorganization theoretical perspective is about places rather than individuals, and as such it examines criminal activity at the neighborhood level. As stated above, the most prominent work in this area came out of the University of Chicago’s School of Sociology. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1942) and their colleagues analyzed Chicago’s neighborhoods and found out that most communities tend to maintain their status as high-, medium-, or low-crime neighborhoods over a period of 30 years, despite dramatic changes in their ethnic and racial composition. Shaw and McKay concluded that the criminal and delinquent behavior that has been associated with certain neighborhoods has less to do with the race and/or ethnicity of the residents, and more to do with the structural differences between whites and racial and ethnic minorities, such as differences in opportunities available to different racial and ethnic groups as well as neighborhood segregation. Shaw and McKay (1942) felt that the racial composition of neighborhoods was so strongly correlated with other characteristics of city
neighborhoods, that it was extremely difficult to separate the effects of community characteristics on delinquency from the effects of racial status on the individuals who live there.

Shaw and McKay (1942) discovered two basic patterns in the geographic distribution of crime and delinquency that serve as the basis of their social disorganization theory. The first pattern is that crime in Chicago’s various neighborhoods did not vary with the racial and ethnic makeup of the neighborhoods. The second pattern is that crime rates tended to be lowest in richer neighborhoods and highest in the poorest neighborhoods, suggesting that the dynamics that led to certain neighborhoods being wealthy and other neighborhoods being poor were associated with the distribution of crime and delinquency (Shaw and McKay 1942). In order to completely understand the complexity of Shaw and McKay’s argument, it is important to understand the social conditions of Chicago when the research of their colleagues (Robert Park and Ernest Burgess) was conducted.

During the 1920s, there was rapid population growth in Chicago. People were moving into the city to take advantage of the ample job opportunities in the stockyards, steel mills, and railroads (McCaghy et al., 2003). Park and Burgess (1925) were fascinated by the plethora of cultures, lifestyles, languages, and traditions that came to characterize various Chicago neighborhoods. This fascination led to their research in urban life and neighborhood development.

Park and Burgess (1925) developed a “model of human ecology” that assumed competition over scarce but highly desired space was the fundamental form of social interaction and that this competition determined the parts of the city in which different
populations could reside. They developed a model that focused around concentric city zones. The central business zone was known as Zone 1, or the Loop; this was where the majority of business and industry was located. Zone 2, the zone of transition, surrounded the city center; this zone generally contained areas transitioning from business to residential, and was also where new immigrants arrived and lived while establishing themselves. As immigrants secured steady employment, they moved out of the zone of transition, away from the center of the city. Zone 3 was the zone of working-class families. Zone 4, a residential zone, consisted mostly of middle-class homes, and Zone 5, the commuter zone, consisted of suburbs. According to their model, Park and Burgess (1925) believed that the tendency for criminal activity was most associated with Zone 2, the zone of transition, because of the turmoil and social disorganization that took place in this part of the city. Characteristics associated with socially disorganized parts of cities include low property values, marginalized individuals, and a general lack of privacy. Shaw and McKay’s (1942) theory extended the work of Park and Burgess (1925) by stating that the rapid population change was most likely to lead to social disorganization. In other words, social disorganization has to do with the characteristics of the zones and the high rates of people moving in, out, and through them. Shaw and McKay (1942) defined social disorganization as the declining influence of existing social values and rules of behavior on individual members of the community. In other words, social disorganization is about the social structure lacking the capacity to bring together the values held in common by the members of a community in a way that maintains order and solves common problems (Bursik 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989).
What gives the social structure the capacity to bring common values together and the capacity to solve common problems are social networks and the relationships formed within these networks (Bursik 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942). A stable community is one whose residents have the capacity to form relations with other individuals within their community. Scholars use the concept of collective efficacy to describe social ties, formal and informal organizations and social networks. The concept of collective efficacy is seen as a key predictor of a neighborhood’s organization. As was stated above, the more people who know each other and form relationships with each other, the more organized a neighborhood is; while the less neighbor interaction, friendships, and relationships, the more socially disorganized a neighborhood is. The term collective efficacy, is defined as “the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good” (Sampson et al. 1997:919). While a rather brief definition in length, it is a very important concept in research that is guided by the social disorganization theoretical perspective. Collective efficacy is more that just neighbors knowing each other and connecting in the community; it is about those connections leading to neighbors having a common understanding and a common goal for the good of the community, and thus acting in a way that maintains social organization and low levels of delinquency and crime. Hence collective efficacy is a central concept in curbing disorder.

Shaw and McKay (1942) felt that socioeconomic status (SES) would be the most important variable associated with social disorganization. They felt that people with low SES would struggle over what little resources and monies were available. Furthermore, there is a correlation between SES and involvement in both formal and informal
community organizations, such that richer people are more involved in these groups, while poorer people are less involved; hence communities with lower SES tend to be more socially disorganized (Sampson and Groves 1989).

Shaw and McKay (1942) saw mobility as a second important social disorganization variable. The idea was that the constant influx of new people into a community prevents the establishment of necessary relationships with other people in the community, and it also prevents the formation of community organizations (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974), hence leading to social disorganization. Since an unstable community—one whose residents are constantly migrating in and out—leads to weak ties and social disorganization, then a stable community—with residents staying over long periods of time—must lead to strong ties between citizens and social organizations (Sampson and Groves 1989).

Shaw and McKay (1942) saw heterogeneity as a third very important social disorganization variable. Shaw and McKay (1942) saw that one effect of the constant motion of people in and out of communities was a bringing together of people of many different races and ethnicities, and they called this heterogeneity. They felt that the coming together of people that were so different from one another leads to a situation where the citizens of a community are not able to achieve a common understanding of their shared values. Put yet another way, in a heterogeneous community citizens are not capable of achieving a state of collective consciousness. Thus heterogeneity leads to social disorganization.

Nearly 50 years after Shaw and McKay’s original work (1942), Sampson and Groves (1989) in their widely cited piece “Community Structure and Crime: Testing
Social-Disorganization Theory” add the variables of family disruption and urbanization to the list of social disorganization predictors. Sampson and Groves (1989) felt that the leaving of one parent from a family would lead to lesser formal and informal social controls. Their argument was that it was easier for two parents to keep their kids, community activities, and their personal property under increased levels of supervision. Additionally they understood that the activities of a community’s peer groups or gangs does not land on the shoulders of one set of parents alone; rather it takes all of the parents to provide the proper supervision (Sampson and Groves 1989). Hence a community where there are more disrupted families will have a harder time providing the necessary level of community supervision and will be socially disorganized. Urbanization refers to the notion that cities have a lesser ability to provide social control than suburban and rural areas (Sampson and Groves 1989). The argument here is that living in the city weakens the necessary ties people need to have in their community, while simultaneously reducing the involvement of citizens in local community organizations (Sampson and Groves 1989).

As stated above, Shaw and McKay (1942) saw low SES as a primary concern. Research that used the poverty level as an indicator of SES, to test Shaw and McKay’s hypotheses that neighborhoods with low SES would be more socially disorganized than wealthier neighborhoods, found that disadvantaged neighborhoods are far more socially disorganized than their wealthy counterparts (McCulloch 2003). Consequently research found that neighborhoods with high levels of poverty also had high levels of general crime (Warner and Pierce 1993).
Regarding mobility, it was found that communities that are rather stable, with the same residents living there year after year, have strong friendship networks; while communities that have citizens moving in and out are rather unstable and over time tend to have less personal relationships, which are needed for social organization (Sampson and Groves 1989, Sampson and Raudenbush 1999, Sampson et al 1997; McCulloch 2003). There is evidence to suggest that delinquency and crime is more common in neighborhoods where population change takes place (Taylor and Covington 1988; Curry and Spergel 1988; Sampson et al 1997; Person et al 2000; Markowitz et al. 2001).

Migration into a community leads to heterogeneity, and heterogeneity has been found to lead to a decreased capacity for communities to control their youth (Samson and Groves 1989). One form of heterogeneity is ethnic, most commonly associated with immigrating groups. Research has found that ethnic heterogeneity leads to a lack of social networks and relationships among neighbors (Sampson et al. 1997). In addition to ethnic heterogeneity leading to social disorganization and crime, it was also found that racial heterogeneity leads to social disorganization. Research findings indicate that racial heterogeneity reduces the amount of social ties in a community (Bellair 1997). Further research indicates that racial heterogeneity also leads to crime (Warner and Pierce 1993).

Collective efficacy is accomplished, generally, in either formal or informal groups. Formal groups include well-organized community groups, while informal groups include friendship networks. Some researchers found that collective efficacy leads to a reduction of property crime such as burglary (Markowitz et al. 2001), while others found that it reduces violence (Sampson et al. 1997) and intimate violence (Browning 2002); while yet other research has found that the interaction of citizens within the community
leads to the reduction of both property and violent crimes (Patterson 1991; Samson and Groves 1989).

Research on urbanization has found that people in urban places have fewer relationships with one another (Sampson and Groves 1989; Bellair 1997; Markowitz et al. 2001). This lack of personal interaction and relationships in urban people leads to a situation where it is more difficult for communities to keep tabs on their youth (Sampson and Groves 1989). The effect of living in an urban setting has been measured using different variables. Borrowing from Sampson and Groves (1989), Markowitz et al. (2001) conceptualized one of the most basic variable measures of living in an urban setting: the variable urbanization simply refers to the effect of living in a crowded urban neighborhood that is located in a city (Markowitz et al. 2001). It was found that the urbanization variable is related to higher rates of burglary (Markowitz et al. 2001). Another variable—and perhaps the most prominent—that measures the effect of urban life is structural density, and even this variable has been measured in different ways. Research found that neighborhoods with high structural density—defined as the percentage of structures with five or more units—had high rates of assault and robbery (Warner and Pierce 1993).

The final social disorganization variable to be discussed is that of family disruption. This variable seems to be the least represented in the empirical literature. However, the literature that does make mention of it reports that neighborhoods with more disrupted families have higher rates of delinquency and crime than do communities with less disrupted families (Sampson and Groves 1989; Warner and Pierce 1993, Sampson et al 1997; Markowitz et al. 2001).
Contemporary literature in the social disorganization tradition has demonstrated that community organizations and volunteer groups are instrumental in ensuring that communities form tight social networks. Moreover, community organizations are key social agents in fostering cohesive socialization in traditionally disorganized neighborhoods. Sampson (2006) writes:

> The evidence is incomplete but suggests that the infrastructure of local organizations and voluntary associations help sustain capacity for social action in a way that transcends traditional personal ties. In other words, organizations are in principle able to foster collective efficacy, often through strategic networking of their own. (136)

In other words, urban society has grown so complex that groups are necessary for social cohesion; individuals are no longer able to go it alone. This notion is supported by research finding that neighborhoods with community organizations that are clustered together with ample citizen participation have higher levels of social organization, greater social cohesion and stronger social networks (Sampson 2006; Morenoff et al. 2001; Bursik 2000), and thus have lower rates of criminality and delinquency.

From a theoretical perspective, the above-cited literature has shown that community groups and organizations do bring cohesive social networks and socialization to socially disorganized communities. However, it is very important to examine how theoretical ideas are put into practice. Historically speaking, the theoretical ideas behind the social disorganization paradigm have led to neighborhood revitalization projects, youth recreation projects, outreach projects, and “street worker or youth worker” social worker initiatives (Sampson and Groves 1989; Schmalleger 1999; Bursik 2000). In addition to programs and policies that directly involve the day-to-day activities of at-risk youth – as mentioned above – there are other policy initiatives that focus on the social
welfare and overall health of the members of a socially disorganized community, that fall within the parameters of the paradigm. For instance, the SafeFutures initiative extended beyond traditional social disorganization programs by providing its participants with social services and health services, in addition to strengthening their social networks (Bursik 2000; Morley and Rassman 1997). In line with the theoretical tradition of social disorganization, the purposes of these programs were to further socialize at-risk youth, and to provide them with social and health services, while under supervision. The Weed and Seed program incorporated both programs that tightened/created social networks and improved the quality of life of residents in neighborhoods. Weed and Seed programs that increased social networks include: cultural/entertainment activities, and crime watches. Weed and Seed programs that improved standards of living and neighborhoods include: community cleanups, victim/witness assistance, rehabilitating seized properties, and pediatric AIDS services.

**Social Learning Theory:**

A 1939 theory, “differential association,” by American sociologist Edwin H. Sutherland, made “social learning” theories popular. Sutherland (1939) stated that behavior patterns are transmitted within a social setting. Moreover, he believed that crime involved a more complex learning than the mere imitation of others. Sutherland argued that in a country like the U.S., where there are a lot of different cultures, clashes between different cultures would be unavoidable and would inevitably lead to crime. Thus, multiple cultures coexisting in a common locale is an essential aspect of crime
causation. According to Sutherland’s (1939) theory, simply seeing others partake in criminal behavior is not enough to cause one to become involved with criminal behavior.

A key concept for Sutherland (1939) is differential group organization. In other words, some groups are organized for criminal behavior while other groups are organized against criminal behavior. What Sutherland is stating is not that different cultures inherently lead to conflict and crime, but rather that in a country with many different cultures, some will be organized for crime while others would not. His theory is based on nine propositions that explain the process by which people come to engage in criminal behavior. Sutherland’s (1939) nine propositions are:

1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication.
3. The principal part of learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a) techniques of committing crimes, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes very simple; and (b) the specific direction of motives, drivers, rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motive and drivers is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.
7. Differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.
9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values, since non-criminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.
Sutherland (1939) felt that these propositions were necessary and sufficient conditions that would lead an individual to become a criminal. While Sutherland gained notoriety for his learning theory, many social scientists have changed and adapted Sutherland’s theory to more precisely explain criminal behavior. Ron Akers has become known for his contemporary learning theory, which has expanded and modernized Sutherland’s original conceptualization.

Akers’ version of learning theory is different than Sutherland’s theory primarily because it incorporates notions originating with general behavior reinforcement theory (Akers et al. 1979). Akers et al. (1979) state, “The primary learning mechanism in social behavior is operant (instrumental) conditioning in which behavior is shaped by the stimuli which follows, or are consequences of the behavior” (637-638). The main premise of this version of learning theory is that people who learn deviant behavior will be more likely to partake in that behavior if they find it more rewarding than not partaking in the behavior (Akers 2000, Burgess and Akers 1966 Akers et al 1979). The concept of rewards received by an action is known as differential reinforcement (Akers et al 1979). Moreover, if a deviant behavior is reinforced via some positive action, then the deviant behavior is more likely to be repeated. Furthermore, reinforcements alone do not lead to the development of deviant behavior; there also needs to be imitation or modeling of other’s behavior (Akers et al. 1979). In other words, there needs to be a teacher present to verbally teach the deviant behavior, in addition to the reinforcements, when behavior is learned through interaction and socialization (Burgess and Akers 1966). Moreover, while Sutherland focuses on primary groups, Akers includes the importance of what he calls reference groups (Akers, 2000; Burgess and Akers 1966). Reference
groups consist of members of society’s primary institutions such as the media, schools, organizations, corporations, and government (Akers, 2000; Burgess and Akers, 1966). Akers explains that reference groups have just as much differential association influence on close-knit groups of peers, friends, and family. Akers also emphasizes the verbal justifications people use to explain their behavior when they are criticized by others (Akers, 2000). They use excuses to justify their past behavior and future behaviors.

Literature has stated that empirical research testing differential association has indeed found an association between delinquent or criminal actions and association with delinquent or criminal friends (Short, 1957; Liska, 1969; Voss, 1964; Jensen, 1972; Conger, 1976; Linden and Hacker, 1973; Buikhuisen and Hoekstra, 1974; Akers et al, 1979; Matsueda, 1982, Warr, 1993; Alarid et al, 2000). In simple terms, it was found that the greater number of delinquent or criminal friends a person has, the more delinquent or criminal actions that person takes part in (Jenson, 1972; Conger, 1976; Buikhuisen and Hoekstra, 1974; Warr, 1993; Alarid et al, 2000).

With regard to exposure to criminal definitions—a central thesis of Sutherland’s (1939) theory—it has been empirically shown that an increased exposure to criminal definitions leads to increased participation in criminal or delinquent actions (Jackson, 1986; Matsueda, 1982; Tittle et al, 1986; Alarid et al, 2000). Matsueda states, “increasing the number of definitions favorable to violation of law relative to unfavorable definitions increase delinquent behavior” (1982:499). The above quotation is rather straightforward, it states that empirical research found a statistically significant relationship between delinquent or criminal definitions and delinquent or criminal acts. It was found that people who are exposed to larger amounts of criminal definitions commit
more crimes and delinquent acts than people who are exposed to conventional definitions.

Sutherland’s (1939) work emphasized that criminal behavior—the physical act of the crime itself (e.g., hotwiring a car) needed to be learned in a student–teacher relationship, where there is a seasoned “criminal teacher” teaching a novice “student criminal” the tricks of the trade. Research has found that juveniles tend to be more delinquent when they have close associations with adult criminals (Short 1957)—adding evidence to what Sutherland (1939) postulated about the teacher–student relationship among criminals and delinquents. Sutherland also noted that the “criminal teacher/student” relationship would teach criminal motives. Research has found that there is indeed a connection between the process of differential association and the learning and understanding of criminal motives (Jackson et al 1986; Tittle et al. 1986).

In general terms, Akers et al. (1979) find strong and significant support for Akers’ social learning theory. Akers et al state:

The findings presented in Table 5 show that even when the most predictive subset of variables is eliminated, the remaining variables are still able to explain 43% and 56% of the variance in alcohol and marijuana behavior, respectively. The fact that four of the five subsets of variables taken from social learning theory each [emphasis in original] explain a substantial proportion of the variance (and that the fifth is significantly related to the dependent variables in the expected direction) demonstrates that the theory as a whole is supported; its power is not dependent on any single component (1979:643)

In broad terms Akers et al (1979) are saying that the factors described in the above description of Akers’ social learning theory are largely responsible for explaining delinquent alcohol and drug use of youth.\textsuperscript{11} When breaking the theory down it was found

\textsuperscript{11} It must be noted that while this quotation provides strong evidence in support of Akers’ social learning theory, the study was based on youth who participated in delinquent
that differential association—a term that combines Sutherland’s (1939) concept and Akers’ concept of reference groups—received the highest amount of empirical support (Akers et al 1979). With this in mind it is also important to note that differential association as defined by Sutherland (1939) was the strongest factor in determining delinquency (Akers et al 1979). Definitions—as in Sutherland’s (1939) description—received the second highest amount of empirical support (Akers et al 1979). Differential reinforcement received the third highest amount of empirical support. Lastly, imitation received the least amount of empirical support (Akers et al 1979).

In community settings social learning theory tends to be applied in small groups. These groups meet in settings that include schools, community centers, and other local venues. The nature of these settings is such that delinquent youths are to learn positive actions and socially sanctioned behaviors (Gorman and White 1995). More specifically, these programs are designed to give at-risk and delinquent youth the skills needed to resist negative social influence, and the skills needed to become successful in society. These programs also give youth the skills they need to interact positively with peers (Gorman and White 1995). While the specifics vary from program to program, research has found that the most successful social learning programs focus on the most high-risk populations, and reinforce their understanding of social norms and values, reinforce their conforming and positive behaviors, and teach life skills, thinking skills, and self-control (Sherman et al. 1998). Regarding the Weed and Seed program social learning theory was drinking and drug use. This dissertation is more interested in the theoretical explanations of violent crimes and street crimes. While this distinction is notable, Akers does state that his social learning theory should be treated as a general theory of crime; thus these results should be applicable to all crimes, including violent and street crimes.
applied in crime prevention/education programs, and Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) programs.

Conclusion

Historically, solutions to social problems, such as new social policies, have been derived from social theory. The crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s did not rewrite history. The community-based crime prevention programs that arose as a reaction to the crime wave were influenced by four traditional criminological theories: the opportunity theoretical perspective, the social bonding theoretical perspective, the social disorganization theoretical perspective, and the social learning theoretical perspective.

Since a major premise associated with the opportunity theoretical perspective is that blocked educational and vocational opportunities lead to crime, a logical step to reducing or preventing crime would be to open or unblock educational and vocational opportunities. For this reason, the opportunity theoretical perspective led to programs that created new jobs, created or enhanced job training, and created or improved educational opportunities or educational programs. Since the focal point of the social bonding theoretical perspective is to strengthen a youth’s conformity to society it only makes sense that the social bonding theoretical perspective influenced programs that created stronger bonds between youth and conventional others. Since the social disorganization theoretical perspective focuses on social ties and the quality of life in a community it makes sense that the social disorganization theoretical perspective influenced some programs that created or strengthened the social ties between members
of a community and other programs that improved the standard of living in the community. Lastly, the main premise of the social learning theoretical perspective is that all behavior is learned, thus deviant behavior can be unlearned and conforming behavior can be learned in its place. For this reason, it is logical that the social learning theoretical perspective influenced programs that taught people how to avoid violence and solve their problems.
Chapter 4

Research Questions and Methodology

The focus of this study is on the societal reactions to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the United States. More specifically, I examine a set of potentially interconnected responses by the general public, the media, the Federal government, and ultimately communities to the crime wave of the 1980s and 1990s.

Research Questions

As outlined earlier, research has found that reporting on violence on major television networks and in newspapers increased more than 400% between 1993 and 1994 (Chiricos et al.1997), even though the national homicide rate peaked in 1991 and then showed regular decreases for the rest of the 1990s. The present research first examines how the crime wave was represented in the newspaper media and in particular examines whether newspapers focused on violent crime in general or if they concentrated on youth-related violence more specifically. This is an important question, because by far the largest increase in crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s occurred among juveniles. Next, the research examines to what extent newspaper reporting was aligned with public perceptions of crime trends and then examines to what extent crime trends, newspaper media reports, and public perceptions were aligned with Federal government and local responses to crime. In terms of local responses to crime, this study will examine whether cities were more likely to implement youth-oriented crime prevention programs and/or general non-age-specific programs. Finally, this study examines how the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations of youth violence prevention programs
may have been affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention program funding opportunities. The specific research questions addressed in this study are as follows:

1. To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime in particular?

2. To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime?

3. To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy?

4. To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs?

5. To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs?

The model of potential relationships among 1) the crime wave of the late 1980s early 1990s, 2) media (newspaper) reporting on crime, 3) the public’s fear of crime, 4) the Clinton’s administration anti-crime policies, 5) the 1994 Federal Crime Bill and accompanying funding, 6) state anti-crime initiatives and funding, 7) city/municipal anti-crime initiatives and funding, and, finally, 8) local youth violence/crime prevention programs are outlined in Figure 1. Where data are available, the present study examines
each of the relationships below. Information on specific state and city anti-crime prevention programs/funding was not available for the present analysis. I was able to obtain data on each of the other phenomena and programs outlined in Figure 1.

**Figure 7**

**Potential Relationships Between Crime, Media Reporting, the Public, Government Policies and Programs**

Research Design and Methodology

The research design for this study employs methodological approaches that require the collection of data from public records and documents and a variety of secondary data sources, including Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), national survey data, and newspaper reports. The analysis examines the period 1990 through 1999 within the constraints of available data. The analysis is conducted at an appropriate level of aggregation relative to the research question being addressed and the availability of
different data sources. Thus, research question 1, “To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime in particular?,” examines national-level violent crime trends and national-level trends in newspaper reports on violent crime, and examines city-level trends as well. In a similar way, research question 2, “To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime?,” examines national-level violent crime trends and national-level trends of citizens’ fear of crime. Due to a lack of overtime data on citizens’ fear of crime at the city level of analysis, no comparisons are possible at that level of analysis. For research question 3, “To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy?,” secondary documents and reports on Federal/national decisions and programs are the relevant level of analysis. Research question 4, “To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs?,” examines national-level information on federal-level policy and national-level trends in fear of crime with national-level trends in crime prevention programs. This phase of this analysis also examines the potential impact of federal policy on the development of youth violence prevention programs in individual cities. Finally, research question 5, “To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs?,” examines the impact of federal-level policy on community-level youth violence prevention programs. Unfortunately,
information on state-level crime prevention policies and funding was not available for this research study.

Data on homicide and violent crimes rates for the United States and each of the individual cities included in this study were available from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) system. Further details on UCR data and murder rates can be found in the “crime data” section below.

Newspaper “media data” stories concerning violence and social programs were derived from newspaper reports from 9 major American cities with continuously participating daily newspapers in the Lexis-Nexis database for the period 1991 to 1999. These “media data” represent how many stories were reported in the media on murder or violence, youth violence, non-age-specific prevention programs, and youth violence prevention programs from 1991 to 1999. Further details on the “media data” are found below in the “media data” section.

Information on overtime variation in the American public’s concern about and fear of crime is available from national surveys on crime victimization and is available in the Bureau of Justice Statistics Source Book. Measures of Americans’ fear of crime were based on how safe people felt walking in their neighborhoods at night; measures of Americans’ concern about crime were based on whether Americans felt that too little was being spent on crime. Unfortunately, this information was not available for individual cities. More information on the public’s concern about crime can be found in the “public opinion data” section below.

Fourth, information on the federal government’s reaction to the late 1980s and early 1990s crime wave was derived from a review of the literature and government
documents. The data on how the federal government reacted to the crime wave came from the U.S. Department of Justice in the form of a report, “Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,” which provided information on grants that were authorized in 1994 by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Data on Weed and Seed came from the U.S. Department of Justice in the form of evaluation reports; more specifically, budget statistics and a program analysis were supplied by Dunworth’s 1999 report, “National Evaluation of Weed and Seed.” Further information on the federal response to the crime wave can be found in the “data on the federal response to the crime problem” section below.

Finally, data on local youth violence prevention programs, or the “program data,” were derived from newspaper reports from major daily newspapers throughout the nation that were archived in the Lexis-Nexis database from 1990 to 1999. The “program data” consist of the descriptive variables that were found for the programs reported in the media. Further information on “program data” can be found in the “keyword search – program data” and the “use of the program data” sections below.

**Data Sources and How They are Used**

**Crime Data**

In the tradition of previous research on urban violence (Messner et al. 2001; Messner and Golden 1992; Lee et al. 2003; Parker and McCall 1999; Velez et al. 2003), this research uses the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR). These data were retrieved from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) website. For this dissertation, murder rate data and juvenile murder rate data were collected from 1990 to 1999 at the national level. City-level murder rate data were collected from 1992 to 1999, the years that the
media data were collected, for the same 13 cities that media data were collected. The national murder rate data were collected to see how national murder rate trends compare to national public opinion data trends on fear of and concern about crime. Secondly, national murder rate data were collected to see if newspaper reporting on violence was associated with the murder rate or with media reporting on violence prevention programming. The juvenile murder rate data were collected to see if the juvenile murder rate was associated with newspaper reporting on violence and violence prevention programs. Murder rate data on the 13 cities that were part of the media data were collected to get an understanding of how the murder rate affected newspaper reporting on murder and violence, youth violence, non-age-specific prevention programs, and youth violence prevention programs.

In other words, UCR crime data were used when examining the first three research questions. Research question 1 asked, To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime in particular? When examining this question, national-level murder rate data are used to see if there is a relationship between the national homicide rate and the level of newspaper reports on violence. Juvenile murder rate data are used to determine if there is a relationship between the juvenile murder rate and the level of newspaper reporting on juvenile violence. The relationship between the national murder rate and newspaper stories on violence and the relationship between the juvenile murder rate and newspaper reports on juvenile murder are shown graphically in the “Crime and Newspaper Reporting” section of the analysis chapter 6, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.”
The murder rates of the 13 cities that had media data collected on them were also used when examining the first research question. To understand whether the murder rates for the 13 cities had closer relationships with newspaper reporting on murder and violence in the newspapers local to the 13 cities, a cross-sectional time series analysis was developed. Secondly, to understand whether the murder rates for the 13 cities had closer relationships with newspaper reporting on youth violence in the newspapers local to the 13 cities, a cross-section time series analysis was developed. Both time series analyses are presented in the “Crime and Newspaper Reporting” section of the analysis chapter, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” UCR data are also used when examining research question 2.

Research question 2 asked, To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime? The national murder rate is compared to the level of the public’s fear of crime and the level of public concern about crime to determine if there is a relationship between the national murder rate and the public’s fear of and concern about crime. The public’s fear of crime is measured by public opinion data on how safe Americans feel walking alone at night in their neighborhoods, and the public’s concern about crime is measured by public opinion data on Americans who feel that too little is being spent on crime. The relationship between the murder rate and the public’s fear of and concern about crime is discussed throughout chapter 6, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” As stated above, the relationship between the rate of violence and the newspapers reports on
violence is also discussed in the same analysis chapter. UCR data are also used when examining the third research question.

Research question 3 asked, To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime, and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of crime prevention policy? The paragraphs above discuss how UCR data are used when examining newspaper reports and public opinion; however, UCR data are also used when examining federal crime prevention policy. Levels of violent crime were used to determine if there was a relationship between the introduction of Federal crime-fighting and prevention initiatives and the national level of violence. This relationship is discussed in the “Crime and Federal Crime Prevention Policy” section of chapter 6, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” Collecting UCR data was rather straightforward; the data were collected from existing sources provided by the FBI. However, finding the “media data” involved a content analysis of newspaper stories. My reasoning for using newspapers as a data source is outlined below.

**Newspaper Data**

Sociologists have a long and strong tradition of using newspaper data when performing research. Research findings using newspaper data have been confirmed by researchers who use more traditional forms of data collection (Earl et al. 2004). Examples of sociological areas of study that have used newspaper data include violence and immigrant groups (Olzak 1989a; Bergesen and Herman 1998), political collective action (Sampson et al. 2005; Olzak 1989b), and protests and police action (Earl et al. 2003). In addition to using newspaper data, the above-cited literature shares a second
theme: analyzing social phenomena over time and space. For these reasons, the above-
cited literature supports the choice of using newspapers as a source of data for this
dissertation.

Literature has shown that there are certain advantages to using newspaper data. First of all, it has been shown that newspapers cover a remarkable number of events that take place on a national scale (McCarthy et al. 1996). Newspapers also tend to get the hard news facts correct (Earl et al. 2003; Earl et al. 2004). ‘Hard news’ refers to items such as organization mission statements (the purpose of the program), where the program took place, and how many people participated in it. Moreover, newspapers allow researchers to follow and document events over time and space (Olzak 1989b; Earl et al. 2003), and to keep tabs on events that took place at multiple locations and at multiple times. For the purposes of this dissertation, newspaper data allowed documentation of cases in which the same program was mentioned in a particular city over a 10-year period. As an example, the Real Alternative Program (RAP) in San Francisco appeared in articles from 1992 to 1994 and in 1996. In addition, this dissertation used newspaper data to document when very similar or identical programs took place throughout the nation during the 1990s. For example, the cities of Boston and Memphis had Ten Point Coalitions, an organization that is run by outspoken ministers. It would have been much more difficult to obtain data without the use of the online newspaper database.

There are various methods by which newspaper research can be conducted. The first method is by performing a keyword search, and the second is by reading the actual pages of the newspaper during the time period being studied (Sampson et al. 2005; Soule 1997). Due to the large number of articles, this dissertation used the keyword-search
method. Validity can be added to keyword searches by taking the proper steps. Studies have found that performing searches in a uniform manner throughout the entire study and maintaining a strict coding protocol increases the validity of newspaper datasets (Sampson et al. 2005; Jackman and Boyd 1979; Oliver and Myers 1999; Adelman and Verbrugge 2000). For this dissertation, the same search terms and coding protocols were used during the entire keyword search.

This dissertation implements one of the most contemporary and up-and-coming keyword-search tools: the electronic database (Oliver and Myers 1999; Wrigley and Dreby 2005; Soule 1997; Adelman and Verbrugge 2000). More specifically, this research uses the largest Internet database, LexisNexis (Adelman and Verbrugge 2000). Although using electronic sources is a well-documented method, it is still a cutting-edge choice for scholars. For this reason, this dissertation has a secondary goal of advancing the use of electronic databases as a research method. Past research has established the importance of electronic databases to research that is limited by time (Oliver and Myers 1999; Soule 1997). Soule (1997) states, “NEXIS allows the researcher to scan many more varied newspapers in a short period of time, allowing for a more thorough data collection than was ever before possible” (864). It has been nearly a decade since Soule’s research, and this quotation has stood the test of time. In the last 10 years, many more newspapers have become electronically archived, and access has become readily available, as more and more libraries pay for subscriptions to electronic databases.

One primary criticism of newspaper data is systemic bias (Lieberson and Silverman 1965; Olzak, 1989b; McCarthy et al. 1996; Earl et al. 2003; Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999). This criticism refers to bias that is built into the structure of
journalism, research of news stories, newswire services, news editing, decisions as to what is fit for print, and the day-to-day operations of running a newspaper. Bias becomes a greater problem when a researcher relies on one major newspaper. The New York Times has been viewed as the leading American newspaper in terms of its depth of national events coverage (Olzak 1989a; Olzak 1989b; McCarthy et al. 1996; Jackman and Boys 1979). However, relying on only one newspaper, regardless of its reputation, can lead to the above biases invalidating newspaper data. However, other research has found that this bias can be avoided by using local newspapers from various cities (Olzak, 1989b; Sampson et al. 2005; Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999; Adelman and Verbrugge 2000). Using multiple newspapers has been shown to increase the number of events covered by the print media (Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999). Moreover, Oliver and Myers (1999) stated:

. . . newspapers classified as “regional” sources provide serious news coverage of their metropolitan areas. Regional news media cover a much higher proportion of the events within their catchments than do national media . . . scholars are recognizing that a collection of regional newspapers may provide a much more comprehensive documentation of events than any national newspaper ever could. (43)

This dissertation has taken such diversity into account by researching youth violence prevention programs and researching such programs in as many major newspapers that a city has available, thus minimizing the bias caused by relying on one newspaper (regardless of how stellar its reputation).

Using local newspapers also minimizes the effect of proximity bias. Research has found that newspaper coverage changes depending on how close the news source is to the event (Earl et al. 2003, McCarthy 1996). The reasoning for this conclusion is that newspapers that focus on their “hometowns” should cover local events better than
newspapers that have a reputation for covering the national scene. Literature has shown this to be true (Oliver and Myers 1999); not only are local papers more comprehensive in their coverage of local events, but more people read local papers than read the New York Times (42).

To recap, this dissertation used newspaper data that were collected from daily papers in 22 of America’s largest cities for the program data and from newspapers of 9 major cities for the media data. In keeping with current research, this dissertation used the largest electronic database available—Lexis-Nexis. To minimize biases and other limitations of using newspaper data, this dissertation used various local papers as well as a uniform method of searching for and coding data.

As stated above, to use newspaper data, a keyword word search must be in place. What are the descriptions of the keyword search that produces the program data and the media data?

**Keyword Search – Program Data**

As stated above, this dissertation used the LexisNexis keyword-search method to collect articles for the program data. The first step in the process was to set the proper search boundaries within the LexisNexis search fields, beginning with opening a blank search screen. LexisNexis allows for a search of various news categories, including general news, world news, U.S. news, arts and sports news, and legal news, among other various news categories. For a complete list, see LexisNexis - http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.ilsprod.lib.neu.edu/universe/form/academic/s_guidednews.html

12 Since this dissertation is focused on community programs that
took place in America’s largest cities between the years 1990 and 1999, the news category “U.S. News” was selected in the “select a category” field.

The second step in the keyword search was to select the type of newspapers to search. After “U.S. News” is selected, LexisNexis limits the newspaper options to regional newspapers and local newspapers. Examples of newspaper options include Midwest regional sources, Northeast regional sources, Idaho news sources, New Jersey news sources, and Washington news sources, among others. Since it has been determined that using local newspapers is the best option for this research (Olzak, 1989b; Sampson et al. 2005; Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999; Adelman and Verbrugge 2000), local newspapers were selected in this step. In the “select a news source” field, the state that the city is located in was selected. Once the appropriate state was selected, the daily newspaper(s) for the city that was being searched must be selected. This is done by clicking on the “source link” button to the right of the “select a news source” field. Clicking this button will open a page listing all the newspapers in the selected state. To select the daily papers for the city being searched, the box next to the paper’s name must be clicked. At this point, it is important to check the boxes next to all of the daily papers in the city being searched. For instance, if a search is being performed for the city of Boston, then the boxes next to “Boston Globe, The” and the “Boston Herald, The” will be checked. Once all the appropriate newspapers are selected for the city being searched, the “about this title” button next to each selected newspaper must be clicked. When this button is clicked, it will allow the researcher to determine if the selected newspaper was archived during the 1990s. At this point, the researcher disregarded all newspapers that

13 For a complete list, see LexisNexis - http://0-web.lexisnexis.com.ilsprod.lib.neu.edu/universe/form/academic/s_guidednews.html
were not archived between 1990 and 1999. Once the list of daily newspapers was limited to those that were archived during the 1990s, the “past to search” button was clicked. Once this was done, the main search page returned. It is also important to note that it is necessary to document how far back the newspapers were archived during the 1990s in LexisNexis for that particular city. For instance, in the city of Boston The Boston Globe was archived in the LexisNexis database during 1990. On the other hand, The Denver Post was archived in the Lexis-Nexis database starting with the year 1994. This year is documented as “the first year a newspaper was archived in LexisNexis” variable.

The third step entails entering the search terms into the “enter search terms” fields. The search terms that were selected for this research are “name of the city” (i.e., “Boston”), “murder or violence,” “program or policy or outreach,” and “juvenile or youth or teen.” Since this search took place in a city’s daily newspapers, it would seem apparent that the resulting articles would be about that particular city. However, this was not always the case. Preliminary searches turned up articles on nearby cities or on the unincorporated county regions near the primary city. For this reason, the city name was included as the first search word in the first string of search terms. The terms “murder or violence” were used because this research was focused on crimes against a person. The FBI defines crimes against a person—murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault—as violent crimes (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005a). Moreover, the literature shows that violence is disproportionately reported in newspapers (Reber and Chang 2000). Thus, this search used the term “violence.” The literature also shows that murder is reported at a significantly higher rate than any other violent crime (Reber and Chang
Thus, the search used the term “murder.” To find the maximum number of articles related to violent crime, this research used the words “violence or murder.” The “or” was used so that articles that used either word would be represented, leading to a sizable sample. The words “city name [i.e., Boston] and murder or violence” were used as the first string of search terms.

After examining contemporary literature, it was determined that the word “program” would be an appropriate choice for the first word in the second string of terms to be used in this keyword search. In one of the nation’s largest assessments of crime-prevention initiatives, the National Institute of Justice examined evaluations of crime-prevention actions, referring to them as programs (Lawrence et al. 1998). Accordingly, this research used the word “program” as the first word of the second string of search terms to be used.

The National Institute of Justice research was undertaken in response to a policy mandate by Congress stating that all crime prevention programs that receive any amount of Department of Justice founding must be evaluated (Lawrence et al. 1998). Congress also works with the Department of Justice on juvenile crime prevention programming policy (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 2006a). Thus, the word “policy” was used as the second word in the second string of search terms when this keyword search was performed.

Additionally, the National Institute of Justice research indicated that community-based programs that use community workers were among the most promising community-based crime prevention programs (Lawrence et al. 1998). For this reason, the word “outreach” was used as the third word in the second string of search terms during
this keyword search. Therefore, the second string of search terms was “program or policy or outreach.” The “or” was used to make sure that as many articles as possible were found that used at least one of the three words.

The third string of search terms was “juvenile or youth or teen.” The word “juvenile” was used as the first word of the third string of search terms because it is the official term used by the Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2006b) to describe members of society who are not considered adults by the criminal justice system. Even though the word “juvenile” is the official term used when discussing minors who have already entered, or who are at risk of entering, the criminal justice system, the term “youth” appears far more frequently in the academic literature. A preliminary search of the academic literature on violence found 313 abstracts when performing a search using the terms “juvenile and violence” and 592 abstracts when performing the same search with the terms “youth and violence.” This preliminary search seemingly demonstrated the greater popularity of the word “youth,” and therefore “youth” was used as the second word in the third string of search terms used in this keyword search.

Lastly, official statistics show that teens—specifically 15 to 17 year olds—were responsible for the bulk of the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the crime drop that followed in the mid-to-late 1990s (Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention 2004). For this reason, the word “teen” was used as the third word of the third string of search terms used in this keyword search. As with the previous strings of search terms, “or” was used to make sure that the largest number of articles containing these terms was found. To recap, the first string of search terms was “city name [i.e.,
The second string of search terms was “program or policy or outreach.” The third string of search terms was “juvenile or youth or teen.”

Once a list of search terms is developed, it is necessary to enter them into the “step three: enter search terms” fields. LexisNexis allows for the entry of three strings of search terms. The first string of search terms entered was “city name [i.e., Boston] and “murder or violence.” Next to the “step three: enter search terms” field, there was a dropdown menu that regulates which part of the articles will be searched. The dropdown menu allows for the selection of several search options. The options available through the dropdown menu include headlines, lead paragraph(s), terms, headlines, full text, caption, or author. This researcher selected the “headlines, lead paragraph(s), terms” selection from the dropdown menu. It was found that this selection allowed for a large sample that did not require an extraordinary amount of time or resources.14

The second string of search terms was entered into the second “step three: enter search terms” field. Unlike the first “step three: enter search terms” field, this field was preceded by an “and/or” dropdown menu that presented the choices and, or, and not, w/5, w/10, w/25, w/s, or w/p. In this dropdown menu, the term “and” was selected to connect the first string of search terms with the second string of search terms. As with the first string of search terms, the dropdown menu that preceded the string of search terms was set as “headlines, lead paragraph(s), terms.” The third string of search terms was entered in a similar manner as the second string of search terms. The “and/or” dropdown menu

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14 During the proposal defense meeting, it was agreed upon by the student and the faculty members that a search that provided thousands of articles would be too grand an endeavor. Since selecting the “full text” search option produced thousands of articles, and the “headlines, lead paragraph(s), terms” option produced hundreds of articles, the latter proved the more manageable option.
was set as “and” to connect all three strings of search terms. As with the first two strings of search terms, the dropdown menu that followed was set as “headlines, lead paragraph(s), terms.” At this point, all of the search terms have been entered into the three “step three: enter search terms” fields.

Once the search terms are entered, it is necessary to set the date limits on the search. LexisNexis has two options that allow the researcher to set date limitations. LexisNexis calls these options the “step four: narrow to a specific date range” fields. The first field is a dropdown menu that allows the researcher to select from the current date through all available dates. The second field is a “from/to” field that allows the researcher to manually enter search dates or a range of search dates. For this keyword search, the manual option was selected. The “from” part of the field was the earliest date during the 1990s that the newspaper was archived, and the “to” part of the field was the last day of 1999 (12/31/1999). This step was repeated for every year during the 1990s that archived data were available. For instance, when the researcher searched the city of Boston, The Boston Globe was archived for the entire decade of the 1990s. Thus, the “from” field for Boston was 1/1/1990, and the “to” field was 12/31/1990. This step was repeated for every year in the decade, ending with 1/1/1999 in the “from” field and 12/31/1999 in the “to” field. As a second example, The Denver Post is not archived until 1994. Therefore, the first year in the “from” part of the field was 1994. The first “from/to” field for The Denver Post was “from 1/1/1994 to 12/31/1994.” As with all other cities, the last “from/to” field ended with 1999 (i.e., “from 1/1/1999 to 12/31/1999”).

15 For a complete list, see LexisNexis - http://0-web.lexis-nexis.com.ilsprod.lib.neu.edu/universe/form/academic/s_guidednews.html
Once all of the search parameters are set and all of the search terms are entered, the search is executed by clicking on the “search” button on the bottom right of the search page. The above-described keyword-search methodology was repeated for all of the 22 cities that were selected. Once a search was completed, it needed to be determined which articles would be analyzed. The criteria and method by which this was determined are described below.

**Article Selection – Program Data**

Article selection was based on several criteria. First and foremost, it had to be indicated that the program was implemented as a reaction to crime. Second, the program had to target the most at-risk population. Statistics show that urban youth are overwhelmingly and historically most at risk for being involved in violence (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003; Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention 2004). The literature further shows that being poor and disadvantaged are related to higher rates of violence (Lee et al. 2003; Messner and Golden 1992; Messner and Raffalovich 2001). Thus, all programs that were found in the media had to be offered to poor urban youth, and, in addition, affordable by poor urban youth; thus, only free programs were included.

The most important factor in the article selection process was that the selected newspaper articles provided details. In other words, if an article was to be included, it had to provide the necessary details. There were five mandatory categories in which each article needed to present details. The five categories of required detailed information included information on the name of the program, the city the program was located in, the year(s) the program was mentioned in an article, details regarding the
mission/operation of the program, and details on the institutional affiliation of the program. While the first three categories are self-explanatory—program name/information on the program name, the city name, and the year(s) the program appeared in an article—the fourth and fifth categories are far more in-depth. The fourth category—details on the program’s mission/operation—included details on the following: whether the program focused on vocation and/or employment, teaching violence prevention (decision-making skills, anger management, conflict resolution, etc.), education, recreation, individual improvement skills (teaching leadership, teaching self-reliance, improving self-confidence, etc.), quality of life (economic/neighborhood development, providing social services, improving mental health, etc.), outreach, street ministry, or mentoring. In the coding process, this category would become known as the “program objective(s).” In the fifth category, the details on the institutional affiliation included whether the organization that implemented the program was a private business, a non-profit organization, a public organization, a school, or a religious organization. When coding, this category became known simply as “institutional affiliation.”

Lastly, there was a seventh category that was not reported in newspaper articles but was derived from the details provided by the fourth category (details on the programs mission/operations); this was the category of policy orientation: each program was assigned a policy orientation based on its mission/operation. How this was accomplished is explained later in the theory chapter.
Keyword Search–Media Data

Collecting the media data was very similar to collecting the program data, with a few minor alterations. Step one of the keyword search remained exactly the same as during the collection of the program data. The first change to the keyword search came in step two. The one change to step two was that each of the cities’ newspapers that were archived between 1991 and 1999 were searched individually rather than all at once. As noted above, the list of 22 cities used for the program data keyword search was reduced to 9 cities because the 9 included cities that had local paper(s) archived from 1991 to 1999. For instance, when performing the keyword search for the city of Boston, only The Boston Globe was selected from the list of available Boston papers because only The Boston Globe was archived from 1991 to 1999.

A second change involved the third step—entering terms into the “enter search terms” field. First of all, the three strings of search terms remained: “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence,” “program or policy or outreach,” and “juvenile or youth or teen.” The strings of search terms were entered via the following sequence. First, “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence” was entered, and the number of articles produced by the search was recorded. Second, the strings “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence” and “juvenile or youth or teen” were entered, and the number of articles produced by the search was recorded. Third, the strings “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence” and “program or policy or outreach” were entered, and the number of articles produced by the search was recorded. Fourth, all three strings, “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence,” “program or
policy or outreach,” and “juvenile or youth or teen” were entered, and the number of articles produced by the search was recorded. Other than this change, all other keyword search mechanisms, criteria, and limitations remained the same.

As an example, when performing the media data search for the city of Boston for the year 1991, the terms “Boston and murder or violence” were entered into the first “enter search term” field, and the search was run. This yielded a result of 952 articles. When “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence” and “juvenile or youth or teen” were entered, the search resulted in 208 articles. When the search was conducted with the strings “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence” and “program or policy or outreach,” the search resulted in 70 articles. Lastly, when the search was conducted using the strings “name of the city [i.e., Boston], and murder or violence,” “program or policy or outreach,” and “juvenile or youth or teen,” the search resulted in 21 articles. This was repeated from 1991 to 1999 for the newspaper(s) archived in the Lexis-Nexis database for all 9 cities, hence completing the media data keyword search.

Although the program data and the media data keyword searches were different, they were also very similar. Regardless how similar the two data sources are, they are used in this dissertation very differently. The programs data are used solely when answering research question 5; however the media data is used when answering research questions 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the use of the media data will be discussed now, and the use of the program data will be discussed at the end of this chapter.
Use of the Media Data

As stated above, the media data were newspaper stories on murder or violence, youth violence, non-age-specific violence prevention programs, and youth violence prevention programs that were reported in the local newspapers of 9 major American cities that were continuously covered in LexisNexis from the 1991 to 1999 period. As stated above, media data were used when addressing research questions 1, 4, and 5. Research question 1 asked, To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime in particular? Media data were aggregated at the national level as a means of determining if there was a relationship between newspaper reports on violence and prevention programs and the national murder rate. At the national level of aggregation, media data on murder and violence were used to determine if there was a relationship between the national murder rate and the number of newspaper stories on murder and violence. Also on the national level, media data were used to determine if there was a relationship between newspaper reports and youth violence prevention programs. The relationship between media data and the national murder rate and the juvenile murder rate is discussed in the “Crime and Newspaper Reporting” section of chapter 6 “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” The media data were also aggregated at the local level.

As stated above, local-level media data were collected from local newspapers from 9 major American cities that were regularly reporting to LexisNexis from 1991 to 1999. Local media data were used in a cross-sectional time series analysis to determine if local reporting led to the media data having a different relationship with the national
murder rate. The first cross-sectional time series analysis used local media data on stories that reported on murder or violence, and the second cross-sectional time series analysis used local media data on youth violence. Both cross-sectional time series analyses can be found in the “Crime and Newspaper Reporting” section of chapter 6, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” The media data were also used when examining the fourth research question.

The fourth research question asked, To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs? The national-level media data were used to show if there was a relationship between non-age-specific prevention programs and the national homicide rate and the public’s fear of and concern about crime. The national-level media data were also used to show if there was a relationship between the youth violence prevention programs and the juvenile murder rate. The local-level media data were again used in a cross-sectional time series analysis to determine if the reporting on non-age-specific prevention programs or youth violence prevention programs was associated differently with the local murder rate than at the national level. The graphs that show the relationship between the national media data and the national murder rate and the juvenile murder rate and the cross-sectional time series analysis are found in the “The Relationships among the Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Murder and Violence Prevention Programs” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Community Crime Prevention Programs.” The media data are also used when examining the fifth research question.
The fifth research question asked, To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs? The national-level media data were used to determine whether the implementation of federal crime programming affected local youth violence prevention programs. To determine this, a cross-tabulation analysis was used to determine if there are significant differences between local youth violence programs from 1992 to 1994—before the implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill—compared to the 1994 to 1999 period after the implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. To create a meaningful analysis, the media data were restricted to the newspapers from the 13 major American cities that continuously reported to LexisNexis from 1992 to 1999. The media data were restricted in this cross-tabulation analysis to the 1992 to 1999 period to increase the number of cities included in the analysis from 9 to 13. In other words, if the media data from 1991 to 1999 had been used, there would have been too few cities in the analysis. Thus, as a way of increasing the quality of the analysis, the media data were restricted to the years 1992 to 1999 as a means of creating a more robust analysis. The cross-tabulation analysis can be found in the “The Potential Impact of Public Policy on the Policy Orientations, Program Objectives, and Institutional Affiliation of Youth Violence Prevention Programs” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Community Crime Prevention Programs.”
Public Opinion Data

Public opinion data on American’s fear of crime are represented by the percentage of Americans who fear walking alone at night in their neighborhoods. These data were retrieved from the BJS’s Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003: Table 2.38; respondents reported whether they felt afraid to walk alone at night in their own neighborhoods. Opinion data on how Americans felt about spending on crime were retrieved from the BJS’s Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (2003: Table 2.41; respondents indicated too little is spent on selected problems in this country). This was done to compare trends in opinion data and trends in newspaper reporting. Public opinion data were used when assessing research questions 2, 3, and 4.

Research question 2 asked, To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime? When answering this question, public opinion data were displayed graphically as a means of comparing Americans’ fear of and concern about crime to violent crime trends. Furthermore, public opinion data were discussed when media reports on violence were incorporated into the analysis. The graphs depicting public opinion data can be found in the “Crime and Public Concern” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” Public opinion data are discussed in conjunction with rates of violence in the same section of the same chapter that the data were graphically displayed. The discussion of public opinion data and media reports on violence can be found in the “Crime and Newspaper Reporting” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the
Research question 3 asked, To what extent were the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime, and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of a federal crime prevention policy? When accessing research question 3, public opinion data were discussed when President Clinton’s crime-fighting and prevention initiatives were incorporated into the analysis and also when the Federal government’s crime-fighting and prevention programming was brought into the analysis. The discussion of public opinion and Clinton’s crime-fighting and prevention initiatives, and the discussion of public opinion and Federal crime-fighting and prevention programming, can be found in the “Crime and Federal Crime Prevention Policy” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” Public opinion was also used when examining research question 4.

Research question 4 asked, To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs? When answering this question, public opinion data were used in the discussion when data on media reporting on violence were analyzed. This discussion using public opinion data and the analysis of media coverage of violence can be found in the “The Relationships among the Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Murder and Violence Prevention Programs” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Community Crime Prevention Programs.”
Data on the Federal Government’s Reaction to the Late 1980s/early 1990s Crime Wave

Data on the Federal response to the crime problem were collected to gain an understanding of how the Federal government responded to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Data on the “The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,” including data on grants that were authorized in 1994, were gathered from a U.S. Department of Justice report: “Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.” The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 report also provided information on the monetary aspect of the grants that were authorized in 1994. Furthermore, the federal government reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s by increasing the budget of the Weed and Seed program. The Weed and Seed program was a well-documented and widespread federal-local collaboration that was implemented by the Federal government to arrest and prosecute violent offenders while providing law-abiding citizens with the social programs and assistance that they need. Data on Weed and Seed were gathered from U.S. Department of Justice analysis reports authored by National Department of Justice researchers. Data on the Federal government’s reaction to the crime wave were used when answering research questions 3, 4, and 5.

Research question 3 asked, To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy? Data on the Federal government’s reaction to the crime wave were discussed within the analysis of how the media’s coverage of violence and Americans’ fear of and concern about crime
led to the development of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill and the increased commitment to the Weed and Seed program. Data on Weed and Seed program funding were also graphically depicted during this portion of the analysis. The discussion on the 1994 Federal Crime Bill and the graphic depiction of the Weed and Seed program funding can be found in the “Crime and Federal Crime Prevention Policy” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy.” Data on how the government reacted to the crime wave were also used when examining research question 4.

Research question 4 asked, To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs? Data on the Federal government’s reaction to the crime wave were discussed during the analysis of how Americans’ fear of and concern about crime led to the development of youth violence prevention programs. This discussion of the data on the Federal government’s reaction to the crime wave can be found in the “The Relationships among the Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Murder and Violence Prevention Programs” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Murder and Violence Prevention Programs.” Data on the Federal government’s reaction to the crime wave were also used when assessing research question 5.

Research question number 5 asked, To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs? When answering research question 5, data on the federal government’s response to the crime wave are discussed during the pre-1994 and post-1994 cross-tabulation analysis of the
media data. The data on the Federal government’s response to the crime wave were discussed during the pre- and post-1994 analysis as a means of discussing any impact the passage of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill had on the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations of local youth violence prevention programs. The discussion of the Federal government’s reaction to the crime wave and the pre- and post-1994 cross-tabulation analysis can be found in the “The Potential Impact of Public Policy on the Policy Orientations, Program Objectives, and Institutional Affiliation of Youth Violence Prevention Programs” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Community Crime Prevention Programs.”

Use of the Program Data

As stated above, the media data and the program data were obtained using very similar keyword searches; however, the media data and the program data are used for different analyses. The program data are used when examining the fifth research question, which asked to what extent were the policy orientations, the program objectives, and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs? The program data are used for the creation of frequency tables depicting the frequencies and counts of the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations of local youth violence prevention programs. The program data are also used in a cross-tabulation analysis that depicts the distribution of program objectives and policy orientations into the five institutional affiliations. In other words, the program data are used to create cross-tabs that state the percentage of each intuitional affiliation that is associated with each
individual program objective and policy orientation. Both the frequency tables and the cross-tabs that were created using programs data can be found in the “The Impact of Public Policy on the Policy Orientations, Program Objectives, and Institutional Affiliation of Youth Violence Prevention Programs Following the Crime Wave of the Late 1980s and Early 1990s” section of the chapter “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Community Crime Prevention Programs.”

**Coding the Data**

The majority of the data used in this research was coded in a rather straightforward way that does not need much explanation. For instance, the crime data at the national level, the city level, and on juveniles were coded as rates. Coding the media data also proved to be rather straightforward. The years from 1991 to 1999 were recorded numerically, as was the number of articles reported in the media on violence and violence prevention programs. Moreover, public opinion was coded as the percentage of Americans who feared walking alone at night and the percentage of Americans who felt too little was being spent on crime. The data on the Federal government’s response to the crime wave were coded as expected. The names of the programs and grants remained as they were found. The year in which the program was established or the grant was authorized was coded numerically. The monetary values associated with program budgets and grants were coded as dollar amounts. Finally, the only data category that was not coded in a straightforward way was the program data category.
When researching local youth violence prevention programs, it becomes apparent that there are many characteristics associated with the programs’ day-to-day operations. Thus, it became necessary to effectively code the program objectives (day-to-day operating goals) of youth violence prevention programs documented by this dissertation. The program objective coding proceeded in two phases. The initial phase was a relatively broad categorizing and grouping of the program objectives into 18 groups, as described below:

1. **Job placement or jobs** – these were objectives that placed at-risk youth in jobs.
2. **Job training** – these were objectives that gave at-risk youth the skills and training needed to follow a vocation and to get a job for themselves.
3. **Teaching violence prevention** – these were objectives that provided at-risk youth with the skills they needed to avoid violence, including avoiding violent situations, making the “right” or socially acceptable decisions, controlling personal anger, and resolving conflict peacefully.
4. **Education** – these were objectives that replicated a public school environment, including tutoring, help with studying, a safe place to do homework, extra help with completing homework, extra classes in the three R’s and other major subjects, and classes in the fine and performing arts.
5. **Recreation** – these objectives organized at-risk youth to participate in games and sports, and included organized sports leagues, places where youth can “hang out” safely, organized games, organized activities, time at swimming pools, outdoor camping, summer camps, and outdoor recreation activities.
6. **Leadership training** – this meant giving at-risk youth the skills and knowledge needed to become the next generation of civic and business leaders.
7. **Minority economic development** – this included providing minority neighborhoods with the resources needed to bring economic gentrification.
8. **Childcare** – these programs provided poor single parents with childcare services so that they could work and provide their family with an income.
9. **Outreach** – outreach workers whose objective was to find at-risk youth in need of services and either guide them to social service agencies or provide the services themselves if possible.
10. **Street ministry** – similar to outreach; here ministers used their involvement in churches when helping and dealing with at-risk youth.
11. **Mental health** – providing at-risk youth with mental health services with the goal of reducing their delinquency.
12. **Teaching moral values** – this objective was to reinforce society’s norms and values in at-risk youth with the goal of reducing delinquency.
13. **Improving self-confidence** – teaching at-risk youth the skills needed to feel pride in themselves and a sense of accomplishment.
14. Neighborhood revitalization – similar to minority economic development but minority status is not an issue. This also includes minor projects such as cleaning up parks and painting buildings (as opposed to fully developed gentrification).

15. Teaching self-reliance – this included giving at-risk youth the skills they will need to survive in society as self-sufficient adults, without needing government assistance programs.

16. Providing social services – this objective provided at-risk youth with access to the welfare safety net or private sector equivalents.

17. Mentoring – providing at-risk youth with responsible, socially conventional adults as role models.

18. Healthcare – providing at-risk youth with the healthcare that they need, with the goal of reducing delinquency.

Following the creation of the above list, it was decided that the program objectives would have to be regrouped into a smaller list to create an optimal situation for analysis.

What follows is a condensed list of the original 18 categories.

1. Job placement or jobs – these were objectives that placed at-risk youth in jobs.

2. Job training – these were objectives that gave at-risk youth the skills and training needed to follow a vocation and to get a job for themselves.

3. Teaching violence prevention – these were objectives that provided at-risk youth with the skills they needed to avoid violence, including avoiding violent situations, making the “right” or socially acceptable decisions, controlling personal anger, and resolving conflict peacefully.

4. Education – these were objectives that replicated a public school environment, including tutoring, help with studying, a safe place to do homework, extra help with completing homework, extra classes in the three R’s and other major subjects, and classes in the fine and performing arts.

5. Recreation – this included objectives that organized at-risk youth to participate in games and sports, including organized sports leagues, places where youth can “hang out” safely, organized games, organized activities, time at swimming pools, outdoors camping, summer camps, and outdoor recreation activities.

6. Teaching individual improvement skills – teaching at-risk youth leadership skills, self-confidence, self-respect, self-reliance, and moral values.

7. Quality of life – this set of initiatives included minority economic development, providing childcare, neighborhood revitalization, social services and healthcare, and improving/providing mental health services.

8. Outreach – workers whose objective was to find at-risk youth in need of services and either guide them to social service agencies or provide the services themselves where possible.

9. Street ministry – similar to outreach; here ministers used their involvement in churches when helping and dealing with at-risk youth.
10. Mentoring – providing at-risk youth with responsible, socially conventional adults as role models.

Some of the categories have been condensed and renamed, while others remained the same. This was done to make the analysis process as efficient as possible. Categories were condensed when their objectives were similar enough that they did not need to remain as independent objectives. The objectives that were not regrouped were left independent because they were too specific and unique to combine with other objectives. This finalized list of 10 program objectives will be used when analyzing the program data. Once the program objectives were categorized, it was necessary to determine which of the five policy orientations the objectives were most closely associated with: opportunity, social bonding, social disorganization, social learning, and social disorganization/social bonding. The policy orientations were influenced by the classic criminological theoretical perspectives of opportunity theory, social bonding theory, social disorganization theory, and social learning theory. To understand how the policy orientations are coded, it is important to have an understanding of classic criminological literature.

Based on the literature cited in the theory chapter, each program objective could be associated with several of the five policy orientations. For this reason, a program’s policy orientation will be based on its most prominent objective.

The program objectives of job placement or job, job training, and education were most closely associated with the opportunity policy orientation. This was done based on the opportunity theory literature cited above (Hagedorn 2006; Akers 2000; Helfgot 1974;

16 Since youth violence prevention programs, not law enforcement actions, are the focus of this research, formal control theories are not included in this discussion. In other words, only theories that use informal social controls will be discussed.
Messner and Resenfeld 2001; Schmalleger 1999), all of which indicates that programs that increase opportunity for employment or education are best associated with the opportunity policy orientation.

The program objective of mentoring was most closely associated with the social bonding policy orientation. This was done based on the social bonding literature cited above (Weber et al. 2001; Hirschi 1969). When considering mentoring programs, Hirschi’s bond of attachment is very important. The importance of the attachment bond can be seen when considering that mentors act as conventional members of society to whom at-risk youth can become close, admire, and learn from.

The program objectives of quality of life and outreach are best associated with the social disorganization policy orientation. This was done based on the social disorganization literature cited above (Sampson and Groves 1989; Schmalleger 1999; Bursik 2000; Morley and Rassman 1997). This literature shows that improving the day-to-day lives of citizens in neighborhoods helps create organization. Examples of activities that accomplish this include providing outreach, providing social services, providing healthcare, and developing neighborhood revitalization projects.

The program objectives of teaching violence prevention and teaching individual improvement skills were best associated with the social learning policy orientation. This was done based on the social learning literature cited above (Akers 2000; Gorman and White 1995; Sherman et al. 1998). This literature essentially states that deviant and criminal behavior is learned; thus, it can be unlearned, and socially responsible and conforming behavior can replace it.
The program objectives of street ministry and recreation are best associated with the combined policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding. This was done based on the social disorganization and bonding theory literature cited above (Sampson 2006; Morenoff et al. 2001; Bursik 2000; Sampson and Groves 1989; Schmalleger 1999; Morley and Rassman 1997; Weber et al. 2001; Hirschi 1969). It is important to note the significance of the program objectives that fall into this joint policy orientation category. The objective of street ministry is a combination of the aforementioned objectives of outreach and mentoring. Street ministry also incorporates Hirschi’s bond of belief. The objective of recreation embodies the core principles of social disorganization by involving at-risk youth in youth violence prevention programs and the principles of bonding theories by involving at-risk youth in organizations that strengthen their bonds to conventional organizations and society. In addition to objectives and policy orientations, the youth violence prevention programs documented by this dissertation were affiliated with institutions (known as institutional affiliations). The coding of the institutional affiliations is stated below.

The institutional affiliation variables were coded as one of the following: private business, non-profit organization, public organization, school, or religious organization. “Private business” speaks for itself; these are for-profit corporations that operated programs that were reactions to the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Examples include youth programs organized and operated by the John Hancock Corporation and the Coca-Cola Corporation. “Non-profit organization” refers to the more traditional community organizations that are typically thought of as taking the lead on social issues, social responsibility, and working toward the greater good. Examples
include the Boys and Girls Clubs and Big Brothers Big Sisters. “Public organizations” refers to two types of public groups. The first type is composed of traditional government agencies that created and operated youth violence prevention programs. Examples of this type of group include Boston’s Summer Jobs Program and the Denver Police Athletic League. In both of these cases, the programs were run by city government agencies, the mayor’s office, and the police department, respectively. The second type of public group includes organizations that were managed and operated by city officials and city workers and were funded by public money, but were not part of a traditional government agency. Examples include City Year Boston, which is a publicly funded, city-operated organization that is not part of a traditional government organization, and Seattle’s Central Area Youth Association's Mentoring Program, which is a local neighborhood social service-providing agency that is city-founded and operated but is not part of a traditional government agency. School organizations are groups that reacted to the crime wave using school faculty, staff, and facilities. Examples include Second Step in Seattle and Peaceful Player in Columbus. Finally, religious organizations are those that focused their efforts on bringing religious ideals to at-risk youth or that were led by religious leaders whose public lives revolved around their ministries. Examples include the Ten Point Coalition in Boston and God's Angelic Neighborhood Gang in Memphis.

As stated above, the program data were the only data that were not coded in a straightforward way. As was discussed above, the youth violence prevention programs that were documented in this dissertation were affiliated with 10 program objectives and associated with one of five policy orientations and institutional affiliations.
Data Analysis Roadmap

As stated above, the first analysis chapter, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, and Public Policy” begins with an analysis of Americans’ fear of and concern about crime based on public opinion data. The chapter then progresses to an analysis of media reports on violence based on the media data. The chapter proceeds to a cross-sectional time series analysis that uses the media data as indicated above to determine if it is possible that homicide rates for specific cities might have a closer relationship with newspaper reports on murder and violence by newspapers in their cities than they do with national trends in news reporting. The cross-sectional time series analysis was conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Finally, the chapter ends with an analysis of the Federal government’s response to the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. As stated above, this analysis used data gathered from official documents.

The second analysis chapter, “The Relationships among the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Public Policy, and Community Crime Prevention Programs” begins with an analysis of media data on violence prevention programs covered by the media. This chapter employs a cross-sectional time series analysis similar to the one used in the previous analysis chapter. However, in this chapter the cross-sectional time series analysis is used as a means of determining if it is possible that homicide rates for specific cities might have a closer relationship with newspaper reports on violence prevention programs by newspapers in their cities than the rates do with national trends in news reporting. As in the previous chapter, the cross-sectional time series analysis uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The second part of this chapter uses frequency
tables to analyze the program data. The analysis depicts the frequencies and counts of
the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations of local youth violence
prevention programs. Next, the analysis uses the program data to analyze the
institutional affiliations of the various program objectives and the various policy
orientations. Lastly, this chapter uses the media data as described above in a pre- and
post-1994 cross-tabulation analysis. In other words, the pre- and post-1994 cross-
tabulation analysis is used to determine if the introduction of new federal crime-fighting
programs, such as the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, encouraged changes in the policy
orientations, program objectives, and institutional affiliations of local youth violence
prevention programs.
Chapter 5

The Federal Response to the Crime Problem Get Tough Policies and Incarceration

As can be seen in the figure below, the incarceration rate in the United States grew considerably during the 1980s and the 1990s (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005e; Smith 2004; Chaiken 1999; Ditton and Wilson 1999; Sorensen and Stemen 2002; Grimes and Rogers 1999). In fact the incarceration rate increased by greater than four times its relatively stable 1975 level by the end of the 1990s (Chaiken 1999). A majority of state inmates that accounted for the increase in the incarceration rate were violent offenders, at 50%; with drug offenders at 19% and property offenders at 16% (Ditton and Wilson 1999). As will be discussed below, these rates were largely due to new “get tough on crime” policies that increased prison sentences beyond previous minimums. Two of the most noteworthy policies responsible for the increase in the incarceration rate are truth in sentencing and mandatory minimum sentences.

Figure 8

Incarceration Rate, 1980-2004 (Rate per 100,000 population)

17 Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005e. After sharp increases in the 1980s and 1990s, the incarceration rate has recently grown at a slower pace. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs. http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/glance/incrt.htm
Prior to the era of determinate sentencing, presumptive sentencing was the norm, where parole boards had the discretion and the power to shorten sentences; however, mandatory minimums and truth in sentencing policies have largely changed this situation, as the drive for longer and more uniform sentences became the accepted standard (Ditton and Wilson 1999). The current trend of determinant sentencing leaves judges with no options other than the prescribed sentences, which can only be reduced by good behavior (Sorensen and Stemen 2002). The first policy that truly implemented determinate sentencing guidelines were mandatory minimums.

Mandatory minimum sentences are guidelines that set fixed prison terms for offenders who commit specified crimes such as certain drug offences (Sorensen and Stemen 2002; Weinstein 2003; Schwarzer 1992), firearm offences (Weinstein 2003; Maxwell 1999), murder, or rape; and for those with serious prior offences (Maxwell 1999). By 1994 – just as the violence epidemic was subsiding – all 50 states had mandatory minimum guidelines in place for more than one offence (Maxwell 1999). Unlike presumptive sentencing guidelines, mandatory minimums take sentencing power away from judges and put it largely in the hands of prosecutors (Weinstein 2003; Schwarzer 1992). The most noteworthy of all federal minimum sentence policies affected drug offenders beginning in the mid-1980s, as laws were passed that set minimum prison terms for trafficking and possession of particular types of drugs (Weinstein 2003). The affects of this policy will be discussed further below. However, it is first necessary to discuss the contemporary counterpart of mandatory minimums, truth in sentencing.
Truth in sentencing policies were enacted by almost every state (41) by the end of the 1990s (Rosich and Kane 2005). Furthermore, truth in sentencing policies were designed to mandate that inmates serve a large portion (typically 85%) of their sentence (Ditton and Wilson 1999; Rosich and Kane 2005; Sorensen and Stemen 2002; Grimes and Rogers 1999). Moreover, truth in sentencing was enacted as a means of reducing the inconsistencies between the sentence imposed and the amount of time that is truly served (Ditton and Wilson 1999; Rosich and Kane 2005). The way truth in sentencing is applied varies from state to state; many states still use parole boards for certain offences, while 14 states have eradicated the use of parole boards altogether (Ditton and Wilson 1999).

While many states have instituted a form of truth in sentencing, the research has shown that many states did not adopt the 85% federal requirement, leading researchers to conclude that the federal requirement did not have a large impact on how states crafted their truth in sentencing policies (Rosich and Kane 2005). Both truth in sentencing and mandatory minimums had an effect on the size of the incarcerated population.

As a result of mandatory minimum sentencing and truth in sentencing, more criminals were spending time in prison, while the numbers of arrested individuals was going down. For instance, research shows that the arrest rate for murder dropped by 19% in the first half of the 1990s, while the incarceration rate for murder rose from 450 per 1,000 to 613 per 1,000 during the same period (Ditton and Wilson 1999). These figures show that even though fewer people are getting arrested for murder, more people are going to prison for committing murder. In other words, mandatory minimums and truth in sentencing policies are leading to more perpetrators of murder landing in prison and less perpetrators of murder under other forms of correctional supervision such as
probation. The same can be said for drug offences. The incarceration rate for drug offences increased from 19 per 1,000 in 1980, to 103 per 1,000 in 1990, and then dropped to 77 per 1,000 by 1996 (Ditton and Wilson 1999). Clearly mandatory minimum sentences helped increase the incarceration rate for drug offenders. However, what the above statistics do not show is that federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences were implemented against crack cocaine and not powder cocaine. Do to this discrepancy blacks were disproportionately affected by federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences. Literature states that at the federal level the possession of five grams of crack cocaine is punished by a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years (Sabet 2005; Donziger 1996; Free 1997) while possessing powder cocaine does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence (Sabet 2005; Donziger 1996). Regarding the trafficking of crack and powder cocaine at the federal level, there is a mandatory 5 year minimum sentence for the trafficking of 500 grams of powder cocaine and 5 grams of crack cocaine (Sabet 2005).

The reason why federal sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine and powder cocaine are controversial is because of race. In other words powder cocaine is predominantly a white drug and crack cocaine is predominantly a black drug. Research stated that 66% of cocaine users are white and blacks use crack at a rate that is four times higher than whites (Sabet 2005). Since blacks are the predominant users of crack cocaine and since crack cocaine possession caries a federal mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years of imprisonment, 85% of federal crack cocaine offenders are black (Sabet 2005). Research that examined arrest records found a similar pattern regarding arrests for crack cocaine and powder cocaine; it was found that 90% of the arrests for crack cocaine were
of blacks and 75% of arrests for powder cocaine where of whites (Donziger 1996). These factors bring emphasis to the fact that mandatory minimum sentences disproportionately affect blacks.

Truth in sentencing seems to be having an effect on seriously violent offenders. In the year 1997, two thirds of all new incarcerations for Part 1 offences occurred in states requiring that 85% of all sentence lengths be served, and 90% of all new incarcerations for Part 1 offences took place in states that required a minimum of 50% of all sentence lengths to be served (Ditton and Wilson 1999). While truth in sentencing has increased the number of inmates, it has not increased the length of sentences.

Research points to the fact that truth in sentencing has not increased the amount of time inmates are spending in prison (Sorensen and Stemen 2002; Grimes and Rogers 1999); however, research does show that mandatory minimum laws have increased the amount of time federal inmates spend in prison. For instance, offenders convicted at the federal level for drug crimes have seen their sentences triple, from 27 months in the middle 1980s to 79 months in the mid-1990s; meanwhile violent offenders have seen their federal sentences double during the same period, and firearms offenders have seen their sentences nearly triple (Weinstein 2003).

Clearly incarceration rates in the U.S. have grown dramatically during the 1980s and the 1990s. This has been a result of new determinate sentencing guidelines such as mandatory minimums and truth in sentencing. Truth in sentencing mandated that offenders serve a majority of the length of their sentence, but these policies have not increased the length of sentences. Mandatory minimum sentences mandate that an
offender is sentenced to an established minimum prison term, with the effect of increasing sentence lengths for some types of offences.

**The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994**

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the 1994 Federal Crime Bill) was this nation’s most expansive crime bill (Donziger 1996; Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Worrall and Zhao 2003; Choi et al. 2002; Roth and Ryan 2000). The 1994 Crime Bill primarily focused on law and order goals and secondarily incorporated non-law-enforcement crime prevention programs (Berger et al. 2005; Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Wheelock and Hartmann 2007). The 1994 Federal Crime Bill set $30 billion aside for crime control spending, over 75% of which was dedicated to hiring new police officers and funding new prisons (Berger et al. 2005).

New legislation enacted by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill included strengthening prison terms (Berger et al. 2005; Donziger 1996; Beckett and Sasson 2004; Kramer and Michalowski 1995), banning military-style assault weapons (Berger et al. 2005; Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Wheelock and Hartmann 2007), and expanding the federal death penalty (Berger et al. 2005; Donziger 1996; Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Wheelock and Hartmann 2007). For instance $9.7 billion was set aside to be distributed to states to build new prisons if they aligned their truth-in-sentencing guidelines with the federal standard that required 85% of the prison term be served (Donziger 1996; Beckett and Sasson 2004). The 1994 Federal Crime Bill also authorized a number of grants to help law enforcement and local communities fight and prevent crimes. The major grants authorized in October of 1994 by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill are summarized in the next
four tables that are presented below. As can be seen in the tables below there were 15 grants that were authorized under the 1994 Federal Crime Bill when it became law in the fall of 1994. The grants can be broken down into 4 categories: law and order, community crime prevention programs, domestic and sexual violence programs, and drug programs.

Table 2\(^\text{18}\)

**“Law and Order” Grants Funded by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year of Authorization</th>
<th>Amount of Authorized Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brady Implementation</td>
<td>A grant for states to upgrade criminal history records as a means of complying with the Brady Act Grants for states or local communities to develop or improve DNA identification capabilities College scholarships for law enforcement efforts including state and local drug task force efforts Community policing grant to put 100,000 police officers on the streets Grants for state correctional agencies to build and operate boot camps and other correctional</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$100 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$40 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$450 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$1.3 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections Facilities/Boot Camps</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$24.5 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt](http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt)
As can be seen in Table 2 there were 6 law and order oriented grants. The Brady Implementation Grant allowed states to better enforce the Brady Bill.\textsuperscript{19} DNA Analysis Grants were intended to improve the science of DNA identification, which is ultimately used as a tool to enhance law enforcement. Police Corps Grants were designed to enhance state and local drug taskforces. COPS grants were designed to put 100,000 new community policing officers onto the streets. Correction Facilities/Boot Camp Grants were designed to encourage the building of new penal facilities including boot camps as to encourage states to implement truth-in-sentencing guidelines. Lastly, SCAAP Grants assisted states with the cost of dealing with criminal aliens.

\textbf{Table 3}\textsuperscript{20}

\textit{“Community Crime Prevention Programs” Grants Funded by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year of Authorization</th>
<th>Amount of Authorized Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Improvement to</td>
<td>A grant for states and local communities for</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$15 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevent Crime in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{19} The Brady Bill became a law that implemented restrictions on the sale and purchase of firearms. The Brady Bill implemented background checks and a mandatory five-day waiting period before a firearm can be purchased (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 1998).


http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/billfs.txt
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Parks</td>
<td>Crime prevention programs in national and public parks Extended lines of credit for community development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Economic Partnership</td>
<td>Corporations to create business and employment opportunities for low-income and unemployed individuals</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$270 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention Block Grants</td>
<td>For public and private non-profits to fund residential services to at-risk youth Grant for local communities to enhance education, provide substance abuse treatment, and fund job programs to prevent crime</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$377 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquent and At-Risk Youth</td>
<td>Grants for 15 cities with model crime prevention programs that incorporate non-law-enforcement methods of targeting high-crime neighborhoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Partnership Act</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$36 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$1.6 Billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model Intensive Grants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Grants for</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$625 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$25.9 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Schools supervised after-school, weekend, and summer programs for at-risk youth. Grants for local communities and local organizations to improve the overall living conditions of at-risk youth in poor and high-crime areas. This included both in- and after-school programs.

Family and Community Endeavor Schools 1994 $11 million

Table 3 shows that there were 8 community crime prevention programs grants. The Capital Improvement to Prevent Crime in Public Parks Grants were designed to help local communities prevent crime in parks. The Community Economic Partnership Grants were designed to create business and job opportunities in economically depressed neighborhoods. Crime Prevention Black Grants were designed so that local governments could fund programs such as youth sports leagues and youth clubs, among other community activities/organizations meant to prevent youth violence. Delinquent and At-Risk-Youth Grants were put in place so that non-profit organizations could fund residential programs for at-risk youth or juvenile delinquents. The Local Partnership Act provided local communities with funds to provide youth with educational programs, job programs, and substance abuse programs as a means of preventing crime. Model Investment Grants provided cities with funds to create innovative non-law-enforcement crime prevention initiatives. Community School Grants provided local communities with money to provide youth with programs when school was not in session. Family
Community Endeavor Schools Grants provided local organizations with funds to improve the overall living conditions of at-risk youth in high-crime areas.

Table 4

“Domestic and Sexual Violence” Grants Funded by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year of Authorization</th>
<th>Amount of Authorized Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battered Women’s Shelters</td>
<td>Competitive grants for battered women’s shelters and domestic violence prevention</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$325 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Prevention to Reduce Sexual Assault Against Women</td>
<td>A grant for rape prevention and education programs including seminars, hotlines, and training for professionals</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$205 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Against Women</td>
<td>Grants to support police, prosecutor, and victim services in cases of domestic or sexual violence</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$26 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotlines</td>
<td>Grants that establish national domestic violence hotlines</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$1 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows that there were 4 domestic and sexual violence grants. Funding grants were included grants for battered women’s shelters. The Education and Prevention to Reduce Sexual Assault Against Women Grants were designed to fund rape prevention and education programs including training for professionals. The Violence

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Against Women Grants provided support for police and prosecutors, and provided victim services in cases of domestic or sexual violence. Hotline Grants provided money for the establishment of domestic violence hotlines.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Year of Authorization</th>
<th>Amount of Authorized Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Treatment</td>
<td>Personal drug treatment programs, Grants for state and local drug courts, which provide supervision and services to offenders with rehabilitation potential</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$383 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Courts</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>$29 Million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lastly, Table 5 shows that there were 2 grants that were primarily geared towards drug treatment were the Drug Treatment Grants that were designed for personal drug programs, and the Drug Courts Grants that established special courts that provided supervision and services to offenders who showed potential for rehabilitation. Clearly, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill funded many different grants. However its single most funded grant program is the COPS grant. As was stated earlier, ultimately the majority of funding made available by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill went to the COPS grant program. Moreover, the COPS grant was the only 1994 Federal Crime Bill grant that was officially researched and evaluated in the literature (Worrall and Zhao 2003; Choi et al. 2002; Roth

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and Ryan 2000). Therefore, the COPS grant will be the only grant that was part of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill that will be covered in further depth.

**Community Policing – the COPS Program**

Research has shown that the federal government played a large role in instituting community-oriented policing as a mainstay in American law enforcement. Community policing has historically involved traditional policing activities in addition to new and progressive activities that make citizens feel safer – such as officers walking beats, officers on bikes, highly visible police cars, satellite police centers in neighborhoods and public places, and police officer involvement in community activities/organizations (Teasley and O’Bryant 2003). The catalyst for the growth of community-oriented policing was the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. One of the primary stated goals of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was to put 100,000 new police officers into America’s communities as a means of achieving community policing goals (Worrall and Zhao 2003; Choi et al. 2002; Roth and Ryan 2003).

The COPS program was largely a grant awarding program that provided local police departments with the funds needed to hire and train new officers who would not only arrest offenders and prevent crime, but would also work with the community to solve problems, and enhance the overall local quality of life (Worrall and Zhao 2003). In order to achieve their stated community-oriented policing goals, the COPS program used a three-pronged approach. First, they would supply local law enforcement agencies with three years worth of funding to hire new community policing officers (Roth and Ryan 2003). Second, they would provide funding so that agencies could purchase technology,
hire civilians, and pay for police officer overtime (Roth and Ryan 2003). Third there was funding given to agencies that enacted special programming focusing on problems such as youth gun violence or domestic violence (Roth and Ryan 2003). While the hiring/reassigning of new community police officers was the centerpiece of the program, there clearly were secondary uses of funds.

There were two main phases of the COPS program. The first phase was the COPS Accelerated Hiring Education and Development (AHEAD) phase, and the second phase was the COPS Funding Accelerated for Smaller Towns (FAST) phase (Teasley and O’Bryant 2003; Choi et al. 2002). The first round of hiring of new police officers commenced under AHEAD and targeted hiring of police officers in cities with populations of over 50,000, while FAST was geared towards smaller towns (Teasley and O’Bryant 2003; Choi et al. 2002; Roth and Ryan 2003). Other phases of the COPS program include: COPS Universal Hiring Program (UHP), and COPS Making Officer Redeployment Effective (MORE) (Choi et al. 2002; Teasley and O’Bryant 2003; Roth and Ryan 2003). All of the program’s phases were launched in order to fulfill the 1994 crime act’s primary goal of getting 100,000 more police officers on the streets performing community policing tasks. With the goal of 100,000 new police officers it was not surprising that 85% of the funds provided had to be used to hire or rehire police officers, purchase equipment, pay overtime, or build support systems (Teasley and O’Bryant 2003). Clearly, the intention of the new grants were either to directly pay for new police officers or to finance the increased costs of the day-to-day police operations with the addition of the new officers.
By 1997, 18,138 COPS grants were awarded totaling $3.57 billion (Roth and Ryan 2003). The vast majority of the grants (17,384) were used to hire 63,400 new police officers by 1997 (Roth and Ryan 2003). By 1999 an additional $1.9 billion in grants were awarded, 74% of which were used to hire new police officers, so that the federal government reached its goal of 100,000 new police officers on America’s streets (Roth and Ryan 2003). The evidence is clear that many billions of dollars went to hire new officers in jurisdictions large and small nationwide. The research also shows that the billions of dollars and thousands of police officers went to places that needed the help the most. Of the municipalities that received grants by the end of 1997, the top 1% with the most amount of homicides in 1997 received 31% of all COPS funds, and the top 10% with the highest homicide count received 50% of the COPS funds (Roth and Ryan 2003). In other words, the funding from this nation’s largest and most expensive law enforcement program was going where it was needed most, to America’s most violent communities.

**Federal-local Collaboration**

Traditionally federal crime and local crime have been viewed as separate issues. Federal offences are handled by the proper federal law enforcement agency such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), while local officials such as the local municipal police department handle non-federal offenses. Based on this tradition, federal and local law enforcement would rarely cross paths. The 1980s changed this arrangement, however, in a way that is predicted to last far into the foreseeable future (Russell-Einhorn 2003).
The 1980s brought in a new era of crime fighting and prevention that featured collaboration between federal law enforcement and local law enforcement officials to solve and prevent local – typically urban – violence. There is only one widely available research study that documents the history and evolution of federal-local collaborations from a national perspective; it was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and authored by Malcolm L. Russell-Einhorn in 2003. Russell-Einhorn’s study found that the once rare collaboration became commonplace and welcomed by both federal and local officials in the 1980s, and since then there have been hundreds of federal-local collaborative efforts to fight drugs, gangs, and other forms of violence in U.S. cities. By and large it was found that federal authorities and local entities worked well together, as they tended to make agreements on how the local initiative would operate, on how leadership roles would be shared, on jurisdiction, and on objectives.

Russell-Einhorn’s study finds that federal-local collaboration is viewed as largely positive because it allows for federal prosecution, which in turn leads to tougher sentences. Other advantages include access to new technologies, expensive pieces of equipment, and a greater ability to track and apprehend criminals who may elude local law enforcement by crossing jurisdictional lines. Furthermore, federal-local collaborations give local prosecutors – in combination with federal prosecutors – access to federal grand juries, and federal grand juries are far more flexible in their investigations than state grand juries. For instance, federal grand juries can be kept together for up to 3 years, can hear hearsay, and have the authority that comes with national subpoenas. There are other benefits in dealing with federal courts; for instance, getting a federal search warrant has fewer restrictions, and federal courts have a lower
burden of proof to secure wiretapping. These are just a few of the advantages that local prosecutors and local law enforcement have when they enter into federal-local collaborations.

Russell-Einhorn’s research has found that the first federal-local collaborative efforts combating urban violence took place during the early 1980s after the Attorney General’s Task Force Report on Violent Crime. As this trend continued and developed through the 1990s, federal authorities helped local officials deal with violence related to drugs, gangs and firearms. Most of the time the federal involvement focused on federal prosecution ahead of everything else.

Russell-Einhorn states that a majority of federal-local collaborations have their roots at the national level. Essentially there are four different types of federally initiated federal-local collaborations. National task force programs include the FBI’s Safe Streets Violent Crime Initiative, the DEA’s State and Local Task Force program, and the ATF’s Project Achilles (Russell-Einhorn 2003:8). Grant-funded programs and demonstration projects include special programs or task forces funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance through discretionary grants (Russell-Einhorn 2003:8). Special initiatives and informal collaborations include Project Safe Neighborhoods; some U.S. Attorney Anti-Violence Crime Task Force programs; episodic, case-specific collaborations of shorter duration between Federal, State, and/or local agencies; the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team program; and some Project Achilles collaborations (Russell-Einhorn 2003:8). Finally, examples of umbrella coordination mechanisms include HIDTAs (regional executive boards), OCDETF (district coordination groups), Law Enforcement Coordination Committees (LECCs), and regular federal judicial district law enforcement
coordination meetings facilitated by U.S. Attorneys (Russell-Einhorn 2003:8). Clearly, federal-local collaborations come in varying shapes and sizes, which means that there are various options available, depending on who is spearheading the initiative, and for what propose.

As is stated above, there is a comprehensive framework in place at the federal level allowing for the implementation of federal-local collaborations in local places. Russell-Einhorn’s research summarizes the nine most noteworthy federal-local collaborations. The State and Local Task Force program was began in 1978 by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The State and Local Task Force program use local law enforcement to lead and participate in targeting middle to upper level drug trafficking in large cities. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force was started in 1982 by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as a program the targeted high-level drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force formed individual case collaborations and also proved local agencies with needed founding. Project Achilles was started by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (AFT) in 1986 as a means of using federal firearms laws and penalties when targeting armed violent offenders. In 1989 the Office of National Drug Control Policy, headed up the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) program. HIDTAs coordinated and purported federal-local collaborations that fought drug related crimes in “gateway” parts of the country. Weed and Seed began in 1991 as a DOJ project that focused on combining community needs, social services, and economic development with neighborhood targeted law enforcement. In 1992 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started the Safe Streets Violent Crime Initiative
that incorporated task forces with law enforcement to transfer FBI experience against criminal organizations to the investigation of gangs. Mobile Enforcement Teams were started by the DEA in 1995 to provide short-term collaborative help to communities that asked for federal assistance in dealing with drug related violence. The DOJ started the Anti-Violence Crime Initiative in 1994 as a way of connecting U.S. Attorneys, state and local attorney’s, and the FBI to create local violence fighting strategies. And lastly in 2001 Project Safe Neighborhoods was started by the DOJ as an effort to support federal-local collaborations in preventing gun violence via prosecution through the U.S. Attorney. Clearly, these programs show that the contemporary tradition of federal-local collaboration has spawned some worthwhile crime fighting and prevention operations. While Russell-Einhorn has provided criminologists with a well-documented history of the evolution of federal-local collaborations, however, the jury is still out on their success.

Russell-Einhorn argues that it is hard to evaluate federal-local collaborations: “...because of how difficult it is to link changes in crime to specific law enforcement activities” (2003:11). Russell-Einhorn goes on to explain that the best evidence researchers have is anecdotal, and it suggests that federal-local collaborations have had some success in fighting gangs. Task forces have also been credited with using federal laws and prosecution in reducing gun violence. Other effects of federal-local collaboration have been an increased intelligence sharing, better problem-solving skills, and improved officer safety. Even though “hard evidence” on the success of federal-local collaboration is needed, it still seems to have been a good law enforcement innovation that was born roughly 25 years ago and seems to have staying power well into the future.
Weed and Seed demonstration projects were launched in 1991/1992. The magnitude of Weed and Seed was of monumental proportions. As an example of the scope of Weed and Seed, the program began as a modest pilot program in 3 cities with a federal budget of a mere $500,000; by 1994 program sites grew by over ten times the size its 1991 conception, and had a federal budget of $11.5 million (Dunworth and Mills 1999). By 1999, there were over 200 Weed and Seed sites nationwide with a federal budget of $49 million (Dunworth and Mills 1999). Clearly there is good reason to believe that Weed and Seed’s impact was felt in urban centers nationwide.

The Weed and Seed program first emerged on the national scene when it was launched by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1991 (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996). At that time it was stated that its long term goal would be to reduce violent crime, and the selling of drugs, all while providing a safe place for citizens to reside, work, play and be with their families (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996). While the above sounds like ordinary law enforcement goals that can be found in any city and/or any law enforcement organization, what makes Weed and Seed different is that law enforcement and prosecutors joined forces with local communities in order to bring human services, social services, and community improvement programs together in a partnership with police and prosecutors (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996). In other words, this is a unique program that brings together the human service world with the law and order world.

Weed and Seed has been called an “incubator for social change” (Dunworth and Mills 1999:3). More specifically they state:
Weed and Seed is a strategy to mobilize and coordinate resources in the targeted communities rather than simply a program or mechanism to fund local activities that share no collective aim. Weed and Seed is an “incubator for social change” to stabilize the conditions in high crime communities and to promote community restoration. (Dunworth and Mills 1999:3)

In other words, the program is not simply about giving communities money the way a traditional grant would. The unique perspective of Weed and Seed is that it implements a value of creating a holistic community where people and organizations work together to make sure that residents get the services that they need, while reducing the criminal element in the place where they live. The law enforcement aspect of the strategy is known as “weeding,” referring to law enforcement’s efforts at finding who the violent offenders are, coming up with a plan of action to apprehend them, and prosecuting them so that the violent element is removed from the Weed and Seed target area (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996; Miller 2001). The “seeding” component comes after the “weeding” has been completed, and consists of providing law-abiding citizens with the human services that they need, such as: after school programs, weekend activities, recreation, summer programs, literacy classes and other educational supplements, counseling services, and neighborhood revitalization projects, all as a way of preventing the criminal element that was “weeded out” from returning or reestablishing (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996; Miller 2001). While the Weed and Seed philosophy is clearly part of the national framework, there are large parts of the mission that is left up to local officials. At the local level all sites require the establishment of a “safe haven” where people, young and old alike, can go knowing that it is designated as a secure Weed and Seed location implemented to provide people with the services that they need (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996). The actual “physical” establishment that
became designated as a safe haven varied from site to site, since Weed and Seed grant-receiving organizations varied from mayor’s offices, to local police departments, to local non-profit organizations (Roehl et al 1996; Dunworth and Mills 1999).

In most cities the Weed and Seed sites were organized around three entities: the U.S. Attorney’s office, local police and prosecutors, and local Weed and Seed steering committees. The U.S. Attorney was a key connection to the federal government and federal resources including prosecution (Dunworth and Mills 1999). In other words, some sites used the U.S. Attorney’s office a means of using federal law when implementing their weeding operations, and using resources available from other federal agencies when establishing their seeding programming (Dunworth and Mills 1999).

Police departments performed the actual law enforcement operations in the targeted areas; however, police officers working in Weed and Seed sites acted in accordance with the Weed and Seed philosophy of building trust with the citizens who live in the targeted area, in order to establish a police/civilian partnership that would make eradicating future violent elements a joint effort (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996; Miller 2001). Steering committees set the local goals, designs, and program objectives (Dunworth and Mills 1999). Steering committees also implemented the weeding and the seeding at the local police level (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996). What made Weed and Seed successful was the collaboration of these three independent bodies.

Many cities tend to build their seeding actions around already-existing resources and previously established programs; however, what was new this time around was that partnerships formed via the Weed and Seed collaborations (Dunworth and Mills 1999). In other words, the existence of a Weed and Seed site in one part of the city brought
together and created partnerships between public and private organizations from other parts of the city that had no Weed or Seed affiliation, but were inclined to join the fight because they saw that the benefits of collaborating with Weed and Seed outweighed the benefits of remaining solely independent. This greater reach meant that local branches of federal programs like the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), local non-profit organizations, private business, and other public and private sector organizations came together with Weed and Seed to make their communities a better place to live (Dunworth and Mills 1999; Roehl et al 1996). Once the proper framework was in place communities were ready to implement their Weed and Seed strategies.

The Weed and Seed program was funded through the DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs (Dunworth and Mills 1999). Early Weed and Seed sites were funded as demonstration programs and received grants of between $500,000 - $750,000 a year over four years (Dunworth and Mills 1999). Following the demonstration years official Weed and Seed sites received grants ranging anywhere between $35,000 - $225,000 yearly. The table below illustrates how the program grew by number of cites and by total amount of federal dollars from its conception in 1991 to the end of the century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Number of sites</th>
<th>Funding in Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above shows how the programs grew over the years. It shows how a modest program in 3 cities with a total federal budget of $.5 million can expand into 88 cites in a mere 5 years. In 1996 Wed and Seed had a total federal budget of $37.5 million, and by century’s end Weed and Seed was in 200 cites with a national budget that was approaching $50 million. Clearly, Weed and Seed was expanding and spreading its unique mission throughout the nation. Even though Weed and Seed spread nationwide like wildfire, however, the question of its effectiveness still remains to be answered.

To date the only wide-scale, multiple-city national evaluation of Weed and Seed was commission by the National Institute of Justice and was authored by Dunworth and Mills in 1999. Dunworth and Mills’ study evaluated 10 Weed and Seed sites in 8 different cities, as can be seen in the figure below. As is shown in the data, they found that 9 target areas allowed them to compare levels of FBI Part 1\textsuperscript{24} offenses one year prior

\textsuperscript{24} FBI Part 1 offenses include: homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft (Dunworth and Mills 1999).
to the implementation of Weed and Seed, to the second year of Weed and Seed being in place. They found that 6 of the 9 areas saw a decrease in Part 1 crime rates, and 3 saw increases. Clearly, these results give a preliminary indication that Wed and Seed had positive implications in a majority of the cities examined in Dunworth and Mills’ evaluation. A much more methodologically sound quantitative evaluation would have to take place, however, before any firm conclusions can be made about the success of the Weed and Seed national program.

Figure 9

The Percent Change in Part 1 Crimes From the Year Preceding Weed & Seed to Year 1 and to Year 2 in Weed & Seed Target Areas

* Year-to-year comparisons in Salt Lake City are based on 5-month periods only. Weed and Seed started in August 1995, and data are available only back to March 1995.

Conclusion

As a means of dealing with increased violence, the federal government implemented several “get tough on crime” initiatives. Mandatory minimum sentences were implemented as a means of assuring that offenders served a non-negotiable minimum amount of time in prison for certain violent crimes in addition to time for certain drug offences. Truth in sentencing was another measure implemented by the federal government as a means of reducing violence. The truth in sentencing policy mandated that an inmate would serve the majority (typically 85%) of their sentence. In addition to implementing new sentencing guidelines as a means of reducing violent crimes, the federal government also passed legislation that was aimed at crime prevention and reduction.

The 1994 Federal Crime Bill was passed by the federal government as a means of preventing and reducing violence through generously funded grants. The 1994 Federal Crime Bill ultimately allocated $30 billion for crime prevention and reduction programs. While the 1994 Federal Crime Bill established eight grants that together provided billions of dollars for community-based crime prevention programs, the overwhelming majority (75%) was used to support law enforcement efforts and correctional facilities. In all, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill established six grants that funded “law and order”-geared crime prevention and reduction programs, eight grants that funded community crime prevention programs, four grants that funded domestic and sexual violence prevention programs, and two grants that funded drug treatment programs. The program that received the largest amount of funding was the COPS program. The COPS program was created essentially as a means of covering the salaries of newly hired community policing officers in
communities, both large and small, across America. The federal government understood that community policing alone would not be a quick fix to the nation’s crime problem. Thus, the federal government established partnerships between federal agencies and local law enforcement organizations known as “federal-local collaborations.”

Federal-local collaborations were conceived as a response to local urban violence. The basic idea was to unite federal personnel, armed with federal funds, with local law enforcement as a means of deriving a local solution to a local problem with the backing of the federal government. One of America’s largest and most widely documented federal-local collaborations is the Weed and Seed program. The Weed and Seed program teams up local law enforcement, local governments, and local community leaders with federal agencies, including federal prosecutors. The Weed and Seed initiative is carried out in two phases. The weeding aspect finds the most violent offenders in a community and prosecutes them to the full extent of the law. The seeding element establishes needed social and community services in the area where the weeding took place. The goal of seeding is to make sure that the law-abiding citizens have everything they need to lead productive lives in their community.
CHAPTER 6

The Relationship Between the 1980s/1990s Crime Wave, Media Reporting, Public Fear, Public Policy and Violence Prevention Programs

This dissertation examines how the media, public, and President Bill Clinton reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The literature shows that media reports on violence during the 1990s continued to increase throughout the entire decade even as the national murder rate showed regular decrease (Chiricos et al 1997; Chiricos et al 2000; Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001). While past research on how the media covered crime during the 1990s focused on overall murder this dissertation will also examine how the media covered youth violence. Furthermore, literature showed that the public concern for crime peaked in 1994 (Chiricos et al 1997; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003d; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003b)as did media reports on violence (Chiricos et al 1997; Chiricos et al 2000; Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001). Thus, this dissertation is interested in knowing if the public’s concern for crime and media reporting on crime were related to one another. Finally, the dissertation is interested in knowing if the public’s concern over crime and media reports on crime were at all associated with how the Federal government reacted to the crime wave. In order to perform this research five research questions were developed (see the Chapter 4). The first four research questions are presented below and their analysis are presented in this chapter. The last research question is discussed in the next chapter and its analysis can be found there as well.

The analysis presented in the present chapter addresses the first four research questions: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime
in particular? To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime? To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy? To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs?

**Crime and Public Concern**

To examine to what extent the public’s concern of crime varies over time public opinion data was gathered from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Public opinion data is being used as a means of determining whether the public’s fear and concern for crime aligns with violent crime trends, newspaper reporting on violence, and the Federal and local responses to violence. The percentage of Americans who feared walking alone at night in their neighborhoods is plotted on the graph below. The graph below was created to determine if the public’s fear of crime aligns with trends in violence, newspaper reporting on violence and the Federal and local responses to violence. The data presented in the graph below shows one of the variables used by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) to represent America’s fear of crime, fear of walking alone at night. The BJS also measures fear of crime via two other variables: concerns over victimization, and engaging in certain behaviors as a reaction to crime (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003c). However, fear of walking alone at night is the only measure of the fear of crime that is
longitudinal. The graph below shows the years from 1973 to 1998 for which data is available. Thus I had to use this variable in this analysis.

Figure 10
Percentage of Americans Who Fear Walking Alone at Night in Their Neighborhood From 1973 - 1998

The graph shows that the percentage of Americans who fear walking alone at night reaches its first peak at 47% in 1982. After 1982 the percentage of Americans who fear walking alone at night in their neighborhood steadily decreases until it reaches its

---

26 Figure source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003b. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003: Table 2.38 respondents reporting whether they feel afraid to walk alone at night in their own neighborhood. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of justice – office of Justice Programs.
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t238.pdf
lowest percentage of 38% in 1987. After 1987 the percentage of Americans who fear walking alone at night increases until it once again peaks at 47% in 1994. After 1994 the percentage of Americans who fear walking alone at night in their neighborhood drops through 1998. As can be seen from the graph and the data, American’s fear of crime peaks in 1982 and 1994.

Figure 11 below shows a graph that indicates the percentage of Americans who feel too little is being spent on crime prevention during the years for which data is available from 1973 to 1998. The graph was created as a means of determining if America’s concern over how much is being spent on crime prevention aligns with trends in violence, newspaper reporting on violence and the Federal and local responses to violence. The graph shows that from 1973 to 1978 between 64% and 66% of Americans felt too little was being spent on crime prevention. The graph also shows that the percentage of Americans who feel too little is being spent on crime prevention increases to 71% in 1982. The percent of Americans who feel too little is being spent on crime prevention drops to a new low of 63% in 1985. Then, the percentage of Americans who feel too little is being spent on crime prevention increases to 73% in 1988, drops back to 65% in 1991, and peaks at 75% in 1994. The percentage of Americans who feel too little is being spent on crime prevention drops drastically from 1994 to 1998. As can be seen in the graph the year 1994 is when the largest percentage of Americans felt that too little was being spent on preventing crime. Thus, both of the graphs presented in this section indicate that the American public’s fear and concern for crime both peak in 1994. The following section of this analysis will exam newspaper reporting on violence to
determine if America’s fear and concern of crime aligns with newspaper reporting on violence.

Figure 11

Percentage of Americans Who Feel Too Little is Spent on Crime Prevention

Crime and Newspaper Reporting

This dissertation sets out to examine to what extent variations in crime over the period 1991 to 1999 are associated with the level of newspaper reports on murder and violence over the same period. The level of newspaper reporting was measured by a search on the terms for murder and violence in LexisNexis for each calendar year for the

Figure source: Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003d. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003: Table 2.41 respondents indicating too little is spent on selected problems in this country. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice – Office of Justice Programs.
years 1991 to 1999. Annual homicide figures for the United States were obtained from the Uniform Crime Report. The number of media reports are presented in Figure 12.

As Figure 12 shows the number of newspaper reports on murder and violence steadily increased 39.6% from 7,443 in 1991 to a peak of 10,388 in 1994. In contrast, the number of reports on murder and violence then decreased 23.1% from the 1994 peak of 10,388 to 7,987 in 1996. In 1997 the number of reports in the media on murder and violence slightly increased by 9.6% or 767 reports to 8,754. The year 1998 saw a slight decrease by 7.3% or 638 reports to 8,116. Finally, 1999 featured a slight 1.3% upward trend, with 8,224 stories reported in the media in murder and violence. As can be seen from the graph, newspaper reports on violence continued to increase after the national
homicide rate peaked in 1991. In other words, the homicide rate peaked in 1991 and then showed a regular decrease, but the number of stories on murder and violence continued to increase until 1994.

The trend in newspaper reports on murder and violence increasing as actual levels of homicide decreased suggests that newspaper reporting on murder and violence is not directly related to the national homicide rate. Indeed the level of newspaper reporting on murder and violence tracks far more closely with the public’s levels of fear of crime (see Figure 10) and the public’s concern that too little is being spent on crime (see Figure 11) than it does with national homicide rates. As Figure 10 showed the public’s fear of crime peaked in 1994 as did the public’s concern that too little is being spent on crime. Newspaper reports on murder and violence also peaked in 1994. However, the measure of newspaper reports on murder and violence and homicide levels are measured at the national level. It is possible that homicide rates for specific cities might have a closer relationship with newspaper reports on murder and violence by newspapers in their cities than they do with national trends in news reporting.

To examine this possibility I created a cross-sectional time series data set of the 11 newspapers\textsuperscript{28} that consistently reported to LexisNexis during the period of 1991 to 1999. Included in the data set, were the annual city specific homicide rates\textsuperscript{29} for the 1991/1999 period, a set of newspaper specific dummy variables and a set of dummies


\textsuperscript{29} The cities with consistently reporting newspapers are Chicago, Seattle, Atlanta, Boston, Huston, St. Louis, Washington DC, New York City, and San Francisco.
variables for each of the calendar years and newspaper stories were reported. The dummy variables for each newspaper were included in the analysis to control on cross-city differences in levels of violence and homicide in each of the cities and also cross-sectional differences in the propensity of the newspapers to report on crime related stories. This type of cross paper and cross jurisdictional variation is important, but it is not the object of the present study, which is focused on overtime change. Since I am interested in finding which of the years during the 1990s saw significantly higher numbers of news reports on murder and violence dummy variables for each calendar year were included in the analysis. Although it would be ideal to have annual city level measure of fear of crime for the analysis such measures are not available on a consistent basis. Fortunately, the annual calendar year dummies provide a proxy measure for annual national trends in fear of crime. Finally, annual city level murder rates were included in the analysis to examine whether city level changes in homicide affect the level of newspaper reports on violence and murder in their respective cities newspapers.

The analysis is conducted with ordinary least squares (OLS) or linear regression analysis. OLS is used because the dependent variable, i.e. the number of newspaper reports on murder and violence for a given newspaper in a given calendar year, is interval level variable.

The regression analysis, presented in Table 7, indicates that a significant number of stories were found in the media on murder or violence in 1994. The dummy variable for the year 1994, 3 years after the peak in overall homicide rates, showed the strongest B coefficient (B = 242.631) of the calendar year dummy variables. Indeed the analysis indicates that no other calendar year variable had a statistically significant effect on the
number of stories reported on murder or violence during the 1990s. Furthermore, OLS regression indicates that the number of stories reported in the media on murder or violence was not significantly associated with the murder rate. In fact, the negative sign of the coefficient of the murder rate and the positive direction of the dummy variables for the years 1992 to 1997 indicates that in these years the number of stories reported in the media increased as the murder rate decreased. Lastly, there is not autocorrelation, since the Durbin-Watson test is in the inconclusive range. This indicates that media reports on murder or violence were increasing as murders were decreasing. In other words, these results show that the media was not writing stories based on rising crime; rather their reporting was being influenced by factors other than the murder rate. Further analysis will shed some light on these other factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7</th>
<th>Linear Regression City Level Murder Rates and Other Factors on the Newspaper Reports on Murder and Violence for Cities with Consistently Reporting Newspapers for 1991 to 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1991</td>
<td>-9.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1992</td>
<td>129.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1993</td>
<td>185.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1994</td>
<td>242.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1995</td>
<td>84.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1996</td>
<td>8.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1997</td>
<td>59.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1998</td>
<td>-7.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 1</td>
<td>-621.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 2</td>
<td>425.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 3</td>
<td>4.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 4</td>
<td>-731.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 5</td>
<td>-445.202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of particular importance homicide rates for both juveniles aged 14-17 and young adults aged 18-24 peaked in 1993 with rates of 12.1 and 24.4 respectively (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005c). Figure 13 below is a graph that in many respects is very similar to figure 12 above. Both graphs represent stories that were reported in the media on murder and violence. However, figure 13 specifically looks at stories that were reported on youth murder and violence while figure 12 looked at the overall homicide rate for the entire U.S. population. Figure 13 adds a constrictive element to the analysis to see what changes occur if only stories on youth homicide and violence are analyzed. As can be seen in figure 13 the results are rather similar to figure 12 except they are more pronounced. Figure 13 shows that there were 1,053 stories found on youth murder and violence in 1991. The number of newspaper reports on youth murder and violence steadily increased by 91.3% from 1,052 in 1991 to a peak of 2,013 in 1994. The graph also indicates that the number of reports on youth murder and violence sharply decreased by 41.0% or 835 reports in 1995 from the 1994 peak of 2,013 to 1,187. The number of stories reported in the media on youth murder and violence declined by 15.9% from 1995.
to 1998 when it reached 998 reports. In 1999, the number of reports on youth murder and violence remained relatively steady, only increasing by 1.9% or 19 reports to 1,017 reports on youth murder and violence.

Figure 13
Number of newspaper reports on youth violence by year

Figure 13 shows that the increase and decrease in newspaper reports on youth murder and violence was more pronounced than the increase and decrease of reports on overall murder and violence. Also, the decrease in reports on youth murder and violence was more constant than the decrease in reports on overall murder and violence. The decrease in stories of overall murder and violence featured disruptions as the years 1997 and 1999 featured noticeable increases, while the decrease in reports on youth murder and violence was constant and relatively smooth, with only an almost unnoticeable increase of 19 reports in 1999. This difference suggests that youth murder and violence is more pertinent to explaining what influenced newspaper reports than is overall murder and violence. However, it must be noted that the 1994 peak in reports on youth violence was 1 year after the peak of the youth and juvenile homicide rate. While this supports the argument that youth issues are important to explaining what influenced newspaper
reports, it does not provide evidence that youth homicides were driving newspaper reports. This is further explained using OLS regression.

Table 8
Linear Regression City Level Murder Rates and Other Factors on the Newspaper Reports on Youth Violence for Cities with Consistently Reporting Newspapers for 1991 to 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1992</td>
<td>46.196</td>
<td>23.148</td>
<td>1.996</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1993</td>
<td>72.034</td>
<td>24.509</td>
<td>2.939</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1994</td>
<td>108.239</td>
<td>22.407</td>
<td>4.831</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1995</td>
<td>27.512</td>
<td>20.831</td>
<td>1.321</td>
<td>.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1996</td>
<td>17.079</td>
<td>20.441</td>
<td>.836</td>
<td>.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1997</td>
<td>7.668</td>
<td>19.136</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1998</td>
<td>-.787</td>
<td>18.912</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>.967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 1</td>
<td>-46.920</td>
<td>48.600</td>
<td>-.965</td>
<td>.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 2</td>
<td>122.231</td>
<td>21.053</td>
<td>5.806</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 3</td>
<td>12.899</td>
<td>22.296</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 4</td>
<td>-119.520</td>
<td>22.536</td>
<td>-5.304</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 5</td>
<td>-18.699</td>
<td>36.540</td>
<td>-.512</td>
<td>.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 6</td>
<td>-72.809</td>
<td>48.600</td>
<td>-1.498</td>
<td>.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 8</td>
<td>-93.653</td>
<td>23.486</td>
<td>-3.988</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 9</td>
<td>-11.431</td>
<td>23.486</td>
<td>-.487</td>
<td>.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 10</td>
<td>85.092</td>
<td>30.654</td>
<td>2.776</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 11</td>
<td>-127.709</td>
<td>22.506</td>
<td>-5.674</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder Rate</td>
<td>-1.461</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>-1.471</td>
<td>.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>148.116</td>
<td>22.459</td>
<td>6.595</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adj. R = .790
Overall significance = .000
df1 = 19, df2 = 79
Durbin-Watson = 1.383
The regression analysis, presented in Table 8, indicates that a significant number of stories were found in the media on youth violence in both 1993 and 1994. The dummy variable for the year 1994 showed the strongest B coefficient ($B = 108.239$) for the calendar year dummy variables. The dummy variable for the year 1993 showed the second strongest B coefficient ($B = 72.034$) for the dummy year variables. Moreover, the analysis shows that no other calendar year variable had a statistically significant effect on the number of stories reported on youth violence during the 1990s. Additionally the linear regression indicates that the number of stories reported in the media on youth violence was not significantly associated with the overall murder rate. Lastly, there is no autocorrelation, since the Durbin-Watson test is in the inconclusive range. This indicates that the media reports on youth violence were increasing as the overall murder rate was decreasing. Hence, at this point the analysis indicated that something other than the overall murder rate was driving media reports on murder and violence and youth violence. As indicated in Figure 10 the publics fear of crime is more closely associated with the reporting of murder and violence and youth violence that the murder rate. Additionally Figure 11 indicates that the public’s concern that too little is being spent on crime is also more closely associated with the reporting of murder and violence and youth violence than the overall murder rate. The next section of the analysis will illustrate how the public’s fear of crime and concern for crime was aligned with the federal response to the crime wave.
Crime and Federal Crime Prevention Policy

As would any potentially successful political candidate in a pluralistic society, President Bill Clinton listened to the masses when constructing his strategy for his first run at the Presidency. As Figures 10 and 11 illustrate there was a momentous upswing in both the percentage of Americans who feared crime and who felt too little was being spent on crime. Thus, President Clinton heard the concerns of the American people during his campaign and built a platform that addressed the American people’s concern over crime.

During Clinton’s presidential campaign he laid out the fundamentals of what was to become the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. During the campaign President Clinton proposed that if elected President he would put 100,000 new police officers on the street as part of his community policing strategy (Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Berger et al. 2005). He would also support the Brady Bill, he would focus on and fund drug treatment (Kramer and Michalowski 1995; Berger et al. 2005), and would back the idea of boot camps for offenders. President Clinton turned campaign rhetoric into action a few short years into his first term as president. In 1994, the Clinton administration and Congress successfully passed the 1994 Federal Crime Bill as a means of addressing the American people’s fear of crime and concern that the government was not spending enough on crime. Thus, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill addresses America’s fear of crime by incorporating crime fighting and prevention policies that included both the law and order approach and the social programming approach to crime fighting and prevention. Furthermore, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill addresses America’s concern over not spending enough on crime by becoming the most expensive crime policy in U.S. history, ultimately allotting $30 billion
to fight and prevent crime (Berger et al. 2005). However the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was not the only noteworthy government crime prevention program of the 1990s. The Weed and Seed program was also a commendable crime prevention effort set in motion by the federal government in the 1990s.

Figure 14

National Weed and Seed Funding

As can be seen from the data, national funding for Weed and Seed has increased ever since it started in 1991. As can also be seen from the data, Weed and Seed funding had two sizable increases. The first came between 1991 and 1992, and the second between 1993 and 1994. While the increase from $.5 million in funding in 1991 to $11.5 million in 1992 is quite a substantial jump, it is relatively unimportant because it indicates that Weed and Seed shifted from being an idea on paper with a couple of minor

and insignificant sites in 1991, to a full-blown demonstration project in 1992. Officially, 1992 was the first year that Weed and Seed demonstration projects were launched at a national level (Roehl et al. 1996). Thus, it makes sense that funding would increase from $.5 million to $11.5 million the first year that true demonstration projects were launched. The next-largest funding increase, and the most important funding increase, came between 1993 and 1994 when Weed and Seed funding jumped from $13.5 million to $31.5 million. 1994 was an important year for the Weed and Seed program because its funding more than doubled. This is due to the fact that by 1994 all Weed and Seed sites transitioned from demonstration projects to being officially recognized; hence the doubling of funding from 1993 to 1994 represents the government’s commitment to fully support the established the Weed and Seed program. The analysis presented above shows that the federal government reacted to the crime wave by make billions of dollars available to fight and prevent violence. The next segment of the analysis examines news media reports on general violence prevention programs and youth violence prevention programs.

**Newspaper Reports and Violence Prevention Programs**

Figure 15 presents a graph of the number of newspaper reports on murder and violence prevention programs over the period between 1991 and 1999. As Figure 15 shows, newspaper reports on murder and violence prevention programs in the United States peaked in 1992 and 1994, and then showed no consistent pattern in the subsequent years. Thus, reports on murder and violence prevention programs increased by 30.6% from 604 in 1991 to their first and highest peak of 789 in 1992. After 1992, reports on
murder and violence prevention programs fell by 11.5% or 91 reports to 698 in 1993. In 1994, reports on murder and violence prevention programs once again peaked as stories reported increased by 11.1% or 77 to 775, only 14 reports below the 1992 peak. Following 1994, a large drop was seen in reports on murder and violence prevention programs as they decreased by 20.4% or 158 reports between 1994 and 1995. The following two years, 1996 and 1997, saw an increase of 9.1% in reports on murder and violence prevention programs, which reached 673 reports in 1997. The following year, 1998, saw a decrease of 8.5% or 57 stories, and 1999 featured an offsetting increase of 8.4% or 52 reports on murder and violence prevention programs.

**Figure 15**

Number of Reports on Murder and Violence Prevention Programs by Year

Examination of the graph presented in Figure 15 shows that the reports on murder and violence prevention programs do not follow the trend set by the two previous time periods presented in Figures 12 and 13. Figures 12 and Figure 13 presented annual
numbers of news reports depicting murder and violence, and youth murder and violence respectively, show relatively steady increases and decreases while Figure 15 does not. However, Figure 15 does share an important similarity to Figures 12 and 13, in that 1994 had the highest number of stories reported on murder and violence prevention programs. 1994 being 3 years after the overall homicide rate peaked, suggest that reporting on prevention programs was not being driven by the homicide rate. This point is strengthened by the OLS regression that follows.

As was the case in my analysis of newspaper reports on murder and violence and newspaper reports on youth related violence and homicide (see, Tables 7 and 8 above), in order to examine the potential impact of the late 1980s/early 1990s violent crime wave and also government policy on the development of violent crime prevention programs, I again employed the cross-sectional time series data set of the 11 cities with consistently reporting newspapers during the period from 1991 to 1999. Included in the data set were the annual city specific homicide rates for the 1991/1999 period, a set of newspaper-specific dummy variables, and a set of dummy variables for each of the calendar years in which newspaper stories were reported. As in the analysis above, the dummy variables for each newspaper were included in the analysis to control cross city differences in levels of violence and homicide in each of the cities and also cross-sectional differences in the propensity to report newspaper stories on murder and violence prevention programs. Likewise, since I am interested in finding which of the years during the 1990s saw significantly higher numbers of news reports on murder and violence prevention programs, dummy variables for each calendar year were included in the analysis. Finally, as in the analysis above, annual city-level murder rates were included
in the analysis to examine whether city-level changes in homicide affected the level of
newspaper reports on violence and murder in their respective newspapers above and
beyond that associated with national levels trends as measured by the annual dummy
variables. OLS regression is again used because the dependent variable, i.e. the number
of newspaper reports on murder and violence prevention programs for a given newspaper
in a given calendar year, is an interval level variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1991</td>
<td>3.113</td>
<td>12.396</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1992</td>
<td>18.441</td>
<td>11.575</td>
<td>1.593</td>
<td>.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1993</td>
<td>11.415</td>
<td>12.256</td>
<td>.931</td>
<td>.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1994</td>
<td>16.427</td>
<td>11.204</td>
<td>1.466</td>
<td>.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1995</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>10.417</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1996</td>
<td>1.878</td>
<td>10.221</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1997</td>
<td>2.119</td>
<td>9.569</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 1</td>
<td>44.544</td>
<td>24.302</td>
<td>1.833</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 2</td>
<td>107.240</td>
<td>10.528</td>
<td>10.187</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 3</td>
<td>35.781</td>
<td>11.149</td>
<td>3.209</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 4</td>
<td>-18.366</td>
<td>11.269</td>
<td>-1.630</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 5</td>
<td>13.580</td>
<td>18.272</td>
<td>.743</td>
<td>.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 6</td>
<td>6.322</td>
<td>24.302</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 8</td>
<td>-14.969</td>
<td>11.744</td>
<td>-1.275</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 9</td>
<td>1.475</td>
<td>11.744</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 10</td>
<td>95.044</td>
<td>15.329</td>
<td>6.200</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 11</td>
<td>-29.679</td>
<td>11.254</td>
<td>-2.637</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder Rate</td>
<td>-.536</td>
<td>.482</td>
<td>-1.114</td>
<td>.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>50.585</td>
<td>11.231</td>
<td>4.504</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The regression analysis presented in Table 9 incorporates the same parameters as the previous regressions. However, the analysis presented in the table above introduces a critical limitation on the underlying phenomena being examined. In the previous analysis above, I focused on newspaper reports regarding murder and violence (see Table 7) and newspaper reports on youth related murder and violence (see Table 8). As noted above, the focus of the present analysis is limited to newspaper reports on murder and violence prevention programs. In other words, the dependent variable of the analysis presented in Table 7 was the number of stories reported in newspapers by year and city on murder and violence; and the dependent variable for the present analysis was the number of newspaper reports by year and city on murder and violence prevention programs. Importantly, unlike regression results presented in Table 7 and 8, none of the yearly dummy variables showed a significant association with reports on murder and violence prevention programs. In addition, as in the analysis above, city and time specific murder rate also does not show a statistically significant relationship with newspaper reports on murder and violence prevention programs. This finding adds more evidence in support of the idea that newspaper reporting is being influenced by something other than the murder rate.

Figure 16 below represents the number of newspaper stories that were reported on youth violence prevention programs between 1991 and 1999. Figure 16 shows that media reports on youth violence prevention programs show a relatively regular increase.
from 1990 until it peaked in 1994. The number of media reports on youth violence prevention programs having climbed 58.3% or 67 reports from 115 in 1991 to 182 in 1994. Subsequently, reports on youth violence prevention programs dropped dramatically in 1995 by 46.2% or 84 reports, to 98. Reports on youth violence prevention programs remained relatively stable for the remainder of the decade with relatively minor fluctuation during 1996 and 1997. In 1996, reports on youth violence prevention programs increased 24.5% to 122, and then they slightly decreased by 2.5% to 119 in 1997. The year 1998 brought a 19.3% decrease in the number of reports on youth violence prevention programs to 96, while 1999 saw a slight increase to 15.6%, bringing the number of reports on youth violence prevention programs to 111.

**Figure 16**

**Number of Newspaper Reports on Youth Violence Prevention Programs by Year**

Figure 16 shows that newspaper stories on youth violence prevention programs conforms to the trend established by the previous time period presented in the analysis above (Figure 12, number of newspaper reports on murder and violence by year; and
Figure 16 shows that newspaper reports on youth violence prevention programs peaked in 1994 as did reports on murder and violence and reports on youth violence. Figure 16 also suggests that something other than the overall national homicide rate is driving reporting on youth violence prevention programs. Further evidence for this is provided by the OLS regression below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10</th>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares Regression of the Number of Newspaper Reports on Murder, Violence, and Youth Prevention Programs, and the Murder Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1991</td>
<td>2.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1992</td>
<td>3.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1993</td>
<td>5.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1994</td>
<td>8.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1995</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1996</td>
<td>2.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1997</td>
<td>1.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stories Found in 1998</td>
<td>-1.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 1</td>
<td>10.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 2</td>
<td>21.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 3</td>
<td>10.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 4</td>
<td>-3.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 5</td>
<td>5.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 6</td>
<td>1.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 8</td>
<td>-1.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 9</td>
<td>2.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 10</td>
<td>13.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper 11</td>
<td>-4.988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder Rate</td>
<td>-.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>7.849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adj. R = .545
As was the case with the analysis of newspaper stories on murder and violence prevention programs above, I have revisited the cross-sectional time series data set. As with the analysis above, I am interested in finding which of the years during the 1990s featured significantly higher newspaper reports. The parameters of this analysis are the same as the above analysis on newspaper reports on murder and violence prevention programs except that this analysis will replace the number of stories on murder and violence prevention programs variable with the youth violence prevention program variable. OLS is once again implemented because the number of newspaper reports on youth violence prevention programs as the dependent variables are interval level variables. As can be seen from the regression represented in Table 10, the results of this analysis followed the trend set by the results represented in Table 7 and Table 8. The results of this regression indicated that there were a significant number of newspaper reports on youth violence prevention programs in 1994. It must also be noted that this analysis, as with the other analysis above, showed that overall national murder rates are not associated with newspaper reports on youth violence prevention programs, thus strengthening the finding that something other than the overall national murder rate is influencing newspaper reporting.

As shown in the analysis above, the overall national homicide rate was not associated with media reports on violence and murder or youth violence. The analysis above showed that media reports on murder and violence and youth violence was closely
associated with the public’s fear of crime and concern for crime and the federal
government’s response to the crime wave, which primarily took the form of the 1994
Federal Crime Bill. The current analysis showed that newspaper reports on murder and
violence prevention programs peaked in 1992 and 1994, and then showed no consistent
pattern. However, Figure 16 above shows that media reports on youth violence
prevention programs peaked in 1994, just one year after the national youth homicide rate
peaked. Furthermore, Table 10 indicates that 1994 experienced a statistically significant
number of reports on youth violence prevention programs, just one year after the national
peak of youth homicide. Figure 17 below shows trends in homicide offending by age
from 1976 to 2005. Figure 17 indicates that the national homicide rate for offenders aged
14 to 17 peaked in 1993 at 21.1 per 100,000; meanwhile, the national homicide rate for
offenders aged 18 to 24 peaked at 23.9.

**Figure 17**

Homicide Offending by Age, 1976-2005

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31 Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007). Young adults have the highest homicide
victimization and offending rates. Washington, DC. Department of Justice – Office of
Justice Programs. [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/teens.htm](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/teens.htm)
Hence, media reports on youth violence prevention programs peaked one year after youth homicide peaked. In other words, the print media was reporting on the problem at hand. In the previous analysis, it was determined that media reports on overall murder and violence was not associated with the national murder rate. However, the current analysis found that media reports on youth violence prevention programs was associated with the national youth homicide rate, the public’s concern for crime, and the federal government’s response to the crime wave (1994 Federal Crime Bill).

Revisiting the First Four Research Questions

At this point I can revisit and the first four research questions and draw some preliminary conclusions. Question one stated: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime in particular? The crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s was not associated with media reports on violent crime in general. As can be seen in Figure 12 above newspaper reports on murder and violence peaked in 1994 three years after the national homicide rate peaked. This conclusion is confirmed by the results of the OLS represented in Table 7 above as there is no significant association between the murder rate and number of stories reported on murder or violence. Additionally, the linear regressions indicates that murders were decreasing as stories reported on murder or violence were increasing. The same pattern hold true for juvenile murder. The overall national murder rate was not associated with newspaper stories on juvenile violence. Stories on juvenile violence peaked in 1994 3 year after the national overall murder rate peaked, as can be seen in Figure 13. As was expected this
conclusion was confirmed by OLS. Table 8 indicates that there was no significant association between the overall murder rate and the number of stories reported in the media on juvenile violence. This is further confirmed by linear regression that indicates that overall murders were decreasing as reports on juvenile violence was increasing.

Question two states: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime? American’s fear of crime began a relatively steady increase in the late 1980s as the crime wave began and peaked in 1994 3 years after the national overall murder rate peaked. This indicates that while the crime wave may have been the catalyst behind the public’s increased fear of crime, media reports on violence led to a continued increase in the public’s fear of crime until 1994 when media reports on violence peaked. If the crime wave was the only factor influencing the public’s concern for crime then the public’s fear of crime would have peaked in 1991 when the crime wave peaked nationally. However, the public’s fear of crime peaking in 1994 indicates that the media reports on violence played a role in influencing the public’s fear of crime. The third question states: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy? As was just stated, the crime wave led to an increase in the public’s fear of crime, which influenced the Clinton campaign to incorporate fighting violence as a priority of the federal government. Subsequently, the public’s increasing fear of crime, and President Clinton’s violent crime prevention plan led to increased media reporting on violence as the federal government unveiled this nation’s most comprehensive violence prevention policy, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. The fourth
research question states: To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs? The public's peak levels of fear and concern for crime in 1994 was a reaction to youth homicide, which peaked nationally in 1993. As a reaction to record high levels of youth violence, and public fear and concern for crime, the Clinton administration and Congress feverously worked together to pass the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. The 1994 Federal Crime Bill authorized over $2 billion to be spent on community-based crime prevention programs. A majority of the community crime prevention programs authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill were youth oriented (for details on the 1994 Federal Crime Bill and the grants and funding associated with it see the “The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994” section of Chapter 5). Thus, the statistically significant number of media reports on youth violence prevention programs was a result of newspapers reporting on the youth violence prevention programs that resulted from the federal government’s 1994 Federal Crime bill. The resulting youth violence prevention programs are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 7

The Impact of Public Policy on the Policy Orientations, Program Objectives and Institutional Affiliation of Youth Violence Prevention Programs Following the Crime Wave of the Late 1980s and Early 1990s

As was stated in the previous analysis chapter the federal government reacted to the crime wave by enacting the 1994 Federal Crime Bill that authorized billions of dollars for community based crime prevention programs. Many of the crime prevention programs that were funded by the grants that were authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill were local youth violence preventions programs. This dissertation now turns its attention to local youth violence prevention programs that reacted to the crime wave. As a means of analyzing local youth violence prevention programs the fifth research question was developed. The fifth research questions states: to what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs? Before this dissertation can begin to determine what sort of affect federal crime prevention programs had on local youth violence prevention programs it is important to have an understanding of the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations of the youth violence prevention programs.

The first phase of the analysis in this chapter will examine the program objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliation of youth crime prevention programs as they were reported in the media in twenty-two major American cities between 1990 and 1999. The second phase of the analysis will examine the potential effect of the introduction of federal crime prevention and crime fighting programs on policy orientations, program objectives, and the institutional affiliation on the development of
youth violence prevention programs. The first phase of the analysis draws on the data collected from newspaper reports covering three hundred forty-three youth violence prevention programs over a period of 1990 to 1999. Table 11 below illustrates twenty-two cities included in the first phase of the analysis. Additionally Table 11 below uses an asterisk to indicate the cities that were continuously covered by LexisNexis from 1992 on that are included in the second part of the analysis. The second part of the analysis examines how the introduction of federal crime prevention and crime fighting programs affected the policy orientations, program objectives, and institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs. In other words, the second part of the analysis for this chapter is restricted to the set of newspapers that are included in the electronic document system LexisNexis before and after the introduction of major Federal youth crime prevention funding in 1994.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities in the Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted in the methodology chapter, once a newspaper was covered by Lexis-Nexis it continued to be covered by the electronic document system. As a result, it was necessary to find a set of newspapers that were reporting prior to 1994, in order to provide a full picture of youth prevention programs prior to the 1994 Federal initiatives. However, in selecting newspapers that were consistently covered by Lexis-Nexis, I also needed to be sure not to start the pre-1994 search too soon in order to avoid being restricted to a very small subset of newspapers the were covered by Lexis-Nexis in the late 1980s/early 1990s. I, therefore, chose newspapers that fulfilled my two primary concerns: 1) adequate pre-1994 coverage, and 2) adequate newspaper and city coverage. I selected only those newspapers (and their corresponding cities) that were covered by Lexis-Nexis by 1992. Thirteen of the original twenty-two cities had newspapers that were covered by Lexis-Nexis at least by 1992, and so, could be included in the pre/post 1994 comparison of new youth programs, as assessed by their appearance(s) in respective city newspaper. These thirteen cities included in the analysis are identified in Table 11 with an asterisk. The cities listed in Table 11 represent a reasonable cross-section of the United States. The sample includes some of America’s largest cities, such as New York and Los Angeles with populations in the millions, as well as some of the smaller American cities, such as Albuquerque, and Virginia Beach, with populations in the low hundreds of thousands. The sample also consists of cities from the different regions of
the nation – including the Northeastern region’s Boston, the Mid-Atlantic cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Virginia Beach, and Washington DC; ; Atlanta, Memphis, New Orleans, and St. Louis from the South; Chicago, Cleveland, Columbus, and Milwaukee from the Midwest; Albuquerque, Denver, Houston, San Antonio, and Austin from the Southwest; and Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Jose from the West Coast.

It is important to note that, while the thirteen cities available for the pre/post analysis (because the all were covered by Lexis-Nexis at least by 1992) are a subset of the original twenty-two cities, they still provide a reasonable cross-section of major American cities.

**Program Objectives**

For each youth prevention program reported on in newspapers, I was able to identify one or more program objectives. Program objectives refer to a program’s primary mission. In other words, a program’s objectives identify what services or opportunities a program offers its members. As an example, a midnight basketball program that required members to attend anger management classes would have had two objectives, recreation and teaching violence prevention (for more see the Methods chapter). I was able to identify program objectives because the first newspaper reports on the introduction of a new youth violence prevention program almost always provided a reasonably detailed overview of the program. In other words, in the rare case that an article did not present the necessary information on a program’s objectives, the program was not included in the analysis. As outlined in the methodology chapter, youth violence prevention program objectives were grouped into ten different categories: Jobs/job placement, job training, teaching violence prevention, education, recreation, quality of
life, outreach, street ministry, mentoring, and individual improvement skills. Table 12 indicates the frequency of each of the ten different program objectives associated with the initial introduction of youth violence prevention programs in my sample of twenty-two American cities over the period of 1990 to 1999. Table 12 presents the percentage (and frequency) of programs for which specific program objectives were reported in newspaper reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Objective</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job/Job Placement</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Training</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach Violence Prevention</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Life</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Improvement</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 12 shows, 9.9% of the 343 youth crime prevention programs were reported to have job/job placement as a program objective. Furthermore, Table 12 shows that even less youth violence prevention programs were reported to have job training as a program objective than was the case for job/job placement as an objective. Twenty-eight,
or 8.2% of all programs, had an objective of job training. This is not surprising as the program goals of job placement and job training may be more commonly associated with programs aimed at adults rather than youths. Moreover, Table 12 provides some support for the notion that job related program goals may be more likely to be associated with programs aimed at adults versus youth. As Table 12 reveals, more youth violence prevention programs reported to have “teaching violence prevention” as an objective than either job/job placement or job training, or a combination of the two. Table 12 further shows that the objective of “teaching violence prevention” was present in 83, or in 24.2% of all programs. Further support for the notion that the programs are youth-oriented can be found when examining the education program objective. Education was an objective for 105 or 30.6% of all programs. Since these were programs that were largely offered through youth clubs and after school programs, it makes sense that the objective of education would be present in almost one-third of all programs. The recreation objective provides the strongest evidence that the programs were geared towards youth. Table 12 shows that recreation was the most popular program objective as 146, or 42.6% of all programs, had recreation as an objective. What this means is that just under half of all programs offered their members an opportunity to participate in youth-oriented games or sports. Since it is now clear that the most popular program objectives were youth-oriented, it would only make sense that the remaining non-youth-oriented program objectives would be less common. Evidence for this is presented when examining the objective of “quality of life.”

Table 12 shows that the quality of life objective was an objective of 45, or 13.1% of all programs. As can be seen, the quality of life objective was far less common than
the objectives of education, teaching violence prevention, or even recreation. The objectives of education, teaching violence prevention and recreation are traditionally youth-oriented, while the goals set forth by the quality of life program objective are typically adult oriented. In other words, the quality if life objective is designed with a goal of providing minority adults with economic assistance, providing parents with childcare, and providing mental health services (for a complete list see the Methods Chapter). The argument as to why there is a low representation of the quality of life program objectives holds true for the program objective of individual improvement skills. Like the quality of life program objective, the goals associated with the individual improvement skills objective are typically geared towards adults as well. The individual improvement skills objective teaches people leadership skills and skills needed in day-to-day independent life. Thus, it would be expected that individual improvement skills would be more common in adult oriented programs than in youth violence prevention programs. This reasoning explains why Table 12 above shows that 33, or 9.6% of all youth violence prevention programs had individual improvement skills as an objective. I know turn my attention to the program objectives of outreach, street ministry, and mentoring.

Table 12 above indicates that 20, or 5.8% of all programs had outreach as a program objective. Furthermore, Table 12 above shows that 7, or 2% of all programs included street ministry as an objective. Moreover, Table 12 above shows that 42, or 12.2% of all programs included mentoring as an objective. Tables 12 clearly show that the youth-oriented program objectives of outreach, street ministry and mentoring were much less common than the other youth-oriented objectives of recreation, education, and
teach violence prevention. This can be explained by the fact that various grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill funded recreational initiatives, educational opportunities, and programs that taught violence prevention skills (for more details see the chapter on Federal Response to the Crime Problem). However, none of the grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill directly authorized funding for outreach, street ministry, or mentoring programs.

Given the data analysis thus far, it can be concluded that the program objectives of recreation (42.6% of all programs), education (30.6% of all programs), and teach violence prevention (24.2% of all programs) were the most common objectives in youth-oriented programs, receiving funding from multiple grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Program objectives of outreach, street ministry, and mentoring are youth-oriented but were uncommon because of a lack of available grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill for these objectives. Finally, the program objectives for job/job placement, job training, quality of life, and individual improvement skills were less common than the objectives of recreation, education, and teach violence prevention because the goals of the objectives of job/job placement, job training, quality of life, and individual improvement skills are typically geared towards adults. Regardless if the program objective was geared towards adults or youth, objectives are routinely influenced by a program’s policy orientation.

**Policy Orientation**

Policy orientation refers to the criminological theoretical perspective that was most influential on determining the program’s objectives. This was done in order to have
an understanding of the influential factors behind the implementation of the program objectives. The opportunity policy orientation was most closely associated with the program objectives of job/job placement, job training, and education. The program orientation of social bonding was most closely associated with the program objective of mentoring. The social disorganization policy orientation was most closely associated with the objectives of quality of life and outreach. The social learning policy orientation was most closely associated with the objectives of teaching violence prevention and teaching individual improvement skills. The combined policy orientation category of social disorganization and social bonding (social disorganization/social bonding) was most closely associated with the objectives of street ministry and recreation. Table 13 below shows the frequency of the policy orientations associated with the initial introduction of youth violence prevention programs in my sample of twenty-two American cities over the period of 1990 to 1999.

**Table 13**

**Policy Orientations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Orientation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Bonding</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorganization</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Learning</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social disorganization/Social Bonding</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13 indicates that 42, or 12.2% of all programs had a policy orientation of social bonding. The fact that approximately 12% of all programs had a social bonding policy orientation is the expected finding. The social bonding policy orientation was most closely associated with the objectives of mentoring. As stated above, none of the grants that were authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill directly funded mentoring. Thus, it can only be expected that the policy orientation associated with the objective of mentoring was the least common policy orientation. As can be seen in Table 13, the social disorganization policy orientation was the second least occurring policy orientation. Table 13 further indicates that 59, or 17.2% of all programs had a policy orientation of social disorganization. The fact that social disorganization was the second least common policy orientation can be explained through the following. First, the policy orientation of social disorganization is associated with the program objective of quality of life, one of the less common objectives because the goals typically associated with this training are geared towards adults. Second, the policy orientation of social disorganization was also associated with the objective of outreach. Outreach, as with mentoring, was not an activity that was authorized for specific funding under the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. So, outreach was one of the least common objectives. Therefore, it follows that since the two objectives associated with the social bonding policy orientation were among the least common objectives, the social disorganization policy orientation would be among the least common policy orientations. However, Table 13 shows that the social learning policy orientation was the first policy orientation that was associated with over a quarter of all programs.
Not only is the social learning policy orientation associated with over one-quarter of all programs, it is almost as common as the policy orientations of social bonding and social disorganizations combined. Table 13 above indicates that 100, or 29.2% of all programs had a policy orientation of social learning. The reason for this is slightly more complex than the reason why the social bonding (12.2%) and social disorganization (17.2%) policy orientations were the least common policy orientations. To begin, the policy orientation of social learning is associated with the objective of teaching individual improvement skills, a lesser accruing objective as its goals are more typically associated with adults. However, the objective of teaching violence prevention is also associated with the policy orientation of social learning. The objective of teach violence prevention is associated with nearly one quarter of all programs, and it is associated with goals that are typically youth-oriented. Therefore, the association between policy orientation of social learning and the objective of teach violence prevention was the catalyst for the policy orientation of social learning being associated with over one-quarter of all programs. The analysis of the opportunity policy orientation was quite similar to that of the social learning policy orientation. Table 13 above indicates that there were 144, or 42% of all programs that had an opportunity policy orientation. This data shows that the opportunity policy orientation was the second most common policy orientation. The opportunity policy orientation was associated with the objectives of job/job placement and job training, both of which were among the least occurring objectives since they are connected to goals that are adult oriented. However, the opportunity policy orientation is also associated with the objective of education, an objective of nearly one third of all programs and exclusively youth-oriented. Therefore,
this analysis shows that the opportunity policy orientation is the second most common policy orientation because it was associated with the commonly occurring and youth-oriented program objective of education. As seen in Table 13, the final policy orientation is a combined category featuring policy orientations that were influenced by both the social disorganization theoretical perspective and the social bonding theoretical perspective. The social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation in Table 13 combines two paradigms that are typically separate, one can draw the conclusion that the social disorganization/social bonding combined policy orientation is the most commonly occurring policy orientation because of its combination status. Table 13 above indicates that 153, or 44.6% of all programs had a policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding. However, a closer analysis shows that the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation is associated with the least common objective of street ministry, and with the most common objective of recreation. Recreation was both the most common objective and exclusively youth-oriented. Street ministry, however, was the least common program objective although, like recreation, it was exclusively youth-oriented. The analysis reveals that the combined policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding was the most common policy orientation not because of its combined status, but because it was the only policy orientation that was associated with multiple objectives that were strictly youth-oriented, including the program objective of recreation, the most commonly occurring objective.

This section demonstrates that the policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding is the most common policy orientation because of its association with the most common objective of recreation, also exclusively youth
orientated. Next, the popularity of the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was also driven by the fact that the objective of street ministry was also exclusively youth-oriented. The opportunity policy orientation was the second most common policy orientation and its popularity was driven by the fact that the objective of education was one of the more popular objective, and that it was also youth-oriented. Over one quarter of all programs were youth-oriented with focuses on social learning and teaching violence prevention. The policy orientation of social disorganization was one of the lesser occurring policy orientations because of its association with the objective of quality of life which had goals that are typically associated with adults. Moreover, the policy orientation of social disorganization is a less common policy orientation because the outreach objective did not specifically receive funding via any of the grants that were authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Finally, the social bonding policy orientation was the least common policy orientation because the mentoring objective was not among the programming that specifically received funding from a grant that was authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Programs could not have been implemented, regardless of their objectives or policy orientation, if they were not affiliated with a social institution.

Institutional Affiliations

| Table 14 |
|---------------------|---------|---------|
| **Institution Type** | **Frequency** | **Percent** |
| Private Business     | 8       | 2.3     |
| Non-profit Organization | 186  | 54.2   |
Table 14 shows institutional affiliations as categorized under the headings of: private business, non-profit organization, public organization, school, and religious organization. Private businesses were for-profit corporations. An example of a program that was affiliated with a private business includes the Summer of Opportunity program that was run by the John Hancock corporation. Non-profits are traditional community organizations that typically spearhead social programs including efforts operated by the Boys and Girls Clubs. Public organizations encompass two types of programs. First, public organizations are government run organizations that typically operate summer job programs and youth sports leagues. Second, public organizations are also nontraditional government based organizations that are funded and operated publicly, such as City Year Boston. Schools refer to programs that are run by school employees. Religious organizations maintain a focus centered around their religious mission, and also use religion in their programming (for more on institutional affiliations see the Methods chapter).

Table 14 indicates the number and percentages of institutional affiliations. The table indicates that 8, or 2.3% of all institutional affiliations were private businesses. There were 186 non-profit organizations, or 54.2% of all institutional affiliations were non-profits. There were 73 public organizations, or 21.3% of all institutional affiliations were public organizations. Finally, there were 38 schools and 38 religious organizations,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Organization</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
or 11.1% of all institutional affiliations were schools and 11.1% of all institutional affiliations were religious organizations. Based on the distribution of the grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, it makes sense that over half of all institutional affiliations were non-profits. However, in order to gain a full grasp of the youth violence prevention programs that reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is important to analyze the institutional affiliations of the various program objectives and the various policy orientations. As described above, each institutional affiliation is typically associated with a specific social task. The institutional affiliation of private business operates to create a profit, non-profits are typically thought of as providing the community with needed social programming, public organizations are publicly funded, managed and operated, school-run programs are staffed by school administrators and employees, and religious-run programs center around a religious doctrine. Thus, analyzing the program objectives and policy orientations are associated with the five institutional affiliations will allow me to know which objectives and policy orientations were most commonly associated with which institutional affiliation. This analysis is performed by creating cross-tabulations. First, each individual objective is cross-tabulated by the five institutional affiliations. Second, each individual policy orientation is cross-tabulated with the five institutional affiliations. A Chi-Square test for significance was performed for each cross tabulation as a means of determining if any of the objectives or policy orientations were significantly distributed amongst the five institutional affiliations. To begin this analysis, I present the cross-tabulation of the program objective objectives by the institutional affiliations.
Cross-tabulation of program objectives by institutional affiliations

Table 15
Cross-tabulation of Program Objectives by Institutional Affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job/Job Plac.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 36.812</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P = .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Train.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 53.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>P = .000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach Viol. Prev.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 14.497</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P = .006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 17.676</td>
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<tr>
<td>P = .001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 15.920</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P = .003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qual. of Life</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 11.769</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P = .019</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indi. Imp. Skills</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 3.565</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P = .468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out. Rea.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cross-tabulation shows that 50% of private businesses were affiliated with programs that had job/job placement as an objective, as private businesses have an interest in hiring members of the local community when positions need to be filled. Along similar lines, it also correlates that nearly one quarter of public organizations were affiliated with programs that had job/placement as an objective because it is in the best interest of local governments to make sure that the local economy’s needs are met and that the economic needs of local citizens are also met. Thus, it follows that public organizations are affiliated with programs that create jobs and employ local community members. Table 15 similarly shows that the program objective of job training holds to a similar pattern.

Table 15 shows that the objective of job training was significantly distributed across the 5 institutional affiliations. Table 15 shows that 6 private businesses, or 75% of them, were affiliated with a program that had job/job placement as an objective. There were 11 non-profit organizations, or 5.9% of them, were affiliated with programs that had job/job placement as a program objective. There were 8 public organizations, or 11% of them, were affiliated with programs that had job/job placement as an objective. There were 3 schools, or 7.9% of them were affiliated with programs that had job/job placement
as an objective. Finally, there were 0 religious institutions, or 0% of them were affiliated with programs that had job/job placement as a program objective.

When considering reasons why three quarters of private businesses were affiliated with programs that have job training as an objective, one can surmise that it is because a private company finds it advantageous to have a well trained talent pool available. When examining public organizations it was found 11% of public organizations are affiliated with programs that had job training as an objective. Thus, there is reason to believe that while private businesses are more interested in having a trained workforce available, local governments are more interested in placing community members in jobs. However, the cross-tabulation of the teach violence prevention objective does not show a continuation of the established trend.

Table 15 shows that the objective of teach violence prevention was significantly distributed across all 5 institutional affiliations. The table shows that private businesses were affiliated with 0 programs with an objective of teaching violence prevention. Forty-seven, or one quarter (25.3%) of the non-profit organizations, were affiliated with programs that had teaching violence prevention as an objective. Twelve, or 16.4% of the public organizations, were affiliated with programs that had teaching violence prevention as an objective. Seventeen, or 44.7% of the schools, were affiliated with programs that had teaching violence prevention as a program objective. Seven, or 18.4% of the religious organizations, were affiliated with programs that had teaching violence prevention as a program objective.

The fact that the objective of teach violence prevention does not follow the trend previously established should not be surprising, as private businesses are interested in
jobs and job training, yet teaching violence prevention is not in the direct interest of the
of private corporations. However, teaching violence prevention is part of the day-to-day
operations of community/civic organizations such as non-profits, schools, and religious
based organizations. In addition to the fact that community and civic based organizations
tend to incorporate teaching violence prevention into their programs, hundreds of
millions of dollars were authorized as available funds by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill to
potentially be used by community and civic based organizations who partook in violence
prevention programming.

Table 15 shows that the objective of education was significantly distributed across
all five institutional affiliations. Half of all private businesses were affiliated with
programs that had educations as an objective. As stated above, three-quarters of private
businesses are affiliated with job training programs because it is advantageous for
businesses to make sure that they have access to a well trained reserve workforce. Along
the same lines, businesses are also interested in being affiliated with programs that have
education as an objective because it is in their best interest to have a well educated
workforce. Furthermore, Table 15 indicates that over 40% of schools were affiliated with
programs that had education as an objective, however this should not be surprising since
schools’ primary mission is to provide youth with educational opportunities. Finally,
over one-third of non-profit organizations and over one-quarter of religious organizations
were affiliated with programs that had education as an objective. This is most likely
because non-profits and religious-based organizations were affiliated with after school
and summer programs that were very generously funded by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill,
receiving over $1.6 billion dollars.
Table 15 shows that the objective of recreation was also significantly distributed across all five institutional affiliations. Table 15 indicates that just one, or 12.5% of the private businesses, were affiliated with a program with recreation as an objective. Ninety-four, or nearly half (50.5%) of the non-profit organizations, were affiliated with programs with recreation as an objective. Twenty-seven, or 37% of the public organizations, were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective. Eight, or 21.1% of the schools, were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective. Sixteen, or 42.2% of the religious organizations, were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective. When comparing the objective of recreation to education Table 15 indicates that there are differences between the distribution of the recreation and education objectives.

There is one notable difference between the recreation objective and the education objective. While half of all private businesses were affiliated with a program that had education as an objective, only one business was affiliated with a program that had recreation as an objective. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that a community with a lot of recreational opportunities would benefit the future of a company to the same extent that a well-educated and well-trained reserve workforce would. Furthermore, over half of all non-profits were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective, almost 40% of all public organizations and just over 40% of all religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that offered recreation as an objective and just under one-quarter of all schools were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective. A reason why community and civic-based organizations were largely affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective was for the same reason why they were strongly affiliated
with programs that had education as an objective. The programs that had recreation as an objective, qualified for their share of the same $1.6 billion that was authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill for programs that had education as an objective. Moreover, in many cases the organizations that had education as an objective also had recreation as an objective. Thus, it makes sense why the institutional affiliations of non-profit, public organizations, schools, and religious based organizations were well represented among programs that had recreation as an objective. However, this pattern does not hold true when analyzing the institutional affiliations associated with the objective of quality of life.

Table 15 illustrates that no private businesses were affiliated with programs with quality of life as an objective. Twenty-two, or 11.8% of the non-profit organizations, were affiliated with programs that had quality of life as an objective. Seventeen, or 23.3% of the public organizations, were affiliated with programs with quality of life as a program objective. Only one, or 2.6% of the schools, were affiliated with programs with quality of life as a program objective. Five, or 13.2% of religious organizations were affiliated with programs with quality of life as an objective.

Table 15 demonstrates that nearly one-quarter of public organizations were affiliated with programs that had quality of life as an objective. This makes sense for a couple of reasons. First, many of the activities performed by programs with quality of life as an objective are typically associated with public organizations. These include public organizations such as local governments that provide social services and gentrification of public places such as city parks. Second, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill authorized $15 million in Capital Improvement to Prevent Crime in Public Parks grants,
and $377 million was authorized to become available to local governments as Crime
Prevention Block grants. As this is so, public organizations were the institutional
affiliations that were most commonly associated with programs that had quality of life as
an objective. As seen, this trend does not apply when examining the institutional
affiliations associated with the objective of outreach.

Table 15 indicates that none of the private businesses were affiliated with
programs with outreach as an objective. Five, or 2.7% of the non-profit organizations,
were affiliated with programs with outreach as an objective. Seven, or 9.6% of the public
organizations, were affiliated with programs with outreach as a program objective. Only
one, or 2.6% of the schools, were affiliated with programs with outreach as a program
objective. Seven, or 18.4% of religious organizations, were affiliated with programs with
outreach as an objective.

As can be seen in Table 15, religious based organizations were the only
institutional affiliation that that had a double-digit percentage associated with the
objective of outreach. This can possibly be explained by the fact that religious based
organizations were not specifically named by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill as a type of
organization that qualified for grants. This can also be explained by the fact that the
activities that were part of the outreach objective were not directly funded by the 1994
Federal Crime Bill. Since religious institutional affiliations were not competing for
funding being provided by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, they were not influenced by the
1994 Federal Crime Bill when deciding which types of objectives to associate with.
Since religious organizations incorporate mentoring into their daily operations, it makes
sense that 18% of religious organizations were affiliated with programs that had
mentoring as an objective, particularly since they were not involved in the race for grants provided by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Conversely, since the four other institutional affiliations were competing for their share of grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, it follows that they were not largely affiliated with programs that had mentoring as an objective since the activities associated with the mentoring objective were not being directly funded by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Moreover, Table 15 displays the institutional affiliations associated with the program objective of street ministry.

Table 15 shows that the objective of street ministry was only associated with the institutional affiliations of schools and religious-based organizations. Private businesses, non-profits, and public organizations were not affiliated with any programs that had street ministry as an objective because the presence of a clergy member within the organization in necessary in order to implement the objective of street ministry. Therefore, the institutional affiliations of private business, non-profit, and public organization were not affiliated with any of the programs that had street ministry as an objective. One interesting finding was that one school was affiliated with a program that had an objective of street ministry. This school was in a unique situation in the sense that they allowed to have local clergy on school property as a means of deterring violence. In other words, the thought was that youth would avoid violent confrontations if local clergy were on school grounds Regarding faith-based organizations, fifteen percent of religious organizations were affiliated with programs that had street ministry as an objective. This finding is not surprising because the activities that make up the street ministry objective are part of the day-to-day roles played by clergy and faith-based initiatives. The five
institutional affiliations were rather evenly associated with the program objectives of mentoring and individual improvement skills.

Table 15 indicates that the program objective of mentoring was not significantly distributed amongst the five institutional affiliations. Table 15 shows that only one, or 12.5% of the private businesses, was affiliated with a program that had mentoring as an objective. Thirty-one, or 16.7% of the non-profit organizations, were affiliated with programs with mentoring as an objective. Six, or 8.2% of the public organizations, were affiliated with programs with mentoring as an objective. Only one, or 2.6% of the schools, was affiliated with programs with mentoring as an objective. Three, or 7.9% of the religious organizations, were affiliated with programs with mentoring as an objective.

Table 15 also indicates that none of the private businesses were affiliated with a program that had individual improvement skills as an objective. Twenty-one, or 11.3% of the non-profit organizations, were affiliated with programs with individual improvement skills as an objective. Four, or 5.5% of the public organizations, were affiliated with programs with individual improvement skills as an objective. Three, or 7.9% of the schools, were affiliated with programs with individual improvement skills as an objective. Five, or 13.2% of all religious organizations, were affiliated with programs with individual improvement skills as an objective.

As Tables 15 indicates that, both objectives, mentoring and individual improvement skills, were not significantly distributed amongst the five institutional affiliations. This means that none of the five institutional affiliations associated themselves with programs that had either objective, mentoring or individual improvement skills, to a significant level. In other words, mentoring and teaching individual
improvement skills were not a priority for any of the five institutional affiliations. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that none of the grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill allocated direct funding for the activities that are part of the mentoring and the individual improvement skills objectives.

Based on the cross-tabulations analysis presented above, it is now known that the majority of private businesses, at 75%, were associated with the objective of job training. The majority of non-profit organizations, at 50.5%, were associated with the objective of recreation. The largest percentage of public organizations, 37%, were associated with the objective of recreation. The largest percentage of schools, 44.7% were affiliated with violence prevention. The largest percentage of religious organizations, 42.1%, were affiliated with the program objective of recreation. As stated above, a cross-tabulation analysis was performed using policy orientations and institutional affiliations.

Cross-tabulation of policy orientations by institutional affiliations

To better understand the prevalence of certain programs, it is important to remember that opportunity theory influenced the creation of new jobs, job creation programs, job training, and new education enhancement programs. The social bonding theoretical perspective also influenced new programs and activities that enhanced a youth’s conformity to mainstream society. The social disorganization theoretical perspective influenced programs that brought a renewed sense of community and a better standard of living to neighborhoods. The social learning theoretical perspective influenced programs that taught individuals how to solve their problems and avoid
violence. Lastly, there is a fifth policy orientation known as the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation that combines the main aspects of the social disorganization and social bonding theoretical perspectives.

The purpose of analyzing policy orientations that were associated with the five institutional affiliations, is to better understand which policy orientations were most commonly associated with each institutional affiliation. As with the analysis of the program objectives, this analysis is performed by creating cross-tabulations. First, each individual policy orientation is cross-tabulated by the five institutional affiliations. A Chi-Square test for significance was performed for each cross tabulation as a means of determining if any of the policy orientations were significantly distributed amongst the five institutional affiliations. To begin this analysis, I present a table displaying the cross-tabulations of the five policy orientations by the institutional affiliations. The table also presents the results of the Chi-Square tests.

Table 16
Cross-tabulation of Policy Orientations by Institutional Affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soc Bon.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 12.5</td>
<td>31 16.7</td>
<td>6 8.2</td>
<td>1 2.6</td>
<td>3 7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 8.423</td>
<td>P = .077</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Soc Dis.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>26 14</td>
<td>20 27.4</td>
<td>2 5.3</td>
<td>11 28.9</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc Learn.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 0</td>
<td>55 29.6</td>
<td>14 19.2</td>
<td>20 52.6</td>
<td>11 28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square = 16.967</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 shows that the policy orientation of social bonding is not significantly distributed amongst the five institutional affiliations. Table 16 shows that that just one, or 12.5% of the private businesses, was associated with a program with the policy orientation of social bonding. Thirty-one, or 16.7% of the non-profit organizations, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of social bonding. Six, or 8.2% of the public organizations were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of social bonding. Only one, or 2.6% of the schools, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of social bonding. Three, or 7.9% of the religious organizations, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of social bonding. Thus, none of the five institutional affiliations associated themselves with programs that were associated with the social bonding policy orientation to a significant level. The only objective associated with the social bonding policy orientation was mentoring. As Table 15 above shows, mentoring was not a major priority for any of the five institutional affiliations because none of the grants authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill allocated funding directly for the activities that are part of the mentoring objective.

As shown in Table16, over one-quarter of both public organizations and religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that had a social disorganization policy orientation. This can be explained by the fact that outreach was one of the two objectives
associated with the social disorganization policy orientation. What is significant about
the objective of outreach is that religious organizations were the only institutional
affiliations that had a double-digit percentage of programs with outreach as an objective.
The second objective that was associated with the social disorganization policy
orientation was quality of life, and almost one-quarter of all public organizations were
associated with a program that had quality of life as an objective. Thus, it follows that
over 20% of both public organizations and religious based organizations are affiliated
with programs that have a policy orientation of social disorganization.

As seen in Table 16, over half of all schools, and approximately 30% of all non-
profit and religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that had a policy
orientation of social learning. The fact that over 50% of all schools were associated with
programs that had a policy orientation of social learning can be explained by the fact that
the objective teach violence prevention was associated with the policy orientation of
social learning, and almost half of all schools were affiliated with a program that had
teach violence prevention as an objective. The objective of teach violence prevention is
also the reason why approximately 30% of all non-profits were associated with programs
that had social learning as a policy orientation, as one-quarter of all non-profits were
affiliated with programs that had teach violence prevention as an objective. Another
program objective that was associated with programs that had social learning as a policy
orientation was individual improvement skills. Approximately 30% of all religious
organizations were affiliated with a program that had social learning as an objective. This
was due to the fact that 13.2% of religious organizations were affiliated with programs
that had individual improvement skills as an objective, and 18.4% of religious based
organizations were affiliated with programs that had teach violence prevention as an objective.

Table 16 shows that over half of all non-profits, over one-third of all public organizations, and almost one-quarter of schools were affiliated with programs that had social disorganization/social bonding as a policy orientation. This statistic can be explained by the fact that recreation is an objective of the programs associated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation. Just over half of all non-profits were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective, over one-third of schools were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective, and nearly one-quarter of schools were affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective.

Table 6 also indicates that almost 60% of all religious organizations were affiliated with programs that had social disorganization/social bonding as a policy orientation. In order to explain this, the second objective associated with the policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding, street ministry, needs to be considered. Almost 60% of religious organizations were affiliated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation because 42.1% of religious organizations are affiliated with programs that had recreation as an objective. This is combined with 15.8% of all religious organizations affiliated with programs that were associated with the objective of street ministry. The final policy orientation shown in Table 16 is the opportunity policy orientation.

Table 16 also indicates that a large percentage of all five of the institutional affiliations were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of opportunity. 87.5%, or all but one, of the private businesses were associated with programs that had a
policy orientation of opportunity. This can be explained by the fact that three-quarters of all business were associated with programs that had job training as an objective, one-half of all businesses were associated with programs that had job/job placement as an objective, and half of all businesses were associated with programs that had an objective of education. Therefore, many businesses were affiliated with programs that had more than one objective. Moreover all but one business was affiliated with programs that exclusively had objectives of job/job placement, job training, and/or education.

Second, just over 40% of non-profits were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of opportunity. This can be largely explained by the fact that 35.5% of non-profits were affiliated with programs that had education with an objective. Third, just over 40% of all public organizations were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of opportunity. This can be explained by the fact that nearly one-quarter of public organizations were affiliated with programs that had job/job placement as an objective, and 12.3% of public organizations were affiliated with programs that had education as an objective. Fourth, nearly half of schools were affiliated with programs that had the opportunity policy orientation. This can be explained by the fact that over 40% of schools were affiliated with programs that had education as an objective and almost 8% of schools were affiliated with programs that had job training as an objective. Finally, nearly one-third of religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of opportunity. This can be explained by the fact that nearly 27% of all religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that had education as a program objective.
The policy orientation and institutional affiliation cross-tabulation analysis showed that the majority of private businesses, 87.5%, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of opportunity. The majority of non-profits, 50.5%, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding. The largest percentage of public organizations, 41.1%, were associated with programs that had an opportunity policy orientation. The majority of schools, 52.6%, were affiliated with programs that had a social learning policy orientation. The majority of religious based organizations at 57.9% were affiliated with programs that had the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation. The overall analysis presented in this chapter is summarized below.

The analysis presented in this chapter shows that the most popular program objective is recreation, and that its popularity is explained by youth-oriented nature of the programming goals. It is also now known that the most common policy orientation is the opportunity policy orientation because of its association with the youth-oriented objective of education. The cross-tabulation analysis showed that the majority of private businesses, 75%, were associated with the objective of job training. This can be explained by the fact that businesses are interested in having a well trained reserve workforce. The majority of non-profit organizations, 50.5%, were associated with the objective of recreation. The largest percentage of public organizations, 37%, were associated with the objective of recreation. The largest percentage of schools, 44.7%, were affiliated with teach violence prevention. The largest percentage of religious organizations, 42.1%, were affiliated with the program objective of recreation. It is understandable that the most popular objective amongst non-profits, public organizations,
and religious based organizations was recreation, and the most popular objective amongst schools was teach violence prevention, because these are youth geared objectives that were being implemented as a means of dealing with youth violence.

The policy orientation and institutional affiliation cross-tabulation analysis showed that the majority of private businesses, 87.5%, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of opportunity. As stated above, it would only make sense that private businesses would be interested in being associated with the objectives of job/job placement, job training, and education. Implementing these objectives leads to an advantageous situation for businesses where positions are filled as needed, and well-trained and educated citizens are available for the future. The majority of non-profits, 50.5%, were affiliated with programs that had a policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding. This makes sense since the objectives associated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation are youth-oriented. 41.1%, of public organizations were associated with programs that had an opportunity policy orientation. This is due to the fact that the opportunity policy orientation is associated with the objective of youth-oriented education. Moreover, the objectives of job/job placement and job training are similarly popular with public organizations, as this objective is in their best interest. Maintaining a community with jobs and a well-trained, well-educated workforce is the key to a thriving community.

The majority of schools, 52.6%, were affiliated with programs that had a social learning policy orientation. 57.9% of religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that had the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation. It is logical that schools are affiliated with programs having a social learning policy
orientation, and religious based organizations affiliated with programs having a social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation, because the objectives associated with both policy orientations are youth-oriented during a period when these organizations are dealing with a youth violence problem. Upon establishing the background on program objectives, policy orientation, and institutional affiliations, it is now possible to analyze the final research question. To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and crime fighting programs? This dissertation now turns its attention to an analysis of how program objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations were affected by federal crime fighting and crime prevention initiatives of the mid-1990s.

The Potential Impact of Public Policy on the Policy Orientations, Program Objectives and Institutional Affiliation of Youth Violence Prevention Programs

As stated above, this section of the cross-tabulation analysis will examine the potential effect of the introduction of federal crime prevention and crime fighting programs on the policy orientations, program objectives, and the institutional affiliations. To begin, I performed a cross-tabulation analysis to determine if the introduction of new federal crime fighting programs, such as the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, encouraged change in the policy orientations, program objectives, and institutional affiliations of local youth violence prevention programs. The analysis will now focus on how program objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations were affected by federal crime fighting and crime prevention initiatives of the mid-1990s.
This analysis is performed by creating two-by-two cross-tabulations. First, each individual objective is cross-tabulated by the percentage of programs before 1994 and the percentage of programs between 1994 and 1999. Second, each individual policy orientation is cross-tabulated with the percentage of programs before 1994 and the percentage of programs between 1994 and 1999. Third, each individual institutional affiliation was cross-tabulated by the percentage of programs before 1994 and the percentage of programs between 1994 and 1999. A Chi-Square test for significance was performed for each cross-tabulation as a means of determining if any of the objectives, policy orientations or institutional affiliations experienced a significant percentage change from the period before 1994 as compared to the period between 1994 and 1999. If the cross-tabulation had any cells with an expected count of less than five, then the significance was determined using the continuity correction statistics. If there was a significant change found post 1994, the year the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was passed, the change will be attributed to the passage of this federal legislation. If there are no significant changes found, then it will be concluded that deferral legislation had no impact on local youth violence prevention programs.

This section of the analysis is restricted to the set of newspapers that were consistently covered by the electronic document system Lexis-Nexis before and after the introduction of major federal youth crime prevention funding in 1994 (for further details on the analysis and data selection see the introduction to the chapter above or the Methods Chapter). This section of the analysis begins with the cross-tabulation of the individual objectives and the percentage of objectives before 1994, and the percentage of program objectives between 1994 and 1999.
Table 17

Program Objectives Percentages Before 1994, and 1994 and After

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>.470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach Violence</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Life</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>.947*</td>
<td>.330*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job or Jon Placement</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jon Training</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>.476*</td>
<td>.490*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>.863</td>
<td>.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Improvement Skills</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>.863</td>
<td>.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Ministry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>.408*</td>
<td>.523*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates that the there were cells with an expected count of less than five. Thus, the continuity correction was used as a test for significance.

Table 17 shows that recreation was an objective in 38.2% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 43.8% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Education was an objective in 29.1% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 30.7% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Teaching violence prevention was an objective in 25.5% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 27.5% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Quality of life was an objective in 12.7% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an
objective in 15% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Job or job placement was an objective in 12.7% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 7.2% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Job training was an objective in 9.1% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 9.8% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Outreach was an objective in 9.1% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 5.2% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Mentoring was an objective in 7.3% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 13.1% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Individual improvement skills was an objective in 7.3% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 11.3% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Street ministry was an objective in 0% of all programs prior to 1994, and was an objective in 4% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Furthermore, Table 17 shows that the program objectives of recreation, education, teaching violence prevention, quality of life, job training, mentoring, individual improvement skills, and street ministry all saw a modest increase in their percentages during the period of 1994 to 1999. Meanwhile, the program objective of job or job placement, and the program objective of outreach both saw modest decreases in their percentages during the period of 1994 to 1999. However, none of the percentage changes reached a level of statistical significance.

Table 18

Program Policy Orientation Percentages Before 1994, and 1994 and After

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Bonding</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorganization</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Learning</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 18 shows that 7.3% of all programs prior to 1994 had a policy orientation of social bonding, and 13.1% of all programs from 1994 to 1999 had a policy orientation of social bonding. 18.2% of all programs prior to 1994 had a policy orientation of social disorganization, and 19.0% of all programs from 1994 to 1999 had a policy orientation of social disorganization. 30.9% of all programs prior to 1994 had a policy orientation of social learning, and 32% of all programs from 1994 to 1999 had a policy orientation of social learning. 38.2% of all programs prior to 1994 had a policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding, and 46.4% of all programs from 1994 to 1999 had a policy orientation of social disorganization/social bonding. 41.8% of all programs prior to 1994 had a policy orientation of opportunity, and 42.5% of all programs from 1994 to 1999 had a policy orientation of opportunity. Moreover, Table 18 shows that all policy orientations saw modest increases in their percentages during the 1994 to 1999 period. However, none of these increases reached a level of statistical significance.

Table 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Organization</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Organizations</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19 above shows that non-profit organizations were affiliated with 34.5% of all programs prior to 1994 and were affiliated with 58.8% of all programs from 1994 to 1999. Public organizations were affiliated with 27.3% of all programs prior to 1994 and 58.8% from 1994 to 1999. Religious organizations were affiliated with 20.0% of all programs prior to 1994 and 13.1% from 1994 to 1999. Schools were affiliated with 12.7% of all programs prior to 1994 and 7.8% from 1994 to 1999. Private businesses were affiliated with 5.5% of all programs prior to 1994 and with 2.6% from 1994 to 1999. Interestingly, all institutional affiliations other than non-profits saw a decrease in the percentage of programs that they were affiliated with in the 1994 - 1999 period. It is also interesting to note that the increase of non-profits from 34.5% prior to 1994, to 58.8% during the 1994 - 1999 period, was the largest and only significant percentage change of all institutional affiliations.

From this analysis I can see that there was little change regarding how communities reacted to crime during the 1990s. The primary conclusion that can be drawn from this pre- and post- 1994 analysis is that non-profits were significantly more likely to be affiliated with a youth violence prevention program post 1994. In other words, the cross-tabulation analysis illustrates that there was virtuously no change between the program objectives prior to 1994 as compared to the 1994 – 1999 period.
The same can be said for the policy orientation, though there was a significantly greater percentage of programs affiliated with non-profits during the 1994-1999 period than there was prior to 1994.

Thus, the answer to the final research question is that the implementation of federal policy had a significant effect on the institutional affiliations of youth violence prevention programs, while it had a minimal impact on the objectives of youth violence prevention programs. In other words, youth violence prevention programs implemented the same types of objectives before the introduction on the 1994 Federal Crime Bill as they did after the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Along the same lines, youth violence prevention programs did not change their policy orientations after the implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Therefore, one answer to the final research question is that the implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill did not effect the day-to-day actions taken by youth violence prevention programs. What did see a significant change after the introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was the institutional affiliation of youth violence prevention programs. Thus, the second part of the answer to the final research question is that the introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill led to a significant increase in the percentage of non-profit organizations affiliated with youth violence prevention programs. Why non-profits experienced a significant increase in their affiliations with youth violence prevention programs while the other institutional affiliations did not, may be as simple as stating, “that is what the U.S. government does best.”

Literature on the relationship that non-profit organizations have with the U.S. government explain why it would only be expected that non-profits would see a
significant percentage increase with the introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Literature states that the 1970s ushered in a new era of privatizing public services (Marwell 2004). Therefore, many of the objectives of youth violence prevention programs had been traditionally performed by the government, most notable during a period that began shortly after World War II until the 1970s. However, as the 1970s progressed so did the transformative process of shifting the responsibilities of public services away from government and into the hands of non-profit organizations. In other worlds, the 1970s featured a time when government funded non-profits began to perform tasks that were once performed by agents of the government.

The privatization of the public sector did not reach full acceleration until the 1980s under the Reagan administration (Marwell 2004). Once the privatization of the public sector became official government practice in the 1980s, there was no slowing down the process. By the mid-1990s, the majority of services that were once considered the responsibility of the public sector were now the responsibility of non-profits, as non-profits became this country’s leading deliverer of government funded services to the citizens (Marwell 2004). Indeed, by the mid-1990s the non-profit sector was receiving government funding to provide the majority of services that people needed in the U.S. The objectives of the youth violence prevention programs were included in the services that non-profits were the primary deliverer of by the mid-1990s.

The magnitude of this transformation cannot be fully appreciated until the numbers are incorporated into the discussion. In 1974, the government funded non-profits to the tune of $23 billion, and in 1995 the government increased non-profit funding to $175 billion (Marwell 2004). Thus, the government has created a situation
where they continuously increased the services provided by non-profits, yet they also
continuously increase the billions of dollars in funding for non-profits. It would only
makes sense that the over $2 billion authorized to be spent on social services by the 1994
Federal Crime Bill went to non-profits, since the government was already in a cycle
where non-profits were the dominant provider of social services. In other words, the
federal government was doing what it did best, providing non-profits with their share of
billions of dollars when there were services that needed to be provided. Before the
implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, there were no large scale federally
implemented and funded programs that provided social services as a means of preventing
crimes. However, by 1994 an ever-increasing level of federal funding provided to non-
profits for delivering services. It followed that a significant increase would occur in the
percentage of non-profits that were affiliated with youth violence prevention programs in
the period after 1994, as it was the first year that billions of dollars were authorized to be
spent on social services as a means of preventing violence. There would have had to
have been a significant increase in the percentage of non-profits affiliated with youth
violence prevention programs with the introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill,
because non-profits were the means by which the federal government turned to when
social services needed distribution. The increase in the percentage of non-profits after the
introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was standard protocol for the U.S.
government.

This analysis brings several major points to light. The public’s peak levels of fear
and concern for crime in 1994 and the statically significant number of media stories on
youth violence prevention programs in 1994 was a reaction to youth homicide. As a
reaction to record high levels of youth violence, and public fear and concern for crime, the Clinton administration and Congress feverously worked together to pass the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. As a response to the federal government’s implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, local communities reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s with local youth violence prevention programs.

This chapter examines the local programs that developed in response to the implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. The analysis of local youth violence prevention programs shows that the program objective of recreation was the most common programs objective (42.6% of all programs). The fact that that 42.6% of all programs had at least one objective that took the form of recreation is not surprising, as the activities associated with the recreation objective are youth-oriented. The second aspect of the local youth violence prevention programs that was analyzed in this section was their policy orientations.

The discussion on policy orientation focuses around the idea that a program’s policies were influenced by the ideas found is criminological theories. In this part of the analysis it was determined that the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was the most common policy orientation (44.6% of all programs). The social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was affiliated with programs that had street ministry and recreation as objectives. The recreation objective was youth-oriented and the most popular objective. Thus, it clearly follows that the most popular policy orientation would be associated with the most popular objective.

Furthermore, this analysis incorporates the five institutional affiliations. Based on this analysis, I can tell that non-profits were the most common institutional affiliation.
This section of the analysis determined which objective was the most commonly affiliated among each individual institutional affiliation. It was found that 75% of all private businesses were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of job training. 50.5% of non-profits were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of recreation. 37% of public organizations were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of teach violence prevention. Finally, 42.1% of all religious based organizations were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of recreation. The next part of the analysis was similar to this section, however the analysis substitutes objectives with policy orientations.

This segment of the analysis determined which policy orientation was most commonly affiliated with the individual institutions. It was found that 87.5% of private businesses were affiliated with programs that were associated with the opportunity policy orientation. 50.5% of non-profits were affiliated with programs that were associated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation. 41.1% of public organizations were affiliated with programs that were associated with the opportunity policy orientation. 52.6% of schools were affiliated with programs that were associated with the social learning policy orientation. Finally, 57.9% of religious based organizations were affiliated with programs that were associated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation. This half of the chapter concluded with the analysis of the distribution of objectives and policy orientations amongst the five institutional affiliations.

The last part of the chapter addressed the last research question: to what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth
violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention
and fighting programs? This question was answered by analyzing cross-tabulation tables
of the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations by the percentage of
each category before 1994, the year the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was passed, and the
subsequent period of 1994 to 1999. The analysis was performed to determine if there
was a significant increase or decrease in the percentages of the objectives, policy
orientations, or the institutional affiliations of youth violence prevention programs. It
was found that there were no significant increases or decreases in the percentage of the
objectives or policy orientations after the federal government implemented the 1994
Federal Crime Bill. However, there was a significant increase in the number of non-
profits affiliated with youth violence prevention programs, suggesting that the passage of
the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was significantly associated with the increase in the
percentage of non-profit organizations affiliated with youth violence prevention
programs. This connection is explained by the fact that the 1994 Federal Crime Bill
authorized over $2 billion into funding for social services as a means of preventing crime.
Since the 1990s was a period when the federal government was dependent on non-profits
to deliver the majority of the nation’s social services, it only made sense that there would
be a significant increase in the percentage of non-profits after the 1994 Federal Crime
Bill passed. Thus, the answer to the final research question is that the passage of federal
crime legislation did not have a significant effect on the objectives or the policy
orientations of youth violence prevention programs. However, the passage of federal
crime legislation did have a significance effect on the institutional affiliations of youth
violence prevention programs, as the passage of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill is
significantly associated with an increase in the percentage of programs that were affiliated with non-profits.
Chapter 8

Conclusions

The focus of this study is on the societal reactions to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the United States. After examining the pertinent sociological and criminological literature it was found that very little of the literature focuses upon the social programs that were part of the reaction to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore, it was also found that the sociological and criminological literature lacks a discussion on how the American public, newspapers, political campaigns, and Congress responded to the crime wave. Moreover, the existing sociological and criminological literature does not discuss whether there was any sort of relationship between the reaction of the public, print media and political campaigns that may have influenced the reaction of the federal government and/or local communities. Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation was to fill this gap in the literature. In order to accomplish, this five research questions were developed. The specific research questions that were addressed in this study were as follows:

1. To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crimes in particular?
2. To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and newspaper reports on violent crime, associated with the public’s fear of crime?
3. To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime, and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy?
4. To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs?

5. To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and crime fighting programs?

In order to answer these questions several analyses were performed. The first four questions were grouped together because they focused on how the public, the print media, politicians, and the U.S. federal government reacted to the crime wave. In order to answer questions 1-4, an analysis was implemented that examined the extent to which the public’s concern for crime varied over time. The analysis then examined the extent to which variations in crime were associated with the number of newspaper reports on murder and violence. Subsequently, the analyses determined whether there was a connection between American’s fear of and concern for crime, media reports on crime and the federal government’s reaction to the aforementioned crime wave. Finally, the analyses determined whether there was a connection between crime rates and media reporting on general crime prevention programs, and youth violence prevention programs. Upon the completion of these analyses, it became possible to answer research questions 1-4 and discuss pertinent conclusions.

At this point I can revisit the first four research questions. Question one stated: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s associated with newspaper reports on violent crimes in general and violent juvenile crime in particular? The crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s was not associated with media
reports on violent crime in general. Newspaper reports on murder and violence peaked in 1994 three years after the national homicide rate peaked. This conclusion was confirmed by an OLS regression that demonstrated that there was not a significant association between the murder rate and number of stories reported on murder or violence. Additionally, the linear regression indicated that murders were decreasing as stories reporting murders or acts of violence were increasing. The same pattern held true for juvenile murder. The overall national murder rate was not associated with newspaper stories on juvenile violence. Stories on juvenile violence peaked in 1994, three years after the overall national murder rate peaked. This conclusion was further confirmed by an OLS regression. Regression analysis indicated that there was no significant association between the overall murder rate and the number of stories reported in the media on juvenile violence. This is further confirmed by a linear regression that indicates that murders were decreasing as reports on juvenile violence were increasing.

Question two states: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and newspaper reports on violent crime associated with the public’s fear of crime? American’s fear of crime began to steadily increase in the late 1980s as the crime wave began and peaked in 1994, 3 years after the peak of the national overall murder rate. While the crime wave may have been the catalyst behind the public’s increased fear of crime, media reports on violence led to a continued increase in the public’s fear of crime until 1994. If the crime wave was the only factor influencing the public’s concern for crime then the public’s fear of crime would have peaked in 1991 at the national peak. However, the public’s fear of crime peaking in 1994 indicates that the media reports on violence played a role in influencing the public’s fear of crime.
The third question states: To what extent was the crime wave of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, newspaper reports on violent crime, and the public’s fear of crime associated with the development of Federal crime prevention policy? The crime wave led to an increase in the public’s fear of crime, thereby influencing the Clinton campaign to make fighting violent crime a priority of the federal government. Subsequently, the public’s increasing fear of crime, and President Clinton’s violent crime prevention plan led to increased media reporting on violence, just as the federal government unveiled the nation’s most comprehensive violence prevention policy, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill.

The fourth research question states: To what extent was Federal crime prevention policy and the public fear of crime associated with the development of youth crime prevention programs? The public’s peak levels of fear and concern for crime in 1994 were a reaction to youth homicide. As a reaction to record high levels of youth violence, and public fear and concern for crime, the Clinton administration and Congress feverishly worked together to pass the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. The 1994 Federal Crime Bill authorized over $2 billion to be spent on community-based crime prevention programs. A majority of the community crime prevention programs authorized by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill were youth-oriented. Thus, the statistically significant numbers of media reports on youth violence prevention programs were a result of newspapers reporting on youth violence prevention programs that resulted from the federal government’s 1994 Federal Crime bill, which resulted from the public’s fear and concern of crime and the record high levels of youth violence. The resulting youth violence prevention programs are the focus of the fifth research question. Once again the fifth research question is: To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of
youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs? However, before answering this question, the conclusions based on the analysis of the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations of the local youth violence prevention programs must be addressed.

The analysis of local youth violence prevention programs concluded that the program objective of recreation was the most common program objective (42.6% of all programs). The fact that 42.6% of all programs had at least one objective that took the form of recreation is not surprising as the activities associated with the recreation objective are youth-oriented. The second aspect of the local youth violence prevention programs analyzed was their policy orientations.

The discussion on policy orientation was focused around the idea that a program’s policies are influenced by the ideas found in criminological theories. The analysis concluded that the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was the most common policy orientation (44.6% of all programs). The social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was affiliated with programs that had street ministry and recreation as objectives. The recreation objective was youth-oriented and was the most popular objective.

This dissertation incorporates five institutional affiliations. Based on the performed analysis, it can be concluded that non-profits were the most common institutional affiliation. The analysis concluded which objective was the most commonly affiliated among each individual institutional affiliation. 75% of all private businesses were affiliated with programs associated with objective job training. 50.5% of non-profits were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of recreation. 37% of
public organizations were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of teaching violence prevention. Finally, 42.1% of all religious-based organizations were affiliated with programs associated with the objective of recreation. Based on the analysis it can be concluded which policy orientation was most commonly affiliated with the individual institutions. It can be concluded that 87.5% of private businesses were affiliated with programs associated with the opportunity policy orientation. 50.5% of non-profits were affiliated with programs associated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation. 41.1% of public organizations were affiliated with programs associated with the opportunity policy orientation. 52.6% of schools were affiliated with programs associated with the social learning policy orientation. Finally, 57.9% of religious based organizations were affiliated with programs associated with the social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation.

After establishing conclusions regarding objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations, we can now address the last research question: To what extent were the policy orientations, program objectives and the institutional basis of youth violence prevention programs affected by the introduction of federal crime prevention and fighting programs? This question was answered by analyzing cross-tabulation tables of the objectives, policy orientations, and institutional affiliations by the percentage of each category before 1994, the year the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was passed, and the subsequent period of 1994 to 1999. The analysis was performed to determine if there was a significant increase or decrease in the percentages of the objectives, policy orientations, or the institutional affiliations of youth violence prevention programs. There were no significant increases or decreases in the percentage of objectives or policy
orientations after the federal government implemented the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. However, there was a significant increase in the number of non-profits affiliated with youth violence prevention programs, suggesting that the passage of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was significantly associated with the increase in the percentage of non-profit organizations affiliated with youth violence prevention programs. The fact that the 1994 Federal Crime Bill authorized over $2 billion into funding for social services as a means of preventing crime explains this connection. As the 1990s was a period when the federal government was dependent on non-profits to deliver the majority of the nation’s social services, it only made sense that there would be a significant increase in the percentage of non-profits after the 1994 Federal Crime Bill passed. Thus, the answer to the final research question is that the passage of federal crime legislation did not have a significant effect on the objectives or the policy orientations of youth violence prevention programs. However, the passage of federal crime legislation did have a significance effect on the institutional affiliations of youth violence prevention programs, as the passage of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill is significantly associated with an increase in the percentage of programs that were affiliated with non-profits.

The public’s peak levels of fear and concern for crime in 1994 and the statically significant number of media stories on youth violence prevention programs in 1994 were reactions to youth homicide. As a reaction to record high levels of youth violence, and public fear and concern for crime, the Clinton administration and Congress feverishly worked together to pass the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. As a response to the federal government’s implementation of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill, local communities reacted
to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s with local youth violence prevention programs.

When analyzing the attributes of the local youth violence prevention programs, the program objective of recreation was the most common of program objectives. The social disorganization/social bonding policy orientation was the most common policy orientation. Non-profits were the most common institutional affiliation. The introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill did not affect the objectives nor did it affect the policy orientations of local youth violence prevention programs. However, introduction of the 1994 Federal Crime Bill led to a significant increase in the percentage of youth violence prevention programs that were affiliated with non-profits.

**Policy Implications**

There are a few policy implications to be drawn from the above conclusions. The analysis showed that the public’s fear and concern for crime was driven by the problem at hand, juvenile violence. Consequently, it can be said that the Clinton administration got it right by implementing the 1994 Federal Crime Bill because it was paying attention to American people’s reaction to a major problem, the record high rate of juvenile violence. Future administrations should base public policy on the concerns of the American people, as is represented by this case.

The analysis also showed that a federal program, The 1994 Federal Crime Bill, was effective in creating a local solution to a local problem. Research showed that the crime wave was a local problem confined to local neighborhoods and therefore needed a local solution. The local solution that evolved was that of local youth violence prevention
programs. Since a significant number of local youth violence prevention programs were not reported in the print media until 1994, when the 1994 Federal Crime Bill authorized billions of dollars in grants to be allocated to local youth violence prevention programs, it seems logical that the availability of new funds led to the creation of new local youth violence prevention programs. As a result, it seems logical to suggest that if a future social problem was to require a local solution then the federal government could encourage local organizations to act by providing adequate to generous levels of funding in the form of federal grants.

The analysis also showed how local organizations mobilize to solve problems. Local organizations did not change their objectives or their policy orientations. However, what did change after the 1994 Federal Crime Bill was introduced was the percentage of non-profits that acted to deal with the crime wave. This was the case because non-profit organizations have been the institutional type that the federal government has increasingly relied upon to provide and deliver local services and programming. All future federal policies intent on providing a local solution to a local problem should initiate collaboration with non-profits as they are now the dominant means by which local services and programming are delivered.

**Future Research**

Future research should be concerned with the youth violence prevention programs found in newspaper reports rather than with how America reacted to the crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s. America’s reaction is clear, the 1994 Federal Crime Bill.
Unclear are the states of the programs found via the content analysis, both before and after the period studied.

The content analysis allowed me to pinpoint when programs were first mentioned in newspaper reports during the 1990s, however this leads to cross-sectional data. For instance, I can tell based on this content analysis that Kids Killing Kids was a program in Cleveland that taught violence prevention and that it was first reported in a newspaper in 1994. However, the content analysis does not allow me to identify whether Kids Killing Kids existed before 1994, or what happened to the program after 1994. In other words, the methodology used here does not allow me to document pre-1990s history of the programs found nor does it allow me to track the evolution and future progress of the programs. It would be interesting to know if programs that founded in the 1990s have roots extending to previous crime waves, or if they evolved from extinct programs that were revived because they were considered successful in the past. It would also be interesting to know the specifics of how programs evolved over the remainder of the decade, not to mention the current state of the programs.

Future research utilizing a methodology allowing for the tracking of a program’s evolution would allow researchers to know how the program changed over time and how subsequent funding or cuts in funding affected the state of the program, if it even still exists. For instance, one can only speculate that the “War on Terror” enacted by the George W. Bush administration dramatically cut funding for youth violence prevention programs, leading to the demise of many programs that were thriving during the 1990s. Researcher will not know that for certain until future research is performed that tracks the evolution of the youth violence prevention programs found in the 1990s.
Future research is also needed to determine the exact role government grants played in creating youth violence prevention programs. While it is clear that the 1994 Federal Crime Bill authorized approximately $2 billion to be spent on social programs aimed at curbing youth violence, the current data makes it impossible to know the specifics of how the grants were distributed. While it is obvious that billions of dollars were distributed from the federal government to community programs, the specifics of the distribution are not known. For example, the 111th Street YMCA of Chicago had a Manhood Program that offered youth mentoring, recreation, and educational opportunities and that this program was mentioned in a newspaper in 1994. As this program was deemed newsworthy in 1994 there is a likely chance that it received funding. There is also a good chance that the Manhood Program received funding from one of the grants authorized in 1994 by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill. Based on this content analysis I cannot tell which grant it would have likely received. Because the YMCA implemented the Manhood Program, it qualified for a Crime Prevention Block Grant and could have received a Local Partnership Act grant. The directors of the Manhood Program provided such diversified programs that they could have worded applications in such a way where they may have qualified for many of the available grants.

Future researchers should to determine which 1994 Federal Crime Bill grants and amounts were distributed to which states, municipalities, and programs. If researchers can create a record that shows exactly which youth violence preventions programs received which grants and at what level of funding, the federal government could recreate
the successful aspects of the social programs funded by the 1994 Federal Crime Bill and would be better prepared to deal with the next crime wave.


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