RELIGION IN POLITICAL CONFLICT: A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORETICAL MODEL FOR PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION

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by

Marian Gheorghe Simion

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public and International Affairs in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Northeastern University, March 2012
ABSTRACT

The second half of the 20th century introduced an unexpected phenomenon—the rise of religion as a marker for political identity, and as a power for structure mobilization. Policymakers often ignored this de-privatization of religion, thus failing to comprehend and recognize its power either as an impetus for structure mobilization (e.g., the Iranian Revolution, Intifadas, etc.), or as a marker of collective identity (e.g., Balkans, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Middle East, etc.). This is also a consequence of the secularist configuration of statecraft, and of the lack of comprehensive political theory on the role of religion in the public life.

In general, religion does not only represent organized religious institutions, which uphold doctrines, ethical standards and patterns of worship, but it also represents a combination of formal and informal postulations about the human condition. Religion endorses assertions over what is held in private and what is held in common, it represents patterns of collective identity, it displays internal agreements and disagreements, pietistic behavior, personal interests and collective action, and so on. As a result, in collective violence, religion is never politically neutral, but has profound implications in generating or dissolving a conflict, thus influencing and affecting public and international policy.

The main thesis is that religion, in its essence, does not engender violence, but it is a source for peace and stability. Nevertheless, in its institutionalized form, religion often justifies and mimics violence, in which religion plays an ambivalent role. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to make a contribution to the development of enhanced public and international policy for cases of collective violence, which involve religion as a key ingredient.

First, this dissertation maps out how religious leaders and policymakers are educated about collective violence (Chapters 2 & 3).

Second, chapter four of the dissertation offers an epistemological rational choice approach to the process in which religion interacts with collective violence. The main argument is built
upon an analysis of the process by which religion interacts with collective violence *internally*, as a devotional instinct, and *externally*, within the framework of organized religions. The analysis rests on a distinction between the phenomenological approach to religion (focusing on *sacrifice* and *scapegoat*, identifiable in the most primitive function of religion), and organized religion, focusing on a tripartite approach to *doctrine, ethics* and *worship*, as informed by *rationalism* (prophet, spiritual leader), *structuralism* (internal power distribution), and *culturalism* (meaning). In this chapter I also argue that organized religion is ambivalent toward collective violence, due to its political interests, and in demonstrating this, I will test two hypotheses: *Religion in Mimetic Rivalry*, and *Double-Competition* hypothesis. The first hypothesis, *Religion in Mimetic Rivalry*, states that religious faith does not generate collective violence, but it is a source for social stability due to its rational intervention between the mimetic rivals through the rituals of sacrifice and scapegoat, which redirect frustration toward a victim that cannot afford to retaliate and continue the cycle of violence. The second hypothesis of the *Double-Competition* derives from the first hypothesis and states that a rivalry over a concrete object of desire triggers a surrogate rivalry which becomes the platform where the original conflict escalates, de-escalates, or remains at a constant level. As Double-Competition hypothesis demonstrates, any competition over a material object of desire is negotiated, resolved, or amplified in the context of a surrogate competition, which is contingent upon the handling of the object of desire from the original competition. Each rivalry (original and surrogate) has an *object of desire* and a *scapegoat*, and whether the conflict escalates, decreases or remains neutral, depends upon how these two factors are being interplayed in between the two rivalries. Therefore, one can identify three scenarios: *positive* (if the object of desire from the original rivalry becomes a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, the conflict most likely decreases), *negative* (if the object of desire of the surrogate rivalry is the same object of desire from the original rivalry, the conflict most likely escalates), and *neutral* (if the scapegoat from the original rivalry becomes a scapegoat or an object of desire in the surrogate rivalry, this is a logical incoherence which bears no impact on the conflict.) It is in the surrogate rivalry that religion intervenes both as a devotional instinct (faith) and as a political institution.
As a devotional instinct, religion becomes a source of stability and peace. As a political institution, organized religion behaves ambivalently toward collective violence because it makes decisions based on its rational interests, which can either amplify or restrain the original rivalry.

Third, by capitalizing on the findings of political theory and religious studies, and in light of the findings of the Double-Competition theory, the final chapter (Chapter 5) proposes an instrumental applicability of the power of religion in policy analysis, policy design and policy implementation.

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation presents the findings of a content analysis of primary and secondary literature on collective violence in the fields of political science and religious studies for the purpose of examining, in a cause-effect relationship, pre-existing scenarios where religion acted as a key ingredient in conflict escalation and in conflict resolution.

The overall methodological preference for a qualitative analysis is generated by the fact that the literature in the field of religious studies is inherently qualitative, as its intent is to serve its prophetic role, and also counteract or reshape various patterns of behavior that are contrary to religious precepts.

The two concepts measured in the analysis are religion and violence, and the units of analysis used in the testing of the two hypotheses are the object of desire and the scapegoat.

The model integrates the basic approaches to comparative politics (rationalism, structuralism and culturalism), and the basic approaches to the study of religion (organized religion and religious phenomenology), within the three dominant approaches to collective violence (Frustration-Aggression, Alienation-Deprivation and violence as a Learned Behavior). These three approaches (Frustration-Aggression, Alienation-Deprivation, and violence as a
Learned Behavior) had been accepted by the social scientists as the leading paths underscoring the conditions under which violence erupts. Each approach is analyzed in terms of strengths (advantages) and weaknesses (drawbacks).

These three approaches will be geared towards public policy analysis, design and implementation in order to elucidate, in a cause-effect manner, the extent to which a conflict can either be escalated or plummeted by various structural configurations and/or entrepreneurs who control public policy and political ritual.
Dedic această Teză de Doctorat părinților mei!

Tatăl meu, Gheorghe C. Simion (1934-1985),
care mi-a insuflat dorința de a cunoaște lumea

și

Mamei mele, Floarea Gh. Simion,
care mi-a dărui curajul de a o face!

Vă mulțumesc din suflet!

~~~ Prâslea
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Three decades ago, when I was but a little boy in my Carpathian village, all I dreamed of was to become a truck driver. It was not that I did not have dreams. Not at all… I was as normal as any little boy. In fact, when I was seven, I was certain that some day I was going to become a helicopter pilot, and my elementary teacher, Ion Diaconu, always approved of it. Yet, as I was approaching my teens, the helicopter of my dreams failed to take off, as I gradually became aware of the harsh reality in Ceauşescu’s Romania. My father’s damaged health, at the hands of the Communist Party’s directives, had stolen much of my childhood, especially as he died helpless in my hands, while urging me to “go as far away as I can see with my eyes.” Because I was only thirteen years old, I did not know much about that “far away” place, except that I was becoming an avid student of the world map, looking for potential destinations. Forbidden radio stations such as the Voice of America, which always started and ended with “Yankee Doodle,” were sending messages of hope, while the Free Europe radio was simply depressing. Yet, it was from my mother that I have learned that even when dreams are trapped by hopelessness and become threatened by the dark night, dreams never die. Even now, I fail to comprehend how she managed to raise five children without an income, in a two room house (with dirt floor and no plumbing), with a dying husband, living off an incredible small piece of land, while raising cows, sheep, pigs, and poultry for the state. So, if there is a hero, that is my mother, the real miracle behind everything I have accomplished insofar. Her jovial and optimistic spirit kept us not only healthy and focused, but inspired us to trust our intuition when selecting the friends we make along the way.

Indeed, on my own path, the friends I made were the best people that one can call friends. They were not many—since gaining a facebook-style popularity never interested me—but few and of remarkable quality, just like in the Latin proverb, *non multa sed multum*. Some were mentors, some teachers, some coworkers, and some even became part of my family. What I always found
bizarre was that none of my friends (particularly those who helped me succeed), ever asked me for anything in return, except perhaps to do the same with someone else who needs my help. I hope not to fail them on this moral imperative.

It was during my time in the theological seminary that I met my first two mentors: the late Rev. Prof. Dr. Alexie Al. Buzera and maestro Corneliu Fânățeanu, one of the most renowned world tenors of the 60s and 70s. Their presence in my life not only made me excel in music and get my first real job as a baritone at the Romanian National Opera in Bucharest, but taught me how to look at life with confidence and optimism. It was because of my success in music that I met Nicholas J. Greanias, a former US Consul in Bucharest and US Army JAG (now a Greek Orthodox priest), who helped me continue my education in the United States. The chance that Father Greanias gave me not only fulfilled my father’s mandate to go “as far away as I can see with my eyes,” but had simply changed my life. At Hellenic College I made a few good friends, but the teachers who really inspired me were Rev. Dr. John Chryssavgis and Dr. Nicholas Constas. Later, at Harvard Divinity School, Professor Lawrence E. Sullivan had added another stepping stone in my academic career. A leading world scholar on religious phenomenology, Professor Sullivan taught me a great deal about various religious phenomena, some of which made their way into this dissertation. As I later became Dr. Sullivan’s research assistant at Harvard, and worked on the conceptual design of the World Religious Museum that was later built in Taipei, Taiwan, this experience made a crucial impact on my understanding of the conflicting hermeneutics within religion.

It was also in this context that I met Dr. Rodney L. Petersen, the Executive Director of the Boston Theological Institute, who offered me the opportunity to join the institute as Assistant Director. This new environment and the exciting projects that Dr. Petersen was conducting through the institute, together with Fr. Raymond Helmick, S.J., of Boston College, had reoriented my academic focus, as I moved into the severely underexplored field of religion and political violence, under the mentorship of Father Helmick. Dr. Petersen’s remarkable library, along with his kindness in offering me unconditional access to it, was something that I had been enjoying
for over a decade, as he helped me sharpen my editorial skills, introduced me to new people, and together we traveled the world. I should also emphasize that in my understanding of religious conflicts, I have been deeply influenced by Fr. Helmick, who, for over a decade, had been my mentor, teacher and friend. His outstanding way of focusing on personal integrity and soul search when approaching the depths of religious conflict not only supplanted my natural tendencies towards subjective loyalties, but taught me that truth and peace prevail only when we empower ourselves to see every human being—especially those we disagree with—as sharing our humanity, as part of ourselves. At the same time, I was extremely fortunate to study human rights with Professor David Little at Harvard Divinity School, and felt extremely privileged when he came with me to New York to offer a response to a lecture I gave before several ambassadors from the United Nations Security Council.

During this journey of learning, I came to recognize that in a violent conflict, religion is more like water and fire: good servant, bad master, and thus I became eager to study the dynamics of religion from within. I wanted to be able to understand the phenomenon of violence, and to identify the real decision-makers in specific cases of conflict, so that I can ponder with confidence over the knotty problem of conflict. I did so fully aware of the fact that governments and religious institutions can often become the “sorcerer’s apprentice” (as in Goethe’s Der Zauberlehrling), when handling the power of religion. As during the past four decades Father Helmick had mediated the Irish, the Kurdish, the Lebanese, the Israeli-Palestinian, and the Balkan conflicts, his sharp eye for religion and policymaking not only refined my understanding of religious phenomenology as related to violence, but made me curious about how policymakers think and make decisions. This is why I decided to pursue a doctorate in political science, and the ideal place was Northeastern University in Boston, where I was going to have the privilege of learning at the feet of a policymaker, the Distinguished Professor Michael S. Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts between 1975-1979 and 1983-1991, and the 1988 Democratic Party Nominee for President of the United States. Being accepted into the doctoral program at Northeastern was a dream coming true, especially as Governor Dukakis became my academic advisor and mentor.
This unique opportunity enhanced my understanding of collective violence in a dramatic way, becoming also a turning point in my academic endeavor. Governor Dukakis not only taught me about the complexities of policymaking and public leadership, but in many ways he represented a father figure during my times of doubt, often telling me: “Marian, you and I know that you can do it!” At Northeastern, I met some of the most remarkable political scientists. Professor William D. Kay was one of the first scholars who introduced me to the language of social sciences and to the complexities of rational choice and structural analysis. His ever-impressive knowledge and special interest in religion gave our conversations a remarkable twist in identifying similarities and differences between political and spiritual approaches to humanity. Professor Amílcar A. Barreto sharpened my understanding of comparative politics and nationalism, while Gerald Bursey deepened my understanding of the oppressive political regimes. Ronald D. Hedlund taught me the methodology of qualitative and quantitative research in social sciences; something that I was completely unfamiliar with. Yet, given my interdisciplinary interests in religion and policymaking, I kept an eye on Professor William D. Kay, and once I passed the comprehensive exams, I invited him to Chair of my dissertation committee, which included Governor Michael Dukakis and Father Raymond Helmick.

Some parts of this dissertation were published last year in a volume *Religion and Political Conflict*, with contributions from Professor David Little and Ambassador Mihnea Motoc, and with a foreword by His All Holiness, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. (Here I want to thank Father John Chryssavgis for bringing my work to the attention of His All Holiness. Παναγιώτατε, Σας ευχαριστώ πολύ για την ευλογία σας!) Because of this book project, I was privileged to have my research reviewed and recognized by several outstanding scholars such as Professors Scott Appleby of the University of Notre Dame, Rabbi Marc Gopin of George Mason University, Professor Yoon Young-kwan, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, now Professor at Soul National University, and Daniel O. Aleshire, the Executive Director of the Association of Theological Schools in United States and Canada.
During the writing of my dissertation, I also benefited from crucial feedback from several scholars such as Joseph Montville (the author of the IR concept “Track-Two Diplomacy”), Thomas J. Butler (a former professor of Slavic Studies at Oxford and Harvard), and Dr. Abdel-Rahman Ibrahim Mohamed (of the Islamic Center of Boston.) My gratitude goes also to Professor Kenneth Himes, O.F.M., who appointed me a lecturer at Boston College Department of Theology, where I had been teaching since 2005. I am also grateful to Professor Dudley Rose, the Associate Dean of Harvard Divinity School, who appointed me a Field Education Supervisor at HDS, where I had supervised various student projects related to the pragmatic use of religion in public life. A man with a positive attitude, sharp mind and a remarkable heart, Dudley Rose always cared for my wellbeing and success. So, thank you, Dudley Rose! My additional gratitude goes to the former Dean of Hellenic College, Dr. Lily Macrakis, who appointed me an adjunct instructor in interdisciplinary studies in 2004, and to the past and current trustees of the Boston Theological Institute, where I had been working as Assistant Director for the past eleven years. As for Father Robert Manning, S.J., a former BTI trustee who left us prematurely, I hold his memory eternal and in my heart.

My success in completing my studies is also due to a remarkable friend, Dr. Mugur A. Roz, who, together and his wife Julieta, had been there for me in time of need and joy. During the past decade, at the Boston Theological Institute, Dr. Roz had built our infrastructure with everything that it entails, ranging from internal network, to website, email and telephone system, and so on, without ever being paid for all his labor. He did it as a friend to help me succeed. Together with Dr. Roz, Fr. Helmick and my wife Denise, in 2008 we established the Institute for Peace Studies in Eastern Christianity, currently managed by my ever capable wife, as its executive director.

In the department of Political Science at Northeastern, I received a crucial support from additional professors such as: Christopher J. Bosso, David A. Rochefort, David E. Schmitt, John H. Portz, Denis J. Sullivan, as well as staff members such as: Barbara Chin, Lyle Ring and Brynn Thompson. Thank you all for your help and patience, as you were there for me in time of need!
Last but not least, my family deserves my gratitude more than anyone else. My brother, Nicolae Simion, the Orthodox Priest of the Romanian Orthodox community in Boston and an incredible woodcarving artist, has always been a presence in my life. As siblings, our lives had been yoked together ever since our father died in our arms. Together we went to the University of Bucharest where we struggled through financial hardship, and then adventured to change our lives by coming to America, himself accompanied by my sister-in-law, Preoteasa Mihaela. My sister Florina and my two additional brothers from Romania, Gică and Vasile (and their families and children) always took good care of our mother, thus relieving me of additional worries. My parents-in-law, Anne and William Burrill III, as well as my sister-in-law Michelle Burrill deserve my deep gratitude for their respect, help (especially with babysitting), and encouragement. My additional sisters-in-law, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces always assured me of their love and reliability in time of need. As for my wife, Denise, my gratitude is endless. She is a remarkable woman in every aspect: exceptionally intelligent, loving, supportive, and extremely dedicated as a wife and mother. During my studies, not only did she take the extra-load of work in raising our children and in attending to our family needs, but she represented my most remarkable scholarly interlocutor during the writing of my dissertation, while she completed her Masters Degree in Management at Harvard University, where at the time of her graduation in May 2011, she was the recipient of the Harold V. Langlois Outstanding Scholar Award. My children, Cecelia Maria, Floarea Anne, Meleana Michelle and Dumitru William have been extremely patient with me, as I spent all my evenings, early mornings, and weekends doing homework. I am sure that by now, their version of a dad is the picture of a man leaving the home early in the morning and returning late in the evening, while being glued to his computer when at home.

I will be remiss if I failed to record my gratitude to His Eminence Methodios, the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of Boston, to Fr. Al Demos, to His Grace Bishop Dimitrios (Couchell) of Xanthos, and to the Orthodox Christian Mission Center of St. Augustine, FL, for the full scholarships I received to complete my Bachelor’s degree in Religious Studies at Hellenic College
as well as my Master of Theological Studies at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, in Brookline, MA.

Father Nikolaos D. Pelekoudas and his Presbytera Linda from the Holy Trinity Greek Orthodox Church in Lowell, MA, made tremendous efforts to provide my daughters with scholarships to attend the Hellenic American Academy, in Lowell, MA. The gift of their friendship will never be taken for granted.

As for everyone else who has been a positive presence in my life, such as my favored uncle, the late Nenea Unchiu’ Nelu (a former law enforcement officer who first introduced me to law and international politics), my mother’s cardiologist Dr. Ilie Barb, Rev. Prof. Dr. Marin Cojoc, Rev. Dr. Nicolae Săpun, His Eminence Irineu Popa the Archbishop of Craiova and Metropolitan of Oltenia, His Eminence Gerasimos Greek Orthodox Metropolitan of San Francisco, Rev. Dr. John Chryssavgis, Dr. Nicholas Constas, Semegnish Asfaw, my good friend Dinu Teofilovici who left this world prematurely, PD Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Fr. Nicholas Triantafilou, Fr. Neculai Buga, Fr. Nicholas Apostola, and others, whose names are not mentioned here due to my own shortcomings, I want to assure you of my deep gratitude.

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Faith is a spontaneous devotional instinct for solidarity, peace and stability that serves as an antidote to fear. [Organized] religion is conventional faith structured on the dynamics of authority, and it is organized as political institutions seeking power growth and power maintenance. Faith becomes organized into religion in a very pragmatic way by ordering one’s daily existence, by formulating various codes of behavior, by marking the stages of human life—birth, marriage, death—through various sacramental codes and rituals, and by formulating ideological frameworks for meaning in defining the world and life. Although the fine line between faith and religion is often obscure, the process of structure building from faith to religion is both unavoidable and necessary. When a conflict arises, organized religions behave ambivalently, and as such, policymakers need to regard them exclusively as political institutions, with platforms anchored in ideologies, rituals and ethical norms. Therefore, as political institutions that follow their interests for power growth and power maintenance, organized religions are never politically neutral.

The Study of Religion in Collective Violence

Advanced theoretical education on collective violence in the fields of religious studies and political science had been as fragmented as marginalized, both within the disciplines themselves, and at the interdisciplinary level. Therefore, this charting of the theoretical field of collective violence in
religious studies and political science is designed not only as an evaluation of how policymakers and religious leaders are educated on issues related to collective violence, but it is also designed as guidelines to stimulate cooperation across the two disciplines for the goal of crafting more effective peace studies programs. My literature review is cumulative in nature in the sense that I summarize major theoretical works and ideas in both fields, upon which I propose a reference structure for future theoretical work to be developed at the interdisciplinary level. Some major clues on what collective violence means, can be extracted from a definition offered by the World Health Organization,

\[
\text{collective violence may be defined as: the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group–whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity–against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives.} \\
\text{(Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, Lozano: 2002, 215)}
\]

Therefore, the prioritization of religious studies and political science over other fields of inquiry (e.g., sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc.), as key disciplines to the domain of peace studies, is spawned by the shared competition between organized religions and the state over political leadership and administration of collective goods. (Figure 1.1) In other words, while military competitions were never carried out for the ideals of Webberianism, or Freudianism, etc., some of the bloodiest wars carried the banner of political ideals (e.g., proletarianism, “spreading democracy,” etc.), as well as the banner of religious ideology (e.g., Crusades, ‘Dar al Harb’ Jihad, “Heretz Israel” Zionism, etc.) Various sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists made great contributions to the understanding of collective violence. Their findings serve mainly as indispensable tools in a peacemaker’s toolkit, rather than as exclusive policy solutions. Therefore, religious studies and political science provide the basic structure to the understanding of collective violence. On the other hand, the fields of psychology, sociology, and anthropology define and inform the internal workings and the dynamics of power within organized religions and state structures.
Figure 1.1 | Analysis Priority Diagram in Peace Studies
In general terms, the theoretical study of collective violence in the social science literature emerged from the general field of psychology, evolving in proximity to Evolutionary Psychology (EP) (Waller: 2002, 145-168; Bloom, Dess: 2003, 1-22.)

Generally regarded as a deliberate, irrational, and instrumental impulse to inflict harm, evolutionary psychologists considered violence to be a mix of *inborn* (Freud: 1950; Lorenz: 1966) and *environmental* factors (Fromm: 1973).

Whether genetically inherited or learned, social scientists have generally accepted three major categories underscoring the conditions under which violence erupts. These are *frustration-aggression*, *alienation-deprivation*, and violence as a *learned behavior*. (Brown: 1987, 7-23; Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 69-91) It must be emphasized that these categories often intersect each other and share affinities; or are in causal relationships—thus the separating lane between the three categories often being obscure. Various components of each model were applied in specific studies related to international security, as well as in general studies on collective violence authored by various religious scholars and social scientists.

While in the general field of political science, the study of collective violence enjoyed almost a century of systematic theoretical development, alongside with the development of comparative politics (Wiarda: 2000, 36-41), the field of religious studies is still in its infancy, as far as the systematic study of religious violence is concerned.

In the field of political science, the study of contentious politics and collective violence started with the western social movement cycle of the sixties (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 145) and evolved as a subfield of *comparative politics* (split between the rational choice approach, *structuralism* and *culturalism*) and as a subfield of *international relations* theory split between international security (*realism*, *liberalism*, and *social theories*), and international political economy (*trade*, *finance*, *international integration*, *environment & population*, *North-South gap*, and *international development*). (Figure 1.2) More symptomatically, the study of violence had focused on types of political violence employed by the political elite against the masses (e.g., totalitarianism, dictatorship, fascism, tyranny, despotism, autocracy, authoritarianism, etc.), as
well as political violence employed by the masses against the political elites (e.g., coup d’état, revolution, guerrilla, riot, terrorism, insurgency, non-violent resistance, and so forth.)

In the field of religious studies, however, more advanced research on collective violence evolved in the aftermath of the Cold War, in an *ad hoc* fashion. This evolution was ad hoc and unsystematic in the sense that most of the seminal thinking behind this new field was problem
oriented in nature, and designed to engage situations of ethno-religious violence, as well as miscellaneous conflicts of ideas that surfaced global politics.

Lamentably, during this time of field evolution and shared interest in the containment of collective violence, political scientists rarely crossed paths with religious scholars, and when they did so, they did it with no substantive mutual engagement, talking past each other. In policymaking circles, religion is still regarded as an exotic appendix to the cultural theory, doing nothing more than fueling irrational behavior.

One plausible explanation for this institutionalized unresponsiveness emerges from the secularist agenda of the modern state. (Stark: 1999) This secularist agenda serves as a platform for denial in offering the religious expertise an integral part to the peace process narrative, and kept obstructing any natural evolution of integrative academics. The myth of religion’s irrelevance to public order (Falk: 2001; 2003) survived during the past two decades as a repertoire of doubts against religion—a mosaic of attitudes of dissent from a generally accepted utilitarian role of religion in the public life. Despite preexisting situations where policymakers failed to recognize the power of religion as an impetus for structure mobilization—such as in the case of Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s—the Church-State separation mentality maintained its irrational loyalty to a dogmatic secularism. Consequently, this lack of interest induced the students of political science into believing that there are no professional perspectives, should they choose to focus on religion, thus graduating with a systemic void of expertise in key functional areas.

Ambitious headway was made at the practical level by various peace activists trained in religious studies, who often bypassed deadlocks reached by policymakers. (Gopin: 2000; Simion: 2001; Steele: 2006; Little: 2007) Encouraged by the ideals of “track-two” diplomacy, (Montville: 1991; Davies, Kaufman: 2003) these practitioners often created genuine combinations between religious narratives and psychological methods of peacemaking (Montville: 2002; Botcharova: 2002) and successfully mediated between rivals. Their successful work and accomplishments (Lederach, Jenner: 2002; Little 2007; Gopin: 2009) yet again demonstrated the logical coherence between the two fields. As David Little pointed out, after presenting the personal stories of
sixteen remarkable peacemakers in a joint project with the New York-based Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, two oversimplifications have affected the understanding of the connection between religion and violence.

One oversimplification is that religion is at the bottom about nothing but violent conflict, about generating ‘clashes of civilization’ and ‘bloody borders.’ Therefore, it is easy to conclude, the less religion the better. The second oversimplification is in sharp contrast with to the first: ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ religion, it holds, never contributes to violence, only ‘flawed’ or ‘distorted’ religion does that. ‘Good religion’ always brings peace. There is of course some truth in both claims, and it is important to disentangle what is true from what is false about each of them. (Little: 2007, 429)

Therefore, in light of this attitude of sworn disengagement between political rejectionists and religious apologists, developing peace studies curricula at interdisciplinary level is not only a matter of intellectual honesty expected of any serious educator, but also a chance for building a more peaceful world.

*Religion and Foreign Policy*

In the practical field of foreign policymaking, numerous critics have pointed out that past reluctance in taking religion seriously resulted in the US failure in Iran and Lebanon. At that time any observation highlighting the long-term power of religion was suppressed almost of every level within the policymaking apparatus, viewing religion strategically irrelevant. In 1994, leading critics, including social scientists, theologians, and diplomats, such as Cynthia Sampson, Douglas Johnson, David Little, John Paul Lederach, Joseph Montville, Donald Shriver, and several others made a strong case through an influential collection of essays, *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, with a foreword by President Jimmy Carter. This publication emphasized the potential contribution of faith-based initiatives to international peace-building, and it was directed
towards the US Foreign Services Institute, colleges, universities and seminaries. An unanticipated success of this initiative was that it led to the establishment of a Preventive Diplomacy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies—successfully led by Joseph Montville, but later defunded by the Bush Administration eager to invade Iraq—and to the establishment of the International Center for Religion & Diplomacy which to this date has an impressive record on projects developed in Sudan and Kashmir. (Additional institutions that emerged included US Department of State Office of International Freedom [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/], US Commission on International Religious Freedom [http://www.uscirf.gov/], International Association for Religious Freedom [http://www.iarf.net/] (Last accessed: July 11, 2010))

Furthermore, during the late 1990s, US foreign policy began acknowledging the challenge of religion and took strategic steps. First, the U.S. Congress, faith-based nongovernmental organizations, and the Department of State began discussing ways to integrate religious freedom initiatives into U.S. foreign policy, and the product of these debates was the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Secondly, in 1998 the US State Department established the Office of International Religious Freedom, which produces an Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. Thirdly, a training program on religion and statecraft was designed for Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guards chaplains as to enhance conflict prevention capability. Fourthly, military chaplains were assigned to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the State Department.

From the outset, it is important to emphasize several basic aspects regarding the presence of religion in collective violence.

Whether systematically shaped by an organized religion, or simply scrutinized as natural eruptions of faith phenomena, during deadly hostilities, religious beliefs have consistently decorated the final sentiments of the aggressors and victims alike on the meaning of life and death. In this sense, one may argue that there is nothing new about religion joining collective violence and any argument proving its presence—whether constructive or destructive—is rather futile.
In general, the increased presence of religion in contemporary conflicts is linked with issues of economic disparity and identity. (Gregg: 2003)

First, numerous acts of social injustice committed by the secular local elites in post-colonial (even post-totalitarian) environments, which led to violent protests, made the population incrementally vulnerable to religion as moral force, thus inviting religious leadership not only to defend the weak, but also to provide a more meaningful leadership, beyond the ephemeral aspirations of this life. (Antoun: 2001)

Secondly, contrary to the assumption that one religion is more violent than another, the current cases of religious violence are in fact proportional with religious membership. For instance, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism appear generally more violent because they are the largest religions, with Christianity representing 33.2%; Islam 22.4% and Hinduism 13.7% from the world population. However, one must note that although Judaism represents only 0.2%, its key role in violence is also conditioned by secular factors as well as doctrinal affinities and competitions over sacred space with larger religions.) In other words, the greater a religion’s membership is, the greater the number of violent cases involving its members is. As a result, an organized religion with a large membership is more likely to appear as more violent.

Thirdly, the interpretation of sacred texts that make reference to violence by persons entrusted with spiritual authority is a dominant variable which could either escalate or diminish a conflict. (Gopin: 2000) In general, key religious texts are either ambivalent or explicitly violent in nature. This means that during a conflict, while an ambivalent text such as “I did not come to bring peace but a sword,” (Matthew 10:34) is subject to cautious interpretations, and debatable theological arguments, an explicitly violent text such as “I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve; therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them,” (Qur’an 8:12) leaves no chances for ambiguity when literally interpreted.

Finally, further caution is necessary concerning assumptions about a particular organized religion labeled as pacifist or violent. For instance, while in the popular culture Buddhism is generally branded as a pacifist religion, facts on the ground—such as the Sinhalese violence against
the Tamils in Sri Lanka (justified on the account of sacred writings such as *The Pali Chronicles*), as well as the *Bushido Code* in Japan–have strongly contradicted this assumption. (Little: 1993)

The dominant thinking of the 20th century had claimed that a human progress based on science and technology is undeniably superior to religion as a relevant dimension of human experience. Curiously, despite of freedom of religion in the West, the battle against religion was fought on both sides of the Cold War, as the Princeton scholar, Richard Falk, argued in one of his lectures for the Boston Theological Institute.

This secularism that rested its hopes for the human future on technological innovation was shared by both sides of the cold war that dominated our understanding of political life for almost a half of century after the end of World War II. Both East and West presupposed materialism, whether in the shape of socialism or capitalism and neither envisioned the limits of such a worldview. (Falk: 2003)

This thinking has marginalized and privatized religion to the extent that it would eventually be discredited as immaterial to the public order of human society.

Nevertheless, during the second half of the 20th century, these attitudes started changing as religion became more intellectually respectable, while science started accepting its limitations in explaining various *whys* and *hows* of empirical reality. The relative growth of interest in religion can be measured also by the relative decrease of agnosticism and atheism starting in the 1970s. The *Atlas of Global Christianity* displays the steady decrease of agnosticism and atheism starting with the 1970s. (Agnostics represent the typical skeptics who argue that it is impossible to know if God exists, who profess uncertainty regarding God’s existence, and other non-religious persons such as secularists and materialists. Atheists, on the other hand, are people who reject the idea of any deity, oppose theism and organized religions.)

As presented in Figure 1.3, the extreme political and social changes recorded by the twentieth century took had a great impact on religious adherence. Great changes on agnostic adherence occurred between 1950 and 1970 due to the rise of Communism, especially in North
Figure 1.3 | Agnostic & Atheist Percentage Change 1910–2010
Korea and China, as well as in other countries heavily influenced by the former Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which rose then dropped off in the post-Soviet era. Agnostic adherents are growing in Western countries (USA, Britain, France and Germany) while waning in many of the former Communist states (Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). As for atheists, the patterns of rise and fall reflect the unique political and social situations in each country listed in Figure 1.3, as atheism rose following the Communist revolutions in the Global North (beginning with Russia), as well as in China. Nevertheless, lower birth rates due to the One Child Policy in China and Communism’s collapse in Russia led to a decline of the number of atheists in the past several decades, mainly in Kazakhstan, China, Belarus, Russia and Georgia, leaving North Korea as the primary national stronghold of atheism. (Johnson, Ross: 2009, 28, 30)

In a political sense, in most of the Muslim countries, the incremental failure of Pan-Arabism that followed the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, in conjunction with the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s, the attitudes of debasing religion have experienced a dramatic rift. Since then, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (through militant organizations such as Hamas), and the Shiites from Lebanon (through political and military units such as Hezbollah), have launched strong covert and overt campaigns demanding the return of leadership back to religion. This call for leadership often tapped into situations of disenchantment with the moral vision of their post-colonial secular leaders, while rousing sentiments of victimhood, as well as religious and cultural humiliation at the hand of the West. (Roy: 2008, 91-97)

Stemming from a post-Westphalian heritage that brought a separation between Church and State in Western Europe, it was out of question that Western policymakers would ever see it necessary to receive comprehensive training on the dynamics of religion. As a result, this status quo prevented policymakers from predicting the influence of religious rhetoric over the behavior of the crowds in question, particularly when religious entrepreneurs started challenging public policies that were either contrary to religious ethics, or based on double standards and disconnected from reality. Additionally, due to a strong secularist outlook on social order, for Western policymakers there has been a difficult dynamic to sociologically comprehend and acknowledge the multilayered
types of religious relationships, and yet to remain in organic solidarity with those who were
different in the way they understood not only authority and public order, but also the meaning of

As numerous offenses committed in the name of faith have portrayed religion mostly
as an irritating source of unrest, after the collapse of the Cold War, Mark Juergensmeyer was
amongst the first academics to raise a red flag over the destructive potential of religion, when
At that time, Juergensmeyer argued that, as never before, religious actors became increasingly
popular not only in challenging the secular leadership—which in their view seemed to have failed
in attending to the needs of their ordinary citizen—but also in exerting a new model of public
influence which often challenged the political scientists’ assumptions about predictive behaviorism.
(Juergensmeyer: 1993)

On the basis of church-state separation, the Western policymakers seem yet uninterested
and perhaps unprepared to look into the dynamics of religion, necessary in managing new realities.
Perhaps the only progress made in the United States—which now persuade policymakers to look
into cases of religious freedom—is the passing of the International Religious Freedom Act of
1998 (H.R. 2431), following political pressure exercised by various Christian groups interested
in protecting their evangelical investments in post-communist societies. Even today it is still
difficult to overcome this taboo, since (except for church-based universities) the Western academia
strongly marginalizes religion as a key factor in statecraft. Existing peace studies programs are
poorly funded novelties, giving the young generation of political scientists no option other than
looking at religious conflicts with limited understanding.

The Meaning-Making Process

Under conditions of crisis, as life-or-death questions are existentially raised by those engaged in
conflict, religious meaning becomes the dominant imagined certainty for a person, or an identity
group. Regardless of the individual’s position in the structure of authority, religion becomes an optimistic repository of meaning that is equally shared by all members, thus generating unified attitudes towards the out-group (often enemies), as well as within one’s own group. The basic religious concepts of an institutionalized religion are thus given new meanings, meanings designed to ensure a group’s safety and survival, while often generating irrational political attitudes as desire for certainty is greater than accuracy. During the interpretative process, a limited set of religious doctrines is selectively skewed as to maximize a group’s uniqueness, according to the spirit of time. Therefore, redefined religious concepts such as “God,” “truth,” “divine election,” etc., not only become the belief zone of the group’s leaders, but often contradict the normative interpretations that were gradually formulated and unanimously accepted by religious institutions under conditions of peace. (This particular phenomenological approach that follows through the remaining part of the introduction has been proposed by Professor Raymond G. Helmick, SJ, of Boston College Department of Theology, in his course “Faith Elements in Conflict,” which he has been teaching during the past two decades. (Simion: 2011, 14)

**Doctrine of Revelation**

An essential feature of prominent world religions, the doctrine of revelation is generally defined as an extraordinary event because the supreme Truth is disclosed and communicated to a community that is inherently limited and privileged. Revelation is described as both *natural*, understood in the stability of the laws of physics and cosmic order, and *supernatural*, understood in the disclosure of Truth that originate from the ultimate source. It is the concept of supernatural revelation that plays a crucial role in collective violence, as this empowers charismatic religious entrepreneurs with unquestionable authority. Taking the Abrahamic (or prophetic) faiths as an example, Moses is recognized as *the* spiritual authority because he spoke with God ‘face to face’ on Mount Sinai (Exodus 33:11) when he received *The Ten Commandments*. By accepting *The Ten Commandments*, the Christians and the Muslims view Moses not only as a Jewish leader, but also as a spiritual authority for the non-Jews. (Bowker 1997: 14-15)
Although each religion has a unique approach to peacemaking, a keen evaluation of the role of a spiritual leader sanctioned by the followers as the ‘revealed’ leader, represents a great opportunity for a policymaker to engage the real religious authority, the one who could deeply influence the dynamic of a particular conflict. In other words, by being able to engage a ‘returned’ al-Mahdi (whether in dealing with Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, or with Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq), or by being able to engage a Bodhisattva (when dealing with the Sinhalese leadership in Sri Lanka), the policymaker gains significant ground in designing more effective strategies and tactics for peacemaking. In such a case, the policymaker wins not only the political goodwill of a religious community, but also its devotional support in implementing a policy commended by its religious leader as mandatory.

**Doctrine of Election**

Emerging from the doctrine of revelation, the doctrine of election claims that God offers unlimited blessings and opportunities only to a limited set of people, who are chosen by divine discretion. Under conditions of crisis, this doctrine often becomes a dominant, independent variable that endorses and justifies acts of violence conducted against the “non-chosen” and in exciting sentiments of racism and xenophobia. It is because of this doctrine that conservative Jews believe that they are “the chosen people” through the covenant of circumcision (Berit Milah)—which even entitles them to fully claim ownership over real estate—some Christians believe that “there is no salvation outside the (Christian) Church” (Extra Ecclesiam Nula Salus); while the Muslims strongly proclaim that “there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet,” (La ilaha il Allah, Muhammad-ur-Rasool-Allah), which inherently makes the Umma a chosen race. While on the positive side, the doctrine of election is a source for unity and solidarity, on the negative side, this is an open-ended place for exclusion, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of those of a different faith. When taken to the extreme, doctrine of election emerges into sectarianism not only as an exclusive claim for truth, but also as a form of dualist and conflict generating isolation.
**Doctrine of God**

How a believer defines God is a very complex problem. In general, God is ‘defined’ as the Absolute, the Mysterious Being, the Creator of the Universe, and the Faithful Provider who demands faithfulness in return. The doctrine of God is based on three general understandings such as *polytheism* (Greco-Roman pantheon and Hindu to an extent), *dualism* (Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism), and *monotheism* (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.) In the context of a conflict, defining God often means defining the meaning of life and death—even defining who qualifies as a true human.

*Polytheism* is a belief in numerous deities with special qualities and powers, eternal and superior to humanity. In Western civilization, the polytheistic outlook of various religious cultures have generally offered worldviews based on personifications of uncontrollable supernatural forces that one’s life depended on. Within the Greco-Roman polytheism, the world was perceived as a terrifying place, full of harming forces. Deities as Ares or Mars (god of war), and the god of thunder are nothing but unforgiving supernatural forces. The perpetual antagonistic relationship between these forces is what the world is all about. Just like in Desmond Davis’ movie *The Clash of the Titans*, gods are jealous at each another and fight each other using humans as ammunition. Therefore, humans are nothing more than perpetual victims, bribing their welfare and survival. Bribery was based on the principle of *do ut des* (“I give so that you may give back”) and usually involved the building of a temple, the offering of material gifts and sacrifice—even human as in the classical case of Iphegeneia from the Greek Mythology. (Burkert: 2000, 301-302) Therefore, the meaning of life was to save oneself from these forces, and save what is most meaningful to humanity.

*Dualism* is a faith in two divine forces struggling to control the universe. While monotheism is a product of reconciliation and solidarity, dualism gives birth to violence, as the two forces are antithetical, and perpetually challenge each other. The world is in a complete unrest, justifying and encouraging violence. There is no final glory but temporary winnings. Therefore, dualist
religious cultures are prone to conflict more as a side effect of imagined rivalries between the two antagonistic forces classified as good and evil.

Monotheism is a belief in a glorious, all powerful being. Contrasting the polytheistic world of fear with a monotheist faith in one powerful God–above and beyond everything–the menacing authority of the divine vanishes, as God ‘faces no challenge from another god.’ As a result, all monotheistic religions regard God as a father figure, with whatever this paradigm might imply during collective hostilities. To the Greco-Roman world, the Judeo-Christian monotheism represented a positive force in building the confidence that the world is not necessarily a place of terror, but it is God’s masterpiece, created out of love. God is one, is with us and for us. “The Lord is my light and my salvation: whom shall I fear?” (Psalm 27:1) “Be strong, and let your heart take courage, all you who wait for the Lord” (Psalm 31:24). Nevertheless, God is not only a faithful friend, but also someone who demands faithfulness—a vision common to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—thus becoming highly problematic in moments of crisis.
Chapter 2
The Study of Collective Violence in Religious Scholarship:
A Field Evaluation

Although the reality of collective violence represents a major concern for almost every institutionalized religion, this theme has not been explored at its fullest potential. One of the many simplistic explanations would point out that organized religions have generally focused more on personal violence and less on collective violence. On the other hand, almost all organized religions have placed collective violence in contexts that are less tangible to the daily life, predominantly within narratives of religious eschatology and world renewal myths.

The question of collective violence also depended on how each organized religion defined its role in public leadership, particularly the extent in which a religious institution claimed ownership over the common good and structures of collective defense. In such case, organized religions present various approaches to collective violence, with the western (prophetic) religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) more authoritative and binding in the political sphere, than the eastern (mystical) religions (Hindu, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism.) (Kurtz: 1995, 214-218)

Starting with the 20th century, various scholars began dissecting between the normative or systematic-institutional and the descriptive or phenomenological approach to the study of religion, thus reshaping the perception of collective violence as well. (Figure 2.1) Yet, in
theological schools, this distinction was ignored due to the traditional institutional control over dogmatic accuracy. In some cases this distinction had generated numerous splits, leading to resolute conceptual disagreements between the two approaches. This dichotomy was evident mainly in prominent American university divinity schools where acerb debates often took place when new curricula were being designed. This also tapped into the long debates over the role of the divinity school in the modern university, originally intended to promote critical theological thinking within the university, while also educating religious professionals. (Hough: 2011, 4-8) Most of the traditionally-anchored theological schools, however, rejected the phenomenological approach due to fears that phenomenology encourages syncretistic trends, which might jeopardize the legitimacy of an institutionalized religion.

On the other hand, while social scientists seemed to have favored a quasi-phenomenological approach to the role of religion in collective violence, any initiative of building programmatic and self-sustaining educational bridges with scholars in the field of religious phenomenology received poor attention. As for relationships with scholars who promoted the institutional approach, such attempts for interdisciplinary collaboration have been not just ignored by the superseding secularist ideology, but they were undermined by harsh rhetoric launched by numerous policymakers against religious institutions (often for legitimate reasons), concerning specific cases of conflicts where religion was involved. Furthermore, in situations of crisis, policymakers wrongly assumed that religious institutions maintain total control over the “religious” behavior of contending parties, particularly when these parties acted under the guise of a particular institutionalized religion.

Consequently, current course offerings in religion and peacemaking not only seem to scramble for legitimacy when facing the set curricula, but also scramble between the phenomenological approach and the institutional approach when such courses are to be classified as core or elective to the degree programs. Additionally, the interdisciplinary structure of such courses has been subject to the individual talent and education of the faculty teaching such courses, while interdepartmental collaboration often remains minimal or is non-existent—not to mention the perennial vulnerabilities to budget priorities.
An apparently reliable case about the state of peace studies in the field of religious studies has been made by a report, *Religious Peacemaking in Higher Education: A Survey of*

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**Figure 2.1 | Collective Violence in Religious Studies**
Institutions, prepared and released in 2009 by the New York based Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding. During the summer of 2009, the Tanenbaum Center has conducted twenty-two focused interviews in twelve theological institutions with the intent of assessing the “current availability, interest and opportunity regarding peacemaking as a component of education for religious leadership.” (DuBois, et al: 2009, 1) The institutions surveyed included Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Christian seminaries, Conservative and Reformed Jewish seminaries, a Muslim Chaplaincy program, and a theological consortium.

In spite of some unavoidable inaccuracies, the significance of this report consists in the fact that it highlights several crucial challenges and opportunities for curricular development on religion and peacemaking in religious education.

Challenges are primarily spawned by institutional configurations, path dependencies and academic motivations. First, schools which do not offer explicit training in religious peacemaking claimed that they have already fulfilled the task of peace education through their existing course offerings on ecumenical and interfaith dialogue, religious pluralism, social justice, domestic violence and family counseling, as well as other set programs. Second, in spite of an alleged desire on the part of selected members of the faculty to have such courses included in the set curriculum, all existing courses on religion and peacemaking are exclusively offered as electives. According to the report, “[m]any institutions cited a curriculum that is already ‘full,’ and others suggested that requiring such classes may be problematic…” Third, the interdisciplinary nature of such education frequently stimulates ambivalent reactions against the complexities implied by the social science terminology—whereby tenured faculty members see it as a daunting endeavor.

While the majority of the participants had no difficulties with Tanenbaum’s language choices, a few respondents expressed ambivalence toward specific terms such as ‘peacemaking,’ ‘conflict resolution,’ and ‘professional peacemaking.’ […] These concerns speak to the need for educators to carefully articulate appropriate language for their institutions, as well as to understand student interest in this world. Great care must be taken to identify and respect these boundaries when considering the creation of new initiatives. (DuBois, et al: 2009, 2)
It is difficult to anticipate the extent to which the timing of curricula adjustments, as well as various fiscal trials faced by educational institutions, could lead to a gradual acceptance of education in peacemaking. (This is also a very broad challenge that affects numerous civil societies, because this argument is invariably linked to the question of the role of religion in secular education and in the public life.) Yet, what it is certain at this point in time is that in most cases, educational curricula are deliberated upon by the tenured members of the faculty, who often try to ensure that curricular changes are in the interest of external factors (e.g., fiscal dependencies, constituencies, institutional representation, etc.), as well as internal factors (e.g., intellectual comfort zone, scholarly bias, employment wellbeing, etc.)

In terms of opportunities, the report indicates that the schools that offer courses on religion and peacemaking reported high student interest. First, according to the report,

> [t]his survey found that courses are either oversubscribed or consistently full. Educators at institutions that do not currently offer these courses speculate that students would be very interested were they to be made available.

Second, the student interest is reflected in extracurricular activities, such as involvement with NGOs that perform peace work in zones of ethno-religious conflict, refugees and immigration ministry, etc. As the report indicates,

> student involvement in extracurricular activities related to peacemaking appears high in the institutions surveyed, and several respondents noted this as an opportune area for growth. (DuBois, et al: 2009, 3)

Third, while about 70% of the graduates of theological education follow the traditional path of ministry (which volens-nolens requires peacemaking skills), the remaining 30% of theological education graduates are seeking alternative fields of ministry work (etc., NGOs, etc.), where
an expertise on peacemaking is extremely beneficial. (DuBois: 2009, 3) Fourth, in light of the existing structural challenges that still prevent a more rapid development of peace studies curricula, there is a noticeable interest to find creative ways to bypass some of the challenges listed above. According to this survey, there are two emerging models of education on religion and peacemaking. “In the first, an institution makes a concerted effort to change its internal capacity. In the second, a seminary partners with an outside entity that specializes in peacemaking and conflict resolution.” (DuBois: 2009, 5)

**APSA Religion and Politics Section**

Incremental advancement is being made in the field of political science through the American Political Science Association, which has a dedicated section on “religion and politics.” According to its website (www.apsa-section-religion-and-politics.org), the purpose of this section is “to encourage political scientists to study religions and politics, including issues of church and state, law, morality, political behavior, social justice, and the contributions of faith to political knowledge.” This section publishes its own interdisciplinary journal via Cambridge University Press, offers mentoring to PhD students, and fosters networking among young scholars, job listings and events related to this subject. This section is a commendable initiative with a foreseeable impact over curricula development.

2A The Nature of Religious Scholarship on Collective Violence

During the past two decades, the nature of religious scholarship on collective violence had been reactionary, apologetic and instrumental. It has been reactionary as to repel the secular state’s contentious accusation of complicity to violence; apologetic as to emphasize that religions, in their systematic and institutional form, are entirely pacifistic; and instrumental in the sense that religious institutions, through religious actors, can and do serve as peacemakers.
On the same token, while the *systematic-institutionalist* religious scholars claimed that religion serves the good, and it is entirely pacifistic except when it gets instrumentalized by political forces, the *phenomenologist* religious scholars, such as Raymond G. Helmick, SJ, and R. Scott Appleby, gave further insight by incrementally recognizing religion’s vulnerability to various psycho-cultural forces which drive contextual meaning and zeitgeist fluctuations away from conventional pacifism.

2A1 The Five Trends

Looking into the nature of religious scholarship produced during the past twenty years, one may broadly distinguish five general trends, each revolving around several major themes such as *fundamentalism*, *religious nationalism*, *religious terrorism*, *electoral politics*, and *social justice* and other emerging themes. (Figure 2.2) Each trend is case oriented and situational in nature as driven by specific world events, and by the media reporting. The trend of fundamentalism is primarily structural in nature, as it relates to church-state relations. The trend of religious nationalism is cultural in nature, as it relates to national identity. The trend of terrorism is both structural and cultural in nature, as it addresses issues of political order and cultural self perception. The electoral politics trend is rational in nature, as religious values are invoked to maximize political support during political campaigns. Finally, the social justice trend is structural as it addresses questions of violence generated by the economics, while other emerging themes such as access to natural resources, religious demographics, environmental depletion, etc., will most likely become key concerns for religious and secular leaders alike.

Nevertheless, the scholarly literature produced was hardly synchronous with the timing of these trends, thus explaining the ambiguity that dominated the field of religion and violence. It is also important to emphasize that these trends are broad in nature, as well as porous, as most of the key writings can make the case for more than one category. Therefore, my attempt is to offer a logic that would advance a more articulate mapping of the field to the benefit of religious
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<td><del>1990-1995</del></td>
<td>The nature of religious scholarship is case oriented and situational, as it was triggered by specific events that surfaced global politics in the aftermath of the Cold War. Religion began challenging not only secular governance, but also started redefining the borders of authority over the common good between Church and State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>~2011- onward</td>
<td>EMERGING CHALLENGES: social justice, climate change, resources control, demographics</td>
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The literature can be broadly categorized as following five thematic trends, such as: fundamentalism (structural), religious nationalism (cultural), terrorism (structural), electoral politics (rational), and social justice (structural).
scholars and social scientists. It is highly important to note that, albeit negligible exceptions, the field of religious studies is entirely qualitative and opinion based in nature, in spite of authors’ occasional use of descriptive statistics in their interpretation of facts. However, these studies reflect and often define concepts that are key in the opinion formation process.

During the early 1990s various fundamentalist movements erupted predominantly in post-colonial Muslim states, mainly as a reaction against the secular leadership due to its failure to fulfill its obligations toward the public–thus demanding the return of leadership back to religion. (Helmick 2002, 1)

During mid- and late-1990s, as identity movements erupted in multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, etc., religion was increasingly used as a marker for ethno-national identity.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the focus on religious justifications of terrorism increased dramatically, dominating the public defense agenda. Due to an increased concern with the dangers of incriminating Islam—an attitude stimulated by Samuel Huntington’s notorious Clash of Civilization hypothesis—religiously motivated terrorism become a rather complicated topic, with severe cultural implications leading to a systemic discrimination of the Muslims in the western world.

Nevertheless, during the 2004 electoral campaign in the United States of America, the emphasis shifted away from a religiously motivated terrorism, toward a more practical and instrumental use of religion. By tapping into the power base of conservative American Christians, the Republican Party’s campaign was skewed toward the rhetoric of defending “Christian values” (something that they also did during the 1980s campaigns), while stereotyping the Democratic Party as “anti-Christian”—albeit the Democratic Party’s support of policies that sustain core Christian values, such as tolerance, care for the poor and elders, more welcoming immigration policies, etc.

Given the global financial crisis generated by a predatory banking behavior that emerged mainly from deregulations generated by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, a new trend of
religious social justice seems to emerge. It is premature to anticipate the nature of such advocacy, specifically whether religious institutions will intervene in an overt fashion, or they would more covertly underwrite acts of violence.

The list of the most prominent names linked with the development of religious studies literature on collective violence include theoreticians and practitioners educated in religious studies as well as social sciences. Such names need close scrutiny as their work is not just exemplary, but crucial to the religious understanding of collective violence. Listed alphabetically, such list includes names such as: R. Scott Appleby, Andrea Bartoli, Elise Boulding, John Esposito, Richard Falk, Marc Gopin, Raymond G. Helmick, Douglas M. Johnston, Mark Juergensmeyer, Yehezkel Landau, John Paul Lederach, Bernard Lewis, David Little, Joseph Montville, Geiko Müller-Fahrenholtz, Rodney L. Petersen, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Lisa Schirch, Donald W. Shriver, David Steele, Theo Tschuy, Desmond Tutu, Miroslav Volf, Vamik Volkan, I. William Zartman, Walter Wink, John Witte, John H. Yoder, Howard Zehr, and several others.

2A1a Fundamentalism

Etymologically, fundamentalism implies ‘to establish,’ ‘to lay a foundation,’ etc., and it is used in reference to the basic aspects of an otherwise more complex structure. Historically, fundamentalism is a Christian concept coined during the 1895 Bible Conference at Niagara, in reaction to the liberal movements inside the Protestant churches. The 1895 Conference affirmed what was later known as “the Five Points of Fundamentalism,” such as 1) The Inerrancy of the Bible; 2) The Virgin Birth of Christ; 3) Christ’s Substitutional Atonement; 4) Christ’s The Physical Resurrection and the Physical Return of Christ and 5) Authenticity of Miracles. (Richardson, Davis: 1983)

As a contemporary religious movement, however, fundamentalism is a modern social phenomenon that manifests itself as a reaction against the secular state, damning its failure in fulfilling its duties toward the poor and the marginalized, while demanding public support for the return of leadership to religion. Religious protest movements hold the secular state accountable
for the existence of inequality, social injustice and marginalization, high rate of divorce, out-of-wedlock births, alcoholism, drug abuse, crime, pornography, etc. Additionally, fundamentalism is a reaction movement against social transformations generated by modernity.

With the collapse of the Cold War in 1989, religion resurfaced global politics in the form of protest movements, getting the attention of mass-media, governments, academics and religious institutions. As a result, an academic initiative called the “Fundamentalism Project,” was launched in the early 1990s, as an interdisciplinary study designed to analyze the anti-modernist, anti-secular militant religious movements on five continents and within seven world religious traditions. Reporting on the findings of this initiative, Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan (in their book Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World) considered that fundamentalism is the byproduct of multiple factors, including political structures, political cultures, and political environments, which fuel organized movements such as Islamic Hamas and Hezbollah, the Catholic and Protestant paramilitaries of Northern Ireland, Christian Coalition of the United States, radical Sikhs and Hindu nationalists in India, etc. (Almond, Appleby, Sivan: 2003)

Another prominent work is Richard Antoun’s Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements, which offers a remarkable analysis of themes that cut across the Abrahamic faiths–predominantly in post-colonial states–highlighting differences and similarities with regard to ideologies and strategic action. Antoun’s main argument is that fundamentalism is a form of protest not only against the secular state, but also against modernity. Explained by Richard Antoun, “[f]undamentalism does not refer so much to a set of dogmatic beliefs, to a creed, or to a literal adherence to a sacred text considered infallible. Rather, more broadly it refers to an orientation to the world, both cognitive and affective.” (Antoun: 2001, 3)

As Richard Antoun emphasizes, the determining factors of fundamentalist movements include: crisis related to resources, overpopulation, environmental depletion, media frenzy, transnational migration, cultural and economic globalization, rapid computerization, crime, drugs, etc.
The common features of various fundamentalist movements include elements such as: a doctrinaire following of sacred texts, naïve oversimplifications of complex violent world events, dualistic outlook on life, viewing religion as determining of all domains of culture and civilization, scriptural justification of actions, selective modernization (e.g., using the Internet while demonizing science), traditioning the present (e.g., eating with wooden spoons), etc.

Antoun Richard also argues that the worldview and ethos of fundamentalism is similar throughout the globe, but it takes different cultural forms. These similarities include diminishing respect for values (e.g., Confucian China highly honored scholars, unlike in the Western world), aggressive productivity (e.g., policies elevating quantity over quality, ‘publish-or-perish’ mentality in the Western academia, etc.), commercial efficiency over human sympathy (e.g., ‘no-worker-is-irreplaceable,’ etc.)

According to Antoun Richard, fundamentalist movements seem to be dominant in the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), faiths which are strongly linked with the state.

Jewish fundamentalism manifests itself in the form of rigid patterns of doctrine, violent retaliation for wrongdoing, archaic lifestyle, hostility toward outsiders, and resistance to assimilation. Jewish fundamentalism is driven by memory of anti-Jewish discrimination and persecution, as well as ambivalent relationship between religious Jews living in Israel and the ‘Diaspora.’

Christian fundamentalism manifests itself in the form of religious bigotry, scandalous beliefs, skepticism toward and opposition to science, puritanical sexual ethics, pietistic behavior, xenophobia, etc. In the United States, the determining factors behind various Christian fundamentalist movements are driven by patriotism (progressive patriotic Protestantism associated with American identity–Huntington: 2005); Calvinist ideology (God-given destiny to expand territorially and grow economically and demographically); secularism (elevating nationalism to the level of religion); response to socio-moral crisis (decline of Bible as a moral guide, sexual
revolution, political immorality, decline of family as a result of woman’s emancipation, opposition to science.)

Islamic fundamentalism manifests itself in the form of Patriarchalism, in tendencies to resort to violence within and outside the national community, hostility toward westerners, harsh punishment for violation of religious norms, repression of women in public. In the Muslim world, fundamentalism is also driven by anti-colonialism, outrage at western values, and economic and military domination, etc.

2A1b Nationalism and Religion

The secularist movement built a political leadership by analogy and often in opposition to the Roman Catholic Church mainly by shifting the consciousness of civic loyalty away from the church, toward the nation. This was anchored on a concept of statehood as defined in Hugo Grotius’s *De Belli Ac Pacis*, and successfully implemented in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Nation was to be defined, at least according to Benedict Anderson, as an imagined political community, inherently limited and sovereign. It is “imagined” because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. [...] The nation is imagined as “limited” because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation. [...] It is imagined as “sovereign” because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. [...] Finally, it is imagined as a “community,” because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (Anderson: 1981, 6-8)
Anderson also argued that the development of print media (books and newspapers) generated a sense of simultaneity which coupled the community together in an imagined way. The newspaper soon replaced the morning prayers, and the development of dictionary and grammar—which systematized and uniformized native languages—infused a sense of sacredness into the indigenous languages, sacredness once reserved only to the Latin language. Yet, nationalism had belligerent features due to a nation’s inherent linkage with land ownership. Fighting for the ancestral land becomes everyone’s ‘sacred duty,’ while the ‘Unknown Soldier,’ who dies in defense of his ancestral land, becomes both a myth and a symbolic tool in national political rituals that glorify self-sacrifice. (One must note also that there is a deliberate refusal to identify the identity of the earthly remains of the ‘Unknown Soldier’–as these remains represent a symbol that each member of a nation can or should identify with.)

Focusing on Eastern Europe, Patrick J. Geary argues that the nineteenth century recorded three stages in the development of nationalism: the study of language of culture, the development and imposition of “national values,” and the apogee. (Geary: 2003, 15-40) He then observes that in order to legitimize their power claims, nationalists often invoke famous “ancestors” from a distant past–most of these recognized for their courage in defending the land. (Geary: 2003, 41-62)

Remarkably, the secularist elite that controlled the nationalist discourse had been able deny the formative role of religion in national identity until deep into the second half of the 20th century. Yet, with the reemergence of religion on the public sphere in the early 1970s, along with a visible decline of atheism (Johnson, Ross: 2009, 30-31), religion began to be incrementally recognized as part of the national identity. This not only revalidated the primordialist nationalist meta-narrative, but it revamped its rhetoric by infusing a deeper meaning to the heroism and sacrifice required for the defense of the national territory. For instance, Yael Zerubavel points out how certain secular symbols of Zionism (e.g., Lion at Tel Hai, Trumpledor, Massada, etc.), had been rather discredited by analogy with their religious counterparts (e.g., claim over Haram al-Sharif, East Jerusalem, West Bank, etc.). (Zerubavel: 1997) Furthermore, this led to new forms of violence such as ethno-religious terrorism. (Pedahzur, Perliger: 2009) George Thomas views
religious nationalism powerful enough as to provide an alternative ideology to the nation state, by addressing contradicting worldviews emulated by various social strata, particularly during times of rapid cultural changes. (Thomas: 1989, 8)

Nationalism—both religious and secular—is reinforced through myths and legends of common ancestry (Geary: 2003, 41-62), through the conceptualizations of territory as sacred (Pedahzur, Perliger: 2009), through the symbolic instrumentalization of the peasant (Barreto: 1998), it is rearticulated by the traditional and organic intellectuals (Gramsci: 1971), it is often enforced by the national army (Massad: 2001), and it belongs both to the material and the spiritual domains (Chatterjee: 1993, 6).

Following the collapse of the Cold War, new theorists such as Mark Juergensmeyer, asserted that nationalism is not an exclusive product of modernization, because religious beliefs—which transcended modernity by far—can indeed be a strong unifying force. Thus, religious nationalism has significant power in reshaping political ideologies, with a strong impact on the future of democracy. (Juergensmeyer: 1993, 26-39)

Focusing on nine 20th-century ethnic conflicts, in which millions of people have perished, Theo Tschuy compiled a remarkable volume questioning the role of religion. (Tschuy: 1997) Paul Mojzes, on the other hand, edited a volume focusing on former Yugoslavia. This volume presents a multivalent analysis of religion and nationalism with perspectives offered by western and local analysts, such as Francine Friedman, John Dourley, Mitja Velikonja, Leonard Cohen, N. Gerald Shenk, Srdjan Vrcan, Esad Cimic, Sulejman Mašović, Dragoljub Djordjevic, Radmina Radic, Dimitrije Kalezić, Michael Sells, Mato Zavkic, David Steele, Miroslav Kiš, Miroslav Volf, and others. (Mojzes: 1998) A remarkable regional study focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict is offered by Marc Gopin where religious culture is a powerful tool in the interpretation of the sacred texts. (Gopin: 2002) The Sri Lankan ethno-religious conflict is masterfully presented by David Little (Little: 1993), while the indifference of western policymakers toward various conflicts—which involved religion to a considerable level—is strongly deplored by Samantha Power. (Power: 2002)
Terrorism and Religion

Designed to instill public fear, in general, terrorism is defined as a deliberate threat, or actual use of violence against civilians for political, ideological and religious goals. At the same time, religious terrorism is better understood in the proximity of narratives of apocalyptic violence conducted toward the goals of spiritual cleansing, so as to purify the world from moral pollution.

As terrorists are by nature opportunistic and narcissistic individuals, their persistence (hence effectiveness) is primarily sustained by a public approval generated by the public’s discontent with the official authority. At the secular level, a terrorist is often viewed as a hero, as long as his/her actions are designed to harm and punish the oppressor. When religion enters the arena—by providing a spiritual logic and meaning to a terrorist’s action—the outcome of violence often reaches both therapeutic and restorative dimensions for the victimized group. God’s intervention by violent means appears when the world is in a terrible need for cleansing from spiritual impurities and sins reflected in the behavior of the leaders. (Stern: 2003; Juergensmeyer: 2003, 121-250)

Nevertheless, religious terrorism can be analyzed not only from the perspective of spiritual meaning, but more so from rational and institutional perspectives.

Historically, as Walter Laqueur informs, terrorism is an old phenomenon, yet more widely spread during the modern era. Conducted for religious goals, and informed by religious meaning, history recounts the existence of infamous cases of religious terrorism conducted by groups such as zealots, assassins and thugs. (Laqueur: 1999, 10-12)

The Zealots: Joseph Flavius, in his work De Bello Judaico (On The Jewish War) Book VII, Chapter 8, describes the Zealots (‘sicari’) as a Jewish faction allegedly involved during the Massada collective suicide, about two millennia ago. The sicari’s tactic was to stab their enemies by daylight and during holidays, using a short dagger (sica) hidden under their coats. Most of their assassinations were carried out in public as to attract public attention. They killed money
lenders, Romans, other prominent Jews (one high priest), torched the archives and the palace of the Herodian dynasts, etc. (Laqueur: 1999, 10; Stern: 2003, xxi-xxii)

The Assassins: An offshoot of the Muslim Ismaili sect, the 11th century order of the Assassins conducted political murder through suicide missions. By sending a Takfir (deceiving mission), the Assassins killed their enemies, then committed suicide under the belief that they would inherit the eternal life of the paradise. As most of their murders were conducted in public, the Assassins enjoyed the display of the public vengeance, which in return, generated a distorted self-perception of martyrdom. The assassins were mainly associated with the Shiite Muslims, and killed Sunni Muslims, including the chief minister of the Sultan of Baghdad. Yet, following the Mongol invasion of 1270, they ceased to exist as a political force and have gradually disappeared. (Lewis: 2003)

The Thugs: The seventeenth century India presented a brand of terrorism carried out as an act of worship. Thuggee (hence the origin of the English ‘thug’) was a menacing priest who worshipped the vengeful goddess Kali. In order to safeguard the village against the terrifying goddess, a thuggae strangled travelers and foreigners, and offered them as sacrifice to Kali, who, in return, would cease to threaten the village for one thousand years. In 1828, Lord William Bentinck, Governor General of India, outlawed this cult and executed most of its clergy. Yet, Martine van Woerkens suggests that the murderous acts performed by the Thuggee were mainly a reactionary movement against the British occupation, and even placed a shadow of doubt over the cultic nature of the assassinations performed by the Thuggaes. (von Woerkens: 2002)

Modern Secular Terrorism: Modern terrorism originates in the nation-state movements. It was carried out by secret societies of patriots and anarchists, who were inspired by various thinkers who advocated propaganda by deed. Karl Heinzen was the main proponent of weapons of mass destruction such as rockets, poison gases, and land mines. Johann Most, the author of The Anarchist Cookbook, and editor the New York-based newspaper Freiheit, proposed that bad rulers must be killed by dynamite and poison, fire and sword. Johann Most also pioneered the concept of a letter bomb. Michael Bakunin, in his book Principles of Revolution, proposed that
revolutionaries should kill through poison, knife, rope, etc., while in his Revolutionary Catechism, Bakunin proposed rules on how to conduct acts of terrorism. (Laqueur: 1999, 12-22)

With the current increase of international terrorism, states have implemented peaceful and coercive responses within the framework of international law. The peaceful responses include all non-forcible measures against terrorist organizations and states assisting terrorists, through international treatises intended to coordinate the national action taken by each contracting state. Peaceful responses are also collective in nature and do not involve the use of armed force. The coercible response however involves the use of armed force in the territory of another state, or in areas not subject to national sovereignty (international airspace, high seas). This response comes either from one state at its own initiative, or from a group of states following the recommendation of the UN Security Council. The coercive response involves destroying terrorist bases and killing terrorists. (Cassese: 2005, 463-481)

Modern Religious Terrorism: In her book on religious terrorism, Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Sterns takes a structuralist approach (as she considers religious terrorism an expression of grievances generated by social alienation, humiliation, demographics, history and territorial disputes), as well as a rational choice approach by interviewing numerous religious terrorists about the logic of their acts. (Stern 2003: 3-137) Thus she demonstrates how social conditions tend to inspire charismatic leaders, who either become ideologues of mass destruction, or become involved in hands-on operations as group leaders (Stern 2003: 147-171), and “lone-wolf avengers,” or even operate within networks and franchises. (Stern: 2003, 172-282)

Unlike Jessica Sterns, Mark Juergensmeyer–in his book Terror in the Mind of God–takes a cultural approach to religious terrorism, as he analyzes the meaning of sacred killing inside cultures of violence, and explores also its phenomenological developments under the umbrella of organized religions such as Christianity (reconstruction theology and the Christian Identity movement, abortion clinic attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, and Northern Ireland); Judaism (Baruch Goldstein, the assassination of Rabin, and Kahane); Islam (the World Trade Center bombing and Hamas suicide missions); Sikhism (the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Beant Singh); and
Buddhism (Aum Shinrikyo and the Tokyo subway gas attack.) Although Juergensmeyer’s approach appeals to religious institutionalism in the sense that it highlights how official narratives become misappropriated and interpreted based on an agenda of violence, he does make a strong case for a rational choice analysis, as he provides a “logic of religious violence.” In the final part of his work, Juergensmeyer looks into aspects of how an individual selects the context and setting as to enhance the meaning of cosmic war, invention of enemy, warrior’s power, and the destruction of violence. (Juergensmeyer: 2003)

More broad in nature, as to address the dynamics between sacred text and meaning-making within structure mobilization, is a work authored by Lee Griffith, *The War on Terrorism and the Terror of God*. In this work, Griffith focuses on Christianity, where he uses history as an explanatory tool in order to highlight the meaning of terror, its psychology, ethics and religious hermeneutics, indicating also the ineffectiveness of counterterrorism, as it justifies and re-enforces terrorism itself. (Griffith: 2002)

Religious terrorism is also instrumental in nature in the sense that it is used as a tool for instant swaps of elites in and out of power (Keppel: 2002), and for power maximization within the paradigm of rationality, as terrorist ideologues such as Osama bin Laden use this tactic to maximize his popularity toward the goal of reestablishing the Caliphate. (Esposito: 2002 3-25) As a result, the general duty of religion is to sacralize action and to validate the agent charged with a “sacred duty,” as the agent is often projected as a chosen instrument to implement divine justice.

*2A1d Electoral Politics*

The power of religious rhetoric in electoral politics has been severely underrepresented in the religious scholarship. Cases indicate that under conditions of fear and uncertainty, the language of religion has been a powerful tool in the electoral process not only in increasing a political group’s cohesion around a particular slogan or policy, but in maximizing its involvement in the voting process through partisan identification. (Barnes: 1997, 125-129)
A significant case that displays the contentious use of religious meta-rhetoric (mainly projected as religious values), is made by the 2004 presidential elections in the United States. During the electoral campaign of 2004 the neoconservative political configurations, closely associated with the Republican Party, managed to appropriate religious values at the core of their rhetoric and thus ensured George W. Bush’s reelection as President of the United States—in spite of the declining economy and a failed war in Iraq. One of the side effects of the religious rhetoric directed against abortion and sexual orientation led to acts of violence, such as assassinations of medical doctors performing abortion, and an increased WASP (White Anglo Saxon Protestant) bigotry.

One of the best selling works written on this subject from the inside of the phenomenon is Jim Wallis’ *God’s Politics: Why the Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn’t Get It*. As Wallis writes,

> [s]ince when did believing in God and having moral values make you pro-war, pro-rich, and pro-Republican? And since when did promoting and pursuing a progressive social agenda with a concern for economic security, health care, and educational opportunity mean you had to put faith in God aside? While the Right in America has hijacked the language of faith to prop up its political agenda—an agenda not all people of faith support—the Left hasn’t done much better, largely ignoring faith and continually separating moral discourse and personal ethics from public policy. While the Right argues that God’s way is ‘their’ way, the Left pursues an unrealistic separation of religious values from morally grounded political leadership. The consequence is a false choice between ideological religion and soulless politics. The effect of this dilemma was made clear in the 2004 presidential election. (Jim Wallis *God’s Politics*, front flap description)

Another notable work, written in a timely fashion, but from the outside of the phenomenon is Geiko Müller-Fahrenholtz’s, *America’s Battle for God: A European Christian Looks at Civil Religion*, where the author underlines religious rhetoric as part of the political culture, hence prone to electoral manipulations. As he writes,
it took me a while to recognize that the religious rhetoric of leaders in the United States is part and parcel of the nation’s political culture. (Müller-Fahrenholtz 2007, 2)

2A1e Social Justice & Other Emerging Themes

The banking deregulations which emerged after the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 are considered as a leading cause to the 2008 global financial crisis. As the economic factor is always a source for violence, it is very likely that religious rhetoric will soon join new movements and sacred protests advocating social justice. By their own nature, organized religions have been keen on issues of poverty and social justice. Thus, in theory, resource-sharing is mainly regarded as a universal right of every human being. Nevertheless, under conditions of uncertainty and conflict, religious sectarianism as well as institutional attitudes become dominant factors which generate ideologies of divine entitlement over land and natural resources, thus generating conditions of poverty for another communities.

The social justice trend is apparently conditioned by un-systematized multivocality, as apparently determined by controversies over positivistic arguments within the economic theory, and amateuresque arguments demonizing Capitalism.

The United Nations Millennium Summit of October 2000 launched a program called the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) with the intent of committing the international community to expand international development as to attain global social and economic justice. Thus, all member states of the United Nations have pledged that by the year 2015, they would 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) develop a global partnership for development. At the UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals in September 2010, the new UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that,
It is clear that improvements in the lives of the poor have been unacceptably slow, and some hard-won gains are being eroded by the climate, food and economic crises. The world possesses the resources and knowledge to ensure that even the poorest countries, and others held back by disease, geographic isolation or civil strife, can be empowered to achieve the MDGs. (*Millennium Development Goals Report*, 2010: 3).

Seeing it as a natural part of their mission, numerous faith communities joined the process launched by the MDG program, not only by tracing doctrinal parallels between their teachings and these goals, but also in the sense of developing advocacy venues toward a pragmatic implementation via religious institutions as well. As two Boston area theologians noted,

[i]n our curriculum in seminaries and theological schools, the MDGs might be matched theologically in the following way: 1) The question of poverty and hunger draws us to consider whether all are made in the image of God; 2) Reducing child mortality calls us to reflect on the incarnation, that our hope came into the world as a child; 3) Promoting gender equality draws us to reflect on the mystery of unity and diversity—that of gender, ethnicity and race; 4) The goal of achieving universal primary education reminds us that education, schools and universities, have been the gift of the Church to western culture; 5) Improving maternal health reminds us that the health of the mother is key to the health of the community; 6) The work of combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other Diseases drives us to ask whether calamity/suffering is payback for sin; 7) The task of ensuring environmental sustainability calls us to be not only “stewards of the mysteries of God” (Col. 1:9) but also “stewards of the earth” (Gen. 2:15); and 8) developing networks for development raises the question of those with whom we are willing to associate, to issues of ‘exclusion and embrace.’

(Douglas, Petersen: 2010, 165-167)

Advocacy venues such as “Bread for the World,” and others, were established by religious institutions, for the purpose of implementing MDG via religious networks. Furthermore, in order to raise awareness and encourage cooperation from across various social and ideological levels, in 2005 an Anglican priest and economist, Sabina Alekire together with Edmund Newell edited a book what was suggestively titled, *What Can One Person Do? Faith to Heal a Broken*
World, where they recommend eight types of action that could be taken at the individual level in order to confront a poverty-stricken world and make a lasting change. (Alekire, Newell: 2005) Another influential work, Ambassadors of Hope, was authored by Robert Seiple (a former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom) offering a Christian vision for global engagement, peace and reconciliation, particularly in regions ethno-religious conflicts (Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan, Lebanon, etc.) (Seiple: 2004)

Additionally, current concerns over the fair share of natural resources (e.g., water, oil, etc.), access to public services (e.g., education, medical care, pensions, etc.), new arms races, environmental sustainability concerns, etc., will invariably lead to international conflicts, which involve religious institutions as well. Thus, in addition to international public policy over climate change such as the Kyoto Protocol (policy situated exclusively under the jurisdiction of the states), religious figures such as the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I (a.k.a. ‘The Green Patriarch’), have launched strong environmental advocacy programs, inviting other non-state actors to join the effort.

2B The Essence of Religious Scholarship on Collective Violence

The study of religion has been traditionally developed by religious institutions in a systematic way–focusing on the basic constitutive elements of organized religion: doctrine, ethics, and worship (Todoran, Zăgrean: 1991, 290-291; Friedli: 2000, 51)–while, more recently, a non-institutional or phenomenological approach emerged. (Figure 2.1; Figure 2.3)

The essence religious scholarship on collective violence seems to be severely fragmented in the literature produced during the past two decades. The distinction between the systematic and phenomenological approaches to religion has been poorly articulated, and the literature is often unreliable given the apologetic trend that dominated the analysis of religion’s role in conflict. A
case in point can be made in reference to Kharijite Islam. When during the 1960s Islam was not incriminated by the Western popular culture as a religion promoting violence, scholars such as Majid Khadduri felt comfortable giving a well balanced perspective on Islam’s theory and practice of collective violence in his work, War and Peace in the Law of Islam. In the post-Huntingtonian era, however, such balanced presentation is often missing, as the most prominent literature tends to be polarized between Islamic apologists, who overtly emphasize the exclusively peaceful traits of Islam (Sachedina 2001, 102-130), and assailants who try to portray Islam as an exclusively violent religion, by overemphasizing the Kharijite tendencies toward anarchy and violence. (Esposito: 2002, 41-61)

History demonstrates that the struggle for truthfulness and legitimacy is inherent in every organized religion, and that this struggle has often led to violent conflicts or it has endorsed military campaigns. At the same time, religions also tried continuously to engage each other in various forms of dialogue. Thus, recent interfaith exchanges generated by the new phenomenon of globalization indicated that organized religions displayed various levels of mutual engagements in doctrine, ethics and worship. First, a higher level of engagement can be noted at the ethical level, due to a cross-cultural theoretical comfort with the Natural Law, and due to the process of socialization in multicultural societies. Second, due to the normative theoretical complexities exhibited by organized religions, exchanges at the doctrinal level are far more reduced and limited to the theological elite only. Third, as worship can often be viewed as the private sphere of an institutionalized religion, exchanges at the level of rituals are more ambivalent. As each religion claims to be the true one, worship is often dominated by sentiments of loyalty and intimacy with the divine, thus setting clear borders that determine various levels of comfort within an organized religion itself. Furthermore, worship is both private and public, and each institutionalized religion sets its spiritual borders when connecting with members of other faiths. Therefore, given the power of ritual in strengthening a culturally diverse group, the tactical recommendation for peace-g geared dialogue is to build interfaith rituals that acknowledge and respect doctrinal borders, which express a shared humanity, and sensitivity to doctrinal loyalties. This will also help build trust at
THE ESSENCE OF RELIGIOUS SCHOLARSHIP ON COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

RELIGIOUS PHENOMENOLOGY

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
THEMES:
1) Sacrifice, Martyrdom
2) Forgiveness & Reconciliation
3) Pietism
4) Restorative Justice

RELIGIOUS ANTHROPOLOGY
THEMES:
1) Mimetic Theory
2) Scapegoating
3) Taboos
4) Theodicies

SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
THEMES:
1) Religious Conflict heresy & legitimacy
2) Messianism
3) Non-Violence Gandhi, Social Change

GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGY

GENERAL SOCIOLOGY

INTERPRETATIVE PROCESS
DOMINANT THEMES

1) Divinity
   a) Ottoman
   b) Yoderian
   c) Problem of Evil
2) Humanity
   a) instrumental
   b) good / elected
   c) corrupt / rejected
3) Sacred Texts
   a) violent
   b) peaceful
   c) ambivalent

NORMATIVE/INSTITUTIONAL

DOCTRINE
Normative: Historical Cumulative
Crisis-Determined: Kairos & Momentum

ETHICS
Normative: Universalistic & Embracing of Diversity
Crisis-Determined: Exclusivist & Justifying of Violence

WORSHIP
Normative: General Complex
Crisis-Determined: Simplistic & Crisis Customized

CONCLUSIONS: AMBIVALENT OUTCOMES
NORMATIVE: violence-justifying or peace-justifying
CRISIS-DETERMINED: violence-generating or peace-generating

FIGURE 2.3 | THE ESSENCE OF RELIGIOUS SCHOLARSHIP ON COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
the inter-personal level. Rituals built around doctrinal borders are more successful because they will avoid fear of syncretism, which delegitimize one’s claim for truth.

2B1 The Systematic-Institutional Approach

Institutionalized religions offer various perspectives on collective violence predominantly within situations not only where this is regarded as a sacred duty to the spiritual benefit of a member, but also for material benefit and membership growth. Cases range from religious doctrines such as the functional dynamism between $Li$ (ethical standard) and $Fa$ (law as unpleasant necessity) in attaining the $Ping$ (peace, harmony, fairness, equality) in Confucianism (Chen: 2004, 27-50); the jurisprudential elaborations on $Arthasastra$ (the art of ways and means) versus $Dharma$ (general principles that maintain the universe) in Hinduism (Nanda: 2004, 51-62); jurisprudential stipulations emerging from $halacha$ (Rosenne: 2004, 63-94) in relation to cases of $rodef$ or $moyser$ (Appleby: 1999, 84); the rationalist debates over $jus\ ad\ belum$ and $jus\ in\ belo$ within the Just War Theory of Western Christianity (Brundage: 1976, 99-139); or the division of the world between $dar\ al\ Islam$ (house of Islam), $dar\ al\ harb$ (house of sword), and $dar\ al\ sulh$ (house of treaty) in the Law of Jihad (Khadduri: 1969) One must note that eastern religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and Taoism) present stronger non-violent doctrines by analogy with the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), in the sense that they are strongly anchored in the doctrine of $ahimsa$, or non-violence, and less linked with the state. (Kurtz: 1995, 214-218)

In the context of wars of the 20th century, religious institutions addressed the question of human violence in a more symptomatic fashion, either by implementing peace doctrines through structure mobilization, such as in Gandhi’s political movement–where the religious concept of $ahimsa$ (non-violence) was implemented as the law of the universe, that was considered morally superior and practical in the sense that it works even in the most unlikely situations (Kurtz: 1995, 221)–or by issuing various statements that defined the position of particular structures of religious authority. Samples of statements could include documents such as the $Pacem\ in\ Terris$ of April 11,

Of particular interest are statements and resolutions issued by international secular bodies in reference to religion, such as: *U.N. General Assembly Resolution 58/128* of 19 December 2003 (“On the promotion of religious and cultural understanding, harmony and cooperation”); *U.N. General Assembly Resolution 59/23* of 11 November 2004 (“On the promotion of inter-religious dialogue”); *U.N. General Assembly Resolution 59/199* of 20 December 2004 (“On the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance”); *U.N. General Assembly Resolution 61/221* of 20 December 2006 (“Promoting inter-religious dialogue, understanding, and cooperation for peace through the creation of a High-Level Dialogue.”)

In the second part of chapter 4 of this dissertation, the ambivalent potential of organized religions in peacemaking and violence will be explored from the perspective of doctrine, ethics and worship. Therefore, it is crucial for the political scientist and religious scholar alike to have
a basic understanding of religious doctrines on violence by analogy with theories of religious phenomenology, and carefully study the official statements issued by religious authorities, vis-à-vis political theories and public policy, as to develop comprehensive understandings of particular conflicts, and also assess their public impact.

2B2 The Phenomenological Approach

The phenomenological approach to the study of religious violence focuses on core themes on religion, which are both trans-cultural meta-narratives (that stay at the heart of organized religions), as well as byproducts of spontaneous religious imagination of selected group leaders. Yet, less strict in a theoretical sense are the quasi-phenomenological interpretations of the instrumental use of religious violence. Located between the normative and the phenomenological approaches to religion, these quasi-phenomenological interpretations of violence are generated either by misunderstandings, or by misappropriations of official teachings of organized religions. As a result, the border between institutionalized religion and religious phenomenology becomes porous, while these quasi-phenomenological interpretations not only tend to promote and justify violence, but also turn themselves subversive to the religious institutions, which they intend to represent.

In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of collective violence from the perspective of religious phenomenology, one must note that this analysis needs to focus on venues (e.g., religious anthropology, religious psychology and sociology of religion), as well as on themes (e.g., sacrifice, martyrdom, suicide, forgiveness, reconciliation, pietism, mimesis, scapegoating, taboos, theodicies, religious racism, ritual, paradox, mortality, immortality, myth-formation, good, evil, etc.), which will offer deep insight on the unexpected power of religion. In general terms, the phenomenological approach to religious violence was developed during the 20th century more through the lenses of anthropology, psychology, sociology, political theology—now valuable tools in the study of collective violence.
Various religious anthropologists such as Rudolf Otto, James Fraser, Jacques Derrida, Victor Turner, Edward Bruner (Turner, Bruner: 1986), Mircea Eliade (1987, 2005), Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss (1981) and others, provided leading theories on religious phenomenology which either gave insight, or fully explored the phenomenon of personal and collective violence.

One of the arguably most prominent representatives in the field is the French Academician René Girard. His leading work on the phenomenon of religious violence has been as consistent as leading and path breaking. Girard’s work is structured around the mythmaking (Girard: 1977), violence and the sacred (Girard: 1979), scapegoat (Girard: 1989) sacrifice (Adams, Girard: 1993), and Mimetic Theory (Girard: 2008).

A hastily dismissed scholar by political theorists and religious scholars alike, René Girard’s writings dealt consistently with the theme of violence and the sacred, while building a social theory of violence that bridges the fields of political science and religious scholarship in the sense that it explains the power of ritual violence in social order. According to Girard, violence is “the process itself when two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire through physical or other means.” (Girard, Williams: 1996: 9) Unless controlled, the tension between the contenders to the object of desire (“mimetic twins”) can result into violence and murder. Therefore, religion intervenes as a catalyst in preventing this rivalry through the notion of sacrifice, which is a ritualistic performance of stylized violence meant to prevent social disintegration. The power of sacrifice consists in the fact that it releases the passionate desire for violence into a surrogate victim usually referred to as a scapegoat. In a practical sense, ritual violence plays also an instrumental role, serving as an educational tool for the society, indicating the foreseeable dangers posed by an uncontrolled violence between the contenders or “mimetic twins.” For Girard, “sacrifice is not to be denied, but it can be diverted to anther object,” (Girard: 1979, 4) via the scapegoat process, a solution of interlocked relationships that mimetic violence infuses into a group, whereby, the imitation of the imitator emerges into an
infinite feedback loop of competition toward the object of desire. Thus, to avoid the spread of the violence emerging from mimetic rivalry, another violence must replace it, but on a third party. This third party provides the antagonists with an object they can really share in the sense that the mimetic rivals can rush together against that victim to destroy it, or drive it away. Ironically, the initial violence that emerges from mimetic rivalry produces a twisted narrative (even a myth) that obscures the very process of redirecting of the surrogate victimization. Girard notably insists that the chosen victim of the scapegoat ritual (the surrogate victim) “is not a substitute for some particularly endangered individual, nor is it offered up to some individual of particularly bloodthirsty temperament. Rather, it is a substitute for all the members of the community, offered up by the members themselves. The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence.” (Girard, 1979: 8)

Informed by theological rigor, René Girard’s thinking not only changes the contours of a public discourse that falsely associate all violence with religion, but demonstrates the positive role of religion and religious ritual in creating and maintaining social order. In Girard’s own words, “[r]eligion shelters us from violence just as violence seeks shelter in religion.” (Girard, Williams: 1996: 25)

Other anthropologists have been less concerned with fundamental theories, studying instead the religion’s potential for structure mobilization, as deciphered from various apocalyptic mythologies. A notable example is Lawrence E. Sullivan’s work Icanchu’s Drum: An Orientation to Meaning in South American Religions, that focuses on post-colonial South American native religious interpretation of anti-colonial struggle.

2B2b Religious Psychology

The psychological approach to religious violence has been highly popular not only in international conflicts, but more so in approaches to local conflicts. The field is vast with regard to a purely psychological analysis, yet highly minimalist when it comes to the intersection with religion. This cross-disciplinary trend on religious psychology—as applied to collective violence—is
rather new in the history of the modern state, and it was mainly inspired by events such as the
peaceful post-Apartheid transition in South Africa, and became anchored in the systematic work
developed by the Mennonite Church. In fact, the Mennonite psychological approach is currently
the dominant approach in the evolving field of peace studies in religious education.

The psychological dynamics of forgiveness and reconciliation had been wide enough
and open to any cultural innovation and insight to the extent that practitioners have managed to
develop specific tools. Currently, the dominant psychological models in peace studies and religion
include forgiveness and reconciliation, as well as restorative justice.

Forgiveness and Reconciliation

The sentiments of forgiveness and reconciliation represent a remarkable dimension of
human spirit, capable of bypassing any rationality and cultural conventionality. Staying at the
heart of numerous organized religions, forgiveness and reconciliation offer new dynamics that
defeat not only fear, anxiety, and revenge, but stay at the core of social stability. The literature
on this topic is vast. Yet, insofar as our study is concerned with analyzing the current fields of
political science and religious studies on the question of collective violence, the set of literature
available is rather limited.

Strongly influenced by the bloodless transition from Apartheid to racial pluralism in South
Africa—a transition engineered and closely monitored by the Nobel Peace Laureates, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu and President Nelson Mandela—the concept of forgiveness and reconciliation
became the dominant approach to collective violence in the religious studies literature that
followed the collapse of the Cold War. A highly influential book is Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s
personal memoir, No Future Without Forgiveness, written during his time as chair of The Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, which emphasizes the need to discover a “third way” in the
healing of the national psyche. (Tutu: 2000) This concept had been largely embraced as the
dominant religious paradigm in conflict resolution due to its inherently religious dimension, as
well as for practical effectiveness.
However, given the complexity of religion in terms of structures and doctrinal variety, and in light of perhaps the most pragmatic and constructive presence of religion in peacemaking, numerous practitioners adopted the concept of reconciliation as a dominant strategy. Reconciliation can often be simplistic for reasons of pragmatic implementation, as it bypasses complexities of causality within collective violence, and deconstructs and eventually eliminates the element of fear between the perpetrator and the victim. By appealing to strategies emergent from counseling psychology in combination minimalist views of forgiveness which exists in almost every religion, doctrinal entanglements can be avoided as well. As a result, relationships can be restored and reestablished on a deeper spiritual foundation, thus leading to a shared amnesia of the unfortunate past. A quite successful volume of essays written by field experts, religious and lay leaders, academics and policymakers, was published by Templeton Foundation, as proceedings of a symposium held at Harvard in 1999. (Helmick, Petersen: 2001) In this volume, a breakthrough method was launched by Olga Botcharova, indicating seven steps toward revenge vs seven steps toward reconciliation, which re-projects the victim mentality away from the self, back unto the victimizer—from “why me” into “why them.” (Helmick, Petersen: 2001, 298)

While this field offers a wide array of literature, a reliable practical guide on how to conduct the process of forgiveness and reconciliation was recently written by Thomas Porter (a former Boston trial lawyer and now a minister), titled *The Spirit and Art of Conflict Transformation*. (Porter: 2010)

*Sacrifice and Martyrdom*

*Sacrifice* is generally defined as an offering of something either animate or inanimate in a ritual procedure which establishes and mobilizes a relationship of mutuality between the one who offers and the receiver. It is conducted for the purpose of expiating fault and sin, and it involves drama, ritual, and action. (Bowker: 1997, 833) On the other hand, *martyrdom* refers to a voluntary act of suffering death on behalf of one’s faith, often for refusing to denounce it, and it appears as a practice in Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. (Doniger: 1999, 695-696; Bowker:
It is a passive act of suffering death, rather than active in the sense of participating directly in one’s own killing, case in which the act itself would be considered suicide. (Owens: 2004, 3-4)

It is important to note that most of the victims of martyrdom and self-sacrifice are young, and their choice of death—whether passively (martyrdom), or actively as suicide (kamikaze, or Jihad)—is related to multiple environmental factors, such as indoctrination and despair, desire to restore injustices, desire to enjoy afterlife and desire to be remembered by the posterity. (Fields: 2004, 23-81) For instance, Early Christian martyrologies record an educated mother, Vivia Perpetua, who embraced her martyrdom at the age of twenty-two. (Wallis: 2004, 699) During World War II, over ninety percent of the Japanese kamikaze pilots were between eighteen and twenty-four years old; while most of the contemporary Muslim suicide bombers are teenagers. Ironically, numerous records of the suicidal terrorism display a personality dominated by a powerful conflict and detachment between the environment that is to be left behind and the mission that is about to be embraced. (Fields: 2004, 23-54) This psychology is made obvious in a kamikaze testimonial from Lieutenant Masahisa Uemura of the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps, Yamato Unit, who died in battle in the Philippine Sea area on October 26, 1944. Prior to his suicidal mission, he writes a letter to his daughter, Motoko, a letter now translated in English by Bill Gordon, the author of a web site on Japanese kamikaze pilots affiliated with Wesleyan University.

The letter was first published in Japanese by Yasukuni Jinja in 1994 in a volume *Farewell, We Are Our Country's Mountain Cherry Blossoms*, in Tokyo, Japan.
“Letter to My Beloved Child
from Lieutenant Masahisa Uemura.”

Motoko,

You often looked and smiled at my face. You also slept in my arms, and we took baths together. When you grow up and want to know about me, ask your mother and Aunt Kayo.

My photo album has been left for you at home. I gave you the name Motoko, hoping you would be a gentle, tender-hearted, and caring person.

I want to make sure you are happy when you grow up and become a splendid bride, and even though I die without you knowing me, you must never feel sad.

When you grow up and want to meet me, please come to Kudan. And if you pray deeply, surely your father’s face will show itself within your heart. I believe you are happy. Since your birth you started to show a close resemblance to me, and other people would often say that when they saw little Motoko they felt like they were meeting me. Your uncle and aunt will take good care of you with you being their only hope, and your mother will only survive by keeping in mind your happiness throughout your entire lifetime. Even though something happens to me, you must certainly not think of yourself as a child without a father. I am always protecting you. Please be a person who takes loving care of others.

When you grow up and begin to think about me, please read this letter.

Father

P.S. In my airplane, I keep as a charm a doll you had as a toy when you were born. So it means Motoko was together with Father. I tell you this because my being here without your knowing makes my heart ache. (Jinja: 1994, 17-19)

As one could easily determine from this remarkable testimony, Uemura’s perception of humanity is dominated by what one could call a psychotic disorder, a partial withdrawal from reality, and illogical patterns of thinking in relation to the self, friends and enemies.
Restorative Justice

In general, there are at least four types of social justice that the victim can seek from the offender. From the perspective of severity, these include distributive justice (fair distribution of tangible and/or intangible goods), procedural justice (fair play rather than fair share), restorative or corrective (reparation of harm, and restoration of relationships, victim seeking the offender’s apology and serious contrition), and retributive (victim seeking direct or indirect revenge.)

Inherent in the ethical tradition of Eastern Christianity—the fifth largest organized religion in the world, bearing a strong impact on humanity—justice is viewed as restorative in nature. Prominent definitions of justice offered by the Roman jurists Celsus and Ulpianus had been adopted by the Byzantine State as guiding principles in defining and attaining social justice through Canon Law into the society. While Celsus (+129AD) defined justice as “the art of good and equity,” (jus est ars boni et aequi), Ulpianus (170-228AD) emphasized its distributive aspect, saying that, “justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give everyone his due.” (Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas, jus suum cuique tribuendi) Thus, the core of justice is non-violence, as “the precepts of justice are these: to live honestly, to harm no one, and to give everyone his due.” [Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere (Justinian, Institutes I, I, 3; Digest, I, I, 10)]

In the Western religious scholarship, however, the restorative justice concept is anchored in the Mennonite tradition, and recently promoted by scholars such as Howard Zehr, whose writings has re-ignited a consciousness movement applicable to various sectors of society, particularly within the filed of criminal justice.

2B2c Religious Sociology and Conflict

Numerous sociologists made remarkable contributions to the understanding of the link between religion and collective violence, most of them taking a formal approach, by focusing primarily on organized religion (e.g., Max Weber), while others tackled with religion in its
phenomenological articulacy, such as Peter Berger and others. (Berger: 1969; Berger: 1999) In collective violence, religion plays multiple roles, based on its institutionalized interests, which can be classified as objective (institutional growth), subjective (politics of heresy), and inter-subjective (truth claims linked with political factors from the outside of religion.)

According to the sociologists, conflict is a natural drive toward social transformation, and it can play constructive and destructive roles. Therefore, constructive conflicts need to be engaged and controlled so that they would not take destructive forms, because, as Georg Simmel puts it, “[s]ociety needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and disharmony, of association and competition, of favorable and unfavorable tendencies.” (Simmel: 1971, 72; Kurtz: 1995, 212)

Some of the contemporary sociologists of religion believe that the return of religion to the public square during the second half of the 20th century was caused by the crisis of modernism and multiculturalism to offer not only economic security, but also meaning to political claims and collective identity.

A comprehensive outlook on the role of religion in collective violence—from a sociological perspective—is offered by Lester Kurtz, in his work Gods in the Global Village, where he skillfully combines resources emerging from religious phenomenology and organized religion. (Kurtz: 1995, 211-240) In his overview, Kurtz acknowledges religion’s dual power to generate both violence and peace. Religion generates violence for reasons emerging from the politics of heresy—which is a conflict within religion itself—and legitimacy, which is a conflict that emerges between remote organized religions, or between religion and other external factors.

**Religion and Violence**

Concerning the potential for violence, Kurtz notes that the most intense forms of religious violence are those generated by what he calls “the politics of heresy.” A complex phenomenon in itself, heresy generates violence either inside the religion itself—between religious authorities and heretics (Kurtz: 1986), or
in relations between sibling religions, such as Judaism and Islam, with same roots, many overlapping beliefs and practices, but significant divergences as well. Such controversy combines the intensity of religious conflict with that of a sort of kinship. (Kurtz: 1995, 212)

On the question of the politics of heresy, within an organized religion, a heretic is a “deviant insider,” perpetually suspected of treason against its dogmas and configuration of authority. The heretic is also suspected of treason against one’s kinship during times of violent confrontations or social transformation. For Kurtz, heresy is a socially constructed phenomenon identifiable through several characteristics. First, heresy is simultaneously near and remote; second, it is constructed in the midst of social conflicts; third, heresy deconstructs and recreates a group’s solidarity; fourth, it generates new doctrines and ideologies that are embedded into a group’s consciousness; and fifthly heresy is associated with ritual action, thus solidifying its internal structure which can often serve as the foundation for a new religion. (Kurtz: 1986, 3ff.; Kurtz: 1995, 213)

The intensity of divergence and conflict between sibling religions, or between confessions stemming from a common religion, is maintained both by dogmatic confrontations and by a common memory, which, at some point in history, it involved a form of political or dogmatic ‘betrayal’.

On the question of legitimacy, numerous sociologists tap into the Girardian approach to religion, whereby religious violence plays a therapeutic role in maintaining social cohesion. As a result, religion considers violence instrumental if conducted for “legitimate reasons,” case in which, violence seeks refuge in religion due to the obscure interests of the entrepreneurs of violence, acting under the guise of religion. Based on this Girardian presupposition, world religions generally support peace, yet under extraordinary circumstances they objectively commend the instrumental use of violence, both for missionary purpose and for safeguarding the common good. During such extraordinary circumstances, death—whether self-inflicted (suicidal) or passively accepted (martyrdom)—overtly receives a sacred mandate to be performed or accepted. (Ferguson: 1977)
A dilemma is posed by various messianic eschatologies with regard to the obscure line between divine revelation—commonly understood as a privileged moment in human history—and the rational interests and the personality of the spiritual leader, claiming such a divine mandate; a case in point being the 1885 Madhist Revolt in Sudan. In general, messianic eschatology emerges and is expected to deliver results during times of social transformation. As put by Lester Kurtz,

[m]essianic eschatologies, found especially in the Western religions, of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, are replete with beliefs about the unanticipated turn of events that will elevate the downtrodden. Similar perspectives are found in Eastern religions in which a bodhisattva or a god may intervene, or things will just work the way they superficially appear to be (e.g., one’s rewards may come in the next incarnation.) (Kurtz: 1995, 219)

As messianic eschatologies advocate the reestablishment of world order in chaotic environments, violence is purely transitory and instrumental in nature. They represent a time when bypassing or contradicting norms of violence—as generally accepted by the religion under which it operates—is of no concern.

**Religion and Non-Violence**

Religion shelters non-violence as much as violence. Records from the history of humanity demonstrate that violence is only episodic, and that the bulk of one’s lifetime is spent in non-violent social relationships. Additionally, religion generated strong arguments for non-violence in light of the negative memory and the long-term negative impact of violence upon human community.

Recent examples of religious advocacy for non-violence point to Mahatma Gandhi’s active pacifism—based on sacred arguments from the Bhagavad-Gita—while the output of various social movements (e.g., women’s movements, environmental movements, etc..) displayed the strong contribution of religion to a non-violent social transformation.
In addition to resources of non-violence imported from organized religions, advocates of non-violence such as Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr., are often taken as exemplars in offering strategies and tactics in advancing social transformation. (Kurtz: 1995, 225-227)

Mahatma Gandhi’s formula of active pacifism—analogous in many ways to the pastoral formula advocated by Orthodox Christianity—emphasizes the necessity to distinguish between the actor and the act (e.g., between the sinner and sin), while deflecting the natural sentiments of repulsion toward the act/sin, away from the actor/sinner. The great benefit of such rationality is that it appeals to the consciousness of the actor/sinner, while giving the actor/sinner a chance to correct the damaging behavior in the absence of fear of retribution. This also leads to the virtualization of the enemy by effectively importing the scapegoat mechanism to the benefit of the contending parties. Additionally, the virtualization of the enemy and the spiritualization of stories of violence, often transcend religious boundaries, so that the pacifist advocacy would not be regarded as the monopoly, or the agenda of one particular religious group.

Recently, women movements focused on a non-violent transformation of patriarchal religious traditions, not only to ensure equal access to ritual performance, but also to sacralize gender equality. Numerous contemporary critics such as Mary Daly and Rosemary Radford Ruether have emphasized that the exclusion of women from leadership roles led to the construction of patriarchal religious traditions that sacralized man’s exclusive authority over ritual. In order to rectify this mishap of history, Ruether, advocates the construction of “an alternative history and tradition that supports the inclusion and personhood of women.” (Ruether: 1981, 391; Kurtz: 1995, 235)

The current realities of climate change anticipate an unfortunate competition over resources—thus leading to various forms of collective violence ranging from full scale war to terrorism, banditry, piracy, corporate oppression, etc.,—unless the current exploitation of resources, as well as humanity’s current attitude toward the environment changes its course.

Environmental movements emerged as forms of non-violent protests directed mainly against patterns of excessive and unsustainable consumption. As Kurtz argues, “[m]any of
the religious traditions—like the goddess worship of Old Europe—that emphasize a harmonic relationship with the natural environment have been destroyed by industrialization.” (Kurtz: 1995, 234) Nevertheless, a natural theological argument is inherent even in religions that have been accused for their complicity to industrialization either through their direct contribution, or through their indifference about environmental depletion.

Numerous religious scholars have joined the chorus of the environmentalist movement, such as James Nash, Ian Bradley, Drew Christiansen, Calvin B. DeWitt, Mary Evelyn Tucker, John Chryssavgis, etc., by raising questions on personal and social responsibility—while spiritual leaders such as Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople (a.k.a. “the Green Patriarch”), took a leading role in such campaign, thus encouraging other spiritual leaders to take a similar stand. (Chryssavgis: 1999; 2003)
Chapter 3
The Study of Collective Violence in Political Science:
A Field Evaluation

The training that policymakers and political scientists have traditionally received on the subject of collective violence was primarily as a subfield of law, comparative politics and international relations theory, within broad topics dealing with issues of peace, security, and justice. Therefore, the following pages will outline the theoretical study of collective violence in comparative politics and international relations theory, by highlighting major concepts, theories and basic literature, within which collective violence can be classified.

3A Comparative Politics

The study of collective violence within the field of comparative politics evolved along the lines of the three competing paths: rational choice, culturalism and structuralism. Since their inception, these three paths have been in strong competition with one another, and it is only recently that comparativists adopted an ambitious intellectual undertaking to develop integrative approaches. (Lichback, Zuckerman: 1997, 3-16)
Emerging from the field of economics, as well as from studies of voting behavior in the United States (Downs: 1957), the Rational Choice theory evolved as an attractive method of studying public policy, so that politics could be explained in rational terms (Wiarda: 2000, 95) Margaret Levi, in her overview of the Rational Choice theory (Levi: 1997, 19-40), indicated that rational choice theorists simply attempt to explain the rationality behind institutional establishments and change, property rights, and the capacity of organizations and parties to achieve political ends. Despite disagreements over its usefulness, as Levi indicates, theoreticians have demonstrated insofar that Rational Choice theory reveals how intentional and rational actors generate collective outcomes and aggregate behavior. They also demonstrated that although the choice of each actor may be intentional and individually rational, the results may be unintentional and socially irrational. Thus, to the joy of its detractors, Rational Choice theory laid to rest the myths that individual interests equal collective action, or that a collective action necessarily produces a collective good.

Rational Choice theory is anchored on the paradigm of the interaction between private ownership and public good—such as in the case of villagers who have traditionally owned livestock privately and land in common. The strength of rational choice is evident in its capacity to generate testable theory by providing a plausible story that identifies causal mechanisms linking independent and dependent variables that will produce falsifiable hypotheses. Some rational choice scholars, such as the proponents of Carl G Hempel’s “Covering Law” approach, even claim that assumptions of rationality are directly observable and testable. (Levi: 1997, 20) Covering law model contends that a statement is explained if it is derived from a set of laws, together with certain factual statements. The laws must be true general statements, and subject to certain restriction as to exclude accidental explanations. Yet, the laws need not to be universal and the derivation of the conclusion may be inductive rather than deductive. (Hempel: 1965, chapter 12)
Mancur Olson, in his work *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, emphasized the concept of “strategic interaction,” demonstrating that each individual makes decisions based on the probable decisions of others. (Olson: 1971, 42-43) Later, Douglass North, in his work, *Structure and Change in Economic History*, combined Olson’s concept of “strategic interaction” with what he called “regulated interaction”—whereby institutions such as the State, prohibit some options while facilitating others. (North: 1982, 20-32) Later, in his work *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, North advanced his theory by emphasizing the concept of “path dependence,” indicating that past actions (history) determine the nature of decisions reached by political actors. “Path dependence,” he writes, “is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through time.” (North: 1990, 98)

Numerous practitioners of the Rational Choice theory focused on the roles played by the state, politics, and various groups and organizations in a country’s economic and political development. Yet, given the appeal to economics, as a way of explaining the logic, Robert Bates insists that Rational Choice theory is not neoclassical economics (Levi: 1997, 20) because the rational interests of the actors do not always produce economic benefit for themselves.

3A1a The Rational Choice Model and Collective Violence

The rational choice model offers the micro-foundations for macro-processes by generating testable hypotheses about what the beliefs of the actors had to be, and what they could not have been. This is also the core logic of the five-step model for hypothesis testing, when stating the null hypothesis ($H_0$) and the research hypothesis ($H_1$), in inferential statistics. (Healey: 2007, 158-161) It also generates hypotheses about what the critical junctures were in the decision-making process, which led to violent or peaceful relationships.

Rational choice model has four important components, such as strategic interaction, the assumption of rationality, game theory, and equilibrium, all of which can be identified in the Prisoner Dilemma game. (Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 95-105; Munck 2002; Tsebelis, 1991)
Strategic Interaction: Anthony Downs, Kenneth Arrow, Mancur Olson, Douglass North, and others, have generally emphasized that rational and strategic individuals make choices within specific constraints in order to obtain their desired ends. Their decisions rest on the probable actions of the others, whose personal outcomes depend on what others do. This is often observable at a macro-level, in cases of war tensions between groups or states. Yet, rational choice analysis operates mainly on the assumption that actors make rational decisions mainly in situations of uncertainty.

The Assumption of Rationality: As the meaning of being ‘rational’ is highly subjective, the key of the matter rests upon the subtle way in which the preferences of the individual are being defined. This is due to the fact that rational choice is not exclusively confined to the wealth-maximizing assumption (characteristic to the economics), it does not require the assumption that individuals are self-interested, and individuals often make deliberately altruistic decisions, particularly in times of conflict. Furthermore, additional constraints over behavior emerge from scarcity and regulated interactions. (Levi: 1997, 24)

Game Theory: The Game Theory attempts to capture human behavior in strategic situations, whereby one’s success depends on the choices of others. This theory was also developed to analyze competitions in which one individual does better at another’s expense (zero-sum). In contentious politics, Game Theory entails four types of scenarios, such as prisoner’s dilemma, deadlock, chicken and assurance. (Tsebelis: 1991; Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 101-105) Nonetheless, Game Theory poses two problems such as the unreasonably high calculative capacity assumed by the decision makers, and the “folk theorem” which demonstrates that in multi-person interactions the outcome is indeterminate because there are multiple equilibria in games in which numerous individuals engage in repeated play, thus affecting the final resolution. (Levi: 1997: 29-30)

The Assumption of Equilibrium: The assumption of equilibrium indicates that actors respond to each others’ decisions until each is at the position from which no improvement is possible. Therefore, the assumption of equilibrium is “not an assumption that all behavior is static, or even that all interactions among rational individuals produce an equilibrium,” (Levi: 1997, 27)
but a process “in which actors respond to each other’s decisions until each is at a position from which no improvement is possible” (Levi: 1997, 23)

3A1b Prisoner’s Dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma is a highly popular scenario that involves threats, promises and time pressures. It is considered the most practical and beneficial game of logic, particularly by the advocates of realism in international security, and by the advocates of power politics. As described by Conteh-Morgan,

[The story goes like this: there was once a governor of a prison who had two prisoners whom he could not execute without a voluntary confession from at least one. He therefore ordered that one prisoner be brought before him. He offered this first prisoner his freedom and a sum of money if he would confess the crime at least a day before the second prisoner did so, so that the second prisoner could be convicted for the crime and be executed. However, if the second prisoner could confess at least a day before him, then that prisoner would be freed and rewarded, and he (the first prisoner) would be executed. But if both of them confess the same day, they will each be spared from execution and get ten years in prison. If neither of them confesses, then both will be set free without any reward. In the end, the governor told the first prisoner to beware because his fellow prisoner was a crook who might hurry to confess so that he would pocket the reward. After the first prisoner was returned to his cell to think about his answer, the second prisoner was summoned by the governor and told the same. How each of them will spend the night alone to ponder the dilemma and arrive at a choice. (Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 103-104)

The first theoretical condition of the game relies on the assumption that individuals are rational and tend to make choices expected to maximize their own benefit. (Figure 3.1) In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the priority of preferences for Prisoner 1 is DC>CC>DD>CD, while the priority of preference for Prisoner 2 is CD>CC>DD>DC. This priority is set by the value of incentives: cooperate first (in exchange for money and freedom); defect while trusting that the other prisoner will defect as well (in exchange for freedom); cooperate at the same time with the other prisoner
(in exchange for not being executed, yet getting ten years in prison), and defect at the risk that the other prisoner will cooperate (thus ending being executed.)

The second theoretical condition is contingent upon the rules of the game, such as the conditions of punishment or reward set by the governor of the prison. Thus, in order for the game to follow its logic, the rules of the game have to be stable.

Third, strategic interaction is a key component because actors make decisions not only on the basis of the consequences of their own behavior, but also on the expectations about the possible choices of other actors. For instance, Prisoner 1 makes choices on the basis of his calculations of the payoffs he expects to receive in the future, while at the same time, the real payoff is constrained by the strategic calculations of Prisoner 2.

Fourth, assuming that both prisoners confess, although this is not the most socially optimal decision, a state of equilibrium is reached because no other strategic interaction between the two prisoners is expected, as they both would be spared from execution, while spending ten years in prison–and the governor himself made the prisoners confess. At the same time, the most socially optimal decision for both prisoners would have been for both
to defect by refusing to confess because they would have been freed. However, this option does not assume equilibrium because each prisoner is under the pressure of incentives (freedom and money) and trusting the other prisoner at the expense of ones own death.

3A1c Path Dependency theory

Largely used in history, economics and other social sciences, Path Dependency theory is closely associated with rationality as to explain constraints that derive from past actions. The sequence of events is causally important because events in the distant past can initiate particular chains of causation that have effects in the present. Thus, once a region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high, while institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal as well. (Levi: 1997, 28) According to Paul David, as quoted by Margaret Levi, path dependency happens under three necessary conditions: strong technical interrelatedness, scale economies, and habituation. (Levi: 1997, 28) Building upon Douglass North’s work, Robert Putnam, in his book, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, uses the path dependency theory in an explicitly deterministic way, when claiming that the fourteenth century events in Italy generated a “virtuous cycle” of civic engagement in Northern Italy, and a “vicious cycle” of distrust in Southern Italy. (Putnam: 1994, 121-162; Levi 1997, 29)


Margaret Levi contends that “rational choice, properly understood and properly undertaken, rests on an increasingly realistic psychology of individual action and interaction, and institutional framework that accounts for what constrains and facilitates human behavior, and a powerful model of aggregation of individual choices.” (Levi: 1997, 35) This can also explain the instrumental use of collective violence by elected leaders for electoral purpose, either externally–upon a remote community which cannot offer any electoral benefit (e.g., Iraq War)–or internally against organized crime (e.g., war on drugs, etc.) Additionally, the instrumental use of violence is often serves as
a tactic to distract public scrutiny from unpopular internal events. Nevertheless, Levi has made strong efforts to view actors as both *rational* and *ethical* beings, in an attempt to overcome the assumption that individuals are exclusively selfish. Consequently, more successful results in conflict management and policymaking can be accomplished if one specifies the conditions under which more instrumental motivations are triggered, such as individuals acting ethically even if it means bearing tangible costs. (Levi: 1991; 1997a; 1997b)

In conclusion, in comparative analysis, the empirical rational choice model is in its relative infancy because it is still in transition from ‘analytics’ to ‘analytic narrative.’ Structuralists increasingly adopt rational choice models, yet they are still split on their views of the origins and effects of institutions and preferences. At the same time, rationalists increasingly accept key concerns raised by the culturalists, particularly when viewing actors as ethical beings.

3A2 Structuralism

Loosely defined, structuralism is a method of analyzing the interrelatedness of patterns in social, economic, cultural and political life.

While the historical and the rational choice variants of institutionalism display crucial points of tangency (Thelen: 1999, 369-371), the contemporary historical institutional scholarship confronts the Rational Choice theory and culturalism as dual threats, rather than as sets of useful tools, which might confidently *engage, appropriate*, and *incorporate* the role of institutions in comparative politics. Starting from the position that persons are embedded social agents operating within structural fields, Ira Katznelson—in her essay, “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics”—outlines the key role of history in structural macroanalysis. She does so with the claim that history provides the context for understanding how institutions operate under various conditions, and also in an attempt to distill structuralism from the dominant rational choice approach to institutions. Unlike culturalism, historical institutionalism rejects the tendency to
reduce reality to signification, while unlike rationalism, it disallows the reduction of agency to effectively utilitarian individuals. (Katznelson: 1997, 86-87; Thelen: 1999)

Some of the foundational minds of the studying of structuralism include Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber, John Stuart Mill, and others. The pioneering work on the structural-configurative analysis is Alexis de Tocqueville’s classical book *Democracy in America*. As one of the most influential political texts ever written on America, Tocqueville treats the United States both as a complex configuration of elements, and as an elaboration over the archetype of equality. Tocqueville emphasized that the United States is situated in place and time not as a hermetically sealed “case”, but as a relationally inscribed instance in *history*, and *development*, while also remaining an *open case*. Its *history* (e.g., quality of institutions, values, demography) is composed in relationship to the experiences of other countries and to global flows of information, ideology and people. Its *development* is situated in relation to larger trends and processes that affect the modern western world more generally. Last but not least, America is presented as the most important *open case*, shaping prospects, choices, and trajectories to be followed by other countries. Tocqueville emphasized that human nature is neither fixed as benevolent, nor as interest-seeking. Rather, human behavior is conditioned on the structural and institutional shaping of values and mores. In other words, structures and actors make democracy, while in return, democracy remakes structures and actors. (Katznelson: 1997, 97)

3A2a Macro-Analysis

Prominent modern scholars, such as Perry Anderson, Reinhard Bendix, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Samuel Huntington, Barrington Moore, Stein Rokkan, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Immanuel Wallerstein focused their research on historical changes by elaborating on the intersection between large-scale processes and institutions. They rejected Durkheim’s view of society as a static, distinct, unitary, comprehensive, integrated, lawful patterning of social and cultural relationships. Instead, they emphasized the dynamic aspect of structuralism, by emphasizing that in particular places, social life and action are shaped by processes, relationships,
and forms of interaction. Taking a macro-analytical approach, they developed a probabilistic approach to structure, starting from the hypothesis that the most significant processes that shape human identities, interests, and interaction are in fact large-scale features of modernity (e.g., capitalist development, market rationality, state-building, secularization, political and scientific revolution, communication, etc.)

_Barrington Moore:_ In a breakthrough book, Barrington Moore started his comparative analysis of routes to modernity, aware that comparisons can often test the accepted historical explanations, thus leading to more stable new generalizations. Moore was able to chart three distinctive revolutions as routes toward modernity: _bourgeois, abortive_ and _communist_. Each route displays a specific configuration of regime, class and revolution, with subordinate combinations that are dominant in specific cases. While embedded in historical materialism, Moore demonstrated that in spite of the power of social sciences, moral political theory is still relevant. (Moore: 1993; Katznelson: 1997, 88-90)

_Theda Skocpol:_ Barrington Moore’s student, Theda Skocpol, argued that Moore’s emphasis on structures and processes of class relations did not fully explain the political mechanisms involved in the process. Her key argument was that modernization represents a key factor which generates changes to economic and political institutions. While taking the nation-state as the unit of analysis, in her work _States and Social Revolutions_, Skocpol highlighted three characteristics of the macro-analytic analysis of revolutions such as _structuralism, internationalism_ and _statism_. _Structuralism_ identifies the objective conditions necessary for the emergence of revolutionary situations. _Internationalism_ traces how transnational economic relations and the international structure of competing states influence domestic developments. _Statism_ indicates that the emergence of revolutionary situations centers on the relationship of the state with its administrative and coercive powers, and military competitors abroad, and with the dominant classes at home. (Skocpol: 1979, 31; Katznelson: 1997, 90-94)
Institutionalism and Neo-Institutionalism

According to Howard J. Wiarda, “fifty years ago institutions were the main and virtually only thing that comparative politics studied.” (Wiarda: 2000, 97) Institutional theory claims to focus on the deeper aspects of social structure and organized behavior, by looking into the processes by which group configurations, rules, norms, and routines become established in time as authoritative guidelines for collective behavior. (Scott: 2004, 408-414) More specifically, institutional analysis connects institutional design to the formation and existence of political agents who possess particular clusters of preferences, interests and identities. Historic institutionalism, on the other hand, explores the creation, dissemination, adoption, change, decline, and abandonment of such elements. (Wildavsky: 1987, 3-21) Neo-institutionalism is a new trend that revisits the classical approach to institutionalism in light of the new perspectives offered by the study of political process, political behavior, decision making, as well as the study of developed nations, state-society relations, corporatism, Rational Choice theory, transitions toward democracy, and public policy. New historical institutionalism shifted away from the macrostructures of the state, economy, and civil society, focusing instead on institutions understood both as rules of transaction between these sites, and as the actual array of formal organizations inside each macrostructure. (Katznelson: 1997, 94-102; Wiarda: 2000, 97)

The Role of State

Institutions emerged as ligatures fastening sites, relationships, and large-scale processes to each other. The state is the most important form of such ligature between the structures of the society, thus having the monopoly over the means of coercion in shaping the public domain, and as coherent actor with vast autonomy. As a result, the configuration of institutions determine, modify and order individual motives, as well as the relations and procedures that mark how parts of the state interact with each other, and how they are tied into groups in society, and outside of it. According to Joel S. Migdal,
[b]ehaviorists’ concerns with the characteristics, attitudes, and behavior of individuals and groups tended to minimize historical factors and miss the important impact that varying forms of organization could have. At the same time, Marxism’s determinism seemed to deny the importance of institutional diversity. (Migdal: 1997, 219)

In this sense the relationship between state and society is often complex, ranging from a weak civil society, specific to a totalitarian state (Gleason: 1997) and nation state, to a subsidiary state—designed to protect both the state against abusive individuals, or groups of individuals, as well as to protect the civil society and its groups against the abuse of the state—(Giddens: 2003; Hollenbach: 2002), or the 21st century state, case in which globalization and supra-national corporatism weakens its unity and omnipotence. (Migdal: 1997, 222)

3A2c The Study of Revolutions

Revolutions are complex events of collective violence which have preoccupied most of the great minds in the history of humanity. In general, revolutions are generated by oppression, state’s inability to manage difficulties (fiscal crises, famine, war, etc.), and by radical ideas. (Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 157-174)

In terms of process, the natural history of revolutions entails several basic features observed in cases analyzed insofar. The intellectuals abandon the old regime. The state makes desperate reforms to meet social criticism. The regime’s collapse is ignited not necessarily by the action of the revolutionary opposition, but by its own inability to manage the crisis. Following the regime’s collapse, the revolutionary opposition splits between conservatives, radicals and moderates, and usually the moderates seize the reins of the state and attempt to use organizational forms inherited from the old regime, before more radical forms of organization can emerge. Significant changes occur when the more radical forms of organization succeed in supplanting the moderates with new trajectories. The disorder generated by a revolution is usually followed by a coercive rule of the new regime. The struggle between the moderates and the radicals frequently allows military
leaders to move into positions of leadership to provide stability. (Goldstone: 1994, 2-4; Skocpol: 1979, 172-173)

The main theories of revolution focused on psychological factors (Davies: 1962; Gurr: 1970), system disequilibrium, and resource mobilization.

The psychological factors indicate that high expectations for better life generate resentments and aggression, particularly when contacts with more advanced societies are increased. Additionally, the “J-Curve” of economic growth (meaning a period of growing and prosperity is followed by a sharp economic downturn), generates feelings of deprivation and aggression. (Bremmer: 2006)

The system disequilibrium indicates that when various subsystems of a society (economy, political system, training for new positions) grow at different rates, people become disoriented and radical ideologies start spreading, while combined with other intervening factors (war, famine, etc.), might bring the government down. (Huntington: 1968)

The Resource Mobilization theory demonstrates that political violence is likely to occur only when the challengers are able to mobilize the massive resources needed to generate a revolution. (Tilly: 1978)

The Structural theories of revolutions contend that revolutions begin from combinations of factors such as state weakness, conflict between state and elites, and a popular uprising. (Goldstone: 1994, 6)

States and Elites: States are organizations built upon internal resources coming from society, and are in competition with other states. The question raised by the structural theorists is what kinds of state organizations are capable to absorb fiscal or military crises, by comparison with other states? Whatever the answer is, the general outlook is that a state’s stability as well as its internal collapse depends on the relationship between state and elites. Additionally, the loyalty of the army is a crucial factor, which could either be used by the state to suppress the uprising, or can sympathize with the population and assist in the regime’s collapse.
Popular uprisings emerge from grievances that threaten the livelihoods of peasants and urban workers. While the grievances of the peasants are directed against the landlords or against the state, the grievances of the urban workers are centered on high food prices and unemployment. The peasant revolts are usually small-scale, local and easily suppressed that can only occur if the key ingredients (e.g., peasant solidarity, peasant capacity and landlord vulnerability, etc.) exist simultaneously. For urban uprisings to occur some key factors (e.g., a city’s layout and scale, police’s size and effectiveness, etc.), need to work to the advantage of the contenders.

Frontiers of Research

Jack A. Goldstone, in his introductory study to a collection of key theoretical texts on revolutions, concluded that

the study of revolutions remains much like the study of earthquakes. When one occurs, scholars try to make sense of the data they have collected and to build theories to account for the next one.

(Goldstone: 1994, 17)

The frontiers of research on the study of revolutions point to four major themes, such as: outcomes of revolutions, nationalism and revolution, ideology and conjunctures in which revolutions occur.

Outcomes: In general, full scale revolutions led to more powerful centralized governments, as well as to more equitable allocation of land, greater healthcare and education. Yet, no improvements are recorded in terms of income equity and economic growth.

Nationalism and Revolution: Nationalist ideologies fostered revolutions because the focus of loyalty shifted from the monarch, or foreign domination, to the nation. (Anderson: 1981; Goldstone: 1994, 13)

Ideology: The main role of ideologies in revolutions is that they summarize diverse grievances and interests under a single set of opposition symbols, while enforcing a Manichaeian outlook on life, by appealing to a struggle between good and evil. In numerous instances, ideologies
are products of revolutions, rather than sources for revolutions. Furthermore, ideologies shape revolutions as much as revolutions are being shaped by ideologies. (Goldstone: 1994, 14-15)

Conjuncture: Revolutionary conjunctures include demographic growth, state financial distress, food shortage, unemployment, price inflation, and divisions between state and elites. Additionally, external factors such as the interest and willingness of the international superpowers to support or resist revolutionary movements affect the success of revolutions. (Goldstone: 1994, 16)

3A3 Culturalism

In his paper, “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” Marc Howard Ross offers a comprehensive analysis of culturalism by summarizing the themes, the contributions, and the critiques of the cultural theory in comparative politics. (Ross: 1997, 42-80)

Usually, political scientists are uncomfortable with culture, because it complicates issues of evidence and it violates canons of methodological individualism. Regarded as a system of meaning and as a basis for social and political identity, Ross defines culture as

a framework for organizing the world, for locating the self and others in it, for making sense of the actions and interpreting motives of others, for grounding an analysis of interests, for linking collective identities to political action, and for motivating people and groups towards some actions and away from others. (Ross: 1997, 42)

Ross further warns that culture cannot be broadly defined so as to include any domain of life, because its effects on collective action and political life are indirect.

Mark Lichback noted that culturalists have distinguished between subjective and intersubjective views of culture, in the sense that the subjective views focus on how individuals internalize individual values and attitudes, while the intersubjective views focus on shared
meanings and identities that constitute the symbolic, expressive and interpretive part of social life. (Lichback: 1997, 245) Given its vast intricacies, Marc Ross focused on the intersubjective approach not only because of its vastness, but also because as a method, the intersubjective approach to culture is highly relevant to the study of politics.

In his mapping of culturalism, Marc Howard Ross indentified and explored four general categories: 1) role of culture in cultural analysis, 2) five themes in the cultural analysis of politics, 3) five critiques of cultural studies of politics, and 4) the centrality of interpretation in cultural analyses of politics.

3A3a Culture and Cultural Analysis

The most significant contributions of the cultural analysis is that culture frames the context in which politics occur, it links individual and collective identities, it defines a group’s boundaries and organizes actions between groups, it provides a framework for interpreting motives and actions of others, and it provides resources for political motivation and organization.

In general, culture represents a “historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols,” through which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about, and attitudes toward life. David Laitin states that “cultural identity becomes a political resource,” (Laitin: 1986, 11) in the sense that it “defines the symbolic and material objects people consider valuable and worth fighting over,” as Ross explains. (Ross: 1997, 46) As a result, culture shapes a conflict by defining how one should understand the others’ motives, and what social action is appropriate to be taken.

In terms of the context in which politics occur, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in their classic work *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* have identified key patterns of political attitudes and political cultures. (Almond, Verba: 1989: 45-62)

Concerning the link between individual and collective identity, culture renders some actions that are reasonable, while removing alternatives, which on rational grounds might be equally plausible. As a result, culture reinforces the bounds between individual and collective identities.
by constructing internal images of the external world on the basis of shared historical experiences, and the ideology of a *linked fate*. According to Marc Ross, “many objects of identification are associated with primary sensations such as smell, taste and sound.” These sensations “acquire intense affective meaning and only later acquire a cognitive component.” (Ross: 1997, 47) Thus, under conditions of uncertainty and threat, cultural attachments are powerful because they are connected to the very primary feelings of identity.

Culture defines the groups’ boundaries and organizes action within and between them, because groups need to reinforce their self-perception as natural (often biological) units.

Considering the inherent ambiguity of actions and words, a shared cultural framework is necessary in interpreting the motives and the actions of others, as well as in linking the individual action to a broader social setting. In this sense, Aaron Wildavsky argues that rational choice theorists make serious errors in taking interests as given, because while interests are more universal, cultural motives are empirically knowable only to a particular cultural context; thus extremely powerful. (Ross: 1997, 50; Wildavsky: 1987)

Culture also provides resources for political organization and motivation because leaders and groups use cultural resources for organization and mobilization in order to achieve goals that could not be pursued directly. According to anthropologist Abner Cohen, as quoted by Marc H. Ross, cultural organizations strengthen the group’s solidarity and mobilization because they define its *distinctiveness*, they intensify *internal communication*, they offer *mechanisms for decision making*, they provide *authority for implementing decisions and for representing the group*, they provide *political ideology*, and they *meet the need for discipline through ceremonials and rituals*, where “religion provides an ideal ‘blueprint’ for the development of an informal political organization.” (Ross: 1997, 52-53; Cohen: 1969, 201-210)
Marc Ross also identifies and examines five approaches in cultural analysis, such as culture and personality studies, civic culture tradition, culture and political process, political ritual, and culture and political violence.

1. Culture and Personality Studies

Prior to World War II, a popular branch of comparative politics was the national character studies, which focused on stereotyping (e.g., “all Germans are authoritarian, all Frenchmen are great lovers, all Italians eat pizza… Arabs are all terrorists…” (Wiarda: 2000, 65-66) These national character studies have been discredited as lacking scientific plausibility. Nevertheless, Lucien Pye and Edward Banfield developed a methodological analysis by proposing that national character studies might have strong elements of plausibility. Specifically, Lucien Pye produced data on crucial psychological variables, through in-depth psychoanalytic interviews with Burmese elites, thus demonstrating a strong link between individual identity of the elites and the Burmese nation-building. Edward Banfield, on the other hand, coined the concept of “Amoral Familism,” as he focused his research on southern Italy, albeit in a less psychoanalytic method. Banfield’s conclusion was that the rule, whereby one can only trust and cooperate with members of one’s immediate family, is taught from an early age, and it is supported and reinforced in various domains of the daily life. (Banfield: 1958, 83-101, 155-158 ) As Banfield writes,

[s]ome readers may feel that amoral familism, or something very much akin to it, exists in every society, the American no less than the southern Italian. Our answer to this is that amoral familism is a pattern or syndrome; a society exhibiting some of the constituent elements of the syndrome is decisively different from one exhibiting all of them together. (Banfield: 1958, 11)

2. Civic Culture Tradition

In the late 1950s Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba conducted a research project in five countries (United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico), in an effort to identify
patterns of political culture and attitudes. Publishing their findings in their work, *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba highlighted three distinctive political cultures: *participant, subject* and *parochial*. These political cultures are reflected in *attitudes* citizens express toward the political system, *trust* in political authorities, levels of political *involvement*, and *beliefs* concerning the efficacy of individual and or of collective political actions. Later, Ronald Inglehart contended that the attitudes of satisfaction determine democratic stability and economical development (Inglehart: 1988), while Robert Putnam added that democracy is most effective where there is a strong tradition of civic participation. (Putnam: 1993)

3. Culture and Political Process

Abner Cohen believes that culture provides a strategic basis for political mobilization of groups whose positions cannot be defended through more conventional political means. (Cohen: 1969) Max Gluckman and the Manchester School explained how and why particular political outcomes occur, by focusing on deeply contextualized accounts of particular events, thus developing useful “middle range” theories. Their middle range theories were built on rich details about political conflict in which culture’s role is at center stage. (Ross: 1997, 57-58)

4. Political Ritual and Identity

Murray Edelman, in his work *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, wrote that “politics is a passing parade of symbols,” to which we react at *cognitive* and *affective* levels. While the cognitive level involves the information that any symbol communicates, the affective level involves the powerful feelings which political symbols can invoke. While political rituals are critical in constructing political reality, the power to control the ritual is crucial in effecting political change. Political rituals offer meaning in ambiguous situations and are crucial to identity construction and maintenance. The most powerful political rituals are those that utilize culturally rooted metaphors and meanings in offering a vision of reality, as well as in raising fears and threats to the point that people are ready to undertake strong action in the name of the group.
5. Culture and Political Conflict

Marc Ross, in his work *The Culture of Conflict: Interpretation and Interests in Comparative Perspective*, provides a more general cross-cultural analysis of culture and political conflict. He finds that *psycho-cultural variables* (e.g., low warmth and affection in child rearing, harsh socialization, male gender identity conflict, etc.), are excellent predictors of a society’s overall level of violence, while social structural factors, such as the strength of cross-cutting ties, or the presence of exclusive male groups, helps *determine whether targets are within the same society, in another society, or both*.

In his paper, “National Revivals and Violence,” David Laitin offers a controlled comparison emphasizing culturally constituted differences in social organization, by explaining the high use of political violence in the Basque protest in Spain, and its relative absence in the nearby Catalonia. (Laitin: 1995) Here, *subcultures* are important because this case reveals the presence of autonomous male groups with strong norms of honor in the Basque region, while such male groups are relatively absent in Catalonia. When these small, local male groups engage in protest that produces some limited and mainly symbolic successes, violence becomes self-sustaining. (Ross: 1997, 60)

3A3c Critique of Cultural Analyses of Politics

Marc Ross highlights five critiques of cultural studies of politics, such as concerns over the unit of analysis, within-culture variations, distinction between culture and social or political organization, the static nature of culture and explanation of political change, and mechanisms that explain how culture works.

1. Unit of Analysis

The imprecision of the existing common language makes it difficult to define culture and its key properties. Nevertheless, it is argued that such concerns can be overcome, first by
acknowledging that cultural identity is layered and situationally defined, and second by accepting that the gradual change of identities does not undermine the reliance upon the unit of analysis. (Ross: 1997: 61-62)

2. Within-Culture Variation

Members of formal groups share meaning and identity in terms of values, lifestyle, political disposition, religious beliefs and ideas about common interests. They see themselves as similar to some people and different from others, thus being open to potential mobilization on the basis of these differences. Under conditions of uncertainty and threat, within group homogeneity increases—along with the demand for conformity—while inter-group differences are overemphasized, thus increasing the potential for conflicts between groups.

3. Distinction Between Culture and Social or Political Organization

The distinction between culture and social or political organization is obscure, and the fine line is often a moving target. Yet, according to Melford Spiro’s chapter, “Some Reflections on Cultural Determinism and Relativism with Special Reference to Emotion and Reason,” by distinguishing between culture and culturally constituted elements, one can begin to distinguish between cultural meanings and identity, and structure, norms of behavior, and individual beliefs. (Shapiro; 1984)

4. Culture’s Static Nature and Political Change

Cultures are generally viewed as slow-changing entities. Nevertheless, empirical evidence provided by contemporary scholarship no longer sees culture as a static phenomenon, marked by fixed beliefs. This is because in particular regions, cultural interpretations of assumption about the motives of others offer insight on explaining specific political processes with a level of probability comparable to rationalism and structuralism, thus giving more clues to the dynamics of change.

The major questions about the way in which culture works, highlight both the effects of culture’s organization and risk factor. Why are appeals to cultural identity so powerful that people are willing to take high risks in its name? In answering these questions, first one must note that while national character studies served as initial cultural indicators, now they can only pass the “likelihood” tests via the rigor of the comparative method, which entails empirical verification mechanisms. Second, social experiences within institutions (schools, religious organizations, kin groups, social groups, etc), provide cultural messages about values and expectations that are selectively reinforced. Third, the power of culture to mobilize builds on fears and perceived threats that are consistent with internalized worldviews that provide emotional solidarity.

3A3d The Centrality of Interpretation in Cultural Analysis

The central role of interpretation in cultural analysis is reflected by the effort to link the contextual political details (as found in particular political settings) to the general domains of political life (e.g., authority, community and conflict, etc.) The radical interpretivists claimed that the uniqueness of each cultural context makes the generalization of its particularities impossible, and thus irrelevant. Yet, the comparativist and psycho-culturalist approaches increasingly weakened the claims of radical interpretivism, by appealing to trans-cultural traits of human psychology.

1. The Comparativists

While accepting the subjective and the inter-subjective character of culture, numerous comparativists identified various mechanisms that link culture and action, in an effort to identify similar patterns in cultural behavior across cultural settings. These mechanisms reveal how individuals absorb, process and modify cultural knowledge, in order to develop images of the world, images which in turn, inform and affect the individual and collective actions.
2. The Psychoculturalists

The psycho-cultural interpretations are the basis on which people, in a culture, understand the world and link specific worldviews to political action, thus offering plausible accounts of the world. These plausible accounts offer psychologic and social protection from ambiguities and uncertainties of existence, thus reinforcing social and political bonds within groups. The psychoculturalists point not only to a group’s action, but also to what the group feels that a rival group is trying to do—a situation visible in various narratives found in long-standing ethnic conflicts. Vamik Volkan, in his paper “The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach,” claims that human beings feel a need to identify some people as allies and others as enemies. This need evolves from the individual’s efforts to protect his sense of self, which is intertwined with his experiences of ethnicity, nationality and other identifying circumstances. (Volkan: 1985, 219)

Volkan also coined expressions such as “chosen trauma,” in reference to a group’s deepest feelings of threat, fear and helplessness at the hand of another group, and “chosen glory,” in reference to a group’s symbolic perception of triumph over the enemy. (Ross 1997a: 319; Volkan: 1991, 3; Volkan 2006: 205-227)

The psycho-cultural interpretations reflect and strengthen the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups. These interpretations are also meaningful to the parties involved, and are deeply embedded into public rituals and myths built around key events from the national or ethnic past.

In conclusion, politics occurs in a cultural context that links individual and collective identities through the concept of ‘linked fate.’ Culture defines the boundaries between groups, and organizes actions within and between them; it provides a framework for interpreting the actions and motives of others; and it also provides resources for political organization and mobilization.
As a result, culture shapes the behavior of public and private institutions, often in sharp contrast with the more universal rational models.

3A4 Toward an Integrative Approach
to Contentious Politics

A notable contribution to the evaluation of the study of “contentious politics”— from the tripartite perspective of rationalism, structuralism and culturalism—was made by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly in 1997, in the context of a Princeton Conference designed to promote an integrationist approach of the three perspectives.

In their initial paper, “Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution,” McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, identified three problems with the field of contentious politics, such as theoretical multivocality, gap between the studies of movements in democratic and non-democratic settings, and the analysis of social movements and revolutions had only focused on selected phases of the dynamics of contentious politics, thus providing an analysis inconsistent with a holistic view expected of any field of inquiry. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 142) As a definition, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly insisted that,

> [t]he study of contentious politics include all situations in which actors make collective claims on the other actors, claims which, if realized, would affect the actors’ interests, when some government is somehow party to the claims. In these terms, wars, revolutions, rebellions, (most) social movements, industrial conflict, feuds, riots, banditry, shaming ceremonies, and many more forms of collective struggle usually qualify as contentious politics. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 143)

3A4a Mishaps and Prospects

In their assessment, the three political scientists identified several dilemmas with the subfield of contentious politics. First, the existing theoretical corpus focuses exclusively on western
reform movements. Second, the non-western experiences have been superficially constricted as classifiable under a broad culturalism, with the assumption that non-western experiences can hardly be compared with the western ones. Third, the studies of social movements and revolutions focused too narrowly on selected parts of the process, rather than adopting a holistic view. Specifically, while the social movement analysis focused on origins, dynamics, social bases and organization, this analysis neglected the outcomes. At the same time, scholars of revolutions focused on the origins and the outcomes of a revolution, while neglecting both the internal dynamics and the process itself.

1. Evolution of the Field

Contentious politics evolved as a subfield of comparative politics along the lines of structuralism, rational choice, and culturalism.

Structuralism focused on collective action by emphasizing the concepts of political struggle and political opportunity. (Tilly: 1978) Combining European emphasis on macro-sociological structuralism with the American emphasis on political structuralism, Theda Skocpol’s study of revolutions (Skocpol, 1979) gained popularity because it combined class relations with an acute attention to the role of states’ internal and international vulnerability during fiscal crises. Nevertheless, Theda Skocpol’s overemphasis of the role of the state in terms of revolutionary outcomes came at the expense of overlooking the role of international factors and revolutionary process—though she later recognized the relevance of urban classes and interclass coalitions. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 146)

The adepts of the Rational Choice theory (political scientists and sociologists alike) argued that various structures that emerge as a result of contentious politics are driven by economic factors under the broad assumption that a rational human being is selfish by nature. Nevertheless, while formulating the theory of “Collective Action,” Mancur Olson emphasized the dilemma of the “free rider,” arguing that rational people, being guided by individual interests alone, might avoid taking action when they see that others are willing to take it for them. However, Olson’s “free
rider” dilemma was elucidated by McCarthy and Zalad’s theory of Resource Mobilization, which argued that in advanced industrial societies, expanded personal resources, professionalization and external financial support generate professional movement organization. At the same time, McCarthy and Zalad overlooked a movement’s emphasis of values, and the anti-bureaucratic grassroots movements which often play a major role in mobilizing toward collective action.

The theoretical approach to the cultures of contention first emerged from E.P. Thompson’s enculturation of the concept of class, as an alternative to and a substitute for the productivist Marxism. Shifting the emphasis from the ‘factory floor’ to the concepts of ‘custom’ and ‘consumer mentality,’ Thompson coined the concept of “moral economy,” through which he proposed class reciprocity as an alternative to the Marxist class warfare, thus safeguarding the interests of capitalism. Applying E.P. Thompson’s “moral economy” concept to the movements of class fragment, James Scott (1976) focused his studies on “individual resistance” (cheating landlords, machine breaking, malingering, etc.,) as a strong factor that eventually emerges into collective movements. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 148-150)

The culture of contention emerged also from the study of revolutions. First, the classical structuralist models failed to explain the power of religion in the Iranian revolution. Second, post-Vietnam anthropologists became influential in offering plausible explanations of some conflicts. Third, the transfer of Thompson’s “moral economy” thinking from the villages of England to the third world farms diverted the attention onto the role of culture. The reaction against Resource Mobilization theory, which was advocated by the rational choice theorists, had generated a new paradigm that emphasized the role of political culture in producing new collective identities through collective action. (Melucci: 1989) By naming collective grievances and expressing new identities, constructionist culturalists argued that social movements were both makers and carriers of meaning. The most prominent amongst constructionist culturalists is Benedict Andersen, who considered that the intersection between mass culture and movement was restricted to rationalism and identity (e.g., national identity), which is an “imagined political community, limited and sovereign.” (Andersen: 1981, 9)
2. The Necessity for an Integrationist Synthesis

Considering the underlying assumption that truth is somewhere in the middle, the new generation of political scientists, schooled in one particular approach, are increasingly open to accept insights from others. Yet, as put by McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, this integrationist synthesis, can’t be productive unless a three-step methodology is strictly followed such as, first reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the three schools, second placing the emphasis on political process in fostering their integration, and third bridging the gap between Western reform movements and various patterns of contentious politics, protests and revolutions. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 151)

3A4b Political Opportunities and the Role of Threats

The expansion of political opportunities ignited by social mobility and democratic concepts led to a rise in movements that contested existing political establishments. Despite ulterior disagreements over theories of how political opportunities affect movements (Meyer: 2004), what Peter Eisinger initially intended by using the expression “structure of political opportunities,” was to help account for variations in the “riot behavior.” (Eisinger: 1973, 25) As a result, some proponents viewed the timing and development of the movements in a mono-causal fashion, arguing whether insurgency influences both the institutional structure and the ideological disposition of those in power (Jenkins, Perrow: 1977), or, on the contrary, state structures influence or even control collective mobilization through manipulations. (Kitschelt: 1986) Nevertheless, other political scientists simply remained indifferent to the causality argument, and focused their intellectual efforts on how to better integrate the concept of political opportunities within the broader models of collective action (Tilly: 1978).

1. Rational Choice and Political Process

Framing theoretical concepts around Theda Skocpol’s macro-analytical work on the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, the general understanding of the role of political opportunities
was largely structuralist (Skocpol: 1979) in the sense that movements become activated by changes in institutional policies, political reorientations, and establishments of new alliances.

Attempts toward a synthetic approach between the rational choice paradigm and political process failed insofar due to the claim of the political process proponents that opportunities alone cause movements to arise, change, succeed or fail. In other words, while political process writers focused exclusively on opportunities, rational choice theorists focused exclusively on shared payoffs that drive mobilization. Considering that the assessment of the new opportunities derives from the cost-benefit calculus of insurgents and antagonists alike, new opportunities toward synthetic integrationism seem to emerge. This is due to the general consensus between the two schools that individuals, while calculating the risks involved by collective action in relation to the benefits they intend to maximize, often overlook constraints imposed by traditions of collective action, such as strike, charivari, protest demonstrations, etc. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 153-54)

2. Culture and Political Process

As cultural influences and motivations play a significant role on the perceived costs and benefits of collective action, David Laitin explains that this is due to the presence of cultural agents, or entrepreneurs. Considering the link between rational choice and culture, political entrepreneurs often select and exploit “the powerful and available symbols of ancestral […] identification to organize political action, seeking to enhance their group’s wealth and power.” (Laitin, Wildavsky: 1988, 591) Furthermore, the study of revolutions presented interesting findings on natural syntheses between cultural and structural models, as acknowledged even by structuralists like Theda Skocpol. (Skocpol: 1982, 265-266)

3A4c Mobilizing Structures

Rationalist scholars indicated that a powerful mix of solidarity incentive and sanctioning mechanisms are usually employed in order to overcome the free rider problem, while the Resource
Mobilization theory brought this concern to the level of established organizations or associational networks. Briefly defined,

> [b]y ‘mobilizing structures,’ we mean those collective vehicles, both formal and informal, through which people come together and engage in collective action. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 155)

Thus, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald in their organizational theory studies (also combined with Mancur Olson’s concepts of “collective action”), emphasized the key role of the social movement sector, thus shifting the attention from the exclusive focus on organizations, to the analysis of collective action. Additionally, process oriented links began to emerge between indigenous institutions and social networks.

*Culturalists* such as David Kertzer considered that ritual construction of political reality is a powerful element for structure mobilization, as this gives meaning to collective identity, particularly during times of crisis.

> Through symbolism we recognize who are the powerful and who are the weak, and through the manipulation of symbols the powerful reinforce their authority. Yet, the weak, too, can try to put on new clothes and to strip the clothes from the mighty. (Kertzer: 1988, 5)

Charles Tilly and Mark Traugott made significant contributions on the intersection between culture and mobilization. As Charles Tilly wrote,

> [t]he repertoire of collective action, like its theatrical counterpart, implies a group of actors who choose among a restricted number of performances with which they are familiar. Their options are circumscribed both by prior experience and by the material, organizational, and conceptual resources they find readily at hand. (Traugott: 1993, 309)
3A4d Framing the Process

In order for structure mobilization to emerge, the consensus among the theoreticians is that,

[mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings that people bring to their situation. At minimum, they need to feel both aggrieved [my emphasis] about some aspect of their lives and optimistic [my emphasis] that, by acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Lacking either one or both of these perceptions, it is unlikely that they will mobilize even when afforded the opportunity to do so. (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly: 1997, 157)

Therefore, the link between culture and structure must assume that the process can be found not under conditions of personal isolation, but in stable structural settings, as Benedict Anderson demonstrated through his analysis of “print capitalism.” (Anderson: 1981, 43)

1. Rationalism and Culturalism

In the process of fusion between culturalism and rationalism, culturalists have been reluctant in adopting rational choice approaches due to the structuralist heritage, as well as due to the fact that incentives (which are central to the rational choice), are cultural constructs in themselves, while cultural factors can play a pragmatic role as determined by the movement entrepreneurs.

In conclusion, a process oriented approach is possible and desirable in the fields of political science and religious studies in analyzing collective violence. Given the need for theory building, comparisons must be made across different varieties of contention (social movements, cycles of protest, and revolutions, across democratic and non-democratic polities, and across national histories of contentious politics), as well as across doctrines, rituals and ethical standards enforced by the organized religions, and religious phenomenology and anthropology of religion.
In the field of international relations, the study of collective violence has a long history, more as a subfield of international security, and less in the context of international political economy. While recognizing the crucial role of international economy—both in exacerbating or in containing violence—this study is limited only to the field of international security.

Theoretically, international security is based on three approaches realist, liberal and social. Pragmatically, international security focuses on the logic of conflict in world politics (Nye: 1997, 1-26), types of international conflict (wars, ideological conflicts, and conflicts of interest), military force and terrorism (conventional and nonconventional warfare such as war, terrorism, insurgencies, banditry, rape as a weapon of war, high seas piracy, WMD, state-military relations), and international organization and law (UN, IL, sovereignty, and human rights.) (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010)

International relations scholars have focused their attention on actors and levels of analysis. The main actors that define and influence the structure of international relations—thus affecting collective violence both directly and indirectly—include state actors (states defined by territories and controlled by national governments), as well as nonstate actors, such as intergovernmental organizations (UN, Arab League, OPEC, WTO, NATO, etc), non-government organizations (Red Cross, Amnesty International, etc.), and multi-national corporations (ExxonMobil, Toyota, Wal-Mart, etc.)

The analysis of collective violence in international relations is conducted at the global level (fundamentalism, terrorism, unofficial diplomacy, etc), interstate level (alliances, wars, treaties, official diplomacy, trade agreements), domestic level (ethnic conflict, nationalism, dictatorship, political parties, Military-Industrial Complex, etc.), and at the individual level (leaders, decision making in crises, learning, assassinations, voting, rebellion, etc.)
3B1 Basic International Security Theories

In general terms, collective violence is closely related to the question how international community balances shared interests and conflicting interests, by analogy with the collective good (a.k.a. common good.) In order to build the collective good and also overcome the “free rider problem” (not everyone who benefits from the collective good pays for it), International Relations theory focuses on three core principles: dominance, reciprocity, and identity. Dominance solves the collective good problem through a power hierarchy designed to offer predictable order and stability, though this might become oppressive and conflict generating. Reciprocity solves the collective good problem by rewarding contributions to the public good through incentives and mutual cooperation, while punishing behavior that is self-interested and gains obtained at the expense of the group. Identity solves the collective goods problem through a consciousness adopted by an identity community which sacrifices (or redefines) its own interests to the benefit of others, while often taking the risk of demonizing an out-group that acts on selfish instincts. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 4-8)

3B1a Realist Theories

Realist theories of international security are based on the principle of dominance. Realism defines and explains international relations in terms of power exercised by states toward each other, on the assumption that human nature is selfish, the international system is anarchical, and the states behave rationally in pursuing their selfish interests. State power is usually measured by the gross domestic product (GDP), as the economic power of a state is crucial to its defense budget, while its short-term power capabilities depend on tangible and long-term resources.
Neorealism (a.k.a. “structural realism”) explains the international distribution of power by general laws on power structure that determine and explain world events. According to the neorealists, international distribution of power is based on the principle of polarity, whereby a great power is at the center and influences the decisions of middle powers that gravitate around it. Power distribution in the international system can be multipolar (five or six centers of powers which are not grouped into alliances, but are more reciprocal and less stable), bipolar (two great rival alliances which are more stable), and unipolar or hegemony (the preponderance of power of one state to single-handedly dominate the international system.) Both realists and neorealists argue that international conflicts occur during transitions of power, in order to rebalance the international system. Thus, according to the Power Transition theory, wars are the result of challenges to the top position in the power hierarchy, challenges exercised by raising powers that surpass, or even threaten to surpass the most powerful state. On the other hand, Balance of Power theory holds that one or more states will create alliances in order to balance the power of another powerful state (or alliance), in order to prevent it from conquering, or dominating a region.

It is important to note that in statecraft, realism often uses the assumption of rationality in the policymaking process, arguing that in the international system, states behave as unitary actors. This assumption is strongly contradicted by organizational behavior, and by the Rational Choice theory, which demonstrate that within the policymaking process, a state’s decision can be irrational and against its own interests. In international relations, conflict is often driven by power politics, whereby great powers and middle powers use the strategies of deterrence (threat to punish another actor if it takes a certain action), compellence (the actual use of force to make another actor take some action), and arms race (a reciprocal process, whereby two or more states build up military capabilities in response to each other.) These strategies are based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma from the Rational Choice theory. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 42-79)
3B1b Liberal Theories

Liberal theories in international security are based on the principle of reciprocity, arguing that states that learn to cooperate and build international institutions achieve more stable relations and economic development than those states using coercion and power politics. These theories had been advanced by the liberal traditions of international relations, domestic influences and policymaking process. Liberal traditions of international relations have generally emerged from the Kantian universalism, or the concept of “perpetual peace,” which proposed more peaceful relationships. Liberal institutionalism treats rational actors as capable of forging short-term individual interests, which further the long-term, well-being of their own community, by creating new international regimes, systems of collective security, and concepts of democratic peace.

Liberal institutionalists are often challenged by the neoliberals who not only come close to the neo-realists, but also strongly rely on the Prisoner’s Dilemma from the Rational Choice theory, as to argue that cooperation is possible under coercive conditions.

International regimes are regarded sets of “rules, norms and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area,” such as international trade, arms control, etc. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 89)

Collective security concept emerges from liberal institutionalism whereby major international actors in the international system make broad alliances to jointly oppose any aggression (e.g., UN Security Council.)

Democratic peace is a concept based on the Kantian philosophy (Perpetual Peace), which contended that states that become republics, with checks and balances expressed in the legislature vs president/monarch model, are less belligerent. According to the Democratic Peace theory, democratic states never fought each other due to trade which creates interdependency–even though democracies can easily engage in wars with non-democracies.

Domestic influences–by focusing on bureaucracies, interest groups, The Military Industrial Complex, public opinion and legislature–strongly claim that international security is the byproduct of within state processes, rather than the result of exclusively interstate relations. Bureaucracies
such as diplomatic corps and inter-agency tensions (KGB vs CIA) affect the formulation of foreign policy, thus influencing a states’ decisions on issues of international security. As coalitions of peoples, who share common interests in the outcome of future policy decisions, interest groups organize themselves for the purpose of influencing the policymaking process, usually by following the strategy of lobbying. Lobbies concerned directly or indirectly with issues of international security—whether this involves military alliances, protection of commercial interests, etc.—aim to gain hearings with busy officials, build strong arguments that would influence the public opinion, and reward policymakers who advance their interests. The Military Industrial Complex refers to a complex interlocking network of governmental agencies, corporations, and research institutes in order to supply a nation’s military forces. These institutions are usually interested in the government’s increased spending on defense. Public opinion has a strong influence on foreign policy in democracies, and to a certain extent, in authoritarian states as well. In order to promote the official narrative, or to popularize a particular interest, or campaign promise, authoritarian states employ propaganda, while democratic states employ public relations methods. In democracies, legislatures have a strong influence on foreign policymaking by passing budgets, regulating bureaucratic rules, creating trade law, immigration policy, etc.

3B1c Social Theories

Social theories in international security are based on the principle of identity, and are anchored into constructivism (identities, ideas, postmodernism), Marxism, peace studies and gender theories (e.g., masculinity of realism, gender of war and peace, difference feminism, liberal feminism, postmodern feminism.)

Constructivism: Constructivism is a fast-growing approach in international security, and it looks primarily at how social identity shapes a state’s identity, and how one state’s identity influences, or changes the identity of another state. Its approach to the types of norms, identity, and ways in which members of a society interact, also helps to advance the understanding of international security.
Taking *identities* as an example, it is often observed that states may choose policies that are “popular” with other states through a complex process of socialization and exchange of ideas. The implementation of change is conducted by various actors and entrepreneurs, through exchanges of ideas, travel, writing, meeting with elites, student exchanges, etc. In situations of conflict, the identity of the potential adversary is often regarded as crucial in understanding the political culture behind the potential dynamics of the conflict—thus necessary in designing more effective strategies.

The central idea of *postmodernism* in international security is that there is no specifiable, objective reality but a complex of experiences and perspectives that are often impossible to be categorized. Thus, according to a postmodernist, the realist’s claim that the state is a central and unitary actor is irrelevant since states are fictions in the sense that these are imagined entities to make sense of activities of larger groups.

The *Marxist* approach considers that domestic and international security is determined by the relationship between economic classes within a state, whereby the more powerful classes oppress and exploit the less powerful ones, denying them the fair share of the surplus that they create. Consequently, the oppressed classes feel alienated and struggle in return to gain power and cease the wealth that they feel they disserve. In international security, the paradigm of *class warfare* is applied to the power dynamic between the richer and poorer states, as seen in the economic disparities between the Global North and the Global South, as well as in comparative politics theories, such as the Dependency Theory and World System Approach. (Wiarda: 2000, 80-84)

*3B1c1 Peace Studies*

Peace studies advocates have strongly challenged the objectivity of the realist and neo-realist approaches to international security, by contending that governments should not be the sole factors in determining inter-human relations. They also argue that more social, interpersonal
relations decrease the likelihood of conflict. This field views the cause of war mainly at the individual level, as determined by economic and social inequalities, gender relations, etc.

Peace studies have long demonstrated that conflicts can be settled by alternatives to violent forms of leverage—a process largely known as conflict resolution. The conflict resolution method often includes a third party which provides mediation between the parties engaged in conflict, and the third party could be institutions such as UN, regional state organizations, single states, or private individuals. The mediator takes an active role in channeling communication between conflicting parties, while maintaining strict neutrality. The mediator’s role is sometime referred to as good offices to a negotiation process, whereby the mediator acts as a “translator” between the conflicting parties. In cases when the conflicting parties agree in advance to adopt a solution devised by a mediator, the process is called arbitration. Sometimes, arbitration uses a three-member panel, two chosen unilaterally by each side, while the third one is someone with whom both sides agree.

Peace studies are usually critical of the culture of militarism. Culture of militarism is a phenomenon viewed not only as matter of dominance of national security over domestic politics, propensity for political leaders to use military force, and a dominant role of the military-industrial complex in public policy, but also as a culture obsessed with “the glorification of war, military force, and violence through TV, films, books, political speeches, toys, games, sports, and other such avenues.” (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 133)

In terms of causes and effects of war, anthropologists have demonstrated that war occurs more frequently in societies with internal inequalities, with harsh child-rearing practices or with fathers being absent from the child-rearing, and gender discrimination. Conversely, the relatively peaceful societies exhibit more open decision-making processes, relative gender equality, and more affectionate child rearing.
Positive Peace theory

While realism regards war as a normal state of affairs, the temporary absence of war is defined as *negative peace*. On the other hand, peace studies also advocate the concept of *positive peace*, which implies addressing the underlying causes for war, beyond the cessation of hostilities. Positive peace means addressing questions of *structural violence* (e.g., hunger, poverty, etc.) which affect negatively the structure of social relations. Positive Peace theory implies the advancement of social change through various means, such as pressure on governments, political activism, development of global identity beyond ethnic, national and religious divisions, general equalitarianism, political participation, etc.

Peace Activism

Due to disagreements over means of achieving a peaceful world, peace activism is often split between the *internationalists, pacifists* and *philosophers of non-violence*. The internationalists support more development of international organizations. The pacifists oppose all wars and express distrust toward governments. The philosophers of non-violence make a unilateral commitment to refrain from violence, regardless of arguments of self-defense and responsibility to protect. Unlike pacifism, the non-violence approach is more engaging and more practical in nature. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 136)

3B1c2 Gender Theories

Gender studies emerged in the field of international relations in relations to studies on war and international security, by inferring that whatever stands out as international relations norms is true only of males, particularly the realist approach that simply assumes males as participants in foreign policy, state sovereignty and the use of military force.

Feminist theories display three strands such as *difference, liberal* and *postmodernist*. Difference feminism focuses on the unique contribution of women as women, due to their greater experience with nurturing human relations, arguing that women are more effective in
conflict resolution and group decision making. Liberal feminism deplores women’s exclusion from position of power, while rejecting difference feminism as based on gender role stereotypes. Liberal feminism claims also that differences between men’s and women’s abilities in conflict resolution and group decision making are nonexistent and trivial. Postmodern feminism rejects assumptions made by difference and liberal feminism, while accepting that gender differences are important and fixed, as well as arbitrary and flexible. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 137-138)

The core theory of realism rests on the assumption of autonomy. As hypothesized by some psychological theorists such as Nancy Chodorow, boys and girls grow up with different views on connection and separateness. Because a child’s primary caretaker is usually female, girls form their gender identity around the perception of similarity, while boys perceive their difference from the caretaker, thus developing social relations based on individual autonomy. Furthermore, in games, boys resolve dispute through arguments about the rules, then continue playing, while girls are more likely to abandon the game rather than argue about the rules. (Chodorow: 1999) As a result, difference feminism considers that realism emphasizes autonomy and separation because men find separation easier than interconnectedness, thus resting on the concept of states as separate autonomous actors, entering and exiting alliances. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 137-8)

In conclusion, International Relations theory will need to address the question of collective violence both within its international security spectrum, and beyond, into international political economy area. Given the power of international economic factors in generating as well as alleviating conflicts, it is mandatory that questions of religious ethics be considered when international trade policies are set in place. The new global realities demand the reshaping of the existing models of global finances and business, as to adopt more humane policies on international integration, the addressing of the North-South gap, climate change and demographics, access to resources, and international development. Currently, as international political economy indicates a dramatic polarization between rich and poor–leading to predictable conflicts–it is mandatory that structural changes be made not in the absence of, but in close collaboration with religious institutions, toward a better global ethic. (Küng, Kuschel: 2006)
Chapter 4
Religion In Political Conflict:
An Epistemological Rational Choice Approach

Mottos:

“La religion originelle rassemble, la religion déformée divise.”
[Original religion unites, distorted religion divides.] (Richard Friedli)

“By denying religion any basis in reality, by viewing it as a sort of bedtime story for children, we collaborate with violence in its game of deception.” (René Girard)

Richard Friedli’s expression, “la religion originelle rassemble, la religion déformée divise,” is paradigmatic of a basic taxonomy of religions that distinguishes between faith and [organized] religion. As noted on page 19, faith is a spontaneous devotional instinct for solidarity, peace and stability that serves as an antidote to fear. [Organized] religion is conventional faith structured on the dynamics of authority, and it is organized as political institutions seeking power growth and power maintenance.

During the past two centuries, various philosophers, social scientists and religious scholars such as Émile Durkheim, James George Frazer, Edward E. Evans Pritchard, Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, Jacques Derrida and others, had been keen in identifying commonalities and differences
among the most primitive forms of religious life inherited by various tribal cultures in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Pacific, and beyond. They did so as an attempt to offer new explanations on why the human being is also a *Homo Religiosus* (Religious Man) and a *Homo Viator* (‘Pilgrim Man’ as in a spiritual return to a spiritual origin), in addition to being a *Homo Sapiens* (including its later derivatives of *Homo Faber* [Man the Creator], *Homo Ludens* [Man the Player], and *Homo Economicus* [Economic Man])—thus challenging the Swedish botanist Carl von Linné’s idealized view of the Enlightenment. Additionally, these scholars have also attempted to identify such primitive religious phenomena within organized religions themselves; thus generating an increased interest into a new approach to the study of religion known as *religious phenomenology*.

Attempting to explain the key distinction between the primordial manifestation of religion and its institutionalized form in relation to violence, Richard Friedli—albeit in a minimalist fashion—makes a distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ organized religions. Extrapolating on the statistically dominant world religions, vis-à-vis the most primitive forms of religiosity preserved by the ethno-religionists and Chinese folk religions, he concludes that “the primordial religiosity is a social factor more productive toward peace, than institutionalized religions.” (Friedli: 2000, 58)

Today, this distinction between religious faith as a devotional phenomenon and organized religions (institutions organizing a faith community around a common creed, worship and ethical behavior) is also visible and testable in social attitudes. Taking the findings of the *World Values Survey* (which had been conducted in 108 countries between 1981-2007), one can easily note that while 8 in 10 people believe in God, 7 in 10 people reject the influence of religious leaders over government in setting public policies. Furthermore, the survey demonstrates that only 2 in 10 people belong to an organized religion. (Figure 4.1) Therefore, as one can easily note, the difference between a man’s religious faith and an organized religion is obvious in the public life; thus crucial to social stability during times of crisis.
Figure 4.1 | World Values Survey
The thesis in this chapter is that religious faith does not cause collective violence, but it is a source for social stability. This is because religious faith serves as a catalyst between the perpetrator and the victim by diverting the victim’s need for retaliation into a surrogate victim (scapegoat) which poses little or no retaliatory threat, thus moving the tension of the conflict into a stabilizing zone.

The main argument is built upon an epistemological analysis of the process by which religion interacts with collective violence *internally*, as a devotional instinct, and *externally*, within the framework of organized religions. The analysis rests on a distinction between the phenomenological approach to religion (focusing on *sacrifice* and *scapegoat*, identifiable in the most primitive function of religion), and organized religion, focusing on a tripartite approach to *doctrine, ethics* and *worship*, as informed by *rationalism* (prophet, spiritual leader), *structuralism* (internal power distribution), and *culturalism* (meaning). Next to the main claim that in its essence religion restrains collective violence, I also argue that organized religion is ambivalent toward collective violence, due to its political interests.

Therefore, in this chapter I will test two hypotheses:

The first hypothesis, *Religion in Mimetic Rivalry*, states that religious faith does not generate collective violence, but it is a source for social stability because of its rational intervention between the mimetic rivals through the rituals of sacrifice and scapegoat, which redirect frustration toward a victim that cannot afford to continue the cycle of violence by retaliating.

The second hypothesis of the *Double-Competition* derives from the first hypothesis and states that a rivalry over a concrete object of desire triggers a surrogate rivalry which becomes the platform where the original conflict escalates, de-escalates, or remains at a constant level. It is in the surrogate rivalry that religion intervenes both as a devotional instinct (faith) and as a political institution (organized religion.) As a political institution organized religion is ambivalent toward collective violence because it makes decisions based on its rational interests, which can either amplify or restrain the original rivalry. The relationship between the original rivalry and
the surrogate rivalry is based on an ecological inference anchored in the findings of Evolutionary Psychology, and it will be derived from an experiment with the mimetic twins rivalry, which will then be applied and tested at the intra-institutional level, as well as at the inter-institutional level. At the intra-institutional level, the simplicity of the ritual of sacrifice indicates that an original rivalry over a material object of desire acts as an independent variable in a surrogate rivalry. These rivalries (original and surrogate) will be tested in the case of the biblical story with Jacob versus Esau (Case 1), and in the Hittite healing ritual of Ašhella. (Case 2) As these two cases demonstrate, the logic of the Double-Competition is valid for several reasons. First, if the object of desire from the original rivalry becomes a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, then the competition decreases. Second, if the surrogate rivalry loses sight of the object of desire from the original rivalry, then the surrogate rivalry fails to restrain the original rivalry, creating at the same time an added rivalry which could result in violence (e.g., Jacob has to flee his home, as seen in Case 1.) Conversely, if the surrogate rivalry does not lose sight of the object of desire from the original rivalry, then the surrogate rivalry is able to restrain and potentially end the competition (e.g., the Hittite woman goes as a gift with bread, beer and several rams to the enemy camp, as seen in Case 2.) Testing the Double-Competition hypothesis at the inter-institutional level, which is more complex due to the role of history (such as in Case 3), the original rivalry over a specific object of desire still acts as an independent variable for the surrogate rivalry, while history (and Path-Dependency) can act either as an antecedent variable, or as an intervening variable. Therefore the relationship between the original competition (miners versus the prime minister), and the surrogate rivalry (Church versus State) demonstrates the same dynamic, as in the first two cases. Because the object of desire from the original rivalry (desire for money) is used as a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, the conflict is successfully managed (resulting in the Peace from Cozia.) In order to avoid tautology, at the inter-institutional level of analysis it was mandatory to treat the original rivalry (over a material object of desire) as an independent variable (rather than as antecedent), because at the inter-institutional level the interplay and the
sets of rivalries are always complex, while historical memory plays a crucial role in defining the interests upon an institution acts.

Therefore, the second hypothesis demonstrates that the logic derived from the experiment with the mimetic twins replicates itself at a micro-level, inside of the primitive instinct of religious faith, as well as at the macro-level between institutions. The Double-Competition hypothesis not only answers why organized religion becomes ambivalent, but it also explains how ambivalence is constructed.

Considering the methodological rigor of political science (Johnson, Reynolds: 2005, 113-119), one can easily observe that these two hypotheses are empirical in nature and falsifiable; they reflect a general phenomenon identifiable across cultures; they are logically plausible; the direction of causality is specific and positive in nature; they are consistent with the data; and they are testable.

The two concepts measured in the analysis are religion and violence, and the units of analysis used in testing the two hypotheses are the object of desire and the scapegoat.

Data selection is based on document analysis of equally distributed cases of primitive rituals practiced by various ethno-religionists which have been analyzed by key sociologists, anthropologists and religious phenomenologists such as René Girard, Emil Durkheim, Edward E. Evans Pritchard, Max Weber, Victor Turner, Mircea Eliade and others, as well as cases of such rituals being absorbed and redefined by organized religions. In the case of organized religions, selected data represent central and unanimously accepted doctrines, ethical norms, set rituals and sacred texts which represent the liturgical standards of an organized religion, on the assumption that such unified structure serves as the likely knowledge base for decision making during times of crisis.

In order to address the question of religion and violence, from within the paradigm of religious phenomenology and organized religion, one must define the concepts of religion and violence.
The online 2011 *Encyclopedia Britannica* defines religion as “human beings’ relation to that which they regard as holy, sacred, spiritual, or divine. Religion is commonly regarded as consisting of a person’s relation to God or to gods or spirits. Worship is probably the most basic element of religion, but moral conduct, right belief, and participation in religious institutions are generally also constituent elements of the religious life as practiced by believers and worshipers and as commanded by religious sages and scriptures.” From an etymological perspective, the concept of “religion” finds its root in the Latin *religio*, a derivative of the verb *religare*, which generally translates as “to (re)bind together.” A similar meaning can be found in the Hebrew word *berit*, which translates as “covenant” and “linkage.” Other researchers consider that the term “religion” derives from *relegere*, which translates “to reread,” “to meditate,” “to venerate,” or from *relinquere*, which translates as “to distinguish,” or “to separate” what is sacred from what is profane. (Todoran, Zăgrean: 1991, 25) John Bowker, in his introduction to *The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*, adopts J.H. Leuba’s contentious definition of religion as presented his 1912 work, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, thus looking into the etymology of “religion” through minimalist lenses. “The Latin *religio* refers to the fear of God or the gods,” writes Bowker, “and (much later) to the ceremonies and rites addressed to the gods.” Furthermore, Bowker recalls the disenchantment that poet Lucretius had toward religion, thus offering a contentious and intellectually imbalanced definition. “Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum… Religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta” (How many evils has religion caused!... Religion has brought forth criminal and impious deeds.” (Bowker: 1997, xv) In a critical sense, Bowker’s approach runs contrary to what Emile Durkheim warned in his *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, where, in order to properly define religion, he recommended epistemological fairness, saying that “[i]t is not from our prejudices, passions or habits that we should demand the elements of the definition which we must have; it is from the reality itself which we are going to define.”
is because “religion cannot be defined except by the characteristics which are found wherever religion itself is found.” (Durkheim: 1969, 38)

In practice, religion is the embodiment of humanity’s relational need, whether at a social level with other human beings, or at a mystical level with the forces of nature and the supernatural. It is a zone of safety from uncertainties and unexpected danger. It is a source for confidence and nourishment. Religion serves its social function of stability and security, with the logical implication that destructive violence runs contrary to it.

4A2 Violence as a Concept

According to the 1991 edition of the Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, “violence represents (1) swift and intense force; (2) rough or injurious physical force, action, or treatment; (3) an unjust or unwarranted exertion of force or power; (4) a violent act or proceeding; (5) rough or immoderate vehemence, as of feeling or language; fury; (6) damage, as through distortion of meaning or fact.”

In spite of cultural constructs, psychology of violence is universal, whether personal or collective. It is anchored into the two auxiliary verbs to have (economics) and to be (identity), and it is directed against oneself (masochism) or against others (sadism). While it is widely believed that only violence can stop violence, ironically, if understood as adversarial retaliation, or vengeance, it is this very belief that reinforces its cyclical makeup. This is because, as René Girard puts it, “[e]veryone wants to strike the last blow, and reprisal can thus follow reprisal without any true conclusion ever being reached.” (Girard: 1979, 26) The viral nature of uncontrolled violence is embedded into its mimetic feature, posing serious challenges to any process of immunization against it. In fact, any effort to subdue uncontrolled violence creates new conditions in which violence can prosper. At the same time controlled violence represents the only validity to the argument of “fighting fire with fire,” because this type of violence is rational rather than emotional.
Anand Nayak of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), is credited with conducting and coordinating a research project on the relationship between religion and violence, apparently in response to the growing Huntingtonian “clash of civilization” determinism between “the West and the rest.” Because Nayak’s definition of violence links social studies with religious studies in a very coherent and comprehensive fashion, his model will be summarized below, with occasional additional comments and points of reference.

Focusing on the general meaning of violence, Nayak distinguishes between atypical and typical violence. The atypical violence is characterized by the absence of a deliberate human intervention, whether direct or indirect. This can be observed in nature’s violence (ecological disasters, violence in the animal world, etc), physical violence (extreme sports and entertainment), and symbolic violence (sacrifice and religious rituals, aesthetical violence in artistic manifestations, gaming industry, and so on.)

The typical violence is the type of violence conducted for the purpose of inflicting harm. Here the actor is always human, and the victim could be another human, or the animal world, or the nature in general. Typical violence is both direct and indirect. Direct typical violence includes violence against and between children, violence against women, violence against aged, group violence, violence against animals, and ecological violence. Indirect typical violence includes structural violence, ritual violence and asceticism, violent sports and potential violence.

**Direct Typical Violence**

Direct typical violence occurs when the intent of inflicting harm is clearly stated—usually as a mechanism designed to restore justice, order, and dignity. 1) Violence against children is observable in child abuse, while violence between children is visible in teenage violence, where some assassins often prepare their acts carefully for the purpose of inflicting pain and death. Sometimes, negative emotions are exteriorized and rechanneled via artistic creations which predict
the potential for violence. 2) According to a report prepared by the World Health Organization in 1996, and cited by Nayak, every three minutes, one woman is beaten, every five minutes one woman is raped, every ten minutes one child is sexually abused. 3) Violence against aged people is mainly conducted by the caretaker, or by the society in general. This can be psychological, physical, financial, and negligence. Often the victim is psychologically dependent on the aggressor, while the aggressor is financially dependent on the victim. 4) Mass violence is violence that is imposed by one group against another. Some types of mass violence are visible in situations of war, banditry, high seas piracy, extreme sports, while others are less visible, such as in situations of embargos that affect the innocent. 5) Violence against animals is visible either in cases of animal abuse for entertainment, or in animal slaughter for nourishment. 6) Ecological violence is violence perpetrated by groups under the pretext of human progress or common good, visible in cases of unsustainable growth, resource exploitation, and environmental depletion. (Nayak: 2000, 8-20)

**Indirect Typical Violence**

Indirect typical violence is caused or justified by a society’s structural configuration, political establishments, laws and traditions. Although the negative effects of such structural violence are easily anticipated, this type of violence continues to be exercised without sensitivity, often being regarded as “lesser evil.” Indirect typical violence includes two categories such as structural and potential.

**Structural Violence:** Structural violence is reflected in violent actions taken by groups or societies due to laws and traditions, thus harming another individual or group. At a macro-level, this is identifiable in political arrangements and economic policies that lead to violence against the vulnerable. Structural violence is sustained by cultural attitudes (e.g., traditions, customs), and structural configurations (e.g., laws, treaties, trade agreements). Culturally, social and religious traditions often use violence against suspected threats directed against a group’s cultural or religious identity. Structurally, the sovereignty principle endows the state with the claim for an
exclusive monopoly over the use of violence in the name of the common good. This is expressed *internally* through the monopoly over community policing, and revolutionary legitimacy that generates class violence, and *externally* through political and economic support toward another country which has an oppressive regime. Additionally, according to Anand Nayak, “state violence can sometimes be sustained through a style of political violence, which is diffuse, deaf, sneaky, which deprives and prevents people of their wellbeing and social status, which deprives them of their rights because of their political views, which tortures, and, in worse situations, never hesitates to eliminate them.” (Nyak: 2000, 22-23) At an international and transnational level, the existing global economic policies can often generate violence due to the power of the capital, which polarizes global wealth, thus leading to famine, maladies, illiteracy, poverty, exile and other forms of injustice. Weapon industry leads to the sophistication of violence and arms trade.

**Ritual Violence and Asceticism:** Ritual violence and asceticism are forms of violence adopted as oaths for the spiritual benefit of the practitioner, or of humanity in general. *Ritual violence* is conducted mainly against animals, even though there are historical cases of ritual violence conducted against human subjects (e.g., ancient Greek religion, Aztec rituals, Oceanic religions, and so on.) Even though ritual slaughter of animals is no longer widely practiced, such cases of ritual violence against animals is still found in contemporary sacrifices made to goddess Kāli (in Hinduism), Shechita and Kosher slaughter for Passover (in Judaism), cattle sacrifice in the Nuer tribal religion, and so on. In such contexts, ritual language, even if used symbolically, is reflective of social structure in its encounter with violence. *Asceticism* is a form of self-inflicted violence for the double purpose of expiation of sins, and internal spiritual growth. This is common through various organized religions. For instance, while in Christianity asceticism is conducted for cleansing sins, in Hinduism asceticism focuses not only on spiritual cleansing, but also on the elevation of inner creative energy, which gives mastering over the self and the entire creation.

**Sport and Violence:** Some forms of sport entertainment are completely inhumane, cruel and violent, and they can cause the death of the competitor.
Potential Violence: Potential violence is a type of violence expressed in artistic creations such as literature and media, which can inspire potential perpetrators on how to perfect their strategies and tactics, or inspire children toward violence by simply mimicking examples that they read or watch on the screen. (Nayak: 2000, 20-32)

4A4 What is Religious Violence?

Arguing from an evolutionary perspective, which subjects humanity exclusively to the killer instinct of the animal world and to the survival of the fittest, various scholars consider violence as being part of the nature. For instance, the Nobel Prize laureate Konrad Lorenz pointed out that aggression fulfills three functions: 1) species distribution balance, 2) selection of the strongest, and 3) defense of the young. Within these three functions, he points to a species of fish, which, if deprived of its natural enemies such as male rivals with whom it habitually disputes territorial rights, it turns its aggression against the members of its own family and destroys them. (Lorenz: 1966; Girard: 1979, 2) Yet, trapped by genetic determinism and natural selection theories, most of the modern scientists failed to fully comprehend the spiritual dimension of violence, instead arguing whether violence has a genetic makeup, or is a learned behavior. In the history of humanity one can observe that religion attempted and succeeded in engineering a reliable control mechanism against humanity’s self-destruction–built from within the process itself–which differentiated between uncontrolled and controlled violence.

In spite of a shared perception that religious faith is a source for violence, faith is in fact a source for peace and social order. This claim has been demonstrated by social anthropologists who gathered data about various forms of religious life from around the world, and who concluded that the ritual of sacrifice and the scapegoat represent the most primitive forms of religion’s relationship with violence. Based on their testing of various religious cultures, they also concluded that violence is external to the essence of religious faith, and that religious faith employs violence only in a limited and fictional way, and only to neutralize its spreading.
Restating the thesis of this chapter in this context, even at the risk of redundancy, one can note that when collective violence erupts, the immediate instinct of religion is to intervene and serve as a catalyst between the contenders of the original rivalry. Religion intervenes in its most basic manifestation, through a ritual of sacrifice which cannot and which it is not disputed by the contenders for reasons already explained. Sacrifice is a ritual performance of stylized violence meant to prevent social disintegration because it releases the passionate desire for violence into a surrogate victim. Although theatrical in its outlook, in a practical sense, religious sacrifice plays an instrumental role because it serves also as an educational tool for the group by exposing the foreseeable lethal danger of uncontrolled violence. Because the performer of sacrifice receives public recognition and is invested with authority, this leads to an institutionalization of the process, and to a process of power building, upon which a surrogate rivalry is built. Therefore, power growth and power maintenance are the decisive factors whether an organized religion will maintain its primordial instinct and act as a pacifier in a violent context, or abandon it due its conflict of interest in power growth and maintenance. (Waardenburg: 2000, 240)

The primitive societies certainly understood that uncontrolled violence was unlimited in the sense that it meant a closed cycle of harm-revenge. At the same time, they understood that controlled violence was limited because it evaded such harm-revenge cycle through the mechanism of *ritual* performance, a mechanism which “is nothing more than the regular exercise of ‘good’ violence.” (Girard: 1979, 37) Controlled violence was soon discovered as a reliable educational and therapeutic tool for the safety of the group, and its instrumental use was considered rational because it managed to control the irrationality of uncontrolled violence, simply by using its own nature as bait and by redirecting its savagery toward a victim with low expectations for retaliation. To be accepted as a taboo, this logical mechanism had to become sacralized because “[o]nly the transcendental quality of the system acknowledged by all, can assure the prevention or cure of violence.” (Girard: 1979, 24) In our contemporary setting, however, the “[v]ictims substituted for the real target are the equivalent of sacrificial victims in distant times. In talking about this kind of phenomenon, we spontaneously utilize the expression ‘scapegoat.’” (Girard: 2001, 156)
According to René Girard, there are three overarching categories of controlled violence.

There may be a certain connection between all the various methods employed by man since the beginning of time to avoid being caught up in an interminable round of revenge. They can be grouped into three general categories: (1) preventive measures in which sacrificial rites divert the spirit of revenge into other channels; (2) the harnessing or hobbling of vengeance by means of compensatory measures, trials by combat, etc., whose curative effects remain precarious; (3) the establishment of a judicial system—the most efficient of all curative procedures. […] The injured parties must be accorded a careful measure of satisfaction, just enough to appease their own desire for revenge but not so much as to awaken the desire elsewhere. (Girard: 1979, 21)

For René Girard, in order to understand the social function of religion vis-à-vis violence, one must adopt an empirical approach and follow a strict scientific methodology. Therefore, by following a scientific methodology, one could easily observe that religion is nothing more than yet “another term for that obscurity that surrounds man’s efforts to defend himself by curative or preventive means against his own violence,” since “[o]nly the transcendental quality of the system, acknowledged by all, can assure the prevention or cure of violence.” (Girard: 1979, 23-4)

4A41 Sacred and Profane

Religion takes an empirical approach to collective violence by offering pragmatic ways of separating life between the domains of sacred and profane. According to Durkheim,

[t]his division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought; the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with profane things. (Durkheim, 1969, 52)
For Mircea Eliade, *sacred* and *profane* are situated at the core of human existence; thus pragmatic by their very nature. Therefore,

> [t]he abyss that divides the two modalities of experience—*sacred* and *profane*—will be apparent when we come to describe sacred space and the ritual building of the human habitation, or the varieties of the religious experience of time, or the relations of religious man to nature and the world of tools, or the consecration of human life itself, the sacrality with which man’s vital functions (food, sex, work and so on) can be charged; ... *sacred* and *profane* are two modes of being in the world, two existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history. These modes of being in the world are not of concern only to the history of religions or to sociology; they are not the object of only of historical, sociological, or ethnological study. In the last analysis, the sacred and profane modes of being depend upon the different positions that man has conquered in the cosmos; hence they are of concern both to the philosopher and to anyone seeking to discover the possible dimensions of human existence. (Eliade: 1987, 14-15)

Sacred and profane stay at the basis of territorial and temporal delimitations, whereby ritual creates the sacred space, makes the distinction between chaos and order, and reorients the man toward an idea of ‘center’. Time and space delineations, which are at the basis of any religion’s institutional design, are dictated by the rules of ritual, such as in the case of the Vedic rituals taking possession of a territory and making it legally valid through the erection of an altar (Eliade: 1987, 22, 29, 30)

While uncontrolled violence obviously belongs to the domain of chaos and it is situated on the realm of the profane, controlled violence, due to its curative feature, is obviously situated on the domain of sacred, only to the extent that this serves the function of recreating the world, by re-establishing trust and social stability. As Girard writes,

In its simplest, perhaps most elementary form, religion manifests little curiosity about the origins of those terrible forces that visit their fury on mankind, but seems to concentrate its attention on determining a regular sequential pattern that will enable man to anticipate these onslaughts and take measures against them. Religious empiricism invariably leads to one conclusion: it is essential to
keep as far away as possible from sacred things, always to avoid direct contact with them…. This same empiricism, however, can sometimes reach conclusions so utterly foreign to our own way of thinking and can show itself so narrow, inflexible and myopic in its attitudes that we are tempted to attribute its functioning to some sort of psychological malaise.” (Girard: 1979, 32)

Assumptions about how primitive societies controlled violence have generally focused on the importance that they gave to the role of prevention, a ritual act exclusively situated within the canopy of the sacred. Thus, during times of collective violence, the sacred is concerned not only with the re-ordering of time and space, but more so with controlling the forces of destruction. When these forces of destruction break the chains of banishment which the ritual periodically binds them with, away from the community, the sacred strives to divert their menace into even more distant objects, situated at the periphery of society. Thus, “[v]iolence and the sacred are inseparable,” because “all forms of violence, more or less ritualized, that divert a menace from nearby objects to more distant objects,” (Girard: 1979, 19) are incontestable taboos. This is because, “[t]he sacred thing is par excellence that which the profane should not touch, and cannot touch with impunity.” (Durkheim: 1969, 55) Consequently, “[w]e are beginning to understand why the sacrificial act appears as both sinful and saintly, an illegal as well as a legitimate exercise of violence.” (Girard: 1979, 20)

4A42 Religious Eschatology

In its most rudimentary form, religion is less concerned with the dread of violence. As a result, eschatological narratives that embellish various religious mythologies are theologically marginal within organized religions simply because eschatology itself proclaims the unavoidability of a total collective violence, thus exalting fear of death. At the same time, because anyone wishes to avoid death due to the self-preservation instinct, organized religions focus their attention on strategies of survival. Even in situations where events anticipated by religious eschatologies cannot be avoided—such as during massive violent confrontations or natural disasters—the exaltation of
life remains central within such eschatological mythology, whereby the violent destruction of the world is viewed as an opportunity for its renewal and re-creation. Therefore, religious eschatology in general does not advocate a total destruction of the world, but it focuses on reordering it through various sacrificial enterprises and scapegoat mechanisms, with similar functions both in organized religions and in the primitive religions.

Apocalyptic imageries are commonly concerned with a catastrophic end of the world, whereby higher powers will intervene to put an end to human failure so that a new and better world could emerge. As David A Leeming writes, “[t]he apocalypse is a ritual cleansing of cosmic proportions, a large scale expression of human fascination with the death and the resurrection process.” (Leeming: 1989, 77) While in Western organized religions, the apocalypse is a one-time event that reestablishes the Kingdom of God, in Eastern religions, this is a cyclical event which involves creation and destruction. In Judaism eschatological imagery is present in “The Day of Yahweh” (Daniel 7-12; Isaiah 24-27; Ezekiel 37; Joel 3), when the dead will return to be judged, and the enemies of God will be destroyed. In Christianity, St. John’s Book of Revelation predicts the coming of the Kingdom with the raising of the dead and the final judgment that will separate between ‘the sheep’ and ‘the goats’. (Leeming: 1989, 77, 79) The Shiite Islām has also nourished an impressive vision of the Final Judgment in which small “signs of the Hour” (a terrifying sequence of events), will serve as a prelude to the return of the al-Mahdi, who will allegedly reestablish the order of the world. (Filiu: 2011, xix, 241-249) In Hinduism, the puranic literature, which sees the world as a cycle of creation-destruction-recreation, proclaims that the world will naturally end in the fourth age, or the Kāli Age, when Vishnu the Preserver, will absorb the world, only for the world to be reborn. (Leeming: 1989, 81) In tribal religions such as the Hopi, when the prophesized end of the world will come, the world surrounding the Hopi village of Oraibi will be destroyed, while Oraibi will remain untouched, and at the center of the world. However, the world will be rejuvenated when a kachina removes his mask during a ritual dance in the plaza, and the faith and ceremonies will mark the start of a new cycle of life. Similarly, the Norse myth of Ragnarök insists that when the world will end through a fire, even
the gods themselves will be doomed, so that life will be renewed. (Leeming: 1989, 84, 85) In the South American tribal religions, the catastrophic end of the world is disclosed in the paradoxical destruction of the catastrophe itself, “through symbols associated with the death of an individual, in funeral rites and afterlife beliefs.” For example, in the case of the Kumayurá, the renewed face of the earth is viewed in light of the death of one of its chiefs, whereby every symbol of life is revitalized. (Sullivan: 1988, 468, 546)

As Mircea Eliade puts it, “by participating ritually in the end of the world and in its re-creation, any man became contemporary with the illud tempus; hence he was born anew, he began life over again with his reserve of vital forces intact, as it was at the moment of his birth.” (Eliade: 1987, 80) This is because, in any curative ritual, everyone acknowledges that “life cannot be repaired, it can only be recreated through symbolic repetition of the cosmogony, for… cosmogony is the paradigmatic model for all creation.” (Eliade: 1987, 82)

4B The Structural Manifestation of Religion and Violence

Organized religion is religious faith organized in political institutions that share doctrines, ethics, and rituals. As a political institution it mimics violence directly and indirectly. In order to avoid the confusion between religious faith and organized religions, one must understand that faith is a rational and emotional personal creed, while organized religion is a political institution with interests defined as sacred precepts.

Organized religion participates in violence directly and indirectly, pending on its interests and relationship with the source of power, a relationship paramount within the surrogate rivalry. Direct participation occurs when organized religion itself has executive jurisdiction over the military forces which are ordered to participate into collective violence directly, and in exchange for material and spiritual benefits. A case readily available is the case of Khalifia, which makes no distinction between secular and religious leadership. (Netton: 1997, 143) Indirect participation
is more complex because its operational mechanism is developed by proxy, acting under the surface of secular governance. Here the participation could take various forms such as political support for a military intervention by influencing public opinion, or the justification of death penalty within the Just War theory discourse. (Harutyunyan: 2011, 49-67) It can also participate indirectly via public rituals which can instrumentalize cultural symbols which are politically charged, and it could mobilize sentiments of patriotism and group identity. (Molitfelnic: 2006, 518-533; Bodrov: 2011, 43-48; LeMasters: 2011, 98-116) Additionally, sacred texts can be used as political instruments in the sense that the spiritual leaders can offer meaning to events faced by the community by selecting specific sacred texts in line with the personal or institutional agenda. If the selection of a violent text can incite to self-defense or aggression, a pacifist text would naturally oppose such actions.

4C HYPOTHESIS 1:

Religion in Mimetic Rivalry

René Girard demonstrated that people desire mimetically. One person borrows the desire from another person, thus encouraging each another’s desire toward specific objects. Secondly, the borrowed desire causes rivalry between the two contenders, which can lead to violence. Therefore, in order to avoid an endless cycle of violence, the contenders focus their violence on a third party which becomes the scapegoat. This mechanism had been accurately depicted by René Girard in his cross-sectional analysis of various myths and rituals, randomly selected from various historical and geographical settings, thus passing the test-retest exigency of empirical verification. (Girard: 1979; Girard: 1989; Girard 2001; Girard: 2008; Girard, Williams: 1996) For Girard, mimetic rivalry is “the process itself when two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire through physical or other means.” (Girard: 1979, 9)
4C1 Frustration-Aggression Theory

John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert R. Sears, in their 1939 work, *Frustration and Aggression*, have demonstrated that the failure to obtain an object mutually desired by two contenders leads to one’s aggression against the other, thus starting a cycle of rivalry and violence (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, Sears: 1939). (On the other hand, Markus Denzler, Jens Förster and Nira Liberman have recently demonstrated how goal-fulfillment decreases aggression. [Denzler, Förster, Liberman. 2009, 90-100]) This is because, as René Girard demonstrates, human being desires mimetically in the sense that one person borrows the desire from another person, thus starting a cycle of rivalry which leads to violence. Furthermore, Girard demonstrated that if unappeased, violence seeks and always finds a surrogate victim (scapegoat) to be sacrificed, simply because “sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence.” (Girard: 1979, 8)

According to the Frustration-Aggression theory (Dollard, et al: 1939), when two contenders begin their competition over an object commonly sought, the first contender (the perpetrator) obtains the object of desire indirectly by harming the second contender. As a result, the second contender becomes a victim whose first instinct is to retaliate in self-defense. Due to the retaliatory violence of the victim, the perpetrator is ready to strike for the second time, thus leading to a cycle of violence that could end into the destruction of one of the contenders. This process also involves the larger group because each contender brings in allies–usually close members of the family, clan, friends, and so on–who join the competition, thus violence becoming collective in nature. Nevertheless, from past experiences, everyone in the group is aware that each rivalry can escalate into the group’s disintegration, thus jeopardizing everyone’s survival. (Brown, et al: 2008, 75-84) Therefore, due to the self-preservation instinct (Solomon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski: 1991, 93-158), the group intervenes to end the conflict while in its initial phase. During this process of intervention, the need of self-preservation–both as a self and as a group–derives from...
past memories, all embellished with various forms of meaning, most of them anchored into an outside all-powerful force. As Brown et al, explain it,

For millennia, philosophers and spiritual leaders have pointed out that attempts to secure our “selves,” even at the expense of others, are primary source—if not the source—of personal distress and interpersonal strive. Many traditional moral and religious cultures have focused on modifying the expression of behavior to ameliorate the excesses of self-centeredness, egotisms, and other problematic products of self-identification, but there has also been long-standing interest, especially among Asian and several Western contemplative and scholarly traditions, in ‘taking a look inside’ to closely examine the properties and operation of the self and to investigate the qualities of consciousness that can facilitate more adaptive ways of being with oneself and others.” (Brown, et al: 2008, 75)

4C1a Experiment:
The Mimetic Twins Rivalry

The mimetic mechanism of violence can be explained in the following way (Figure 4.2):

In an empty room there is a set of twin babies. Initially the two babies are happy (Stage 1). Later, a toy is placed between the two babies; the babies become curious and want the toy (Stage 2). The first baby gets to the toy first (Stage 3). Seeing this, the second becomes frustrated then comes and takes the toy away (Stage 4). The first baby turns angry and tries to recover his toy, and thus the fight begins (Stage 5). The mother becomes aware that unless she intervenes, the emotional tension between the twins can result into violence, and even murder (Stage 6). Therefore, the mother removes the toy. As a result, both babies turn their frustration against the mother who now has to absorb their frustration, thus becoming the scapegoat of their competition, while a new competition begins between the mother and the twins, because she is about to set rules, while the toy becomes the new scapegoat within the new competition.
Figure 4.2 | The Five Stages of Mimetic Rivalry

Twin Rivalry | Stage 1

Twin Rivalry | Stage 2

Twin Rivalry | Stage 3

Twin Rivalry | Stage 4

Twin Rivalry | Stage 5
Displaying the Frustration-Aggression theory in one of its most basic forms, this heuristic device indicates that in order to hinder the spread of the violence that emerged from this rivalry, another rivalry had to replace it, but with the violence being redirected against a third party. (Figure 4.3) At the same time, this heuristic device displays also a double rivalry: the first, an original or independent rivalry, generated by the toy as the object of desire, the second, a surrogate or dependent rivalry, generated by the desire for authority in order to control violence.

4C1b The Genesis of the Surrogate Rivalry

The original rivalry occurs between the two babies, and the surrogate rivalry takes place between the babies and the mother. In the first rivalry the object of desire is the physical toy. In the second rivalry the “object” of desire is more abstract and institutionalized, as it deals with setting rules
necessary for a peaceful coexistence. The original rivalry is objective in nature, as it is generated by possession (economics), and the surrogate rivalry is subjective in nature, as it is generated by power (identity). The original rivalry is cauterized by the surrogate rivalry because of an inherent logic of double substitution. With the surrogate rivalry playing on the screen of the original rivalry, this heuristic device is also illustrative of the two phases of collective violence: the first generated by the economic factor (*to have* the toy), the second generated by institutionalized power and identity (*to be* in charge.) This also demonstrates that a conflict generated by economics is stronger and it precedes the conflict of identity, as “philosophy goes through the stomach first.” (Romanian proverb) This double rivalry points not only to the existence of two objects of desire, but it also points to two scapegoats. In the original rivalry, the mother becomes the scapegoat of the competing twins, as they project their frustration against the mother. What it is important to note is the fact that the mother becomes a successful scapegoat because she does not retaliate, while in the second rivalry, the toy becomes the scapegoat, and the conflict between the babies ends successfully. In other words, in the surrogate rivalry, the toy—which is the object of desire from the original rivalry—becomes the scapegoat of the competition between the twins and the mother because it gets “destroyed” by being taken away. (Chart 4.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Contender</th>
<th>Second Contender</th>
<th>Object of Desire</th>
<th>Scapegoat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baby 1</td>
<td>Baby 2</td>
<td>Toy</td>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Rivalry (object: toy)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Contender</th>
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<th>Scapegoat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>Babies</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Toy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Rivalry (subject: authority)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart 4.1 | Mimetic Competition rivalries*

With the institutionalization process of authority over an object of desire, the surrogate rivalry can generate violence only if it abandons its original instinct to keep sight of the object of desire from the original rivalry, and fails to use it as a scapegoat. For example, if the mother looses sight of the object of desire from the first rivalry (the toy), and focuses on the object of desire from the second rivalry (making rules and expressing her authority as an adult), she fails to resolve
the conflict between the twins, generating more violence between the two babies, as well as between the babies and the mother. One must note that the mother plays a double role: scapegoat in the original rivalry and competitor in the surrogate rivalry. Therefore, an ecological inference between the role of the mother and religion in social conflict can only be made in the case of religion’s primitive instinct, because the mother does not mean to hurt the babies, just as faith, as a devotional instinct, strives to prevent social disintegration.

Assuming that the mother does not remove the toy, but gives it to the first baby, while placing the second baby in a crib behind the bars, several phenomena begin taking shape. First, the mother no longer conducts an effective “sacrifice” because she abandons her natural instinct to protect the young, thus displaying an unnatural, deviant behavior toward the babies. Such behavior also contradicts the “defense of the young” instinct, noted by Konrad Lorenz, specific of the animal world and it is thus statistically irrelevant. Second, the babies will begin building their identity in relation to their feelings toward each other vis-à-vis the object of desire. Therefore, one baby begins seeing himself as a winner (hence superior), while the second baby begins seeing himself as a looser (hence inferior.) Furthermore, because the second baby is still a potential threat to the first baby, the first baby begins contemplating how to build his defense against any eventual aggression initiated by the second baby. However, the second baby feels increasingly alienated and deprived, thus building a sense of resentment and desire to restore his integrity. In time, the two babies build resentment against each other, thus laying the foundation for a culture of violence. Finally, this scenario, as derived from this experiment reveals the germinating process of the main theories of collective violence: frustration-aggression (when the object of desire is introduced), alienation-deprivation (when the second baby gets placed in the crib behind the bars, without the toy), and violence as a learned behavior (as the two babies build their identities on resentment and fear of loss.)
4C2 Explanatory Tool: An Ecological Inference

Making an ecological inference between this experiment of mimetic rivalry and religion, by applying this paradigm to the functional role of religion in society, one could easily demonstrate that if the institutionalized intervention of religion in a conflict looses sight of the initial competition (over a material object of desire), then religion can make decisions that generate resentment, while also expediting the process of building cultures of violence.

Therefore, in order to build a strong explanatory tool, and also avoid ecological fallacy between the mother’s intervention (as seen in the experiment with the mimetic twins) and religion’s intervention in a collective conflict, the aggregate data ought to remain anchored in the Frustration-Aggression theory. Frustration (independent variable), which emerges from the competition over an object of desire, leads to aggression (dependent variable). In return, aggression emerges from the self-defense instinct for retaliation, thus generating a cycle of violence that leads to the destruction of one competitor. This process can be observed in the interaction between the two babies, and by inference in the interaction between adults. During this process, in the case of the babies, the mother intervenes (intervening variable) and redirects the frustration of the babies away from each other, and toward a third party—this being the mother herself who will not retaliate against the babies. The mother becomes the scapegoat of the babies, thus ending the competition between the babies. Similarly, in a collective conflict religious authority (intervening variable), interjects itself between the competitors and redirects their frustration toward a surrogate victim (material or spiritual) that displays no expectations for reprisal, thus moving the cycle of violence into a stabilizing zone. (See phase 1 of Figure 4.4) With each repeated intervention, religion capitalizes upon its initial successes, and thus begins to accumulate power by establishing laws on ritual performance, and collective behavior, similarly to the mother who establishes rules. (See phase 2 of Figure 4.4) Just like the mother who has authority over the babies by virtue of her being an adult, the authority that religion gains over ritual performance and law, drives religion
into solidifying its power through a complex theological superstructure that institutionalizes its public authority through doctrinal precepts, ethical norms and set rituals.

4C2a Why does the group appeal to religion?

The meaning that the group assigns to any intervention toward stability is often filtered through a language that attempts to control the uncontrollable forces from the inside and the outside of the group. Here, religion presents itself as a most practical devotional tool in interacting with these uncontrollable forces, thus generating stability at personal and collective levels. In fact, as we saw earlier, the standard definition of religion derives from the relational attribute of humanity, the ζωον πολιτικόν [political animal], whereby religion solidifies a group not only in the interest of its physical survival, but also for its spiritual salvation and encounter with the transcendent. And, because religion succeeds in re-linking the group together after an internal strife has occurred,
the group recognizes the power of religion as resting beyond the power of the contenders (or of the group itself), thus never disputing the authority of the sacred.

4C2b How does religion intervene?

In the context of a deadly competition, religion intervenes in one of its most basic forms, by conducting a sacrifice; an act of stylized and controlled violence performed in a dramatic fashion. The logic of the sacrifice, although presented as a taboo, derives from a very practical observation of the retaliatory potentials of the surrogate victim. Therefore, within the process of ritual performance of sacrifice—whereby “the rites to be performed are symbols of the divine” (Weber: 1977, 268)—religion redirects and discharges the tension and the negative energy accumulated between the two contenders into a real or virtual surrogate victim. The real surrogate victim can be a prized object, an indispensable animal, or a human being which the group itself refuses to accept: an outsider, or a deviant insider, or even someone regarded as cursed because of a physical defect or illness that generates fear of contamination. The virtual surrogate victim is an invisible entity, an evil concept or thought, an insignificant object, a demon or evil itself viewed in existential terms. This act of controlled violence is sacred simply because it attempts to control the uncontrollable forces, as well as because the surrogate victim’s lack of retaliation indeed holds the key to violence by offering a payoff to both contenders, thus ending the cycle of violence.

4C2c Rivalry & the Stabilizing Role of Religion

In the initial phase of the conflict, a sacrifice consists in the performance of a symbolic and stylized political ceremony whereby the members of the group interact with each other actively as performers, and passively as spectators. The context for ceremonial interaction not only
establishes rules of interaction, but also favors the development of the phenomenon of power—a phenomenon which for Robert A Dahl represents “a relation between people … expressed in simple symbolic notation.” (Dahl: 1957, 201) This relation between people, as controlled by symbolic action, leads to the recognition of the ritual leader as a prophet. Within this new position of power, the prophet is not only “a purely individual bearer of charisma, who by virtue of his mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine commandment” (Weber: 1977, 253), but also someone who “demands obedience as an ethical duty” (Weber: 1977, 263), thus setting new laws, whether as a founder or as a renewer of a religion. The prophet, therefore, (re)defines the interaction between the members of the group, as well as with an out-group in order to offer “a unified view of the world derived from a consciously integrated and meaningful attitude toward life.” (Weber: 1977, 266) This attitude toward life is based on a power structure designed to lead the group toward salvation, while “balancing the guilt and merit of individual actions in a very precise bookkeeping and determining the religious fate of the individual person according to the outcome of this accounting.” (Weber: 1977, 271) The building process of the power structure is reinforced through a repetition that emerges from an archetype thought of having divine origins, because, according to Mircea Eliade “all religious acts are held to have been founded by gods, civilizing heroes, or mythical ancestors” (Eliade: 1974, 22). The ceremony itself is a source for power accumulation because it involves a type of behavior reserved only for special occasions, thus building a structure based on symbols and rules of the ritual, as made obvious in the case of Brahmanism. (Nayak: 2000, 66-70)

In the context of violent competition, the ritual of sacrifice demands the emergence of a special code of behavior, while the power to adjudicate eventual deviations from such code rests exclusively with the ritual performer. This also institutionalizes the control of violence by setting laws on ownership and transfer of property—a process that led Walter Burkert to conclude that “all orders and forms of authority in human society are founded on institutionalized violence.” (Burkert: 1986, 1) For instance, at the basis of Hinduism rests the primitive form of the ritual of sacrifice. In time, the ritual of sacrifice led to the concentration of power around the Brahmins, their
cast being now recognized as the top cast within the Hindu social structure. (Bowker: 1997, 163)
Also, according to Anand Nayak, “sacrifice is at the heart of all Brahman civilizations, crystallized within the grand offer made by the Brahmin to all deities and forces of the universe and life.” (Nayak: 2000, 68) As the structure develops, the initial religious phenomenon of sacrifice becomes institutionalized, and whoever controls the ritual of sacrifice, controls also the political behavior of the group; now (re)defined by the meaning given to the ritual act (doctrine), the rules of the ritual itself (worship), and their imposition in the group’s conformity with a standard behavior (ethics).

In conclusion, one must note that although religion sanctions a limited use of violence against a real surrogate victim, it does so only to the extent that its intervention ends the cycle of violence. Therefore, the logical inference is that religion does not cause collective violence (Waardenburg: 2000, 257), but it represents a solution to collective violence, thus becoming a source for trust, confidence, and social order. Furthermore, in its most primitive manifestation through the act of sacrifice, religion stays at the development of morality and social structure (Huber, Mauss: 1964, 6, 13), and at the origins of various social institutions. (Durkheim: 1969, 466) Furthermore, sacrifice sets the rules for designing and sharing the sacred space, since “all symbols and rituals having to do with temples, cities, and houses are finally derived from the primary experience of sacred space.” (Eliade: 1987, 58)

4C3 The Functional Role of Sacrifice

Various studies of anthropology have demonstrated that ritual life has been at the basis of social function from primitive societies down to our modern world. In general, the social function of the ritual is to seal relationships, mark various stages of human life, and bind social conventions. The literature on the meaning of sacrifice is vast, ranging from Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Lévinas, Joseph Suglia, Jacques Derrida,
James George Frazer, Mircea Eliade, René Girard, Dennis King Keenan, Lawrence E. Sullivan, and others. However, my aim here is to simply follow the ritual of sacrifice, mainly within the scapegoating paradigm.

4C3a What is the Ritual of Sacrifice?

In the context of collective violence, the inherent logic of the ritual of sacrifice has been to prevent the spread of violence by endorsing a limited use of a ‘good’ type of violence in order to seal the fate of violence itself, as to never return to the community. Therefore, the ritual of sacrifice is 1) preventive in nature, 2) rational in its design, 3) isolated in its use, and 4) therapeutic in its scope. As Girard explains, “[r]itual precaution that appears lunatic or at least highly exaggerated in a modern context… is not dissimilar to that of medicine when suddenly confronted with an unknown disease.” (Girard: 1979, 33)

1) Ritual of sacrifice plays a preventive role because of its ability to eminently invoke the unknown and communicate with the sacred, hence “holding the key” to the untouchable dimensions of human existence. Because any encounter with violence outside the ritual setting involves a contamination process, the ritual is inherently designated to anticipate it by separating cleanness from contamination, and by polarizing a “community’s aggressive impulses and redirect[ing] them toward victims that may be actual or figurative, animate or inanimate...” (Girard: 1979, 17) The idea of contamination is the very key to prevention because it explicitly reveals the potential of becoming self-inflicted with harm. The primitives instinctively understood that in the absence of an independent sovereign body that would release the victim’s desire for revenge, violence could only escalate, thus generating even more social disequilibrium. Therefore, the need for prevention became acute, and sacrifice was the main “instrument of prevention in the struggle against violence.” (Girard, 1979: 17)
2) Within the kaleidoscope of ritual life, the *rational* design of the ritual of sacrifice can be identified at the core of humanity’s complex internal disputes. The design reveals a convoluted process often endowed with a narrative, a myth, and a theological superstructure; thus incomparable and incompatible with a simple outburst of anger. As Girard puts it, “it would be inexact to compare the sacrificial act to the spontaneous gesture of the man who kicks his dog because he dares not kick his wife or boss.” (Girard: 1979, 9) Etymologically, sacrifice means “making things sacred,” in other words, finding the logic that reverses the process of corruption back to the primordial purity and health. According to Dennis King Keenan,

[s]acrifice effects the revelation of truth that overcomes the negative aspect of the sacrifice. In a word, sacrifice pays. One gets a return on one’s investment. But this economical understanding of sacrifice only makes “sense” if it is pushed to its “logical” extreme. Ironically, it is as if the economical understanding of sacrifice inevitably unworks itself. The work of sacrifice unworks itself. To be what it “is” sacrifice must sacrifice itself. Sacrifice is essentially a holocaust. In sacrifice, all (*holos*) is burned (*caustos*). (Keenan: 2005, 1)

Keenan’s observation of sacrifice as an element of destruction relates to the destruction of the object of desire. As he later points out, “[t]he *uneconomic* understanding of sacrifice inevitably gets sublated by an economical understanding of sacrifice” (Keenan: 2005, 2), mainly because by destroying something palpable a greater reward of social stability is achieved. Therefore, sacrificing the sacrifice simply translates as the destruction of the object of desire from the original rivalry in the context of the surrogate rivalry. In the same venue, Max Weber, in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, classifies asceticism as a rational form of sacrifice not only because it balances the relationship between religion and the economic and social life of modern culture, but also because it sets limitations within the competition over the object of desire.

3) At the core of ritual of sacrifice stays the element of transfer, which identifies and then *isolates* the bridge between the contenders, as well as between the contenders themselves and a third party which is uncontaminated by competition. To sacrifice means to locate this obscure
communicative element and isolate it in order to use it as a venue for transferring something from the domain of the profane to the domain of the sacred. This is why the ritual of sacrifice displays “a dynamic transfer, within a religious context, of something to a numinous object or energy…. from a lesser to a greater being.” (Patton: 2009, 18) It is both related to time and space, and to human and divine. As a result, in controlling violence, “the sacrificial act assumes two opposing aspects: sacred obligation and criminal activity,” (Girard: 1979, 1), simply because “[t]he purpose of the sacrifice is to restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric. Everything else derives from that.” (Girard: 1979, 8)

4) The *therapeutic* scope of the sacrificial ritual is identifiable within the effect of scapegoating because the removal or the destruction of the object of desire within an alleged surrogate rivalry (that emerges from the original competition) reveals the secret of social stability in the primitive societies. It also explains the survival of these societies. The emotional release of anger within a ritual context—whether this has to do with stoning the devil in Mecca during the *Hajj*, or sacrificing a prisoner of war during an Aztec ceremony—helps to reset the emotional stability of the group.

4C3b From Social Pragmatism to Theological Superstructure

Anand Nayak rightly observed that “each culture, and each religion sees violence inscribed at the origins of its existence,” continuing to state that this formative or foundational violence, “seems to shape their own development.” (Nayak: 2000, 5) He considers that “sacrifice, which is a process that consists in the establishment of communication between the sacred world and the secular world through the agency of a victim sacrificed violently during a ceremony, constitutes an essential part of numerous religions, seeing it [the sacrifice] at their foundation.” (Nayak: 2000, 25) Therefore, this formative violence is anchored in the social function of sacrifice.
Numerous intellectual productions from secular (and some religious) scholars insisted that religion generates collective violence due to an inherent state of ambivalence that characterizes the sacred (Otto: 1958; Appleby: 1999; Little 2007, 429). Such productions found obsessive resistance from an opposing intellectual camp of theologians, who argued that in its essence, religion is a source of peace and stability. Taking a creationist approach to humanity, numerous theologians who viewed God as the source of all good (evil being sought in an external source), found themselves obsessed with this claim by going the extra mile in arguing that organized religions are non-violent, except when co-opted by malicious external forces. (This is the main argument made by the apologists, who wrote during the past two decades.) This claim for institutional non-complicity is what scholars such as David Little seem to discard (Simion: 2011, 33). This was not only an idealistic view of religion, but also a tendency on their part to reevaluate institutionalized religion and deplore its cooptation by an external power. Often, this defensive outlook had been triggered by the science-or-religion antagonism that struggled to classify religion either as a product of evolution (anthropologists), or as a result of divine revelation (theologians). On the evolutionists’ camp the normative appeal made to the mechanism of causality (obvious within the process), along with an obsession for a quantitative argumentation in demonstrating an otherwise epistemological perspective, had only generated ideological mistrust toward creationism, with the creationists making similar counterclaims.

As far as the question of collective violence is concerned, the heuristic devices used by the theological superstructure promoted by the creationists often involved the recreation of a parallel mythical world, where similar mechanisms identified by the anthropologists can easily be found, thus unmasking the irony of convergence between the two camps. Yet, one of the key distinctions between the two approaches rests on the moral nature of the surrogate victim. While the creationists charged the surrogate victim with a moral mission, such as the expiation of social ills and the restoration of primordial purity, the anthropologists refused to view the victim in terms of “innocence or guilt,” and favored the fiat, cold exploration of religions phenomena through the lenses of behaviorist observation of both human and animal worlds. (Girard: 1979,
This view not only deprives the act itself of playing any educational role, but it also ignores
the obvious mechanism of the surrogate rivalry, as collective violence occurs not only over the
idea of possession of material objects (to have)–which the anthropologist approach seems to favor
exclusively–but also over questions of power and identity (to be). Therefore, the moral character
of the victim relates to the question of identity as much as to the question of possession, placing
the creationists at an apparent advantage.

As for the rational aspect of controlled violence used through the vehicle of sacrifice, this
had been further explored and clarified by Victor Turner and Godfrey Lienhardt in their analysis
of sacrificial practices of the Kinga and Ndembu tribes in East Africa (Girard: 1979, 7-9), by
Walter Burkert in his analysis of the Greek religion (Burkert: 1986, 293-298), by Henri Hubert
and Marcel Mauss in their comparison of the Greek and Hindu sacrifices. (Hubert, Mauss: 1981),
and so on.

As René Girard points out, although the theological superstructure is built upon the violence
imprinted in the final statement of sacrifice, the act itself has a rational function for the society
in the sense that it addresses various forms of violence generated by identity, property, disease,
transition events, and so on. (Girard: 1979, 8)

4C4 The Scapegoat

In the Western studies, the cognitive dissonance of shifting blame within the Frustration-Aggression
theory is usually referred to as “scapegoat” (literally, ‘the goat that departs’), a term borrowed
from a Jewish ritual performed in Ancient Israel on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). On the
Day of Atonement, the high priest sacrificed two goats: one as an offering to Jehovah, the second
sent out in the wilderness, carrying all the sins of the tribe away from the community. (Leviticus
16:18-22) However, similar atonement rituals were performed in various Middle Eastern and
Mediterranean religious traditions. The Hittites, for instance, used both a human and an animal to
transfer evil away from the community. The ancient Greeks always used a human as a scapegoat, who was beaten, killed or exiled. (Westbrook, Lewis: 2008, 417-422)

The theological superstructure built around scapegoating rituals insists to point out that the reward for conducting such a sacred act of transferring evil unto an object, animal or another human being, is to be found in purification from contamination and divine reward, as well as in a perpetrator’s recognition of guilt for wrongdoing. In some instances, almsgiving was not performed solely for charitable reasons, as much as a scapegoat mechanism. For example, Tom Douglas identified a widespread medieval practice of sin-eaters (gifts that were spiritually contaminated), as well as a practice of the whipping boys (a designated person receiving another’s punishment.) (Douglas: 1995, 31-48) Concerning sin-eating, insofar as my tradition from my Carpathian village counts as evidence, almsgiving for a deceased does not carry out functions of social charity, as much as it serves as a vehicle in transferring the un-expiated sins of the dead back unto the living. Once the living receives the gift from the dead man’s family—particularly the coliva, which is a ritual meal of boiled grains symbolizing the body of the deceased—the receiver becomes contaminated with the un-expiated sins of the dead; now having to perform extra efforts for spiritual cleansing to get rid of the sins received from the dead. At a social level, the most likely candidate to receive more substantial gifts from the deceased, is someone that the village usually marginalizes, thus unravelling the scapegoat mechanism at a different level.

Psychologists have offered two main explanations of scapegoating along the lines of psychoanalysis, and frustration-aggression pragmatism.

In psychoanalysis, Carl Gustav Jung considered the scapegoat as originating into the archetype of man’s shadow, the dark side of the human psyche expressed in violence, weakness, aggression, sexual urges, etc. Thus, according to Jung,

[i]f we could see our shadow (the dark side of our nature), we should be immune to any moral and mental infection and insinuation. As matters now stand, we lay ourselves open to every infection, because we are really doing practically the same thing as they. Only we have the additional
disadvantage that we neither see nor want to understand what we ourselves are doing, under the
cover of good manners. (Jung: 1988, 85)

As Sylvia Brinton Perera interprets Jung’s view of the scapegoat,

[i]n Jungian terms, scapegoating is a form of denying the shadow of both man and God. What is
seen as unfit to conform with the ego ideal, or with the perfect goodness of God, is repressed and
denied, or split off and made unconscious. It is called devilish.... And the scapegoater feels a relief
in being lighter, without the burden of carrying what is unacceptable to his or her ego ideal without
shadow. Those who are identified with the scapegoat, on the other hand, are identified with the
unacceptable shadow qualities. They feel inferior, rejected and guilty. They feel responsible for
more than their personal share of shadow. Both the scapegoater and scapegoat feel in control of
the mix of goodness and malevolence that belongs to reality itself. (Perera: 1986, 9)

Gordon Allport, in his work *On the Nature of Prejudice*, offers a chapter with a theoretical
assessment of the scapegoating, viewing it within the paradigm of frustration-aggression dynamic.
He simply points out that frustration that blocks access to a goal or object of desire, leads to the
displacement of anger onto a victim that is subject of envy (not necessarily the weakest), using
the negative prejudices as the driving force in punishing the surrogate victim. (Allport: 1979,
343-360)

Unfortunately, beyond the confines of faith and social psychology, the scapegoat
mechanism was employed in various conflicts, such as against the Native Americans, and against
the Black Africans (who were used as scapegoats during instances of competition between
European contenders), against the Jews in Germany, against the Gypsies, and so on, as pointed
out by various social psychologists.

The phenomenon of religious scapegoating seems to subsist in the contemporary society
in various forms, and it does not belong exclusively to the primitive manifestation of religion
and social order.

In a religious sense, as Girard explains,
the expression ‘scapegoat’ designates (1) the victim of the ritual described in Leviticus, (2) all the victims of similar rituals that exist in archaic societies and that are called rituals of expulsion, and finally (3) all the phenomena of non-ritualized collective transference that we observe or believe we observe around us. This last meaning leaps over the barrier that anthropologists attempt to maintain between archaic rituals and their modern substitutes, the phenomena whose persistence shows that, yes, we have changed a little since the time of archaic rituals but less than we would like to believe. (Girard: 2001, 159)

Considering the distinction between the subject of the ritual of sacrifice, and the object of sacrifice, one can immediately note a dramatic contrast. On the subject of sacrifice, because sacrifice is a ritual that reestablishes social order, it belongs to the domain of the sacred, and it involves the entire group. In Orthodox Christianity for example, the Eucharistic “bloodless” sacrifice is considered pure, it is offered to the divinity in a highly stylized fashion (“we offer to you these gifts from your own gifts in all and for all”), and it is placed on the sanctuary at the group’s epicenter for worship and social integration. The object of sacrifice (victim or scapegoat), on the other hand, represents the chosen victim destined to absorb the group’s violence—if not the spirit of violence itself. (“He was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was on him, and by his wounds we are healed.” Isaiah 53:5) The object of sacrifice belongs both to the domain of the sacred and to the domain of the profane. (“The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth.” John 1:14) The victim is deliberately considered by the community as sacred, while accused of impurity (“But the Pharisees said, ‘He casts out demons by the ruler of the demons.’” Matthew 9: 34). The victim is offered as a gift both to the deity (“Father, into your hands I commit my spirit” (Luke 23:46); as well as to the violent crowd (“this is My body which is broken for you” 1 Corinthians 11:24); it gets expelled from the community (“and they bound him and led him away and delivered him over to Pilate the governor” Matthew 27:2), and it is ritually abused with verbal insults and pejoratives. The object
of sacrifice is carefully selected because of its sacred duty to absorb all elements of negativity not only without ever retaliating (“He was oppressed and afflicted, yet he did not open his mouth; he was led like a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before its shearer is silent” Isaiah 53:7), but also with the expectation of offering something benefic to the group in exchange for its death (“For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.” John 3:16). Paradoxically, the victim itself very rarely embodies the pejoratives that it is charged with. On the contrary, it is carefully selected to display quite the opposite, such as gentleness, sacredness, and relative purity. (Girard: 1986, 112-124)

The contrast between the actual qualities of the victim and what the victim is charged with is resolved through a deliberate ritual misunderstanding. (“The men were amazed and asked, ‘What kind of man is this? Even the winds and the waves obey him!’” Matthew 8:27) As Girard explains, “the sacrificial process requires a certain degree of misunderstanding. The celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial act. The theological basis of the sacrifice has a crucial role in fostering this misunderstanding. It is the god who supposedly demands the victim; he alone in principle, who savors the smoke from the altars and requisitions the slaughtered flesh.” (Girard: 1979, 7)

Although the social function of the scapegoat is identical from any primitive manifestation of religion to contemporary institutionalized religions, the identity of the scapegoat ranges from case to case, some emphasizing its purity, while others its contamination.

**4C4a Sacrificeable vs. Non-Sacrificeable**

Crucial to the scapegoat’s identity is whether the victim is sacrificeable or non-sacrificeable, as sacrifice itself has a missionary purpose. The key feature that distinguishes the sacrificeable victim from the non-sacrificeable one rests on the victim’s prospect for retaliation, revealing once again that sacrifice derives from social pragmatism. Once embellished with religious meaning,
the sacrifice of a scapegoat displays a remarkable orchestration of the group’s primitive instincts to attain social stability.

**4C4b Human-Animal Transference**

The transition from human to animal sacrifice, in a religious setting, is evidenced within a human-animal transference that transposes and (re)projects the structure of the human society unto the animal world. In the case of an animal victim, the relationship between the animal and the social group ought to be one conditioned by mutual dependency for nourishment, such as the relationship between the cattle and the Nuer community. A confederation of tribes located in South Sudan and western Ethiopia, the Nuer community is credited with the preservation of some of the most primitive forms of religious life, where cattle sacrifice—particularly the *piacular*, or restorative type—rests at the heart of their social order. What is unique about the Nuer cattle sacrifice is the fact that the cattle represent a social organism that mirrors the social structures and the communal attitudes of the humans. As Girard writes, “[i]n order to understand the Nuer, one must *chercher la vache*—look at the cows” (Girard: 1979, 3), so that one could follow the intricacies of the social structure and determine the most effective tools for conflict management. The Oxford anthropologist, Sir Edward E. Evans Pritchard has conducted detailed research on the characteristics and rationales behind Nuer’s sacrificial outlook on social order. The close link between the Nuer and their cattle emerges from the mutual nutritive interdependence. (Pritchard: 1956, 248)

Concerning the rationale of cattle sacrifice, Pritchard describes it in the following way:

(1) There are two broad types of sacrifice, that which is chiefly concerned with social relations—changes of social status and the interaction of social groups—and that which is concerned rather with the moral and physical welfare of the individual. […] (2) The piacular sacrifices are performed in situations of danger arising from the intervention of Spirit in human affairs, often thought of as
being brought about by some fault. [...] They centre, however, in the general idea of substitution of life of ox for life of man. (3) Almost all sacrifices consist of four movements—formal presentation, consecration, invocation, and immolation. It is particularly in the invocation and consecration that we must look for the meaning of the whole drama. [...] When a whole lineage or clan is concerned in the sacrifice the spear is that of the ancestor of the lineage or clan and represents the whole group which, through its representative, offers up the victim. (4) The consecration by placing ashes on the back of the victim with the right hand is also, at any rate in the piacular sacrifices, a gesture of identification of man with victim; and this is a special and emphatic expression within the sacrificial situation of an identification which has a more general denotation, perhaps arising from that situation, for in sacrifice man and ox can be said to be really equivalent. (Pritchard: 1956, 272)

The human-animal transference is effective due to both the immediate availability of the cattle, and yet their ‘outsider’ status (by the simple delineation between human and animal realm), and because there is no chance that the heard will take vengeance against their owners, thus the cattle becoming sacrificeable. As Girard points out,

[t]he considerable importance this freedom from reprisal has for the sacrificial process makes us understand that sacrifice is primarily an act of violence without risk of vengeance. … the paradox—not without its comic aspects on occasion—of frequent references to vengeance in the course of sacrificial rites, the veritable obsession with vengeance when no chance of vengeance exists.” This is so because, “[b]y incorporating the element of reprisal into the ceremony, the participants are hinting broadly at the true function of the rite, the kind of action it was designed to circumvent and the criteria that determined the choice of victim. (Girard: 1979, 13)

4C4c Victim’s Social Integration

In the context of violence, the distinction between what is sacrificeable and what is non-sacrificeable is also determined by the level of victim’s social integration. First, “…all victims, even the animal ones, bear a certain resemblance to the object they replace” (Girard: 1979, 11),

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and yet they are the community’s outsiders who pose no threat for retaliation. “If we look at the extremely wide spectrum of human victims sacrificed by various societies,” writes Girard, “the list seems heterogeneous, to say the least. It includes prisoners of war, slaves, small children, unmarried adolescents, and the handicapped,” all of these being “exterior or marginal individuals incapable of establishing or sharing the social bonds that link the rest of the inhabitants. Their status as foreigners or enemies, their servile condition, or simply their age prevents these future victims from fully integrating themselves into the community.” (Girard: 1979, 12) Because of its outsider status, and lacking the available means for self-defense, the victim is often gentle, seeking acceptance and inclusion, and in the case of animal sacrifice, the animal is chosen as to embody such human qualities. (Girard: 1989, 112-124)

4C4d Victim’s Sacredness: Purity and Contamination

An element of paradox exists over the sacred status of the victim. For Girard, “[b]ecause the victim is sacred, it is criminal to kill him–but the victim is sacred only because he is to be killed. Here is a circular line of reasoning that at a somewhat later date would be dignified by the sonorous term ambivalence.” (Girard: 1979, 1) The concept of sacredness is closely linked with the victim’s notion of purity, and the standards of purity are determined by the victim’s contamination with the dispute. Therefore, the less contaminated and involved in the dispute, the more pure the victim is–thus increasing its sacrificial efficacy due to low prospect for vengeance. (Girard: 1979, 28)

To avoid empathy, the contact with the prospective victim is to be ceased. Therefore, any contact and eventual violence conducted against the prospective victim outside the ritual setting implies a profound sense of contamination for the community itself. (This process is similar to our modern society’s attitude toward the death penalty, whereby it is the community, through its legal authority, that puts a criminal to death, and not the criminal’s victims, so that the victims will not become contaminated by the spirit of murder and vengeance.)
Within the confines of the sacrificial ritual, the contamination mechanism is explained by Girard in the following way: “Two men come to blows; blood is spilt; both men are thus rendered impure. Their impurity is contagious, and anyone who remains in their presence risks becoming a party to their quarrel. The only sure way to avoid contagion is to flee the scene of violence…. Contamination is a terrible thing, and only those who are already contaminated would willfully expose themselves to it.” (Girard: 1979, 28) Yet, once contaminated, the community needs to undergo rituals of purification, which are directed against violence itself. (For instance the ancient Israelites had very strict rules concerning contamination, and had clear purification procedures in place, procedures that later appear in the Byzantine tradition, where Basil the Great’s *Canon 13* excluded from Communion for three years soldiers who fought in war on the account of uncleanness [Viscuso: 1995, 33-40].) Here, “[t]he function of ritual is to ‘purify’ violence; that is to ‘trick’ violence into spending itself on victims whose death will provoke no reprisals. Because the secret of this mechanism is unknown to the participants in the rites, religion tries to account for its own operation metaphorically, using for that purpose the objects and materials involved in that operation.” (Girard: 1979, 36) This same paradox of tricking violence and death remains keen even in organized religions, such as in the case of the Orthodox Christian resurrection hymn which states that, “Christ is risen from the dead, *trampling down death by death* (θανάτω θάνατον πατήσας).”

4C4e The Law:
From Pragmatic Effectiveness to Structure-Building

The successfulness of the ritual of sacrifice and the emergence of the prophet, generate a process which unavoidably leads to the standardization of behavior and the creation of more complex social structures. As Emile Durkheim asserts, the law, as an administrator of collective punishment imposed for wrongdoing, originates in the most primitive forms of religious life, because “nearly
all the great social institutions have been born in religion.” (Durkheim: 1969, 466) If collective vengeance was initially dealt with through sacrifice, later, this became administered through a legal punishment, law representing nothing more than the third party, uncontaminated by the initial competition. One must clearly understand that both sacrificial ritual and law are forms of limited violence, emerging from the idea of vengeance, and used as instruments for social stability. Sacrificial ritual and law represent also an exercise of ‘good’ violence, even though “the judicial system is infinitely more effective” (Girard: 1979, 23). Because law is a proxy for managing vengeance, “[h]e who exacts his own vengeance is said to take the law into his own hands.” (Girard: 1979, 16)

With the development of the human society, the sacrifice becomes gradually replaced by the juridical system both within the process of religious institutionalization, and as a parallel secular endeavor. Thus, the legislation process eliminated the need for sacrifice, because this third-party authority (which is not contaminated by the dispute), is transferred to the penal system defined by laws which are universally applicable and designed to offer a fair punishment. Various anthropologists such as Godfrey Lienhardt (Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka), Victor Turner (The Ritual Process; The Drums of Affliction: A Study of Religious Process Among the Ndembu of Zambia), Sir Edward E. Evans Pritchard (The Nuer), and others have already demonstrated that ritual action is more dominant in societies deprived by a reliable judicial system, because “ritual in general, and sacrificial rites in particular, assume essential roles in societies that lack a firm judicial system.” (Girard: 1979, 18)

The legislative process also eliminates the need for sacrificial ritual because “the function of the judicial system is … more concerned with the general security… a decisive difference between primitive and civilized man is the former’s general inability to identify the guilty party and to adhere to the principle of guilt.” (Girard: 1979, 22) In other words, vengeance is not self-perpetuating because the preventive role that sacrifice played is now translated into judicial retribution, and “[t]he judicial authority is beholden to no one. It is thus at the disposal of everyone, and it is universally respected.” (Girard: 1979, 23)
With the increase of legalization, the interest in sacrifice decreases dramatically. Nevertheless, law fails to replace sacrifice completely because sacrifice regains its dominance in situations where law is either ineffective, or it is no longer recognized as neutral third party. Furthermore, a deeper reason for the survival of the ritual—even once the law made its way into social order—emerges from the ritual’s complete subscription to an inherently transcendental distinctiveness, something that the law subscribes to only partially, mainly through the *practice of oath* in civil societies. This transcendental quality of the ritual demonstrates that “[m]en can dispose of their violence more efficiently if they regard the process not as something emanating from within themselves, but as a necessity imposed from without, a divine decree whose least infraction calls down terrible punishment.” (Girard: 1979, 14) Therefore, in contemporary settings, ritual does not replace the law, but it complements the law during special occasions, such as during political ceremonies. “It must not be assumed, however, that sacrifice simply ‘replaces’ a judicial system. One can scarcely speak of replacing something that never existed to begin with.” (Girard: 1979, 18)

In conclusion, *vengeance, sacrifice* and *law* share a fundamental identity in the sense that “they tend to adopt the same types of violent response in times of crisis.” (Girard: 1979, 25)

**4D Hypothesis 2:**

*The Double-Competition*

The hypothesis of Double-Competition derives from the logic of the subjectivization of the object of desire during the process of transition from the original (independent) rivalry to the surrogate (dependent) rivalry, as displayed by the experiment of the mimetic twins. Making an ecological inference between the mimetic rivalry which encounters a double-competition (the first between the two babies [original], and the second between the twins and the mother [surrogate])—and the dynamic of religion’s intervention in a conflict, one can identify the same pattern of rivalries:
first pre-institutional in a phenomenological form (original), the second inter-institutional in a structural form (surrogate). (Chart 4.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-institutional Rivalry</th>
<th>Institutional Rivalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Contender</strong></td>
<td><strong>Second Contender</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator</td>
<td>Victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Object of Desire</strong></td>
<td><strong>Object of Desire</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective Property</td>
<td>Religious Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scapegoat</strong></td>
<td><strong>Scapegoat</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Weak Outsider</td>
<td>Secular Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjective Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Rivalry (object: economics)</td>
<td>Dependent Rivalry (subject: identity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pre-institutional rivalry and the institutional rivalry are in causal relationship because a surrogate rivalry is built upon an original rivalry. While on the short term, the original rivalry is cauterized by the surrogate rivalry, on the long term, the extinction of the rivalry depends on how the surrogate rivalry within organized religion addresses the object of desire from the original rivalry. Therefore, in order for the scapegoat mechanism to be effective and for religion to bring the conflict to a safe landing, the sight of the original object of contention must never be lost. Conversely, if the dependent rivalry (between institutionalized religion and secular governance) loses sight of the original object of desire (e.g., the legitimate owner, or fair share), organized religion fails to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, religion becomes a source for a larger conflict which takes place at two levels: between the original contenders, and between organized religion and both contending parties.

The Double-Competition hypothesis will be tested by using the following methodology: First, the two competitions will be identified and classified based on their objects of desire with the assumption that the original (cause) competition has a palpable/material object of desire, while the surrogate (effect) competition has a more symbolic object of desire. Second, we will identify the scapegoat in each competition: original and surrogate. Third, we will proceed to analyzing the interplay between the original and surrogate rivalries by tracking the ways in which each object of desire and scapegoat is handled, in relation to the outcome of the conflict.
4D1 Intra-Religious Case Selection

The double-competition hypothesis will be tested in two intra-religious cases: 1) The Hittite Ritual of Ašhella and 2) Esau versus Jacob conflict from the Hebrew scripture. These two cases display the similarity of mechanism, and the differences in payoff, as generated by the way in which the original object of desire was handled. As we will note, in the first case, the original object of desire becomes a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry thus making the ritual effective at least at a theoretical level, as implied by its being repeatedly practiced by the Hittites. At the same time, the second case demonstrates that because the original object of desire did not become a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, the conflict further escalated.

4D1a Case 1: The Hittite Ritual of Ašhella

As described by Raymond Westbrook and Theodore J. Lewis of The John Hopkins University, in their paper “Who Led the Scapegoat in Leviticus 16:21?,” the Ritual of Ašhella is a Hittite healing ritual that prescribes the steps to be taken to cure an army camp of plague. The ritual points to a set of two rivalries: one original (over women and livestock), which is more implicit and the second surrogate (over health), which involves both an animal and human actor as scapegoat. The text that describes the ritual—which is reproduced below entirely—had been translated into English by Oliver Robert Gurney, and originally published in his book, Some Aspects of Hittite Religion. (Gurney: 1977, 49) According to the ritual,

4–7. At evening time, the army commanders, whoever they are, all prepare rams—whether white or dark does not matter at all. . . .

11–14. At night they tie them in front of the tents and say as follows: “. . . Whatever god has made this plague (henkan), behold! I have bound up these rams for you: be appeased!”
15–17. At dawn I drive them out onto the steppe and with each ram they bring a jug of beer, a loaf of thick bread, and a . . . jug, and they make an adorned (unuwant) woman sit down before the king’s tent and place with the woman a jug of beer and three loaves of thick bread.

18–24. Then the army commanders place their hands on the rams and say as follows: “Whatever god has made this plague, now behold! the rams are standing here and are very fat in entrails, heart, and loins. Let human flesh be hateful to him and let him be appeased by these rams.” And the army commanders bow to the rams and the king bows to the adorned woman.

25–32. Then they bring the rams and the woman and the bread through the camp and they drive them away onto the steppe. And they run away to the enemy’s border without coming to any place of ours. And they say repeatedly as follows: “Behold! Whatever evil (idalu) there was in the camp among the men, oxen, sheep, horses, mules, and donkeys, now behold! these rams and this woman have taken it away from the camp. And the one that finds them, may that land take this evil plague (idalu henkan).

As Raymond Westbrook and Theodore J. Lewis clarify,

“[t]he ritual is explicitly designed to transfer the evil (idalu) that is the cause of the plague (henkan) from the soldiers to the rams. They are chased out of camp together with the woman, and both woman and sheep continue on until they reach enemy territory. There is thus a double dispatch: the king and his troops send away the woman and the rams, but it is she who has to herd the rams across the border. The woman acts as a buffer between the king and the rams, who are contaminated with the evil plague. In terms of a warriors’ encampment, a woman, the symbol of weakness, held the lowliest possible status in terms of physical strength. Nonetheless, the woman is dressed in finery, apparently as a substitute for the king, just as the male rams are substitutes for the warriors. In another Hittite plague ritual, the king exchanges clothes with a prisoner of war, who is then described as “adorned” (unuwant).” (Westbook, Lewis: 1998, 418-419)

In this ritual context, we can clearly identify two competitions taking place: the first competition between the Hittites and their enemy tribes which is reconstructed from historical data as well as from the ritual itself, and the second between the Hittite army and the gods who brought the plague, as the Hittites try to appease the gods in order to regain their health. In other words, the
original competition is deduced from the clear delineation between the Hittite warriors and their enemies, as well as from various historical accounts. The surrogate competition is embedded into the rules of the ritual. (Chart 4.3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Rivalry</th>
<th>Surrogate Rivalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Contender</strong></td>
<td><strong>Second Contender</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Tribes</td>
<td>The Hittites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Rivalry (object: women &amp; livestock)</td>
<td>Dependent Rivalry (subject: health &amp; power)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presence of the Hittite woman as a scapegoat (along with livestock) in the surrogate rivalry infers that she may have been the object of desire from the original rivalry. The validity of this inference is demonstrated by historical data which indicate that in the Middle Eastern antiquity, the Hittite women were famous for their charm and beauty. As a result, they were often objects of desire, leading also to inter-tribal discords. Hebrew Bible narratives record various stories that demonstrate the objectification of the Hittite women. For instance King David sends his mercenary soldier, Uriah the Hittite, into the frontline of the battle so that Uriah would be killed, while King David takes Uriah’s Hittite wife for himself. (2 Samuel 11:1-27) Also, Isaac’s wife, Rebekah, begs her son Jacob not to marry a Hittite woman (as Jacob’s brother did) due to a foreseeable tribal discord. (Genesis 26:34; 27:46) Beyond the biblical narratives, as C.R. Conder noted over a century ago, “the beauty of the Hittite women is again indicated by the fact that many of the early Egyptian kings were married to Hittite princesses.” (Conder: 1883, 507-508) Additionally, within the limits of the Ašhella ritual, the Hittite woman’s beauty is implicit in the fact that it is only the king that bows to the woman, while his generals bow only to the rams.

In this ritual one can observe that the object of desire from the original rivalry (woman, bread, beer, livestock) is destroyed in the surrogate rivalry (between the Hittites and the strange gods), thus ensuring the efficacy of the ritual. A logical inference from this scenario indicates that while it is less probable that this healing ritual brought health to the soldiers, what it is certain is the fact that such gesture initiated by the Hittite military camp toward their enemies led to a
hiatus in confrontation, by appeasing the desire of their enemy tribes from robbing the Hittites of their livestock and women. Strategically, this also gives the Hittites the chance to buy more time to regain not only their physical strength, but also their morale, via a deceptive ‘gift’ which was spiritually poisonous, as it carried out the evil of the disease, and eventually transferred it unto their enemies. This double strategy of destroying the object of desire, while launching a spiritual attack against their enemies from the original competition is very clear because the woman and the rams were not sent out in the wilderness, but into the enemy’s camp. (Stern: 1991, 305)

4D1b Case 2: Esau versus Iacob

The second intra-institutional case used in testing the Double-Competition hypothesis is the rivalry between the biblical twins, Esau and Jacob, over a subjective “object” of desire (father’s blessing), as ignited by a prior (original) rivalry between their mother, Rebekah and her daughters-in-law (Esau’s Hittite wives Judith and Basemath), over Rebekah’s inheritance.

According to the narrative recorded by the Hebrew Bible,

When Esau was forty years old, he married Judith daughter of Beeri the Hittite, and also Basemath daughter of Elon the Hittite. They were a source of grief to Isaac and Rebekah. When Isaac was old and his eyes were so weak that he could no longer see, he called for Esau his older son and said to him, “My son.” “Here I am,” he answered. Isaac said, “I am now an old man and don’t know the day of my death. Now then, get your equipment—your quiver and bow—and go out to the open country to hunt some wild game for me. Prepare me the kind of tasty food I like and bring it to me to eat, so that I may give you my blessing before I die.” Now Rebekah was listening as Isaac spoke to his son Esau. When Esau left for the open country to hunt game and bring it back, Rebekah said to her son Jacob, “Look, I overheard your father say to your brother Esau, ‘Bring me some game and prepare me some tasty food to eat, so that I may give you my blessing in the presence of the LORD before I die.’ Now, my son, listen carefully and do what I tell you: Go out to the flock and bring me two choice young goats, so I can prepare some tasty food for your father, just the way
he likes it. Then take it to your father to eat, so that he may give you his blessing before he dies.” Jacob said to Rebekah his mother, “But my brother Esau is a hairy man while I have smooth skin. What if my father touches me? I would appear to be tricking him and would bring down a curse on myself rather than a blessing.” His mother said to him, “My son, let the curse fall on me. Just do what I say; go and get them for me.” So he went and got them and brought them to his mother, and she prepared some tasty food, just the way his father liked it. Then Rebekah took the best clothes of Esau her older son, which she had in the house, and put them on her younger son Jacob. She also covered his hands and the smooth part of his neck with the goatskins. Then she handed to her son Jacob the tasty food and the bread she had made. He went to his father and said, “My father.” “Yes, my son,” he answered. “Who is it?” Jacob said to his father, “I am Esau your firstborn. I have done as you told me. Please sit up and eat some of my game, so that you may give me your blessing.” Isaac asked his son, “How did you find it so quickly, my son?” “The LORD your God gave me success,” he replied. Then Isaac said to Jacob, “Come near so I can touch you, my son, to know whether you really are my son Esau or not.” Jacob went close to his father Isaac, who touched him and said, “The voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau.” He did not recognize him, for his hands were hairy like those of his brother Esau; so he proceeded to bless him. “Are you really my son Esau?” he asked. “I am,” he replied. Then he said, “My son, bring me some of your game to eat, so that I may give you my blessing.” Jacob brought it to him and he ate; and he brought some wine and he drank. Then his father Isaac said to him, “Come here, my son, and kiss me.” So he went to him and kissed him. When Isaac caught the smell of his clothes, he blessed him and said, “Ah, the smell of my son is like the smell of a field that the LORD has blessed. May God give you heaven’s dew and earth’s richness—an abundance of grain and new wine. May nations serve you and peoples bow down to you. Be lord over your brothers, and may the sons of your mother bow down to you. May those who curse you be cursed and those who bless you be blessed.” After Isaac finished blessing him, and Jacob had scarcely left his father’s presence, his brother Esau came in from hunting. He too prepared some tasty food and brought it to his father. Then he said to him, “My father, please sit up and eat some of my game, so that you may give me your blessing.” His father Isaac asked him, “Who are you?” “I am your son,” he answered, “your firstborn, Esau.” Isaac trembled violently and said, “Who was it, then, that hunted game and brought it to me? I ate it just before you came and I blessed him—and indeed he will be blessed!” When Esau heard his father’s words, he burst out with a loud and bitter cry and said to his father, “Bless me—I too, my father!” But he said, “Your brother came deceitfully and took your blessing.” Esau said, “Isn’t he rightly named Jacob? This is the second time he has
taken advantage of me: He took my birthright, and now he’s taken my blessing!” Then he asked, “Haven’t you reserved any blessing for me?” Isaac answered Esau, “I have made him lord over you and have made all his relatives his servants, and I have sustained him with grain and new wine. So what can I possibly do for you, my son?” Esau said to his father, “Do you have only one blessing, my father? Bless me too, my father!” Then Esau wept aloud. His father Isaac answered him, “Your dwelling will be away from the earth’s richness, away from the dew of heaven above. You will live by the sword and you will serve your brother. But when you grow restless, you will throw his yoke from off your neck.” Esau held a grudge against Jacob because of the blessing his father had given him. He said to himself, “The days of mourning for my father are near; then I will kill my brother Jacob.” When Rebekah was told what her older son Esau had said, she sent for her younger son Jacob and said to him, “Your brother Esau is planning to avenge himself by killing you. Now then, my son, do what I say: Flee at once to my brother Laban in Harran. Stay with him for a while until your brother’s fury subsides. When your brother is no longer angry with you and forgets what you did to him, I’ll send word for you to come back from there. Why should I lose both of you in one day?” Then Rebekah said to Isaac, “I’m disgusted with living because of these Hittite women. If Jacob takes a wife from among the women of this land, from Hittite women like these, my life will not be worth living.” (Genesis 26: 34-27:46)

In this extensive narrative one can identify two rivalries: The first rivalry takes place over an *objective* object of desire (property) between Rebekah and her daughters-in-law, over the fate of Rebekah’s property. The second rivalry takes place between the twin brothers Esau and Jacob over a *subjective* object of desire (father’s blessing.) (Chart 4.4)
Although, both Esau and Jacob were twins, Esau was delivered before Jacob, thus being qualified to the privileges of birthright and father’s blessing. Nevertheless, as Esau sells his birthright to Jacob in exchange for food (Genesis 25: 29-34), his only chance to retain some privileges was in receiving his father’s blessing. Competition over the birth-right does not count because Esau sold his birth-right to Jacob. It was, therefore, a voluntary act based on an exchange of goods. What makes this case very interesting and theoretically powerful is the way in which the mother had treated her sons. Even though the original rivalry is only briefly mentioned in the text, as it takes place between Rebekah and her Hittite daughters in law, Judith and Basemath, whom Rebekah’s son, Esau, married apparently contrary to her will (Genesis 26: 35), Rebekah tries to prevent her daughters-in-law from inheriting her wealth. Therefore, Rebekah instigates her second son to Jacob to steal from Essau even his father’s blessing, which was to be given to Esau.

In this case, because the object of desire from the original rivalry does not become a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, the original competition does not reach a positive conclusion, as the conflict continues between Rebekah and her daughters in law. Furthermore, as this scenario indicates, by failing to address the object of desire from the original rivalry, Rebekah generates further rivalry between the contenders from the surrogate rivalry as Esau threatens to kill his brother Jacob. At the same time the sacrifice of the baby-goats performed in the context of the surrogate rivalry, which Girard identifies, fails to be effective because it was not directed to appease the competition between the two brothers, but only to appease another potential rivalry this time between the father (Isaac) and his deceiving son (Jacob) who hides in the skin of the baby-goats as Girard noted. (Girard: 1979, 5). In fact, as an interpretivist, René Girard places his emphasis on the interplay between two subjective competitions, as his purpose is to analyze the theological superstructure of the scapegoat, built on top of another structure which in this case is a subjective competition conducted over a symbolic object of desire. Therefore, he does not investigate the original competition between Rebekah and her daughters-in-law.
The Double Competition hypothesis will now be tested in an inter-institutional case. This case displays two rivalries: the original rivalry, between a crowd of mine workers and Romanian Government, and the surrogate rivalry, between the Romanian Government and the Romanian Orthodox Church. Although this case may reflect a very complex set of rivalries, it is mandatory to take a reductionist approach in distinguishing the material object of desire (money) of the original rivalry, from the symbolic object of desire of the surrogate rivalry (public trust.)

This case is also significant because it demonstrates why and how organized religion becomes ambivalent in the way it engages various conflicts. The key here is the way in which the object of desire from the original rivalry is handled by the organized religion.

4D2a Case 3: the miners versus the prime minister

This case will test the Double-Competition hypothesis in the scenario of the two rivalries: the original rivalry between the mine workers and Romanian Government, and the surrogate rivalry between the Romanian Government and the Romanian Orthodox Church, in relation to this particular crisis. By keeping in sight the object of desire from the original rivalry, during the negotiation, bishop Gherasim Cristea successfully negotiated an armistice between the Prime Minister, Radu Vasile and the leader of the miners, Miron Cosma. In this case we will also note that in light of the institutional interest in power maintenance, the aim of the Church was to maintain its public trust, thus acting as a fair broker in addressing the original object of desire (pay increase) rather than siding with the government, as it occasionally did under Communism to ensure its survival. (Stan, Turcescu: 2000, 1467-71)

The original rivalry between the miners and the prime minister is described by Bishop Gherasim Cristea in the following way:
In early 1999, while the budget for the Coal Administration was under negotiation in Bucharest, some tensions erupted over the question of salaries and layoffs. Miron Cozma was not admitted to be part of the [miners'] delegation, but this did not stop him to ask that the negotiations will take place in Valea Jiului. Prime Minister Radu Vasile refused, saying: “A prime minister does not stand to bargain with a criminal.” This was the spark that triggered the explosion.

On January 14, 1999 Miron Cozma had already made the decision to march into the capital city, in spite of a resolution issued by the local Court from Petroșani which declared the strike as illegal. At Bumbești-Livezeni, the army and the gendarmes have organized a first blockade, trying to retain the miners in the Valley. Both failed, as the “ortacii” [miners] crushed the barricades and continued their way toward Vâlcea County. A new battle took place at Costești, where again, Miron Cosma has emerged victorious. In this well-publicized brawl, the careless recruits, policemen and gendarmes were disarmed and humiliated, and the law enforcement commander, General Gheorghe Lupu, abandoned his troops disguised as a peasant.

In the evening of January 20, 1999, the victorious miners entered [the town of] Râmnicu Vâlcea. The population welcomed them with fear; however the miners behaved in a civilized manner, organizing and providing security at all public institutions to avoid potential challenges and destruction.

Together with two of my priests, Ion Predescu (minister at the Cathedral) and Matei Constantin, I went to the New Hospital where the wounded from the two combatant camps were being hospitalized. There were plenty of them; some with serious injuries, but all of them were well treated. At the hospital I learned from the President of the Vâlcea County Council that Prime Minister Radu Vasile and Miron Cozma were to meet at Cozia monastery, sometime around 2pm.

With a small delegation from the Diocese and with great fear in my heart, I decided to go to the Holy Place [monastery] myself. As I knew that no force could stop the miners, I feared the worst for the monastery. Neither I, nor the [Romanian Orthodox] Church, was involved into [partisan] politics, but I felt it was my duty to become involved, because it was a Romanian against a Romanian; a brother against a brother.

At Cozia, the miners (their delegates, specifically) took strategic posts in the courtyard of the monastery, waiting for the arrival of the Prime Minister. Naturally, I invited them to sit at the table, and taking advantage of this opportunity, I told them: “in this place, the great ruler Mircea the Old, sleeps his eternal sleep, the ruler who defended our country and adorned it with holy
monasteries to the pride of our nation. Revolutions and riots bring nothing but destruction and misfortune; let it not happen now. I call on you to find together the way of peace and understanding, and there will be a great joy for all.” Later in the day, Mr. Radu Vasile arrived, but the atmosphere was already diffuse and friendly for dialogue. Later, some of those present (I am referring primarily to the Prime Minister), have had sharp conversations, full of courage. Yet, there were no such things as ‘bellicose’ discussions. The government accepted the wage increases, yet, not willing to give the impression of making ‘concessions under pressure,’ the government requested that money [for salary increases] be sent via the bank accounts of our Diocese.

As for my role, there is nothing to be proud of. I only tried to convince the miners that the way of understanding and peace is the only way in which we can discuss, negotiate, and sign a document. Besides, everyone was sitting in the House of the Lord, in a holy place full of Faith and History; all being Christians and Romanians.

Later, in a book, Cursă pe Contrasens [Racing Through the No-Entry], written by Radu Vasile, he describes himself as a great and wise politician, as the ‘artisan’ of the ‘peace from Cozia,’ invincible and fearless, the last blockade against the invading miners… What could I say [about the book] other than: false, embarrassing, and clumsy. The country [Romania] was going through a crisis of authority, as nobody was able to stop the miners, unless one was to start shooting them. That is to say, a new Revolution, a new Timişoara. However, with wisdom and no [destructive] ‘events’, everything calmed down; the merit of bishop Ioan of Covasna and of myself is very modest, as we only tried to calm the spirits, and call for lucidity and reason, toward a closer divine consciousness.

In less than a month, on 15 February 1999, the miners were again marching toward Bucharest. This time, Miron Cozma had organized ‘his own’ uprising, but he was defeated and arrested. Sad, painful, and pointless… There has been so much suffering and destruction; we made ourselves the laughingstock of the world, to prove what? (Lazăr: 2008, 66-69) [text translated from Romanian by the author]

Additional details about these events were recalled by Andreea Cascaval and Petru Zoltan, in an article titled, “Epopeea ‘Mineriadei’ din ianuarie 1999” published by Jurnalul National, on May 14, 2008, where the influence of Church is better clarified.
Inside the church of Cozia Monastery, before the altar, two men were praying. With candles in hand, Romeo Beja and Luka Geza were meditating over what happened, imploring God to be with them. It was around 11:30am and the prime minister was expected to come for negotiations. About an hour later Miron Cozma had showed up. After they prayed, the leaders of the miners were invited by the Archbishop Gherasim of Râmnic in the guest room of the monastery, where conversations with the chief executive were to take place. After four hours of negotiations, both Prime Minister Radu Vasile, and the miners’ leader, Miron Cozma, left the guestroom of Cozia Monastery. The two headed toward the altar of the monastery, where they prayed and each lit a candle. Radu Vasile seemed pleased with the outcome. After negotiations, Prime Minister Radu Vasile told [reporter] Marius Tuca that “the vindictive action ended. Right now the miners are loading their busses and are going back where they came from. In essence, these discussions have lasted several hours. We identified a series of solutions that will be finalized once a program will be presented so that losses will be recovered by reducing various costs in the companies that participated to these protests.

In this case, the object of desire from the original rivalry (pay increase) is never lost sight of during the surrogate rivalry (between the Church and state), because the second rivalry takes place in a covert fashion. Nevertheless, the locus of the negotiations and the presence of the two bishops (Gherasim Cristea and Ioan from Covasna) is an embryonic statement for social justice that favors the miners against the prime minister as well as the Church against the state. At the same time the scapegoating mechanism within the surrogate rivalry is worked out in a subtle way that is implicit of the object of desire from the original rivalry. By scapegoating revolutions rather than money, in the surrogate rivalry, the Church makes an effort to mask the object of desire from the original rivalry so that this could be used as an effective scapegoat, particularly as the miners and the prime minister agreed to put the money for the pay increases into the bank accounts of the Church. Blaming revolutions and revolts (instead of money) reveals also an effort made by the Church not only to remain a trusted power broker, but also to virtualize the object of desire from the original rivalry so that its ‘destruction’ through virtual scapegoating would not have a negative impact against the weaker competitor (miners), which the Church indirectly supports, but will appease the Government.
However, it must be clearly understood that in this case, the original rivalry (miners versus prime minister) did not necessarily cause the surrogate rivalry (Church versus state), but it only reactivated a protracted (historical or antecedent) rivalry, whose object of desire is symbolic in nature, in the sense that both the Church and the State compete for public trust. This became obvious from the choices made by the competitors from the original rivalry: the miners, by choosing to negotiate on the Church’s ground; and the Government, by trying to discredit the Church’s role in achieving the Peace from Cozia, as visible in the later memoire of the prime minister, that bishop Gherasim Cristea made references to. Note also that in the original rivalry the scapegoats are the armed forces which had been humiliated by the miners and discredited by the Government. (Chart 4.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Original Rivalry</strong></th>
<th><strong>Surrogate Rivalry</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Contender</strong></td>
<td><strong>Second Contender</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miners</td>
<td>prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Rivalry (object: money)</td>
<td>Dependent Rivalry (subject: public trust)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In light of the complexity displayed by the surrogate competition, which affects the decision whether the object of desire from the original competition will be used as an effective scapegoat in an overt or covert fashion, it is important to offer more details about this particular case.

For historic, cultural, nationalist and demographic reasons, following the collapse of Communism in 1989, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been successful in securing its re-claim of ownership over Romanian identity and sovereignty in a context when national identity was perceived as threatened by liberal concepts. As a result, the Church became not only the leading institution to strongly influence Romania’s political development, but also claimed to be the most trusted repository of national values and identity. Today, the Church is in serious competition for power with the State to the extent it can forge new relations with public authorities and with state-run institutions, thus controlling the public agenda (Enache: 2005) that defines public values.
Apart from predispositions that were historical and social in nature (Preda: 1999), after the fall of communism, in its crafting of the new relationships with state institutions, the Church seems to have also been influenced by public trust surveys to its own advantage. (Giurgeanu: 2010) Therefore, perceptions of public trust have influenced the Church in the way in which it crafted its power maintenance strategies, by increasing overt cooperation with institutions that rank highest: (e.g. National Army 72%, local government 46%), while maintaining covert relationships with institutions that ranked lower in terms of public trust (e.g. National Government: 29%, Parliament 22%). (Figure 4.5) [Data presented in Figure 4.5 reflecting the trust trend analysis between 1994 – 2007 has been compiled from reports made by several polling institutions such as, CURS, MMT, LUAS, IMAS GALLUP, reported by Soros Foundation. (Soros Foundation & The Gallup Romania Barometrul de Opinie Publică: Oct. 2004, Nov. 2005; May 2006; Oct. 2006; May 2007, Oct. 2007)]
In such environment, as Gabriel Andreescu and Liviu Andreescu noted, “during the 1999 *Mineriadă* [uprising of mine workers] the ‘peace’ between the miners bent on toppling the regime and the government was brokered by the Orthodox Church.” (Andreescu, Andreescu: 2009, 29)

4D3 Conclusions:

**Toward Formulating a Theory of “Double-Rivalry”**

Based on the analysis of the three cases presented above, it can be concluded that the original rivalry either generates, or reactivates a protracted surrogate rivalry. In either case, whether the surrogate rivalry is newly generated, or it represents a return to a protracted rivalry, the competition over a *material* object of desire acts as a causal rivalry, while in the surrogate rivalry the object of desire is *symbolic* and subjective in nature. (In the case of a cultural conflict, the surrogate rivalry is often a protracted rivalry involving the same actors, or groups of actors, case in which historical memory can intervene and intensify the rivalry.)

The basic findings from testing the three cases above, in an ecological inference with the mimetic-twins paradigm, indicate that the two rivalries are in a causal relationship. Any competition over a material object of desire is negotiated, resolved, or amplified in the context of a surrogate competition, which is contingent upon the handling of the object of desire from the original competition, as shown in Figure 4.6. Furthermore, within this causal mechanism, the economic conflict (e.g., relative deprivation) precedes the symbolic conflict (e.g., ethnic identity).

Each rivalry (original and surrogate) has an *object of desire* and a *scapegoat*, and whether the conflict escalates, decreases or remains neutral, depends on how these two factors are being interplayed in between the two rivalries. Therefore, one can identify three scenarios: *positive*, *negative* and *neutral*. 
**Negative Impact** scenario: The negative impact scenario demonstrates that if the object of desire of the surrogate rivalry is the same object of desire from the original rivalry, then the conflict most likely escalates because the surrogate rivalry fails to eliminate the original object of desire, and the competition against the same object of desire increases. Furthermore, as this scenario indicates, the actor that intervenes in the original rivalry becomes a competitor in the surrogate rivalry over the same object of desire and not to prevent the spread of violence; the actor fails to be a reliable peace broker. For instance, because the object of desire from the surrogate rivalry between Jacob and Essau (father’s blessing) is almost identical with object of desire of the initial rivalry between Rebekah and her daughters in law (inheritance)–as they both relate to the future of Isaac and Rebekah’s wealth–Rebekah fails to resolve the conflict between her sons, and Jacob has to flee his home. Assuming that Rebekah used the object of desire from the initial rivalry as scapegoat (instead of scapegoating her own son Essau), no conflict would have escalated between her sons. Similarly, if the Church wanted the money contested by the mineworkers and the Romanian Government from the original rivalry, then the Church would have failed to resolve
the conflict, by losing its credibility, while the conflict could have escalated between the miners and the prime minister.

*Positive Impact* scenario: The positive impact scenario demonstrates that if the object of desire from the original rivalry becomes a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, then the surrogate rivalry has a positive impact over the original rivalry in the sense that the object of desire is eliminated, thus leading to a termination of competition as no winner can be forecasted. For instance, in the Ritual of Ašhella the object of desire from the original rivalry (woman & livestock) is eliminated in the second rivalry between the Hittite army and the harmful gods because they are used as scapegoats. Similarly, in the case of the conflict between the prime minister and the miners, the object of desire from the original rivalry is used as a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry (as desire for possessions generate fratricide), the Church successfully destroyed the object of desire, thus having a positive impact over the original rivalry.

*Neutral Impact* scenario A: The first neutral impact scenario demonstrates that if the scapegoat from the original rivalry becomes an object of desire in the surrogate rivalry, this generates a logical incoherence, because it is impossible for the original scapegoat to become an object of desire in the surrogate rivalry, as the original scapegoat is already rejected, discredited and even destroyed.

*Neutral Impact* scenario B: The second neutral impact scenario demonstrates that if the scapegoat from the original rivalry becomes a scapegoat in the surrogate rivalry, then it has a null impact over the initial object of desire that triggered both the original and the surrogate rivalries. Furthermore, it is impossible for the scapegoat from the original rivalry to become a scapegoat in the second rivalry since this is either eliminated, and discredited, thus becoming irrelevant to the original rivalry, or it becomes a competitor within the surrogate rivalry, thus being strong enough to retaliate, which would contradict its scapegoat status within the surrogate rivalry.
4D3a Theoretical Application:

Why does religion move toward ambivalence?

Within the theoretical framework of the Double-Competition hypothesis, particularly as tested at the inter-institutional level, one can easily find the answer to why organized religions become ambivalent during times of war.

With the institutionalization process of religion, the sacred authority which the ritual performer receives from the society leads to definite structural configurations and theological superstructures visible in doctrines, ethical precepts and rituals that are built in time by organized religions. Therefore, as an organized institution, religion becomes a quasi-political structure interested in power growth and power maintenance. Because its theological superstructure is built on the strategy of power growth and power maintenance, organized religion becomes interested in power maintenance for the purpose of spiritual legitimacy, internal and external authority, spiritual hegemony, and monopoly over the universal truth.

4D3b Theoretical Application:

How does religion move toward ambivalence?

As demonstrated in the three cases analyzed, during a crisis, the interaction of organized religion with the contenders is triggered by the faith’s original instinct in conflict resolution, as well as filtered by its interests in power growth and maintenance. As a result, the decisions made by religious institutions are ambivalent. If the power interests of the spiritual leader are not undermined by its choice to act as a fair power broker, then it will remain loyal to its original peacemaking instincts. Conversely, if the power interests of the spiritual leader are undermined by its choice to act as a fair broker in a particular conflict, then the leader most likely abandons
the original peacemaking instinct, generating instead a surrogate rivalry, where the religious institution itself becomes either a contender or an absentee.

Within this surrogate rivalry, religion enters into a shadow competition with the strongest competitor, and sometimes chooses to use the weaker competitor as a surrogate victim. Unfortunately, in this case, the second competitor is no longer the ideal surrogate victim because it has sufficient resources to retaliate, thus being able to continue the cycle of violence. As a result, due to its ambivalence toward its original mission for conflict resolution, and its explicit effort in maintaining its power, organized religion becomes an indirect source for collective violence. More specifically, if the position of power of the spiritual leaders is undermined, in most cases, the spiritual leaders retaliate against anyone perceived a threat (innocent or guilty, insider or outsider), as well as against anyone unable to provide the security that the spiritual leaders need during their surrogate rivalry. Spiritual leaders strike against the members of their own institution through various forms of theodicy that maintain structural violence, encourage suicidal missions, and justify the death penalty imposed by their shadow rival. For instance, in spite of Orthodox Christianity’s collective opposition to the death penalty, the medieval Moldovan erudite, Dimitrie Cantemir, in his monograph Descriptio Moldaviae, notes that, “whenever a death penalty question arises and the prince sentences someone to death, the metropolitan either endorses or challenges the prince’s decision before the Divan (ruling council), according to the law, and the prince, as a good Christian and lover of justice, welcomes this procedure.” (Cantemir: 1973, 269) This medieval Moldavian practice of giving apparently the silent approval to the ruler to enforce the death penalty, if the interests of the Metropolitan and those of the prince coincided, has been elaborated by fictional literature produced on the basis of historic cases, such as Alexandru Negruzzi’s notorious historical novel Alexandru Lăpușneanu. Here, under a display of Machiavellian cynicism, Negruzzi portrays how the metropolitan silently endorses a planned political assassination. “‘What will you advise me, Father?’ said the frightened woman, looking at the metropolitan with her eyes in tears. ‘Cruel and terrible this man is, my daughter; may God, the Lord guide you! As for myself, I will proceed with ensuring that everything is
prepared for our new prince. As for the old prince, may God forgive him, and may God forgive you too.’ Saying all this, his holiness Teofan walked away. Ruxandra picked up the silver chalice full of water which one of the servants brought over; then, mechanically, and forced more by the boyars, she gave him the poison.” (Negruzzi: 1857)

Nevertheless, if the strategy of power maintenance coincides with the restoration of peace, then organized religion acts as a source for stability and can successfully end of conflict, due to the original power of sacrifice which subsists under the surface of any organized religion.

In conclusion, organized religion enters the arena of violence in an ambivalent fashion, both in competition for resources, and in conflict of identity, thus participating in violence both indirectly and directly. Indirectly, religious institutions justify violence, or endorse political authorities to perform violence by appealing to violent sacred texts in making meaning of a situation where control is lost, and by demonizing real or imagined enemies. Directly, some organized religions make policy decisions during military confrontations, such as in Islām, where Muhammad’s successor, or the Khalīfa, is both a spiritual and a political leader (Netton: 1997, 143), while other organized religions offer their ceremonial backing to secular leaders by blessing weapons and political symbols. (Bodrov: 2011, 43-48) Even though the primordial religious instincts still operate under the guise of organized religion, its structural configuration as a quasi-political institution makes it more prone to entering the arena of collective violence, whereby the institution itself becomes a frustration-aggression element; thus generating and/or maintaining violence.
Assumptions about Religion

As assumptions about the public role of religion are often unsystematic, ambiguous, and often incriminatory, it is crucial to enlist some of the basic aspects of the largest organized religions by presenting data that define their dogmatic approach towards collective violence from the perspective of the relationship between the sacred text and its interpretation, as well as from the perspective of ritual life and public behavior.

Richard Friedli’s Categories of Organized Religions

(soft versus hard)

A reliable and creative mapping of attitudes toward collective violence in organized religions is offered by Richard Friedli, a Professor Emeritus for Religious Science at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, in his essay, “La religion et la paix La « religion douce » et l’ético du monde Un pas vers la paix ?” [Religion and Peace: The “Soft Religion” and World Ethics, A Step Toward Peace?], part of the Fribourg Symposium. (Richard Friedli initially presented this mapping in his 1981 study published in German Frieden wagen. Ein Beitrag der Religionen zur Gewaltanalyse und zur Friedensarbeit. [Peace Venture: A Contribution of Religions to the Analysis of Violence and Their Contribution to Peace] published by the University of Freiburg.)

Considering the tension poles between the mystic of peace and the reality of war, Richard Friedli challenges the popular culture’s stigmatization of organized religions as either violent (Abrahamic monotheism), or pacifist (Buddhism). He does so by proposing an approach that distinguishes between soft religion and strong religion, analyzed from within organized religions, on the account of their public and private function. (In a footnote of his paper, Friedli attributes
the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ religion to Johan Galtung—the Norwegian sociologist credited to be the main founder of the discipline of “peace and conflict studies”—who presented this thesis in a 1986 public lecture on “Religion and Peace,” at Princeton University, but which he never published. (Friedli: 2000, 50)

Summarizing his mapping, Friedli’s “main intent is to demonstrate that the comparative study of religions does not allow in any circumstance to classify the ‘prophetic’ religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islām), as having militaristic tendencies, nor to facilitate the recovery of ‘mystical’ religions (Hinduism, Buddhism), as following the pacifistic trend.” (Friedly: 2000, 49) His paradigm rests on a structural approach driven by the power distribution within organized religion, whereby a ‘soft’ religion presents a more disperse distribution of power (concentric circles), while a ‘hard’ religion presents a more hierarchical (pyramidal) power distribution. (Friedli: 2000, 51) In this sense, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ religions are classified and compared by four criteria of power measurement such as: (1) the ideal of theological life expressed by a religion, (2) its social consequences, (3) psychological tonalities, and (4) its strategic course of action.

**Hard Religion**

The **hard** use or interpretation of religion displays three postulates, such as: (1) the human being is divinely elected to be superior to nature, and the nature is to be exploited exclusively by the human being; (2) The man is chosen to be superior to woman, and (3) One’s own nation is the embodiment of the chosen race, and it is superior to all other ethnic groups.

**The Ideal of Theological Life:** Hard interpretation of religion is found in the monotheistic principle which portrays God as transcendent, eternal, and absolute, and the sole judge of human actions, whether good or bad. Politically, this outlook on life favors religious authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

**Social Consequences:** The social consequences of a **hard** interpretation of religion are visible in the phenomenon of proselytism, which is generated by the absolute conviction that a religion has a unique mission in the world, and this needs to be universalized. This manifestation
is generally opposed to dialogue, and it often articulates its missionary goals in an aggressive fashion.

*Psychological Tonalities:* The psychological tonalities of a *hard* interpretation of religion are based on dualistic principles, which lead to the demonization of the other (e.g., nation, gender, profession, individual), and to the justification of deadly violence.

*Strategic Course of Action:* A hard religion’s strategic interaction is based either on the military option, or more latently on a social separation of one group from the rest of humanity (e.g., territorial segregation between the elected and the damned), and personal withdrawal and warfare (e.g., spiritual warfare, exorcisms)–a separation which implies a forthcoming punishment.

*Soft Religion*

The *soft* use or interpretation of religion displays the three postulates: (1) the human being and the nature are partners in creation, (2) men and women are equal, and (3) the global society is viewed according to principle of a civil invitation for cooperation and convergence.

*The Ideal of Theological Life*

A soft religion’s ideal of theological outlook on life is the principle of divine omnipresence, whether distinct of creation or part of it. As Friedli insists “[i]ndeed, to use the basic creed of Islām–there is no divinity other than God–any historical institution and any dogmatic doctrine are relative and subject to criticism and prophetic theology.” Friedli: 2000, 55)

*Social Consequences:* The main social consequence of a soft religion is its empathic disposition toward humanity more generally, such as in the commandment of love in Christianity or Karma in Hinduism, which reintegrates enemies into the ‘family’.

*Psychological Tonalities:* A soft religion’s psychological tonality focuses on the right of recognition of the other. Here, differences are recognized as legitimate, and do not cause destruction, but represent an invitation to hospitality.

*Strategic Course of Action:* The strategic interaction is based on compromise, rather than on a zero-sum paradigm, looking for synergies.
Friedli’s Conclusions

As a conclusion to his classification, Richard Friedli claims the thesis that, *La religion originelle rassemble, la religion déformée divise* (original religion unites, distorted religion divides)—a thesis often contested by religious scholars such as David Little and others. (Appleby: 1999; Little: 207, 429; Simion: 2011, 33) Friedli’s claim is based on the ambivalence of psychological and social dynamics, which in essence give vitality to religion. Nevertheless, he cautions by stating that relations between organized religion and peaceful coexistence is complex and complicated, in spite of the peace generating instincts of the primitive religiosity. Furthermore, he acknowledges that each organized religion displays both manifestations: ‘soft’ and ‘hard’—in full rejection of Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* thesis—and such critique of religion can only be developed from within the organized religion itself and not from its exterior. Last but not least, he insists that the ‘soft’ elements of religion are more universal, favoring and also making dialogue mandatory in the interest of peaceful coexistence. (Friedli: 2000, 58)

4D4a Prospects for Religion’s Future Implication in Collective Violence

Contrary to the secularization thesis which predicted that modernity will decrease interest in religion, empirical evidence indicates the contrary. For example, the *World Values Survey* registers a persistent increase of interest in religion, including in China, which is another case that displays the failure of secularization theory. Therefore, the prospects for religion’s future implication in collective violence will be triggered not only by their internal dynamics, but also by external factors such as religious freedom and population density and growth.
Religious Freedom

As presented by Todd M. Johnson and Kenneth R. Ross in their monumental work, *The Atlas of Global Christianity*, during the second half of the 20th century the human rights movement led to numerous public declarations in support of religious freedom, based on the goals set by Article 18 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. The Roman Catholic Church, as largest religious institution, took serious steps particularly during the Second Vatican Council, issuing the 1965 *Dignitatis Humanae*, thus departing significantly from the 1888 *Libertas Humana*, which was highly restrictive on issues of religious freedom. Furthermore, the United Nations has now a Special Raporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, and in 1998, the US Congress has passed the *Freedom of Religion Act*, monitoring violations of freedom of religion around the world. Today, 80% of the 156 countries with population greater than 1 million promise freedom of religion in their constitutions, and less than 15% fail to offer such a promise. (Grim: 2009, 36)

Nevertheless, these initiatives met various obstacles set by governments, private actors, extremism and terrorism. The strongest and most persistent opposition comes from restrictions placed by private actors and by the governments. For example, social restrictions initiated by private actors in India led to anti-conversion laws, while in numerous Muslim countries the civil society exhibits strong calls for the Sharia, particularly in Sudan, Egypt, Somalia and others.

In light of the *Frustration-Aggression* theory, restrictions on freedom of religion imposed by governments as well as by private actors lead to a higher level of religious conflict, as recently demonstrated by Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke. (Grim: 2010, 15) As Brian J. Grim explains,

> the empirical data are clear on two points. First, religious freedom is part of the bundled commodity of fundamental and responsible human freedoms that energize broader productive participation in civil society by all religious groups, which arguably helps to stimulate the socio-economic progress of women and men. Secondly, religious freedom reduces conflict and increases security
by, among other things, removing grievances religious groups have toward government and their fellow citizen. (Grim: 2009, 37)

The *Global Restrictions on Religion* study published in 2009, reported that about one-third of the countries have high or very high restrictions on religion, and that the most restrictive countries contain about 70 % of world population. Restrictions on religion are placed by governments and by private actors. When asking a question such as “was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of government,” 137 countries answered ‘yes’, while only 61 answered ‘no’. Conversely, when asking, “was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by individuals or groups in society,” 139 countries answered ‘yes’ and 59 ‘no’. (Grim: 2010, 12) As one can observe in Figure 4.7, two major religions (Islām and Hinduism) are dominant in the countries which display a very high level of government restrictions and social hostilities involving religion, while being also among the most populous regions of the world. In light of Michael Brecher’s “crisis escalation model,” conflict is more likely to escalate between adversaries with capability, regime pairs, internal instability, particularly when geographic distances are relatively small. (Brecher: 1996, 221) Furthermore, restrictions imposed by private actors and by the government are located in the most populous countries. (Figure 4.7) Thus, considering restrictions, high population density, birth rate, and religious homogeneity of each society, a potential future conflict can escalate between India, Pakistan and China. Therefore, it is easy to anticipate how these statistic indicators will point to the likely locations for future theaters of religious hostilities, having organized religions as direct and indirect participants.

Furthermore, in spite of increased pluralism which during the past one hundred years led to a more religiously diversified world, the map shown in Figure 4.8 displays the geographic reality of the world’s major religions distribution by their historical evolution.

Based on statistical projections published by the *Atlas of Global Christianity*, over the next 40 years, Muslims are expected to increase significantly from 22.4% to 27.1% as a share of the global population; Christians will see a slight increase as well from 33.2% to 35.0%. Agnostics”
Religious Restrictions in the 25 Most Populous Countries

This chart shows how the world’s 25 most populous countries score in terms of both government restrictions on religion and social hostilities involving religion. Countries in the upper right have the most restrictions and hostilities. Countries in the lower left have the least.

Government Restrictions

Circles are sized proportionally to each country’s population (2009)

Colors are based on each country’s position on the chart.

Note: The Pew Forum categorized the levels of government restrictions and social hostilities involving religion by percentiles. Countries with scores in the top 5% on each index were categorized as “very high.” The next highest 15% of scores were categorized as “high,” and the following 20% were categorized as “moderate.” The bottom 60% of scores were categorized as “low.”

Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life • Global Restrictions on Religion, December 2009
Figure 4.8 | Percentage Majority Religion by Province, 2010
share will decrease noticeably, while other religions will see smaller changes (mostly declines), if any, in their global percentage. (Figure 4.9)

Therefore, considering the outlook on religious freedom along with the forecasted birth rate, and growth of religion’s influence in the public life for the next 40 years, religion becomes even more relevant to public policy.

### Religious adherence and growth, 2010–2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>2010 Total</th>
<th>2010 %</th>
<th>2050 Total</th>
<th>2050 %</th>
<th>Percentage of all adherents</th>
<th>Religious growth rate*</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
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<td>Christians</td>
<td>2,202,454,000</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>3,203,484,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zoroastrians</td>
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<td>7,943,000</td>
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<td>0.81</td>
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<td>Cremation</td>
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<td>6,014,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td>Shinto</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zoroastrians</td>
<td>181,000</td>
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<td>170,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<td>Total population</td>
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<td>1,912,094,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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*Rate = average annual growth rate, per cent per year between dates specified

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**Figure 4.9 | Religious Adherence and Growth, 2010-2050**

4D4b Potential toward Ambivalence:
Meaning-Making & the Kairos Effect

During conflict—as meaning-making is vital both in offering an explanation for the existence of social ills and in taking action—almost each organized religion focuses on spiritual narratives that are considered appropriate to the existing conditions. Here, the “Kairos effect” is the most crucial
phenomenon which can be viewed as an intervening variable between the Zeitgeist, or general spirit of time (independent variable, or cause), and institution’s adaptability to these conditions of time (dependent variable or effect). Unlike the Zeitgeist, which is a broad sentiment acknowledging that conflict is almost inescapable, the Kairos effect is exclusively based on the momentum of collective panic, which demands an urgent decision to be made here-and-now (e.g., Hannibal ante portas!) Because the danger is imminent, “the Kairos effect” discards any moral principles that may oppose violence, even if conducted in self-defense. Consequently, an institution with a pacifist orientation temporarily abandons its normative stand not only because the spirit of time encourages the opposite, but more so due to sentiments of collective distress. As a result, a process of distortion occurs at each level of the institutionalized religion, as the general attitude becomes dominated by apocalyptic-like thinking. (Figure 4.10) Thus, in its temporary manifestation, a dominantly pacifist religion embraces a more phenomenological self-expression in order to offer meaning to a situation where control is lost, even if this contradicts its dogma, or undermines its theological legitimacy. Doctrines become quasi-doctrines in the sense that they are modified or minimized, and the ethics are dominated by the Zeitgeist, and Kairos. The ritual becomes both creative, by adding new meaning derived from the Zeitgeist, and selective, in the sense that it abandons its normative structure, where instead of promoting peace, it invokes divine revenge, as imposed by the Kairos.

It is also important to recognize the existence of pacifistic offshoots, which, during moments of collective distress, would rather accept martyrdom instead of retaliating. Yet, such pacifistic offshoots are most likely small in number and influence, and thus ineffective in preventing the rush to violence, under situations of Kairos. One must also note that under conditions of Zeitgeist, pacifistic offshoots can, and often do influence the public perception of times, away from violent confrontations, pending on available resources.

As graphically represented in Figure 4.11, during a violent conflict an organized religion finds temporary refuge in a phenomenological manifestation due to the process of interpretation. During times of peace, the doctrinal aspect of religion, which is meant to ‘translate the will’ of
### The Process of Distorsion

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MODEL</th>
<th>SYSTEMATIC</th>
<th>PHENOMENOLOGIC</th>
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<td>NORMATIVE</td>
<td>INSTITUTIONAL</td>
<td>CULTURAL &amp; RATIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionally-Driven: pacifist attitude vs apocalypse</td>
<td>Crisis-Driven: meaning making in a situation where control was lost</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM ZEITGEIST TO KAIROS</td>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Quasi-Doctrinal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Quasi-Ethical (Zeitgeist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ritual</td>
<td>Quasi-Ritual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

→ → → → the process of distorsion → → → →

**Figure 4.10** The Interpretative Process during Crisis
Figure 4.11 | Organized Religion's Response during Crisis: A Basic Model

The meaning of action is historical, cumulative, and kairos: momentous. The doctrine, interpretation, conduction, and transformation of the sacred, is general and theoretical, while during hostilities, doctrines become temporarily adapted to the existing situation. Similarly, in time of peace, the ritual, which is meant to communicate with the sacred, is general and complex, while during crisis, it becomes simplistic.
as it is customized to respond to the needs of the crisis. Last, but not least, the ethical norms which are concerned with the ‘implementation of the will’ of the Sacred, are universalistic and embracing of diversity during times of peace, while during conflict they become exclusivist, justifying violence.

During times of violent confrontations, the interpretative process of the sacred texts becomes remarkably simplistic, the leader focusing on enforcing “the Divine will,” and on deciding who qualifies as human and who does not, who is good and who is evil.

4D4b1 Meaning-Making: Zeitgeist & Kairos
4D4b1a Defining the Divine

The doctrine of God is a very complex theme due to the concept of contingency, which simply states that it is impossible for the ‘limited’ to comprehend the ‘unlimited’. Simplistically, God is ‘defined’ as the Absolute, the Mysterious Being, and the Creator of the Universe and life. Western doctrines of God are based on three general understandings ranging from Greco-Roman polytheism (with occasional cases of henotheism), to Zoroastrian and Manichaean dualism, culminating with the Abrahamic monotheism (Judaism, Christianity, and Islām.)

Due to the confines of the normative approach, which is advanced by the institutionalized religions, the theological approach to the study of collective violence emerged in the Western scholarship during the 20th century, and only at the periphery of theological endeavor. The contribution of this approach is credited with having been focused primarily on the “manifestation” of the Divine during times of conflict. (Here the term “theological” is used in its strictest etymological sense: Θεός = ‘god’ + λόγος = ‘knowledge of.’) Nevertheless, a dilemma is almost inescapable: Is God an exclusively loving, compassionate, and forgiving entity—case in which God can love and forgive one’s enemies—or is God an unpredictable entity, case in which God loves as much as punishes his own faithful and their enemies alike?
To this extent, within the theological approach, one can find two tendencies expressed in the Ottonian and Yoderian approaches, with a particular focus on the dilemma of evil. One must recognize that these approaches are widespread primarily across the monotheistic religions, and the endorsements as “Ottonian” and/or “Yoderian” are used for an exclusively instrumental purpose, as a symbolic recognition of the intellectual legacy and influence of Rudolf Otto and John Howard Yoder.

4D4b1a1 Ottonian Approach

The Ottonian approach is based on the conceptualization of a fearful and rather merciless God, and it emerges from the remarkable work of the German theologian Rudolf Otto, *Das Heilige: Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen* (The Holy: On the Irrational in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational.) In his work, Rudolf Otto considers the Holy (or the “numinous” allegedly the Divine) as “mysterium tremendum et fascinans,” a mystery that is terrifying and yet fascinating. Under conditions of crisis, the perception of a terrifying God can have multiple effects on a group’s self-perception, as well as on its attitudes developed toward the group’s enemies. The Ottonian approach is often considered a dominant paradigm to religious interpretation of sacred texts under conditions of crisis, and was thus adopted by prominent scholars such as Scott Appleby in his instant classic, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. In Appleby’s approach, for instance, the encounter with the sacred is not an ethically unambiguous experience, as it ingrains various forms of ethical behavior and interpretation ranging from sadomasochism to philanthropy.
The Yoderian Approach was coined as such in recognition of the intellectual legacy and practical advocacy of pacifism that marked the persona of Yoder. John Howard Yoder considers the Divine as a completely merciful and compassionate entity that transcends the material world, while human violence is exclusively the result of human weakness and failure. Deeply Christological in nature, the Yoderian approach is the standard teaching in the dogmatic theology of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, and in some Protestant churches as well. Subject to the privilege of revelation—and thus beyond human perception and intervention—the Yoderian approach is fully supported by numerous prominent theologians, as the standard perception of a sacrificing God, wanting nothing more than to fulfill the promised reconciliation between God and humanity (Genesis 3:15)—the very essence of the incarnation of the Divine Logos. (John 1: 1-6)

Complex in itself, the origin and the nature evil appears to be construed by almost every culture and religion not only as a mere attempt to offer explanations over the existence of pain, suffering and death, but as an attempt to identify viable remedies in the struggle against its destructive gamut. (Stoyanov: 2000, 4) Within western religions, speculative and non-speculative minds have given impetus and urgency to the problem of evil as a social defense mechanism in suppressing fear of death and unknown, and to protect the longevity of the community, as usually expressed through funeral rites developed by various religious traditions. As the prominent Byzantine scholar Dmitri Obolensky wrote,

[the metaphysician and the theologian must explain the possibility of any relation between the Infinite and the finite, between the perfection of the Creator and the imperfection of the creature, between God and the world; and those men who, without being philosophers, believe that God is
the source of all perfection and goodness and that He has created the world, cannot but recognize that in this world moral and physical evil–suffering, cruelty, decay, death–is abundantly present. How then, can God, the Supreme Good, be the cause of Evil? Is it possible to escape the following seemingly logical conclusion: either God is the creator of Evil, in which case He is not the source of all perfection and hence not truly God; or else He is not the creator of Evil and the origin of Evil must be sought outside God in some agent distinct from and opposed to Him? (Obolensky: 1948: 1)

Thus, within this mechanism, one might encounter monist and dualist tendencies.

The monist tendency views evil as non-existent, as a product of one’s imagination and as a reversal of one’s fears (Mango: 1992). This tendency is the norm for Eastern Christian explanation of suffering and death (Basil the Great: 2004, 195), staying also at the heart of the Yoderian approach. In light of Obolensky’s dilemma, the monist approach resolves the paradox of evil by analogy with the role of zero in mathematics–a model apparently formulated by one of the prominent early Christian writers, Dionysius the Areopagite. As presented by two of Dionysius’ exegetes,

we may illustrate this thought by the nature of zero in mathematics, which is non-entity (since, added to numbers, it makes no difference) and yet has an annihilating force (since it reduces to zero all numbers that are multiplied by it.) Even so evil is nothing and yet manifests itself in the annihilation of the things it qualifies. (Sparrow-Simpson, Clarke: 1957, 20)

The dualist tendency–which emerges from a cultural dualism inherent in various cultures, including the Western culture–claims that collective violence is the byproduct of the two forces of good and evil which coexist in a perpetual antagonism. For instance, America’s “culture of fear,” which finds its origin in the ambivalence of the two markers of “the American dream” (desire for success and fear of loss), gets replicated through Hollywood film productions (The Star Wars, The Lord of the Rings, Harry Potter, etc.), negative electoral campaigns, market advertising, video games, etc. Noted by influential sociologists such as Barry Glassner (The Culture of Fear), and exacerbated
by filmmakers such as Michael Moore (*Fahrenheit 9/11, Sicko, Bowling for Columbine*), the culture of fear seems to increasingly celebrate a mythical battle between good and evil at its fullest potential. Consequently, this dualist tendency can easily demonize real and imagined enemies, while also scapegoating the more vulnerable entities caught in the crossfire.

### 4D4b1b Defining Humanity

By analogy with views on divinity, organized religions and religious phenomenology display significant elaborations on what it means to be a human, in relation with the divinity, the nature, and other human beings.

The views of humanity range from regarding it as *good*—by being created in God’s image (B’Tzelem Elohim)—hence essentially superior to the animal world (dominant in Abrahamic faiths), *instrumental* and powerless (as in ancient Greek mythology), *indistinguishable* from the physical nature (a tendency recognized across Asian religions), and *corrupt*—as seen in various native religions, cast religions (Weber: 1968, 284-293; Weber 1991, 80-95), or sectarian movements which tend to classify human races into superior and inferior.

Following the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* at the end of World War II, the human rights movement that soon emerged had systematically promoted an equalitarian view of humanity, which not only made a gradual improvement of the laws and state constitutions across the globe, but had also been receiving incremental support from various institutionalized religions. (Stahnke, Martin: 1998; Morsink: 2000)
A simple analysis of the interpretation of sacred texts under conditions of crisis indicates how structural elements of religion become skewed toward meta-narratives that either overemphasize a subset of the structure, or simply modifies and distorts it as to make it applicable to the spirit of time.

One must note that under conditions of crisis, institutions increasingly dawdle their engagement of the conflict for philosophical and practical reasons. These include an assumed religious universalism over humanity, as well as internal procedures, and policymaking process which often involve the management of multiple interests and opinions (e.g., synodal principle, councils of imams, etc.)

On the other hand, cultural groups are usually speedier in engaging a conflict by their instinctive rush to offer meaning in ambiguous situations. In the same vein, individuals often tap into culture in time of crisis to legitimize and impose a change in an institution by skewing the meaning of a particular crisis to their advantage. Conversely, under the constraints of the momentum, leaders within an institution import cultural elements of political meaning such as patriotism, nationalism, meaning of community (ummah), philosophical principles (ming in Confucianism), and use them for a narrowly defined purpose, that will ensure their survival on the position of authority.

In general, sacred texts are explicitly violent, peaceful, or ambivalent in nature and they represent repositories of meaning and standards for relationships during times of war and peace. During a time of peace, violent texts are either overlooked, or interpreted symbolically, as a reference to a spiritual war. Nevertheless, in times of war, the hermeneutics gravitate toward literalism.

Taking Judaism and Islām as examples, violent texts such as
Remember, Lord, what the Edomites did on the day Jerusalem fell. ‘Tear it down,’ they cried, ‘tear it down to its foundations!’ Daughter Babylon, doomed to destruction, happy is the one who repays you according to what you have done to us. Happy is the one who seizes your infants and dashes them against the rocks. (Psalm 137: 7-9);

or

I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve; therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them. (Qur’an 8:12);

are countered by explicitly peaceful texts such as:

“Depart from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it.” (Psalm 34: 15)

or

O you who believe, if you strike in the cause of God, you shall be absolutely sure. Do not say to one who offers you peace, ‘You are not a believer,’ seeking the spoils of this world. For God possesses infinite spoils. Remember that you used to be like them, and God blessed you. Therefore, you shall be absolutely sure (before you strike). God is fully cognizant of everything you do. (Qur’an 4:94)

While texts which are explicitly peaceful or violent are clear in defining the attitudes toward enemies in time of war, the ambivalent texts are often subject to theological debates and controversies. Ambivalent texts are usually de-contextualized, particularly from within their own narrative preserved by the text, and applied with an exclusive instrumental purpose. A remarkable sample is the meaning of the sword in Christianity. If read in the contexts of violent hostilities, Jesus Christ’s affirmation, “I did not come to bring peace but a sword,” (Matthew 10:34) leaves no doubt about the justification of violence, both offensive and defensive. Yet, if read in its own context, one can argue that the text refers to the sociological difficulties encountered by the early
Christians due to their conversion, which implied family tensions, and denial of one’s past and traditions, etc.

Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man’s foes will be those of his own household.

(Matthew 10:34-36)

Furthermore, that the meaning of the sword was used symbolically, this is clarified by a context recorded by the sacred texts, when the sword was used during a violent confrontation.

Behold, one of those who were with Jesus stretched out his hand, and drew his sword, and struck the servant of the high priest, and struck off his ear. Then Jesus said to him, “Put your sword back into its place, for all those who take the sword will die by the sword. Or do you think that I couldn’t ask my Father, and he would even now send me more than twelve legions of angels?”

(Matthew 26:51-53)

According to this text, the use of the sword in violent confrontations was strongly rebuked by Jesus Christ. Consequently, to an early Christian interpreter such as Tertullian, when Peter cut Malchus’ ear in Gethsemane, Jesus cursed the works of the sword for ever after. (Cadoux: 1919, 51)

4D4c Mapping Organized Religions on Peace and Violence

The mapping below (Chart 4.8) is based on the dual potential of organized religions both in conflict escalation and in conflict resolution. The intent is to highlight the basic doctrines, ethical precepts, worship and sacred texts which are generally appealed to during hostilities from the dual perspective of peace and violence.
The selection of organized religions was based on their direct impact on collective violence as generated by membership size, and it includes Christianity (2.3 billion), Islām (1.5 billion), Hinduism (949 million), Buddhism (469 million) and Judaism (15 million.) Judaism was included at the expense of Sikhism (25 million) due to its relative impact over Christianity and Islam, as well as due to its geopolitical role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other organized religions such as Baha’i, Confucianism, Jainism, Shintoism have been omitted from this charting due to their relatively small size and assumed low impact over public policy and collective violence. Additionally, most of the Asian religions usually subscribe to principles derived from Hinduism and Buddhism.

The classification of world religions by the ambivalent lines of peace and violence should by no means imply a fifty-fifty share in such attitudes. It is rather an attempt to offer data from within the organized religion itself in supporting the thesis that organized religion is ambivalent towards violence due to its interests. Placing Islam and Buddhism on an equal footing on their share of peace and violence would be a regrettable ecological fallacy, as Buddhism can safely make the case for promoting pacifism, while Islam has its regrettable violent history. At the same time this is also an attempt to deconstruct stereotypes that exclusively classify Islam as a religion of violence.

The 2005 edition of *Encyclopedia Britannica*, offered the following figures concerning the top ten organized religions, as listed in Chart 4.6. In 2010, counting the global adherents of organized religions, the *Atlas of Global Christianity* offered comparable data on organized religions to the global population. (Chart 4.7)
Christianity is the first largest organized religion, representing 33.2% of the global share of religious membership, with an estimated 2.3 billion adherents that belong to the three historical branches: Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox. In spite of being an originally pacifist religion, in its history, Christianity developed ambivalent attitudes toward collective violence, ranging from universal pacifism and martyrdom, to attitudes of Just War, Crusade, Holy War as well as limited pacifism and adaptability. (Bainton: 1979; Simion: 2008b; Simion: 2010)

At a theological level, the doctrine of peace is anchored in a redemption from an alleged primordial sin committed by ‘the parents of humanity,’ Adam and Eve, in the paradise, and by their posterity. The redemptive essence of Christianity is located in Jesus Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, to forgive and reconcile humanity with itself, and with its Creator. At a social level, the doctrine of peace is embedded into the concepts of non-violence and martyrdom, fully practiced by its adherents during the first three centuries, then occasionally by various local churches under conditions of persecution. (Angaelos: 2011, 24-32) On the negative side, however, Augustinian ideas which emerged from a legitimate need for self-defense led to various theological superstructures which not only justified violence, but even offered favorable conditions that coined war as holy, albeit in clear contradiction to the nonviolent precepts of the Gospel.

The ethics of peace is anchored in the concept that peace can only be achieved if the question of structural violence is properly addressed, and by promoting a sense of justice which is distributive, procedural and restorative in nature. In Western Christianity, peace tradition is anchored both in the Gospel, as well as in the ethics of pacifistic religious societies, such as the Mennonites, the Amish, and the Quakers. In Eastern Christianity, the understanding of peace-oriented justice is rooted in an ethical tradition which combined the Gospel with the Roman juridical thinking of Celsus and Ulpianus. These Roman jurists defined justice as *ars boni et equi* ["the art of good and equity,"] and emphasized its distributive aspect in non-violent terms,
such as: *honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere* [“to live honestly, to harm no one, and to give everyone his due.”] (Asfaw, Chehadeh, Simion: 2011, xix) The ethics of war is solely concentrated in various forms of Just War activism. Tracing its roots in the Roman juridical thought, the idea of “just war” was, in fact, an attempt to limit the rush to violence. Between about 1000 and 1300 the discussions of war suffered a fundamental transformation, because the problem of war became a fundamental problem of law (rather than moral and theological discourse), as both theologians and lawyers were concerned with questions of property rights, liability for damage resulting from war, the legitimacy of conquest, and its implications for possessory and jurisdictional rights. Finally, there emerged the concept of holy war, war that was justifying and spiritually beneficial to those who participated in it. (Brundage: 1976, 99-110) Today, the Just War theory entails several conditions focusing on collective behavior prior to the war (jus ad bellum) and during the war (jus in bello). *Jus ad bellum* category defines six conditions under which the use of force is justifiable, such as 1) just cause; 2) lawfully declared and by a lawful authority, 3) for a good intention, 4) all options be tried first, 5) reasonable chances for success, and 6) means proportional with the scope. *Jus in bello* sets three conditions: 1) protection of the innocent, 2) using appropriate force, and 3) respect international conventions.

On the positive side, Christian worship focuses on reconciling humanity; an effort situated at the heart of the Eucharist. The process of forgiveness and reconciliation takes place not only within humanity, but also between the divine and humanity, and it is central to Christian missionary endeavors. Worship is also centered on a notion of spiritual warfare, whereby war is directed against human passions and negative thoughts. (Scupoli: 1952) Nevertheless, on the negative side, severe asceticism is a form of violence conducted against one’s own body, which is viewed as a source spiritual failure. (Simion: 2010) At a collective level, the Church supports violence indirectly by justifying and blessing wars, and soldiers, even in cases of aggression. (Molitfelnic: 2006, 518-533; Brundage: 1976; Bodrov: 2011; Harutyunyan: 2011)

Christian sacred texts are generally pacifistic and ambivalent, which, when de-contextualized, they are used in support of violence. A sample of a pacifist text from the Gospel
can be “If someone slaps you on one cheek, turn to them the other also. If someone takes your coat, do not withhold your shirt from them. Give to everyone who asks you, and if anyone takes what belongs to you, do not demand it back. Do to others as you would have them do to you.” (Luke 6: 29-31) A sample of an ambivalent text is “Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man’s foes will be those of his own household.” (Matthew 10:34-36) Texts in support of collective violence are usually invoked from the Hebrew Bible, which is accepted within Christianity as the Old Testament and recognized as a fundamental canonical sacred text.

4D4c2 Islām

Islām is the second largest organized religion representing 20.1% of the global share of religious membership, with an estimated 1.4 billion adherents. Born in a violent sociological environment, its founder, Prophet Muhammad, succeeded in uniting the Arab tribes by redirecting their belligerent energy and competition for resources toward the world outside the Arabic peninsula. Central to the concept and practice of peace and violence is the division of the world between dar-al Islām (house of Islām) and dar-al-Harb (house of the sword.) (Nayak: 2000, 232-234)

The doctrine of peace emerges from what is known as arkan al-Islām (or the five Pillars of Islām): 1) the shahadah (creed), 2) salat (daily prayers), 3) zakah (almsgiving), 4) sawm (fasting during Ramadan), and 5) hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca.) More specifically, the juridical concept of Ijtihad—which focuses on the independent interpretation of problems that are not covered by the Qur’ān (scripture), Hadith (tradition), or Ijmā (local, or universal consensus)–creates contextual conditions favorable to a peaceful interpretation of Islamic precepts. (Smock: 2004; Netton: 1997) On the other hand, the doctrine of violence is mainly anchored in Islām’s missionary agenda, that of expanding humanity’s ‘submission to Allah’ beyond the dar-al Islām (house of Islām), into the
non-Muslim world known as dar-al-Harb (house of the sword.) (Khadduri: 1969) Furthermore, in a juridical sense, the principle of imitating past precedents (the *Taqlīd*), which replicates adjudications from past cases (Netton: 1997, 245), can often regenerate violence, particularly when such precedents involved an administration of violent punishments such as killing by stoning, physical mutilation, gender abuse, and so on. When such cases are being replicated they can also reinforces various forms of structural violence.

The ethics of war and peace is anchored in the doctrine of *jihād*, or “struggle.” The term *jihād* is derived from *jahāda* which means “exerted.” Its juridical-theological meaning is exertion or the putting forward of one’s power in Allah’s path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world. The recompense of *jihād* is the achievement to salvation. As “Allah’s direct way to the paradise,” *jihād* bypasses the Five Pillars of Islam. Pragmatically, *jihād* may be regarded as a form of religious propaganda that is to be carried on by persuasion or by the sword. Thus, the *Makkan Revelations* emphasize *jihād* as persuasion through the power of the word for the salvation of soul, and the *Madinan Revelations* emphasize *jihād* as the strife for proselytizing through the power of the sword. Therefore, the ethic of peace is derived from the Makkan revelations, whereby doctrine of *jihād* entails the spiritual warfare for spiritual fulfillment, known as “the Greater Jihād.” Furthermore, Islamic jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) provides various forms of protecting a selected number of religious minorities, known as *Ahl al-Kitāb* (People of the Book), which includes Jews, Christians and Sabians, and against whom, no *jihād* by the sword is to be declared simply on the account of their faith. Nevertheless, according to the Muslim creed, the People of the Book are those who distorted their scriptures and fell into Allah’s disfavor, and are therefore, partially punishable. This partial punishment involves tax poll, and second-class citizenry status, which subjects them to various restrictions. Islamic jurists have emphasized four ways in which a believer can fulfill one’s *jihād* obligations. These are, *jihād* by *his heart* a.k.a. “the greater Jihad” (combating the devil), *jihād* by *his tongue* (theoretically admonishing for wrongdoing), *jihād* by *his hands* (pragmatically admonishing for wrongdoing), and *jihād* by *the sword* (fighting unbelievers or non-Muslims and enemies of faith.
Concerning public ethics, Islām promotes pro-social attitudes such as *khayr* (goodness), *birr* (righteousness), *al-iqsat* (equity), *al-‘adl* (justice), and *al-haqq* (truth and right.) (Gopin: 2000, 83)

In general, Muslim worship takes several forms such as *salat* (ritual prayer), *dhikr* (contemplative prayer), *dua* (prayer of praise or exhortation). The ritual prayer involves a ritual prostration towards Kaba from Mecca, which is performed daily (morning, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset, and evening), and it could be practiced at home or in the mosque. Public prayer is preceded by *adhan*, or the call to prayer recited from a minaret, and it includes the *takbir* (“God is most great”), *shahada* (“there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”), and the imperative “hurry to salat.” (Ruthven, Nanji: 2004, 14) Peaceful and violent aspects of the Muslim worship are linked with the centrality of Mecca, as well as with the question of leadership. One of the five pillars of Islām is the *Hajj* (or the pilgrimage to Mecca); demanded of each Muslim to be performed at least once in a life time. The Hajj culminates with a special ritual of “stoning the devil,” in an attempt to denounce Satan’s temptation against Abraham and by extension to the entire Muslim community. The importance of this ritual is highly significant in peacemaking in the sense that it promotes a dramatic ritual-release of frustration against a virtual scapegoat. In this sense, and at a theological level, the scapegoat becomes *al-Shaytān* (The Satan), or *Iblīs* (The Devil), rather than another human being, who could easily be subject to such violent punishment. Furthermore, this virtualization of the scapegoat undermines the demonization process against the human enemies of the Muslims, while also increasing a sense of solidarity with other religions against an invisible common enemy. For instance, the Orthodox Christian iconographic tradition from Syria and Palestine depicts St. George as fighting against the devil together with a Muslim, Al Khader, and the Christian St. George is also venerated by the Muslims as a spiritual ally. (Simion: 2011, 185-189) Nevertheless, on the negative side, the concept of Satan can also be applied collectively against a segment of humanity, such as in the recent political rhetoric of militant Muslim organizations such as Hezbollah, al-Quida, and so on, in reference to the State of Israel and the West more generally. While Muslim prayer is generally geared toward peace,
during physical confrontations, particularly when these confrontations are coined as a sacred duty, worship precedes and entertains violence. A prominent chanting for mobilization is the shahada, *La ilaha il Allah, Muhammad ur-Rasool-Allah* [“there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet”], which forecasts and often precedes violent confrontation. However, the most widely practiced chanting for mobilization is *Allahu Akbar* [Allah is the Greatest]; a slogan allegedly prescribed by Prophet Muhammad to each mujahedeen [holy fighter] to be invoked as to ensure the spiritual legitimacy of violence. During military confrontations, worship is present both as an act of encouragement and as a form of spiritual discipline in order to ensure that the battle is conducted for the benefit of Islam. Furthermore, on the negative side, the *Ashūrā* ritual of the Shiite tradition (which is the anniversary of the death of al-Hussain at the hands of Caliph Yazīd), is observed with a dramatic display of self-inflicted wounds. The pain imposed by self-flagellation has strong emotional consequences over the practitioners, indicating also a strong willingness for martyrdom. (Bowker: 1997, 99)

Muslim sacred texts reflect the ambivalence toward collective violence as well. On the positive side, a text supportive of peace and justice from the Qur’an reads as: “O you who believe, if you strike in the cause of God, you shall be absolutely sure. Do not say to one who offers you peace, ‘You are not a believer,’ seeking the spoils of this world. For God possesses infinite spoils. Remember that you used to be like them, and God blessed you. Therefore, you shall be absolutely sure (before you strike). God is fully cognizant of everything you do.” (Qur’an 4:94) [This text presents also obvious similarities with *jus ad bellum* category from the Christian Just War concept.] On the negative side, however, violence can be justified by a countering text from the Qur’an, such as: “I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve; therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.” (Qur’an 8:12)
Hinduism is the third largest organized religion representing 13.7% of the global share of religious membership, with around 949 million adherents. Hinduism is a religion of collective deities, doctrines, rituals, and sacred texts sharing a common outlook on the origins of the universe and life. Violence, in its multiple forms, is an omnipresent theme in Hinduism, and this religious tradition should by no means be reduced to the doctrine of *ahimsa* (‘do not cause harm’), commonly translated as nonviolence and successfully implemented by Gandhi. One of the earliest sacred texts, *Ṛg-veda*, displays various perspectives on violence in the context of sacrifice. The kings invoke the gods in order to guarantee their victory, and a later text (the *Bhagavadjītā*) attests that it is legitimate to kill. The *Laws of Manu* established a hierarchy in which the place of the Brahman, situated at the top of the cast system, can defend his position even violently, because his position is the result of the extraordinary quality of his previous lives. It is also a difference between killing a Brahman or an outcast (today a Dalit.) Within the ambivalent pantheon of Hinduism, one could find that Kālī, the goddess of destruction, has a dominant place, particularly within the Thuggee cult that involves a ritual killing of strangers. As for the defense of Hindu nationalist doctrine of *Hindutva*, the political version of violence is now reflected in the politics of Indian Bharatiya Janata Party, whose most recent history demonstrates that non-violence is not necessarily the rule of Hinduism. (Nayak: 2000, 65-66)

The doctrine of peace is anchored in the concept of *ahimsa* (roughly defined as ‘non-violence’, ‘non-harmfulness’), recommended as a rule of interaction. As for the doctrine of war, the foundational texts, the *Vedas*, give a violent image of the wars between the three worlds: the world of the gods, the world of the men, and the world of the demons. This same theme is pursued in the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* sacred texts. Furthermore, within the confines of *danda* doctrine, violence is regarded as a common good, similar to the Christian Just War doctrine. As Anand Nayak explains, “the king is therefore entrusted to exercise force, whose
The clearest expression is the killing of the enemy. It invokes the deities whose main attribute is that of strengthening war. The danda is the punishment expressed in the exercise of brute force. In its extreme form (war), danda takes the meaning of the sacrifice. In this sense, violence as sacrifice would be seen as a pure act when it is exercised for the good of all worlds and not for one's selfish benefit.” (Nayak: 2000, 74-75)

The ethics of peace is anchored into a successful implementation of ahimsa during early 20th century by Mahatma Gandhi, in his ethical application of Hinduism. In fact, Gandhi combined ahimsa (nonviolence), with satya (truth) and tapasya (asceticism) toward the goal of achieving satyagraha (truth force). (Ferguson: 1978, 38; Burger: 2000, 136-146) At the same time, the ethics of war and violence often derive from various interpretations of violence himsa or kraurya as a positive manifestation in the Mahābhārata. (Nayak: 2000, 72-73) Additionally, the nationalist philosophy of Hindutva, as reflected in the writings of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (The Orion [1893], The Arctic Home of the Vedas (1903) and The Gitarahasya [1915]), promotes and justifies violence against non-Indians and against various religious minorities.

Hindu worship is highly elaborated in outlook and strictly devotional in essence. It emerges from the Brahmanic period, which began with the end of the compilation of Rg-veda around BC 1000, it extends until around the production of the first treaties of laws (dharmaśāstra) around the fourth century AD, and it was developed on two venues. The first venue is that of dharma, which interprets the order of the Vedic sacrifice, and imposes conformity with specific priorities into the lives of the members of the society, often in a discriminatory and violent fashion. The second line of thought is that of yoga and of meditation, which, following the tradition of the ascetics (tapasvin), interiorize the Vedic sacrifice within the concept of mental liberation (mokṣa). If the first line of thought offers little concrete methods outside of a detailed ritual, the second line had developed various techniques on how to destroy violence that is rooted in the heart of the human being. Concerning violence performed as a sacrificial act in a modern context, Maya Burger writes the following: “Recall that sacrifice is central to the thinking and the way of functioning of the Vedic and Brahmanic world. In this context, sacrificial killing is considered as legitimate
and necessary. This concept is so central that all acts of killing, to be accepted, must be related to the sacrifice, or the idea of sacrifice. This notion of sacrifice, in its most modified form, remains central to Hinduism.” (Burger: 2000, 132)

As for sacred texts, Hindu references to peace usually gravitate around the story from the *Bhagavadgītā*, where hero Arjuna rejects a commandment from Krishna (an avatar of the vengeful god Vishnu), to fight his cousins, the *Kauravas*, by saying “It is not right that we slay our kinsmen.” *Bhagavadgītā* 1:26. (Ferguson: 1978, 30) As for violent texts, these are often derivations from the violence that appears in the foundational myth of the world, the myth of the sacrifice of *Puruṣa*. The fundamental creed expressed in *Puruṣa-sūkta* (*Ṛg-veda*, X, 90) is deeply immersed in an atmosphere of primordial sacrificial violence, whereby the primordial man Puruṣa is the victim of sacrifice. This means that sacrificial killing that involves the dismemberment of the victim is creational in essence, because the body of the being which is sacrificed is capable of generating other beings and orders in humans. (*Puruṣa* is the first human with gigantic dimensions, exceeding the limits of the earth—who contained in himself worlds that are past, present and future—was slain in a sacrificial rite. The world of men and divine beings was created of *Puruṣa’s* dismembered body.)

4D4c4 Buddhism

Buddhism is the fourth largest organized religion representing 6.8% of the global share of religious membership, with 469 million adherents. Rooted in Hinduism, the Buddhist concepts of violence and peace emerge from the Brahmanic sacrificial ritual, which in its historical development it adopted the venue of the ascetics (*samanas*), that of vowing a complete renunciation to violence. Coined in the popular culture as a pacifist religion, Buddhism is nevertheless an organized religion—hence a political institution that acts on its interests—thus manifesting ambivalent attitudes toward collective violence. A recent case of violent manifestation is the case of the conflict in Sri Lanka.
between the Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus that displays the violent manifestation of an alleged pacifist religion. (Tambiah: 1990, 741-760; Little: 1993; Tschuy: 1997, 87-99; Kleinfeld: 2005) As Anand Nayak writes, “[i]f religion itself did not directly incite hatred or provoked wars, we often find kings who led wars in favor of Buddhism. For example, at the beginning of the Sui Dynasty in the sixth century, the Chinese emperor led wars in favor of Buddhism. In the eleventh century, king of Burma, Anuruddha, proclaimed Buddhism the official religion of his country and fought wars against his neighbors to retrieve the sacred relics of Buddha. In Japan, the Buddhist monks did not hesitate to use their weapons. [...] During the sixteenth and nineteenth century persecutions against the Christians in Japan, the Buddhists displayed great complicity with the public authority. If Buddhism does not cause violence, it may not always act fairly to fervently prevent the spread of violence, particularly that which is practiced in its favor.” (Nayak: 2000, 181-182)

The Theravada, Mahayana and Zen branches of Buddhism contain various records of violence. While Theravada Buddhism remained strong in condemning killing, Mahayana found ways of justifying killing, and Zen even promoted a soldier aristocracy. On the positive side, the Buddhist doctrine of dharma is redemptive in nature, and it consists of the For Noble Truths (Cattāri Ariyasaccāni), which state that (1) life is suffering; (2) origin of suffering is attachment; (3) suffering is destroyed by the elimination of desire; and 4) life must be guided by practicing the eightfold path (right understanding, thought, speech, action, vocation, effort, mindfulness, and concentration.) These doctrines are elaborated upon by various schools of the Buddha philosophy (the Mādhymika School of Śūnya-vāda, the Yogācāra School of Subjective Idealism, the Sautrātika School of Representationism and the Vaibhāṣika School), as well as by the religious schools of Buddhism (Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.) (Chatterjee, Datta: 1984, 130-160) On the negative side, Zen Buddhism has developed doctrines of Bushido ideal, where violence defines the code of honor, as well as in promoting teachings for an alleged soldier aristocracy. (Ferguson: 1978, 54)

Concerning the implementation of doctrines in collective behavior, on the positive side, the Buddhist ethics strives to implement detachment from desired property, which helps eliminating
competition over an object of desire. The Buddhist monk, in particular, is expected to follow three fundamental rules: poverty, nonviolence (including killing of animals for nourishment), and celibacy. Concerning poverty, a Buddhist monk can only possess nine ritual objects, three articles of clothing, needles, filter, fan, sash, and a begging-bowl. He may neither beg, nor give thanks for the gifts he receives, and eats only one meal a day, in the morning. Furthermore, the principle of personal morality, when applied to the community level, it makes a positive impact over a society by creating a culture of non-violence. (Ferguson: 1978, 46-49) Concerning collective violence, the Brahmajala-sutta of Theravada Buddhism demands that the children of Buddha should have no part in any war, should not deal with lethal weapons, should avoid rebellions and uprisings, should not participate in embassies, and should not watch a battle, while killing (directly or indirectly) is a reason for excommunication. (Ferguson 1978: 50) On the negative side, detachment and selfishness can often have negative effects because this eliminates empathy toward any adversary, particularly when the adversary is demonized, or simply denied of his existence on the account of everything being an illusory mental construct. In a more concrete sense, Buddhist pacifism has either been instrumentalized by various political authorities for the purpose of achieving military goals, or it simply joined violence as numerous Buddhist monks have participated in war, have demonized their adversaries, have joined uprisings, and even advocated killing for spiritual benefit. (Ferguson: 1978, 52) Thus, in Sri Lanka, king Duttha-Gamani marched to war with a relic of Buddha as his banner, while Sri Lankan Buddhist monks joined the army, context in which they demonized and denied the humanity of their enemies. In Tibet, a Buddhist monk assassinated king Glan Durma, while in Korea thousands of Buddhist monks enrolled into the army, and fought against Jürtcher (12th century), against the Mongols (14th century), against the Japanese (16th century), and against the Manchus (17th century). During the Maoist revolution in China, radical Buddhists readapted Buddha’s teaching as to permit the killing of those who opposed the Communist revolution, claiming that Buddha has taken the side of the oppressed against the oppressor. During the Korean war, some Chinese Buddhists raised money to pay for a fighter jet, which they named “The Chinese Buddhist,” arguing that “[t]o wipe out the American
imperialist demons, who are breaking world peace is, according to Buddhist doctrine, not only blameless but actually gives rise to merit.” (Ferguson: 1978, 57; Yu: 2010, 149)

As worship involves spiritual transformation towards enlightenment, through a meditation technique that is geared towards the goal of becoming a bodhisattva, the Buddhist worship exclusively geared towards peace and non-violence. A bodhisattva is a Mahayana model of ‘saint’ which deeply embodies the quality of nonviolence. (Nayak: 2000, 176) Toward this goal, a ceremonial reading practiced twice a month states that “anger must be overcome by the absence of anger; evil must be overcome by good; greed must be overcome by liberality; lies must be overcome by truth.” (Ferguson: 1978, 46) However, there are cases in which ritual killing was argued to be a straight path towards attaining the bodhisattva status. For instance, in A.D.515 China, a ruler Fa-ch’ing led an army of 50,000 rebels and announced that any of his troops who killed an enemy would become a bodhisattva on the spot. (Ferguson: 1978: 52) John Ferguson identifies five situations in Mahayana Buddhism, in which killing is justified as an act of worship. First, the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana-sutra claims that in one of his previous lives, Buddha himself had killed a Brahmin to protect the doctrine. Second, various narratives commend the monk who killed one bandit in order to save five hundred merchants. (In one variant, the killer-monk sacrifices his salvation in order to save the lives of the caravan that was to be ambushed, while in another variant it is the Buddha himself who kills a bandit in order to save five hundred merchants, and everyone is spiritually saved.) Third, if everything is an illusion, then killing does not exist: because there is no soul, no self, thus nothing to kill. Fourth, a Buddhist philosopher, Asanga, recommends that it is better to kill another than to allow him to kill. Fifth, because everything is predestined, killing must be part of one’s destiny. (Ferguson: 1978, 55-56)

Sacred scriptures of Buddhism are as vast as complex. These are sources for philosophical speculation, as well as guides for social life, and spiritual fulfillment. Therefore, they offer various texts that can often play a crucial role in shaping the attitudes toward particular violent conflicts. On the positive side, concerning punishment, Dhammapada teaches that “all men tremble at punishment, all men fear death; remember that you are like unto them, and do not kill, nor cause
slaughter. All men tremble at punishment, all men love life; remember that thou art like unto them, and do not kill, nor cause slaughter. He who seeking his own happiness punishes or kills beings who also long for happiness, will not find happiness after death. (*Dhammapada* 10, 129-131) Conversely, a violent Buddhist sacred text of the 13th century, *Pujavaliya*, declares about Sri Lanka that “The island belongs to the Buddha himself... Therefore, the residence of wrong-believers in the Island will never be permanent, just as the residence of the Yakkhas of old was not permanent. Even if a non-Buddhist ruled Ceylon for a while, it is a particular power of the Buddha that his line will not be established. Therefore, as Lanka is suitable only for Buddhist kings, it is certain that their line, too, will be established.” (Kleinfeld: 2005, 288-9)

4D4c5 Judaism

Judaism is the sixth largest organized religion representing 0.2 % of the global share of religious membership, with an estimated 15 million adherents. In Judaism, the attitudes toward peace and violence are grounded in several interpretative traditions, such as Hebrew Bible, Rabbinic Judaism, Medieval Jewish Philosophy, Kabbalah and Modern Zionism, as recently explored by Robert Eisen, from an ambivalent perspective. In fact, Robert Eisen claims that both readings of the sacred texts—whether in inflicting pain against non-Jew, or in promoting peace—represent authentic religions interpretations in Judaism. (Eisen: 2011, 1-14)

Doctrines of peace and violence are based on the attitudes towards the non-Jews. The attitudes of peace are based on the acceptance of the foreigner, universality and human equality. (Eisen: 2011, 34-60, 69-97, 114-121, 133-137, 177-201; Gopin: 2000, 6-9) Conversely, religious justification of violence is anchored in doctrines of Jewish intellectual superiority such as in medieval Jewish philosophy (Eisen: 2011, 121-126), or spiritual superiority, whereby the soul of the Jew is superior to the soul of the non-Jew, as in the practice of Kabbalah (Eisen: 2011, 131-133), or simply in the territorial disputes of modern Zionism. (Eisen: 2011, 145-177) All peace
doctrines emerge from the concept of security as elaborated upon by the general concept of shālōm, which means security, peace, contentment, good health, prosperity, friendship and tranquility of heart and mind. (Bowker: 1997, 884) When the attitudes are negative, various doctrines dictate the manner in which ethnic and religious minorities are to be treated. Thus, based on the doctrine of divine imitation, ‘God’s fury’ is imitated and redirected in attitudes toward enemies, whereby the doctrine of election claims that the Jews are the chosen race, while the gentiles are to be doomed. Furthermore, messianism contends that at the fulfillment of time, a Jewish political leader (the Massiah) will reestablish David’s kingdom. Internally, the doctrine of violence is based on the concept of divine punishment “because of our sins” (mipney hata’einu), rather than as a result of an external aggression or potential danger. This concept is often elaborated upon in the context of Jewish worship. (Eisen: 2011, 82)

The ethics of peace is strongly developed along the history of Judaism. For instance, the orthodox Jewish scholar, David Luzzatto, developed strong ethics on the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. Here, wherever the distinction between re’a (love toward neighbor) appears, the distinction between nokhri (foreigner) and ahikha (your brother) focuses on generating positive attitudes toward the entire human community—even though the ahikha receives priority over the nokhri when it comes to practical aspects such as giving interest free loans. Another strong precept that promotes peace—which originates in the early Rabbinic Judaism—is the concept of Tikkun Olam (repairing the world), where the mitzvot ritual gives impetus toward a practical implementation of good deeds visible in pro-social attitudes toward non-Jews. The ethic of violence appears internally, within the hallakic tradition of the Jewish community in relation to cases of rodef or moyser, whenever a Jew betrays or endangers the life of another Jew (Appleby: 1999, 84), or between the Jews and non-Jews within contexts when the implementation of the herem war laws (total annihilation of the enemy) were circumscribed in Rabbinic Judaism. (Gopin: 2000, 94) Nevertheless, as Rabbi Marc Gopin explains, “[t]he rhetoric of war, even in deeply religious societies, almost never simply states a legal or moral obligation to kill on a massive
scale. Generally, the enemy needs to be portrayed as utterly corrupt, and infidel, or not human altogether.” (Gopin: 2000, 84)

Judaism projects worship as peace-generating as well as violence-generating. Peace generating worship highlights the Talmudic benedictions (Berakhot) which are addressed not only for the spiritual benefit of the Jewish community, but also toward the entire world and nature. In ancient Israel, the nazirite (holy unto the Lord) ritual (which was preceded by purification preparations such as abstinence from drinking alcohol, from cutting the hair, avoidance of corpses and graveyards), was a sacrificial peace-offering ritual that involved three types: olah (lamb as a burnt offering), hatat (sheep as sin-offering) and a shelamim (ram as peace offering.) Even though the nazirite ritual was fully adopted by other religious groups that claim to evolve from Judaism (such as the Rastafarians), some of its components represent occasional practices among the contemporary Orthodox Jews. Biblical Judaism often combined the act of worship with war, whereby the power of prayer had an allegedly direct impact over the overall success of the military enterprise. One classical sample of such ritual behavior—which is often invoked in the Christian spiritual war, as well as in the Muslim military confrontation—is the episode from Exodus where the success of Israel depended on Moses keeping his hands raised. “As long as Moses held up his hands, the Israelites were winning, but whenever he lowered his hands, the Amalekites were winning. When Moses’ hands grew tired, they took a stone and put it under him and he sat on it. Aaron and Hur held his hands up—one on one side, one on the other—so that his hands remained steady till sunset. So Joshua overcame the Amalekite army with the sword.” (Exodus 17:11-13) Contemporary Jewish worship involves morning prayers (shacharit), afternoon prayers (mincha), evening prayers (ma’ariv, or arvit), Friday night services, and Saturday morning services. The evening prayers include a particular peace invocation such as: “Lay us down to sleep, Adonai, our God, in peace, raise us erect, our King, to life, and spread over us the shelter of Your peace.” (Martin: 2005, 35) On the other hand, violence-generating worship derives from the biblical ritual killing of enemies (including their livestock), as an act of worship, often performed on the basis of the mythical battle. (Eisen: 2011, 25)
Sacred texts promote ambivalent attitudes toward non-Jews as well. On the positive side, a devotional text such as, “Depart from evil, and do good; seek peace, and pursue it” (Psalm 34: 15) is welcoming of the stranger whom the Jew is commended for promoting peaceful relations with, while on the negative side, other devotional texts promote violence and vengeance against real or imagined enemies. In this regard, a devotional sacred text states the following: “Daughter Babylon, doomed to destruction, happy is the one who repays you according to what you have done to us. Happy is the one who seizes your infants and dashes them against the rocks.” (Psalm 137: 8-9)
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<tr>
<td>* a combination of ahimsa, satya, and tapasya–as in Gandhi’s model</td>
<td>* Kraurya or Himsa</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BUDDHISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 6.8%</td>
<td>* 469 million</td>
<td>* Dharma (The Four Noble Truths)</td>
<td>* Dharma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Buchido Ideal</td>
<td>* Brahmajala-sutta</td>
<td>* Mahaparinirvana-sutra</td>
<td>* It is not right that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Zen: Soldier Anoscacy</td>
<td>* Three Fundamental Rules of the Monk</td>
<td>* Justification of killing</td>
<td>we slay our kinsmen.” (Bhagavadgita 1:26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Personal Morality principle</td>
<td>* lack of empathy</td>
<td>* Spiritual Reward for Killing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* detachment from desire</td>
<td>* Demonization of Enemies</td>
<td>* Becoming a Bodhisattva through a complete renunciation to violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUDAISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 0.2%</td>
<td>* 15 million</td>
<td>* Shalom</td>
<td>* Becoming a Bodhisattva by killing enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* ger (stranger)</td>
<td>* mipney hata’einu (because of our sins)</td>
<td>* Tikkun Olam</td>
<td>* Mahayana’s Five Justifications of Killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* divine imitation</td>
<td>* ahikha (interest free loans)</td>
<td>* nokhri</td>
<td>* “The island belongs to the Buddha himself... Therefore, the residence of wrong-believers in the Island will never be permanent [...] Therefore, as Lanka is suitable only for Buddhist kings, it is certain that their line, too, will be established.” (Pujavaliya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* election</td>
<td>* rodef</td>
<td>* meyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* messianism</td>
<td>* nazirism</td>
<td>* berakhot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Chart 4.8</td>
<td>Mapping Organized Religion on Peace and Violence**</td>
<td>* keriot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5
Conclusion:

As the distinction between faith and religion was previously clarified from a rational choice perspective, this chapter will highlight this taxonomy from a pragmatic perspective, a perspective geared toward policy analysis and policymaking. Fr Raymond Helmick, SJ explains the distinction between faith and religion in the following way:

We place faith in God, trusting that he provides for our good and is our reason to face the world unafraid to act confidently in his sight and commit ourselves in his name to the good and service of others. Those others are so much involved in our life of faith that we do not do this alone, as solipsists, but in community – communion – with each other. Religion is an institutional service to our community of faith. Without some kind of structure, as much or as little as we need, we have no true association as a community in our faith, but once we have that institution, we have to guard carefully that it not be used for purposes that have nothing to do with that agenda of faith, for instance, for the power or privilege interests of its own leaders, or as a buttress for our identity.
(Helmick: 2012)

The recognition of faith, as a devotional instinct for solidarity, yields confidence in viewing religion and religious institutions as assets in policymaking. Although the fine line between faith and religion is often obscure, the process of structure building from faith to religion is both unavoidable and necessary. As stated on pages 19 and 115, faith becomes organized into religion in a very
pragmatic way by ordering one’s daily existence, by formulating various codes of behavior, by marking the stages of human life—birth, marriage, death—through various sacramental codes and rituals, and by formulating ideological frameworks for meaning in defining the world and life. The key is finding the subtle way in which the original instinct of faith remains uncorrupted within the structure, particularly during times of pressure for cooptation by external forces. Often, this is a challenging endeavor within the contemporary peacemaking circles, where religion is usually discredited as a fundamentally troublemaking element; while religious actors are completely excluded from dialogue. As political institutions that follow their interests for power growth and power maintenance, organized religions are never politically neutral, and when a conflict arises, their behavior can become discriminatory.

At the same time—due to the political power of religion—political competitions often adopt the cloak of religion for purpose of legitimacy. In time, such “sacralized” political splits turn into offshoots of a commonly shared religion, or become organized religions in themselves.

For example, in Islām, the origin of Sunni-Shī’a split originates in a political competition over who should lead the faithful as a khalīfa, following the death of Prophet Muhammad in AD 632. One side, “the Sunnis,” considered that any worthy man could lead the faithful, regardless of lineage, and favored Abū Bakr. [Abū Bakr (AD 573-13/634) was an honest early convert to Islām who made the al-hijra (migration) together with Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in AD 622, then married into Muhammad’s family. (Netton: 1997, 16)] The other side, a relative minority, believed that only a direct descendant of the prophet should take up the mantle of khalīfa. This side called themselves the Shī’a ‘Alī (or Ali’s Partisans), after the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Husayn ibn Alī, whom they favored to become the next khalīfa. In order to maintain their power, the elite associated with the Abū Bakr’s camp saw it strategic to assassinate Imām ‘Alī during the Battle of Karbala (AD 680), which gave birth to the Shī’a Islam. (Steele: 2006, 15) This group, the Shi’ites, considered themselves victims to tyranny because they felt cheated of their right to succeed. (Bowker: 1997, 889)
This competition for succession had also generated doctrinal splits with heavy political implications. For instance, in the Shī’ite political theory, the role of Imām is much more powerful than the role of khalīfa from the Sunnī. (Netton: 1997, 231) As a result a comprehensive understanding of the Shī’ite role in collective violence should unavoidably gravitate toward personality studies.

Furthermore, as David Steele explains,

After the death of Husayn, his followers were excluded from major leadership within the Muslim community. As a persecuted minority, they developed a very hierarchical structure which gave their leadership an unchallenged level of authority. The Imām – regarded not only as the spiritual and political leader of the community, but as a direct descendent of Mohammed – was seen as sinless. This lineage became extinct, however, in 873, when the 12th and last Shī’ite Imām, Mohammed al-Mahdi, disappeared within days of inheriting the title at the age of four. The Shī’ites refuse to believe that he died; instead believing he will come “out of hiding” and return at the end of time. (Steele: 2006, 15)

As it is obvious, the strong denial associated with the failure of the Shī’ites to protect this ninth century Imām, Mohammed al-Mahdi, had cultic implications by becoming sacralized into political messianic occultation. This occultation, or Ghayba, is a belief that the Twelfth Shī’ite Imām, Muhammad al-Qū’im did not die, but went into a hiding place. The Twelver Shī’ite identify a lesser and a greater period of ghayba for this figure: the first which lasted for about 67 years, the second, which according to the Islamic calendar, lasted from 329/941 and it will only end with the reappearance of this Imām. (Netton: 197, 86) Therefore, it is from this hiding place that Imām Alī will return to redeem Islam before the Day of Judgment, when he will rid the world of wrongdoing, injustice and tyranny. This phenomenon is often observed in contemporary political movements such as Hezbollah.
As the product of a violent political split, the Shī’ite Muslims have generally been the victims in the struggle to lead the faithful and to divide patronage and power. That has left them with a sharp feeling of dispossession by corrupt rulers. The culture of victimhood and violence left is marks over the sacramental life as well. The major Shī’ite holidays celebrate the martyrdoms of Imām Alī and Imām Husayn, Ali’s son, as typified by the preeminent Shī’ite holiday of Ashūrā, which marks the slaughter of Husayn and 72 of his followers by a Sunni khalīfa outside the Iraqi city of Karbala in AD 680. The day of Ashūrā is celebrated in Iraq and Iran by the Shī’ite (sometimes by the Sunnis) through elaborate processions of men reenacting their own passion play, many of whom self-flagellate with chains to the beat of drums. (Netton: 1997, 42; Steele: 2006, 15)

Modeling an Interdisciplinary Approach to Public Policy
Design, Analysis and Implementation

Building an integrative approach to collective violence–based on a successful capitalization on the findings of political theory and religious scholarship–requires a mutual disposition both for political scientists and religious scholars to begin learning from each other the intricacies of collective violence. Each field is remarkably wealthy in terms of resources and potential for peacemaking, and by capitalizing on mutual skills and resources, collective violence could be far better contained. As both religion and politics are here to stay, any loyalty to dogmatic secularism can often become counterproductive even in complex, multi-cultural and multi-religious societies such as in the United States, where secularism has been and still is a necessity in the public life.

One must also be aware that this task requires mutual moral responsibility not only in advancing peacemaking, but also in preventing the misuse of such research.
In order to advance an integrative theoretical approach to collective violence—particularly when religious beliefs emerge as key ingredients to political conflicts—one must refer to the basic components of religious studies (systematic religion and religious phenomenology), as well as to basic theories in comparative politics, in order to elucidate the extent to which a conflict can either be advanced, or controlled by institutions, or by political entrepreneurs who gain temporary control over public policy and political ritual. Therefore, a coalition between political and religious institutions and leaders is desirable in order to selectively coalesce structural and cultural resources that can positively influence the conflicting parties, and successfully contribute to the decrease of belligerence.

While the field of political science is relatively advanced on policymaking and conflict resolution methodology, the question of religion has yet to be addressed more deeply by the political scientists.

First, it is mandatory that a terminological parity be established between the two fields, so that concepts, which refer to actions that convey similar vectors of impact upon collective violence, would be properly matched and analyzed in close relationship.

Second, additional strategic venues could be developed by understanding, then tapping into the interests and the structure of religious institutions, thus securing their cooperation. Here, the rational functionalist approach to religious institutions may offer strong insight into the structure of authority, policymaking process, protocol interactions with secular structures, identity relations between religion and nation, trans-national structures of authority, jurisdiction, identity relations between genders, inter-religious dialogue, internal protocol and cultural communication, as well
as models of interaction with various political systems, ranging from democratic, to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

5A1a Social Science Tools

By using the tools of social science, both policymakers and religious leaders will enjoy mutual benefits in the sense that they will comprehend, analyze and evaluate the depths and dynamics of violence. They will also enable themselves to test their effectiveness, either at the educational level—particularly in the case of religious leaders—or in terms of public policy, by surveying the public or their constituencies on knowledge, meaning and attitudes.

The scientific method employed by social scientists is experimental in nature and based on empirical verification, falsifiability, normative and non-normative knowledge. (Concerning “falsifiability”, social science willfully distorts for the purpose of ascertaining patterns, meaning, and objective truth.) It is also cumulative and explanatory, in the sense that it attempts to answer in a comprehensive manner any logically derived sets of propositions, such as “why” and “how”. The scientific method is also based on parsimony (or simplicity), while offering probabilistic explanations—though these could become more complex. Built on deductive and inductive reasoning, the building blocks of scientific research include hypotheses, concepts, variables, and statistical measurement. It is also based on research design, which consists in a plan of action necessary to execute a research project that specifies a theory to be tested. (Bynner, Stribley: 2010) The scientific approach has wide credibility in the sense that it is factual in nature and subject to empirical investigation and verification. Hypotheses are testable statements of causal relationships between two specific statements that change value across the cases (variables).

Conducting a literature review in religious studies implies document analysis of doctrines, ethical norms and themes of worship, as well as analysis of episodic records provided by the histories of specific times of crisis. This method will enable religious scholars to comprehend not only the dynamics of collective violence, but also the implementation level and the effectiveness of the official dogma in the popular consciousness, as measured by member’s behavior. Furthermore,
measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion from descriptive and inferential statistics can help a religious scholar reach conclusions which will strongly test the way in which theological concepts are absorbed by the believers. (Johnson, Reynold: 2005; Shoemaker, Tankard, Lasorsa: 2003)

Yet, a meta-analytical approach–that combines controlled variables, with real life observations of how the meaning of life is projected into the lifestyle–will enable a higher level of predictability of violent reactions under specific conditions that are prone to violence, while also controlling cases of paradoxical behavior, which may or may not impact the direction of conflict.

5A1b Process Orientation

The integrative approach needs to be process oriented in nature, and anchored also into the tools of qualitative and quantitative research analysis. Key resources could be collected and used as peacemaking tools by focusing on: inputs, pastoral process and outputs within religion itself. (Wiarda: 2000; Simion: 2009, 83)

5B An Instrumental applicability of EP theories to Political Science and Religious Studies

The three categories of Alienation-Deprivation, Frustration-Aggression, and Violence as a Learned Behavior are adopted as a theoretical paradigm in the theory-building process, as well as for the purpose of advancing more effective integrationist crossovers between the fields of religious studies and political science. (See Chart 5.1; Chart 5.2; Chart 2.3)

Nevertheless, in light of this minimalist proposal for integrationism made by this present study, it is mandatory to avoid mimetic isomorphism because of the unambiguous conceptual divergences between the religious and the political thinking. Otherwise, the proposal itself will
## COMPARATIVE POLITICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EP theories on Collective Violence</th>
<th>FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION (rationalism)</th>
<th>LEARNED BEHAVIOR (culturalism)</th>
<th>ALIENATION-DEPRIVATION (structuralism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Theory</strong> (institution)</td>
<td><strong>Drawback</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advantage</strong></td>
<td><strong>Drawback</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap between desire for change &amp; accomplished changes.</td>
<td>Resource Mobilization Theory</td>
<td>Historically, system disequilibrium led to violence</td>
<td>Conjunctures can be used in disabling components of mechanisms that would otherwise lead to uprisings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic-Rational Confluences in Policymaking</strong></td>
<td>dysfunctional policymaking process in institutions</td>
<td>“Groupthink Strategy” (occasional removal of the authority person from the group)</td>
<td>Ignoring the interests of the ideologues and the long term effect of ideologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maximizing a leader’s popularity/notoriety through aggressive politics (e.g., “better feared than loved”)</td>
<td>developing Gandhian leadership ethics</td>
<td>“path dependency” by following and maintaining “vicious cycles”</td>
<td>generating new “virtuous cycles”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deflecting public scrutiny from personal to collective vulnerabilities</td>
<td>Mennonite &amp; Quaker models</td>
<td>Active Pacifism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Theory</strong> (community)</td>
<td>contentious meanings that supersedes accuracy</td>
<td>desire for certainty greater than accuracy</td>
<td>“Chosen Trauma” – exaggerated reactivations of group’s perception of a traumatic past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>protection from ambiguity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chart 5.1 | EP Theories on Collective Violence in Comparative Politics*
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EP theories on Collective Violence</th>
<th>FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION (rationalism)</th>
<th>LEARNED BEHAVIOR (culturalism)</th>
<th>ALIENATION-DEPRIVATION (structuralism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REALISM</strong> (dominance)</td>
<td>Power Politics</td>
<td>Cooperation through threats</td>
<td>Culture of Militarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>Prisoner’s Dilemma</td>
<td>Just War theory</td>
<td>Humanitarian Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIBERALISM</strong> (reciprocity)</td>
<td>“The Military Industrial Complex”</td>
<td>executive diplomacy</td>
<td>Diversionary Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda and negative campaigning</td>
<td>increased legislative process</td>
<td>influencing public opinion by linking militarism with patriotism</td>
<td>R2P building international institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIAL THEORY</strong> (identity)</td>
<td>pacifism often leaves numerous issues unresolved (e.g. victim compensation, etc.), thus reinforcing frustration</td>
<td>advocates the Positive Peace</td>
<td>Negative Peace &amp; Structural Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>criticizes patriotic rituals in schools that reinforces nationalist militarism</td>
<td>fathers being absent from child rearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>advocates active non-violence by expressing non-trust towards the state leaders</td>
<td>highlights humanity’s exemplary acts of courage, honor, love, sacrifice, and altruism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 5.2 | EP Theories on Collective Violence in International Relations

lose its effectiveness and credibility. Furthermore, in light of the sworn disagreements between evolutionism and creationism (to the extent that creationism is shared across religious lines), the evolutionary psychology categories are used with an exclusively instrumental purpose (rather than ideological), as both religious studies and political science have the common moral goal of
advancing non-violence. [To the interests of the social scientists, a remarkable set of cases was published by Mari Fitzduff and Chris E. Stout in 2005, under the title, *The Psychology of Resolving Global Conflicts: From War to Peace (Contemporary Psychology)* in three volumes.]

5B1 Alienation-Deprivation theory

*(Gravitates toward Structure)*

Regarded as a “condition of self-estrangement or psychological separation (as opposed to mutual identification or solidarity) with one’s immediate environment,” (Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 295), the Alienation-Deprivation theory has been mainly regarded as a Marxist doctrine, and
thus associated primarily with the domain of economics. Yet, as the condition of alienation and deprivation pervades the domain of economics, this becomes strongly associated with imaginary and symbolic circumstances.

Sigmund Freud’s most distinguished pupil, Erich Fromm, in his work *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, not only rejected his mentor’s “death instinct” concept that Freud advocated as a deterministic component of human being (Freud: 1950; Freud, 1952, 755)–by distinguishing between “malignant aggression” and “defensive aggression”–but insisted that “malignant aggression” (sadism, masochism) is generated by social condition of individual, or group alienation. Such alienated individuals, as Seyom Brown wrote later, are

intentionally driven to avenge their terrible loneliness and feelings of impotence through “godlike” acts of destruction. The alienated are also ready candidates for recruitment into violent communal and nationalist organizations, where individuals can compensate for their lack of human connectedness by ‘losing themselves’ in a group bound together by its hatred of the outsiders. (Brown: 1987, 12)

Emerging from the hypothesis of alienation, as a representative state of mind of the individual (which is also projected onto the group), the theory of Relative Deprivation represents

the feeling or perception of a gap or discrepancy between what one considers one’s rights, dues, or expectations, and what one has actually attained. The filing of deprivation is theorized to produce frustration and anger, and is therefore linked to the onset of rebellion. (Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 304)

This theory of Relative Deprivation serves also as a crossover between Alienation-Deprivation and Frustration-Aggression theories.
The field of religious studies provides a remarkable wealth of situations where the Alienation-Deprivation theory could sharpen the understanding of the ambivalent role of religion in collective violence. Historical records of organized religions indicate that religious leaders and institutions tapped into the alienation-deprivation dynamic both when inciting to violence, as well as in peacemaking.

In peacemaking, in order to restore the anticipated damages created by alienation and deprivation, organized religions usually emphasized the value of sharing ‘earthly’ resources as central to spiritual salvation. As a result, religious institutions developed integrative rituals that welcomed the alienated, and performed symbolic acts that emphasized the value of forgiveness and reconciliation. (Petersen: 2010, 149-170) In Christianity, for instance, the Eucharist, although restricted to its membership, has generally been regarded as a universal privilege granted to the entire humanity, and as an open invitation to reintegrate the alienated and the deprived–particularly across racial and cultural divides between groups or individuals. (Porter: 2006)

Conversely, organized religions have often deprived and alienated their own members, as well as members of other religious faiths. Deprivation implied the removal of access to the common pool of resources, as well as the strapping of freedom, honor, prestige, and social status. Furthermore, organized religions have also alienated their own members, particularly those whom they regarded as dangerous heretics or dissenters. (Kurtz: 1995, 213-214) This was usually carried out either directly—in cases when organized religions made public policy decisions—or indirectly via the power of the state, in cases of majority status and/or influence within the political system. In situations of conflicts, where appeasement was regarded as the only strategy for survival, or under conditions of political and economical oppression, religious actors often deprived their own members of self-worth via meta-narratives that underscored alienation and deprivation as theodicies. (Roberts: 1984, 290-300)

For instance, what Rabbi Marc Gopin coined as “discrimination within a family myth” (in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict), is a meta-narrative that often seems to have influenced
ideologically-driven policies of the state of Israel toward its Arab population. (Gopin: 2000, 8-9) The Hebrew Bible recounts a story whereby Abraham’s first born son, Ishmael (mythical forefather of the Arabs), was mocking Abraham’s second born son Isaac (mythical forefather of the Jews), thus leading to an instigation from Abraham’s wife Sarah (Isaac’s mother) to get rid of their maidservant (Ishmael’s mother) so that Ishmael would not share Abraham’s inheritance with Isaac. (Genesis 21: 1-20)

Furthermore, the Curse of Ham meta-narrative from the Hebrew Bible was adopted not only by the Dutch Reformed theologians to justify the Apartheid in South Africa (Mosala: 1994; Daly: 2004, 33-39), but also by the slavery proponents in the 19th century United States, in response to the abolitionist movement. (Johnson: 2004, 37) According to the sacred text,

Noah, a man of the soil, proceeded to plant a vineyard. When he drank some of its wine, he became drunk and lay uncovered inside his tent. Ham, the father of Canaan, saw his father’s nakedness and told his two brothers outside. But Shem and Japheth took a garment and laid it across their shoulders; then they walked in backward and covered their father’s nakedness. Their faces were turned the other way so that they would not see their father’s nakedness. When Noah awoke from his wine and found out what his youngest son had done to him, he said, ‘Cursed be Canaan! The lowest of slaves will he be to his brothers.’ (Genesis 9:20-27)

Based on this sacred text, the 19th century white American racists, as well as the 20th century South African Dutch Reformed theologians identified the black race as descendents from Ham. As a result, the white discrimination against the blacks was conducted under an alleged sacred mandate.

Regarded as spontaneous manifestation of faith phenomena, religious phenomenology relates to the Alienation-Deprivation theory both in conflict escalation as well as in peacemaking. Various religious mythologies tended to overemphasize that the loneliness suffered by sacred figures—such as in the hadith on the martyrdom of Hussain ibn Ali in the Shiite Islam—is caused by a restless exterior agent, usually viewed as an irreconcilable enemy. In Shiite Islam, the sense
of alienation felt by those loyal to Prince Hussain ibn Ali, as well as the loyalists’ sense of guilt in failing to protect him, had invariably led to the construction of rituals of self-punishment and sacred violence (such as the rituals of self-flagellation performed in the Day of Ashura), or to myths of sacred loneliness (such as the Ghaiba, or the invisible place where the Hidden Imam, or al-Mahdi, resides) and from where he will return with vengeance. On the other hand, alienation was often regarded in positive terms, not as loneliness but as solitude for spiritual benefit. The solitude experienced by Prophet Elijah, or by John the Baptist is often valued as a source for peace, recollection, reconciliation, and restoration of social order.

5B1b Political Science

In comparative politics the Alienation-Deprivation theory was approached by structuralists, rationalists and culturalists, both as an advantage as well as a drawback to peacemaking.

To the structuralists, the Alienation-Deprivation theory highlights vulnerabilities and strengths of groups, by pointing out system configurations that raise the likelihood of collective violence. On the positive side, the findings of Alienation-Deprivation theory can serve as an early warning signal for policymakers to anticipate violent protests during times of economic decline. Yet, in order to prevent violence caused by an anticipated economic decline, policymakers can create safety nets with surpluses accumulated during periods of economic growth. On the negative side, this theory raises problems with capital accumulation, obviously for the adepts of the free market and Laissez Faire capitalism, as the economic policies derived from the principles of Laissez Faire capitalism are inherently designed to polarize wealth. Additionally, the J-Curve of economic growth demonstrates that a period of fast growing and prosperity is followed up by a sharp economic downturn, which is predictable of violence. (Bremmer: 2006)

In Rational Choice theory, the Alienation-Deprivation theory emphasizes the destructiveness of the “Zero-Sum” game, which divides a group between winners and losers. In the absence of regulated interactions designed to disperse wealth and ensure a fair-play game, an exclusively strategic model of interaction that acts outside the rules, often polarizes wealth and access to
resources. This is particularly the case with situations where the two players come from contexts that are highly disproportionate in terms of size and availability of force, case in which the availability of threat is unidirectional. On the other hand, Alienation-Deprivation theory can find an asset in the Rational Choice theory to the extent that strategic interaction is deliberately interlocked with regulated interaction, case in which the common pool of resources survives, while social protection mechanisms and safety nets are set in place. (North: 1982)

As far as culturalism is concerned, the Alienation-Deprivation theory displays a strong potential in conflict escalation and peacemaking. Cultural theories have demonstrated that it is common for cohesive groups to allow porous boundaries and actions within and between each other, even under conditions of uncertainty, due to the power of scapegoating. If properly handled, the scapegoat mechanism virtualizes the source of discontent so as “the enemy” would not be associated with the rival group, but with something intangible. Conversely, by disallowing porous boundaries to develop and also by decreasing cooperation between groups that are situated at different levels of economic advantage, not only the deprived group will resent the privileged group, but the communication between the groups will decrease, thus leading to fear of unknown and insecurity.

*International Relations*

The *International Relations* theory generally considers Alienation-Deprivation theory as related to the arena of international political economy, while still a question for international security.

The realists and their critics focused their analysis on the advantages and the drawbacks of the global economic system implemented by the first world countries in the aftermath of World War II. On the positive side, and to the advantage of first world countries, the economic system implemented after WWII led to a dramatic economic progress in the Global North, while creating various forms of dependency in the Global South. According to the Dependency Theory and the World System Approach, countries situated at the center got rich at the expense of countries...
situated at the periphery, thus leading to economic disparities. Thus, the peripheral countries became economically alienated and deprived of a prosperous future, thus leading to national resentments against rich countries. (Wiarda: 2000, 80-84) Nevertheless, considering the potential for conflict indicated by the Alienation-Deprivation theory, realist theorists incrementally agreed that new policies must be set in order to promote a grassroots development that is entrepreneurial in nature and based on the principle of **reward or carrot** (for hard work), and **punishment or stick** (for laziness.)

Liberal theorists advocated the principle of reciprocity and saw a common interest/benefit in bridging the gap between the Global North and the Global South. The liberals also advocate strong investments in education, particularly in technical expertise in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, liberals face their own drawbacks, as they are known for giving into pressures coming from various constituencies and lobbies active in democratic settings. A case in point is made by the fact that farm subsidies in the Global North put the farmers from the Global South at disadvantage on the international markets, thus leading to internal poverty and conflicts in the Global South. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 429-431; Tschuy: 1997, 28-40)

Social theorists, however, are the strongest advocates of fairness, striving to eliminate economic alienation and deprivation in the international system, by proposing more equalitarian fiscal and trade policies. On the positive side, social theorists promote an ideology that applauds and further encourages sacrifice and selflessness on the part of rich countries in order to advance a good cause. Yet, on the negative side, they tend to demonize countries which contrary to their GDP outputs, give far less in economic aid. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 6-7)
5B2 Frustration-Aggression theory in religious experimentation

*(Gravitates toward Rational Choice)*

Frustration-Aggression theory was initially advanced by John Dollard and Leonard Doob prior to World War II, who argued that the interference with, or simply the blocking of goal-directed activity generates anger and frustration, which emerges into violent behavior meant to hurt, or destroy the object or person that prevents the attaining of the goal. (One must note also the parallel with Girard’s Mimetic Theory.) While not all frustration leads to violent behavior, what this hypothesis states is that in cases of violent and destructive behavior the basic cause is found in an intensely experienced frustration of activity directed toward the satisfaction of a strongly desired objective. This is predominantly visible in cases of violence imposed from above (authoritarianism, totalitarianism, dictatorship, etc.), which generates violence from below (rebellions, terrorism, revolutions, etc.) This theory focuses on environmental factors such as the social and material conditions of the individual. (Brown: 1987, 13, 24-37; Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 70)

5B2a Religious Studies

While organized religions have cumulatively developed a general sense of non-violence, the basic language of aggression against whatever is perceived as adversary, is essentially spiritual in nature and projected against the self (e.g., vice, sin and mortality), and against an invisible spiritual enemy (e.g., Satan.) However, in contexts of violent conflicts, a process of shifting narratives begins to develop, whereby the adversary becomes more personalized and contextualized. The rival is associated with the invisible spiritual enemy (demonization), while the world is split between good and evil (dualism). Furthermore, this process not only contradicts the very essence of the inherent universalism recognized during times of peace, but also creates hermeneutical conflicts over sacred texts. Consequently, dualist interpretations of events can obviously frustrate adversaries, thus increasing the likelihood of the adversaries’ aggression, particularly when the chance for success rests upon an instrumental use of violence. (van Evera: 1999, 35-72)
Within the phenomenological manifestation of religion, Frustration-Aggression theory can serve as a mechanism to identify the causes and the solutions to conflicts, by scrutinizing religious and political rhetoric, and by evaluating the implications of symbolic acts and political rituals performed by religious actors in time of war and peace. Phenomenological manifestations emerge also under the guise of organized religions, where rhetoric and symbolic acts are designed to send messages that often contradict the core beliefs of the institution itself.

On the negative side, the Frustration-Aggression theory reveals ways in which spiritual leaders can often frustrate existing and potential opponents via public symbolic acts. A case can be made by the recent Church-State developments in Russia, where Patriarch Kiril of Moscow expresses strong interest in consolidating the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the new Russian state, particularly in military terms. A December 2, 2010 report released by Milena Faustova of Voice of Russia highlights the Patriarch’s strong interests in military activities, as “in his younger days, he completed 19 training flights on “Mig” planes and also performed advanced acrobatics. He made many parachute jumps.” [cf. http://english.ruvr.ru/_print/36135511.html] More concerning is the Patriarch’s endorsement of weapons of mass destruction. According to various Russian media reports, on August 29, 2009, Patriarch Kiril visited a military base where he conducted a religious service, giving his blessing to the building of a new Russian Borey-class strategic nuclear submarine. To the cultural amusement of his constituencies (and power base), Patriarch Kiril christened the new nuclear submarine as “Svyatitel Nikolay” (Saint Nicholas), apparently in reference to the stick used for corporal punishment in elementary schools during the 19th century in Russia and Eastern Europe. Obviously, this act, symbolic as it may be, not only contradicts the core teaching of Orthodox Christianity on warfare and protection of nature, but was rather unwelcomed by his Orthodox and non-Orthodox neighbors, who were easily reminded of the Soviet era.

On the positive side, the Frustration-Aggression theory reveals ways in which the frustration of the real and potential enemies could fade away through political rituals and symbolic acts designed to display concern for humanity more generally. A case in point can be made in reference
to the remarkable environmental work conducted by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople. Although not necessarily absent, the concern for the environment has never been a dogmatic priority of the Orthodox Church. Yet, in light of various new facts about climate change, the direct effect of the Ecumenical Patriarch’s work is that it provides leadership both to the Orthodox Christians worldwide, as well as to other religious institutions to advance awareness and theological expertise in this new area of global concern. Indirectly, however, the support which the Ecumenical Patriarch receives from around the world for such work can hardly be regarded as threatening to an already hostile political environment in Turkey.

5B2b Political Science

In comparative politics the intricacies of Frustration-Aggression theory had been regarded by structuralists as less significant in generating collective violence, due to the findings of the Resource Mobilization theory, which demonstrated that the lack of resources in achieving mass mobilization diminishes the threat against a government’s stability. (Tilly: 1978; Skocpol: 1979) On the other hand, exclusive reliance upon the Resource Mobilization theory can blindside against various factors that can intervene during periods of transition and unrest, due of the unavoidable gap between desire for change and accomplished changes, which leads to impatience and protest movements. (Huntington: 1967)

Rational Choice theorists also indentified drawbacks and advantages with the dynamics imposed by the Frustration-Aggression theory. The rationality behind active pacifism is that while frustrating the aggressor by non-violent means, it also popularizes the benefits of non-violence, jamming at the same time the retaliatory aggression via international public opinion. History witnesses several remarkable accomplishments of rational decisions made by Gandhi—via his concept of active pacifism publicized during the post-colonial transition in India—which not only displayed the benefits of pacifism, but also maximized Gandhi’s reputation in the collective memory around the world. A similar case can be made in reference to the rationality behind the design
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the post-Apartheid South Africa, whose work avoided a highly anticipated bloodshed. Following the TRC experiment, both victimizers and victims turned into intimate enemies because the model imposed that they faced each other in a controlled environment, where they released their mutual anger and fear in a non-harming way. Nevertheless, the negative aspect of the rational choice approach is that the misuse of the dynamics imposed by frustration-aggression can indeed maximize one’s personal benefit at the expense of creating more violence, simply by inventing an unnecessary scapegoat.

As far as cultural theories are concerned, the advantage of the Frustration-Aggression theory is that by understanding its damaging consequences, frustration could be eliminated through conscious efforts in order to decrease the enemy’s fear and desire for retaliation. Thus, using pacifist strategies and interpretations of events, new group policies could be designed to offer protection from ambiguities. If the cultural interpretation of ambiguities is skewed toward non-aggressiveness—even if this implies a willful misuse the data—the manufactured ‘facts’ that are intended to increase trust will be accepted as credible evidence, because under conditions of uncertainties, “the desire for certainty is often greater than the capacity for accuracy.” (Ross: 1997, 69) On the other hand, a contentious interpretation of facts will invariably increase the out-group’s hostility and aggravate relations between the groups.

**International Relations**

In international security the proponents of realism use an inherently frustrating rhetoric by advocating the use of force—thus generating fear on the side of their existing and potential enemies. (Volkan: 1985, 219-247) Additionally, the bipolar and the hegemonic international systems invariably frustrate the identities and the interests of smaller countries, which, as demonstrated by the Balance of Power theory, will overtly and covertly struggle to balance the great powers as to maintain their internal stability and identity. (van Evera: 1999, 117-192) Yet, on the positive side, Frustration-Aggression theory gives some credence to the realists in achieving peace and stability, as there are cases in which a smaller power gains a peaceful response and collaboration from a
great power, just because of its aggressive tone. (Brams, Togman: 2006, 247-259) Additionally, the Game Theory used by the realists in their strategy, indicates that frustration created by the great powers can achieve successful non-violent responses from the small powers. (Conteh-Morgan: 2004, 101-110)

As frustration generates retaliatory aggression, the proponents of the liberal theory in international relations promote the idea of abandoning the use of sanctions as a method of frustrating rogue regimes (whether military or economic), because this could only generate more a aggressive response from the rogue regime itself, either in the form of internal political rallying behind the regime, or in the regime’s increased suppression of internal opposition. On the positive side, however, liberalism advocates the use of *executive diplomacy* under the scrutiny of an intense legislative process, prior to moving into war situations. Nevertheless, although highly supportive of peaceful international relations, the proponents of liberalism often frustrate international actors indirectly by tapping into the use of negative campaigning and economic propaganda that favors the elite. Additionally, the proponents of the liberal approach to the international relations are often staunch supporters of the Military Industrial complex, whether for strategic or scientific reasons.

Social theorists advocate the complete elimination of any foreign policy method designed to frustrate existing or potential enemies, on the argument that such policies can only generate resentments which could lead to retaliation. To their benefit, the majority of social theorists advocate the Positive Peace theory—which mainly refers to the absence of indirect, structural violence. In other words, according to the Positive Peace theory, real peace can only be achieved via economic development designed to address the underlying causes of resentment, such as poverty, hunger, discrimination, Apartheid, and social injustice. Social theorists also advocate active non-violence and criticize the use of selected patriotic political rituals by nation states, rituals which are essentially designed to reinforce nationalism and militarism. As a drawback, however, despite of a heavy reliance on the Positive Peace theory, numerous social theorists who advocate exclusive pacifism rely also on the Negative Peace theory (or the absence of direct,
organized use of violence such as assault, riot, terrorism, war, etc.), and tend to leave numerous issues of injustice unaddressed, thus reinforcing feelings of alienation and deprivation. (Goldstein, Pevehouse: 2010, 133-134)

5B3 Violence as a Learned Behavior in religious experimentation

(Gravitates toward Culture)

Various scholars from the fields of psychology, sociology, religion, anthropology, political science, etc., have proposed a behaviorist approach to human violence by arguing that humans can be taught by their cultural environment to be more peaceful or more violent. Thus, violence can be taught either via direct physical punishment, or through mental indoctrination emerging from worldviews, religious and secular propaganda and rituals, myths and legends, institutional policies, dualist narratives, gaming industry, etc. As Seyom Brown wrote in the late 1980s,

‘teaching’ can be direct, through behavioral punishments and rewards to train fighting capabilities and to remove inhibitions. [...] It can be indirect–through myths and legends defining heroism and courage as the willingness to risk one’s life in physical combat against the enemies of one’s group, through ideologies and propaganda engendering hatred toward members of enemy groups and dehumanizing them, and through religious and ethical concepts and social mores that justify killing under certain circumstances. (Brown: 1987, 15)

Additional venues for indirect teaching include the gaming industry, film production, media reporting, etc.

Furthermore, the norms of a group, ranging from family to clans, gangs, vigilantism, religious sects, nations, etc., enforce cultures of punishment and reward for social behavior that is explicitly violent or pacifist, and in manners that are overt and covert.
**5B3a Religious Studies**

Organized religions offer remarkable deposits of narratives of violence either via transculturally imposed sacred texts, or within local mythical traditions, which are often tapped into during times of uncertainty. On the positive side, such narratives of sacred violence are often virtualized and transferred unto the spiritual realm as paradigms for a “spiritual warfare” (e.g., Greater Jihad, духовной брани, etc.), precisely to avoid their misuse by minority cultures in their own struggle, which, pending on the context, could have destabilizing effects on the institutionalized religion at the macro-level. It must be emphasized that organized religions have cumulatively developed peace-geared doctrines with ethical teachings that are generally universalistic and inclusive of diversity. They also tend to emphasize human dignity and personal meekness as universal values of humanity. Nevertheless, on the negative side, leaders of organized religions often tend to overstate their self-perceived victimhood, while also glorifying sacrificial death during times of conflict.

Religious phenomenology, on the other hand, demonstrates that under conditions of crisis, religious practices become favorable of violence, while various actors engaged in conflict often perform their divinely-mandated duties under the guise of organized religions. Religious anthropology offers a vast array of resources where the cultural constructs of violence either generate destructive violence, or sustain a regenerative form of violence via myths and legends designed to recreate a group’s self-esteem, or via the scapegoat mechanism. (Girard: 1979, 275-308)

**5B3b Political Science**

In *comparative politics* records of violence as a learned behavior are present in the form of various stereotypes about cultures, portraying their nemesis as violent or peaceful.

Structuralists generally agree that historically, violence erupted during times of “system disequilibrium,” when violent ideologies emerged unexpectedly. On the positive side, however,
issues of conjuncture are considered to have a strong effect both in enabling and disabling components of structural mechanisms that could lead to uprisings.

Rationalists who look at collective violence as a learned behavior attempt to identify advantages and drawbacks in peacemaking. As an advantage, Path Dependency theory indicates that at various conjunctures of history, opportunities for creating “virtuous cycles” (Putnam: 1994, 121-162) can lead to viewing peaceful relationships as mutually advantageous functional relationships, thus leading to cultures of peace. On the negative side, Path Dependency theory indicates that in the absence of efforts to change the direction of a conflict (whether fomenting or fully erupted), the conflict will generate its own history and cycles of violence, while the cost of reversal increases.

As a learned behavior, collective violence generally gravitates toward culturalism in the sense that it is related to environmental factors that favor violence and lack of compassion. A remarkable psychological analysis of collective violence as a cultural construct is offered by Vamik Volkan. Studying the history of some ethnic conflicts, as embedded into their cultural perceptions, Volkan concludes that cultures are capable of regenerating violence by focusing on the negative memory (Chosen Trauma), or capable of eliminating it by focusing on the positive memory (Chosen Glory). By focusing on positive memory, cultures use a sense of shared amnesia with regard to unfortunate events, by focusing on what he calls “Chosen Glory.” In essence, Chosen Glory is a shared mental representation of events and heroes from a group’s history which increases self-esteem among its members, serving also as deterrence from violence. On the other hand, “Chosen Trauma” is an exaggerated process of reactivating a group’s perception of a traumatic past, thus retorting to violence in order to restore the dignity. (Volkan: 1991)

*International Relations*

In addition to economics, International Relations theory relies heavily on the dynamics of culture in understanding and managing international conflicts. (Nye: 1997, 53-54; Cohen: 1997; Avruch: 1998; Väyrynen: 2010) A remarkable theoretical work is the international bestseller,
Cultures and Organizations: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival, authored by Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, which offers detailed ways in which cultural communication renders mutual benefit. (Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov: 2010)

The adepts of realism regard violence as emerging from culture, and often take a reductionist, unsophisticated approach to it. Yet, in light of the complexities implied by the cultural analysis of collective violence, the realists contend that international conflict is purely instrumental in nature and it should be used to serve national interests. On the negative side, the realists uphold a culture of militarism either directly, by increasing the national defense spending, or indirectly through unconventional partnerships with the entertainment industry, which glorifies war, heroism, and an existential battle between good and evil. On the positive side, however, the realists often retort to the principles of the Just War theory and humanitarian intervention in retaliation to conflicts where a military intervention can play a positive role in defending the weak and vulnerable, as a responsibility to protect mandated by the principle of collective security.

The liberal theorists, on the other hand, advocate the positive role of functionalism, which is mainly recognized in the role of international institutions that foster international cooperation. International functionalism also reduces the likelihood of violence by deconstructing cultural stereotypes through transnational interaction and cooperation. On the negative side, liberal theorists often give into diversionary foreign policy due pressure from their constituencies, as well as tendencies to link militarism with patriotism during electoral campaigns.

Social theorists tend to highlight humanity’s exemplary acts of courage, honor, love, sacrifice, and altruism, by relying on the peaceful nature of the human being. Yet, they fail to offer strong arguments that would address issues of Negative Peace, Structural Violence, and other psycho-cultural factors.
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