CUING EUROSKETICISM, OR WHAT PARTIES MAKE OF IT

European Integration and the Strategic Use of Its Consequences

A dissertation presented

by

Liubomir Kiriloff Topaloff

to

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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In the field of

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To my wonderful Natalia, Theo and Nona,

my mother and father.

And to the living memory of

my grandfather Lubo, and my beloved Nikiphor, Caesar and Mauro
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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Abstract

Growing evidence points to the salience of European integration in the domestic political discourse of European member-states. Party-based euroscepticism is an intense point of contestation between different schools of thought. The current study defines euroscepticism as a socially and politically constructed strategy employed by peripheral political elites. The majority of the existing research focuses on inter- or intra-party dissent as a new dimension of existing social cleavages, therefore studying the popular attitudes towards Europe in the member-states. While this approach has its merits and accounts for some of the characteristics of opposition to European integration, it does not address adequately the oscillation of marginal party positions with regard to the European issue across time and electoral systems. This work focuses on the strategic nature of party-based euroscepticism. The theoretical model offered in this study facilitates understanding the processes of issue evolution and its establishment as a salient point of contestation. The current work addresses in particular the following questions: How to explain the volatile variability of party positions with regard to European integration across electoral systems, across party blocs, and across time? What are the conditions, under which an issue, such as the European integration, is politicized and how? And what are the consequences from the politicization of the European issue for the process of political contestation?
Acknowledgments

The topic of this dissertation is due to an accident, in a manner of speaking. While writing a paper on how Greek national identity was gradually constructed in the late 18th and 19th centuries, I came across certain evidence about the controversies surrounding the debate regarding the role of the Byzantine Empire and Ancient Greece’s lustrous heritage in this process. The rationale behind the early Greek nationalists to reject the potential links of a newly created Greek nation-state with its ancient roots, only to discover the immense legitimizing power this romanticized image held for the political and cultural elites of the European Great Powers, and embrace it, brought an inevitable association with certain dynamics of contemporary party politics in European Union. The ability of entrepreneurial political elites to spot opportunities, and to exploit them to their best advantage, even if this requires them to make a 180 degree turn in their previous positions, is hardly a characteristic of contemporary political discourse. Little has changed with regard to how politics has been undertaken throughout the centuries only the actual context and the structural limitations have changed. Deconstructing this enduring characteristic of the political process has challenged my intellectual curiosity, the outcome of which has resulted in writing the current work.
Acknowledgments

My deep gratitude for the successful completion of this dissertation goes first to the members of my dissertation committee. I was fortunate to have the guidance and intellectual illumination of my advisor, Professor Amílcar Antonio Barreto throughout the process of conceptualizing, researching, and writing the current work. Not coincidently, it was for his class that I wrote the paper on Greek national identity. His inspirational spell and eloquence made him my natural choice for guiding and advising me in the dissertation writing process I was about to embark. He knew as well as I did that this would be a big challenge. I am immensely grateful that he accepted this challenge and went along with me in this process. Without his encouragement, patience to read and work on the drafts – from the big revisions, to the small details – this project would not have been possible in its current version. Naturally, my first acknowledgment goes to him in full recognition of the intellectual impact, direct and indirect, his works, his classes, his advisorship, his mentorship and I dare to say his friendship had on me and my worldview as a researcher and as a person.

I would like to thank also to my two other readers. Professor Ronald Hedlund’s guidance on how to stay on solid research grounds, and his very helpful advice “the best dissertation is the done dissertation” resonated with me and kept me from losing focus throughout the process of writing. I am also grateful for all the helpful comments and for the close editing of my manuscript to Professor Dimitar Bechev at the European Studies Centre at St. Antony’s
College, University of Oxford. His extensive and detailed notes improved immensely the quality of my work. I must recognize here the support the Department of Political Science gave to me during the past years. I was fortunate enough to be among the continuous recipients of the Senior Graduate Assistantship award, thanks to which financial side I was able to continue working on my research. My recognition in that context goes to Professor John Portz, chair of the Department of Political Science, whose support and encouragement must be fully recognized. I am grateful also to Professor William Crotty, whose mentorship and inspiration can be found in many of my elaborations on the principles of democracy and democratization throughout the dissertation, as well as for the impact my research position at the Center for the Study of Democracy had on my overall academic curiosity.

It is customary in such cases to acknowledge the support of those, without whom the current outcome would not have been possible. I cannot think of anyone who deserves more acknowledgment than my wife, Natalia, whose infinite patience, support and endurance allowed me to persist through very tough times in the past years. Among all the people who supported me throughout this process, often inadvertently, she was the first one to see this project completed and the milestone passed on. I am the most fortunate person in the world to have her next to me. Undoubtedly, the process of research in political science is by any standard extremely solitary métier and I cannot begin to imagine how I
would have been ever able to go through this process without her presence, support, understanding, and love. For this, and also many other reasons, мила моя, искрено и смиренно ти благодаря! This dissertation is inseparably connected also to two of the most important events in my life, the birth of my son Theodossee and of my daughter Nona. In some ways, the dissertation was born and grew in size, substance and complexity along with the growth of my kids. It is now time that they surpass it.

I started the process of writing of this dissertation believing that the old Latin proverb *Omnium gradium difficillimus est primus* will prove right. Every time I am embarking on a new adventure, I remember that proverb and the beginning becomes easy. I can firmly say now that this time it did not. In the process of writing the dissertation the first step was just as difficult as it is this last step I am completing at the moment. The work on the dissertation challenged not only my intellectual potential. It challenged my understanding of myself, as well as my worldview. For the past few years I kept reminding myself the words of great warning inscribed on the Temple of Apollo in Delphi *Γνῶθι σαυτόν*! I can finally say that with the completion of this dissertation I am at least one step closer to that goal. The Sisiphus myth of knowledge is alive and the mountain is steep and high. But my determination is unabated!
Acknowledgments

To all people mentioned above, and to all those whom I have, knowingly or unknowingly neglected to acknowledge and extend my gratitude, Maximus Gratias Agó Vos!

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Entrepreneurs are simply those who understand that there is little difference between obstacle and opportunity and are able to turn both to their advantage.

Niccolò Machiavelli

One man’s opportunism is another man’s statesmanship.

Milton Friedman

At a moment when the European Union is engaged in an intense attempt to complete the “ever closer” dream for a unitary Europe, a growing body of research points to the salience of eurosceptical politics in the domestic political contestation of the member states.¹ This push for greater and deeper integration finds its reciprocal counterweight in the proliferation of eurosceptical attitudes both among selected political elites and among ordinary citizens. Today more

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¹ The idea of an “ever closer union” was first expressed in the Treaty of Rome (1957) which established the political dimensions of the European Coal and Steel Community, renamed at the same time to European Community.
than ever, a large number of political parties and individual politicians in the European political spectrum vehemently oppose specific European Union policies, the direction of European integration, and in some cases they even advocate the complete demolition of the European Union.

Perhaps, this trend can be seen as logical, even natural; however, what makes it interesting is its sudden and sharp rise in prominence. Before the mid-1980s no significant political leader, outside the UK, was talking about the dangers of “Europeanization,” or proudly calling themselves “eurosceptics” in domestic elections. From an observer’s point of view the origin, nature, and variety of this sudden proliferation of eurosceptical attitudes presents an interesting set of questions: Was euroscepticism deeply ingrained in the roots of domestic contestation since the creation of the European Community (EC)? Was it dormant and waiting to be tackled? Was its appearance provoked by some internal political dynamic, or was it introduced in response to global political changes, perhaps as a result of the end of the Cold War, or of intensified forces of globalization? Furthermore, when politicians propel and promote eurosceptical stances, do they merely reflect voter preferences by ‘diversifying’ their political portfolios with a measured amount of anti-EU dissent and resentment, or do they actually cue the general public in specific eurosceptical direction? The questions presented here pose concerns with more than just causality. They reflect a more general discussion about the formation and assessment of public preferences
towards such fundamental issues as the transfer of sovereignty, the creation of a common identity, or the role social cleavages play in democratic systems.

Evidence for the rising tidal wave of opposition to an ‘ever closer Europe’ is not new and can be traced back, at least, to the beginning of the 1990s. Today, it can just as easily be found in series of events, such as in the rejection of the European Constitution Treaty, in the decision of twenty six out of the twenty seven member-states to pursue ratification via their national assemblies rather than holding national referenda on the adoption of the Lisbon Reform Treaty,\(^2\) or in the negative outcomes in seven out of eighteen referendums on European matters held since 1986. In that context, the Lisbon Treaty’s rejection by Irish voters in the first referendum in 2008 is just the latest in series of popular expression of opposition to the deepening European integration.\(^3\) The decision by the European heads of state to minimize the risks for deepening the European integration is significant in and of itself. A reasonable question would be the why European central political elites, the pinnacle of two hundred years of European democratic emanation, try so hard to avoid input from the *vox populi* on these matters that are so vital for all European citizens? How democratic is it, by any norms, to delegate unprecedented powers to one largely unaccountable, non-

\(^2\) The reform treaty, signed in Lisbon on Dec. 14, 2007, entered into force on December 1, 2009. It reformed and consolidated the EU in much the same way as envisioned by the failed attempt to adopt a European constitution.

\(^3\) Ireland is constitutionally obliged to hold referendums on matters that concern national security and constitutional arrangements in the country.
transparent, and as the time of Jacques Santer’s presidency of the European Commission has shown, much corrupt supranational institution against the will of citizenry? And wherever popular plebiscites on European matters are unavoidable, as in Ireland, how acceptable it is to hold one referendum after another until national and European governing elites are satisfied with the final result?

The decision by central political elites to hind behind national parliaments’ ratifications of the Lisbon Treaty signifies one more trend — an attempt to return towards more ‘behind the scenes’ policy making reminiscent of the old and nostalgic permissive consensus. The intuitive analysis of the most pro-European policy-makers about the growing popular dissent towards European integration is most clearly expressed in their conscious decision to seek alternatives to public debate on the agenda for deepening European integration by relying on wide public support. This de-democratization trend — or perhaps, more precisely, de-popularization of the decision-making — is the most clear recognition of the growing power of peripheral political elites. These are small and marginal political parties and they are determined in their bid to add a new dimension of political contestation to the existing old dimensions. Suddenly, the European issue opened an opportunity for these peripheral elites to gain control over the

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4 The term permissive consensus here means tacit public support for the general direction of a given foreign policy, which is not revealed political elites in details, or at all.
direction and substance of the debate, and to implement their own agenda. This is, de facto, an attestation for the ongoing restructuring of the domestic political space in the European member states in clear correlation to, and a consequence from the dynamics of, European integration.

Studying euroscepticism is a very challenging task not only because of the complexity of this multidimensional phenomenon, but also because it easily falls into the gray category of such provocative buzzwords such as nationalism, globalization, and why not even terrorism. All of them are marked by the inevitable dogma of subjectivism, fluidity, and omnifarious applicability. In that sense, euroscepticism, just like the other notions, reveals itself to be socially constructed and politically exploited vague concept. With some exemptions, the research conducted to date is less theoretical, rather limited in scope, and predominantly country-case or party-case oriented. The overwhelming majority of the current works are focused on voters’ attitudes and not enough attention to the political elites.5 The current state of the field is clearly in need of a better understanding of the mechanics behind cuing preferences and generating attitudes in support of or in opposition to the European Union and integration processes.

This is not to say that theoretical conceptualizations are missing altogether. A growing body of research focuses on various theoretical aspects of

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5 Among the most prominent studies and Harmsen & Spiering 2004; Marks & Hooghe 1999; Marks & Steenbergen 2004; Sitter 2001; Szczerbiak & Taggart 2005; 2008; and Van der Eijk & Franklin 2004.
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euroscepticism, on the one hand, with its causes and structural dependencies leading to the exponential growth of “opposition to Europe” (Harmsen and Spiering 2004; Mair 2000; Sitter 2001, 2002), and, on the other, with different methodological issues of defining and measuring euroscepticism (Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002, 2003). The current work’s ambitions are more modest. The hope is that it will fit within the larger theoretical domain of works dealing with the ways political party elites use issues to gain strategic advantage in the democratic competition process. This study is an attempt to enrich further our understanding of the conditions and dynamics behind euroscepticism, under what conditions and by whom it is used as a distinct political strategy. Euroscepticism should not be judged as a destructive and worrisome symptom often portrayed by policy-makers and journalists alike. Its surge to prominence signifies increased politicization of issues previously ignored by voters. And while the direction of politicization is not necessarily pointing towards greater, but instead less tolerance and cosmopolitanism, it also marks an increased tendency toward more pro-active involvement and participation in public sanctioning of political issues. The growing significance of these issues affects a wide range of aspects in the everyday lives of European citizens. This growing participation, regardless of its direction, represents an act of public scrutiny and sanctioning the polity — an act, which by any standard of democratic theory is a manifestation of active civil society. This politicization trend is also
revealing some hidden processes linked to identity formation, the implication from which spreads beyond domestic, or even regional studies.

A series of questions reveal the motivation behind the current research project. First, how best to describe, understand and analyze party-based euroscepticism. In essence, the questions beg the difference between ideologically-driven and strategically-determined euroscepticism. The outcome from this discussion is important in order to arrive at a more comprehensible definition of euroscepticism. If spatial and temporal analyses reveal a largely invariable and logarithmically linear presence and intensity of opposition to the European integration across the European polity, regardless of its upward or downward direction, then the origins of euroscepticism may be considered structural. Its causes may be regarded as separate or combined factors, embedded in the characteristics of the EU’s institutional design, in the traditional cleavages of domestic politics, or in the constitutional design and party systems of the member states. If the analysis reveals, on the other hand, a disparity in euroscepticism’s intensity, and inconsistency of its manifestations, this will imminently beg the question of why. The underlying assumption will be that other factors, outside the structural / ideological domain determine the propensity to and intensity of opposition to the European integration.
To test the plausibility of the “ideological” argument against the plausibility of the “strategic” argument the current study looks into the genealogy of contemporary political party families in Western Europe and attempts to determine their defining characteristics, comparing them to the way they relate to the main socio-political cleavages and to the specific issue of euroscepticism. The dominant social cleavage, of course, is the left /right divide, but there are also others, including nationalism /cosmopolitanism and liberal market economy / social welfare, just to name a few. This discussion speaks also to a larger debate in the Social Sciences, between the primacy of the logic of appropriateness – i.e. ideological considerations, versus the primacy of the logic of consequences – i.e. instrumental action in normative democratic studies (March & Olsen 1989; see also 1995; 1996 & and 1998; c.f. Goldmann 2005).

Second, the current study tackles the question of what explains the timing of the growing opposition to European integration. Is it coincidental that euroscepticism, in all its forms and types, has appeared and gained prominence within the past quarter century, and especially since the Maastricht Treaty? Was this a linear process, or did it oscillate along with the intensity of the proposed reforms and their implementation? The underlying aspects of these questions deal with the specifics of inter-party dynamics and the contingencies with the overall structural political contestation. The two contending views which appear in regard to this question follow the general discussion from above about the
ideological/strategic character of euroscepticism. The first one deconstructs euroscepticism as a form of ideological issue, aligned along, or orthogonally crossing one or more of the pre-existing social cleavages. According to that approach, the timing of euroscepticism’s appearance and growth to prominence is coincidental with the structural changes by the deepened integration. The changes, the argument goes, have simply elicited and exacerbated new dimensions of existing social, political and economic cleavages: ideology, identity, economics, and welfare. In that context, euroscepticism becomes nothing more than a new dimension in old divides, enabled by the introduction of reforms.

The opposite approach emphasizes the conditions for and the consequences from defining euroscepticism as a political strategy. Political party elites are generally assumed to make constant rational calculations about the short term political returns from taking a populist opposition to the European integration vs. the long term benefits from supporting the integration process. The argument that the small, overwhelmingly marginal, parties have the propensity first to seize the opportunity and then exploit the European issue is not in and of itself that original. As experienced political entrepreneurs the marginal party elites, undoubtedly are generally set to embrace a dose of populism and exploit contentious issues such as European integration in their full advantage whenever the occasion presents itself. They are after all, arguably, among the most unconstrained by responsibilities and power-dependencies actors in the
domestic political domain. However, the timing of their growing opposition to Europe does not simply coincide with the introduction of reforms, such as the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but it is largely enabled by them. The objections the eurosceptic parties raise are, in their majority valid: opposing the growing powers of the European Commission; pointing at the problems associated with the democratic deficit; alarming about the Brussels’ European elite tendency to turn into a “new class” which has confused its own interests with that of the Continent; rejecting the process of quiet supplementation of the national identities with a common pan-European ones, etc. Regardless of their overall validity, these objections to the political, socio-economic, and cultural processes taking place at the European Union level, especially since the end of the Cold War, are hardly spontaneous, springing from below. Instead, I argue in the current thesis, they are cultivated and exploited by political entrepreneurs as part of their strategy in the domestic political competition for votes. This is particularly valid for the small peripheral parties. Albeit often times their positions with regard to European integration may seem firmly based on ideological principles, this study argues that this is misleading. Other factors, such as their location in the electoral system, as well as their chances to access governmental office or not, largely determine the actual political stance they will take with regard to European integration.
Euroscepticism is directly associated with the framework of increased European integration. Up until the middle of the 1980s, the word euroscepticism was not even in fashion, hence in use. Instead, anti-EU proponents were called ‘anti marketeers’ — a word associated with the British opposition to participating in the European integration process (Spiering 2005). A few events preceded the change of perception and vocabulary. First, Britain was finally accepted as a member, and with it came greater public discussion — mainly skeptical in nature — over the merits of greater centralization of European policies and politics. At first, the domestic political discourse in Britain with regard to the EU shortly before and after its accession mimicked the signs of first order electoral contestation. Politics in Brussels became fair game for all political actors in Britain both as point of reference to issue disposition and as a strategy of political behavior. Then, the discussion over the direct election of the European Parliament (EP) entered the public discourse. There were provisions for the direct elections of EPs in the Treaty of Rome, but they were never enacted. David Marquand (1979) – a British political scientist – was the first to seriously raise the question about the democratic accountability of the European institutions, insisting on direct elections and greater authority for the European Parliament. The ‘democratic deficit’ debate followed.

The issue of a ‘democratic deficit’ is important for the current discussion. Along with the ravaging at the time dissatisfaction within the political and
business European circles from the _de facto_ lack of free trade and movement of goods, people and capital across the Union, it sets the stage for the need to ‘deepen’ European integration. Increasing the political, economic, and cultural integration was seen by many as a cure to the growing sense of “Eurosclerosis.”

From the very beginning of the creation of the European Community there was an implicit requirement for members to be democratic states. Largely in response to the increased push for enlargement and the intensity of the ‘democratic deficit’ discussion the Copenhagen declaration from 1994 formalized this requirement with regard to the future accession of countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The assumption behind the enactment of the Copenhagen criteria was clear — if all member-states are democratic, so will be their Union. As it turns out, this logic was faulty.

The argument for an association between the issue of a democratic deficit and integration is bi-directional. On the one hand, the process of integration — understood here as increased transfer of powers (or sovereignties)\(^6\) to a supranational level in order to achieve policy outcomes, and the creation of new political institutions with exclusive executive, legislative and judicial powers to implement these polices generates conditions for an intensified decision making with an increased impact on both the governments of the individual member states and on the lives of the ordinary citizens (c.f. (Goetz and Hix 2000).

\(^6\) Throughout this work I use powers and sovereignties in this particular context interchangeably.
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Following the principles of democratic governance, such political importance necessitates greater accountability and institutional checks and balances, which can be achieved only through a greater democratization of the European institutions. The European Parliament is naturally the first balancing body which requires greater competences, but by no means is it the only one. The European Commission suffers from its position as a hostage to interstate politics; yet, it is conspicuously marked by tremendous lack of transparency proportional to its powers over the daily lives of almost half a billion Europeans.⁷ Even after all the reforms, its meetings are still “held in the dark” with no available transcripts of the Commissioners’ deliberations for greater public scrutiny. The most important legislative body – the European Council – is still comprised of national executives and its decisions are commanded by somewhat narrower national interests. The European Court of Justice has primacy over any domestic court; yet, ironically, it is the least accountable of all European institutions. On the other hand, more democratic accountability and greater democratization in the functioning of the European institutions is impossible without the greater involvement of the European citizenry — the European demos — which requires the European Union

to become part of the political discourse of the domestic political contestation.\textsuperscript{8} In turn, this requires greater integration.

This vicious cycle of dependency was first broken by the turbo-charged negotiations and adoption of the 1986 Single European Act.\textsuperscript{9} This became a watershed event. The SEA became the first big revision of the Treaty of Rome. It established the Single European Market, the European Monetary Union, and the future creation of the pillars of the political unity — the European Union. Further, it reformed the operational procedures of the European institutions, set the stage for upcoming common European economic policy, coordinated a common European foreign and security policy, and provided the roadmap for the subsequent Treaty of the European Union (TEU), better known as the Maastricht Treaty. What is significant about this change is that once introduced into the domestic political discourse, the debate about European integration cannot be simply removed at will again; it was there to stay. This fact became painfully evident during the tumultuous and exhausting ratification of the TEU in France and Denmark.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{8} Some have suggested that if a “European demos” is not achievable, at least there must be some form of common European “public sphere.” See Habermas & Derrida \textit{The Initial Salvos}, in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic relations after the Iraqi war, ed. Levy, Pensky and Torpey 2005; also see the critique of that idea by Kalypso Nicolaidis, \textit{We the Peoples of Europe…} in \textit{Foreign Affairs} 2004, November-December; Kalypso Nicolaidis, \textit{The New Constitution as European Demo-cracy?} in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7:1 Spring 2004.

\textsuperscript{9} The SEA in fact came into effect in 1987 after a couple last minute crises, one of them – to the embarrassment of the Irish Government – involved an amendment to its constitution.

\textsuperscript{10} In the current study I am not discussing in details the specific ways in which European politics made their way into the domestic politics, nor how this transformed the domestic character of political
The primary focus of this study is on the dynamics of party politics and strategies. This is only natural in the light of the observation that the evolution of almost all aspects of European Union politics are close correlated with the dynamics of party politics in the individual member states. As Hix and Lord (1997) correctly point, all three decision-making branches of the EU’s leadership — the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Council — are recruited and are thus determined by national political parties. Even more so, despite many efforts, there are still no truly pan-European political parties, which can compete on a wider pan-European level during in European Parliament elections. Building on the assumption that the domestic political parties remain the most important actors in the processes of European governance, of Europeanization, and of European integration, it is impossible to understand aspects of European politics without analyzing the dynamics of political contestation inside the member states. The reverse relationship is not immediately apparent: there is still no clear evidence of direct impact of European level decision-making on domestic political contestation in the member-states.\footnote{The outcome from the unprecedented pressure Brussels currently applies on the newest additions to the EU – Bulgaria and Romania – to find an effective way to deal with their rampaging corruption and organized crime issues, will shed some light on the ability of the EU to influence deeply entrenched domestic political processes and tendencies. This is, however, still a process in the making.}

\footnote{Others have already pointed to the link between the increased European integration and the death of the ‘permissive consensus.’ See for example, Newman 2005; Dennis & Wright 1999; Rief 1993; Schmitter 2002; Crombez 2003; Eichendberg & Dalton 1993; Franklin, Marsh & McLauren 1994; Taggert & Szczesniak 2005 and 2008.}
1979, Reif and Schmitt (1980) pronounced a verdict on them to be of ‘second
order.’ Others have argued in the same vein, pointing that questions of European
integration have not had a significant impact with regard to either the format or
the mechanics of national party systems (Mair 2000). These conclusions gradually
lose their validity, in light of the new political developments and evolution of
party politics, as demonstrated in the current work.

Presumably, incumbent political parties have greater access to political and
economic resources on the European level, as well as greater leverage over the
integration processes. They are the ones engaged in negotiating with the
European Commission and fellow European governments. The candidates for
the highest European institutions are usually drawn from their ranks, and they are
the ones intimately involved in European legislation and policy making. Not last,
the deepening of the European integration has transferred large powers to the
supranational level; but paradoxically the central political elites’ powers and
influence have not proportionally decreased. On the contrary, in some cases their
policy-making capacity has increased instead (c.f. Milward 1993). Due to these
political dynamics, the mainstream parties have a much lower propensity to adopt
eurosceptical policies. As it becomes clear in chapter four, they are the ones
controlling the dissemination and appropriation of European Structural and
Cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy with all its redistributive
power, and the European budget. They are also the ones guiding a given state’s
input for specific aspects of the European integration. Even when in opposition, mainstream political elites have a strong incentive to limit their tactical eurosceptic rhetoric to carefully crafted, qualitative, highly specific policy criticism to aspects of European politics, and only under exclusive circumstances. In general, they remain largely pro-European oriented.

Following the natural wave of democratic power cycles, the most secure prediction one can make with regard to the central elites in power is that sooner or later they will move into opposition. This dynamic of the democratic arrangements casts a powerful contingency over the strategizing process of the mainstream and marginal political parties. In the current study I call this factor the shadow of the future of ascendance to power. The study infers that the propensity to adopt anti-European positions, as well as the type and intensity of euroscepticism, depend not exclusively, on considerations of factors such as the locus a given party occupies in the domestic political system, its chance for ascendance into office, and its intra-party relations with other parties in the same political domain of the ideological divide. Political entrepreneurs recognize the payoffs from adopting a ‘healthy’ dose of dissent with Europe, regardless of whether they are in government or in opposition; but eurosceptic positions are something else. Euroscepticism suggests active opposition to integration, its current status quo, and attempt to reverse to more intergovernmental kind of regional integration. Therefore, only when given political elite does not stand to gain from European
integration in short or long term, it can afford to turn against Europe. As it becomes evident in chapter five moving between hard and soft euroscepticism is not something unusual for political parties.

This is particularly valid for the marginal political elites. Their decisions are often determined by the self-image they hold with regard how coalitionable they are, or alternatively to what degree they are confined to the fringes of the political process. Peripheral political elites tend to adopt extreme positions towards the European Union, largely due to their allocation in the political process. Unable to compete meaningfully for office, they have a greater chance to yield some influence in the domestic political dynamic and score greater political dividends by adopting populist anti-European positions. By espousing euroscepticism with some form of extreme nationalism and mixing it with populist policies, such as strong protectionism and anti-globalism, these parties stand a better chance of remaining in the political race and survive. That conclusion applies to national elections as well as EP ones, which are usually seen as a chance to cast a protest vote against domestic politics. Such positions both solidify their presence in the margins and offer them a chance for more active protest. In the mean time, some of them readily abandon their anti-Europe rhetoric when coalitional options open in front of them. Perhaps, the best known case is that of the Austrian far-right FPÖ, whose charismatic populist leader Jörg Haider, desperately circulated the European and world capitals in 1999 in a
desperate attempt to dispel the hard anti-European Union and wide populist image his party has acquired during the preceding years, in light of the unexpected coalitional perspective after the general elections.

In light of the above elaborations, studying euroscepticism presents serious challenges to any researcher, due to its elusive and omnifarious nature. First and foremost, euroscepticism — defined as a symptom and as a strategy — is not a stable political phenomenon, which can easily be classified, observed, coded and measured. This explains why most, if not all, of the current studies dealing with euroscepticism tend to be either very descriptive, therefore avoiding the use of theoretical models, or very particularistic in the case studies they observe. Analyzing euroscepticism as a political strategy requires consideration of the complexity of decision-making process conducted by political elites. If European integration is approached as just being this strategically politicized and exploited by the “losers” issue of European integration, then one does not have to go far in search for proof in order to explain the causes of euroscepticism. It will just suffice to determine the gains and losses associated with European integration, and then match the results to the parties that are either pro- or anti-European. A more elaborate study, however, must examine the specific conditions under which the peripheral political elites make those decisions, considering the cost and benefits associated with each choice. Indeed, it is difficult for such an elusive and largely subjective notion to be systematically studied across borders and political
environments. Consequently, deriving a unified concept and a working theoretical model becomes ever more complex and challenging task.

It is important to note the immense difficulty conceptualizing euroscepticism based on content of the dissent, i.e. the causes for euroscepticism. In some cases the main criticism of the eurosceptics against the European Union is based on economic principles. For British eurosceptics the EU’s endorsement of a more centralized and regulated economic system represents a violation of the free market economy principles, while the same economic system present an issue for the Swedish eurosceptics who deem the EU’s economic regulations insufficiently tight and lacking adequate safety nets. Similarly, the reasons for rejecting the European constitution by French and Dutch voters in 2005, and the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish voters in 2008, cannot be put in consistent categories. The French generally voted against the inadequacy of their own economic system and against their government for adopting and adapting to the challenges of globalization, as well as against the government’s inability to improve the seemingly diminished central role of France in future Europe. The Dutch voted against it because of immigration, the enlargement of the EU, and the inability of their government to respond adequately to the challenges of multiculturalism. These reasons are compatible but not overlapping. They differ significantly from the Irish who rejected the Lisbon Treaty largely because of the striking democratic deficit at the EU level which gives great many powers to Brussels without
matching them with adequate checks and balances. Irish eurosceptics charged against European integration for allegedly distorting the distribution of power in the light of the new enlargement, which favors the larger countries in the Union. These inconsistencies, and at times mutual exclusivity of reasons marking the adoption of euroscepticism by different actors in different member states, exemplify the futility of classifying this phenomenon based on one set of objective criteria and enforces the view that euroscepticism is best understood as a strategy.

Focusing on euroscepticism as a strategy offers much more intelligible and coherent base for analysis. Approaching euroscepticism as a result of rationally calculated and premeditated decision-making, which has been scrutinized through pragmatic cost-benefit estimation, is theoretically and methodologically speaking, somewhat different than treating it as symptom. The former is essentially an input which can be researched, studied, measured, and analyzed from the point of view of political elites, their strategic goals and objectives, their position in the political system, and their core characteristics. Researching euroscepticism as a symptom, on the other hand, shifts the focus on the output — that is the consequences of adopting a particular policy, strategy, or plan of action. This approach by default includes the impact of particular decisions made by the elites over the way voters perceive the issue, but primarily focuses on the reversed interaction – the impact voters’ attitudes have on political elites’ positions and
decisions. Both phenomena are interrelated and it is hard to “drive a wedge” between them.

For purposes of parsimony and clarity, the current study focuses primarily on the former and examines only limited aspects of the latter. Methodologically, the two approaches to euroscepticism also require different research models. Treating euroscepticism as a symptom naturally focuses on attitudes and perception, usually reflected and measured by polls and other statistical methods. On the other hand, treating it as a strategy requires examining the particularities of the political structure, the core characteristics of the political actors adopting it, and measuring the success of the policy from a strategic viewpoint. Such an approach does not lend itself simply to deconstruction of the individual message, since much of the content will be context based. In analyzing the competing strategies, the researcher has to “imagine” the options in front of a given political elite, assign ordinal preferences and examine the various strategic calculations with regard to associated short and long term costs and benefits, in order to arrive to a plausible conclusion.

The persistence of shared eurosceptical attitudes among both peripheral political elites and masses across a wide range of member-states suggests that this phenomenon is closely related to both the structure of the political process of integration and the role of self-identity in the context of ever blurring European
national lines. In the mean time, the wide variation of intensity indicates that it is not based on some ‘objective’ perception of reality, but rather on ‘subjectively constructed’ concept akin to Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1988). It is, to borrow a concept from Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), a newly “invented tradition.” Opposition to European integration is not a simple binary variable, either “pro” or “con.” It comes with great variety of nuances and is powered by different motivations. Various definitions put forth in the current leading studies of euroscepticism vary from the simpler “hard” and “soft” (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2000), to more elaborate “specific” and “diffuse” (Kopecky & Mudde 2002), to Flood’s spectral approach from “rejectionists” to “maximalists” (2004). Of all of these definitions, which are dealt with in greater detail in chapter four and five, only the first one allows for euroscepticism to be treated as a strategy. The advantage of treating euroscepticism as either soft or hard is in its simplicity, nuance differentiation, and directional orientation. If euroscepticism is defined as soft in a specific political context, this tells us something about the location in the electoral system and strategic orientation of the given eurosceptic political party. As it becomes clear in chapter five, some small peripheral parties may undertake soft euroscepticism under certain conditions, only to become later hard eurosceptics, and then again soft eurosceptics. The distinction between hard and soft euroscepticism does not tell us much about the content of the message. But
it tells us a great deal about the preferences and goals of the political party, and the direction in which it is going.

A central assumption in the current study is that euroscepticism was enabled by structural changes at the domestic, regional and international levels, which were first undertaken by the central political elites. These structural changes are related to internal and external events for the European Community, such as the evolution and end of the Cold War, the enlargements of the European Community starting from 1973 on, and the evolution of the European Community / European Union itself. Together, the changes in these factors led to the implementation of deep political and economic reforms, which in turn led to the inescapable politicization and exploitation of the European issue. Some of the aspects of these changes prompted the initial response by the peripheral political elites, which led to the convergence of pro-European core elites around the defense of the need for these reforms. Certain that they can make the case for deeper integration better than any political entrepreneur, the central elites advanced towards further reforms with little concern and great complacency about the rising tidal wave of opposition. The troublesome ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in France and Denmark exemplifies this claim rather well. The central political elites across the European member polity, arguably, would have preferred to remain hidden behind the veil of permissive consensus, which allowed them to operate without much input or interest in their actions from the
general public. The changes they had to enact, however, were of such magnitude and importance, that they could not be bypassed easily in the democratic process and resulted in the politicization of the integration.

The peripheral political entrepreneurs from the marginal parties were first to tap in this potentially explosive topic and begin to exploit the European issue. Jean-Marie le Pen, the battered leader of the French *Front National*, and a symbolic embodiment of the crudest spirit of political entrepreneurship, went from a supporter of the European Community to a staunch opponent. His position, and that of his party, can best be explained as strategic in the context of the evolving reforms. After the FNs emergence, the European Community was seen by le Pen as a platform for opposition to the dominance of the mainstream parties in the French domestic political system. Creating powerful European institutions was believed to diminish the influence of the mainstream domestic political parties, and potentially to tie the hands of the national governments. Both of these outcomes strongly advantaged the FN. By 1992 was clear to all that empowered European institutions in fact were only strengthening the power and influence of the mainstream parties. New decision-making procedures, and the creation of new and more potent redistributive mechanisms for economic and political resources, benefited the central political elites and marginalized further the peripheral ones. Chapter four outlines many of the mechanisms by which the central political elites *de facto* increased their powers. European integration, it was
becoming increasingly clear, was not a counter-weight to the powers of the domestic actors, but instead an extension.

Any dynamic conceptual framework of euroscepticism should acknowledge a core dependency between structure and process, in which the structural features of the political contest determine the shape, character, and direction of the strategies which are employed. Structure itself alternates and mutates under pressure from the very same issue it helped shape and tackle. In the context of the examination of euroscepticism, when the debate over the direction and depth of European integration entered the realm of actively contested domestic politics, parties that introduced it had the advantage of an existing lack of interest among the general public on the subject, a lack of understanding of the complexity of the issues at hand, and the inability of the peripheral elites to exploit the subject to their advantage. European politics were conducted still under the restrictive form of permissive consensus and tacit support by the general public for the central political elites’ vision for the general direction of European integration. Since the first major reform, the SEA, the European issue underwent a major evolution and by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty began to become a salient political issue in the domestic democratic contestation process. The issue was, in fact, salient enough not to be ignored by the mainstream parties. As demonstrated in chapter two, between 1992 and 2005 increasing number of mainstream parties had to include clear
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statements on where they stand with regard to the European integration. They simply could not afford to ignore the European issue, as they have done in the past. To do so would have meant opening a niche for other actors to take over the initiative of representation for this issue. Only by implementing such a dynamic model to the conceptual framework of euroscepticism is possible to derive a meaningful understanding of euroscepticism as a strategy for political contestation and the underlying political reality defining the environment in which the decision-making is taking place.

Successful models are copied and emulated on a large scale by actors in any domain, political, economic, or social. Thus if a strategy is seen as successful, we would expect to observe its rapid proliferation, where variation of form and intensity would be determined by the place a particular actor occupies in the political domain, and the goals of the political actor when embracing this policy.  

The current study makes precisely this inference. As a strategic choice, euroscepticism pays off and it is therefore increasingly adopted by political parties, as demonstrated by the empirical examination in chapter two. Strategic success is generally assessed by its outcomes. The research results presented in this work

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12 The concept of emulating successful models is a subject of study in different social science disciplines. In International Relations in general, and in Neorealism in particular, the international system compels states, especially the great powers, to adopt similar adaptive strategies or risk elimination as independent political entities (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). In economics it is assumed that successful models are quickly emulated, and in Sociology and Psychology it is generally assumed that role models are followed because of people’s desire to repeat success. New studies of terrorism also claim that suicide terrorism is rapidly proliferating due to its success. Robert Pape (2005: 61) claims that “The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works.”
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corroborate this claim. As a result of advancing the European integration process we observe an increase in the number of references to Europe, first by the marginal and then by the mainstream parties in their public pronouncements and official documents, such as party manifestos. Furthermore, the variation of intensity and form of adopted euroscepticism increases along with the reforms of the European Treaties.

Chapter two discusses the conditions which emanated the European issue into prominence. The chapter focuses on the political discourse which made euroscepticism more visible in the domestic political contestation. It provides a short overview of the literature dealing with European integration and euroscepticism, followed by brief discussions of the European integration process and associated with it the democratic deficit process and the decline in the permissive consensus. It examines the context, in which the reforms for deepening of the integration process have been contemplated and implemented, as well as how the changes that followed impacted the process of domestic political contestation. Chapter three deals with the contentious theoretical debate about the nature of euroscepticism, whether it is strategic or ideological. It examines each of the claims and the available evidence from election manifestos of various political parties. Using content analysis, the main research focuses on comparing how attitudes towards European integration relate to left-right, liberal-regulated market, and sovereignty-intergovernmentalism divides.
Chapter four examines the claim that mainstream political parties have great incentives to be pro-European, because they are in control of the integration process and are positioned to harvest the benefits from it. By systematic analysis of the political and economic aspects of integration that came with each major revision of the European Treaties, the chapter advances the argument of the shadow of the future explains why even in opposition these mainstream parties remain largely committed to the European project. Finally, chapter five deals with the inconsistent manifestation of euroscepticism by the marginal parties. By constructing the argument around the explanatory variable conditionally termed the specter of coalitionability the chapter looks into various case studies from Denmark, Spain, and France in order to determine its validity. This work concludes with some considerations of the implications from the findings of the current research with regard to future examinations of the topic.
Chapter 2

The “Dark” Side of Democratization

**The Road to Euroscepticism**

The adamant supporters of the European project often compare the necessity of further integrating the policies and politics between the members of the European Union to riding a bicycle — if you stop pedaling, you fall off. The analogy is not quite accurate, given the complexity of European Union politics, but it points to the strategic vision of *europhiles* who feel the need to instill a perception of necessity and even inevitability of radical reforms. The need for such reforms, which require further transition of sovereignties from the individual

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14 No specific pundit of European integration could claim to be the author of this analogy. It appears in various publications usually referring to comments by a panelist. For example, the European Policy Center – an independent think tank - quotes in its website Argimon Paiste as the person making this point in connection to EU and Mercosur.
member states to Brussels, is oftentimes justified as the only available panacea to the existing problems of the “democratic deficit,” collective action problems, and problems associated with greater disparity between disproportionately pro-European governing elites and anti-European voters. Thus, for the past quarter century two simultaneous processes characterizing the attempts by European “peddlers” to keep their balance on the “bicycle” — widening and deepening of the European Union — have been taking place.15

The need to “peddling ahead,” with varying intensity, has dominated the past fifty years of EU development. Justification for this pro-integrationist rhetoric is usually sought in the growing inefficiency and dysfunctionality of the European Union’s institutions in the light of incessant enlargements, and in the apparent growing disconnection between European and domestic politics. Readily available evidence for this fragmentation and alienation can be found, for example, in the observed gap between expected political commitment and actual civic engagement of the citizens of the individual member states towards pan-European projects, such as the direct elections for the European Parliament. Interestingly, both europhiles and eurosceptics are equally hasty in pointing out

15 The widening, or enlarging, of the EU was propelled by many factors. But after Maastricht was became imperative, primarily, due to the fall of the Communism and the need to re-incorporate the states of Central and Eastern Europe “back” in the European family. The deepening, or integration, which is partially in the focus of this chapter, was compelled by other factors. Ironically, many opponents of the “deepening” process favored “widening” as a way to delay, and in hope of derailing, the former. This approach, however, creates a paradox: the wider European Union becomes, the greater the need for an even “deeper” Europe.
the “democratic deficit” in the EU’s institutions, and to the incomplete *sui generis* form of socio-economic and political organization of the Union as the main culprits for these hurdles. In that regard, proponents as well as opponents of the European Union frequently point to the existing level of integration as the main source of the problem. But where europhiles see the problem in the impotence of the EU institutions, the eurosceptics see it in its unprecedented omnipotence for these same institutions. In the view of the former, there is need to deepen integration, whereas the latter claim that there is “too much” of it. The former call for the continued empowerment of the existing EU institutions; meanwhile, the latter call for an immediate halt to transferring sovereignty to the supranational level, and for a return to an earlier stage of more modest economic and political interdependence among the member states. Eurosceptics also argue that only by returning to a more simple form of intergovernmental cooperation, could the increased number of heterogeneous ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious entities find common ground.

Linked to the aforementioned is another common argument. It is usually centered on the impossibility of overcoming the importance of national identity and the creation of a truly committed European citizenry, ergo a formation of homogeneously functioning community. The problems associated with the democratic deficit and free riders problem are directly linked to the lack of a European citizenry. To address these issues, europhiles argue, there needs to be
serious reforms. The most adamant reformers are the “federalists”, for whom anything short of creation of a European federation, with common European identity and values, is doomed to fail in middle to long run. The Lisbon Treaty, which was finally cleared with the second Irish referendum and the Czech Supreme Court’s recent decision, is precisely such a milestone. It creates the positions of a President of the Council and merges the institutions of the High Representative for CFPS with that of the External Relations Commissioner. These are not just mere ceremonial posts; they are powerful symbols of the lengths to which the European integration process has gone. More than 35 years ago then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly demanded to know the phone number to the European Community in Brussels if the need arose.\textsuperscript{16} After the Lisbon Treaty, not only Hilary Clinton will know whom to call in Brussels, but Barack Obama will have someone to talk to as well. European citizens can travel freely across borders\textsuperscript{17}, can work freely in other countries, can vote where they live\textsuperscript{18}, use their medical insurance in other states, set businesses anywhere in the EU, and in general feel like pan-European citizens. This is the depth of European integration today — a response to the challenges to EU survival. Yet, eurosceptics doubt that such supranational unity is ever possible. They see perils in this European unification and weakness in the face of the

\textsuperscript{16} In a recent talk in Oxford 2009 he denied to having said that/1 The author is thankful to Dimitar Bechev for this clarification.

\textsuperscript{17} This does not apply yet to the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe for another few years.

\textsuperscript{18} Voting is applicable only in European and municipal elections.
negative impact of globalization over the most vulnerable of their constituents. For them, the solution is a return to the cautious intergovernmentalism between well defined nation-states, with strong national identity and state-centered protectionism.

Despite their diametrically opposing views, the two camps have one common trait – both see the current status quo as unsustainable. It is in this context of mutually exclusive and contradictory remedies to a common problem that the analogy of the bike-riding becomes much more useful. If we develop further the analogy, the europhiles see the recent enlargements of the European Union as lots of riders hopping on the same bike. The increased number of the “riders,” and the additional weight they put on the “bike” make it sluggish and unstable, with not enough “peddlers” to keep it going. For them, the only solution to the danger of “falling off the bike” under its increased weight is to “peddle ahead” and “peddle fast,” seen as resorting to even deeper integration. For the eurosceptics, the dangers of “falling off the bike” are associated, instead, with the fast speed and complexity of the current system. Therefore, not only do they warn against “peddling fast” but they also challenge “peddling ahead” itself, warning us of a fast approaching cliff. For that, they advocate an immediate halt to the integration process and fast reverse in order to restore stability and avoid the inevitable fall into the abyss.
Returning to reality, eurosceptics and europhiles use similar supporting evidence for their respective arguments: Europe lacks truly democratic institutions and sufficient levels of accountability to the public, it lacks actual representation on a European level, there are problems with policy synchronization and free riders, and there are a preponderance of narrowly defined national interests over long term collective good. Since 1980, the European Community / European Union went through number of enlargements. The biggest one was in 2004.\textsuperscript{19} One can argue that with each enlargement the problems became increasingly acute. The political institutions in Brussels were not initially designed to handle the shock from the operational and political complications and diversification due to the addition of members, especially after the “big bang” enlargement in 2004. Nevertheless, the questions of how and why the processes of enlargement and integration have gained such comparatively high prominence in domestic political contestation in the past fifteen years or so requires more careful examination. After all, it was not the widening, but deepening that generated the heated debate since the middle of the 1980s. The Single European Act created great unease with many, especially small and marginal parties. But it was the Maastricht Treaty that mobilized powerful

\textsuperscript{19} Except for the first enlargement in 1973, all other enlargements happened after 1980. By 2007 there were total of six enlargements, through which the Union grew from six to twenty seven members, the territory it covered grew from 1,299,530 km\textsuperscript{2} before the first enlargement to 4,454,238 km\textsuperscript{2} after the last one, and its population grew from 169 million to 494 million citizens (data, European Commission website).
bottom-up resistance — enough to shake up the confidence of many europhiles in Brussels and around the European Union. The French “petit oui” and the Danish rejection of the Treaty in 1992 not only served as a wake-up call for the habitually complacent pro-European governing political elites across the Eurozone. This was the moment of the powerful big-bang emergence of many small anti-European formations, whose *modus vivandi* and *modus operandi* increasingly revolved around explicit opposition to European integration.

Interestingly, such formations appeared not only in countries, which electoral systems of proportional representation allowed for the survival of small parties. More significantly, these formations appeared in countries with electoral system clearly hostile to the formation of small parties. France’s majoritarian two-ballot system is a good example. The debate over the Maastricht Treaty encouraged small eurosceptic groups to secede from their former party carriers. Their leaders, essentially political entrepreneurs, betted on the growing dissent against an integrated Europe. In almost all cases they were vindicated. In 1997 Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s *Mouvement des Citoyen* (MDC), a splinter from the Socialist Party, became a coalitional partner in the Jospin government. Philippe de Villiers’ *Mouvement pour la France* (MPF), a splinter from the centrist UDF, and Charles Pasqua’s *Rassemblement pour la France* (RPF), a splinter from the
Chapter 2: The “Dark” Side of Democratization

conservative RPR joined forces in 1998 and won more seats in the European Parliament than the mainstream RPR.20

The dissent, however, was not local or national; it was pan-European. Neither was it constrained to a particular past moment. A total of eighteen referendums on European integration, including two on the Euro, were held between 1985 and 2009 (see Table 2.1). In seven of them, or more than one third, the anti-European forces prevailed. This is a significant number pointing to the growing dissent and opposition to Europe. Except for the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, all other successful rejections happened on or after year 2000, which coincides with the growing momentum for integration. Arguably, if more member-states were to hold referendums on the Lisbon Treaty, it would have never become reality. Had the ratification of the Treaty been delayed to the next British elections, the Conservatives would have put it to a referendum, which most certainly would have killed it. The Lisbon Treaty was in danger also if Poles, Czech, Dutch or even French were to vote directly on it in a referendum.

This is hardly surprising. During the initial decades of the EC’s existence business was dealt exclusively behind closed doors. The general public remained oblivious and largely ignorant of the actual dynamics of the negotiations and their outcomes. The public was fed scarce, highly technical and boring information,

20 After the 1997 electoral fiasco, the UDF underwent a major crisis and fragmented into smaller fractions. More recently, the RPR transformed itself into Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, which also absorbed some of the small fractions left out after the UDF.
intelligible for most. Thus, integration was an entirely elite driven process, where only selected core groups had knowledge of the actual direction of development. Their power partially rested in their exclusive redistribution and decision-making monopoly. All the others, residing in the periphery, had no say over the actual terms of negotiation. With the introduction of direct elections for the European Parliament, and the ambitious reforms staked in the Single European Act and in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), the core could no longer hide behind the position of defender of the general interest of all groups within the society.

As with any such process, the deepening of integration inevitably produced winners and losers, and the core could no longer pretend otherwise. This was

### Table 2.1 Referendums on European Integration 1986-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referendum</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single European Act</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maastricht Treaty</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURO</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nice Treaty</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Establishing European Constitution</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Lisbon</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
The correlation between increased integration and the prominence of the issue, in the process of domestic political contestation, is rather linear. In the post-Second World War period, the rhetoric of a “United Europe” with common European interests and a common future became ideologically indoctrinated — a sort of hegemonic idea, hardly questioned by the majority of the social and political groups. The fundamental challenges to all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life, brought in by the SEA and the TEU, raised a sudden alarm. Deepened integration generated changes which led to increased resistance by political elites, especially by those who represented the most marginalized groups of constituents. These elites, and the groups they represented, stood to lose more than they stood to gain, in both relative and absolute terms, from further “deepening.” European matters transitioned into a rational and pragmatically defined real-politics and economic policies. As a consequence, European integration lost its vague civilization appeal, only to become part of the ground-level political discourse, every bit of which was now up for contestation.
If indeed there is a direct link between integration and an elevated level of euroscepticism, it is to be found in the increased politicization of the former. This fact has an important consequence for attempts to theoretically model euroscepticism as a function of party politics, making the issue of greater or lesser integration endogenous to the process of domestic political contestation. In the current chapter I hypothesize that as a consequence of increased European integration, the *permissive consensus* gradually ceased to exist and the domestic political space of contestation was forced to restructure. As a result, this transformation opened the possibility for marginal parties to raise issues related to the existence and role of the European Community / European Union, and to politicize them as elements for electoral contestation. In essence, the hegemonic idea of “ever closer Europe” as a vague, generally good, but unclear representation of the best direction for development, gradually acquired more tangible shape and as a result has lost its hegemonic status, only to become a contestable issue for the marginal parties. I further hypothesize that with every major milestone in European integration an increasing number of mainstream

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21 Politicization here is understood as a sharp increase of interests, opinions, and values to the extent that they become salient enough to be considered indispensible from the political process and as such are advanced by the political parties within the domain of policy formulation within a political system. The term was originally coined by the neo-functionalists as one of their three core hypotheses for the development of European integration, “Politicization thus refers initially to a process whereby the *controversiality* of joint decisionmaking goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to a widening of the audience or *clientele* interested and active in integration. Somewhere along the line a *manifest redefinition of mutual objectives* will likely occur” in Schmitter, Philippe C. 1969. Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration. *International Organization* 23: 161-166.[italics in original].

22 Term, will be explained in detail, subsequently, in the current chapter.
parties were also forced to take a stand and respond to the attempts of the marginal political parties to insert the European issue in the political agenda. The dependent variable in this chapter then becomes the politicization of the European integration, transforming it into the “European issue.” The independent variable is a collective factor of structural changes and rational decision-making on behalf of various political elites. The empirical test is based on historical analysis of the major reforms in the European Community / European Union since 1979, the conditions for these reforms, and their impact in three major areas: political, economic, and social changes. These three areas, not coincidently, overlap with the three main areas of integration opposition by the eurosceptics. Finally, the conclusions that are drawn from the analysis are compared against data from the Comparative Manifesto Project in attempt to validate them further.

The approach in this chapter is largely consistent with Kitschelt’s spatial model (1995: 15-17). With regard to radical rightwing parties, he claims that the convergence of mainstream parties creates a space for new parties to enter the political marketplace, and for older small parties to expand. Focusing on the sudden success of new radical right parties, he argues that their emergence and success depends on the opportunity structure for party competition (1995:14). According to him, when mainstream parties converge, space is opened up for political entrepreneurs to exploit. More importantly, it is only when this space
opens that political entrepreneurs can attempt to seize the opportunity with a winning strategy of their own. In the current chapter I argue that the restructuring of the political space began as a result of an attempt by the core political European elites to meet the challenges of globalization, “democratic deficit” and enlargements through an unprecedented deepening of European integration. The politicization of the process could be regarded then as unwanted but inevitable consequence, a sort of negative externality. The structural changes following from the SEA and the TEU, and the subsequent overall deepening of the political and economic aspects of the European Community / Union pushed the European issue right into the center of domestic political contestation, making it an inseparable part of the core issues in most political parties’ portfolios. The mainstream political elites, being the de facto engines of the integration processes, converged around the pro-European agenda, enabling the marginal parties to reciprocate by opposing the dynamics of integration.

Integration as Elite-Driven Process

Studying, researching, and comparing individual European politics without considering integration may lead to an incomplete and inaccurate assessment. But as one study has rightly suggested: “trying to understand European integration without understanding European domestic politics is a mistake” (Taggart and
Szczerbiak 2001:5). This claim points to an intrinsic interconnectedness between European integration and domestic politics. Among the scholars trying to explain EU integration over the past decades there is a general agreement that this was primarily an elite-driven process. Throughout most of its early existence, the European Community’s scope and the direction of its development was largely determined by its technocratic and diplomatic political elites (Norris 1997:276). Undisturbed, these elites were able to push European integration forward, largely thanks to the established general tacit agreement and support among the mass public for the direction of development of the European project — a process that came to be noted in the literature as a “permissive consensus.”

In the 1960s, the sociologist V.O. Key Jr. first coined the term “permissive consensus” in his discussion of the U.S. foreign policy in the earlier post-war decades. By using cross-tabulating poll responses against predictor variables, he implied that while the broad American public had little detailed knowledge of the direction of the US foreign policy, opinion polls demonstrated consistent support for the government’s lead. As he noted, “When a permissive consensus exists, a government may be relatively free to work out a solution of the issue or it may be free to act or not to act” (Key 1961:35). In the early 1970s, in attempt to summarize the theoretical contributions and findings of previous studies of European integration Leon Lindberg and Stuard Scheingold borrowed the term from Key and concluded that:
In general a permissive consensus did emerge. The Community enterprise was seemingly taken for granted as an accepted part of the political landscape, making it relatively easy to mobilize support for projects to advance or protect the economic programs of the Community. Moreover, support extended to strengthening existing supranational institutions even at the cost some loss of national sovereign prerogatives. Finally, opportunities for playing on national cleavages in order to block progress were relatively slim. (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970:62)

In the aftermath of the most devastating conflict in human history, the Second World War, past concepts for European unity – with its epitome being the influential pan-Europa project – generated new and unprecedented support for an overarching European community. Politicians from both the left and the right were quick to espouse the perspective of greater economic and political integration (Dinan 1999:12). Thus European integration came largely as a result of the incessant efforts by the original member states on the basis of a permissive consensus, coupled with “peace, prosperity and supranationalism” as legitimizing values and forces, to establish stable and cooperative post-conflict environment (Weiler 1994, 1995). In this context, the European political elites needed as little as possible involvement from the general public opinion, or from the national parliaments.

The most popular argument regarding the creation of the ECSC is that of a motivation based on careful far-sighted vision about the greater benefits from
deeper economic and political integration. This project, the argument goes, would not have been possible without a permissive consensus because of the potential for petty quarrels among the politicians and the domestic political constraints a democratic system imposes. Naturally, the dependent variable(s) in these studies — integration and interdependence — were usually presumed to be correlated with the efforts of the small, elite interest-groups, which succeed in securing political outcomes for their preferences (Mitrany 1966, 1975; Pentland 1975).23 In the 1990s, Moravcsik advanced an alternative liberal intergovernmentalism approach, in which he explained the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) as a specific illustration “that the EC can be analyzed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy coordination” (Moravcsik 1993:474).

Interestingly, a basic commonality in the approach of the majority neo- functionalist and intergovernmentalist scholars is the way they all saw the process of political integration as an implicit rational decision; one that was necessary because of the functionality of free markets and power politics of interests. Later, Moravcsik (1998b) argued in what seems to be one of the first prominent rational choice theories of EU institutional choice, that member-states adopted European

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23 For a more extensive discussion from neo-functionalist perspective of the processes of European integration as example of economic interdependence in the realm of international relations see Haas 1958, 1960, 1968, Nye 1968; Moravcsik 1990, 1993, 1994, 1998; Schmitter 1969, 1970. The common theme between all these authors is their general approach to core cause of the European integration based on the functional economic and political efficiency.
institutions, and empowered them, in attempt to increase the commitments among themselves. Subsequently, Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) sought to model the functioning of EU institutions, and the processes of selection, adoption, execution and adjudication of EU polices in terms of strategic decision-making. And Majone (2001) and Pollack (2003) introduced in their arguments the political economic concept of transaction cost with regard to European integration and institution-building. Building on theoretical literature of delegation in America, in a distinct but similar way, each presented an argument that was in tune with Moravcsik and Tsebelis. Principals, such as the member-states, have delegated unprecedented powers to supranational agents, such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Court of Justice, in an attempt to lower the transaction cost of policy-making. The assumption is that governments of member-states anticipate domestic opposition, and associated with it high political cost, to any attempt for promulgating vital cooperation policies on European level. Therefore, they empowered European agents in order to get the commitments fulfilled on their behalf, without suffering the negative consequences. Consequently, Pollack (2003: 9-11) argued, agents take advantage of their discretion to pursue their own policy preferences, further deepening European integration. Taken together, the rational choice models successfully explain the level of integration in terms of self-serving interests and the establishment of the lowest common denominator.
Chapter 2: The “Dark” Side of Democratization

The death of the “permissive consensus”

A general assumption consistently made in all works reviewed on European integration is that at certain point the core political elites felt the need to deepen European integration, which in turn led to the gradual death of the so-called “permissive consensus.” Two important questions emerge in the context of this claim. First, what explains the need for the reforms which led to the politicization of the European issue? And second, what explains its timing? The first question, in essence, seeks to investigate the conditions and causes, which led to the increased level of integration that led to a greater politicization of the European issue, and in turn resulted in the end of the permissive consensus. To that end, permissive consensus and politicization are the two extremes of the same continuum. It must be noted, however, that the causal relationship between integration and politicization is unidirectional: greater integration leads to greater politicization, but greater politicization does not necessarily lead to greater integration. If anything, it may halt the integration processes and lead to reduced integration. Furthermore, the way greater integration correlates with politicization of the European issue does not presuppose that after it has been politicized, a decrease in the speed and level of integration would lead to the depoliticization of the issue. Once the European issue has been elevated to a contestable topic in domestic politics, it is no longer possible to conceal it behind the veil of
permisseconsensus politics. Hence, once pushed in the political domain, the issue of Europe was there to stay and be exploited by all political actors.

The second question focuses on the specific causes for deepening integration. This is, indeed, the focus of the rest of this part of the chapter. The avalanche-like evolution of European integration since the 1970s has specific causes. The need for democratization and for adapting the existing institutions to the challenges posed by the increased number of member-states, are the two leading ones. Consequently, the sense of urgency for reforming the European Community led to the introduction of first direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979, and the “Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union” in 1983. Both steps, taken together marked the beginning of a long and tedious process of transforming the European Community, which in turn led to markedly increased politicization of the process in domestic political contestation.

In the 1960s the EC struggled for its own survival. Its existence was jeopardized by many challenges: de Gaulle’s personal hostility towards Britain’s membership; the EC’s bizarre institutional design (one that was intentionally made bicephalous to create a balance between the power of the member-states and the European institutions); and its economic and military dependency on United States’s protection and support at the height of the Cold War. By the 1970s, the Community was in a serious economic recession, the military
significance of its leading members — France and UK — was overshadowed by the dynamics of the US-USSR arms race, its economic growth was held hostage to OPEC’s oil monopoly, its international competitiveness in terms of research and development, and commercial leadership, energy and ecological innovation were all overshadowed by US and Japanese primacy. The EC’s institutional dysfunctionality and inertia, and its decision-making paralysis — embodied in the empty chair crisis — all characterized the urgent need for profound reforms. In the words of a prominent historian of European Community, “the terms “Eurosclerosis” and “Europessimism” encapsulate[d] the history of European integration in the mid-1970s” (Dinan 1999: 57).

The first enlargement in 1973 added more pressure thanks to the accession of three new members — the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. The accession of these three countries complicated the political aspects of the EC operativeness with regard to the way decisions were made on the European level. The addition of two “non-continental” countries — Britain and Ireland, each having traditional trans-Atlantic ties and particular “islander” self-perception of non-continental political exceptionalism to European traditions — meant introducing a potential venue for general dissent from the European vision of their “continental” counterparts. In addition, while both Denmark and the UK clearly sought accession because of the economic benefits, they made no secret of their doubts about, and lack of commitment to, the political goals of the
European Community. Finally, the first enlargement led to the creation of the European Council as a semi-annual forum for the heads of state and government of the member-states in 1974. On the economic side, this enlargement was accompanied by further institutional development, as was the case with the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), coupled with a new regional policy with the sole goal to redistribute funds back to UK in response to the unfair consequences from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its strains on the British budget.

By the second half of the 1970s it was clear that the European Community had to extend membership to Greece, and by early 1980s, there was little doubt that Spain and Portugal would also be allowed in. This was the so called Mediterranean enlargement. Interestingly, the economic reasons for this *two-wave* enlargement\(^\text{24}\) were prevailed; however, the first line of justification was always political. In particular the Greek accession was seen in a political light. Between 1967 and 1974 Greece was under a military regime. During that period the association agreement with Greece, the first step towards full-fledged membership, was suspended. Not long after Greece returned to democracy in 1974 it applied for full membership. Germany and France gave their full support.

\(^{24}\) Some authors clearly speak of “the Mediterranean enlargement” in singular, without even proper explanation for their assumptions (see for example Michael Baun, *A Wider Europe* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000))
to the country’s accession bid.\textsuperscript{25} From an economic point of view, albeit the preexisting agreements between these countries and the EC regarding the regulation of imports and exports of agricultural goods, the agricultural sectors of the Mediterranean future members posed a direct threat to the interests of core European member-states — France and Italy in particular. In addition, Spain, Portugal and Greece were three poor southern countries, two of which had large borders with the EC member states, and not insignificantly, large fishery industrial sectors. It is interesting to mention that as a consequence of their accession, they had to significantly cut their production of oranges, grapes and other fruits, as well as various vegetables, olive oil, wine and cheese productions, among other commodities, to match the criteria in the \textit{Acquis Communataire}.\textsuperscript{26} For example, during a visit to Madrid in June 1982 French president François Mitterrand stated bluntly that Spanish accession “under existing circumstances would mean an unfortunate state of anarchy, adding new pressures to those already facing the Communities.”\textsuperscript{27} The accession of the Mediterranean states further necessitated increased intra-Community transfers from the wealthy to the poor countries, which as a consequence led to the first attempts to reform the CAP. In addition, while the problems with fruits and vegetables were resolved successfully, the

\textsuperscript{25} The German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the Bundestag, “Greece, only recently returned to the democratic fold, would march in future with the Community of European nations.” (quote in Dinan 1999: 83).

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Acquis Communataire} is the 80,000 pages of collective body of treaties, directives, and frameworks of the EU.

\textsuperscript{27} Quoted in Dinan1999:107.
fishing industry became a hotly disputed issue, which contingencies continued to be felt well in the 2000s. Finally, the accession of significantly poorer states in the Community required a significant expansion of the Structural Funds, and the creation of the Cohesion Fund. These were all consequences from this enlargement.

As a result, by 1986 the EC doubled its initial number of members. This fact alone rendered the European institutions less functional. The increased transfer of sovereignties to a supranational level led to increased questioning of the democratic nature of the organization. British political scientist David Marquand (1979) warnings about the profound lack of democratic procedures were encapsulated in his catchphrase, the “democratic deficit” (Marquand 1979). Back in the 1970s he came up with a highly critical analysis of the European Community Institutions, essentially launching a diatribe against the European Assembly (later the European Parliament) for its alleged paucity of democratic procedures, such as direct universal suffrage and real representation through elections. Even though direct European Parliamentary elections were introduced in 1979, the catchphrase did not go away, nor did it lose its meaning. Since that time it kept on expanding to become one of the central issues after the SEA and the TEU ratifications in 1986 and 1993, respectively.

28 The number of member states between 1957 and 1986 went from six to twelve in three enlargement waves.
With the growing politicization of the integration issue, and the descent of the era of “permissive consensus,” public support for integration declined drastically in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994). That is also a period of increased acceleration of integration as a result of the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty, the failed European Constitution Treaty, and finally the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, what used to be made possible under the “permissive consensus” — high level nontransparent politics conducted behind closed doors until mid to late 1980s — became increasingly visible and vulnerable to contestation by political parties, resulting in the creation of an altogether new battlefield of political contestation for domestic political actors. The greater politicization of European politics and the death of the permissive consensus did not come suddenly. Rather, it was a long and tedious process, starting as early as the mid 1970s, when the big debate centered on whether the European Community needed to introduce direct election to its newest institution, the European Parliament. Many believed that direct elections would bring greater democratic legitimacy to this institution, and to the Community as a whole, by mere resemblance to the democratic institutional design of the member states.

It must be noted that there are many issues associated with the impossibility of the EC/EU successfully democratizing. First, the European Community / European Union is not an easily definable organization. Due to its
unidentified political character, or as one French politician once called it “un object politique non-identifié,” no traditional political theory on democratization applies directly to the EU. Democracy is a regime type exclusively related to the structure of the state, usually based on a set of rules that govern elected representatives. It is generally accepted that three categories of social actors interrelate in democracy: those who are governed, those who govern, and those who link the first two. In very simple terms, democracy means rule of the people, and rule of the law, with the help of the parties as the legitimate representatives. Using this theoretical framework, two of the major problems with the democratic nature of the EC, and later EU, become immediately evident. First, democratic principles hardly apply to it, since it lacks some crucial characteristics of a state. Second, while there is a rule of law enshrined in the Acquis Communataire, in the existence and rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights envisioned in the 1999 Declaration from Laeken, the rule of the people on European level is clearly missing. Even decades after the initial attempt to democratize the European Community / European Union, and despite the substantial growth of its powers, it is the national institutions which retain monopoly and primary responsibility for ensuring democracy and accountability.


30 It is rather ironic, for example, that the Copenhagen criteria for membership spells out the presence of consolidated and stable democratic system as a necessary prerequisite for accession, yet the EU itself clearly fails that same test on multiple levels.
in the Union, as noted in details by (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Kirchner 1992).\textsuperscript{31}

Second, democratization presupposes the existence of a \textit{demos}; but there is hardly such a collective on a pan-European level, especially in the 1980-1990 period. Even if the model for EC/EU democratization does not necessarily follow the traditional state type, still some form of a \textit{demos} is necessary to comprise the second part an autonomous “democratic” institution – the followers. The essential part about the presence of a pan-European \textit{demos}, or worst – a few \textit{demoi}, is the ability to form a common identity. Such an identity, just like nested national, regional, and local identities, could be evoked by the political parties in time of supranational democratic consolidation of this supranational organization. The notion of a demos is usually considered necessary in the democratic context to indicate the “sovereign” that legitimizes institutions, aggregated into a democratic regime (Dahrendorf 2001:5-6). There is hardly an author writing about the democratic deficit in the European Community / European Union, who does not mention the need to develop some sort of common European identity that would seek a broader representation, beyond the parochialism of the national party systems. However, even in 2009

\textsuperscript{31} With regard to representation, Pippa Norris makes an interesting argument that democratic accountability has three “democratic” venues of enforcement: 1) direct elections of EPs; 2) indirect appointment of EU Commission via domestic elections for government; and 3) interest groups and lobbyists.
such “European” citizenry with truly “European” identity and political worldview remains largely utopian, even for one of the core European countries — France.\textsuperscript{32}

The notion of the \textit{demos} is linked to the existence of representative parties, which would translate the will of self-selected segments of this \textit{demos} into policy. In “traditional” democratic systems political parties are the most viable link between the voters and the government (Diamond 1999; Lijphart and Aitkin 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Sørensen 1993). They carry the wish of the people, and keep the executive power accountable. Political parties are the core of every representative regime, where autonomous organizations are stratified to leaders and followers; where the leaders have the capacity to invoke collective identities, and control the strategic behavior of the followers; where leaders are representatives participating in representative institutions, and where representation makes a difference for the well-being of the followers (Przeworski 1991:89n). The problem is that there are no such truly “European” political parties, which cut across national boundaries, neither in the 1980s, nor the 1990s, nor even today.

Connected to that, furthermore, is the confused identity of the European Parliament. While national parliaments operate within clearly defined political

\textsuperscript{32} A special Eurobarometer edition in 2009, surveying how French feel about European citizenship reveals that only 3\% of participants feel European first, and French second. The majority responded with sometimes European, sometimes French, while 31\% of the participants indicated that they feel French only, and “not really European.” For more see Eurobaromètre Flash, \textit{Quelle Europe? Les Français et la construction européenne}. 2009 European Commission.
domains — legislative bodies comprised by followers with strong feeling of national identity — this is clearly not the case with the EP. Parties, represented in the EP, although grouped across national boundaries, remain representative for traditionally domestic political cleavages: often they campaign on domestic issues, and even when they try, they still cannot escape the traps of the home-state politics.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned impediments, the establishment of direct elections for the EP played a significant role in the elevation of the general debate of European “democratization.” Along with it came also a steady trend towards greater politicization of the European issues on the domestic political stage. For the EP elections to have any meaning issues should have revolved around truly global European questions.

**The Euroscepticism Factor**

The Single European Act (1986) was the first serious revision of the Treaty of Rome, which established the basic functional principles for the European Community. The three main reforms targeted the creation of common internal market, greater political cohesiveness (or European Political Cooperation — EPC), and risky institutional reform. Together, these three main SEA themes amounted to a revolution. The internal market required a series of changes in the
domestic laws of the member states, such as taxation, national standards and regulations. The institutional and political reforms, for their part, required additional changes to domestic law. They also empowered the European Commission, and to a lesser degree the European Parliament, beyond the wildest belief of domestic political actors. In particular, marginal political parties saw no benefits for themselves from all these reforms.

The effects from these changes were further exacerbated by the more radical Treaty on European Union (1992). The Treaty not only created two more “pillars” for the newly created European Union — the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Judicial and Home Affairs (JHA) — but also set the path for the convergence of the monetary system within the Eurozone, as envisioned by the SEA, and the introduction of a single European currency. All this, of course, entailed further dramatic changes in the domestic law of the member states, and a great deal of “sovereignties” transferred to the supranational, that is EU, level. According to the European Commission website, the TEU’s objectives included “strengthen[ing] the democratic legitimacy of the institutions,” and “develop[ing] the Community social dimension.”33 Both these goals were articulated in direct response to the need to democratize the Community. As a result, a new codecision procedure was created under which

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33 European Commission website, last accessed December 3, 2009 <<

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the European Parliament, the only elected body in the entire EU, received new competences, such as the right to adopt acts in conjunction with the European Council, and involved the Parliament in the procedure of confirmation of the European Commission. The Treaty also expanded the EU’s reach over six new areas that previously were entirely domestic realm, including consumer protection, industrial policy, and culture. Finally, it created a European citizenship “over and above national citizenship.” From there on, any citizen of a member-state became also a citizen of the European Union as a whole.

The extent and the repercussions of the decisions made in Brussels that affect the daily lives of the ordinary citizens became very clear after the Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Amsterdam, and especially with the implementation of the new Lisbon Treaty. As Jurgen Habermas (2003: 90) put it, the “Democratic deficit will always result when the circle of those involved in democratic decision-making does not extend to cover the circle of all those affected by those decisions.” The core of the problem then is linked as much to an actual lack of EU-level decision-making legitimacy\(^ {34} \) as is the question of who gets to sit on the table. Undoubtedly, there are many objective reasons criticizing the democratic system. The Commission, for example, is not directly elected political body. The European Council is simply a forum of democratically elected statesmen

representing member states and not direct European constituency. The European Parliament suffers from both, lack of power and lack of mechanisms for exercising effective political accountability in the same way the national parliaments do. According to the classical discussion of supranational organizations, European institutions derive their legitimacy indirectly from elected governments. The problem with the EU, however, is that on one hand the EU is not just an international organization; it is a much more complex political entity. On the other hand, due to the direct impact of its decisions over the daily lives of the ordinary European citizens, a direct form of legitimacy may be necessary.

By itself, the *acquis communautaire*, the complete body of over 80,000 pages community laws at the present, is a powerful collection of documents. According to the provisions in the Treaty of Rome (1957), it takes primacy over the domestic laws, for which is often regarded not only as a sacrosanct set of rules and laws, but also as a such that cannot be changed or debated prior to accession. Thus, it imposes non-negotiable “take-it-or-leave-it” options to new comers. While this method has clearly helped stabilize the new democracies, it has also reduced the EU’s level of legitimacy, often times putting the europolity against the national interests of current, or to-be-members. This was clearly the case with the Norwegians for example, who twice rejected EU accession fearing that membership would threaten both their democratic system and their high welfare expenditure. In a different context, this was the reason Spanish and Portuguese
farmers became one of the most vocal anti-EU groups around the time of their respective countries’ accession into the EU.

In addition, the increased transfer of competences and powers from national to European level effectively reduced the absolute power, that is, the sovereignty of any given state vis-à-vis the other states, both inside the Community / Union and out. In this context, it is fair to say that competences acquired at the EC/EU level are usually lost at the domestic level. The “democratic” issue in this case is, of course, that the competences are transferred without a reciprocal transfer of representation. Thus, the democratic deficit emerges from the fact that some of the crucial decisions are taken at the EU level without any real popular representation. In the context of this debate, Habermas is correct to observe that “the EU bureaucratic decisions offer the kind of democratic deficit that emerges in result of the transfer of the national competences to intergovernmental commissions, staffed by governmental representatives” (ibid., 90).

All these changes had profound repercussions for domestic politics. Where mainstream parties saw an opportunity to solidify their role as conductors of European politics – and benefits – in the domestic realm, the marginal and predominantly extreme parties saw an opportunity to restructure the domestic political arrangements and in the process carve out a larger niche for themselves.
This is, indeed the place, consistent with Kitschelt’s model, where extreme parties sought to restructure domestic politics and extrapolate advantages from the inevitable conflicts resulting from integration and the transfer of sovereignties on a European level. In the empirical section, I test that argument by comparing the presence of European topics in the parties’ manifestos since 1979, as well as the direction of their positions.

European integration impacted three main domains: economic, political and social. The internal market, the common currency and the industrial, environmental, and competition regulations had enormous impact on domestic economies. One of the main eurosceptic themes is consistent with the economic changes from the integration process. The socio-economic changes create a sort of center-periphery conflict between those groups, which are threatened by the status quo revision, and those who benefit from it (Hix 2005: 151; see also Gabel 1998a; 1998b). The socio-economic aspect of the European integration elicited the wrath of far left and far right political parties. In the various reforms, the far left unabatedly was seeing conspiratorial steps towards economic liberalization as a form of “capitalist” exploitation project, centralization of banking systems, and marginalization of workers’ power by marginalizing the unions. The SEA, for example, targeted the elimination of non-tariffs barriers (NTB), which led to the need for a more comprehensive liberation of trade, and the elimination of domestic protectionist practices. Far left parties saw this as a move towards
greater corporatism. Their euroscepticism was matched in force by the protectionist push of rural agrarian parties. They recognized that the reforms, especially those related to the CAP and the Structural and Cohesion Funds, were a perilous silhouette of globalization. Free trade and competitiveness were not the tools the rural parties elites wanted as response to globalization. Instead, they continually insisted on greater protectionism.

Right-wing marginal party echoed the same anti-capitalist, anti-globalization, and anti-corporatist arguments. They add anti-immigration and pro-sovereignty elements to their discourse. In this way it became difficult for observers to differentiate between left and right extreme ideological arguments. The liberalized flow of people meant greater ability of unskilled workers to travel freely across the European polity. This fact entailed practical and emotional dimensions. On the one hand, unskilled workers could now move to locations with greater demand for their services, therefore threatening the interests of local unskilled workers. Jean-Marie Le Pen incessantly preached against the loss of sovereignty and campaigned on the slogan “Keep France for the French,” to which Philippe de Villiers added the threatening image of a “Polish plumber” as a metaphor for cheap labor coming from Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the incessant enlargements, especially with Turkey’s perspective accession, fueled further anti-immigration and xenophobic arguments across Europe. The debates about role of Muslim communities and their integration in the member-states
exacerbated the fear for many Europeans that “their” culture and national identity are already morbidly diluted. This is particularly valid for those, who identify themselves exclusively with their nation-state, as opposed to other forms of “inclusive,” one could say “nested,” multiple identities (Hooghe & Marks 2004; see also 2005b).

The eurosceptic arguments from all sides tend to converge also around the political aspects of opposition. The dissatisfaction with the way EU represents the interests of the ordinary citizens and lack of legitimacy of the European institutions, is a frequent refrain in the rhetoric of extreme left and right eurosceptic parties, as well as rural, social conservative, and others. The lack of democratic legitimacy becomes a proxy outlet for economic, social, cultural, and political opposition. In that sense, it represents the clearest example of a policy “black box,” stuffed with various issues depending on the context of the user. In some cases, political euroscepticism is directed against the growing federalism of the European Union. Currently, the European Union has an anthem, a flag, a de facto constitution in the form of Lisbon Treaty, a President and Foreign High Representative, a government-like Commission, a Parliament, a Central Bank, a court, a police (Europol), common borders, etc. This type of federalization becomes the target of criticism. In others, the political opposition is equated with the de-homogenization of the “European culture,” an argument that frequently mixes Islamophobia, xenophobia, and ethnicity with democracy and politics. At
times, the political aspect is used to denote the loss of sovereignty, and to target the enormous powers granted to the European Commission to govern and regulate the environmental, social, commercial, and other aspects of the community life.

In result of this great centralization in all aspects of the political, economic and social existence of the member-states, the frustration of the political elites in the periphery, and the constituent groups whose interests they represent, amounts to ever more vocal opposition to European integration and the European Union as a whole — a manifestation of the gradual politicization of the European issue. This process, which started in the mid-1970s, accelerated with the SEA and TEU and exploded with the referendums on the Euro and on the Constitutional Treaty. Had the Lisbon Treaty be put before the voters for ratification by more than just one state the chances are that it would have followed the Constitutional Treaty’s destiny.35 Save for the unorthodox Czech president and his desire to enter history at any cost, there was a general tacit agreement among the governments of the European member-states to ratify the Lisbon Treaty as quietly as possible and as far away as possible from heated public debates. That fact, in and of itself recognizes the growing power of peripheral political elites and their challenge the centrality of European policy decision-making processes. The way the Lisbon Treaty was ratified signals a major turn towards a new type of realpolitik by the

35 Ireland has constitutional obligation to do so.
core elites, depleted from the idealism and endeavor for popular democratic management of the European integration, which characterized the first turn to popular referendums in early 1990s. Realizing the hard truth that the general lack of popularity and enthusiasm among the general public for “ever closer Europe,” when coupled with the growing power of the grass-root opposition launched by the peripheral political elites, amounts to a powerful anti-European force, the core elites have taken gradual steps to decouple once again as much as possible European politics from domestic ones. This is, indeed, a sign of a general shift towards more elitist democracy, a reduced dependency on momentary popular attitudes, and more on strategic vision for development, even if it has to be imposed despite the vocal opposition of the “demos.”

This turnaround is not confined to European politics nor is it limited to the European continent. The growing dependency of the elected policy-makers in consolidated democratic countries on poll-measured momentary public attitudes is, in general, a positive trend. Arguably, this is among the greatest appeals of the democratic ideology. This dynamic, however, becomes a powerful weapon in the hands of peripheral political entrepreneurs because of the momentum it creates. The shift towards greater dependency of policies’ enactment by the momentary attitudes of the general public, measured in constant public polls, deprives core elites of their ability to act on strategic visions that require hard to understand trade-offs. This trend is more than just a challenge to
the “trust me” argument, which layed at the foundation of the permissive consensus. It also represents a challenge by the periphery of the old, central, and often times closed political elites. Ironically, the same destructive force of populism is the clearest proof for the actual democratization of the European Union and its politics. Opposition to greater and deeper European integration, even in its most populist form, unavoidably points to the complexity of creating a functioning supranational political entity by using as its main ingredients the same founding political, economic and social principles that constitute the democratic nation-state: representation, demos and exclusive identity. The need to “democratize” this polity should not be understood as just some negative, marginal populist trend. This tendency is also manifest in the wider discussion over the future of Europe, and indeed the future of the nation-state. The irrational fear that the anti-European populist elites seek to create in the general public serves as an antidote to the all glorious idealism that comes from the pro-European elitist integration promoted by mainstream parties. Anti-European populism, in that sense, challenges the inflexible rigidity of mainstream politics, confined to the traditional ideological domain of left-right, with a dose of social and cultural trepidation that serves the goals of the eurosceptic elites. As a result, the “democratization” of the European issue raises the awareness of many, previously apathetic and passive citizens, about the importance of European integration and the consequences it has for them. It would be wrong to assume
that all these new participants in the European politics necessarily subscribe to the anti-European camp, although undoubtedly many do.

As with any such “democratization” process, the drawback of course, is most visible in the quality of policy-making. Mainstream core elites tend to be socially more responsible, which is reflected in many of the past policies they were able to push at the European level. Today the Euro is much stronger than the US dollar, and it is the choice currency for half of China’s reserve. The governing efficiency of the European Commission is considered by some analysts to be higher than that of the British government even by those who are not exactly friendly to the EU idea (Taylor 2007). Despite all the criticisms of the European Parliament and its powers, European elections represent the largest simultaneous act of exercise of democratic freedoms in the world, performed by twenty seven countries, all in the same time. These successful milestones would not have been possible without the ability of the old core elites to push ahead with their agenda. The democratization of the integration process, has its own caveat — insecurity. Core elites vulnerability to peripheral populism decreases the quality and efficiency of governance. But it is unmistakable sign for the growing politicization of the issue of European integration issue in domestic and European politics, which coincidently is the main argument of this chapter.
Empirical Evidence

The data for the actual empirical test of the arguments in the previous part of the chapter, and the analysis which followed, comes from the Comparative Manifesto Project. In the actual computation of the comparative graphs I combined data from the original Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945—1998 and its second part Mapping Policy Preferences II, which includes manifestos from 1990 to 2003. The data is only for the fifteen EU members who joined before the 2004 “big-bang” enlargement.

The assumption made throughout the entire chapter is that with the deepening of European integration, we will be able to observe increased levels of politicization of the European issue. From here follows that the first pick should coincide with the first expression of the changing, or more precisely — deepening, of the political dynamics governing the European Community. The first direct elections in 1979 are precisely this type of event. The problem with the CMP data is that it covers only party manifestos for national elections; therefore, we can only speculate that the European topic will appear tangentially in the party manifestos for elections held around that time. Following Reif and Schmitt (1980), at the time European elections were considered to be “second order” national elections, unlike “first-order” elections for national political office. Although European elections are carried out on the national stages by the same national political parties, and most often than not governed by the same national
political issues of the day, presumably they could not be inferred to be any less related to the European issue than the national ones. Therefore, one can assert that there is some overlap between national and European elections, with regard to the issues raised by the political parties, and European topics in particular. Expectedly, European issues may not have primacy in the domestic topics of contestation. But if we observe an increase the frequency of reference to the European issue in political parties’ manifestos for national elections we can confidently assume that Europe will occupy at least the same level of prominence in the European elections. In brief, if we observe an increase of the frequency of references to Europe in the political parties’ manifestos for national elections, this must be as equally valid for the European elections. Figure 2.1 is a histogram of the frequency of all positive and negative references to Europe in the parties’ manifestos from 1979 to 2003 (2005 in the case of UK), represented as a percentage of the entire manifesto.

As is evident in this comparative analysis of party manifestos, the increasing frequency of references to Europe is correlated with the deepening of the European integration. The red line is a linear logarithmic function, computed on the basis of the data, which indicates the actual increase.36

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36 It is important to note here that the CMP has many caveats, some of the major ones of which are discussed in greater length in chapter three.
For the purpose of the current discussion, it must be noted that the way the manifestos are coded, by quasi sentences, only indicates direction (upward or downward) and not the intensity of euroscepticism. For example, consider the following two examples: hypothetically party $A$ has only one quasi sentence dedicated to European Union. The sentence is, for purposes of this elaboration, quite straightforward: “We hate everything about the European Union.” At the same time party $B$ has a slightly more elaborate statement about the European Union: two full sentences. Whereas the first one can be further separated in two quasi sentences, the second one is also a single quasi sentence by itself: “In general, we support the existence of the European Union, but we oppose the
current drive towards greater European federalism. We also oppose the monetary policy of the European Union currently in place.” According to the way the texts are coded in the CMP, party $A$ will have one instance of negative reference to EU. If the total quasi sentences in the given manifesto add up to one hundred, the negative EU references will be 1% of the total, and 1% of the combined positive and negative references. In party $B$'s case, if the quasi sentences in the manifesto are again one hundred, then 2% of them will be negative and 1% positive, with a total of 3% of all quasi sentences in the manifesto. If we plug into the Figure 2.1 histogram the two hypothetical parties, we would conclude that party $B$ is twice as eurosceptical as party $A$, and three times more politically oriented towards the EU. While the conclusion that party $B$ has a more elaborate position towards Europe is be correct, we would be wrong to say that party $B$ is more eurosceptic than party $A$. Therefore, we must look directly into the content of the manifesto.

In the current examination of the data, the collective frequency of references to Europe, both positive and negative, is sufficient to point to the direction of the issue's politicization. The histogram on Figure 2.1 does indicate that for the overall period between the beginning of 1970s until the middle of 2000s. Looking into the periods from 1979 (the first direct EP elections) to 1984, right before the introduction to the general public of the plans for the great revision of the Treaty of Rome by the Single European Act, it is clear that almost
all references to the European Community are made by marginal parties. In Figure 2.2 the X-axis represents the percentage of votes won in a given election in the period, and the Y-axis represents the intensity and direction of mentioning of the European Community. The blue line indicates the collected value for all positive and negative references to Europe, while the red line indicates the direction of the reference as the difference of all positive ones minus all negative ones.

Interestingly, for that period, most references to Europe are made by political parties, which won about 5% of the vote. When we consider the fact

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Figure 2.2: References to Europe (intensity and direction) 1979-1984

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that this is also the most frequent threshold for entering the parliament in the majority of the European countries, one can almost certainly make the claim that the some marginal parties have included the European issue in their manifestos in attempt to expand the dimensions of political contestation. One more interesting trend is notable, namely that most coalitional parties — those which won between 15% and 25% of the vote — have, as a group, any references to Europe. Individual mainstream parties, such as the UK Labor party (36.94% in 1979), the Greek PASOK (48.07% in 1981) and the Irish Fianna Fail (45.20% in 1982) have also made negative references in their respective party manifestos.\footnote{Their cases have been discussed by others and they represent separate incidences, not indicative of the actual trends.}

The second observed period between 1985 and 1989 reflected the impact from the Single European Act. As already discussed, this was the first major revision of the foundational Treaty of Rome. Expectedly, the intensity of the discussion of Europe in the manifestos of the political parties increased. The increased frequency of referring to the European issue by marginal parties, whose share of the vote at the end hardly surpasses 3%, as well as preserved trend of reference by the parties which have scored between 5% and 10%, is particularly noticeable. What is more interesting, the direction and intensity of referencing is peaking in the marginal parties; but there are some positive references made by some of the 5-10% parties, a clear sign of the diversification of the politicization
of the issue. Such references are made, for example, by the Dutch Libertarians D66, and the French Front National.

The position of Le Pen’s party must not surprises us. It only indicates the FN’s initial pro-European orientation, which started to change drastically in 1989-1990 with increased discussions for the next major reform, the Maastricht Treaty, and possible EU enlargement to the East and North. Before the end of 1989 the FN’s strategic assessment of the European issue was quite the opposite. Le Pen and his lieutenants considered Europe as a possible venue for contestation of the
mainstream parties. His closest competitors on the right were the Gaullists, which by default were intergovernmentalist, ergo not exactly pro-European. Also, the *Front National* at that point was not yet targeting the far left disillusioned by globalization and economic liberalization constituents. Eastern Europe communism had yet to fall, the influx of desperate skilled workers had yet to intensify, and the vociferous call of the Eastern Europeans for a “return to Europe” had yet to be heard.

One more interesting observation of the comparison from this period is not the increase of positive references to Europe in the manifestos of major political parties (those with 15% or more of the vote). Even more importantly, the frequency of general references made by the mainstream parties to European integration also increased significantly. This is an indication that mainstream party leaders’ need felt obliged to come out in support of the increased European integration process. Whereas before they preferred to deal with European integration quietly, behind closed doors, they now chose to address the issue in their party manifestos as a direct dialogue with their constituents. This fact alone is a clear testimony for the politicization of the issue. The sporadic negative instances of references to Europe among the parties with large share of the vote, comes again from PASOK (0.12% of the 1985 manifesto) and Fianna Fail (0.31% of the 1987 manifesto). The most pro-European references for the same period
came from the French Socialists (5.10% of the 1988 manifesto) and the Dutch Christian Democrats (4.10% of the 1989 manifesto).

The third period is from 1990 to 1996. Three important events took place during that time. First, communism in Eastern Europe collapsed, therefore opening the great debate that came to dominate the European politics — the need to enlarge towards the east. Second, the big debate about the Maastricht Treaty, and the referendums in Ireland, France and Denmark took their first casualty in the Danish “no” and the French “petit oui.” Finally, the debate about the Treaty of Amsterdam started to take shapes.
Figure 2.4 confirm the trends already observed in the previous periods: the majority of the opposition comes from the marginal parties. It is notable, however, that the intensity increased. Compared to the previous periods, opposition to the European integration from parties which have gained about 5% of the vote at a given elections has increased, as has anti-Europe rhetoric in parties that gained about 10% of the vote in national elections. In the mean time, the only mainstream party, which according to the data has expressed more negative than positive attitudes towards the EU in its party manifesto is the British Conservatives (1.10% of the 1992 manifesto). All other mainstream parties have come out in support of the EU and the reforms provisioned by the Maastricht Treaty. By now, it must be already clear that it is primarily small parties, which make negative European references in their manifestos. There is also surge of EU support among the parties which gained around 20% of the vote. These parties usually participate in wide coalitions, or oppositional mainstream parties, as is the case with the Dutch Labor Party and Christian Democrat Appeal.

Figure 2.5 is a histogram of selected eurosceptic parties and how their attitude towards Europe has changed between 1979 and 2005. There are three interesting trends. First is the case of the British Conservatives, which started as pro-European and finished as eurosceptics. As already noted, mainstream British euroscepticism is a separate case and does not make one of the case studies in this
research. The second interesting trend is similar to the case of British Conservatives inconsistency, the French Front National. As noted, and then further discussed in chapters three and five, Le Pen’s party started as generally pro-European, but soon changed its general course. The evolution of the FN’s position towards the European integration is a textbook case study of strategic euroscepticism, and this becomes quite evident from the histogram. Finally, and perhaps the most interesting of all, is the position of the Austrian FPÖ, led by the charismatic political entrepreneur Jörg Haider. As discussed in chapter four, Haider switched FPÖ’s European position a few times, with the biggest change occurring after the 1999 elections, when his party suddenly became a coalition partner. Following the histogram, after that the FPÖ made a major turnaround. It largely abandoned its anti-European populist rhetoric in a desperate attempt to repair some of the damage to its image, as Austria has been put under a symbolic diplomatic cordon sanitaire by the other European member states, as well as by Israel and the United States.

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38 Haider’s life tragically ended on October 11, 2008 in a car accident. Police reports have confirmed that the level of alcohol in his blood has been 1.8 mg/L, more than three times the legal limit of 0.5 mg/L.
Finally, let us look at Figure 2.6, which covers the period between 1997 and 2005. The first noticeable trend is the increased politicization of the European issue as discussed in the manifestos of all political parties, small and large, mainstream and marginal. Even more interestingly, the pro-European references not only increased in the manifestos of the parties with share of the vote 15% or more, but also among those with less than 15% of the vote. This is a very important observation, because this also supports the argument presented in chapter 5 — one that predicts that small parties which consider themselves...
coalitionable, strategically will present themselves pro-European under certain conditions, in order to gain position in a coalition government.

Figure 2.6 References to Europe (intensity and direction) 1997-2005

Based on the presented data, three conclusions follow. First, with the intensification of European integration, the European issue became more salient, as discussed in the manifestos of the political parties, both mainstream and marginal. Second, the parties with small voting share have been consistently more concerned with discussing European integration in their political manifestos. And third, with the greater politicization of the European issue, the positions of the
mainstream parties have consolidated around support for the EU, and deepening of the integration. In the meantime, the positions of the small and marginal parties have gradually diversified. While in the beginning of the observed period their positions were almost exclusively negative, in the last period they have been inconsistently mixed — a trend, most plausibly explained with the strategic consideration of some of them to present themselves as coalitionable, while others embarking on hard opposition to Europe.

**Conclusion**

The gradual politicization of the European issue led to the end of the permissive consensus, which characterized this behind the scenes, elite-driven functional integration on pan-European regional economic level. Each layer of the integration, on every step, was generally conceived and negotiated behind closed doors. Until then, the deepening of the political, economic, and social ties between the member states was executed by the political elites of the member states with the blind approval, and with the overall ignorant blessing, from the general public and no less ignorant peripheral political elites. At the time the public seemed more consumed by the ideological conflict with the communist east, than by concerns over such issues as the cumbersome bureaucratization of European Commission, the lack of direct accountability, or by the partial
secession of national sovereignties to this same bureaucratic and unaccountable supranational authority.

It is worth mentioning that the ideological divide of the Cold War was an important factor for political and economic consolidation during the ‘permissive consensus’ era. The emergence of the Cold War with all its repercussions for domestic, regional, and global politics, has contributed towards the growth and strengthening of the European movement (Dinan 1999:16). Its sudden end in 1989-1990 opened new venues for political contestation, on grounds not very popular before that, mainly because they were seen as giving up to the common ideological enemy. The model of liberal democracies in Western Europe during the Cold war was heavily organized around the antagonism between the political left and political right, between the ideological political and socio-economical models of the Soviet Union and the United States, between labor and capital. In this political context the extremes of left and right were practically nonexistent as viable political actors, mainly because of their ideological irrelevance in the context of the same ideological cleavage between the mainstream political parties.

With the end of the Cold War this structure came largely to an end, forcing the mainstream political parties to converge on some and diverge on others lines of political contestation in light of the new challenges of globalization, changing ideological and security environment, shifting of identities, and the progressive
entrancement of common European market principles of organization. This shift enabled newly developed small political parties on the margins to emerge to the national political theatre, embracing clearly articulated eurosceptic positions. These parties were, for the most part, located on the extremes of the political spectrum, either in the far left or in the far right. For them, regardless on which part of the ideological divide they were, exploiting anti-European topics during the height of the Cold War was rather irrational and counter-productive political move. On the one hand, in the context of the ideological struggle, for a right-wing ultra nationalist party to take strong anti-European project position would have meant effectively to lose support and credibility among the majority of its constituents, whose political affiliation was built on common disdain and fear of aggressively proliferating communism. On the other hand, for an ultra-leftist party to come out with arguments against the European project would have been ineffective and counter-productive: regardless of its nature, European integration was rather facilitating the repeated attempts by left-wing parties to build transnational coalitions of united laborers across Europe. They stood to lose more than they could gain from openly opposing the European project. Of course, it would be wrong to claim that no such parties existed. The Greek communist party and the French Trotskyites are but two examples.

With the end of the Cold War many of the lingering political conflicts that seemed tamed by the dynamics of the ideological conflict, and by the dominance
of the statist politics, came up to the surface. Marginal parties found new source of political emancipation in the form of populism and revolt against the elitist politics of the ever more entrenched, inflexible, and irresponsive to closer scrutiny politics of the mainstream political parties. The new areas of political contestation, along with the way this contestation was conducted by the marginal political parties, brought along structural changes in which the rhetoric of populism could no longer be excluded on grounds of ideological or practical reasons. The era of the permissive consensus was replaced by a period that could be termed “the revolt of the ants against the elephants.” There is, however, a better way to sum up the changes: democratization of the European integration process.
Chapter 3

Euroscepticism: Old Cleavages or New Strategies

Chapter two examined how the intensification of European integration has led to the gradual politicization of the issues related to increasing transfer of sovereignties from national to supranational level and to the death of the permissive consensus. This chapter takes on the theoretical question dealing with the nature of euroscepticism. On the one hand, there is some evidence indicating that this issue is ideological in nature and thus it is associated with party positions in the electoral arena, reflecting wider, albeit new, social cleavages in Europe. On the other hand, the issue fails some of the basic tests that would indicate its structural nature. These deficiencies confirm its strategic nature. The most important implication from such a conclusion strikes at the heart of another theoretical debate associated with strategy
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vs. ideology in party politics — that of the relationship between voters’ preferences and parties’ strategic choices. This chapter examines some of the classical theoretical frameworks with regard to preference reflection vs. preference cuing, and offers a general discussion of the flaws of the former argument from both methodological and empirical perspective.

The rest of the chapter will offer an extensive discussion of the main thesis — namely that euroscepticism is strategic and not ideological in origin and character. Building on collected empirical evidence from a large number of parties’ manifestos and after conducting factual context analysis, I demonstrate that the ideological argument fails to stand in the face of empirical research. Armed with this evidence, this chapter concludes by venturing into a more detail oriented analysis of the strategic nature of euroscepticism. It illustrates the failure of the structural/ideological argument through a brief discussion of a striking electoral union between what I call two ‘strange bedfellows’ in a classical case of a eurosceptical party — the French Front National.

As outlined in the introduction chapter, this study is driven by a series of hypotheses, which lay out a roadmap for analyzing the strategic character of euroscepticism, and researching the conditions for its appearance and evolution. Euroscepticism is neither an ideological issue pertaining to the traditional Left/Right divide, running parallel or orthogonal to the divide as part of new social cleavage.
Instead, it can be best explained as a set of strategic decisions made by political elites, appealing on the ‘gut feeling’ of disgruntled and exasperated strata of the society.

It is not merely the populist character of the appeal that defines euroscepticism as strategic, but the observed incoherence between traditional ideological cleavages and adoption of anti-European policies and positions. Part of the existing confusion with regard to the structural vs. strategic character of euroscepticism is inherently linked to the discussion in the previous chapter. It is impossible to determine the nature of euroscepticism by looking at its political origins by searching for a long-standing socio-economic cleavage. Indeed, explained in the previous chapter, the conditions for politicization of the issue became ripe only in the wake of the Cold War’s demise, with Central and Eastern European countries flooding the checkpoints of the European Community / European Union, and also due to of death of the *permissive consensus*. While many have rightfully observed that the problem with European integration became salient only in the beginning to mid 1990s, its origins can be traced back to endogenous and exogenous changes of the status quo, associated largely with integration, democratization, liberalization, and transformation of the EC into the EU, and the end of the Cold War. These events enabled the superficial appearance of anti-Europeanism. However, it took a conscious effort by certain political parties to transform this condition, constructing
from it what will be described in chapter five as a viable de-Europeанизation strategy. The following section looks into this conundrum of ideology vs. strategy.

Theories and Models of Euroscepticism

If the intensification of European integration provides the structural framework for rising euroscepticism, then the political parties are its engine. Among them, marginal parties are at the eurosceptical helm. This claim remains valid regardless of whether the euroscepticism is considered ideological or strategic in nature. Almost all aspects of political and economic integration provide opportunities for partisan contestation. The end of the 1980s was not only a time of political liberalization in Eastern Europe. It was also a period of symbolic political liberalization with regard to politicization of the issues of the European Community/Union within the well established democracies of Western Europe. Since the beginning of the end of the permissive consensus, sometime in the mid-1980s, more and more political parties tried to occupy the political niche of euroscepticism, venturing in different form and intensity. European integration was no longer terra sancta for them, although the acquis communautaire did manage to secure a somewhat sacrosanct position in most of the debates. Ironically, European integration — with its hallmarks the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty — was gradually falling victim to its own success. More and more voices from both left and right were calling for a halt, if not a reversal, to further deepening.
In this context, two main theoretical approaches are used to explain the rise of euroscepticism: a structural explanation analyzing the ideological cleavages in terms of “traditional” vs. “new” divides, and a strategic actor or rational choice explanation, tackling the relationship between elite and mass preferences. Applying structural arguments, a plausible approach to the internal dynamics of these processes, is provided in the literature on domestic contestation and policy formation. The classical study of social cleavages formation by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) is a good starting point in approaching the problem of political conflict formation and ideologies in the context of domestic political contestation. Consistent, to a degree, with this model is Kopecky and Mudde’s (2002) analysis of euroscepticism which holds that party ideology is a powerful explanatory variable for the inclination of political groups to develop anti-European positions. In essence, both paradigms represent a linear approach, where the divide is part of the existing left-right ideological basis. From here, it can be inferred that European integration is not an isolated phenomenon; rather, it is deeply rooted in the structural design of the domestic politics at both the socio-political and economic levels. Therefore, it is associated with the locus occupied by a particular party on the ideological continuum.

Theorizing further over the issues of European integration, the general argument of most mainstream structural studies dealing with problems of social cleavages is that these issues are deeply rooted in the rudimentary socio-political and
ideological divides that have marked traditional European politics. Such analyses also require more complex, multidimensional models, where the new divide can be seen either as unrelated to the traditional ideological divide — therefore orthogonally situated in a bi-dimensional analytical plane (Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997) — or fused onto the existing one along a single dimension (Tsebelis and Garret 2000), or somewhat intermingled and related to, but not necessarily coinciding with, the traditional left/right divide (Marks and Hooghe 1999; 2001).

Not necessarily at odds with structural explanations is another theoretical approach focusing on the strategic choices and preference formation of political elites, where Downs (1957) sets the political parties in a dynamic, vote maximizing behavioral competition. Indeed, studies of party politics and contestation inevitably require an understanding of the political dynamics of the issue-voter-political party relationship. The inter-party political competition focuses more on strategic objectives, such as party organization, survival, policy setting, and winning of office, than simply reflecting ideological doctrines. Therefore, considering the strategic politics of democratic party competition is perhaps at least as important, if not more so, than the underlying structural framework of the ideological social divide which the political parties represent.

Among the most notable recent dynamic models explaining euroscepticism through that strategic interaction between elite and voters’ preferences is that of Sitter
(2003) who argues that party-based euroscepticism is a function of strategic decision. Building on classical theories of political parties as being vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking (Sartori 1976; Strom 1990; Wolinetz 1991; 2002) with the goal of propelling a candidate into office, he added a fourth goal: organizational survival. It seems that the first three goals do not necessarily correlate with the forth. There exists abundant empirical evidence pointing to the long existence of various political parties, which have never been able to win a major election, or send a candidate in office. Seen from a different angle, though, no party that cannot guarantee its organizational survival can send a candidate into office. In the mean time, however, not sending one into office does not necessarily mean the political death of that party. Organizational survival, it seems, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the other three goals to materialize. In general, the current study concurs with Sitter’s strategic model on many of the basic theoretical points. Where it largely diverges from the previous works in the field, is in its dynamic approach, offering more comprehensive, more detailed and yet parsimonious explanation for the structure-choice dependency in the strategic adherence and use of euroscepticism by the political parties. The task of correctly identifying the strategic motivations behind the process of adopting eurosceptic positions, by both, marginal and mainstream parties, is not easy. Often, what explains the strategic motivation of the former, defies the strategic motivation of the latter.
Classical assumptions about party behavior in the rational choice literature suggest that the goal of all political parties revolves around pursuit of office (Axelrod 1970; Downs 1957; Riker 1962). But more recent works provide convincing evidence that the marginal parties may be ‘vote-seeking’ but not necessarily ‘office-seeking’ and vice versa (Strom 1990). To this end, Tsebelis’s now classic *Nested Games* (1990) provides a dynamic model of political elites’ strategic decision-making. By focusing on Belgian complex political contestation he examines the payoffs from breaking parliamentary deadlocks by cooperating with partisan rivals – a behavior that ran contrary to vote maximizing assumptions. This is important since it marks an attempt of developing a dynamic model based on interaction, not just an assumption of the actors’ preferences and goals, and fits well the current argument.

One general problem with the strategic approach argument is that Downs (1957: 47) perceived voters’ preferences as fixed, given, and well defined, which means that political manifestos, speeches, and other advertisement would not significantly alter the electoral outcome. Indeed, as Patrick Dunleavy (Dunleavy 1992:4) correctly observes, the problem of many public choice theories rest on restrictive and inflexible premises, assuming people had complete and perfect information prior to making political decisions, exogenously fixed preferences, and both, patron and clients, to act on a single maximizing course of action open to...
them. As a result, we should expect quick convergence of policies by the main political parties around the median voter preferences, which is largely disproved by virtually all empirical observation of various democratic party systems, regardless of their specific type. Even in the United States, where due to its idiosyncratic characteristics of the regime design, electoral rules, one should expect greater convergence around the median voter as described by Downs, the evidence shows enduring differences between the parties, which cannot be accounted for by this notion of fixed voters’ preferences and preference acquisition strategies of political parties. In that sense Schumpeter’s (1934) pessimistic outlook at politics as being manipulated and fashioned by political entrepreneurs seems much more plausible and comes much closer to reality.

Dunleavy furthers this argument, claiming that political elites do not merely reflect the preferences of the voters, but also try actively to shape them. As he quite compellingly argues, political parties are frequently faced with two competing strategies: preference accommodating and preference-shaping ones (Dunleavy 1992:112-144). The specific balance between the two is achieved on a case to case basis, considering idiosyncratic differences of the political context. Since he is

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39 Another interesting logical flaw in the Downsian model is that he makes a strong case for the power of the government and how incumbent political party becomes the “locus of ultimate power in its society, i.e. it can coerce all other groups into obeying its decisions, whereas they cannot similarly coerce it” (Downs, 1957:21-23). This argument, in and of itself, contradicts his main premise that political parties struggle to accommodate the median voters’ preferences by suggesting that the governing party has enough power to shift these preferences. For additional discussion on this theoretical discrepancy see Dunleavy (1992: 112-119).

40 For more on these enduring differences, see Chappell, H. W. and Keech, W. R. 1986. Party motivation and party difference in a dynamic spatial model of party competition. American Political Science Review 80, no. 4: 1065-87.
looking at party strategies in general, his hypothesis allows for variance of passive and active strategies in terms of voters’ preferences accommodation and voter’s preferences shaping. This current study adopts the latter approach. Most notably, euroscepticism has become a fundamental component of the political portfolios of the marginal parties, enabled by the politicization of the European integration and the ensuing death of permissive consensus, providing them with significant tool for contestation and carving out of a niche for themselves in the political spectrum. This is, indeed, in tunes with Dunleavy, who notes:

[A]n account of how parties and candidates try to change voters’ preferences explains the considerable advantage, which accrue to incumbents from deploying state power with an eye for partisan advantage. Multiple factors influence how party leaders choose between preference-accommodating and preference-shaping strategies, rooted in the characteristics of the party systems… Successful parties are simply those where politicians are more skillful than their opponents in presenting a case. (Dunleavy 1992:112-4)

The general thrust of most rational choice hypotheses postulates that while there is some preexisting proximity between various party positions and voters’ preferences, it is by specific political parties’ choice to heighten in prominence issues, considered strategically important such as European integration, in attempt to monopolize the initiative of framing it and therefore to set the discussion agenda with relative competitive advantage for itself (Carmines and Stimson 1986:902-3). Indeed, with regard to the general top-down preference cuing, some authors have even made
the explicit argument that their policies and electoral issues are all conceptualized, driven, and cued by political elites (Riker 1982). In that respect, Riker makes the case that political parties strive to rise to prominence, in part, by pushing salient political issues, which they favor and give them strategic advantage over other political competitors, in order to offer the alternative issue as a platform of contestation that will allow them to “beat the current winner” (ibid., 209).

In chapters four and five this argument is extended to account for the appearance of eurosceptical policy positions among both, mainstream and marginal political parties. Arguably, political entrepreneurs not only strive to politicize issues that they have identified as potential for salience by framing it in a specific way to reflects their own preferences and goals. They also gain strategic electoral advantage so long as they can remain the sole champions of the particular issue. The last conclusion also comes with significant implication for the form and type of euroscepticism. How political issues are framed is often contingent upon the number of actors that choose to use them in their election portfolios, their size, position in the system, and inter-relations with other political actors. Such variance in strategies can very well explain, I argue, why some regionalist and nationalist parties embrace militant euroscepticism while others do not.
Empirical Analysis

Although the structural / ideological approach has significant explanatory power, on a macro level it fails to explain some variations of outcome. Since it rests too much on a social cleavage explanation, which inevitably remain frozen in time and do not allow for flexible evolutionary change, it fails to grasp the dynamism of euroscepticism as it evolves. First, if the issue of European integration is part of a greater ideological divide, it is hard to explain why we find equally strong zeal by some political parties on both sides of the divide, left and right, to oppose the European Union and the European Integration. Alternatively, if the issue is stand-alone ideological one, therefore running orthogonally to the traditional left-right divide, we should expect to observe relatively consistent presence over time and relative stable presence in terms of intensity and form.

The classic study of party cleavages by Lijphart and Rokkan (1967) argued that the 16th and 17th century Reformation and the Counter-Reformation produced a division between those who aligned with the Church and those who sided with the State, thus splitting society into secular and religious groups. It also argued that this was only one of a series of cleavages occurring over the next couple of centuries, resulting in the present day political party divisions. Others include center and periphery cleavage, democracy-autocracy cleavage, consequences of the agricultural and industrial revolutions, Soviet and Fascist totalitarianism, and post-industrial
European integration. All these dynamics, according to the authors, have produced clear cut party families based on ideological and interest differences.

If ideology underwrites euroscepticism, we should expect to observe relative consistency and coherence among parties from the same ideological family across the border towards the issue of European integration, just as this is true for other socioeconomic and political issues. To be sure, ideological positions are nothing more than a set of fixed attitudes towards vital economic, political, and social issues firmly enshrined in an idealized blueprint which is preached by a given political elite. They usually consist of visions of how the society should be structured and how it should function, arguing therefore that it would be better off replacing the status quo with the one that is prescribed.

Following this paradigm, parties from the communist and socialist family for example, build their ideology, in different degrees, on the classical Marxist view of society as innately divided by class antagonism. They preach a set of political and economic reforms which together will bring about greater equality and fair distribution of goods and services. Most if not all parties from the socialist/communist family support state intrusion in the market place to correct the “unfair” outcomes from laissez faire capitalist economy principles, even when they formally support them. In addition, most parties from this family are fairly ‘international,’ meaning that they endorse international ties. Yet many are anti-
globalists; some are expressively pacifists, and all are staunch defenders of the workers’ unions as forms of collective means of opposition to the interests of the owners of production, that is investors. Liberals, for their part, emphasize the individual’s political, economic, and social freedom above that of the society. They fight for a smaller state’s intervention and greater defense of personal rights, and property against the “encroaching” power of the state in these domains. Christian Democrats and conservatives, as the main political party families of the right, offer a various mix of liberal economic measures and norms and values based on long standing religious traditions. Where the Church of Rome was aligned with the state during the periods of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Christian Democrats became the dominant party, while the states with national churches produced instead strong conservative parties.

The ideological foundation of EU politics — be it pro or anti — must inevitably encompass a whole spectrum of policies, economic, social, political, etc. In that sense, the EU as a political system, has to respond to a whole variety of political and social forces, that transcend the vested power of political parties and underlie the *raison d’être* of the political system. Ideological foundation is, in other words, the *sine qua non* for the appearance of big pan-European parties, organized on either a pro- or anti-European platform. The problem with this premise is that rarely political parties in general, and eurosceptical parties in particular, discuss EU politics from a pan-
European standpoint. In other words, in their essence, EU party politics are more about ‘national interests’ than about party ideologies. Some scholars even contend that ‘authoritative domestic institutions’ for decision making are the ones responsible for determining the ‘national line’ of a given country towards the EU (Moravcsik 1993). Furthermore, the EU hardly has pan-European parties which can claim sustainable constituent base and which directly engage the electorate in a competition for alternative approaches to European integration (Hix and Lord 1997:17). The best the most proactive pro-European, or eurosceptical parties can do is to attempt to produce an aggregate, but heterogeneous political majority at the European level. Example of such an aggregate majority is, indeed, the group of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament. Such groups, however, are by no means pan-European, trans-European, coherent or homogeneous political entities. As Hix and Lord keenly observe:

[The] transnational party activities touch on many individual aspects of the EU’s governance, [but they] do not amount to a classic model of party government…In so far as the EU has a party politics, it borrows heavily from the efforts of national political parties…which come nearest to endowing the EU with a party system of its own… That is to say, they are not composed of individuals and local branches, but of preexisting national parties, many of which were fully developed before the foundation of the Union itself (Hix & Lord 1997:16).
The obvious conclusion that follows from this discussion is that while existing political parties can produce certain majorities at European level with regard to pro or anti European agenda, by no means are these result of some coherent ideological platform on which they find a common ground.

Methodology

The majority of comparative political studies dealing with party politics, party positions, preferences, and cleavage often make implicit rather than explicit references to the positions of political actors on one or more partisan dimension. Generally speaking, the methodological approaches which attempt to shore up this gap of available data in the existing literature are three: by the use of expert surveys, by measurement of perceptions of positions through mass surveys, and by analyzing the content of election manifestos. Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, and there is a large body of literature discussing each of them. With regard to European integration issue, the best known attempts of estimating the political elite preferences and positions are the manifesto coding by European Election Study by Van der Eijk, et al. (Van der Eijk et al. 2002), the expert survey conducted by Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (Marks and Steenbergen 1999), and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) by Ian Budge, et al. (Budge 2001;
A recent debate ensued over the accuracy, validity, and reliability of each methodological approach (see Marks 2007), underscoring that this is no mundane question. The most widely used method for decades has been the expert surveys. These are in essence questionnaires distributed to party experts that offer a conditional ranking of political parties relative to each other and with regard to various dimensions within a given country: left/right; pro/anti free market; etc. (Castles 1984; Huber 1995; Laver, Benoit, and Sauger 2006). These estimates are widely considered to provide valid and accurate placement of the political parties on the ideological continuum, and grouping them plausibly into respective party families (Laver, Benoit, and Sauger 2006; Marks et al. 2007). The expert surveys, however, also have at least three major flaws and drawbacks. First, by design this method of research produces scores which are valid only within the country in questions, and cannot be used in cross-national comparisons (Klemmensen, Hobolt, and Hansen 2006). The latter is indeed an impressive two volume set of collection of hand-coded quantitative textual analysis of political manifestos of most political parties in a large number of OECD countries and Israel since the end of the Second World War. While deciding between the two available databases, the question is not only about in-country estimate, but also cross-national comparison must be considered.

41 The European Election Survey 1999 can be obtained through the European Election Study website under URL <http://shakti.trincoll.edu/wmfrankl/EES99.html> The Expert Survey can be downloaded from the personal website of Gary Marks under URL: <http://www.unc.edu/wgwmarks/data.htm> The Comparative Manifesto Project data are available on a CD-Rom included in the study of Budge et al. (2001) and Kingemann et al. (2006)
2007). The reason is very simple: since the experts pertain to the specific country in focus, it can be assumed that they have the specific national context in mind for ranking, assessing, and evaluating the parties. What is ‘center-left’ for one country, the argument goes, may not necessarily be the same for another. For example, Catalanian nationalists often are branded as conservative nationalists, while the Irish nationalists are traditionally associated with the left, whereas in both cases the application of these categories is at least questionable, if not outright wrong. Such discrepancy will then hamper any further attempt for cross-national comparisons and analysis. Second, it becomes difficult to measure party positions retrospectively through surveys (Mair 2001). And third, expert surveys do not offer the flexibility of manifesto coding for easy verification, and cheap replication of results.

The alternative is to use hand-coded content analysis of manifestos of political parties in attempt to derive positions on one or more political dimensions. Party manifestos and other official party statements are by default elite-driven documents. They offer an interesting and at times fascinating material for quasi-direct observation and analysis of the decision-making rationale of the political parties’ elites. Usually they serve a couple of functions at once. They offer concrete positions on various dimensions and justify them. In the mean time, they implicitly reveal a lot of information about both the political parties per se and the strategic policy positions of the political management in control of the policy agenda setting. In their political
Chapter 3: Euro scepticism: Old Cleavages or New Strategies

manifestos parties ‘come on record,’ offer official statements, which are open to scrutiny by their competitors and the general public. Thanks to the proliferation of personal computers and internet, many party manifestos are read by directly by average voters. Still, the majority of voters learn about political parties’ positions either directly by party representatives during various campaign events, or via mass media. In any case, these manifestos are considered important statements which can help researchers identify and place any given political party on a comparative scale with others regarding specific issues or dimensions. Unlike the expert surveys, the coded data is raw, which allows for systematic evaluation, manipulation, and analysis, without compromising the validity of the results. This methodology also comes with its own weaknesses and inaccuracies. Regardless whether the content analysis process is conducted by hand-coding as in the case of CMP (Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006), or by specially designed computerized coding schemes for words and patterns count, as in the case of Wordscores (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003), various questions arise about the accuracy of the results with regard to the correct estimate of the political parties’ positions on such crucial issues as Left/Right and European integration dimensions (Pelizzo 2003).

For the purposes of examining the hypothesis offered in this chapter, we have used the raw data from Mapping Policy Preferences II (Klingemann 2006). Since the task at hand is to assess the argument that euro scepticism is rather instrumental strategic
tool than an ideological position, we have focused on examining and comparing the positions of political parties in fifteen Western European member states, revealed in their published programmatic manifests. CMP’s coding procedure is rather simple: each political program, or a manifesto, is analyzed by means of content, defined as “research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson 1971: 18). For the purposes of this database, the coders have identified and separated as individual sentences statements from the program. These semi-sentences are called ‘quasi-sentences’, defined as verbal expression of a single political idea or issue (Klingemann 2006: 165). The coders then have placed each of these quasi-sentences into one of the fifty-six specially developed standard categories, grouped into seven major policy areas: external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, and social groups (Ibid., 168-9).

The CMP estimates their Left/Right orientation given a given party’s position on the ideological scale by an elaborate scheme, which is outlined below (Table 3.1). Appendix I includes the full results from the data analysis. Negative scores on the Left/Right divide are associated with positions to the left from the center, and positive scores are associated with positions to the right for the center. At the very extreme to the left and to the right we find the radical left and ultra right parties, along with some protest and single issue parties, which have devoted their entire
political manifesto to issues associated with the ideological side. We can observe in these results a large variation across countries. Some countries are without political parties scoring -/+100, and others have often more than one such party.

Table 3.1  Scoring a Left/Right scale on the basis of the manifesto estimates*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right emphases: sum of %s for</th>
<th>Left emphases: sum of %s for minus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>military: positive, freedom, human rights, constitutionalism: positive political authority free enterprise economic incentives protectionism: negative economic orthodoxy social services limitation national way of life: positive traditional morality: positive law and order social harmony</td>
<td>military negative: decolonization anti-imperialism peace internationalism: positive democracy regulate capitalism market economic planning protectionism: positive controlled economy nationalization social services: expansion education: expansion labor groups: positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Mapping Policy Preferences II

The focus in this project is on the political programs of one hundred and fifty eight political parties in fifteen West European EU member countries before the 2002 and 2007 enlargements. Using the raw data from these manifestos, we have constructed our own categories, such as Pro/Anti EU Integration, Market Economy/Planned Economy, and Nationalism/Cosmopolitanism. We then computed the mean for these positions for each of the one hundred and fifty eight political parties, looking at national legislative elections, for the period between 1977
and 2003. The period selected is of specific importance. It includes all of the crucial reforms and changes which preceded, and to a certain degree brought about, the death of the permissive consensus and the politicization of the European integration: the debate about the democratic deficit in the EU, the end of the Cold War, what were arguably the three most important enlargements of the Union — to the south in 1981 and 1986, to the north in 1995, and to the east in 2002 — the first direct elections for European Parliament, the Single European Act, and the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, which further transformed the EU.

When the first results emerged, some of the shortcomings of the current data became clear. The inconsistencies were similar to those for which CMP was criticized in the past, and which the primary investigators claimed to have addressed in the second volume (Klingemann 2006: 80-3, 108-110). Pelizzo’s (2003) main criticism, for example, focused on some of the observed anomalies with regard to the nationalist parties in Italy, according to the original CMP Left/Right scale. The original dataset failed to identify correctly to which party family they belong and to place them on the correct side of the continuum, or to identify known marginal extremists political parties as such. Thus, Gianfranco Fini’s neo-fascist *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), a coalition partner in the current Berlusconi government, is surprisingly scored by CMP as a center-right party (*Ibid.*). Similarly, in the first assessment of this research project’s results the CMP’s Left/Right score placed the
Austrian Freedom Movement (FPÖ) of Jorg Haider in the center, supposedly displaying only insignificant anti-Europeanism. The explanation of the principle investigators from the CMP claims that these observed anomalies are due to discrepancies between the ‘legacy’ of these parties – that is the reputation a political party has acquired in the past – and the results from the scientific approach in the actual calculation of the Left/Right scores by CMP. This inconsistency ironically underscores the apparent paradox as outlined by Pelizzo: “Manifesto[s]...unwanted outcome...is the consequence of adopting either a faulty methodology, or results from the choice of faulty data...Yet it can be shown that the PMD do identify a clear left-right dimension. This leaves us with an apparent paradox: why do we get faulty estimates if neither the method nor the data are faulty?” 42 (*Ibid.*, 67-8). The answer, Pelizzo claims, is that the CMP Left/Right scores “indicate parties’ direction, that is how (and how much) parties move to adjust to changing political conditions and to remain electorally competitive” (*Ibid.*, 68).

To design an objective and what some scholars call a “purely indicative” 43 spatial analysis of the policy positions of the political parties in a given country through manifestos or through any other approach, seems rather impossible. There are methodological, as well as practical issues associated with precise measurement, the most important of which being that politics do not exist in a vacuum. They are

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42 Pelizzo notates the CMP as Party Manifesto Data (PMD) throughout his article.
43 c.f/1 /2ever and Benoit (2003: 313)
contingent on the number of actors, their goals and strategies, as well as other macro conditions. The nature of political interaction is based on asymmetrical information. Without perfect information about political parties’ preferences and strategies, placing them accurately on the spatial distributive model is rather impractical.

### Table 3.2 Composition of dimensions categories for policy positions of political parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro European Integration</th>
<th>Euroscepticism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European integration: positive</td>
<td>minus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism: negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laissez Faire Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free enterprise: positive</td>
<td>minus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives: positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectionism: negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic orthodoxy: positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulated Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism: positive</td>
<td>minus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European integration: positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National way of life: negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism: positive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the light of this argument and the observed anomalies from the proposed by CMP Left/Right scale, this project offers an amended approach. Following the adopted methodology, each score in CMP is calculated as a percentage of the quasi-sentences which make a statement in one of the fifty-six categories. Therefore, a complex score — such as Left/Right, or any of the independently composed scores in the current study, such as that of European Integration/ Euroscepticism, Market/Regulated Economy, and Sovereignty/Cosmopolitanism — has to be calculated for each election as a percentage of the accumulated values of the selected
variables for a given category. One can subtract the sum of all negative or alternative
variables from the sum of all positive and various other variables. The result is
divided by the sum of all used variables, multiplied by 100. This way the calculated
score of the given dimension is presented as percentage of the entire manifesto, and
the issue of direction rather than actual policy position is resolved. Table 3.2
provides the categories which comprise respectively the EU, Economic, and
Sovereignty dimensions.

**The Results**

The complete results of the computations for each dimension, along with
detailed results for each election for all one hundred and fifty eight political parties in
the current dataset are included in Appendix I. In addition, the comparative graphs
for each country are also included in Appendix II. Together, these results offer the
necessary evidence to seriously question the hypothesis that European integration is
being considered an ideological issue — either as part of a traditional social cleavage,
or as orthogonally cutting into it. The observed discrepancies and lack of overlap
between the traditional ideological divides and the EU-issue, both during single
electoral cycle, and as a calculated mean of all elections and referendums,
demonstrates that euroscepticism lacks the structural characteristics to represent a set
of stable principled positions with regard to the EU.
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The Parallel Argument

When ideology is compared with European Integration, it becomes clear that there is no single family of political parties that sides exclusively on either side of the EU issue. Despite the sheer difference in historical and social origins of the examined political party families, and the interests of the respective political groups they represent, it is still possible to place them on a single left-right dimension and distribute them along a spectrum regarding their traditional families’ affiliation. That is not true, however, for the European integration issue (see Table 3.3).

The results indicate, as expected, the salience of left / right division between the different families of political parties, with expected variations due to particularities for each sub-party family group. Thus, with a few exceptions, one can find the communist and other radical left parties to the very far left of the spatial diagram, followed by socialist and green parties. Social-democrat, centrist, center-democrat and center-liberal, liberal and Christian-democrat parties clustered in the middle of the continuum. Whereas conservative, republican, populist and monarchist parties stand to the right of the center block. Predictably, one finds radical, nationalist, extreme right, and other neo-fascist parties occupying the far right of the spectrum. Some regionalist and single issue parties defy this distribution on ideological principle; but overall the ideological distribution is salient across the border. With regard to intra-family variations, there are some observable differences between Economic and
Radical Liberals, as well as Christian Democrats and Conservatives. These are due mainly to existing variations in the intellectual origins and analytical framework of individual political party with regard to causal relationship between economy, society, and political change (Panebianco 1988). Yet, on a macro level, spatial distribution across the ideological spectrum holds firm regarding all major political families: from radical left to extreme right.

Table 3.3 European Integration vs. Left / Right Ideology
With respect to European integration, however, the picture is very different. Vociferous opponents to the European project can be found just as easily among the radical left as among the extreme right parties. For example, the Austrian Communist party, the Danish Communist Party and Danish People’s Party, the Finland’s Rural Party and Christian Union, the French Communist Party and rightwing National Front, UK’s Independence Party, the Greek Communists, the Irish Worker’s party and Sinn Fein Ourselves III, various Italian ultra left and right wing parties, among others are all examples of vehement eurosceptic parties. Yet, they are located on opposing sides of the ideological continuum. An obvious conclusion is that since the abovementioned parties are all found in the extremes and most are marginal parties. This could suggest that euroscepticism is a phenomenon found at the ideological margins.

Certainly, from looking at the left-right ideological continuum, we can notice that the majority of the eurosceptic parties are clustered at the extremes, while the pro-European parties are found in greater number around the center block. This, however, would be an erroneous conclusion. From the one hundred fifty eight parties, about forty one oppose the European integration project. A good number of them are located not at the extremes of the ideological divide, but towards the center. Among them are the Danish Christian People’s Party and the Liberals, Finland’s Liberals, the Greek coalition Left and Progress, the Italian European Democracy, La
Rete, and National Alliance, and the Portuguese Democratic Union and Democratic Intervention. Hence, opposition to European integration, and to the European Union, is not confined to the radical left and extreme right for ideological reasons, but is present throughout the ideological spectrum.

Interestingly, a different comparison also reveals a discrepancy and an incoherence of parties' ideological positions and their attitude towards European integration. When parties are compared within their own families, some are pro-European integration, some are neutral, and some are against it (see Appendix I). Such a discrepancy cannot possibly be explained as ideological, but as strategic. Here we must look into other factors, such as location of the party in the domestic political system, size and history, and presence of other eurosceptic parties in the system. Let us look, for example, at the green parties. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden the green parties are to various degrees very eurosceptic, while in Belgium, France, and Italy they are very pro-European. Similarly, there is observed inconsistency within the Communist/Socialist family. Whereas Austrian, Danish, British, Italian, Portuguese, Swedish, and Luxembourgian communist parties, among others, are eurosceptic, Belgian and Spanish ones, along with socialists from Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain, Belgium and Sweden, and the left Dutch PPR Radicals are often indifferent, or intermittently soft eurosceptic. This incoherence of positions in terms of European integration is confirmed from the
historical evidence, which shows divided and equivocal attitude within many party families. In the 1950s, for example, the socialist parties from the original six member states showed greater support for the Paris Treaty and Rome Treaty than their comrades from the rest of the Western European states. The others remained either largely indifferent, or opposed to the creation of the prototype of the European Union (Hix & Lord 1997: 35-7).

The incoherence of policy positions and a discrepancy between ideology and euroscepticism on the other side of the ideological divide is equally persistent. Most center right parties from the Christian Democrat family favor greater European integration. The exemption is Finland, where SKL Christian Union is firmly against it. Among the conservative parties, the incoherence is greater. In Denmark, Italy, and Sweden support for European integration is strong, in France is lingering, and in Spain is not existent. The British CP is rather against the EU, although the party position is also somewhat equivocal, depending on the time period examined. Historically, the Christian Democrats have always shown greater support for the European project than the conservatives, and while their differences about such conservative social issues as abortion and religious role in society have largely disappeared, on European level these parties are more likely to face off each other than to stand on the same side.
Liberals, along with Greens, rank among the most divided when it comes to attitudes towards the EU. Some Liberal parties are among the most integrationist, even more than Christian and Social democrats. In the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium Liberals are strongly in favor of European integration, while in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Spain they are rather opposed, with other countries faring somewhere in the middle. Across the border of intra-party families, support for and opposition to European Union varies from country to country, and from party to party within each country.

**The Orthogonal Argument**

Although the results from this comparison point to a significant discrepancy between ideology and euroscepticism, this alone does not prove that euroscepticism is not a structural phenomenon. Some authors recognize the apparent lack of overlap between ideological positions and European integration, but argue that the issue of euroscepticism represents a complex conglomerate of revisions of various ideological positions. These revisions include economic regulation, sovereignty, and political representation, creating a separate cleavage, which runs orthogonally to traditional left/right divide, but still remains part of the same ideological category. Indeed, political parties operate largely in ideologically driven political systems where voters recognize political representation as a complex mixture of policy and ideological positions. To date, one of the best efforts to reconcile the seemingly cross-cleavage
nature of euroscepticism with traditional party ideologies comes from Marks and Willson (2000) who identify a set of factors that fuel anti-European attitudes to the left, and a separate set of factors that fuel anti-European attitudes to the right. They find that different political, cultural, and economic issues fuel left-wing euroscepticism from its right-wing counterpart.

The main shortcoming of this, and other structural arguments alike, is linked to their inability to explain the variance within the ideological domains of left and right. If the issue with euroscepticism was mainly ideological in nature, we should assume that political parties to the left of the center across the European Union would address a set of issues that are somewhat consistent with regard to the core defining principles of euroscepticism. Such issues would include sovereignty, social policies, or economic principles. The main premise of Marks and Wilson’s argument is that the issue of euroscepticism splits parties internally forming a new cleavage divide; but it is not strong enough to cause a complete rift within the party and splinter it in two or more smaller ones. For them, then, euroscepticism becomes something like a dissent of positions — an extravagant issue that splits internally a coherent group of political confederates, but fails to produce ideological enemies.

For this argument to have strong explanatory power it must demonstrate a pattern of similar issues that internally split political parties. Ideological positions are not very flexible and are based on solid principles and a particular worldview.
Therefore, the pattern of variations in the positions of members of the same political family within a given system, would be expected to repeated in general terms across the border in the other systems. Otherwise the issue would not be structural in nature. If the issue of euroscepticism is indeed an ideological one, it must be formed on the basis of socio-economic and political structural dependencies. Such dependencies are by default inflexible and this characteristic makes them valid across the border. This is clearly not the case of euroscepticism. Its variety of motivations, diversity of manifestation, and inconsistency of appearance all point to its strategically constructed nature. Even if we assume that euroscepticism is not consistent because it is not salient enough issue to cause actual rift within the large party family and to result in creation of splinter groups, there is not enough available evidence to suggest that it is based on actual, albeit new, ideological cleavage. If it were, we should have observed greater coherence of manifestation and consistency of substance. Otherwise, it is no longer a structural issue. What it is, instead, is a populist strategic position, or as it is in the case of certain single issue parties, a self sufficient raison d’être.

As it is demonstrated by the dataset and the graphs (see Appendix II) euroscepticism does not appear to follow a pattern of splitting political parties, left or right on economic or social issues. Communist and socialist parties, for example are rather inconsistent in their attitude to European integration; but they are consistent
with regard to economic and social issues. If their euroscepticism is based on opposition to policies, such as regulation, competition, or free movement of people, goods, and capital, and this is somewhat ideologically driven, how does this, then, explain the discrepancy of intra-party splits from one member-country to the next? Euroscepticism can very well be orthogonal to traditional left/right ideology. But it should follow a defining logic which splits not just the French socialists, but also the Belgian Flemish socialists, and the Spanish socialists, for example, even when not all socialist parties in EU are split this way. A specific variable then must be identified in the political dynamics of these countries, and with regard to the existence and political survival of these socialist parties, which explains the internal rupture along the eurosceptic faulty line. No such argument has been made so far, however, and no such pattern of division is observable.

The right wing mirror image of the center-left parties exhibit the same lack of consistency and lack of pattern how and why some split internally. With regard to the economic policies of the European Union, for example, most center-right parties do not have problems with the liberal economic principles of *laissez faire* or social issues of safety nets and welfare. Still some are internally divided in their approach to European integration, producing fervent defenders and staunch opponents. Once again this inconsistency indicates that if the dissent was ideological in nature, we would have observed repeating cases of splitting that follows a particular pattern and
is tied to a specific variable. In both cases the empirical evidence fails to support these claims.

Finally, ideological conditions must have some coherent logic in explaining particular political behavior. If an electoral policy of a political party is based on class interests, as claimed by the principles of theory of cleavages, there should be a good reason for members of this class to defy their fundamental principle of association and bypass it for a more precious, appealing, or daring alternative. In other words, there must be some good reason why the members of a particular class betray their traditional class interests and transcend into their “enemy’s” political camp. Albeit not impossible to imagine, this first requires a class-based rallying point which is elevated above the traditional cleavages and class ideologies. As discussed earlier in chapters one and two European integration is considered by virtually all political scientist, commentators, and policy makers to be ‘second tier’ political issue. How is it possible, then, to reconcile this logical incoherence with the support some eurosceptic parties successfully solicited in recent years forging ‘strange class bedfellows’?

Strange Bed-Fellows, a Short Case Study

Consider, for example the case of the French Front National (FN). Between 2002 and 2006 it established itself as the third largest party on the French political scene. During the April-May 2002 presidential elections Le Pen came dangerously
close to the Elysee Palace and then his party saw experienced significant electoral successes during the June parliamentary elections that same year. His party marked its highest point of political performance since its creation in 1972. In the aftermath, FN came out with 11.34% of the vote, and Le Pen ran against Chirac in a breath-taking runoff, prompting the French electorate to vote for the incumbent ‘with gloves’ in a demonstration of disgust that they have to negatively vote against an ultra-right xenophobe this way. Similarly, in 1997, the FN marked its highest success in the national elections with 14.94% of the vote. Subsequently, in 1999 and 2004, it received a record number of MEPs in the European Parliament — five and four respectively.

During these series of dramatic elections the FN, clearly an extreme rightwing marginal party, was surprisingly supported in its ascendance to prominence by two ‘strange political bedfellows,’ that of the petites indépendantes and that of disgruntled industrial workers. These two groups were for a very long time both on the losing side of the intensified economic and social regionalization and globalization. In the mean time they come from two diametrically opposite ideological class poles. The petites indépendantes were among the permanent suffering economic classes in France since at least the mid 1950s when the artisan sector started to steadily shrink. This pattern of crisis was repeated in the commercial sector, where the spread of supermarkets and hypermarches precipitated the rapid decline in the number of small
shopkeepers and family corner stores. So, after being the dominant economic and social class in the country since at least mid 19th century, by the end of the twentieth century les petites indépendantes were an increasingly dying breed. The situation with the industrial workers is somewhat similar: the country’s deindustrialization and its shift to a services-based economy laid the foundation for the economic liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s, and underscored the functional redundancy of French workers in the new post-industrial economic reality.

Although these two groups seem to converge in their loss of prominence, they are indeed very different. In fact, the petites indépendantes are every bit the opposite of the industrial workers, both in terms of interests and organization of work. While the industrial workers have a strong incentive to unionize, the petites indépendantes preferred to organize themselves in loose associations as patrons, while trying to keep their employees away from any professional unionization. Industrial workers are part of frequently subsidized industries, which in turn hurt the petites indépendantes. While the industrial workers are concentrated in large industrial centers, the petites indépendantes are dispersed across the country, but they are more likely to be found in smaller closed communities. While the industrial workers demand ever higher regulations and standardizations which will provide greater guarantees for them and will ensure their monopoly of production, the petites indépendantes support the classical
libertarian views, *i.e.*, smaller government, less regulation, and conservative fiscal policy, which in turn would also mean less fiscal burden on them.

Then, how can it be that in the two 2002 elections, the majority of votes in support of the FN came from industrial workers and the *petites indépendantes*? The post election analyses show that industrial workers massively rejected the *Party Communist de France* (PCF), the party that was traditionally collecting their votes since end of the WWII, and instead voted for Le Pen’s right wing party. They were joined in that by the *petites indépendantes*. Ideology, clearly fails to explain this phenomenon. The fall of the Iron Curtain, and the opening of the borders to skilled and unskilled workers in the aftermath of the fall of communism offers an alternative, more powerful and yet parsimonious explanation. Since the end of the Cold War, the death of the permissive consensus as discussed in chapter two, coupled with the steady integration of Central and Eastern Europe opened the flood gates for desperately poor laborers from these countries. Their willingness to put up with the same amount of work as the domestic workers, but for less money directly threatened entire layers of social classes across Europe. France, Germany, and Spain seemed to be natural magnetic centers, not only because of their relative size of economies, but also because their cultures and languages have been studied in the East as alternative to English, which was, of course, associated with the ideological struggle between USSR and USA.
Such an outlook offers a much simpler but powerful explanation for the adventures of these incompatible ideological groups.

The enlargement of the EU could add some dimension to the explanation of the crisis that has befallen the two class groups, as well as could explain the FN’s intensified anti-immigration and highly protectionist populist positions. Tuning up its populist agenda, the FN appealed to the ‘gut feelings’ of the most affected and disgruntled groups, suffering the unintended consequences of the concurring processes of economic globalization, political decentralization, transfer of sovereignties to the supranational level, a common currency and market, and the free movement of goods and services. The FN’s populist appeal quickly found resonance in these most affected social groups, trumping their underlying ideological incoherence. It is argued here that we do not need an inconsistent class theory or a vague and stretched-in-time identity crisis theory to explain why these two divergent groups chose to couple. Such theories hardly account for the timing of the changes. Instead, a much simpler explanation provides a consideration of the strategic gains from the FN’s decision to expose on the forefront its populist and gut-appealing opposition to the EU on socio-economic, immigration, and political grounds. These may sound like ideological characteristics, but they lack the underlying historical cleavage and practical rationale to be such.
Conclusion

This chapter examined the main structural argument that euroscepticism is an ideological issue which either cuts orthogonally or runs in parallel to the traditional left/right ideological divide. The evidence from the presented research, and the case study, rejected that hypothesis. A brief discussion of the recent electoral support for an otherwise ideologically-driven political party, such as the Front National in France, indicated that euroscepticism is too broad of a theme to bring together strange political bedfellows, such as the small business associations and the industrial workers, each of which traditionally supported ideologically opposite parties. The conclusion from this discussion buttresses the main argument through the research project that euroscepticism is better understood as a set of strategies employed by political parties, and not class ideologies.
Chapter 4

The Shadow of the Future

Hypothesis

The political parties which have least institutional constraints are more prone to adopt euroscepticism because they are not impaired by what will be referred to here as the ascendance to power shadow of the future. For the marginal parties the potential immediate gains associated with holding office far outweigh the probable future predicaments from adopting what seems to be a damaging and rather populist anti-EU position. The process of composing a political portfolio, and the issues included in it, are usually asymmetric to the actual understanding of these issues by the average potential voters. Therefore, marginal parties have less to lose and more to gain from greater exploitation of the asymmetry of information concerning aspects of the European integration. They are expected to take more extreme populist positions and to advocate strong anti-European policies, because they do not expect to face the challenges of governing along with the responsibility of it. In the current chapter we argue that, in
general, marginal political parties do not stand to lose significantly from adopting hard populist eurosceptic positions the way mainstream parties do. This explains why mainstream parties in government and mainstream oppositional parties largely abstain from adopting hard eurosceptic positions, even when they could profit from the political conjuncture of EU-rejection.

While the mainstream parties remain largely constrained by their relative proximity to the centers of power and perspective to ascend to power, the marginal parties have strong incentives to engage in ‘gut feeling,’ ‘pleasing the crowd’ politics by legitimizing long term undesirable populist attitudes in order to reap greater political gains. In this process, the interplay between constraints/lack of constraints and gains/consequences is crucial for understanding the technology of adopting a political strategy which explicitly relies on populist exploitation of the European issue.

Consequent from the strategic nature of euroscepticism political parties engage in what can be termed de-Europeanization process, akin to other social constructivist strategies such as securitization. It can be best understood as objectification of certain negative aspects of European integration for the strategic pursuit of voters' preferences shaping. The theoretical debate about preference shaping vs. preference accommodation fits rather nicely the current discussion of euroscepticism being strategic in nature. The main premise from the following
discussion is that once introduced new political issues, as well as new political
cleavages, take root in the political processes and all parties have to deal with
them even when they do not want to. Otherwise, alternative political subjects
would quickly move in and replace the old ones by selling themselves as
representatives of the voters’ group with regard to these issues. This dynamic
explains also the constant pressure over the political parties to gain enough
legitimacy to control the agenda for politicization of issues, i.e. to compete for
formal and informal agenda- and policy-setting positions in the system.

Once the issue of European integration is introduced in the political
process, and it is politicized enough to become a major issue in any electoral
campaign, most if not all political parties are forced to take a stand and address it,
one way or another. In order to tackle this problem, a workable definition of
euroscepticism is set in place. As it becomes clear from the following discussion,
this may not be an easy task.

**Definition of Euroscepticism**

To date, there are a limited number of attempts to define euroscepticism
as a political symptom. In what is widely perceived as a seminal work in the field
of euroscepticism, Taggart (1998:366) describes it as an encompassing term – ‘a
touchstone of dissent’ – which spreads across Europe. According to him,
euroscepticism is ‘idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as
incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.’ Being associated first with strong British opposition to the European Union, euroscepticism slowly spread over the rest of the Union. In that regard, Harmsen and Spiering (2004) point to an interesting aspect of euroscepticism as not just ‘anti-integrationist’ British suspicion to EU, but much deeply entrenched resentment towards ‘Franco-German’ ‘continental’ dominated regional political and economic system.44 This qualification, albeit plausible in the British case, is inapplicable when is considered the scale and variety of euroscepticism around the European Union zone and across the political spectrum.

In an attempt to clarify the meaning of euroscepticism, in later research Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2008: 7-8) differentiated between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ euroscepticism, where as ‘hard’ is defined any ‘principled opposition to the EU and European integration.’ An alternative definition given by Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 302-4) focuses on the structural aspects of euroscepticism, differentiating between ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ one. They outline four ideal types of euroscepticism assembled in a matrix, by optimist/pessimist and Europhile/Europhobe axes. Christopher Flood (2002) supports the structural approach to euroscepticism, but adds his own nuanced definition, distinguishing between what seems to be positive and negative euroscepticism based on degree

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of dissent from ‘rejectionists’ of the European project, through moderate
‘revisionists’ and ‘gradualists’, to insatiable ‘maximalists’ for deeper integration.

While each of these studies has its merits and contributes to the overall understanding of euroscepticism as a relatively recent phenomenon, these definitions and classifications are difficult to reconcile. This may explain the endeavor of many researchers to compile their own definition and nomenclature of classification of types and subtypes of euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the examples mentioned above delineate the major differences between defining euroscepticism as an ideological issue as opposed to a strategic choice.

The present study does not attempt to develop an entirely new definition. Instead, it adopted Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2004:3) definition of hard euroscepticism as “outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or remaining a member of the EU.” As Taggart and Szczerbiak accentuate, the expressed principle objection is directed “to the current form”\(^{45}\) of integration in the EU, i.e. it is against the status quo. Soft euroscepticism, on the other hand, is defined here as “contingent or qualified opposition to European integration” (Ibid., 4). The definition, as given, does not necessarily entail outright rejection of the EU or advocates leaving it, or abolishing it. Taggart and Szczerbiak, however, differentiate between ‘policy euroscepticism’ and ‘national interest euroscepticism’

\(^{45}\) Emphasis in the original Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004:3)
in the context of its soft version, where the first targets particular policy — i.e. monetary reform and introduction of the euro — while the latter refers to two variations of immediate domestic politics: a) politics with tangible ends (tough negotiations for accession, Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) quotas, etc. therefore involving narrow national interests set against other national interests in a zero-sum game), and b) politics with intangible ends, revolving around nationalistic pride, national symbols, etc.

How finely should we grind the definition of euroscepticism? This question presents not only a semantic issue, but also a methodological one. Elite driven strategic euroscepticism is observed indirectly, in speeches, parties’ manifestos, media interviews, internet postings, and organized rallies. Many times the position is associated and derived not only from direct attacks, but also from more indirect ones. By definition, professed euroscepticism is rather elusive and subjective. Further, it is manifested at times as a single overarching issue, and sometimes as part of greater political portfolio. Some of the attempts outlined above distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ euroscepticism (e.g. Flood 2002; Kopecky & Mudde 2002) but such distinction only makes sense in the context of considering euroscepticism to be a manifestation of social cleavage, old or new. Normative consideration of the nature of euroscepticism places the focus on preexisting conditions and searches for structural dependencies and motivations for rejecting the European integration process. Similarly, one would
expect definition of an ideologically buttressed position to provide a normative assessment. In the light of the current argument though, the strategic nature of euroscepticism does not require such hair splitting because it is considered to be an instrumental policy for attracting greater number of voters and for establishing, maintaining, and expanding political presence. Therefore, we remain agnostic as of the ‘nature’ of euroscepticism with regard to its positive or negative character, as long as the position represents an opposition to the European Union. In the mean time, both semantically and methodologically, it makes sense to distinguish between hard and soft, as well as general and specific euroscepticism (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Euroscepticism and Political Parties Types

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>General</th>
<th>Specific</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hard</strong></td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Marginal / Single Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft</strong></td>
<td>Marginal / Mainstream</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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This approach allows for variation in intensity and form, while it does not bog down our discussion in speculations over the nature of motivations, which may vary from positive opposition because of too little integration, to negative
opposition because of too much integration. Considering euroscepticism to be a strategic instrument for political contestation eliminates \textit{a priori} the need for such speculation about the normative origins of the rejection of the status quo.

In addition, one major logical flaw in the normative definition must be pointed here. The claim that the opposition could be either because of too much, or because of too little integration, therefore including groups of extreme Europhobes or Europhiles, is in principle correct. However, the policy implications for political actors can be diametrically different. The case for positive opposition to the European Union supposes that political actors allegedly adopt anti-EU position because they believe that the current status quo is not satisfactory with regard to the desired depth of integration. The opposition, however, by default not only ‘opposes’ the status quo, but entails a desire to reverse the status quo to a status quo ante. Placed on a simple more-less scale, integration can either increase or decrease, regardless of the multi-dimensional aspects of it, with the current level somewhere between zero (no EU) and one hundred (EU turned into a federal mega state). If the process of integration is not considered deep enough, the proponents for its deepening would hardly benefit from a return to the status quo ante of less integration, since any number on the scale to the left of the current level of integration by default is less, while the desired outcome is located to the right, where is more. Yet, as it was already
established above, euroscepticism entails policies of reversal of the status quo towards less integration, not more integration. 

In other words, if not enough integration is the primary cause for opposition to the status quo, it is highly irrational and it makes no sense to support even lower level of such integration as a form of protest against not enough integration, even if this is just a symbolic protest. Thus, the idea that euroscepticism could be regarded as opposition to the current status quo because of not enough integration, and not because of too much integration, is logically flawed and must be dismissed. This leaves us with the only other option: euroscepticism should be regarded as resistance against the form and depth of the current integration.

**Hard Euroscepticism at the Periphery (Barbarians at the Gates)**

By applying the definition of hard and soft euroscepticism, hard eurosceptic parties are defined as political parties which have clearly articulated general position against their country’s membership in the EU, and they justify their position by alleging negative consequences for their country stemming directly for this membership. Appendix A offers a non-exhaustive list of such parties in the fifteen members of the EU of countries from Western Europe.
Most of these parties are also included in the data analysis. To achieve greater clarity, and for comparison purposes, Table I included additional eurosceptic parties. The selection was based on the raw criteria in the previous chapter and differentiates which are hard eurosceptics and which are soft. In addition, some of the parties are actual movements and splinters from larger political parties. The dataset, therefore, reflects a larger view on the political parties of Western Europe by indicating intra-party splits and tensions linked to strategic positions of these parties as a whole towards the processes of European integration.

**Marginal and Mainstream Parties**

Literature on political parties in Western Europe is not sufficiently clear regarding their typology and classification. Classical studies classify parties on the basis of their functions, i.e. their *raison d'être*, such as parties of ‘individual representation,’ parties of ‘social integration,’ and parties of ‘total integration’ which differ by their goals and *modus operandi* (Neumann 1956). Others focus on the rational logic of electoral competition (Kitschelt 1989); on functional advantage from collusion of state and representation in ‘cartel party’ models (Katz & Mair 1995); on general organizational structures of ‘mass’ and ‘cadre parties’ (Duverger 1954) and on more specific organizational typologies, such as ‘mass-
bureaucratic’ and ‘electoral-professional’ parties (Panebianco 1988). To date, the most elaborate and arguably most effective classification comes from Gunther and Diamond (2003) which distinguish between seven general types of political parties based on cross-reference between function and organization. As is the case with Duverger and Panebianco, they implicitly recognize the apparent difference which exists between the parties in a single ecological system based on their relative size. Thus, they categorize a total of nine subtypes of parties in three functional categories which all share a characteristic of being ‘mass’ parties. Indeed, a categorization based on size and sustainability of electoral support may be advantageous for a discussion, such as the present, which for reasons of parsimony seeks to avoid unnecessary baroque elaborations and interpretations of categories and subcategories, which put unnecessary weight to the core argument.

The proposed classification here with regard to types of political parties is based on their relative size, electoral success, and sustainability of electoral share governance, where political parties are considered either mainstream, or marginal. The assumption is that a mainstream political party attracts a large number of voters, and a marginal political party attracts only a smaller, often insignificant, number of voters. As a result, a mainstream political party would have significant command over a larger structure of local organizations across the country, while a marginal political party would strategically focus only on areas with clustered constituents, thus having more simple party structure. There is a simple
economic logic behind this dynamic: a large political party has much more financial resources to spend on campaigns, on supporting local structures, on paying for political ads and offices, and on agitation materials, than a small political party. Thus, the large political party is faced with not so dire trade-offs in comparison to the small political party in terms of the formation of their political portfolios. Furthermore, a large political party has a greater chance either to have been in power in the past already, or to ascend to power in the foreseeable future, therefore securing for itself additional monetary and non-monetary resources.

Because of its past electoral success, a large political party tends to attract a greater number of parochial constituents under the same umbrella, to offer better policy outlet for different smaller groups, and in result, to occupy larger policy areas and to command larger number of core constituents. Indeed, the post-industrial mainstream parties are in many ways ‘catch all’ or ‘cartel’ parties which are composed of rather parochial smaller representative groups. As Kirchheimer (1966) has keenly observed, the emergence of the “catch all” parties has critically changed the mode of organization of political parties and of the way political parties compete. The “catch all” parties challenged the very notion that the political party is merely a representative of predefined social cleavages that exist within the society. Instead, they now aggregate not only parochial social groups, but also blended previously distinct collective political identities (Katz & Mair 1995: 7). In sum, the general mass parties, regardless of their transformation in
ideological mass-based party, catch-all party, or cartel party, are usually mainstream parties, because they have both larger representation and greater chance to be in power at some foreseeable point in the future.

At the same time, small political parties count on momentum, on single issues, and on a wild populism to stay afloat. They are constantly in search of cracks and niches in the political landscape, which they attempt to usurp and hold. This is a classical center-periphery setting, in which the marginal parties are located at the outer edge of political contestation. In order to remain in the system they try to create enough gravitational force, usually based on one or two single issues which appeal to a small but radical enough and loyal enough constituent group. At the same time the core parties have enough of a critical mass to attract large number of constituents, which places them towards the epicenter of political contestation, in the very center of which is located the cause of this political ecosystem, the source of state power.

One issue with this argument is that it does not solve the definitional problem. In the dynamic of political contestation it is not unusual for a small, at times even single-issue party, to rise to prominence, carried on the crest of unexpected political twist. Such a rise of the right conditions, which often have only tangential correlation with the core issues forming the base of a small party, can provide powerful momentum to the political party and catapult it into
prominence, helping to expand multifold its influence during particular electoral campaign. The important question to answer here is whether such a rapid electoral catapult to the front place of political contestation is a good enough factor to move a political party from the marginal category to the mainstream. In other words, the question is whether the mere transition into prominence is a strong enough factor to turn a marginal party into a mainstream one. The underlying question is, of course, what factors to consider, what changes to account for, and what observable data to include when categorizing a political party as a mainstream or a marginal one?

To illustrate this definitional conundrum, consider the French rightwing party, the *Front National* (FN). Is it a marginal, or a mainstream one? Similarly, are the Austrian *Freedom Party* (FPÖ) and the Dutch *Pim Fortuyn List* (PFL) marginal or mainstream parties? Looking at the performance of these three parties at specific elections within the past decade or so, all three can easily be considered mainstream ones. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN’s battered leader, narrowly lost his bid for the French presidency in the second round of presidential elections in 2002 against the incumbent Gaullist Jacques Chirac. Much to the dismay of most political observers, the first round catapulted Le Pen as the main rival to Chirac ahead of the socialist candidate and incumbent Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. Some 4.8 million French voters supported his candidature (16.86% of the vote) versus 5.6 million for Chirac (19.88% of the vote). The results were as troubling,
as they were surprising, because they could potentially indicate enormous expansion of the FN’s constituents’ base far beyond its overall average marginal 2-5% of the vote since its creation in the early 1970s. The subsequent elections, however, proved that success to be rather short lived — more of a onetime anomaly than a political trend. Over the following national and European elections the FN steadily lost support and even failed to enter the French National Assembly (see Chapter 3, Appendix C).

Similarly, under the charismatic leadership of the late Jorg Haider, the FPÖ surprisingly received 27% of the vote in the 1999 Austrian general elections, beating even the ruling giant People’s Party. The FPÖ joined the ruling coalition of Wolfgang Schussel, provoking widespread anguish across the European Union. The rest of the 15 EU member states then imposed strict monitoring of the Austrian membership, and some even temporary limited their relationships with the Austrian government to a bare minimum. These unprecedented steps were taken in response to what was considered a drastic breach of the cordon sanitaire since the end of the World War II against allowing rightwing extremist parties into power. Ironically, in the case of the PFL, the party’s success is as much due to the charisma of the eccentric personality of Pim Fotuyin as to the mystery surrounding his assassination soon after he created the party. In the elections held nine days after his death, on May 15th 2002, the PFL swept an astonishing 17% of the vote, coming out as the second largest party in Dutch politics.
Yet, these spectacular electoral performances perhaps had more to do with a symbiosis between endogenous factors, such as professed charisma, wild political populism, and exogenous factors, such as domestic and international economic or political crisis, immigration and employment conditions, electoral rules, or simply momentary lack of viable political alternative during election campaign, than with some structurally defined trends of creeping right wing extremism. More importantly, while in the aftermath of their respectful electoral success all of the above mentioned political parties widened their core constituent bases, stacked full their party chests, and expanded their policy outlets, their momentary blaze of glory failed to transform them into mainstream political parties.

Based on this discussion we consider ‘mainstream’ any political party, regardless of its position on the left-right divide, which is placed in such a way with regard to the power center that it captures the support and represents the interests of a major part of the voters. In addition, a mainstream political party must be able to maintain its relative policy and agenda setting power for an extended period of time — in at least three consecutive elections. That does not mean that the political party must remain in power during three consecutive elections. Apart from a small number of actual democratic systems in which the historical analysis reveals such rather anomalous political succession, the only parties which have remained in power in a long line of consecutive elections with
large margin of ‘votes’ were the communist parties in non-democratic systems, such as the Soviet Union and its former satellites. Their ‘success,’ it must not be forgotten, had nothing to do with their actual command of political representation. There was none. It all had to do with the political charade perpetrated by totalitarian rulers who engaged in elections for ceremonial purposes and in a bid to manipulate historical legacies. According to the definition presented here, political parties exist, operate, and contend on another in conditions of consolidated democratic systems. Under such conditions, a mainstream party must be able to command at least 12% or 15% support of core constituents for at least three consecutive elections. Considering that in a typical democratic election within the member states of the European Union during the period of research in this study is about 60% of all eligible to vote, a level of support that averages about 12% to 15% over three consecutive elections is large enough to represent significant social strata.

Since capturing the majority of the vote of the people in any functioning democratic regime is the way to gain power, perhaps it is more correct to call these mainstream political parties core parties. They are simultaneously closer to the power center, or the power core, and stay afloat thanks to the support of a large and coherent core constituent base. Thus, a core/mainstream political party has three distinct characteristics: a) it commands relatively large public support; b) it is often covering what Kitschelt calls “main area of voter distribution”
(Kitschelt & McGann 1995: 15-16) to the left or to the right of the political center, and c) it has sustained significant electoral representative power as percentage of votes through at least three regular electoral cycles. In addition, we also add a conditional characteristic, namely that the mainstream political party is large enough, and possesses elaborate enough organizational structure to form and run a government on its own, or with little coalitional support given the electoral opportunity.

A ‘marginal’ party is defined in contrast to a ‘mainstream’ party. It is usually located on the periphery, away from the political power center. It is relatively small in comparison with the ‘mainstream’ party in terms of grass-roots infrastructure, electoral potential, and overall financial resourcefulness. And while it could potentially possess relatively elaborate organizational structure, it would not be able to form a government on its own if given the electoral opportunity to do so. The marginal parties thus are more often than not located at the periphery of the power center and they occupy the extreme locus of the ideological spectrum, largely as a result of a structural contingency. These marginal parties may be offshoots of larger ideological parties, or may be hodge-podge parties in terms of their political expression, which include ‘single issue’ parties, and ‘protest’ parties (Wolinetz 1991; 2002).  

47 We recognize here the obvious overlap of some of the characteristics of the ‘marginal’ parties, namely the possibility for such a party to be simultaneously single issue and extreme, or protest and extreme party.
An alternative classification of ‘mainstream’ and ‘marginal’ parties is briefly considered by Katz and Mair’s (1995; 2002) as part of their discussion of ‘cartel party’ as opposed and challenged by smaller ‘protest’ parties. There is a possibility, that a marginal party may be of the ‘catch-all’ type despite the fact that this classification is reserved, by default, for ‘mainstream’ political parties. In the case of Katz and Mair’s argument, the definition of ‘catch-all’ comes from the parochial political portfolio of the parties and not their actual impact on the political process. Such catch-all exception is found in the example of the two cases discussed above — the French FN and the Austrian FPÖ. Their political manifestos and electoral base are very diverse and bring together more or less incompatible interest groups, as in the case of the petits independents and the radicalized industrial workers by the FN. Their momentary success, indisputably, is a consequence of the ability these parties have to raise issues with the voters which stick during particular election. However, if they are unable to sustain their electoral success over an extended period of time, such as three consecutive elections, there is not enough evidence that these parties could consistently represent the interests of significant socio-economic strata.

An implication from this conditional division of mainstream and marginal parties is the inevitable ontological connotation of the concept – political parties cannot escape from their relative locus on the ideological continuum of left-right, since ideology remains among the strongest principles of political organization in
democratic regimes. But they also remain anchored to the second-most common divide, center-periphery. I find this conditionality acceptable, given the fact that the main political cleavage in the European politics remains based on ideology, regardless of the increased multidimensionality of the political spectrum.

Appendix A includes a number of marginal parties, which for one reason or another were omitted from the CPM project. Their electoral insignificance may explain the CPM collaborators’ decision not to include these parties in the original dataset. However, for the purposes of the argument presented here, these parties’ political performance coupled with their position vis-à-vis European integration, offer an interesting and important insight. For the most part these parties are located along the ideological extremes of the political spectrum, and are marginal in terms of their electoral share. It is no coincidence that the majority of them opt for populist negative positions towards the EU. In the aftermath of elections these parties have less to lose from the shadow of the future of their positions, and much to gain from playing on the gut-feelings of voters’ sentiments. In the next section we look into the ways these marginal parties compete.

There are a handful of assumptions, which we make prior to exploring the strategic character of euroscepticism, which are important for the argument made in this chapter as well as for the general claim made throughout this study. First,
political party elites are rational actors led by strategic decision makers, whose priorities, as we have concluded, include survival, ascendance to office, and internal organizational coherence. Second, it is important also to comment that while often we look at political parties as unitary actors, in reality they are not. In the rational choice literature is customary to make the assumption that during the course of a “game” the institution in question is operating as a unitary actor. This approach simplifies and facilitates the analysis.48 One argument in favor of treating political parties as unitary actors is found in the observation that a traditional political party’s internal organization is fairly centralized and hierarchically top-down, and quite undemocratic, or as some claim even oligarchic (c.f. Michels 1999). In addition, systemic or ‘dispositional’ dependencies have great influence over the rational or situational decisions and actions of both party central elites, and local leaders. Just like any other organizational social or political structure, political parties go through cycles, internal and external organizational crises, and death. When the phenomenon of political parties’ existence, function, and lifecycle is approached from strategic rational perspective, it is only natural to regard them as unitary actors for greater simplicity and parsimony. Otherwise, the analysis cannot capture the dynamism of aggregate preference formation divorced

48 Approaching actors as “unitary” is not confined to rational choice in comparative politics only/1 /2n international relations literature, one of the main neorealist assumption is that states are unitary actors (c.f/1 /2altz 1979).
from the rational utilitarian assumptions manifested in various forms of rational choice, namely that of transitivity, completeness, and universality.

The process through which political parties actively seek to shape the preferences and interests of voters takes place in the course of an intersubjective interaction – a social act – in which the strategic behavior of the political parties plays the decisive role. This behavior, in turn, depends on the decisions made by the political elites in charge. Political parties are, as noted above, top-down centralized organizations and are driven by immediate concerns for survival. Their leadership makes constant volume of elaborate decisions with regard to what polices and political issues they must engage in, what polices and political issues they would like to elevate to salience, and what polices and political issues they would prefer to downplay and avoid during a given election campaign. In addition, the party elites decide on the most appropriate strategy to achieve these goals. At the end they produce parties’ manifestos and their representatives make various public pronouncements, such as speeches, press conferences, and interviews through which they communicate the political party’s specific positions on these issues.

With these assumptions of rationality and strategy aside, the question which will guide the discussion in the next section is how marginal political parties influence European integration vote choice and why eurosceptic parties are
dispersed out in the periphery? Following some seminal theoretical works on ‘political entrepreneurship,’ ‘issue evolution,’ and political populism we argue that marginal parties in the periphery do not have the constraint of the shadow of the future with regard to the process of European integration; therefore they have strong incentive to engage in active de-Europeanization politics.

**The Shadow of the Future**

Rational choice of politics and policy construction emphasizes the strategic character of the decision making of party elites. This is valid for all political parties, mainstream and marginal. They are assumed to act as a kind of political entrepreneur in order to compete for survival, policy-formation, and office. As it has been already demonstrated in chapter three, the difference in their choice of strategies, however, does not come from the nature of the ‘political culture’ in the specific political system. Rather, it comes from the idiosyncratic constraints each party faces based on its locus in the political system. It also depends on factors such as electoral system and number of direct competitors in specific political domain.

From the perspective of an individual political party, consolidated democratic electoral competition, with its complexity and diversity, can easily be narrowed down to two factors which determine its strategy. First, who are their main ideological rivals — what neoliberal economists call ‘perfect compliment’
with regard to commodities. And who are their immediate competitors-in-kind — what economists call ‘perfect substitute.’ This assessment can be done regardless of the type of the actual electoral system, constitutional design, ideology, or number of participants. The former determines the identity of the political party, while the latter determines the specific strategy for survival. Marginal extreme parties tend to be hard eurosceptics for various reasons, but mainly because they can afford it. They simply do not have to face the shadow of the future with regard to possible occupation of office because of their position. They stand to gain, however, from adopting wild populist positions. Such positions are frequently framed in polarizing ideological terms, but in reality represent strategically selected issues. In the case of the EU issue, the leftwing radical parties tend to focus on its allegedly exploitative neoliberal economic nature and the dangers of the free trade and freedom of movement engrained in the European Union policies. These serve as a powerful motivator for action because pose a direct threat to the marginalized constituents of the far left – usually low-skilled industrial workers. For the rightwing extremist parties the most frequent anti-EU populism is based on claims that the EU destroys national sovereignty and identity, exacerbates immigration, and promotes liberal over conservative family values, such as homosexualism and religious plurality.

Due to the reality they face, mainstream and marginal political parties deal with different constraints with regard to their strategies. There are, in general,
two reasons why mainstream parties rarely adopt eurosceptic positions, and even when they do, it is a soft, specific-policy oriented type. First, as already established, all aspects of the European Union existence – political, economic, monetary, commercial, cultural, etc. – are driven primarily by political parties, and so is the European integration process itself. Political parties do not just comprise part of some parochial set of actors which collectively determine the direction of development of the EU; they are the actors. The mainstream parties have no incentive to raise the European integration issue, mainly because they generously benefit from deepening this process. Via joint efforts and coalitions throughout the member states area they de facto build, deepen and determine the general course of integration. This claim is valid not only for the past evolution of the Union, prior to the death of the permissive consensus, but also for the present. As it will become clearer later in this chapter, Commissioners in the EU Commission are selected among the ranking members of the ruling political parties in the individual member states. The European Council is composed by the heads of state or government which under the predominant parliamentary system in Europe are more often than not the leaders of the governing political parties, and their field ministers. And the myriad of administrative and executive EU bodies in Brussels and Strasbourg are staffed with politically appointed employees loyal to the mainstream parties.
With regard to the marginal parties, the reality they face is quite different. They have no chance of appointing their members to the Council, or to the Commission, or for that matter anywhere in the bureaucratic apparatus of the European Union. Their best bet is to try to ride the wave of populist sentiments in European, domestic, and local elections. The peripheral parties have a full set of incentives to bring up and emphasize their anti-EU position (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2002; Netjes & Binnema 2007). They have little to lose and much to gain from such an opposition. This explains why the only European institution which includes among its members eurosceptics, is the European Parliament. The elections for it, as discussed earlier, are part of the domestic political contestation and thus eurosceptic parties get a chance to send MEPs on their own.

The peripheral political parties focus around perceived and often vigorously exploited threats to build sections of their political portfolios in order to play up hard eurosceptical policies. It seems that their anti-EU positions are due to their ideological considerations, but in fact they are due to their locus in the electoral system and their relative lack of constraints with regard to their possible future ascendance to power. In short, the policies and politics of the European Union and European integration offer a great opportunity for exploitation by the marginal political parties in the absence of the shadow of the future. This could be considered a case of political entrepreneurship, which could yield or not a return on their investment. Before we look into specific cases
which demonstrate the importance of the shadow of the future we must explore and define the term ‘political entrepreneur.’ What does it entail, who are the political entrepreneurs, and what separates them, if anything, from ideologically driven political actors?

**Political Entrepreneurship**

Following the general struggle for survival, marginal political parties often act as entrepreneurs in a market, searching for a niche and dressing up familiar concepts in attempt to capture larger voters’ market share. These parties readily embrace conformist and opportunistic positions which defy both the mainstream political parties, and the existing ideological and social cleavages. This attribute is not, of course, only characteristic for the marginal political parties, but this label emphasizes the political entrepreneurship of these parties’ elites, much in tunes with the Schumpeterian “political entrepreneur.”

Pareto’s (1991) classical theory of circulation of elites outlines the basic class I and II residue types among the ruling political elites. This paves the way for deeper research on the social equilibrium over which the dynamics of political contestation take place. In it, Pareto keenly identifies the inherent antagonistic dynamism between different political elites, marked in his view by a generational divide. In the current study, this divide could be easily recognized as one existing
between political elites of mainstream and marginal political parties in the context of same generational political contestation:

The new elite which seeks to supersede the old one, or merely to share its power and honors, does not admit to such an intention frankly and openly. Instead it assumes the leadership of all the oppressed, declares that it will pursue not its own good but the good of the many; and it goes to battle, not for the rights of a restricted class, but for the rights of almost the entire citizenry. Of course, once victory is won, it subjugates the erstwhile allies, or, at best, offers them some formal concessions. Such is the history of the struggles fought by the plebs and patres in Rome; such is the history of the victory which the bourgeoisie won over the nobility of feudal origin, a victory well noted by modern sociologists. (Pareto 1991:36)

This argument can be then coupled with a model by Gordon Tullock — one that is somewhat different in concept, but similar in dynamism. Tullock (1965: 464-5) identified for the political domain what later became the very controversial and ardently debated topic of ‘franchise bidding for natural monopolies.’ Whereas Pareto saw an inherently structural antagonism between classes and generations, Tullock saw political parties bid and buy commodity market dynamism with political interests and monopolies. In a nutshell, his main argument articulates that political parties act as buyers and place ‘bids’ in democratic elections for executive office in a process which very much resembles
the periodic auctions for licenses for exclusive monopoly rights in some industries rather than simply a class or generational struggle for power.

Put to close scrutiny, Tullock’s model, albeit bearing resemblance to the actual process through which parties gain access to power, is not entirely satisfactory explaining the actual political process. For one thing, parties tend to act much more like ‘sellers’ than ‘buyers’ in the political process, where varieties of political products – ideological, political, and socio-economic positions and policies – are offered to voters not as ‘payments’ in a bidding process for political monopolies, but rather packaged and sold in exchange for shares of political representation and agenda- and policy-setting powers.

An elaborate instrumentalist argument as far back as 1942, Joseph Schumpeter famously defined democracy as “competition for leadership” (p.271) and developed the concept of the ‘political entrepreneur’ as the main actor in this party-voter interplay. Schumpeter was among the first to observe and acknowledge that political leaders, and thus parties of any kind, tend to act as entrepreneurs in the market for voters. For him the characteristic which marks entrepreneurs from others is innovation and “the one carrying new combinations” (ibid., :132). Pondering further over the conditions of rational political behavior by political entrepreneurs, he concludes that since they face “high-powered” incentives and opportunities to exploit the asymmetric information vis-à-vis the
voters, political entrepreneurs are “able to fashion and, within very wide limits, even to create the will of the people” (ibid., :263).

Following this approach, and without the constraints of the negative consequences from endorsing hard line euroscepticism, the marginal parties in the periphery have strong incentive to use that asymmetry of information to attempt restructuring the contestation and enlarge their electoral foundations. In short, the lack of the shadow of the future from the perspective marginal parties to ascend to power alone may not be enough to explain their rational decision to resort to the highly contagious strategy of euroscepticism. When coupled with political entrepreneurship though, this could potentially become a game changer for them. By default, radical left and extreme right political parties have very limited ideological space for expansion. Following their traditional ideological identity policies these parties remain firmly grounded on the very edge of the power contestation vortex. The entrepreneurial approach by the party elites motivates them to make a strategic choice – to find, or define, an issue which can help them “find some alternative that beats the current winner” (Riker 1982: 209). European integration is the perfect vehicle for such a strategy. Potentially, not only it could bring new voters, but also, and somehow more importantly, the general European public is on average more eurosceptical than are the mainstream parties, undoubtedly because they are the biggest winners from the European integration process, as already discussed. In short, adopting hard
policies against the EU, unconstrained by considerations for future ascendance to power, offers the perfect opportunity for the marginal peripheral parties to raise the ceiling of their voter base, and their share of political control. This approach coincides with the characteristics of the political entrepreneur outlined here above.

**Issue Evolution**

The proposed dynamic between innovative political entrepreneurship and absence of constraints of the shadow of the future in the case of European integration seem as plausible strategy for the marginal parties to carve in a niche and storm the power center. Yet, it still remains unclear how exactly these political elites succeed to raise the banner of euroscepticism so high. Is it because anti-EU sentiments are supposedly quietly drowsing as a ‘sleeping giant’ waiting “some policy entrepreneur or entrepreneurs [to] come along who are willing to capitalize [on] these preconditions in order to win votes that otherwise would have gone elsewhere” (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004: 48)? Or is it a strategic calculation of bringing actual antagonism between observed and perceived value from European integration, i.e. to use the asymmetry of information in order to make the issue salient? A possible solution is offered by Carmines and Stimson
(1986; 1989) with their discussion of *issue evolution* with regard to a prevalent issue in American politics – race.\(^{49}\)

The basic argument behind Carmines and Stimson’s seminal work is that party elites make strategic calculations with regard to issues which could serve their goals and set in motion a complex process through which to turn these selected issues into salient ones. The first step towards this seminal transformation comes with what the authors call a ‘critical moment.’ That is usually some event or series of events which allow the issue to come into light and offer itself as a suitable vehicle for the goals of given political actors (Carmines & Stimson 1989: 146). In the case of euroscepticism, the ‘critical moment’ was really a protracted period marked by the deepening of European integration on the one hand, the end of the Cold War on the other, and the death of the permissive consensus as a consequence. Once out of the dark, the issue is then propelled into prominence by those political elites which have greater utility from its exploitation, and as a result it becomes contentious. It must be noted here that political elites constantly try to propel issues into such prominence, but only rarely a ‘critical moment’ occurs in order to make the issue salient. In addition, the issue has to have particular characteristics in order to become contentious. Out of the total number of issues constantly raised by political elites

\(^{49}\) The literature on *issue evolution* is large. For more on the topic see also Abramowitz (1994), Adams (1997), Layman and Carsey (2002) and Stimson (2004).
parties as part of their electoral portfolios, only a very small number manage to pass through the policy cycle and leave a lasting impact on the system. As Adams (1997: 719) notes, in order for the issue to remain “on the public’s agenda year after year” it must be “‘easy,’ requiring little outside knowledge or expertise.”

Empirical Testing

What sometimes seems logical and self-explanatory is subsequently revealed to be unsustainable to logical and data examination. Therefore, theoretical assumptions must always be put to empirical test. The main premise in this chapter, that marginal political parties attain a strategic advantage from embracing general hard euroscepticism as opposed to the mainstream parties, seems self-explanatory. Yet, it is worth examining the actual validity of this argument in greater detail. As the argument goes, marginal parties not only lose little or nothing from a populist, politically entrepreneurial stand taken against the processes of EU integration, but they also stand to gain nothing from joining the bandwagon. At the same time, the mainstream parties tend to gain from such integration and lose from non-integration. This line of thought presupposes a kind of zero-sum game between the mainstream and marginal political parties.

50 For more on “easy” and “hard” issues see Carmines and Stimson (1980).
with regard to the EU issue. To be sure, the zero-sum game is revealed by the direct causal relationship between the gain of one party and the loss of the other. There is no place in such a relationship for any ambiguous situation, such as Pareto improvement or Pareto optimal outcomes, where one party can gain and improve without this success to be transformed into loss for the other party.\textsuperscript{51} This structural dependency between marginal and mainstream parties is tackled in the next chapter, where the propensity to enter into coalitions is taken under consideration.

If strategic advantage of gaining a greater electoral share without the constraints of the \textit{shadow of the future} could explain why marginal political parties tend to embrace hard euroscepticism, let us examine what are the gains for the mainstream parties from the opposite trend — namely, deepening integration. According to the zero-sum game logic, the gain of the latter is a loss for the former, and vice versa. These, in essence, will define the constraints which cast their shadow over the political future of any mainstream political party which has crossed over to the eurosceptical camp. First, let us briefly address the question why mainstream political parties in opposition rarely, if ever, side with the positions and arguments of the marginal eurosceptic parties, and even when they do, it takes the form of soft and issue-specific eurocriticism rather than

\textsuperscript{51} The complexity of the Pareto improvement is, admittedly, at best dubious. The relationship between various parties and how they potentially affect each other’s respective gains is not always overt enough for such impact to be observable. This is especially true in the intensely globalized cross-national relationships of various political and economic agents in the world as a whole, and in the EU in particular.
euroscepticism. If euroscepticism is, after all, strategically advantageous for the marginal parties – by default also always in opposition – why would not it be so attractive for the mainstream ones when they are in opposition, too? The simplest answer is, perhaps, found in the laconic but brilliant definition of democracy by Adam Przeworski (1991: 10): “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections.” As he further explains, the presence of a party which wins elections is not, by any standard, a sufficient condition for democracy. After all, in the former communist bloc before 1989, just as in many quasi-, hollow-, and pseudo-democracies around the world today, elections are staged and rigged on a regular basis by political elites looking to legitimize their rule. It is the ‘losing’ part which defines the process of political fluctuation in a democracy. As some students of American politics and economics have correctly observed, the main reason why some political agents, whether from the executive or the legislative branches, resist their rational inclination to seek augmenting their own powers while in office can be easily explained by their fidgety anticipation of the moment when they will lose elections and thus be forced on the other side of the power divide (Krugman 1994). Just as in the American politics case, incumbent European parties do not want to see highly independent and unchecked sovereignties which can benefit them while in power falling into the hands of the opposition when the day their fortunes change has arrived.52 Accordingly, European mainstream

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52 An interesting example of such duality of politics, albeit in American politics, can be found in an ensuing
political parties in opposition do not want to limit the prerogatives of incumbent political parties with respect to their engagement with the EU in anticipation of the time when their turn comes to grab the governmental steering wheel. European mainstream political parties in opposition certainly dread the agenda-setting and redistributive powers of the parties in power with regard to the EU politics which come with the deepening of the European integration. They largely tend to abstain, however, from vociferously criticizing, or actively opposing, the European Union itself, and the processes of integration in particular, knowing that in the future this will hurt them, too. As it will become clear from examining the trends of appointing European Commissioners (Appendix B), after winning elections some political elites even tend to leave their opponents’ commissioners in place for another round of governance, confident that their gesture will be reciprocated in the future. The major gains for the mainstream political parties which define their strategic inclination to support and further the European integration – and which in turn explain the strategic loss for the marginal political parties and their anti-Europeanization and integration – are political and economic in nature. Albeit the two are interconnected, for greater clarity we will look into them separately, starting with the political gains.

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crisis in Massachusetts over the senatorial seat of the late Ted Kennedy and the interim appointment of a replacement for him in the federal Senate. The Democrats in the state legislature blocked efforts by former Republican Governor Mitt Romney to appoint an immediate senatorial replacement had Senator John Kerry been elected president in 2004. While they insisted on a vacancy period of six months under a Republican governor, they now are backtracking in the wake of Kennedy’s passing.
For the longest time, the scholarly literature has focused on theories of functionalism, neo-functionalism, and intergovernmentalism in attempting to explain political elites’ endeavor to deepen European political and economic integration. Such an approach certainly possesses powerful explanatory power, especially prior to the death of the permissive consensus. It is, however, not so successful at explaining continued integration in the face of the altered geopolitical and economic landscape since the end of the Cold War. An alternative approach focused on the strategic interests and advantages of certain political elites to deepen integration as a function of their rational interest – the already mentioned zero-sum game in domestic politics and the shadow of the future – seem more plausible, parsimonious and possessing stronger explanatory power. Let us explore how.

The major milestones with regard to the integration process, as discussed in chapters two and three, are marked first by attempts to democratizing the EU, and then by the continuing transfer of sovereignties to a supranational level. The first direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979 marked the long waited, albeit unnecessary, beginning of democratizing the governance process. In the mean time, the main vehicle for deepening European integration since the creation of the EU has always been through a set of agreements among the

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53 It must be noted that the two processes are not synonymous and as some authors have keenly observed that they are “in some respect opposites” (Vaubel 2009: 23).
member states, the so-called treaties. The “bible of the European Community,” as Dick Leonard (2005: 40) famously called it, is, of course, the 1957 Treaty of Rome. It provided the blueprint for a common set of institutions for the European Economic Community (EEC) and the basis for ultimate authority delegated to both the European Commission and the European Council. But by no means is the Treaty of Rome the only one. In the past twenty five years or so there are five attempts to reform the EU through such multi-state accords:

- First among these is the European Single Act (SEA) of 1986. It amended some of the basic articles the Treaty of Rome (TEC) with regard to the voting procedures in the Council of Ministers, and established the roadmap towards single internal market, monetary union and political union.

- Next was the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) from 1992. To date this remains the most significant revision of the Treaty of Rome. Among other things, it changed the name of the European Community to European Union, set the provisions for establishing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the idea of a single currency – the euro. It set the specific steps for establishment a greater political union with

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54 Technically speaking, two treaties were signed simultaneously on March 25, 1957. One established the European Community, and the other created the Euroatom — the European Atomic Energy Community. Nevertheless, when scholars, historians, and policy makers talk about the Treaty of Rome, they usually mean the bulky document, comprising over 248 articles and some 160 pages of annexes, protocols and conventions rather than the treaty establishing the Euroatom.
provisions for common foreign and defense policies, and it established the primary institutional pillars for the European Union – the EC-ECSC-Euroatom, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

- The Amsterdam Treaty (AMT) of 1997, reformed and reshuffled some of the SEA and TEU provisions of competences among the European institutions.

- The Treaty of Nice (NIT) of 2001 – which came only into effect as late as in 2003 due to vehement opposition from Ireland – dealt mainly with the challenges of the European enlargement process, further democratization of the European institutions, and conditions for membership rights.

- Finally, the failed Constitution for Europe (TCE), which after the French and Dutch rejection was revived in the form of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. The original intention of TCE and later the Lisbon Treaty is to complicate the institutional design of the EU with regard to the increased integration and grand expansion from 2004 and 2007, to collect the provisions of all previous treaties into one single, accessible form, and among other things
to create unified positions of a president and a foreign minister for the EU.\textsuperscript{55}

Each of these treaties marks a departure from the status quo by attempting to deepen the political, economic, and cultural integration of the EU. Four out of the five treaties took place after the period dealt with in chapter two and marked by, among other things, the death of the permissive consensus, and after the introduction of direct elections for the EP. All of these represent ‘critical moment’ markers which allowed the European issue to elevate in salience. A general look at the major changes these treaties achieved exemplifies the point about the process of deepening the integration as a marker for a ‘critical moment.’

Out of all recent treaty revisions, the Single European Act (1986) is arguably the most important because it rejuvenated the European integration process, pulled out European politics out from a state of shared pessimism, petty quarrelling, and personal animosities, and it paved the road for single market, single currency and a common foreign and security policy. On the political and institutional side of reforms, in a nutshell, the SEA changed the voting rules in the Council of Ministers by putting an end to the so called ‘Luxembourg

\textsuperscript{55} In the following we will omit looking into the TCE and the Lisbon Treaty for two reasons. First, because the TCE was effectively killed by the “no” referenda in France and the Netherlands, and second, because the Lisbon Treaty’s destiny remains unclear, at least until the second Irish referendum and the direction the possible conservative British government will take with regard to the reform.
Compromise’ and reaffirmed and extended the use of the qualified-majority voting rule.\(^{56}\) After January 1, 1966 when the Luxembourg Compromise entered into effect, decision making in the Council “slowed to a snail’s pace as member states refrained from calling for a vote in deference to each other’s real or supposed ‘vital national interests’” (Dinan 1999: 261). It also formalized the meetings of the heads of state under the umbrella of “European Council” as an official European institution with a regular reunion schedule. This reform was not new. In fact, since 1974 the heads of state began formally meeting three times a year under the title of the European Council. Thus, the SEA gave legal recognition to an already established and functioning European Council. The SEA also marked the beginning of what seems to be a gradual process of enhancing the powers of the European Parliament. It provided for a necessary assent from the EP in the final conclusion of association agreements with candidate states for membership. Finally, Article 10 of the SEA revised Article 145 of the EEC Treaty by providing that the European Council confers to the Commission powers for implementing rules which the Council lays down. All of these political reforms, but especially the first one, meant that incumbent national political elites gained increasing power at the European level.

\(^{56}\) Under the original terms of the TEC, various issues, including Common Market legislation, were supposed to be subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) and not subject to a unanimous vote. Following De Gaul’s tough opposition and the ‘empty chair’ crisis, the Luxembourg Compromised was negotiated, practically by France, as an effective backdoor to unanimity for all issues. According to it, a member state could veto any legislation which it deems to have threatened or violated ‘vital national interests.’
On the economic side of reforms, the Single European Act set up the path to a common internal market, known also as Single Market. The SEA defined the Single Market as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (SEA, Article 13). It also set up a timetable for the implementation of the steps which would lead to the creation of internal market and the subsequent harmonization of national legislation, as well as the establishment of internal and external borders. More importantly, at the time of the SEA’s signing, the vision for restructuring the most important economic tools of integration, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), from practically a tool for wealth redistribution into a tool for regional development, was already in place. Only a year after the SEA came into effect the ERDF became part of the so-called Structural Funds. Their goal was to identify the lagging sub-national regions in the member states which are affected by the decline of the industrial era, and provide them with direct financial help. As it will be discussed shortly, the actual distribution and control over the Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds falls into the realm of the Commission and the central governments. This in turn streamlines enormous redistributive power from the EU directly into the hands of the national governments – one more reason for mainstream parties to enjoy, support, and further European integration processes.
While the SEA is considered to be the turning point for deepening the European integration, the 1993 Treaty of the European Union (TEU), which was signed in Maastricht and is better known as the Maastricht Treaty, marked the actual deep revision of the original terms spelled out in the Treaty of Rome. The TEU was agreed in December 1991 and signed in February 1992. However, due to a narrow ‘no’ vote in the June 2, 1992 Danish referendum, the TEU almost did not come into existence. This rejection is significant not only in terms of its importance on the future of the TEU; it also impacts the future integration of the EU itself. The Danish rejection signaled the rising tide of euroscepticism provoked by the now visible unprecedented transfer of sovereignties to a supranational level in the context of an apparently dying permissive consensus for such major political reforms to this shaky and astray politico-economic European institutional hodgepodge. More importantly, the second Danish referendum, held in the middle of the following year approved the TEU with fewer than 30,000 votes. The vigorous debate, which enflamed Danish politics at the time, included some of the most inflammatory arguments against the nuclei of the subsequent strategic positions of most of the eurosceptic parties. The TEU itself was largely necessitated by a few geopolitical changes such as the unification of Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall. These events alone proved strong enough deterrent for Danish and French skeptics alike. The main anti-TEU arguments, however, also included such topics as fear about foreigner’s ability to buy Danish holiday
homes, losing national identity, diminishing the role of small states in the EU in light of the enlarged mega states such as a reunified Germany, various concerns about losing current social welfare, and doubts and fears from the perspective for European Monetary Union and single currency.

It was indeed the TEU that reformed the European Community into a coherent politico-economic *sui generis* supranational power house. It is difficult to enumerate all of the fundamental changes instituted by the Treaty. The confusing and incoherent order in which the reforms were introduced is evident even in the structure of the Treaty itself. Unlike the previous treaties, the preamble of the TEU has no less than seven titles, which address the different political, economic, and social reforms achieved with this revision. Altogether, the Maastricht Treaty marked the most significant deepening of European integration, going well beyond its original, more narrowly defined, economic objective. It is worth mentioning here some of these changes. As a collective, they played a significant role in further marginalizing the political parties on the periphery, which in turn directly correlates with the main argument of this chapter.

On the political and institutional side of reforms, the TEU, first and foremost, transformed the existing institutional structure of the EC, turning it into what is now know as the European Union. This was more than a name change. The Treaty created the so called ‘pillars’ of the European Union; it
regrouped and expanded the powers associated with each pillar and it created new institutions and powers. The first pillar, the EC pillar, brought in together the original core principles from the Treaty of Paris, the Treaties of Rome, and the cooperation amendments and changes from the SEA. Thus, the EC pillar reaffirmed and drastically expanded the principle of supra-nationalism, understood here as a transfer of sovereignties and powers from national to an international level. In doing so, it consolidated what was previously seen as separate economic and political entities, the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Under the EC pillar the powers delegated to the European Council, the European Commission and its various Directorates, and to the European Parliament expanded considerably. Thus, the TEU introduced yet more areas of competence to the Council which required qualified-majority voting (QMV) in lieu of unanimity and it introduced new decision-making procedure which required more formal cooperation with the European Parliament. It expanded the EU’s responsibilities outlined in the SEA, into areas such as research and technology policy, environmental policy, and regional policy.

57 The Treaty of Paris, the first one establishing the ECSC, had a fifty year limit and at the time of Maastricht it was due to expire a decade later — on December 31, 2001. The Treaties of Rome 1957 established EEC and EAEC.
The Treaty also revised and further increased the powers of the European Parliament by introducing the so-called codecision procedure (TEU, Article 251), according to which the EP and the Council can now adopt legislation jointly in a large number of policy areas. And it gave Parliament a formal role in the confirmation of the European Commission composition and structure. Taken together the reforms with regard to the EP meant closer cooperation the Council and the Commission in search of compromises.

A clear example of how the TEU infringed upon the domestic competences of the member states is the establishment of Community policies in six new policy areas: consumer protection, industrial policy, education and vocational training, trans-European networks, youth, and culture. In addition it also broadened the social competences of the EU in such policy areas as the promotion of employment, social protection and dialogue, improvement of living and working conditions, development of human resources, and greater integration of persons excluded from the labor market. The Treaty reform also expanded the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) authority, granting it the power to sanction member states in cases in which these statutes choose to ignore or violate its rulings or in which they fail to implement European Law according to a specific timetable. With these expansions of powers, the Commission and the ECJ could

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58 A special procedure was created for the UK in order to allow this member state to bypass becoming a signatory to the social protocol.
from then on regulate, impose direction of development, and sanction non-compliance with its decisions within the realm of a larger number of policy areas. All of them transcend and *de facto* eliminated the national sovereignties which in the mean time remained *terra sancta* for the majority of the relatively more superficial ‘intergovernmental’ agreements provided to other similar international organizations.

The TEU also made an effort to evolve, broaden, and consolidate the concept of European citizenship. Although earlier treaties, especially the Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Rome, provided for the free movement of workers in the coal and steel industries, and of workers and services in general, respectively, a direct reference to the concept of EU citizenship was never made prior to the Maastricht Treaty. It specifically spelled various rights for European citizens as members of the Community, apart from the rights they had under their national citizenship. Thus, under the TEU European citizens now had the right to circulate and reside freely within the borders of the Community. They could also vote and to stand as candidates for European and municipal elections within their states of residence and not just their state of origin. Additionally, they had the right to seek protection while on the territory of a third country by the diplomatic and consular authorities of a member state other than their state of origin if their state of origin is not represented in that third country. Citizens had the right to
petition the European Parliament for various topics, and they could submit complaints to the European Ombudsman.

Finally, as a countermeasure to this unprecedented transfer of sovereignties from national to supranational level, the TEU introduced the new principle of subsidiary. According to its basic tenets, nothing in the EU or its member states should be completed by a larger organization or entity if it can be equally well completed by a smaller and simpler organization. In theory, this principle was meant to devolve some of the powers transferred from national to supranational level. Thus, it was contemplated as a way to reinforce decentralization, by establishing a mechanism via which the EU should not concern itself with matters which are better dealt by national governments. Likewise, national governments should not concern themselves with matters which are best handled by regional and local authorities. Since its introduction, however, the principle has been very loosely enforced and in practice largely ignored. The major European institutions, along with pro-European domestic political elites, have a vested interest in a greater centralization of powers on national and supranational level, rather than the opposite. The lack of enforcement mechanisms, along with various practical procedural problems, also proved a real impediment to the ubiquitous application of the subsidiary principle. For example, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) established in 1962, which has been a subject of controversies and vehement debates since its introduction,
remains to this day the most expensive item on the EU agenda. It consumes nearly half of the Union’s total yearly budget. According to the principle of subsidiary, the CAP should have been gradually phased out by now from the EU’s agenda, and its responsibilities should have been completely transferred to the national governments, which can better assess their own idiosyncratic needs and goals with regard to the goals and strategies for their specific agricultural sectors. Do date this remains in the realm of wishful policy considerations. States which prefer the status quo usually find a way to opt out of these policies so that they integrate only the sectors and policy areas which they deem to be in their own national interest.

All of these together meant that the political character of the European Union was rapidly changing into a mega confederate-like entity, with an increasingly centralized power in the hands of its executive bodies – the Commission and the Council. Nothing, however, exemplifies more clearly the deepening of the integration process and the transfer of sovereignties to EU level than the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – the epitome of the TEU’s economic reforms. It represents the pinnacle of European-level economic centralization and it signifies the finalization of the single European market project. According to it, member states must ensure coordination of their economic policies, provide multilateral surveillance for this coordination, submit to external financial and budgetary discipline, and introduce a single currency.
The third stage of this market unification was completed in January 1, 2002 when the Euro finally replaced the national currencies in all member states which took part in the EMU.\(^{59}\) As part of this project the TEU also formally rubberstamped the creation of such institutions as the European Systems of Central Banks (ESCB), the European Monetary Institute, and the European Central Bank (ECB), all of which gradually transferred the monetary and fiscal decision-making from national to European level.

The common monetary policy evolved in three stages. Its origins date back to the 1970s when Pierre Wener, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, presented a report for monetary union. The “Wener Plan” offered a three stage blueprint for this remarkable economic integration achievement. It was Jacques Delors and his Commission, however, who established were largely responsible for implementing these stages. The first stage included the formal recognition of the EMU as one of the Union’s goal. In that sense, the TEU only made the project official and set a number of economic convergence criteria with regard to various economic and financial tasks, such as inflation rates, public finances, interest and exchange rates stability, various currency devaluation.

\(^{59}\) Currently all West European member states are also members of EMU, except UK, Denmark and Sweden\(^{1}\)/2 Denmark rejected the adoption of the Euro via referendum, Sweden has opted out by using a loophole: according to the Accession Treaty of 1994 the country was required to join the EMU as soon as the country meets the criteria to do so\(^{1}\)/2 one of the requirements is to join the EMR II (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) system for a period of minimum of two years, prior to adopting the Euro\(^{1}\)/2 2003 referendum rejected the Euro, which led to the decision of the government not to join EMR II for the time being\(^{1}\)/2 K negotiated its opt-out during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations.
instruments, and limits of national budget deficit.\textsuperscript{60} All of these clearly represented important national tools and instruments of economic policy making. Giving them up was, perhaps, the most significant infringement on national sovereignties. The EMU, in essence, represents the hallmark of European economic, financial, and fiscal integration. At the time of strategy contemplation and implementation, the European Commission, as the main proponent of the reform, sought to undermine its political ramifications. Delors’ argument emphasized a two-speed integration, faster for the economic side and slower for the political side, in attempt to convince political elites across the European Community that for the successful reformation of the Union a single economic policy is necessary, yet non-essential, compared to political integration process. Most of all, he made it sound like it was unavoidable, yet insignificant from a political standpoint. This argument, dissipated quickly, of course, in the light of the TEU’s ratification crisis, which made clear the deep identity symbolism attached to national currencies.

The second and third pillars of the new European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), represented the other powers delegated to the EU from its

\textsuperscript{60} According to the requirements for Stage III, the member states which wish to introduce the Euro and thus become part of the EMU, must meet a certain number of criteria. The four most important ones are: price stability with an average inflation rate not to exceed more than 1.5%, budgetary discipline as defined as maintaining a domestic deficit of less than 3% of GDP, currency stability and observance of normal fluctuation margins of the ERM for at least two years without any devaluations, and interest rate convergence not exceeding more than 2% of the three top performing EMU states.
member states. The pillars transformed and consolidated the legal and political foundation for deeper intergovernmental cooperation under the former umbrella of the European Political Community (EPC) in the areas of foreign and security policy. And they established the principle of deeper cooperation in areas such as justice, immigration, crime, and terrorism. The two pillars, however, represent a lesser integration effort than the first, at least until the battered Lisbon Treaty is finally ratified by all member states and implemented. The policy area decisions in the second and the third pillars clearly bore on the EC pillar. However, their structures, prerogatives, and mode of operation resembled much more a traditional intergovernmental cooperation initiative, than a deeper integration process. Taken together the TEU simultaneously marked a continuation of the reform process begun under the SEA. But it also marked a sharp departure in the direction of unprecedented political, economic, and social integration. The TEU remains the most serious reform of the character and mode of operation of the European project until the failed attempt for European Constitution (TCE).61

The subsequent Amsterdam (AMT) and Nice (NIT) Treaties only refined and built on the integration initiatives envisioned and outlined by the TEU. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, for example, was not meant to introduce any major

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61 At the time of this writing the successful implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is still hanging in the air.
initiatives, unlike the previous Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC).\textsuperscript{62} Instead, it was planned as a follow-up conference to assess and amend some provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, the IGC, which culminated in the Amsterdam Treaty, set a precedent as a routinely convened IGC for reform and method to improve the institutional design of the European Union as a consequence of the deepening of the integration process. Unlike the previous five such conferences, Amsterdam was not convened on an \textit{ad hoc} basis.\textsuperscript{63} Its organization was planned in advance within the provisions of TEU (TEU, Article N2). As already mentioned, the first pillar of EU marked the most profound and most unprecedented deepening of the European Integration since Maastricht. However the second and third pillars only provided venues for greater integration without actually including too many provisions in this direction. The Amsterdam Treaty could be regarded, in that respect, as a necessary addition to the TEU, especially with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) — the second pillar. It specifically dealt with Articles 11 to 28 of the TEU, reforming and expanding the powers of the EU institutions with regards to forming and conducting common foreign and security policy. For example, the Treaty

\textsuperscript{62} At the time the press was also very critical of AMT achievements. The UK Guardian ironically noted that “Europe is much the same this week as it was last week.” (Guardian, “The Real Lesson of Amsterdam” June 18, 1997) while The Economist made a point that The Amsterdam Summit ‘produced more of a mouse than a mountain” (The Economist, “Mountain Still to Climb” June 21, 1997)

\textsuperscript{63} The five IGCs mentioned are the 1950-1 conference in Paris, which established ECSC, the 1955-7 conference which resulted in the two Rome Treaties establishing EEC and Euroatom, the 1985 SEA, and the two Maastricht IGCs resulting in the TEU (both the Political Union and EMU). (c.f. European Commission, Representation of the UK, Background Report – BR/09/95: September 1995)
amended the TEU by allowing for the European Commission to be directly involved in the CFSP (Article J.4 §4, AMT). It also provided for ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peace keeping’ (Article J.7 §1 and §2, AMT). The Treaty created the powerful position of High Representative for the CFSP – the equivalent of a foreign minister for the EU (Article J.4 §4, AMT) – with which the Lisbon Treaty would become even more powerful in terms of deciding a unified foreign policy for the EU.

It also introduced the concept of ‘constructive abstention’ by allowing members who for one reason or another desire to stay out of a certain common European peacekeeping operation to do so without compromising or blocking the others’ participation. It enabled an early earning unit for analysis and prevention of international crises to prepare in advance the Council and the Commission for necessary actions with regard to upcoming or unfolding conflicts. And finally it added two necessary foreign policy tools, the creation of common strategies and guidelines, which were aimed at greater synchronization of common positions and joint actions already provided by TEU. In short, as a result of the reforms introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU became a greater and more unified actor on the international arena. It successfully transferred sovereignties in such areas as foreign policy and national security, which are traditionally considered to lay at the core of state policy, and also a
source of national pride. This, in turn, explains the strategic choice by eurosceptic parties to make use of these particular issues, to spearhead their attacks against the EU.

Somewhat even more importantly, the Amsterdam Treaty, and later on the Nice Treaty, dealt extensively with how to enhance the EU’s powers with regard to legislation in civil law and procedure, immigration, and with regard to the free movement of people within the EU. This, of course, was all done anticipating the enlargement of the EU to include Central and Eastern European countries within its borders. All of the issues regarding protection of human rights, free movement of people, immigration and asylum policy, police and customs cooperation, crime prevention and terrorism fall under the EU’s third pillar – Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Since its creation under the TEU provisions they have remained the weakest pillar of all (Dinan 1999: 181). The third pillar retained an almost entirely intergovernmental character. This is understandably so, since all nine policy areas outlined under the TEU’s Article K1 regarding the JHA impact core national sovereignties. The infringement of national sovereignties would have been too brutal, had the actual powers under the third pillar been given any actual value. It would have transformed the EU into a real federation-like or co-federation-like political entity. For that reason the second and third pillars have been left outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ so that states retain certain power over this policy decision-making. According to the final
version, the ECJ can offer preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of decisions, framework or else. But there is no ‘automatic’ mechanism for accepting these decisions by any of the member states (Chryssochoou et al. 2003: 91). Instead, a member state first has to accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ through a special declaration, as outlined in Article K7, §2 of AMT, a practice long established for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague (Ibid.). Evidently, at the time of AMT’s signing there was not enough political will to introduce stronger principle of supranationalism, which led to the endorsement of this much more intergovernmental and less intrusive one, into the third pillar.

Yet, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced some significant changes, too. For example, according to Article K4 the Council now had the power to lay down some limitations, conditions, and requirements with regard to the jurisdiction under which the competent authorities of one member state, or the Europol, may operate on the territory of another member state (Article K4, AMT). Similarly, the Council could now adopt, at Commission’s initiative, or at that of a member state, a common position with regard to a particular matter. Such positions could concern matters of national security, including organized crime and terrorism. These ‘framework’ decisions could become biding, thus mimicking national legislation and regulation (Chryssochoou et al. 2003: 91-2). Such decisions and various other conventions could then enter into force with the ratification of half of the member states concerned.
The third pillar policy areas originally outlined by the TEU were made by design ineffective so that they would need additional support and agreement by the member states in order to be any effective at all. That is why before signing the AMT European leaders decided to move some of its provisions, particularly on immigration and asylum, under the supranational first pillar, in order to make them more effective (Dinan 1999: 181). Such a move may be interpreted as a clear sign on behalf of the governing national political elites to empower the European Union institutions around particular issues, which have inflamed domestic debates about European integration since Maastricht. With regard to controversial policies, a tighter European-wide regulation achieves two goals at once, with ultimate responsibility transferred to the much less accountable European Commission. First, it alleviates the burden of dealing with such volatile issues from governing elites, thus improving their stance vis-à-vis domestic political opposition. Second, the control over many of its aspects ultimately remains within the reach of these same governing elites, via the powers yielded by the Council, as well as via their leverage over the Commissioners. In effect, this could be analyzed as Putnam’s ‘two-level game’ reversed.64

From all treaties since the SEA, the Treaty of Nice (NIT) is, perhaps, the most technical one with regard to proposed changes. Its significance, however, is no less than that of the AMT. And according to many observers it is even more

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64 For more on the two-level game, see Putnam 1988.
so. Its achievements are no less far reaching, for example, with regard to strengthening the supranational powers of the EU, thus further enhancing the integration process. The NIT is, in its essence, an institutional reform aimed at assessing and refining the changes made by the TEU and the AMT with regard to the supranational governance of the EU and the ensuing change in the balance of powers among the member states. It corrected some procedural issues, and prepared the EU for its pending ‘big bang’ two-step enlargement with regard to twelve more members. The NIT made some important changes with regard to the weights of the votes of individual member states in the Council, and it further solidified the power and the position of the President of the Commission vis-à-vis both internal pressure from fellow Commissioners and external pressure from member states. It also provided additional powers to the ECJ, allowing the Court to exercise greater political activism in various aspects of the EU policy making and enforcing procedures (Chryssohoou et al. 2003: 113). The implications from NIT are numerous and concern all the member states a great deal. Among the most notable ones are the expansion of the areas of QMV, the number of EP seats allocated per state, and actual political leverage of member states vis-à-vis the structure and functioning of the Commission. Nevertheless,

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65 For full list of changes see NIT at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm>  
66 By allowing the President of the Commission to internally reshuffle his or her Commissioners’ portfolios, the NIT provided for an elegant solution to the longstanding problem of horse-trading practices between member states with regard to the assignment of portfolios to their respective Commissioners.
the Treaty did not shift significant powers from national to supranational level. Instead, it reformed and enhanced the way power already allotted to various EU institutions is used. More significantly, it changed the balance of power between small and large states in the Council, which foreshadowed the next consecutive crises with treaty ratification – a sneak preview of the spectacular failure of the Constitution Treaty and the still unraveling crisis with the Lisbon Treaty.

Even without the overt transfer of sovereignties to a supranational level, the Nice Treaty proved difficult to ratify, especially in Ireland’s case. The NIT represented an interesting attempt to pass an actual disempowerment of the small states in the Union as their concealed victory. The Irish government, arguably, responded by using a formal procedure to threaten the Treaty’s destiny without implicating itself as the main perpetrator. Instead, it let domestic eurosceptic groups take credit for mudding the waters. As the record showed, this move empowered eurosceptics, boosted their self esteem, and provided them with a know-how to stand up effectively to changes pushed by the mainstream parties and gain the upper hand in the public debate.

The Irish referendum, which was organized for the purpose of ratifying the NIT, received a record low turnout — only about 34%. This was due to a combination of active campaigning by the eurosceptic groups and an egregiously

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67 For detailed discussion of the gains and losses of the small member states vs the large ones, see Andenas, Mads and John Usher (2003: 183-209), see also Chryssochoou et al. (2003: 94-118).
lacking interest and largely absent campaign by the pro-European political parties and civil society groups. The end result was the successful transformation of the Treaty by the governing party Fianna Fail into a hostage to be released in exchange for various concessions by the other member states, and the European Commission, which ultimately strengthened its power-grip vis-à-vis issues related to the European Union. The important precedent set by the Irish “no” vote to the NIT, one could argue, flashed the trend of ensuing rejections of the European Constitution by the French and Dutch referenda, and the latest Irish “no” to the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. However well concealed, the Nice Treaty rejection by a popular referendum was greatly facilitated by the passive help of the governing and opposition mainstream political parties and main civil society groups. The crisis was largely enabled because of the surprising ruling by the Ahern’s government, at the Attorney General’s advice, that the ratification of the Treaty may require a constitutional amendment (The Irish Times 2001: A6). The end result of this seemingly orchestrated sabotage was that Ireland successfully push ahead its Irish national agenda and extracted two important treaty amendments concessions. Fearing the shadow of the future, Fianna Fail gladly let the eurosceptic parties to pick up both the bill and the credit for this success. Since none of these events developed in an isolated environment, the lessons from the eurosceptic success were well noted by many opponents of European integration,
and were successfully applied a few years later during the Constitution Treaty and Lisbon Treaty ratifications.

According to the tenth amendment in the Irish Constitution, all major changes to the European treaties must be ratified via constitutional amendment. All other member-states can ratify a treaty through a vote in their national assemblies. The reason is simple. Since TEU’s entrance into force, the European Law mandates that all amendments to the current European Treaties must be made via a new Treaty. Such a new Treaty then must be duly ratified by all member states in order to enter into force. Such were, indeed, the cases with AMT and NIT, which ultimately amended provisions outlined by the TEU, as well as more recently with the TEC and the latest of all, the Lisbon Treaty. In turn, each such amendment requires a popular referendum in Ireland.

The amendment to the Irish Constitution was established back in 1987, as a result of Crotty vs. Taoiseach. Back then Raymond Crotty, a renowned Irish historian and a social scientist, challenged the Irish government with regard to its decisions and actions concerning matters of European integration.68 The Irish Supreme Court affirmed that from there on every significant change to the European Union treaties, specifically in the CFSP areas, required an Irish

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68 To access the full text of the ruling in this case and other relevant information online see <<http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1987/4.html>>
referendum. This, in turn would lead to an amendment to the Irish Constitution in order for such a change to be ratified by Ireland and come into full force.

Interestingly, in the case of the Nice Treaty, it remains a matter of controversy as to whether the Irish government was really required to it through a referendum, since the Treaty was not amending any of the currently existing provisions with regard to the CFSP. Some observers, politicians, and commentators, such as the Irish Green Party MEP Niall Andrews, have argued that the government intentionally pushed the NIT ratification through a referendum, coupling it with three other referendums and setting an extremely short timeframe for discussion in order to confuse voters (“The Nice Treaty,” 2001: 17). No less significant evidence for the transparent role the government played in setting up the Nice Treaty referendum down a path to failure is the symbolic decision by the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, not to visit Ireland before the referendum (Staunton 2001).

The Irish government made out well in this crisis. As a result of the “no” vote in the June referendum, Ireland obtained two exceptions which strengthened the power grip of the Irish government vis-à-vis European policy issues. First, Ireland was no longer obliged to join the common European Security and Defense Policy under any circumstances, as outlined by the Seville Declaration.69 This reaffirmed the Irish policy of neutrality. This is highly symbolic and a largely

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69 For a full text of the declaration see: http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?locID=367&docID=900
domestic political point of contention. Out of all the EU member states Ireland spend the smallest percentage of its GDP on defense.\(^70\) It is also one of the smallest, albeit well maintained military, and frequently deployed as part of various international peace keeping missions. In addition, the CFSP was a topic which the TEU tackled and not by the NIT. This fact alone, in and of itself, is a clear evidence for the disingenuous intentions of the Irish government at the time it decided to hold a referendum for the NIT. Second, any agreement under the so-called “enhanced co-operation” procedure under the EU treaties now required the approval of the Irish House of Representatives. Arguably, this was indeed the kind of amendment the Irish government was trying to extract from its European partners. The recommendations of the Attorney General also outlined the “enhanced co-operation” changes in the Nice Treaty as a possible reason for putting the Treaty to a popular referendum, and not the indirect implications the NIT allegedly had for the CFSP.

The principle of ‘enhanced cooperation’ was first established by the AMT and it made an important contribution to the complicated and cumbersome procedure of decision making in the EU by introducing greater flexibility. In essence, this principle offered a way out of an impasse whereby a member state

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70 Irish defense budget is about 0.53% of its GDP for 2007, which percentage wise is smaller than Malta’s defense expenditure of 0.72% of its GDP for the same period/1 2or 2009 the two countries have roughly similar defense expenditure as percentage of the GDP, about 0.66%/1 2his is due, however, not to some increase of the actual Irish expenditure, but to the global economic crisis which has affected Ireland more than Malta, and in turn has contracted its GDP in actual terms.
could oppose and veto a given proposal, thus stalling the integration process. Under its provisions, the principle stipulated that a minimum of eight states, or one-third of the member states, can join forces in order to file a request with the European Commission to proceed with an ‘enhanced cooperation’ proposal. Soon after the most recent Irish rejection in June 2008 — this time, the Lisbon Treat — many politicians and pundits began actually pushing the idea of a “multi-speed Europe.” This would allow those ardent to further integrate to bypass the opposition of the states opposed, in particular Ireland. Speaking shortly after the latest Irish rejection, this time on the Lisbon Treaty, via popular referendum, the Luxembourg Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, boldly suggested what has been on the mind of many: “Given that it is increasingly hard to get all states moving together, probably the only thing left is a ‘Club of the Few’ (Lichfield and Brown 2008). Other leaders were quick to hint that the principle for an ‘enhanced cooperation’ mechanism could potentially be applied as a deal breaker with regard to the Lisbon Treaty, if it is not ratified successfully within a reasonable period of time by all member states. This controversial idea for ‘multi-speed Europe,’ has its adherents and opponents. But what is more important

71 The Lisbon Treaty changes this from eight to nine states.
72 One such proposal is currently pending with regard to a common divorce law for the EU. If passed, an EU-wide regulation will bypass the opposition by some states, in particular Sweden, who fear the abolition of their more liberal law.
73 From a policy perspective, one can make the argument that cooperation has certain limits and with the number of member states more than doubled since the intensified integration began, a multi-speed integration makes perfect sense. With the apparent differences between small and big states in the Union, and their respective strategic interests and spheres of influence, states which do not feel comfortable with
here is the strategic concept of using the ‘enhanced cooperation’ principle as a tool for political solution.

As a result, one can make the argument that the Nice Treaty set the trends for future spectacular failures of the European integration, such as the Constitution Treaty rejection, as well as the troubles for the Lisbon Treaty today. More importantly than that, NIT demonstrated that grass-root opposition does work. The eurosceptical parties found a way out of their deepening marginalization arming themselves not only with populist arguments of various range, but also with self esteem and belief that by playing the right arguments they can become visible and can command power and influence.

**EU Institutions and Integration**

The major engines behind the deepening of the political integration and continuing revisions of the treaties were and have always been, undoubtedly, the European Commission and the European Council. Historically, the EC/EU was set to have two executive bodies in order to keep each other in check. While in many cases this is, indeed, the case, with regard to the gains for the mainstream parties, hence the losses for the marginal parties, the two can be regarded as a certain reforms, should not be coerced to participate/1 /2in reality, however, smaller states do not have the “go it alone” power the big states do. On the other hand, however, one should not be allowed to “sit at the table” if not making proper contribution/1 /2or more on the “go it alone” power, see Lloyd Gruber, *Ruling the World* (N/1 /2.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
two-headed political power-monster which works in tandem to guard its powers and influence. Of the two, the European Commission is the institution which stands to gain the most from deepening the political integration and further transfers of national sovereignties to a supranational level. So let us focus on it first.

The European Commission was once characterized as the “strangest executive bureaucracy ever created” (Peterson & Shackleton 2002: 72) — a sui generis executive institution with no analog in domestic or international realms. Article 155 of the Treaty of Rome institutes the main structural composition and functions of the European Commission, both of which were subsequently expanded by various treaties. The Commissioners are chosen and nominated for their positions by the individual national governments. They are then confirmed by the European parliament, en bloc, and appointed by the European Council. Among its most important tasks is exclusive responsibility over initiating proposals before the Council of Ministers, and to serve as a guardian of the principles embedded in the various union treaties, and to propose various legislations. It must be noted that under the current provisions of European law the Commission is the sole body responsible for initiating legislation on any matter in the European Union. True, after the revisions of the Maastricht Treaty, under the co-decision procedure any amendment requires the assent of the European Parliament (TEU, Article 251). It is also true that both the European Parliament
and the European Council may also formally request the Commission to propose legislation on a certain subject. It is, however, also correct that the Commission is under no obligation to comply with such request, albeit it may choose not to use this discretionary right (Commission Report SEC (95) 731, p.14). Other duties include:

- implementation of approved legislation;
- discretion on the spending policies of the EU and full control over the Structural and Cohesion Funds;
- conduct of quasi-judicial proceedings as part of its competition and anti-dumping policies, passing verdicts and imposing penalties.\(^7^4\)

In brief, the Commission has combined executive, legislative, and judicial powers.

The Commissioners’ voting record is, by default, not published, which fuels the ‘democratic deficit’ debate. Ronald Vaubel (2009: 31-33) is correct to point that there is a serious principal-agent problem with regard to the egregious unaccountability of the European Commission. The European Commission is presiding over the daily operations of what remains, despite all talk, an international organization. As such, citizens’ perception of its decision-making process remains obfuscated and distanced. In addition, a European citizens’

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\(^7^4\) Examples of the European Commission imposing harsh penalties are the record high fines against Microsoft in 2004, 2006 and 2008, of €497 million (US$794 million), €280.5 million (US$448.58 million) and €899 million (US$1.44 billion) respectively.
access to decision-makers is cumbersome, unclear, and restricted, which imposed additional costs on an individual to try to understand, initiate action, and follow up on an action with regard to European politics, than that of domestic politics (Ibid.). This, in return, fuels people’s feeling of powerlessness. According to Eurobarometer poll from 1995, over 40% of the respondents feel that they have no influence over the Commission’s decisions at all (Ibid., 32).

More interesting is the question of who are the commissioners composing this quite omnipotent institution. Appendix B provides a list of commissioners from the first Delors’ Commission in 1985 to the current Barosso’s Commission. This list can be read as a representative sample for the entire history of the institution. Evident is the overwhelming presence of politicians who are a) part of the ruling party/coalition at the moment of their appointment, and b) those with political careers which in almost all cases included high public office, such as a ministerial, or national / European parliamentarian position. In some cases the commissioner may be from a political party in opposition at the time of his/her appointment or tenure. Often, this unorthodox appointment is due to internal political dynamics, partisan considerations, and even inter-personal negotiations. In six out of 111 cases we see “unique names” — commissioners do not come
from mainstream political parties with firm control over the domestic political processes.\footnote{This count does not keep track of repeated appointments of the same commissioner to two or more different Commissions, or their replacement in mid-term. That is why the count includes ‘unique names.’}

The commissioners are chosen by national governments, confirmed by the European Parliament and appointed by the European Council.\footnote{It is worth recalling that the European Council is also composed by Prime Ministers and/or resource ministers from the member states.} Thus, the Commission’s composition is entirely a function of partisan decision by elites in mainstream political parties. The marginal parties have no chance to become a political appointee with regard to the European Commission, unless they are both part of a governing coalition and openly pro-European. This is, indeed, the case with the six exceptions. Take for example the case of the current Energy Commissioner from Latvia, Andris Piebalgs, who was a Finance Minister and an Ambassador to the EU prior to his appointment to the Barosso’s Commission. There is also the case of the former Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Information and Telecommunication Technologies from Germany, Martin Bengemann, who was a Federal Minister of Economics prior to his appointment to the Santer’s Commission in 1995. They both were members of marginal political parties, the Latvian Way and the German Free Democratic Party, respectively. Their parties were both members of a governing coalition at the time of their appointment, and clearly pro-European in their personal orientation and ideological convictions.
Another aspect of the political unaccountability of the European Commission relates to its powers to dispose with very large financial influence at its own discretion. For example, in the period from 2005 to 2007 the Commission distributed over €50 million to dozens of non-governmental organizations (Vaubel 2009: 38). In that sense, the Commission can be said to have favored NGOs with wide political influence, such as the European Trade Union Confederation (€4.8 million), or the International Lesbian and Gay Association (€1.5 million), which in turn can endorse and support various governing and oppositional parties.

The Commission yields even more financial power with respect to its duties as the main body entrusted to manage the EU’s budget. The EU’s general budget is comprised of contributions from the member states as a fixed percentage of their GNI — currently an average of 1.12% across the EU\(^7\) — along with other types of revenue, such as taxes raised on behalf of the EU which include the so-called traditional own recourses (TOR) and the value added taxes (VAT) levied at each member country. The Commission plays a prominent role in initiating the preliminary draft budget for a seven year period, for negotiating yearly budget expenditures, and for implementing the budget. The Court of Auditors monitors the implementation process and issues a report which provides an assessment of the completion of the Commissions’ duties and issues an

\(^7\) The maximum amount of GNI-based revenue is capped at 1.24% for the EU as a whole.
opinion whether the EP should discharge the Commission from the past budget implementation process.

The European Union budget is, arguably, the most powerful financial tool member states have at their disposal to redistribute money among themselves as a source of political power over domestic constituents. As a recent policy paper from the Center for European Policy Studies argues, as long as this 'perverse incentive' continues to exist the budget structure will remain 'impervious to change.' No member state stands up for the general EU interest, the returns for doing so are minimal, and the incentives to be selfish are enormous (Gross 2008).

Among its many expenditure articles, the budget has two fairly big items, which combined are a living testimony of the enormous financial power the European Commission and by the European Council yields. These are the management and funds allocation for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural and Cohesion Funds.\textsuperscript{78} Combined, these two items currently consume about 75% of the EU’s budget (see Table 4.2). They also stimulate the main areas of common policy integration – agriculture, infrastructure and regional development.

The CAP is perhaps the most controversial policy of the European Union. Established shortly after the Rome Treaty as a compromise between France and Germany (Swann 2000: 232), the policy has long lasted its expected life. The

\textsuperscript{78} Although it is a separate policy initiative, the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) is now listed in the EU budget as part of the same section as it is CAP, therefore I combine them together here.
CAP, in essence, is a gigantic EU subsidy which covers close to 94% of all European produce, with only 6% being left to the market. Among the foodstuffs which enjoy either a permanent or conditional guarantee of price and sale are such products as wheat, rye, barley, maize, rice, sugar, dairy products, beef and sheepmeat, minor cereals, quality wines, certain fruits and vegetables, pigmeat, eggs, poultry, oil seeds, cotton and flax seeds, etc. Because of its scope, it alone absorbs close to half of the current EU budget.79

Table 4.2   EU Budget 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Million in €</th>
<th>% of EU budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP and Fishery Expenditure</td>
<td>€59,639</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural and Cohesion Funds</td>
<td>€48,427</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission

Historically, the CAP has been an amalgam of prices regulation, aids for agricultural producers, storage and carry-over arrangements, and common policy for imports and facilitating exports. Hence, the CAP, understood as an artificial ‘regulation of markets insulated from import competition’ (Rieger 2005: 162), is a profoundly anti-market protectionist policy. At the time of its inception during the Treaty of Rome the CAP served a quarter of the citizens of the original six

79 Although the CAP’s expenditure is projected to decrease to about 37% by 2013, in 2009 it still represented 43.8% of the EU’s budget, or €59.64 billion. Albeit, the percentage has decreased from previous years. In 2006, for example, it absorbed about 45.5% of the budget. The absolute value of redistributed money since then has increased with approximately €9 billion.
member states. In the 1950, save for UK, the majority of the European states, today members of the EU, had on average between 20% and 25% of their population locked into the agricultural sector (Ibid., 163). The CAP’s goal was to address the concerns from political and economic integration of all people engaged in the agricultural sector, guarantee and improve their lifestyle, and preserve traditional forms of farming during the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society. In all accounts, as controversial as the policy may be, it has succeeded in its goals. Some even argue that the CAP is, perhaps, the most successful integration policy of the early EC/EU (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970: 41). Today the reality is much different. Across the EU, before the latest enlargements to the East, only about 5% of all EU citizens were involved in farming. In addition, some countries benefit more than others from the rebates. France, Germany, and Italy head the list (Gros 2008).

Of greater significant for the current argument, the European Council has the upper hand with regard to compensation distribution. The CAP is primarily driven by domestic political considerations and fueled by member states’ preferences, with the Council at the head of this process. Each year the agricultural ministers of the member states get together to negotiate the specifics of the funds dispersed among the member states, and to set the prices for various subsidized agricultural products. In order to reach an agreement the Commission has to submit proposals which suit the members of the Council. This naturally
Chapter 4: The Shadow of the Future

precludes the involved parties from concluding objective and balanced policy; rather it induces an atmosphere of incessant compromises which in the end serve the narrow interests of member-states, their political groups and constituents. The agricultural ministers are representatives of the governing political parties and coalitions, and they are also under pressure from their own farming communities, and from various political and lobbyist organizations to set the highest possible price level (Leonard 1993: 156). In that sense the CAP serves and benefits the constituents of the incumbent mainstream parties, as well as those in opposition which could make their voices heard and have their political representatives enter office within a cycle or two of elections. Thus, the CAP becomes a directly-managed financial tool for domestic political influence, which in the same time resides on a supranational level.

The structural and cohesion funds are the other financial tools which serves the mainstream political parties in the member states. The aim of these funds is to promote economic, social, and territorial cohesion. At the present, along with the cohesion fund, there are four funds allocated for this objective: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) which also provides a small portion of the CAP funds, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). Together, these funds comprise the regional and agricultural integration policy of the EU. For budget year 2009, the
allocated money for the structural and cohesion funds amounted to €48,426 billion, or about 35%.

The distribution of the funds has gone through a number of revisions over the past thirty years. In the beginning they were seen as a mechanism for welfare redistribution of monies from the EU budget to poor regions. The EU’s regional policy began in 1975 with the establishment of the ERDF, now part of the structural funds. With the evolution of regional integration policies, the need for reforming the conditions, and objectives of why and how these funds are dispersed, simultaneously grew. Since 1985 onwards, the structural funds were justified in terms of ‘economic and social cohesion,’ and they were intended to identify and help struggling regions affected by industrial decline. Simultaneously with this shift of focus, the allocated funds increased exponentially, from about 4.9% of the EU budget in the mid 1970s to 35.1% today (see Table 4.3). The SEA outlined the idea of cohesion as linked to the urgency for reduction of the regional disparities, although not the only such available solution.

### Table 4.3 Structural Funds Increase Since mid-1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Millions ECU / €</th>
<th>% of EU budget</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>ECU 257.5</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>ECU 3,312</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (with pre-accession help)</td>
<td>€34,615</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>€48,427</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation from European Commission Documentation
Unlike the case with the CAP funds, where the Commission has little say and the European Parliament even less than that, the Commission has wide discretion for implementation in the case of structural and cohesion funds. Its powers steadily grew since the early 1980s, when most of the funds were distributed by national quotas. The funds functioned, therefore, as a way of reimbursing the governments for projects already completed, or in process of completion. The Commission gradually absorbed power and discretion with regard to the structural and coherence funds, and today it is the main agent for decision and distribution. The member-states first submit conversion plans, which include a precise description of the region to be targeted, an estimate of appropriate strategies, and an outline of how the funds will be used. Going through a series of elaborate procedures, the funds are approved by the Commission and transferred to a managing authority within the member-state, usually a sub-branch of the government. In other words, the funds are negotiated by governments and regional authorities, and the Commission. Additional condition in the European law postulates that the funds do not replace the central government’s commitments. Thus, no regional program can do well without the commitment of the central government, and its contribution to the project.

Proponents of the ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks 1992; Marks, Hooghe & Blank 1996; Hooghe & Marks 2001) argue that the structural funds are example of breaking the ‘gate-keeping’ power of the central governments through joining
forces of two other actors, that of supranational power (the EU Commission) and that of subnational powers (local and regional authorities). This hypothesis, however, does not become automatically valid. David Allen (2005: 220-2) for example, argue that while in its earliest days the structural funds reform may have been able to circumvent the omnipotent power of the central governments, therefore empowering smaller regional actors, by 1999 the governments have managed to begin reasserting their authority over the allocation, distribution and implementation of the funds. Since 2000, the Commission lost some of its powers over structural funds, especially the part for pre-accession. It was also forced to accept weaker positions vis-à-vis the member-states with regard to the principles of partnership and additionality (ibid., 223).

**Conclusion**

The dynamics of European integration have undoubtedly favored the mainstream political parties. It is no surprise then that the eurosceptic parties have been relegated to the margins. Just because a marginal party is not situated in the center of the European maelstrom of funding and power does not necessarily mean that it would be eurosceptic. The argument, however, holds firm when the direction of argumentation is reversed. A mainstream party has no incentive to be hard eurosceptic, because of its location, regardless whether it is in
power or in opposition. The main reason behind this rationale is the shadow of the future which hangs over its head. Mainstream parties have a chance to ascend to power; thus, they have great incentive to support European integration, and they could potentially face great restrictions if they take hard eurosceptic positions. It would be also counter their interests as political subjects, concerned with survival, policy implementation and office holding, to take anti-European position.

Furthermore, mainstream parties, either in power or in opposition, extend their power grip over their constituents by exerting influence over the main European bodies, namely European Council and the European Commission. The consecutive revisions of the EU treaties since the Single European Act have deepened the level of political and economic integration, and have established a system of mutual dependency whereby the member-states have seceded powers to a supranational level, but they have also retained power to steer and control the internal bodies of the EU in a way that favors them. As the evidence presented in this chapter suggests, in some cases European Commissioners may be suggested and elected not only from among the governing parties, but also among oppositional, even marginal, political parties. This is, however, possible only if they are vehemently supportive of the European Union as a sui generis polity, and the European integration as a way of transforming the EU into a full scale quasi-federal politico-economic system. Finally, it has become evident that the European Union, and its main legislative and executive bodies, has at their
disposal a wide range of financial tools which can be used to strengthen the
domestic positions of the mainstream political parties vis-à-vis specific constituent
groups. Close to 75% of the current EU budget is under the control of either the
Commission or the Council, or both, to be deployed and used in a constructive
way to strengthen policy integration EU-wide. But it is also used to pacify
political grievances, solidify political influence, and build political dependency
between the mainstream parties and various constituent groups.

Taken together, these redistributive powers, agenda setting powers, and
administrative powers, constitute one side of a zero-sum game equation, on the
other side are the euro-disfranchised, marginalized political powers. Fighting for
survival and not fearing the *shadow of the future* and all its consequences, these
parties find no reason to restrain themselves in adopting hard, populist, gut-
feeling eurosceptic fear-mongering strategies as their main tools to carve-in a
niche for their political existence. The next chapter will deal with the exceptions
and will account for the variation of party-driven euroscepticism among the
member-states.
Chapter 5

The Specter of Coalitionability

In order to get a sense of the implications from the main argument in this chapter, let us first consider the events that took place in Austria between the late Fall 1999 and early Spring 1999. While the Freedom Party’s sudden ascendance to prominence is not an isolated event in European politics, it represents the most egregious case of such sudden success. Something more, it is a rare case of such a marginal party’s trip to government as a result of its suddenly increased popularity. Thus, it represents more than just a case study. It is, arguably, a model for prediction. This is why before discussing theoretical models and review current debates, I will start with this case study. Towards the end of the theoretical part, I will return to it once again for more discussion.

Jörg Haider’s eurosceptic rightwing and populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) came out second in the general elections in October 1999. As a result of long and loaded
negotiations it became a coaltional partner to the mainstream People’s Party (ÖVP) in the new Austrian government early in 2000. This event created widespread surprise. The European and indeed international, political communities were unpleasantly surprised, and stunned. For many it seemed unconceivable that 27% of the Austrian voters have supported a eurosceptic, populist, extreme rightwing political party. The perspective the new government in Hitler’s country of origin to include an extreme rightwing element, whose leader has made no secret of his xenophobic worldview and admiration for the Third Reich labor polices, made leaders around the world uneasy. In response, it elicited a harsh and unwelcome response by world leaders. Israel first threatened and then recalled its ambassador from Vienna so long as the FPÖ remains a member of the coalition government. Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright recalled “for consultation” the US ambassador Kathryn Walt-Hall in another clear signal of suspicion. The European Parliament’s president, Nicole Fontaine, remarked with disdain: “Jörg Haider’s party conveys an ideology which is diametrically opposed to the humanist values underpinning any democratic society. The EU is based on those values — respect for human rights and rejection of exclusion — and it would be intolerable for a party which denies these fundamental principles to gain power in a member country of the Union” (EP Press Release). Soon, the fourteen other member states of the EU followed suit with a more symbolic, but nonetheless equally damaging collective political ‘quarantine’ imposed on Austria’s diplomatic relationships.
In mid-February 2000, the new Austrian minister of Social Affairs, Elizabeth Sickl, a member of the FPÖ, was treated with disrespect during her visit to the regular EU summit in Lisbon. In an abrupt contrast with protocol, the summit ended without the traditional photo opts. In addition, shortly before her official speech to the forum, Mrs. Sickl’s Belgian and French counterparts demonstratively walked out in a display of a principled moral outrage with the participation of a rightwing extremist party in the Austrian government (Perrault 2000). In short, the world was almost uniformly reacting to the surprising ascent to power of the rightwing eurosceptic FPÖ. The EU member states imposed this symbolic “cordon sanitaire,” allegedly for violation of an unwritten rule in pan-European politics since the Second World War not to allow extremist rightwing parties in power.

Unpleasantly surprised were also many Austrian voters, as well as politicians from all parts of the ideological spectrum. Their surprise, however, had a different origin. They were largely defiant against the distrustful and hasty negative reaction of the world towards the Austrian democratic political system, and the sovereign right of voters to support any candidate and party of their choice. An opinion poll published in Der Standard (February 4) revealed increased support for FPÖ and the newly formed coalitional government. Another public opinion poll conducted by IMAS International, demonstrated that over 50% of the people are concerned over the ‘unfair’ treatment of Austria by the other EU member states (IMAS 2000). In the months before the resolution of the crisis, the Austrian political parties gradually
united their position against their European counterparts. The reactions varied from individual to collective lobbying, from private negotiations behind the scenes, to public showdowns, from issuing common parliamentary declarations against the political sanctions to threatening to retaliate by vetoing future enlargements, or even calling a referendum on the sanctions and on the future membership of Austria in the EU.

The most surprised of all from the new situation, however, seemed to be the FPÖ’s battered leader himself, Jörg Haider. In a clear testimony to his unpreparedness for the perspective to ascend into high office in the aftermath of the elections, he embarked on a series of frantic foreign trips, in a desperate attempt to repair his image, and that of his party. Soon after the 1999 elections, Haider travelled to Paris and London on “good will” trips in a desperate attempt to change the negative perception of his future European political partners of the political nature of his party. In a widely publicized interview, conducted in Europe, with the Washington Post he made a desperate attempt to shake the FPÖ’s, and his own, unpopular image. He claimed to “abhor all programs and all ideas of what [Adolf] Hitler stood for,” and offered a “stunning apology” for some of his previous outrageous statements (Boustany 1999). Haider also rushed to send his fellow party member and MEP Peter Sichrovsky, a self-described Jew himself, to Israel in a desperate PR attempt to convince the Israeli political and business elites that the Freedom Party was "neither anti-Semitic nor racist” and that “Haider was not a neo-
Nazi” (Perrault 2000). In the end, all efforts proved futile and Haider resigned under pressure from the FPÖ’s leadership in early May 2000 an in attempt to save the party’s position in the coalition, as well as his own political future. Consequently, by mid-September, the political sanctions were removed and the EU member states welcomed once again Austria as a full-fledged member of the Union.

This anecdote illustrates some of the most important issues, which guid the rest of this chapter. This episode of the FPÖ’s rushed ascent to power, and the row this created with the other fourteen EU member states, is not a story of successful collective action by the EU member states to curtail the rise of rightwing, and indeed eurosceptical, political power in European politics. Nor is it a story of how mainstream domestic political parties have sought to ignore the support euroscepticism received among a large part of the voting population, especially among the 30-year-old and younger voters, in attempt to resist embracing more eurosceptic positions in their platforms.80 The main story is, indeed, about the FPÖ’s leadership’s surprise and its unpreparedness, spearheaded by Jörg Haider himself, to deal with the consequences of ignoring the Shadow of the Future — the perspective that his party actually could get a chance to enter office. Even more importantly, the FPÖ did not imagine itself as a coalitional partner, nor did it act in any such way during the election campaign. During the earlier EP elections, and in the months preceding the

80 A poll published in Der Standard, October 5 1999, indicated that some 35% of the FPÖ’s electorate that voted in the elections was 30-years old or younger.
1999 legislative elections, the FPÖ’s leadership pursued a strategy of wild populism, significantly marked by eurosceptic statements, in accordance with its strategic assessment that as a small, marginal, rightwing, populist political formation, it did not have much coalitionable appeal. Treated for a long time as a pariah by the mainstream parties, the FPÖ under Haider’s leadership pursued a deliberate strategy of populist opposition against the mainstream parties. Since the mid-1980s when Haider took over the FPÖ, the party’s position towards the EC/EU issue fluctuated significantly, from full-fledged support, to complete rejection. This instability and unpredictability of behavior in the pursuit of political differentness contributed to the party’s image as “anti-cartel,” eurosceptic, rightwing, and extremist, which predetermined its self-perception as a political outsider.

The FPÖ episode has also a different significance. It delivers a blow to a growing theoretical literature on coalition politics, which rests on the assumption that coalition-building can best be explained as a deliberate strategy by party elites to remain, above all, party leaders (Luebbert 1986; Maor 1998). The general premise of their models is that party leaders’ first priority is to remain their parties’ head, and only then to remain in office.81 In the aftermath of the elections, Haider first had to give up his role in the government, and then his leadership of the party.

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81 Another case, which defies Maor and Luebbert’s argument is the two consecutive coalitional governments in Bulgaria since 2001/1. The leadership of the NDSV, the party of the former bulgarian king, Simeon Saxe Cobug Gotha, lost all of its electoral appeal and shrunk to the level of a marginal party, after enduring tumultuous coalitional partnership, which from the beginning was clearly damaging its image.
The FPÖ’s sudden popularity is not a completely isolated phenomenon in European politics. Around the same time the FPÖ was struggling for acceptance, various eurosceptic parties gained prominence across Europe. The most notable among them gearing up popular support by the use of populist, mainly anti-EU, rhetoric, were Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands, the Front National in France, and the Northern League in Italy. The significant difference between these, otherwise no less-extreme in their ideological orientation, political parties and the Freedom Party in Austria is in the expectation each of their leaderships had with regard to the chances that their party could ascend to power. To put it differently, each of the political elites of these small, eurosceptic players strategically calculated the level of coalitionability of their respective political parties, and on the basis of this calculation considered the likely impact of such a political course in a given election cycle.

The theoretical model for strategic decision-making developed in the current chapter arguably captures the dynamics of interparty competition and successfully accounts for the small political parties’ behavior vis-à-vis the European integration issue. Apart from the fact that, as a rule, the citizens tend to be more sceptically disposed to EU than are the mainstream political parties — an issue already discussed in the previous chapter — the current literature on euroscepticism insufficiently and inadequately deals with the observed variance of attitude towards EU by small, often peripheral, political parties. Thus, a series of questions lead the main inquiry in the
current chapter. Questions, such as why, for example, a country with traditionally low levels of public support for European integration such as Finland does not exhibit the level of euroscepticism found in some pro-European integration countries, such as France? Or, for that matter, why is Spain’s Communist coalition bloc, IU, an exception among the other Communist parties in the Western European countries in its persistently soft eurosceptical attitude? The main research focus in this chapter, is what explains the propensity of some small political parties towards euroscepticism, and what are the causes for some of them to undertake soft, that is qualified, opposition, while others resort to outright hard euroscepticism? Therefore, the main unit of analysis will be the interaction between political parties in democratic competition. The goal is to determine if there is any association between their location and behavior, and how this relates to the exhibited level and type of euroscepticism. The research follows the main premise from chapter three that party-based euroscepticism is best understood and explained as a strategic rather than ideological position. The model I offer in the current chapter explains the small political parties’ strategic choice with regard to resorting to euroscepticism, what type, and why.

**Strategic Assessment**

According to the argument put forth in the previous chapter, the *Shadow of the Future* the ascendance to power, and the disproportionate benefits distributed to the
mainstream parties as a result of European integration explain the overall propensity of the main political parties to be largely pro-European integration. Mainstream political parties, even when in opposition, stand to benefit from the deepening of European integration, and they stand to lose from opposing it. They are empowered vis-à-vis their domestic competitors. They possess agenda setting powers and they command redistributive privileges with regard to various financial and political tools of integration, such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds, or CAP subsidies. More importantly, even when in opposition, they brace themselves for the moment when the next electoral cycle will bring them back to power. They know that this moment, inevitably, will come. While the *Shadow of the Future* theory explains this general pro-European propensity among the mainstream parties, it also leaves enough room for qualified opposition to the EU — especially from the opposition parties. Strategic behavior is the obvious explanatory variable here. Mainstream oppositional parties are in the best position to challenge specific policies and aspects of European integration, thus seizing on the popular concerns, without compromising themselves as eurosceptic. This is consistent with current mainstream studies of euroscepticism (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2000: 8).

However, where this theory down, and this is the subject of inquiry in the current chapter, is in its inability to account for the behavior of the small pro-EU parties. According to the main assumptions of the *Shadow of the Future* paradigm, if a political party has no chance to get in power, and thus to attain advantage in some
way, politically as well as financially from the processes of European integration, it stands to gain more by opposing it. Why then are some small parties firmly pro-European integration, while others are outright anti-EU, and yet others are fluctuating between soft and hard euroscepticism? Since we have concluded that ideology fails to account for this variation, strategy seems to be the most likely explanation. To prove the ideological explanation inconsistent, as chapter three does, does not automatically provide support for a strategic decision-making argument.

A good explanatory model requires spelling out factors and conditions under which a small party would choose to pursue pro- or anti-EU policy. In other words, we need an independent variable that can explain the variation of the main dependent variable — euroscepticism at the small parties’ level. The goal of organizational survival as a main explanatory variable for descent to populism and embracing anti-EU rhetoric (Sitter 2000) is an argument, which is overall consistent with Katz and Mair’s assumption that political parties ‘were changing’ and ‘were adapting to the challenges’ that were posed by the fast changing political environment (Katz & Mair 1992: 9). The position of losers from the redistribution of power and goods, which followed from the deepening of the European integration, seems to explain why it is rational for small political parties to oppose EU integration, and their country’s membership in the Union. This association, however, is not enough to explain the observed variation of positions.
The existing evidence shows that, despite expectations, some small political parties located in the periphery of the ideological spectrum, at times embrace either soft eurosceptical, or even outright supportive positions with regard to the processes of European integration. At other times, small parties, albeit moderate and located towards the ideological center, take harder eurosceptical positions. In order to account for this counterintuitive variance of positions vis-à-vis European integration I construct a model of decision making, in which the main factor is the strategic assessment the of the party elite whether the party is coalitionable or not. It is not easy to make an argument, such as that coalitionability is the only, or even one of many, variables, which explain the direction one political party takes with regard to EU. In fact, there are other factors, such as competing elites and groups within a political party, identity of political party, and actual impact of EU policies and treaties on domestic politics, which possess each a distinct explanatory plausibility on their own.

The evidence presented in the current chapter illustrates, however, that coalitionability is the single, most important explanatory variable among all, which parsimoniously and powerfully explains the rationale of party elites’ decision-making with regard to EU. This is not to deny other reasons for opposing EU integration. Coalitionability, however, is a traditional binary variable — either a party is coalitionable or it is not, therefore spelling out clear conditions and constraints for the model to work. How coalitionable a political party is provides strategic conditions for the elite to take pro- or anti-EU position, as well as to bring nuanced
approach via hard or soft, general or specific euroscepticism. In some cases, such as the French politics since early 1990s on, factions from the mainstream parties broke out from them in attempt to gain greater bargaining power, posing themselves as separate small, but under certain circumstances crucial partners.

Whether a party would enter into a coalition with another party, and under what circumstances, is a different question altogether. It depends on many factors, such as the actual strategic assessment of gains and cost from such an action in the aftermath of specific elections. The self-image of whether the party is generally coalitionable or not is a leading factor, which determines the party politics prior to elections. If a party considers itself generally non-coalitionable, then no Shadow of the Future will hang over it and restrain its populist, including hard eurosceptic, positions.

**Coalitionability and Strategic Voting**

Before dealing with the self-image a party leadership holds, and based on which it tends to determine the course of action, we must examine the general strategies of coalition. On a macro level, the system rarely has a policy vacuum between the peripheral boundaries of the political parties. Most of the time they overlap in some policy dimensions, while remain distinct in others. In such cases, more than just one political party could potentially represent constituents’ policy preferences. On the other hand, since political representation is multidimensional, it
is unlikely to find political parties, which completely overlap each other’s policy parameters. Hence, frequently political parties, mainstream as well as marginal, compete for the same pool of constituents at their adjacent points. The place where their policies overlap. These parties are often members of the same party family. Such political parties are, for example, the Social Democratic and Socialist parties in most of the European countries, as well as Socialist and Communist parties, though in a lesser degree. Where the two political parties border each other, they inevitably also share a common appeal to a fluid group of constituents, which under certain circumstances would go either way.

The question of why and how voters choose to support one political party over another one is a subject of a vast literature. Voting behavior which represents an attempt to maximize the weight of each casted vote is referred in general as ‘strategic voting’ behavior (Duverger 1954; Riker 1982; Hoffman, 1982; Cox, 1984; Niemi, 1984; Palfrey, 1989; Myerson and Weber 1993; Cox 1994, 1997). In general, each voting pattern may be considered ‘strategic’ since it is subordinated to a particular rational logic on behalf of the voters. This, however, is hardly helpful because of its general explanatory nature. It is only natural to assume that a voter will support a political party, which either will realize a preferred set of policies, or will implement policies, which are second order, i.e. tangentially closest to the preferred policies, while the first order preferences may be unattainable. Much more precise, however, seems the definition of ‘strategic voting’ provided by Givens (2005:89),
according to which “Strategic voting occurs when voters choose to vote for a party other than their preferred party because they are afraid of wasting their vote or they are afraid that their least-favored party will win if they vote for their most-preferred party.” Empirical evidence from Spain and France, later on in this chapter, provides examples and illustrates well the significance of the strategic voting under certain structural contingencies.

The theories of voter behavior, however, rest on a set of assumptions about rational thinking by those who cast a vote. They are frequently at odds with the reality that shows a rise in the prominence of marginal parties, such as the cases of the FPÖ, the Pim Fortuyn List, and the Front National. If voters’ goal were to maximize the weight of their vote and influence policies, they would be willing to overstep their first preference and support a mainstream party. In short, voters’ behavior is not entirely driven by strategic voting, or we would observe complete conversion of political parties into two mega blocs, whereas the empirical evidence points to the other direction. This is the place where theories of elite strategic decision-making step in and offer a better analysis. These theories rest on the assumption that political parties do not simply lay out in the open a set of policies, in attempt to attract voters, but fine-tune them in attempt to guarantee their realization. Thus, cleavages become only structural limits of the actions of the elites, which must balance the task of maintaining cohesion of collective political identity with strategic decisions. Furthermore, theories which rely only on structural factors, such as social
and economic cleavages within a society, fail to account for such anomalies, as the ‘rainbow’ coalitions, which ruled for decades in Finland and in Austria. There, as discussed in brief later in the chapter, left and right political parties formed coalition after coalition despite their ideological incompatibilities. Strategic choice makes a difference and the empirical evidence section of this chapter provides proof how party leaderships of small parties play this out in their favor. Before that, however, let us look into specific theories of coalition building and determine which parties are ‘coalitionable.’

It is hard to find a parliamentary democratic country across Europe, and beyond, in which a coalition government has never ruled. Coalitions, if anything, are characteristic for democracies, especially parliamentary democracies, because of electoral systems’ particularities, or simply because of the dynamic of free voting. Even Britain, the closest to the two-party American system, has had to face periods of infamous coalitions or minority governments rule in the past decades. Mainstream political parties rarely have an incentive to announce beforehand their intentions to enter into coalitions. By default, they attempt to present themselves as non-coalitionable. Their strategy is to avoid alienating their hard-core loyal voters by preliminary announcing shadow deals and marriages of convenience with political opponents in the name of office. Such a move may discourage and turn away voters from supporting their most preferred mainstream party. In result, voters could either cast their ballot for someone else, or not vote at all. In either case, mainstream
parties’ dominant strategy would be to abstain from coalition promises, to present themselves as *non-coalitionable*, and to deal with the consequences in the light of the election results. In fact, the lengthy coalition-forming negotiations after elections are often intentionally protracted, as a tactic to put up a show for the rank-and-file party functionaries and supporters. As Luebbert observes:

> …[N]egotiations must appear the way they do in order to satisfy the members whose orientation is still largely attuned to the vocal, symbolic, and ideological aspects characteristic of each respective political subculture. It is wrong to assume that, because interparty negotiations take a long time, much is being negotiated among the parties. Most negotiation in cases of protracted government formation takes place between leaders and their followers and among rival factions within parties. (Luebbert 1986:52)

Small, marginal parties are different. They *must* present themselves as *coalitionable* in order to get a chance to enter office. By default, marginal parties neither have the broader structure of the mainstream parties, nor the capacity to create a government on their own. Therefore, in order to gain a position in a governing coalition they must be an acceptable choice for partners. Not all marginal parties are coalitionable, however. In fact, many by default are *non-coalitionable*. Such parties include the majority of the extreme left and radical right parties, along with some populist and single-issue parties not located in the extremes of the political divide.
By conducting a reflective self-evaluation, party leaders are usually aware of their own party’s status whether, in general terms, it is coalitionable or not. Thus, parties such as the Belgian’s Flemish Block and National Front, French National Front and National Movement to the right and Latte Ouvriere and Revolutionary Communist League in the left, German People’s Union, or the Greek SYNaspismos party and the Communist Party are all examples of marginal parties with little chance ever to be picked as coalitional partners. Their modus operandi is not based around strategies of ascending to power, but an alternative organizational survival, usually centered around anti-system, protest, populist, or single-issue extreme philosophy. In other words, their organizational survival rests on gathering votes via the premise that there is always a need for someone to point out to disillusioned voters that the king has no cloths, and that this someone will always enjoy under democracy enough support to survive.

To be coalitionable a political party has to cover two conditions that feed on each other. First, the party leadership must hold a self-image as coalitionable. Second, other party elites, and general constituents beyond its immediate support base, also must be able to recognize the party as an acceptable candidate for governing coalition. In many ways, this model of perception corresponds directly to the classical Barth model of ethnic boundaries. In a seminal contribution to anthropology, Barth claimed that ethnic group boundaries, albeit in flux, are defined by two highly subjective simultaneous processes — that of ascription and of self-ascription (1969: 13). In other words, belonging to an ethnic group, which just like
that of a political party in Barth’s words “is seen as a form of social organization” (ibid.), becomes a function of self-imagining as well as external recognition. The process of self-imaging is a crucial component of the current model. This is, arguably, among the leading characteristics of the collective identity creation of a political party. The self-image a party leadership holds correlates directly with the image party supporters hold for it. In a similar way, parties’ identities are impacted by the image others hold for them. The result of these two processes directly relate to the strategic assessment of party’s coalitionability status.

For example, the right-wing extremist, some even openly neo-fascist, parties are by default non-coalitionable in the aftermath of the Second World War. While they are non-excludable from the democratic system as long as they adhere to the constitutional and common democratic rules, their only chance to be part of a government is to win majority and form one on their own — a highly improbable event. Appalling cases of white supremacist violence, xenophobia, and hate crime perpetrated by militarized right-wing groups with links to extremist parties also added to this combination of external expectations and self-image for non-coalitionability of extremis right-wing parties.

A similar fate fell upon the extreme left-wing parties, especially after communism’s gradual loss of credibility and in the light of the Soviet Union’s blunders throughout the Cold War. Immediately after the Second World War
Chapter 5: The Specter of Coalitionability

communism retained some credibility and enjoyed relatively wide sympathy among elements of the general European population for some time. The high polling in the 1940s and 1950s of the French, Italian, and Finnish among others, communist parties is the clearest proof of that popularity. This changed with the escalation of the Cold War. Events, such as the Berlin Blockade, the bloody and repressive crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968, the gradual revelations about the horrors of the Stalin’s Purges, and the reports of indiscriminate Afghan massacres, have all permanently discredited not only the general sponsor of the majority of these communist parties across Europe – USSR, but also the parties themselves. In addition, left-wing terrorism, which for two decades horrified citizens and politicians alike across Europe, delivered a final verdict on the plausibility for extreme left-wing political parties ever to ascend to power. As early as late 1960s and early 1970s some communist parties began to sever their relationship with the USSR in order to regain credibility and avoid the consequences from the rift between the East and the West.

This leaves us with a set of political parties different from the extreme ones. Parties in which policy positions fluctuate with the support they are able to gather. Such parties include among others the French Parti Communiste Français (PCF), Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), Mouvement pour la France (MPF), Rassemblement pour la France (RPF), the Spanish left coalition Izquierda Unida (IU), or the Danish People’s Party (DF), all of which are further focus of scrutiny in this chapter.
Before discussing specific conditions under which small, non-extreme parties become coalitionable, however, it is important to mark up some of the major theoretical works dealing with party politics and coalition building. Most of the literature on coalitions accepts a spatial analysis, with two variations. One dealing with coalition building as a strategy, that is office-driven action, and the other being policy-driven action. Therefore, coalition building is seen as a way for political parties either to get in office, or to join forces and implement similar or coinciding policies. The traditional rational choice theories endorse policy-blind, goal-oriented strategies. They rest usually on the assumption that actors are goal oriented, and that the goal is usually office holding. As they predate the policy-driven approaches, perhaps, the most frequent starting point of such discussions is the classical economics study by Hotelling (1929) and his “principle of minimum differentiation.” As discussed in detail in chapter three, his model served as basis for Downs’ rational choice theory of party politics (1957). In essence, these models represent spatial policy-blind approaches to party politics. The classical Downs’ approach considers parties to be unitary actors seeking to take office by winning as much votes as possible. The model presupposes softening of ideological positions, wherever possible, towards the center of the political divide. Such spatial models conceptualize coalition building based on conversion of positions in the name of the self-serving common interest to gain power. Political parties, according to this model, pursue policy as a form of externality on the road to office, and not as part of their initial goal. In other words,
the political actors in Downs’ model are policy-indifferent; but policy itself is, nevertheless, important because of the political interests and strategies of vote-seeking actors. Long ago Riker (1962) established the policy-blind strategy of office-seeking political behavior as the norm in coalition building. His approach endorsed a prediction for minimal winning coalition, arguing that actors are solely driven by their desire to enter office.

The policy-driven theories are in a stark contrast with the key assumption of the policy-indifferent theories. They focus is on the interest of the party elites to implement policies as means to prove worthy for people’s votes and therefore to secure their survival. The most prominent among the recent spatial analyses using policy-driven approach is that of Laver and Schofield (1998). They demonstrate throughout that the policy-driven approach offers a solid and consistent explanation of dynamics behind coalition building, a fact that makes their contribution merit.

Recent theories of coalition building parted with the long tradition of considering political parties as unitary actors. The unitary actors approach is not exclusive to policy-blind models only. Treating political parties as unitary actors is based on sheer convenience and on a wealth of empirical observations. After all, political parties tend to enter and leave coalitions en bloc, and members of parliament tend overwhelmingly to vote in support of their parties (Laver & Schofield 1998; Powell 2000). Treating political parties as unitary actors also has its methodological
advantage. Models, which make use of this approach, avoid the messy dealing with intra-party politics. This allows them to focus better on the inter-party dynamics and the systematic characteristics, which facilitate or constraint coalition building. In the mean time, theories which break with the tradition of explaining coalition building by referring to political parties as unitary actors allow for greater ‘endogization’ of key features of the competition, not only with regard to party leadership competition and internal fractionalization and dissent, but also with regard to birth and death of political parties (Laver & Schilperoord 2007).

Most recent research on coalition building tends to focus more and more on the conditions for competition endogization. Laver and Benoit (2003) break with the classical game-theory models of institutional cooperation, by shifting the focus from comparing pre-election time series, to inter-election models of evolutionary dynamics of legislative party behavior, where loyalty and affiliation of legislators is dependent on expected payoffs from switching positions. In these new trends, the unit of analysis switches from inter-party politics, to intra-party politics and examines the weight institutional constraints have on them (c.f Giannetti & Benoit 2008).

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82 There is a long tradition in various Social Science disciplines to treat organizations as unitary actors/2uch an approach is parsimonious and allows for more neat systemic analysis of underlying contingencies and limitations/2n neoliberal economic tradition, firms are considered unitary actors trying to maximize profit; in the Realist tradition of International relations, states are considered unitary actors struggling to survive; and in Comparative politics often times political parties are considered unitary actors/2hodologically, this approach has its merits and its shortcomings/2ot looking what is inside the ‘black box’ is helpful for observation of patterns of social behavior and for outlining structural characteristics, such as impact of institutional design or of type of electoral systems, as it is in the case of the current study/2n the other hand, changing the unit of analysis is helpful to reveal underlying dynamics, which at times seem to exhibit greater explanatory power.
For the proposed model in this chapter, endogization of the key features of political competition is a useful tool that allows for a greater understanding of the dynamics of internal dissent, conflicts and splits, which lead to the formation of small splinter groups out of mainstream parties. Some of the above-mentioned parties in France, including MDC, MPF and the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) of the former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, are all cases of such intra-party competition, which under the ripe conditions, such as the Maastricht Treaty polarization, culminated into separation from the mother party. These parties previously existed as internal factions, but splintered from the mainstream party-carrier in order to secure greater maneuverability for themselves and in effort to increase their political weight and bargaining leverage. For them the coalitionability, as self-image and as external perception, is a key political feature. Maintaining such image guarantees them both organizational survival and power. Their presumption is that by offering an explicit dissent, particularly with regard to salient political issues such as globalization and European integration, they can gather enough political clout to catapult themselves in the Assemblée Nationale and eventually to become coalitional partners. Being represented in the parliament, and maintaining an image of being coalitional, allows them to increase both their power and their payoffs.83 Thus, I

83 The most striking example of the exploitation of such a power-niche is the events surrounding the formation of two Fianna Fáil’s governments in 1982 and in 1987/1 in the latter case, after the collapse of the Fine Gali and the Labor Party coalitional government, the faith of the government formation rested in the hands of a one independent member of the parliament, Tony Gregory, who held hostage the future formation of the government until managed to extract promise for substantial governmental projects in his Dublin Central electoral region/1 in a different political context, but not different with regard to the structural
define coalitionability of a small political party as the ability to project and maintain an image of acceptable alternative to calling new elections. Such definition is broad, but it has one very useful characteristic: it uses the cost of new elections as a measurement unit in the dichotomous decision concerning coalition building. In other words, if the cost of forging a coalition with an extremist political party is greater than calling new elections, the minority holder of a mandate would give it back, or seek an alternative coaltional configuration consistent with the concept of Shadow of the Future. Let us elaborate.

Coalitions become topical in the aftermath of elections, when no single political party holds majority, or the majority is very fragile. In striking a deal to form a coalition, a party would have to consider all possibilities, including giving back the mandate and eventually facing the cost of new elections. The literature reviewed here-above deals primarily with the dynamics of the decision-making and negotiations for entering into a coalition. It assumes the perspective of the various actors concerned with the decision to build a coalition or not, and applies models, which spell out conditions for the two main outcomes. The aforementioned theories, however, hardly mention whether self-imaging is a factor for a political party to consider itself coalitionable in the first place. While the majority of the authors

characteristics of the crisis, the Greek conservative government of Nea Demokratia fell from power in 1993 after governing for less than three years with a fragile majority of just one MP from the Democratic Renewal formation/1 /2guably, these, as well as other similar cases demonstrate the temptation for factions to augment their power, as in the case in France during the Maastricht Treaty debates, by acting as standalone balancers.
engage in lengthy discussions whether the political parties are unitary actors or not, they hardly if at all examine the projected self-image of the party leadership. They just assume that all parties consider themselves coalitionable, which is not the case in reality.

The self-image of coalitionability, which leadership holds, is not at all a question of values, or merely a question of identity. It is primarily a question of rational pragmatism. As already mentioned, there are clear cases where marginal political parties are not coalitionable. To waste time and resources in attempt to be considered coalitionable runs contrary to one of the main assumptions in political science, namely that political actors are rational actors concerned with their survival (Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988). Social science in general cannot account for irrationality. Rationality here must be considered in a wider sense. Even altruism can be regarded as rational when factoring in satisfaction as a motivator. Recent research unequivocally demonstrates that the way individuals strategically deliberate their alternatives is not constrained only, or in fact at all, to our pragmatic, material-seeking rational nature (Barreto 2009). Instead, it also extends to our emotive side, which was wrongly considered separate and at odds with the rational side since the time of Descartes.84

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84 For further discussion of the origins of this artificial separation, which came to dominate the Social Sciences for the past two centuries, see Amílcar Barreto’s Nationalism and Its Logical Foundations (2009) and Antonio Damasio’s Descartes Error (1995). Outside scholarly literature, see Jonah Lehrer’s How We Decide (2009).
Models of Strategic Coalitionability

The current model takes into consideration structural limitations, including electoral systems, and focuses on the elites’ strategic decision-making. I also assume that political elites are well aware of the electorate’s propensity to vote strategically under certain circumstances. With regard to the issue of European integration, however, I argue that the leading consideration is largely determined by a self-assessment how coalitionable the party is. This is, no doubt, correlated to the Shadow of the Future argument, however it is tailored so that to capture and explain the strategic decision-making of small political parties’ elites. These parties by default are not able to form a government on their own even with significant gains of votes and seats in the parliament. Thus, I argue that the first concern of small parties’ elites is not entrance in office, but survival. Something more, as the continuation of the short anecdote about the FPÖ’s sudden success demonstrates, if the party makes a wrong initial assessment, the strategy it pursues will also be mistaken and possibly harmful to itself. Desperate adjustments later could lead to its ultimate decline, split and even demise. The FPÖ’s leadership, for example, considered itself uncoalitionable not only because of the obvious fact that it is a rightwing party, but also because over the course of consecutive elections it consistently endorsed wide populist policies, which do not square with reciprocal responsibility. Thus, its strategy was for a long time to guarantee its survival by appealing to the extreme elements of the society: young rightwing groups, senior groups of unapologetic collaborators with the Third Reich,
outright xenophobes, economically, socially, and politically marginalized groups, and fervent nationalists. All of which, for different specific reasons, suffered the most by the EU accession of Austria, thus vehemently opposed both, the country’s membership, and the processes of integration.

Haider, for his part, made the assessment that since the FPÖ is drawing its support from these groups, the party is a priori unlikely candidate for a coalition partner. Hence, his surprise in the aftermath of the elections, by finding the FPÖ and himself in the prospect to participate in the formation of a government. In an interview for the Austrian TV channel ORF, Haider outlined the possible options for coalition governments in the following way: “1) an SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, 2) an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition, 3) a government led by a Chancellor independent of any party or 4) a government constituted exclusively of experts” (Perrault 2000). He stated that his party was open to each of these options (ibid). Soon after that, coalition negotiations between the previous former coalition partners, the ÖVP and the SPÖ, failed, leaving the other three options on the table.

One more possibility, which Haider chose not to discuss in public, and one that was potentially most damaging to his personal career and the future of the FPÖ, was to hold new elections. Had such option materialize, the FPÖ would have most certainly lost much of its electoral success and appeal. On the one hand, many voters who perhaps did not vote, but were suddenly alarmed by the FPÖ’s rise to power,
most certainly would have tried to correct the record this time around. On the other hand, those who have observed the first voting results, might have reconsider their strategic voting in attempt to maximize the chance their preferred set of policies, if not the first order than the second, to be enacted. Finally, many who have casted their vote for the FPÖ, in any event of retreat from coalition building opportunity by Haider, might have considered it a wasted vote, and supported another party this time around. Hence, a reluctant Haider had to go ahead and enter into coalition talks, while launching a massive PR offensive in an attempt to repair his damaged image. In the end he had to give up any personal role in the future government, he resigned from the party’s leadership, and finally he faced a party split, whereupon a splinter group could became the new preferred coalitionable partner and entered in office soon after the divorce. The FPÖ suffered immensely by the unexpected results, which appeared incongruent with its own pre-elections strategic assessment and behavior.

The *coalitionability* variable, on which the current model is built, is hardly a new discovery. It is frequent, however, for scholars to focus on more than just one independent variable. This is where the current study sharply differs from them. Including more than one independent variable in a comparative study not merely complicates the theoretical model. It also harms it by taking away its explanatory power and simplicity. As King and his co-authors conclude, “A successful project is one that explains a lot with a little” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 123). Thus,
they recommend that we limit the number of explanatory variables, possibly only to just one (ibid.). In their study of euroscepticism among communist parties in Italy, Spain and France, Bendetto and Quaglia (2007: 481), for example, link a multitude of “explanatory factors at the international, national, and party levels.” There, the strategic assessment of coalitionability shares explanatory power with other variables — most notably relations with super powers, i.e. USSR, and public opinion attitudes. The other variables, it is argued, play an equally important role, and are further dependent on additional factors, such as, for example, party-specific features — i.e., party type and leadership. Their study is hardly an exception. Analyses, which focus on government-opposition relationship among the mainstream political parties in explaining euroscepticism often include more than one explanatory variable (c.f. Sitter 2001: 25-33). Batory and Sitter (2004), on the other hand, offer a plausible parsimonious analytical model for explaining the propensity of some, if not most, of the European agrarian parties to adopt eurosceptic positions. Their theoretical analysis seem to capture rather well the contingency of the intersubjective relationships, the interdependent role of the party identity and party goals in the context of strategic adoption of euroscepticism, but fails to provide a more dynamic model of the strategic decision-making itself. The obvious conclusion is that the current state of theorizing of euroscepticism faces the dilemma of concentrated either narrower approach, or broad but diluted one, which exhibits the classical shortcomings of social science definitions (Sartori 1984: 28-35).
By contrast, in the current research I focus exclusively on the short and long term strategic assessments party elites make about how coalitionable they are. Previous studies of euroscepticism have remarked that the propensity of a political party to take up eurosceptical position depends on the type of political party. For example, policy based parties, which seek agenda setting and veto powers, tend to support or oppose European integration with regard to whether or not it helps them to consolidate their power and weakens their opponents (Hix & Goetz 2000). Similarly, Taggart (1998) claims that extremist parties may use the European integration issue ideologically to differentiate themselves from the mainstream parties. In so doing they seek to present themselves as protest, anti-system, parties.

Such arguments commit a logical fault by reversing cause and consequence. Instead, consistent with arguments from chapter 3, I argue that political parties first consider their chance to ascend to power and to take office as a means to survive. The political elites of small parties are not only constraint by the electoral structure. They seek to use that in furthering their strategic goals in the ordinance: organizational survival first, and office holding second. Once they determine some probability for this to happen, they begin to pursue a strategy congruent with their conclusion. If the party deems itself an ideological outcast, and thus uncoalitionable, then it directs its strategy towards other means of survival, including becoming anti-system, protest, or a populist party. This simple strategic assessment explains why marginal political parties tend to resort to populist “gut feeling” politics, as well as
why small political parties’ euroscepticism tends to fluctuate between hard and soft. This is simply their only viable strategy for survival as an organization.

Figure 5.1 Strategic Decision-Making Tree

If, on the other hand, it finds some plausibility in the perspective to be considered coalitionable, the party elite focuses on variety of strategies. These depend on conditions and constraints, which I outline below. Figure 5.1 visually demonstrates how the process of decision-making evolves with regard to strategic euroscepticism.
Control Variables and Structural Limitations

Strategic decision-making does not take place in an isolated environment. It is contingent upon structural limitations of the political system. Therefore, in the empirical evidence section I infer a correlation between structural variables, such as electoral systems on the one hand and rational choice variables, such as dynamics of strategic decision-making on the other. Many have examined dependencies between structural constraints and dynamics of decision-making previously (c.f. Bates 2001; Boix 2003; Acemoglu 2006). Perhaps, the clearest exemplification of such structure-strategy contingency is found in Elizabeth Wood’s comparative study of democratization in El Salvador and South Africa (2000). There, in a rather innovative way, she offers a dynamic model of interaction between elites and masses in changing structural dependencies.  

Aside from the empirical merits of her research, she can be credited with the methodological innovation of demonstrating how structural features in period $A$ determine the limits of actors’ strategic behavior in period $B$. Forging ahead with their strategic choice in period $A$, actors change the parameters of the societal

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structure so that what remained outside the structural limits in the first period becomes attainable in the second period. Actors’ strategic choices not only reflect their position in the overall system of competing interests. They also actively modulate the structure itself. It is important to note here that, unlike the traditional structuralist approach, in which preexisting conditions enable limited strategic action, in her model it is the strategic interaction *per se* that changes the societal structure, enabling previously unavailable options.

Following some of these conclusions, in accounting for the variance of strategic decisions, I examine the significance of a few structural variables. More specifically, I focus here on the type of electoral systems, on the presence or absence of other extreme parties, and on the relationship between the governing party/coalition and the small political party in focus. These factors tentatively could be termed “control variables” (King et al., 1994: 77). Out of the three control variables outlined here, the last one plays by far the most important role. Let us examine them briefly.

**Type of Electoral System**

Types of electoral systems have immense impact on the specific political structure in a given state. Some electoral systems facilitate the existence of many small political parties. The structure of these political systems is so fragmented that political parties by default are required constantly to enter into coalitions in order to
form a government. The post Second World War political history of Finland or the Netherlands is a good example of the effects of such a fragmented system on government formation. There, the strategic political behavior of party elites inevitably include an elaborate set of coalition signaling, and predispose strategic decision-making to constant re-evaluation of the political parties’ coalitionability. In the case of French presidential elections, the two ballot majoritarian system has a direct impact on the propensity of the candidates to include a slight (soft) eurosceptical dimension as a necessary condition for forming a wider coalition and thus become eligible (Harmsen 2005). Even more importantly, electoral systems largely determine the number of political parties, and their relative size, in a given political system. Therefore, electoral systems design have the ability to influence strategic decision-making and should be accounted for in the model.

A large number of studies show that proportional electoral systems generally tend to contribute to political fragmentation. The classical Duverger’s Law (1954) spells out the conditions under which electoral designs produce two or multi party political systems. According to his findings, a majority system favors small number of large political parties, while a proportional system favors the existence of many small parties. For Aspinwell (2000: 416), British euroscepticism is not a result of some functional or historical idiosyncrasies, but a result of the UK electoral system, which empowers “Eurosceptic backbench MPs” as a result of a “feature, which is rarely, if ever present in other member states.” Many subsequent studies have clearly
shown how, what Mudde (2000:161) calls “extreme proportional representation,” facilitates the existence of small political parties. In the context of the Netherlands’ electoral system, for example, it takes only 0.67% of the vote to win a seat in the Dutch parliament (Givens 2005: 89). Danish politics are traditionally marked by propensity for coalitionability, partially due to the low 2% threshold at the Folketing. Other electoral systems with high thresholds encourage strategic vote for larger political parties, as is the case in Germany. There, a 5% threshold for admittance into the Bundestag helps the big mainstream parties consolidate their power vis-à-vis the small ones.  

To vote for a small party, which will probably not make it over the threshold, is waste of vote. In that context, Sartori claims that “[e]lectoral systems have a two-fold effect: one on the voter, and one on the number of parties” (Sartori 1997: 32). He further argues that majority systems reinforce strategic voting by providing incentives to the voters to support mainstream parties, which by default have a greater chance to win and enact their policy preferences. France is one such example, where the run-off threshold is 12.5% and the winner of the plurality vote takes it all (Blais & Massicotte 2002: 43). Consequently, small political parties, which hold a self-image of themselves as being coalitionable, must signal their readiness and posit themselves as candidate-members for a coalition government. Abstaining from egregious populist, anti-system, including anti-EU statements is therefore one way to signal that. Alternatively, parties which self-assessment leads them to conclude that

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86 This theoretical notion has been lately challenged by a number of scholars, most notably Carter (2002, 2005), Norris (2005) and Gibens (2005).
they are unlikely candidates for coalition, stand to benefit more from resorting to unrestrained populism and anti-EU rhetoric.

**Spatial Distribution: Place in the Political System**

Political elites take under consideration their proximity to, and indeed the presence or absence of other marginal parties from the same ideological divide. In addition to assessing their general likelihood for becoming a coalition member, small party elites assess, in particular, their chances of how coalitionable they are in comparison with their closest competitors. They first consider the payoffs of resorting to populist arguments versus the probability to maintain coalitionable image, with primarily consideration for their concern of organizational survival. In rare, anomalous, situations becoming a coalitional partner may be the only means for survival, even though the payoffs from maintaining populism position to seem higher. The FPÖ’s episode clearly demonstrates such a predicament. Under conditions, in which a small party elite deems itself unlikely choice for coalitional partner, as the FPÖ must have concluded after been treated as a pariah by its political colleagues for over a decade, it is more likely that the party would resort to greater populism in order to consolidate support from the margins for its survival. On the other hand, if other parties exist at the margins, which have already occupied the extreme periphery and thus by default are uncoalitionable, joining the populist
extreme group may not necessarily lead to a base hardening and does not guarantee survival. In the meantime, the political context opens a niche for bidding for coalitionability. Indeed, as we will see in the empirical evidence section, this is a case of clear inter-party contingency which is as characteristic for the left as it is for the right. The presence, for example, of largely uncoalitionable hardcore “Trotskysté” French communist splinters such as Latte Ouvrière (LO), and Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (dissolved in February, 2009) on the extreme left of the French political system, inevitably leaves little to no room for less extreme parties to bid for the support of the hardcore base. The cluttering of the extreme left space, however, opens room for soft eurosceptics, which can occupy the space between the hard eurosceptic communist group and the pro-EU center-left Parti Socialiste (PS), including the Parti Communiste Français (PCF). It is in this political context, in which the former French minister of defense, and later on minister of the interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement spun his soft eurosceptic party, Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC). As the evidence will demonstrate, his is not the only such party, nor is this contingency exceptional only to the leftwing ideological spectrum.

**Who is in Power**

Finally, political elites conduct a thorough analysis of the relevant political conditions in period $A$ – that is the period before elections, in which they conduct the analysis and make the strategic decisions — with regard to how those conditions
would change in period $B$, that is after the elections. What they specifically consider is which party or a coalition is currently in power, and the nature of their prior relationships with that party or a coalition. If the party or the coalition in power is ideologically a kin-party — i.e. from the same party family or from the same ideological divide, and the small political party in question is not part of broad governing coalition — then a harder form of euroscepticism is more likely to ensue. The small party leadership acknowledges and factors in the fact that it was not invited to take part in a coalition when the kin-party took office. Two consequences follow from this conclusion. First, if the performance of the kin-party in government was to be deemed successful, the majority of the voters would have all the emotional and strategic incentives to support the party once again at the next elections. If, on the other hand, the governing track record of the incumbent kin-party is not that good and there is a chance that it may lose the next elections, there may be many disappointed voters, who will either abstain or deny their vote. In both cases, the small party stands to gain by actively opposing the kin-party in power, as long as it is not part of a broader governing coalition.

The dominant strategy for the small party in both cases then would be to delineate itself from the incumbent kin-party and its European policies. Considering that, as we have established in the previous chapter, the mainstream parties in power are by default pro-European integration biased, the only winning strategy for a small kin party is to harden its position vis-à-vis the European issue. By doing so, in the
first case scenario the small party will demarcate itself from the incumbent kin-party just enough to attract disappointed voters. Since ordinary voters by default tend to be more eurosceptic than the party elites are, taking somewhat harder eurosceptic position will appeal to a greater constituency base and will bolster its collective party identity as a needed and necessary opposition. If it cannot share the benefits and gains from being in power, the small political party stands to gain more by distancing itself from the inevitable failures and unpopular measures, which invariably accompany any occupant of higher office. This is primarily due to the inevitable need for incumbent parties to engage in “dirty hands”\textsuperscript{87} politics.

However, in cases where the incumbent is not a kin-party, a strategy of hard euroscepticism would hurt the small party. This strategy will push it into direct competition with a larger number of close competitors: the marginal extreme parties from both sides of the ideological divide, and the small non-extreme parties, which struggle to delineate themselves from the kin-party in power. The strategy may result in a further process of outbidding with regard to eurosceptic positions, which may render it less coalitionable. In addition, if the party fails to delineate itself enough from the kin-incumbent party, without sharing the benefits from being in power, it risks being perceived as a weak, “yes-party” supplement to the mainstream one, therefore losing the strategic vote at the next elections. Voters who find no other

\textsuperscript{87} The concept refers to the necessary choice a leadership makes between unpopular decisions and to compromise or abandon moral principles in order to govern effectively (Calhoun 2004: 364).
appeal in its positions, would prefer the party, which has greater chance to represent their policy preferences, than to waste their vote on a small, hardly distinguishable in policy perspective party.

The small non-extremist parties have an incentive to maintain enough strategic ambiguity with regard to EU integration, as the commentators and the voters to be unable define them as soft or hard eurosceptic ones. Haider and his party were not always hard eurosceptics. In fact, for much part of the 1980s, and early 1990s the FPÖ was even somewhat pro-European. In his case, the gradual adoption of sheer populism and the endorsement of controversial xenophobic positions, and praising some of the Third Reich’s policies turned the FPÖ, and Haider himself, into an appalling coalitional partner. In fact, the FPÖ’s eurosceptic positions ranked only second in the concerns of the European political elites when the “cordon sanitaire” was imposed on Austria.

If, on the other hand, a non-kin party or a coalition is in power — that is, one from an ideologically incompatible origin party family — the small party in question would seek to mitigate its anti-system, and therefore anti-EU appeal, by presenting itself as coalitionable in the election’s aftermath. This is valid unless the small party teams up and tunes in with factional dissent from the mainstream kin-party, as in the case of the PCF in the 2002 and 2007 French elections. In all other cases, the party may retain a strategic soft eurosceptic appeal, but the utility from embracing hard
eurosceptic positions will decrease proportionally with the increase of the utility from the perspective to be considered coalitionable. Furthermore, if the size of the party is too small there is a chance for a pre-election coalition deal with a mainstream kin-party or a bloc, in an attempt for a vote-consolidation and containment of spill-offs or fragmentation in the eve of the elections. Under such circumstances, it is strategically more advantageous for a small coalitionable political party to play it safe by resorting to controlled, soft, policy-specific euroscepticism, than to a general and hard one. In both instances, however, these flip-flop parties with regard to the European integration issue play an important role within the political system, serving as a release valve for popular discontent from various aspects of the European integration, without subscribing to extremist parties’ group. In a way, these are the parties, which proclaim that the king has no cloths, without provoking the wrath of the mainstream constituents.

To be precise, the strategic consideration of the small political parties not occupying the ideological extremes is contingent upon the identity of the governing political party or a coalition. If an ideological kin-party is in power, the most likely position with regard to the European integration is to adopt hard euroscepticism. If the incumbent is not from the same family, soft euroscepticism is a dominant strategy and therefore it is the most likely policy. When it comes to the way political parties compete for votes, arguably they act in a similar manner as business firms in a market: they have to find a niche and compete for strategic advantage. Just like the
market is in flux, so is the political process, which requires the parties to adopt new strategies and adapt to new realities.\textsuperscript{88} Sometimes this is the only survival behavior available to them. Their strategic calculations include factors, such as not only what issues to raise during election campaign, but also how to raise them in order to maximize voters’ support.\textsuperscript{89}

**Empirical Evidence**

The empirical evidence in support of the model I have offered looks at the cases of soft and hard euroscepticism in France, Denmark and Spain. At times, I also refer, whereas necessary, to other countries, such as Italy, Ireland, and Austria – the latter was already discussed at some length earlier in this chapter. In focusing on these selected countries, I was led by specific considerations. First, in attempt to

\textsuperscript{88} I recognize the sensitivity with which one has to approach this comparison, as political discourse is no market of goods, commodities, or services; otherwise, it would be a travesty to the democratic process.\textsuperscript{1} However, it is difficult to ignore the similarities between the behavior of a political party and the behavior of a firm in the market vis-à-vis new challenges: in order to survive they need to establish and secure a market share, to hold on to it, and whenever possible – to expand it\textsuperscript{1} or a good application of theories of business organization and market competition to International politics see Kenneth Waltz, in his seminal *Theory of International Politics* (1979). He makes similar claim with regard to states’ behavior in the international system\textsuperscript{1} concludes, however, that the share states want to occupy in the anarchical system is limited to satisfying their necessity of security, as more power may provoke balancing against them\textsuperscript{1} unlike states, neither political parties, nor firms on the market can satisfy for the status quo without endangering their survival\textsuperscript{1} the context of their existence and the nature of competition in a highly contingent and dynamic market, settling-up for the status quo for them would mean inevitable decline and death.

\textsuperscript{89} In the process of creating their strategies, parties rely on exploiting asymmetrical information about the types, nature, and specific aspects of the political issues chosen to politicize as part of their portfolios\textsuperscript{1} he inter-party relationships, especially between the various small political parties, which are competing for the same niche on the political spectrum, is based on constant exploitation of asymmetry of information, which exist between them and the voters\textsuperscript{1} Kerlof (1970) has captured this dynamic, explaining why and how various actors exploit the existence of asymmetry of information in their advantage\textsuperscript{1} mall, entrepreneurial political parties, in that aspect, act as the sellers of ‘lemon’ cars\textsuperscript{1} only difference in their case is that they sell their coalitionability in some cases, or their anti-system populist protest in others, depending on their assessment of utility from the one or from the other.
control for size, the sample of selected countries include large ones (France, Spain), as well as small ones (Denmark). Geographical diversity was also a leading consideration. The sample includes northern countries (Denmark), central ones (France), as well as southern countries (Spain), in attempt to control for possible regional identity cause.

Second, the selected countries cover a wide range of historical EU enlargements — from founding members (France), to early enlargements (Denmark), to pre-end of Cold War (Spain). Further, the sample includes different types of electoral systems, double ballot majority (France), and various proportional ones: PR with multiple local districts and single tier (Spain), and two tiers (Denmark). This is important. Consistency of the explanatory power of the model across all these cases, which vary by size, geographical location, different time of EU accession, and different electoral systems, is strengthened by dismissing any of these variables (except for electoral system, which serves a different role). Finally, the cases include countries, some of which are ‘net contributors’ and others ‘net beneficiaries,’ as well as such, which are in transition from the one category into the other.90 The net contributor/beneficiary argument is often used to explain the propensity for overall favorable or negative popular attitudes towards EU as a whole, and the integration

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90 A net contributor is a member state, which contributes to the EU budget more than it gets in return, under the form of various programs and funds, such as CAP and the Structural and Cohesion Fund. A net beneficiary, respectively, is a country, which gets from EU more funding than it contributes. Some scholars have made the claim that net contributor/beneficiary status is indeed sufficient to explain propensity of a given country to higher or lower level of euro scepticism.
processes in particular. For greater clarity, Table 5.1 compares all these features of the selected cases.

**Denmark: the case of the Danish People’s Party**

Denmark’s politics are marked by an interesting idiosyncrasy, which sets it apart from other EU members. Denmark has political parties that participate in elections for the European Parliament and in referendums on the European Union (for more on that see Worre 1987), but do not vie for office in national elections. Such parties include the *People’s Movement Against the EU*, and its splinter group, the *June Movement*. The People’s Movement, is comprised primarily of left-wing Nordic exceptionalists campaigning for the country’s withdrawal from the EC/EU. Its creation marked the formation of the first directly anti-EC political organization in Europe (Hix & Lord 1997: 45). Over the course of its existence and activity, the Movement managed to introduce euroscepticism as a valid strategic issue in Danish national politics (Knudsen 2008: 156). The Movement split in 1992, after the first Maastricht referendum in which the Danes rejected the TEU. In the aftermath of the second referendum in 1993, the new June Movement adopted a softer position with regard to the country’s policy towards the EU, while the People’s Movement retained its hard euroscepticism position. In the following discussion, I focus primarily on the parliamentary represented parties, as they exemplify better the explanatory power of the model. It is interesting to point, however, the broader applicability of the model
with regard to the similar inter-party dynamics between the People’s Movement and June Movement.

Denmark’s electoral system is proportional, with multi-member districts. The Danish Parliament, the *Folketing*, has 179 members of which 175 are elected by mainland voters, and four are elected from the autonomous Greenland and Faroe Islands (two MPs each). The government is traditionally coalitional, drawing support from both left and right. After the 2007 elections, the Liberal-Conservative (*aka Venstre-Konservative*) coalitional government of Andres Fogh Rasmussen drew support only from the right, in a precedent since 1929 for a party to get support only from one side of the ideological divide (Karina Kosiara-Pedersen 2008: 1040). Thus, the Danish case highlights the impact the electoral system design has on the governmental structure.

Denmark’s coalitional governments since 1986 were of two types (see Table 5.2): those dominated by Conservative People’s Party (KF), or by the Social Democratic Party (S). From 1987 through 1994, after three consecutive elections, the Conservative People’s Party served as the main government core; the Liberals, Centre Democrats, and the Danish Social Liberal Party received varying levels of support. This changed after the 1994 elections, when the oppositional Social Democrats replaced the Conservatives as the main core of the coalition governments. Since the 2001 elections, the Conservatives came out of opposition and formed a coalitional
government with the Liberals and the active parliamentary support of the Danish People’s Party — a small soft eurosceptic party. Thus, the change of coalitions in office marks the different periods for observation.

Even though the Danish coalitions are not traditionally as ‘rainbow’ as they are in Finland, most of the small parties represent in parliament play an important role in the country’s governance. For this reason, most of them avoid taking extremist positions. The best example of this strategy of coalitionability is the Danish People’s Party (DF). Formed in 1995, the party was a splinter movement of the Progress Party. It began as an opposition to the Schengen Agreement and relaxation of border control (Raunio, 2007: 42). In its Principle Program the party declares: “Danish People's Party wants a friendly and dynamic cooperation with all democratic and freedom-loving nations in the world, but we will not accept that Denmark cede sovereignty. It follows that the Danish People's Party is opposed to the European Union” (Danish People's Party Program). The main argument against the EU is that Denmark is saturated with planned economics and centralism, which egregiously resembles the political and economic structure of the former communist countries (Sorensen 2004: 14). Albeit its explicitly declared opposition to EU in its program, ever since the DF assumed the role of a support party in the governing coalition, it restrained itself from openly advocating its EU opposition. Instead, it adopted a strategy of non-engagement with regard to shaping the country’s EU policies (Raunio 2007: 42).
The Danish People’s Party policy towards the EU is a subject of a particular interest in the current discussion. From all Danish political parties, the DF case best exemplifies the use of euroscepticism as a strategic issue. This necessitates a further examination into the party’s manifesto. As mentioned, one of the party’s founding principles was an outright opposition to the Schengen Agreement, which provided for removal of internal border control and establishment of common external borders for the member states. Denmark was initially not part of the Schengen Agreement, but as of December 1996, it signed the Agreement along with the rest of the Nordic countries, including a non-EU member, Norway. The DF targets the Schengen Agreement primarily because of its direct link with some of the salient issues the party emphasizes, namely tighter immigration rules, crime prevention, and border control. Safe for that topic, in its public appearances, the party leadership strategically remains largely silent with regard to the processes of EU integration. While in power, it tries to avoid controversies and to provoke intra-coalitional quarrels.

On its front page, placed in a most visible location, the program summary, the party just has a one-line ambiguous statement with regard to the EU: “Danish People's Party is opposed to the European Union” (DF Party Program). The statement was intentionally left equivocal — whether the party opposes the EU in general, or whether it opposes only certain aspects of the EU. One has to go deeper into the detailed party manifesto in order to discover more details with regard to the
party’s attitudes towards the EU. In a separate section in the manifesto, the party addresses various aspects associated with Denmark’s membership in the EU, and the DF’s position towards them. The party repeatedly attacked the democratic character of the EU, reiterating the usual eurosceptic argument for widespread democratic deficit of the EU institutions, secrecy and unaccountability of the European Commission, and dangerously relaxed immigration policies. In addition, the party endorses NATO over the CFSP as the main collective security provided for the EU, criticizes currently existing social redistributive mechanisms within the Union, and calls for a strong Council of Ministers over the executive and legislative powers of the European Commission. The party campaigned against the euro in the 2000 referendum and as a result added to its popularity by coming out as a winner. The party’s leadership linked the “no” campaign in the referendum to the future of the monarchy and against further EU integration into “developing a United States of Europe” (Evans-Pritchard 2000). Finally, the DF sees the European Parliament as non-representative of the peoples of Europe, and has a long section against Turkey’s potential membership.

Even more interesting is, however, what is not included in the manifesto. At no point does the DF call for Denmark’s immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal from the EU — a characteristic of marginal hard eurosceptic parties. In the manifesto, the party explicitly acknowledges the right of the other European countries to participate in such a cooperative union. Indeed, it also acknowledges the
benefits, and endorses the continuation of EU cooperation in areas, such as trade, environmental policies, and technical development. Therefore, its borderline criticism of the EU, apart from the Schengen Agreement consequences, falls short of what was defined earlier as hard euroscepticism — i.e., outright rejection of the EU, calls for the country’s complete withdrawal from, and immediate abolition of the Union. Instead, one can argue that the DF’s is a case of professed qualified, albeit borderline with hard, euroscepticism.

At the time of its creation, the DF’s founder Pia Kjaersgaard declared that the party would promote the same policies as the Progress Party (Art 2006). These were not only largely anti-tax and anti-immigration policies, but also hard eurosceptic ones, too. The tax lawyer Mogen Glistrup founded the Progress Party (PP) in 1972 largely as an anti-tax party, from which the DF broke away. At the time, the PP aligned itself with the Danish Communist Party (DKP) and the Centre democrats in opposition of the Danish EC membership.91 Under Kjaergaard’s leadership the DF started as a classical radical, populist right-wing party; but by its first elections, it quickly transformed into a relatively moderate, liberally oriented and fluctuating positions with regard to EU, but with strong positions on salient issues, such as immigration and crime prevention.

The success of the DF cannot be analyzed outside the political context of the rise and demise of its mother kin-party, the Progress Party. The PP won a landslide

91 For further details see Klitschelt 1995: 130-2.
victory in the “earthquake elections” in 1973 when shortly after its creation it became the second largest party in the Folketing. Since then the party has steadily lost support and by the 1994 elections it was all but marginalized. In the mid-1980s, the party switched strategy and its aggressive rhetoric changed from predominantly anti-tax to anti-immigration (Andersen 2003: 189). The PP and the DF shared this anti-immigration focus. Yet, the new splinter party evolved as a pragmatic one, espousing some hard nationalist positions with liberal welfare ones. While its positions on immigration, environment, and capital punishment set it in the wider camp of traditional European radical right parties, its policies towards welfare for pensioners, employment, housing, tax policy, and industry policy areas positioned it in the traditional center or center-left space (Erhard 2001). In addition, for the past decade, the party leadership pursued a policy of continuous membership base-building, and of ever more centralization of the intra-party power distribution – policies, which steadily transformed the DF from a marginal into a mainstream party (Pedersen 2006). This intentionally maintained continuous ambiguity of policies provokes some analysts even to question the actual radicalism of the party (Pedersen 2008).

The theoretical model of strategic decision-making applies well in the case of the Danish People’s Party. In 1995 Pia Kjaersgaard founded the DF in response to the push for an even wider populism and extreme radicalism by the majority of the Progress Party leadership aliened with the expelled former leader Mogens Glistrup. They believed that maintaining the party’s identity as a protest radical rightwing party
suits best its position in the political system (Peterson 2006). In her eleventh year as a chair of the Progress Party, Kjaersgaard sought the opportunity for a pragmatic and moderate flip-flop party, by departing from the PP’s general radicalism while invigorating support for somewhat narrower nationalism, coupled with social issues. At the time of the DF’s creation, the Social Democrats and the Radical Left Party, both on the left side of the ideological divide, were the core center of the coalitional government. By divorcing itself from the PP’s extreme right populism, the new DF party strategically positioned itself to be just enough radical to collect support from the more moderate PP electorate, yet gradually departing from the image of marginal extremist, and irresponsible party. Instead, it strived at creating an image as an acceptable coalitionable partner to the mainstream parties to the center-right. As a result, in its first elections the DF won surprisingly high support of 7.4% of the vote, taking 13 seats in the newly formed parliament. Post election analyses showed that, expectedly, the DF took much of its support from the Progress Party. However, many self-employed, young high-school diploma, and old-age pensioners also accounted for the stunning rise of the party (Nielsen 1999).

By the next elections in 2001, the DF managed to transform its image from a splinter radical, rightwing, marginal party, into a coalitionable center-right party with regard to social issues, while maintaining command on the salient immigration and crime issues in the Danish politics. More importantly, the party leadership managed to stay out of major controversies and to maintain internal unity. During the same
period, internal disagreements and scandals continued to tear up the PP. The battered former leader of the party, Mogens Glistrup, rose up again to prominence — this time with a renewed bid to lead the party once again. In 1984, he lost the leadership position to Pia Kjaersgaard in the aftermath of a big scandal when a superior court sentenced him to three years in prison for tax fraud. Consecutively, the party expelled him in 1991. But during the party’s September 1999 convention he managed to stage a spectacular comeback (Boddum 1999). After more than two-third of the delegates voted for his re-acceptance, Glistrup took the stage and proclaimed: “The question for the pro-immigration parties is whether they would prefer to be leaders of Turkish people, Pakistanis, Iraqis or the Palestinians than for the Danish people — so I think actually, these politicians had to move from Denmark and beyond to the countries,” further calling for “Denmark free of Muslims, Denmark free of income tax” (ibid.). At the end of the convention, his leadership come back succeeded. In protest, all party MPs demonstratively left the party and formed an independent group, Freedom 2000. By resorting to extreme, racial and xenophobic rhetoric, Glistrup and his closest aides continued to drag down the Progress Party into the next elections cycle. In the 2001 elections, the party won only 0.6% of the vote and failed to gain a seat in the parliament, while the DF almost doubled its share to 12%. It now has an impressive 22 MPs in the parliament.

If the Danish party system is analyzed from a two-dimensional perspective of traditional left-right scale, in the aftermath of the 2001, 2005, and 2007 elections, the
core DF support would seem to be coming increasingly from voters in the center than either the Conservatives or the Liberals — both coalitional partners since 2001 (Pedersen 2006: 5, fn.14). It is only when issues of immigration, environmental protection, crime prevention, and aid to Third world countries are included in the analysis, that the DF makes the decisive move to the right. The Progress Party, on the other hand, squarely occupied the far right end of the ideological spectrum. Glistrup’s incendiary comments against the Danish Muslim population presented the final coup de grâce for the Progress Party’s parliamentarian representation. Since then, its only chance of survival remained the strategy to hold firmly to the margins, by fully embracing wide populism and right-wing extremism.93

In congruence with the theoretical model, the Danish People’s Party established and solidified a position of moderate radicalism in some policy issues between 1995 and 2001. Overall it followed a policy of strategically presenting itself as overall acceptable, reliable and coalitionable partner. Its leadership strategically voiced populist salient issues of immigration and crime, especially in the wake of 9/11, while equally strategically it quieted down and remained silent on more controversial issues such as the EU. The coalition government was at the time

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93 In October 2001, for example, Glistrup offered to expel the 420,000 strong Muslim population in Denmark/1/2 In a political report delivered to Progress Party delegates, he claimed that all Muslim’s “holy and sacred duty, set in the name of Allah” is to eradicate the host populations in which they immigrate (Ritzau 2001)/1/2 For these incendiary comments, Glistrup was sentenced to 20 days home confinement/1/2e left the party in 2004.
center-left, which opened a window for coalitionability in the aftermath of the next elections. The presence of the extremist Progress Party in the extreme right-wing margins also helped enormously. So did the pragmatic leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard, who for the most part of the first five years of the DF’s existence was not only the leader of the party, but in many ways the face and idea behind it. In the words of one commentator, “especially during the first couple of years, [she was] simply the party” (Pedersen 2006: 2). By focusing on only one or two divisive issues, such as immigration and crime prevention, and adopting a more moderate approach to social welfare, housing, and employment issues, she managed to strike a balance of image and appeal, which allowed the DF to assume the role of a support party in the aftermath of the 2001 elections. Her strategy paid off and when in 2001 the Conservatives / Liberals coalition replaced the coalition government of the Social Democrats, the Radical Left, and the Center Democrats. Unlike the situation in Austria two years earlier, no controversy surrounded the DF’s participation in the coalition, as a junior partner in Denmark. The general domestic and international public accepted the Danish People’s Party as tolerable, moderate, small and largely uncontroversial participant in the Danish political process, without the shock and hysteria the FPÖ’s adventure in office provoked. Significantly, unlike Jörg Haider’s predicament after the elections, Pia Kjaersaard did not have to embark on frenetic diplomatic tours across Europe, and to the US, in attempt to repair her own image,
and that of her party. Simply put, she was neither surprised by, nor unprepared for her party’s success.

**Spain: the case of the United Left**

More than anywhere else in Western Europe, Spain is a prime case study for the eurosceptic parties’ strategic use of the European issue under extreme systemic constraints. The country is among the most pro-European ones in the entire Union; 71% of the Spaniards approving of the EU and their country’s membership in the Union (European Commission 2009). The country’s emergence from decades of fascist dictatorship and its fast integration back into the leading European countries, along with all benefits — a direct result of its membership in the EC/EU — deprived euroscepticism from a broader populist appeal. Small, extreme leftwing, or neo-fascist ultra-nationalist right-wing parties are the only political outcasts adopting hard, populist, eurosceptic positions without much success. Even the radical Partido Comunista de España (PCE) espouses a soft, qualified, opposition to EU.

The historical legacies of right-wing military dictatorship further constrained the extremities to which the PCE could advocate centralized political and economic policies, as they unavoidably would borderline the limits of the democratic system. Being among the major front-runners of opposition to Franco’s dictatorship, the Communists, along with the mainstream Socialists, found themselves in a precarious
position of being pro-Europeans by default. Legacies of the past confined their political strategies to a rather narrower political framework of operation after the country’s transition to democracy in 1976-7. This was the same political framework, which contributed to the further marginalization of the far right political parties and coalitions, such as the Phalange, which albeit their intense efforts could not just escape their ultra-authoritarian, fascist, anti-democratic legacy associations (Ellwood 1995).

Finally, the awkward coincidence of Spain’s accession into the EC and the politicization of the European integration in the context of the Single European Act put the majority of the political parties in a precarious position. Opposition to the EC was simply not popular. Therefore, the largely positive popular attitudes to the EC/EU among the general population, and the institutional restrains of associations and legacies of the past, did not allow for the European issue to gain similar level of salience in Spain after 1986, as it did in the majority of the other European states.

These and other particularities of Spanish political contestation have created an interesting case study for the strategic party use of euroscepticism. While the issue is hardly manifested on the level of variation and intensity, as it is within the domestic politics of other member-states, such as France, Denmark, or Ireland, in Spain, it is somewhat more nuanced, and takes a backbench position. Nevertheless, the principles of the theoretical model tested here hold firm and corroborate its plausibility and explanatory power. The choice of the PCE and the dominated by it
coalitional front-organization, Izquierda Unida (IU), offer a representative case of strategic use of euroscepticism as an instrument of political contestation, even when the issue had not have become salient enough to play a leading single role of a delineator, as it is the context of the Danish or French politics.

The Spanish electoral system is one of limited proportionality. It is based on the popular \textit{d’Hondt} PR electoral formula, which allows for the division of the votes collected by the largest political parties in such a way that, in theory, guarantees also some representation of other, smaller, political parties. The system is widely used in Europe. Among the most notable states using \textit{d’Hondt} are Portugal and Finland, while a different version of the same system is in use in Denmark and in the Netherlands (Blais & Massicotte 2002:46-7). Interestingly, since 1999, the system is also used EU-wide in the elections for the European Parliament (Leonard 2005: 65). What sets apart Spain from the other states using \textit{d’Hondt} PR system is its very limited application. In Spain, the legislative, autonomous community, and municipal elections are based on very small electoral districts (Magone 2004: 81). As the \textit{d’Hondt} formula goes, the larger the constituency, the more proportional the system becomes. The Nordic and the Benelux countries are among the best examples of this proportionality, with the Netherlands championing it with only 0.67\% of the vote required for a single representation in the parliament, because the country has just one single large national electoral district.
On the other hand, Spain has a large number of small electoral constituencies covering some 50 provinces and the additional North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. This places the Spanish system and its consequences on the political representation in the lower chamber of the Parliament, the Congreso de los Diputados, among the most disproportional ones in Europe, effectively ranking in it on a par not only with German’s mixed electoral system, but also with the British plurality, or the French two-ballot majoritarian systems. In addition, the lower chamber is considerably smaller, only 350 members, compared to other similar in terms of population and territory European countries, such as UK (659 deputies), France (577), Italy (630), and in lesser degree Germany (656). With a 3% threshold for entrance in the Congreso de los Diputados, the representation of the small political parties is quite limited. This is further aggravated from the widespread unequal distribution of seats across the country, the so-called principle of malapportionment (Ansolabehere et al. 2003). Because of this, some provinces, where the population size has fallen, are de facto overrepresented, while others are given fewer seats despite population increases.

In sum, the electoral system is functioning almost as a majoritarian one, producing a stable, polar political system, dominated by two major parties. Unlike the political reality in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland, among others, in Spain

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94 The d’Hondt system provides that each seat is allocated to the political party, which has received the highest average vote per seat if it received this seat. This is considered the “purest” application of the principle of highest average. For more on that see André Blais and Louis Massicotte, “Electoral Systems,” in Comparing Democracies 2, ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, & Pippa Norris (London: SAGE, 2002), 88-107.
the propensity of the major parties to enter into coalitions is minimal. Since the
democratic transition of the country in late 1970s no coalitional government was
necessitated or negotiated. This conclusion has long lasting effects, both for the
political dynamic in the country, and respectively for the strategies of the minor
political parties. Due to the above outlined systemic characteristics of the Spanish
electoral system, the political landscape is dominated by two major political parties,
the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE), and
People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP), with the PCE-dominated IU remaining in a
distant third place. Both major parties are strongly in favor of the European
integration process, and the EU as a whole. In the early years of transition to
democracy, the political landscape was dominated by another mainstream party, the
Union of the Democratic Center (Unión de Centro Democrático, UCD), which after the
failed coup of 1981 split, lost ground, and soon after disintegrated. Since the 1982
elections, the Spanish political landscape has been dominated by the PSOE and the
PP, changing positions in power on an intermittent basis. The PSOE ruled from
1982 to 1996; after widespread corruption scandals it was replaced by a PP
government. In the aftermath of the Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004, and due to
widespread disapproval of Aznar’s economic and foreign politics, the PSOE came
back to power. The party just won another round of electoral cycle in March 2008.

The cycles with regard to kin-party in power or in opposition, therefore, are
clearly marked. The first one started in 1977 with the initial democratic elections, in
which the PCE was believed to have a stronger organizational base and greater electoral command than the PSOE. The PCE won, however, only 10.4% of the vote, perhaps because of its past legacy for maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union and open glorification of Stalin’s personality and policies, which came back to haunt the party (Maravall 1982). The PSOE emerged as the mainstream left-wing party, winning 29.3% of the vote, and the second largest party after.

Catastrophic for the PCE, the 1982 elections marked the beginning of the second cycle. This was the third major defeat for the party, which brought in a harsh disillusionment as to its own position in the system and electoral appeal. Outlawed during Franco’s regime, the PCE represented the most important anti-fascist opposition in the country, with wide representation in the trade union federation Comisiones Obreras CCOO (Magone 2004: 100). After the fall of the dictatorship, the party leadership continued to believe that it enjoyed some popular support and up until the 1982 elections harbored aspirations to regain its leadership of the left and become the official conduit of socialist policy-making (Maravall 1982).

The structural limitations of the electoral system, which hardly allow for more than two major competitors, have forced party leaders to make a harsh decision regarding their own political identity. Estimating its chances of coalitionability to be minimal, and in search of alternative organizational survival, the leadership gave priority to staunch and vehement opposition of the PSOE as its primary identifying
characteristic. Due to strategic voting, the PCE’s votes in 1982 declined further while the PSOE’s votes increased (Chari 2005: 297). Since that moment, the PCE entered into a deep identity crisis. The party leader, Santiago Carrillo, sought to improve the party’s image by implementing a series of reforms, including a rejection to use obsolete Marxist jargon, such as “dictatorship of the proletariat” and “democratic centralism” from the official party documents (Magone 2004: 100). This led to bitter internal bickering and ultimately, splits, expulsions, and a change of leadership.

In 1986, the new PCE leadership initiated the creation of the Izquierda Unida largely as a response to the identity crisis. Originally, seven political parties made up the IU.95 At the time of its creation, the PSOE’s government was already in its fourth year with no inclination to seek any coalitional partners. The prospects of the IU entering office required one of the two possible scenarios: either a) gaining power on its own, or b) becoming a coalitional partner, neither of which had any chance to materialize any time soon. At the time of its creation, the IU leadership, following the PCE’s lead, correctly identified as non-coalitionable and it adopted a hard stance against its rival the PSOE. It labeled the PSOE’s policies as centrist to center-right, and tried to seize the opportunity to fill in a potential political niche for a new left-wing organization (Benedetto & Quaglia 2007). Following such a strategic approach,

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95 Along with the PCE as its core, the other parties in the IU were the pro-Soviet Communist PCPE, the IR (Izquierda Republicana, Republican Left), the FP (Federación Progresista, Progressive Federation), the left-socialist PASOC (Partido de Acción Socialista, Socialist Action Party) and two additionally and largely irrelevant parties with confused ideological principles — the Humanist Party and the Carlist Party. For more see Ramiro-Fernandez, 2004. Electoral competition, organizational constraints and party change: The communist party of Spain (PCE) and united left (IU), 1986-2000.
the PCE and the IU began a long campaign of labeling the Socialists as no different than the PP (Ramiro-Fernández 2004: 20). The PSOE’s response was equally harsh. It took a series of steps in attempt to isolate and delegitimize the IU, in order to expand its electoral space (Chari 2005: 299). In short, the two parties recognized each other as direct competitors for the same pool of electoral support, largely overlapping appeal, in a confined political system of only two dominating political parties.

In the first part of the 1990s, the PCE and the IU radicalized their position towards PSOE even further. Attacking the socialist government for its, reportedly liberal economic position, support for the TEU, and encouraged by the incessant corruption scandals ripping through PSOE’s core, the IU leadership actually believed that it has a good chance to surpass electorally PSOE (Ramiro-Fernández 2004: 21). This belief further fueled IU and PCE’s conviction that their success passes through the demise of the Socialist party, where the winning strategy rests only on clear and unequivocal differentiation. The electoral results from that period demonstrate some support for the plausibility of that strategy, as this becomes evident from Table 5.3, which combines electoral results from local, national, and European elections for the entire period between 1986 and 2009.

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96 This practice of de-legitimization continued well into the late 1990s, and culminated in 1999 notorious now “slip of the tongue” by the former Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, who speaking at a socialist campaign event, called the acting Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and the IU leader at the time Julio Anguita “la misma mierda” (translation “same shit”). The blunder was reported by El País and created a huge scandal. See A. Diez and R. Terrano” Felipe González afirma que Anguita y Aznar "son la misma cosa" El País, June 10, 1999 Espana Section, Base, p.18.
The third cycle started with the change of guard in the aftermath of the 1996 elections, when the conservative PP won a narrow victory, 38.8% of the vote, against 37.6% for the incumbent PSOE. The period 1994-1996 marked the IU’s high point. A quick comparison of the electoral performance of the PSOE and the IU in local, national and European elections demonstrates the direct interconnectedness between

![Table 5.3 Combined results for nationwide vote in Spain 1977-2009 local, national, EP elections](image)

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of Spain

* Local Elections
** EP Elections
the two parties’ outcomes — proof for the strategic vote dependency between them. Between corruption scandals, disillusionment and electoral fatigue from having the same socialist party in power for over fourteen years, many voters switched loyalty and voted for IU (see Graph 5.1).

The PSOE’s gradual decline in the mid-1990s, and its loss of power in 1996 coincide, as it is evident from the graph, with the gradual improvement of the IU’s popularity. On domestic level, this process culminated in 1994 municipal elections, which also marked the lowest point for the PSOE since the first elections in 1977. In national legislative elections, the IU’s biggest success came again in 1996, when the party crossed the 10% psychological threshold for a first time since 1979.
A few developments took place after this “historical” IU victory, and no less historical defeat for the PSOE, which shaped the future strategy of the two political associations towards each other. First, from vote seeking survival strategy, the party gradually began to pursue a strategy of conciliatory politics with the PSOE. With the Socialists no longer in power, and with evident trends for the rise of the IU’s popularity, the leadership became convinced that the winning strategy is one of rapprochement, albeit timidly. First, the IU switched its position towards European integration. Second, it adopted a more moderate and compromising attitude towards potential coalitions with the PSOE on a local level. Third, a change in the IU leadership made possible various regional agreements between the two parties, which managed to agree on a list of common policies and a series of tentative commitments to form coalition governments in case the Socialists won a plurality of seats (Hough & Verge 2009).

By 1999 and 2004, the PSOE and the IU had behind them a few signed agreements and coalitions in place on the local level. First was the “Progress Pact” the two political actors signed between themselves, and with another small left-wing nationalist party, the Socialist Party of Mallorca (PSM), to govern together the Council of Mallorca, a powerful local institution. Then came the coalition in the Balearic Islands formed after the local elections in the 1999. Finally, came the Asturias coalition in 2003, which along with the PSOE and the IU included other smaller left-wing nationalist associations. An outdated IU’s party leadership decree,
issued in late 1980s, which explicitly preventing the local IU organizations from seeking any form of coalition with the PSOE, was lifted. Before that, however, this did not materialize despite the possible openings in 1987, 1991, and 1995, when the two associations had the sufficient votes to form a governing coalition in the region (see Hough & Verge 2009). Now, coalitions were possible. This does not mean that these opportunities always materialized. A coalition between the IU and the PSOE almost happened in Madrid after the 2003 elections. However, because the city is considered to have enormous strategic importance for the Socialists, and because of their growing confidence in their power, the PSOE called off the negotiations, which led to new elections won by the PP (ibid. p.48).

The forth cycle began after the 2004 elections, in the aftermath of the March 11 terrorist attacks on Madrid, and the subsequent disingenuous attempt by the ruling PP of José María Aznar, to blame the attack on ETA. This case of brute manipulation just topped the ever wider popular resentment against the Aznar’s decision to support the US’ invasion of Iraq and to send troops there. In March and April 2003, the anti-war demonstrations numbered just over 3 million people, far more than the similar marches in London or Paris attracted. Spanish support for the unpopular Polish opposition against the proposed system of double qualified majority by the Constitutional draft — an act many interpreted as sheer anti-Europeanism —

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97 According to Antonio Franco, editor in chief of the Barcelona-based El Periòdico de Catalunya, the Prime Minister personally called him, among others, to convince him that ETA was involved in March 11 attack with the words: “It was ETA, Antonio, don’t doubt it in the least!” Alvarez and Sciolino, New York Times, March 17 2004, Section A, pg.12.
led, arguably, to the PP’s demise. The Socialists were poised to win the elections and to form a new government.

Since the PSOE’s victory, the Socialists and the IU parted from their fragile regional cooperation, abruptly abandoning their wider cooperative moves. This was primarily due to the interconnectedness between the two associations’ performance at the polls. While the Socialists saw their numbers in the polls soaring, the IU saw theirs rapidly declining. Strategic voting is the most likely explanation. Voters, whose primary concern was to prevent the PP from remaining in power, tactically voted for the PSOE, even when the IU represented their first preference. Similarly, in the 2008 elections, many crossed party lines and voted for the PSOE, fearing a potential PP victory and return to power (Smith 2009: 363).

The IU’s position towards the European integration process largely mirrors the dynamic of its relationship with the PSOE. When the PSOE was in power, such as during cycles two and four, the IU’s positions harden compared to cycle three, when the coalition demonstrated much more positive attitudes towards the EU and the process of integration. During Franco’s regime, the idea of Europe and the goal of entering European Community embodied the dreams of democratic ideals and norms of the majority of the Spaniards (Ramiro & Morales 2007: 127). This association made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, from the onset of the democratic transition period for the Communist party to join the pan-European
bandwagon of euroscepticism and Europhobia, which dominated the strategies of the other European communist parties at the time. In the 1960s, the Spanish Communists followed the Soviet Union political line of rejecting the EC as an epitome of capitalist instrument for exploitation. Then in the early 1970s, the PCE distanced itself significantly from Moscow and adopted a pro-European position. The April 1977 publication by Santiago Carrillo, the legendary PCE leader, of his seminal book *Eurocommunism and the State*, set the course of breaking away from the Soviet-dominated communist orthodoxy, and paved the road for the Spanish Communists to join the growing group of European communist parties, which were distancing themselves from the USSR. For a good discussion of the origins and evolution of Eurocommunism see Bogdan Szajkowski, “Roots of Eurocommunism,” in *Contemporary Crisis* 3 (1979) 255-267.

Furthermore, as one of the most prominent pillars of anti-Francism and pro-democracy resistance, the PCE risked its image by turning openly anti-European. At the time of transition to democracy, all major parties in Spain embraced the idea of Europe as an embodiment of democracy, and the European integration process as a symbol of an economic progress and modernization. The PCE joined the other parties, partially because of conviction, and partially out of necessity. If it were to play any major role in the future democratic development of the country, it could not have afforded to be seen as anti-European, as in the post-Franco’s context of Spanish politics this would have also meant a loose association with anti-democratic.
The rather straightforward dynamic of interparty relations between the PSOE and the IU, can be traced back, to a large extent, to how both associations dealt with the issue of European integration. The IU’s life as a coalition partner was marked since its creation by controversies, which largely determined its leadership’s decision-making process. The coalition aspired a mainstream position, but because of the structure of the electoral system and because of the legacies of the past of its core members, it was bound to remain a marginal extreme quasi-party. As a marginal association, however, it could not enjoy the freedom to make a full use of populist anti-European rhetoric. Instead of turning into an outright hard eurosceptic, the coalition embraced soft eurosceptic, but hard anti-PSOE position. Thus, the issue of European integration played much lesser role in the overall political identity formation of the IU than its position vis-à-vis the PSOE. To be sure, the EU played an important part of the coalition’s portfolio — just not a primary one. Still, the evolution of the IU’s dynamic position towards the European issue followed the general pattern of inter-party trajectory with regard to its relationship with the PSOE.

Despite its traditional left-wing stances and representation of classical New Left issues, such as environment, peace, and feminism, the PCE, and later on the IU took rather soft eurosceptic position towards the process of European integration (Gómez-Reino, et al. 2008: 141). Chronologically, when the UCD’s government formally launched Spain’s application for EC membership, few months after the 1977 elections, the PCE joined the majority of the political parties supporting it.
future membership was seen as a source of inspiration, and as an emanation of the process of the country’s transition to democracy. Hence, the Spanish Communists marked one of the few exceptions in the EC, where all main political actors were in complete agreement on the benefits from union membership (Álvarez Miranda 1996). The only parties not supporting the country’s application at the time were a few small neo-fascist extreme rightwing Francoist parties, such as the Phalange. Despite its support for accession, however, the PCE maintained a soft critical position towards the EU on economic grounds from the beginning. It argued that the EC is an embodiment of capitalist liberal market economic policies, disguised behind an non-transparent bureaucracy, which services large corporations and the rich dominant classes in power (Menéndez-Alarcón 2000).

While this position is allegedly consistent with the general ideological attitude towards EC/EU of the communist parties across Europe, it is hard to reconcile two factors here. First is the IU’s, and respectively the PCE’s major change of heart in the face of the Amsterdam Treaty and their support for it. The AMT, arguably, provisioned much deeper integrationist reach, which was far beyond the modest market integration taking place in the late 1970s. Notably, however, this support came at a time when the PSOE was in opposition and the two associations were already working together on their careful rapprochement with regard to possible regional coalitions. Second, while one of the PCE’s main criticism of the EC was directed at the excessive level of infringement on the national identity of the
Spaniards through the economic globalization forces (ibid. p.340), the more recent IU’s criticism with regard to the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty (discussed below), is centered around the argument of not enough integration, a federalist maximalism of a sort (see Benedetto & Quaglia 2007). Clearly, this discrepancy of positions is not easily reconcilable with the front-end ideological façade given by the Communist leadership.

Following the first elections for the European Parliament, the PCE MEPs firmly aligned themselves with their Italian colleagues along the lines of the Communist and Allies Group (Dunphy 2004). In their professed euroscepticism, the Spanish Eurocommunists stood against the Single European Act (SEA), claiming that all economic benefits provisioned in it, including economies of scale and intense production efficiency, come at expense of the working class, especially in the weaker members of the EC, such as Spain. Nevertheless, their criticism of the SEA can be defined as qualitative, therefore soft euroscepticism, since it was not an outright rejection of the deepening European integration most of the hard eurosceptics across Europe ventured in, but was rather policy oriented. Although the PCE’s position on the SEA hardened somewhat between 1986 and 1989, it remained qualitative. If focused on issues of globalization and integration, the leadership and its intellectual scholarship continued to emphasize the exploitative character of the reform, driven
by the agenda of the wealthy conservative circles. Instead of simply rejecting European integration, the PCE’s leadership attempted to play a more complex role — that of a visionary for the EC’s role of in a globalizing world and how best the interests of the working class can be defended in this new political and economic context.

Julio Anguita, the communist mayor of Cordoba for nine years, was elected Secretary General of the PCE in 1988; in 1990 he became leader of the IU. He exhibited strong leadership character and adopted highly centralized personal decision-making style (Ramoro-Fernández 2004: 25, n1). On the topic of European integration, he repeatedly clashed with some of the members of his political cabinet. He favored a stronger opposition to the integration process, pointing to the danger of globalized Europe, not only in terms of economics, but also in terms of communications and workforce. He warned about the hidden dangers for the Spanish workers from the provisions guaranteeing free movement of capital and labor. In a widely circulated essay in the World Marxist Review, he blamed the Single European Act for having its “main emphasis on those aspects, which will benefit conservative economic circles the most… Judging by the statements from those who govern us, Europeism is synonymous with modernity. But, what sort of Europe are they talking about? The communist party of Spain supports Gorbachev’s concept of a

"common European home" (Anguita 1989: 3). On the other side of the argument stood high ranking party functionaries, such as Juan Berga and Francisco Palero, who argued that in the new post-Soviet era, the political potential and credibility of the Communist project is exhausted, that the IU has to be dissolved and turned into a modern leftwing socialist party (Val 1991). This effectively meant dropping the euroscepticism positions, active rapprochement with the PSOE, and eventually merger into a bigger, more united Left. In late Fall of 1990 Francisco Palero, the PCE’s foreign policy secretary, expressed in front of the British Communist Party’s official newspaper, the Change, his strong pro-European sentiments, claiming that he was “deeply committed” to the ideals and future of the European Community.\footnote{Richard Dunphy actually claims that Palero’s statement is clear evidence, which directly contradicts the widespread belief, most prominently voiced by David Bell (1996: 250) that in the eve of the Maastricht Treaty, the Spanish Communist coalition became more “anti-European” and that this has led to identity crisis and change within the IU (Dunphy 2004: 124)/\footnote{In fact, I concur with Bell’s argument}/\footnote{While Palero’s statement is arguably pro-European, it is not representative of the IU as a whole}/\footnote{Palero later went on to become a member of the NI and left the parliamentary group of the IU}/\footnote{In 2001 he and his colleagues from the NI officially joined the PSOE’s ranks.}} This was an outright dissent with Anguita’s political line of confrontation with PSOE and hardening euroscepticism. The split culminated into the creation of the Nueva Izquierda-IN (New Left) splinter group, which was composed of pragmatists, who wanted reform the current identity of the Communists as being anti-Europeanists, but not enough; as being anti-Socialists, but hoping to represent the Spanish left; and as being hard communists, but without the communist ideals of the Soviet Union political ideology. With regard to both, rapprochement with PSOE and with European integration, they ultimately failed and Anguita’s hardliners prevailed. This
led to the first major split in the Communist coalition in the eve of the Maastricht Treaty ratification.

The IU’s first major anti-EU campaign took place during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992. Far from being coincidental, the PSOE was the long term ruling party at the time. The IU claimed that the TEU enables deep cuts in the social expenditure and gives a priority to neo-liberal economics. Furthermore, the Communists criticized the impending loss of the Spanish Central Bank’s independence to that of the newly created European Monetary Institute, and its future transformation into a European Central Bank, as provisioned by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, the general criticism of the TEU, which the Communists voiced, centered on the opposition to tighter constraints in areas of economic and monetary interdependence and integration. Based on that assessment, they ventured into a campaign to portray the PSOE as centrist, liberal economic formation, and therefore to move in the alleged space in the left.

In effect, the debate over the Maastricht Treaty’s ratification presented many of the European Communist parties in general, and the Spanish PCE / IU coalition in particular, with the opportunity to redefine their core ideology of communist ideals and to decouple it from the dogmatic Soviet doctrines of radicalism and revolutionary zeal. The politicization of the European integration issue allowed for greater internal debates elsewhere in Europe, which inevitably affected the political dynamics in Spain.
as well. In addition, the traditional internationalism of the extreme left could now be replaced with, or coupled to, moderate nationalism, especially with regards to the future of the workers, and the dangers of the greater internalization of the European Community. In the case of Spain, the halo of the democratic ideals embodied by the European Community was no longer *sine qua non* for the legitimacy of any of the political formations, including the Communist coalition. Hit hard from the dominating role of the PSOE in the domestic politics, and by the fall of the Soviet Union, the pressure for a new IU’s identity no longer to build on the ideological dialecticism of the legitimacy and viability of Communism vs. Capitalism, mounted. This opened an opportunity for the use of harder anti-European populism as a winning strategy, which no longer was hurting the coalition’s image. In short, the deepening of the European integration in the context of the SEA and the TEU provided the Communists with an opportunity for adoption of, and consolidation behind, harder anti-European and pro-nationalist populism.

With the approach of the pending ratification of the TEU by the Spanish Parliament, the IU’s official position hardened. Anguita argued in favor of the launch of a nationwide referendum to ratify the Treaty in a clear bit to undermine the PSOE’s pro-TEU policy. With the approach of the actual vote for ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the Congress of Deputies, the IN’s MP broke rank with the national leadership despite the vehement opposition to TEU by Julio Anguita and the rest of the national leadership (Gómez-Reino *et al.* 2008: 150, n.10). As a result, the
IU’s leadership settled for a compromise: the IU MPs, including those from IN, will vote abstained, not “yes,” while the national leadership will continue to blast the Treaty. In this way, both the coalition and its faction, will save face without severely compromising their respective strategic positions and common goals. In the end, only eight of the IU MPs abstained from supporting the TEU ratification; the remaining seventeen members voted in favor of the Treaty (ABC 1992). This caused a colossal scandal in the ranks of the IU and tore its internal discipline.

In the aftermath of 1996 elections, when the PSOE lost power and was replaced in office by the PP, the IU gradually began to change its position again towards European integration. The search for a suitable identity took a long time and the change of attitude did not happen overnight. Between 1996 and 1999, the Communists maintained their belligerent position towards PSOE, using the contrast with them as a main point of political identification. However, as outlined earlier, some of the internal party directives forbidding cooperation with the PSOE at a regional and national level were relaxed and the two associations joined forces in a few regional elections. This rapprochement culminated right before the 2000 general elections, when the national leaderships signed an agreement for cooperation on a short list of common policies, a commitment to form a coalition government and a pact for the elections to the Senate (Ramiro-Fernández 2004).
The gradual change in strategy resonated also in the coalition’s position towards the Amsterdam Treaty which, not insignificantly, was negotiated by the conservative PP government of José María Aznar. The IU adopted soft eurosceptic approach, criticizing certain aspects of the Treaty, but was overall supportive of it. Its main criticism predominantly centered around the claim that the Treaty is not deepening European integration enough, rather than arguing against negative consequences from it (Benedetto & Quaglia 2007: 492). Hardly being “anti-European” this type of criticism focuses on certain aspects of the integration process, such as social safety nets, which achievement goes through deepening, not through its reversal. There are two notable differences here with the IU’s previous positions. First, while its criticisms and opposition to the SEA and the TEU were of a negative character — i.e., seeing the integration process and its consequences as dangerous for the workers’ rights and their general wellbeing — the current criticism was positive, centering around the argument that their rights and wellbeing will be better served by even deeper level of integration. Second, while in the previous instances the coalition’s criticism advocated maintaining the status quo, in the AMT case it advocated change over the status quo. Technically, all positions can classify as soft euroscepticism, as they target certain policies of the integration, but do not argue for outright withdrawal from the EU. However, in the first two instances there was a status quo bias, while in the latter there was not.
The Congreso de los Diputados ratified the Treaty of Amsterdam on October 8, 1998 with the IU MPs voting abstained, in accordance with the national leadership, while the IN group supported it. The main reason for the IU’s abstention was the failure of the Treaty to reach deep enough into creating a true European federalism (Gómez-Reino et al. 2008: 150, n.10). In the Senate, all but one of the 218 senators voted in support of the Treaty ratification on November 24 (Senado de España 1998). The AMT ratification marked the height of the IU’s support for the EU integration. It also offered the clearest example, so far, of the strategic character of IU’s euroscepticism. Only in a few years, during the discussions of the failed Treaty of European Constitution, and the Treaty of Lisbon, the IU will once again change its position to harder opposition to European integration. Once again, not coincidentally, during the time this change of hearts happened, the Socialists would be in power without inviting the IU to participate in a coalition.

Between 1999 and 2004, the IU saw its popularity slumping while the PSOE’s popularity was soaring. The direct connection, which existed with regard to the support for the two political actors, seemed unaltered by the time Socialists spent out of office. The lack of national extreme populist party to the left of the IU, which would espouse populist rhetoric and struggle for the far left electoral niche, was both beneficial and detrimental for the IU. It was beneficial, because the quasi coalition could stretch out to cover the electoral space between of the PSOE and the extreme left margin. It was also detrimental, because without a contrasting populist party to
its left, the IU could not establish itself to be seen by both the electorate and the
PSOE’s elite as something more than just a small contender for the Socialists’
political space. This contrasting image was valid, even though it did act as a
responsible political actor with strong enough nation-wide organizational structure
and contained its criticism for the European integration within reasonable, policy
defined, boundaries. Regardless, the IU’s behavior with regard to European
integration traced rather rigidly the cycles of its kin-mainstream party, the PSOE, of
going in and out of power.

French: the cases of Parti Communiste Français & Mouvement des Citoyens

The manifestation of euroscepticism in France is a subject of extensive
research lately, especially in light of the French “petit oui” on the TEU in 1992, and
“grand no” on the TEC in 2005. The specific interest arguably transcends the
statistical significance and the richness the country politics have to offer for studying
the phenomenon of euroscepticism. In fact, one could make the argument against
the special attention French political discourse usually receives as being too
significant because the danger of over-generalization and over-prediction is a real
one. To be sure, the problem with the French case study is frequently treated as one
of the ‘default’ bias, the propensity of studying the country’s politics as the default
case, against which the other cases are compared and contrasted. This, by no means
however, corresponds to the reality. Admittedly, with regard to this ‘universalisme’ of the French politics towards the processes of European integration, one has to remember that the creation and evolution of the European Community was marked by a historical paradox. On the one hand, at least partially, the EC/EU initially evolved as a strategic pursuit of narrower national, including French, interests. The ECSC was conceived as a tool to impose international control and regulation over strategic resources such as coal and steel in the aftermath of the Second World War, and as an economic tool of integration on a larger scale as means of mounting the cost of future war and increase of incentives for cooperation. In the same time, it would be gross misrepresentation to claim that the European project has ever, even in its early planning stage, been limited to these rather narrower, and largely national goals. Instead, they could be seen as externalities of a greater project.

This sort of genealogical contradiction with regard to the European Union reflects to a large degree the role the image of Europe plays in the French political discourse, and consequently the significance of the French experience with regard to the study of euroscepticism. This perspective of the French on the matters of Europe was perhaps best captured some time ago, before the WWII or the idea of European Union, by Paul Valéry, who in 1924 wrote that the French distinguish themselves by thinking they are universal (Valéry 1977: 294). This is, indeed, a good characteristic of the so-called “French exceptionalism,” a mode of identification so dear to many French politicians, scholars and intellectuals alike. They tend to use this
notion of exceptionalism as universalism, an oxymoron really, as a national delineator, often invoked both as source for legitimacy, and as a universal standard, by purportedly outlining idiosyncratic yet universalistic cultural traits. This is, in fact, more often than not elevated to the status of a standard for “European-ness” against which all other European phenomena in the political, cultural, and social domain must be compared. To summarize, what is French, is both exceptional and unique, yet it is also universalistic in its significance, at least in the context of the European socio-political domain.

This bicephalic exclusivist-universalist mode of thinking, it is fair to say, has always been the standard approach of the French policy makers towards European integration. Since the time of de Gaulle, French policy makers have always demonstrated a particularistic approach towards the EC/EU. This worldview could be summarized as the following French line of policy: all that is good for France must be good for Europe, ergo if it is not good for France, must not be good for Europe, either. As Frank argues, “a discourse on Europe is mainly a discourse on French power, or French influence in Europe” (Frank 2001: 311). The best manifestation of this attitude is to be found not in the unmasked disdain de Gaulle held for the European Commission and the supranational character of the EC, but in the words of perhaps one of the biggest pro-European French politicians, and former head of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, whose well-known equivocal motto was “For France through Europe.” In the aftermath of the French presidency of the EU
in 2008, for example, some 66% of the French citizens believed that it was good for Europe, which is approximately the same number – 63%, who claimed that it was good for France itself (European Commission 2009: 10). Assuming that under a French presidency of the EU Council, a European policy of integration cannot possibly be divorced from the interests of France, it is logical to conclude that what was good for Europe was before that necessarily good for France.

Far from arguing about the actual grounds for French exceptionalism, or in favor of the actual merits of this approach, it is necessary to recognize the practical benefits and, thus the strategic nature of this concept. Arguably, the idea of French exceptionalism is a useful tool for political contestation. The use of French exceptionalism with regard to European politics is, indeed, a telling story. France is among the founding states of ECSC, and it is fair to say that without France EU’s existence is rather unimaginable, or at least not to the extent that this is possible without some other states, such as Ireland or even UK. But so is, arguably, the German, the Italian or the Benelux experience, too. Notwithstanding, neither the French citizens nor the French politicians can be said to have been historically driven by some overzealous love for Europe. According to the latest edition of

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101 Various notions of exceptionalism are frequently evoked by scholars and policy-makers who strive to drive a thicker line of demarcation, or at times even to invent and artificially impose one, between processes and phenomena, which otherwise may not necessarily possess particularistic patterns of differentiation. Nordic exceptionalism with regard to European identity is one example, American exceptionalism with regard to democratic experience is another. Even in studies of sport, exceptionalism are frequently employed as explanatory variables. For more on Nordic exceptionalism see Lawler 1997, Browning 2007; for extensive discussion of American exceptionalism see Lipset 1997, also c.f. Bacevich 2008; for a challenging discussion of American exceptionalism in sports’ history of soccer see Markovits 1987; Markovits and Hellerman 2001.
Eurobarometer, some 52% of French citizens believe that EU is rather good thing for their country, which is in the normal average for France (European Commission 2009). However, this approval rating, albeit marking an improvement over the 2003-4 low mark of 43-4%, is nowhere near the constantly high pro-European attitudes of the traditionally Europhile Luxembourg (79%), or for that matter the Netherlands (72%), Spain (71%), or Denmark (65%), some of which have been discussed in the framework of the current chapter.

This conclusion has important consequences with regard to the electoral system, used here as a grade mark in the comparative analysis and an intervening variable regarding the coalitionability argument. The French electoral system currently in use for both, presidential and legislative elections, is a second-ballot majoritarian one. This essentially means that there are two rounds of elections for each seat in the Assemblé National, for which an absolute majority of 50+1% and a total vote equal to at least one quarter of the registered electorate is required or the process advances to the second round. In cases when the elections is advanced to the second round, one needs the support of 12.5%, or one eights of the electorate in the first round to move on to the second. If no candidate polls more than 12.5% in the first round, a runoff is held between the two top candidates with higher percentage of the vote.
This system has important and far-reaching implications for the actual process of contestation in the French politics, and how the issue of Europe is debated. First, with regard to the presidential elections, arguably any president, who wishes to prevail in the second round, needs a broad alliance behind his or her candidature. Therefore, the sheer logic of presidential elections, as determined by the electoral system, necessitates the formation of broad, majority coalitions (Harmsent 2005). To win, any candidate has to reach two marks: to gain a place on the ticket for the second round, and to secure the support for the second round of a broad coalition, encompassing not only the major political associations immediately to the left or the right of the center, but also to calculate correctly the strategic vote.

This logic necessitates then a careful balancing between support and criticism for the European integration. On the one hand, the position should be clearly supportive of the European integration in order not to alienate the Europhile electors, and on the other, it has to be obscure enough in order to satisfy the eurosceptics, yet to contain their influence. As of result, the dominant strategy in the majority of the presidential races has been to take a position, broadly speaking in the lines of discourse on Europe suggested by Frank’s quote above as “the influence of France on Europe.” In general, this trend is historically valid, with the ostensible exception of the 2002 presidential elections, when the incumbent Jacques Chirac had to defend against the far right eurosceptic Jean-Marie le Pen — a fact that naturally has had its impact on the format and discourse of the debate on Europe. All
presidents since the 1970s on have been rather europhiles, yet they have run on ambiguous and carefully balanced platform between euroenthusiasm and policy criticism: from d'Estaing to Sarkozy.\textsuperscript{102} This is the manifestation of the French exceptionalism with regard to Europe, perpetuated in the presidential campaigns.

This dynamic is not the same, however, with regard to the behavior of the political parties. When it comes to legislative elections, the particularities of the French electoral system influence the political contestation process in a different way. First, unlike a proportional representation system, where the nationwide percentage of the vote is roughly translated into the same percentage of seats in the Parliament, the majoritarian one distributed seats follows a principle, which reflects strategic voting on a much greater level. Second, it introduces the rather rare principle of second round to the dynamic of the legislative elections. While this principle is suitable for presidential elections, where naturally only two candidates head into to a runoff, its benefits are less clear in the case of legislative elections (Bláis & Massicotte 1997).

Following Duverger’s Law (1951) and further elaborations by Cox (1997) on the impact of the electoral system on the mode of organization and behavior of the political parties, it follows that two ballot systems evolve into a multiparty system with possible strategic voting. France seems to be the only consolidated democracy

\textsuperscript{102} Harmsen (2005) goes even further, claiming that this particularity of the French electoral system favors, and indeed fosters strong individualistic and ‘présidentiable’ candidates (c.f. Harmsen 2005).
known to use that type of electoral system currently. One distinct characteristic of the system is that it strongly favors the formation of large political parties. As Blais and Loewen note (2009: 349), the implications from the use of the double ballot system in the legislative elections resembles plurality systems with single-member districts, which favor stronger (and larger) parties, and disadvantage weaker parties. The effects from such a strong bias have been observed before; but the findings with regard to the actual relationship between seats and votes are continuously deemed inconclusive (Bláis 2004).

In short, the French electoral system favors the creation of large coalitions before the elections, which more often than not include factions that might possibly dissend. Such past and present coalitions are, for example, the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UPM), the coalition behind the president Nicolas Sarkozy and the prime minister François Fillon; its predecessor Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), and the d’Estaing’s party Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF). The evidence points that under the French double ballot majoritarian electoral system the small parties are systematically underrepresented, and the large parties are systematically overrepresented. Also, electoral alliances are much more frequent than it is habitual in one-round electoral systems (Bláis & Loewen 2009).

There are certain implications from these characteristics of the French electoral system with regard to the propensity to and mode d’emploi of strategic
euroscepticism by some of the political parties, or the dissident factions within them. As a starter, because the system favors big parties and large coalitions, as opposed to small parties, it is likely to identify many of the eurosceptics as actual factions within the larger coalitions, rather than as independent parties on their own. This argument is, in fact, posing one more challenge to the attempts to explain euroscepticism as an ideological cleavage, situated orthogonally (Hix & Lord 1997; Hix 1999), or parallel to the traditional left-right divide (Tsebelis & Garret 2000), or somewhat mixed of both (Marks & Hooghe 1999; 2001). Instead of focusing on a complex deconstruction of the ideological coat of the mainstream left and right political parties, the current theoretical model of coalitionability offers a much more parsimonious alternative to these largely complex arguments with regard to why the dissent on European integration is found within these large formations.

In the same time, it would be incorrect to claim that there are no small political formations, which center at least part of their political portfolios around the issue with Europe. Such formations are, for example, Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen (MRC), Charles Pasqua’s Rassemblement pour la France et l’Indépendance de l’Europe (RPF) and Philippe de Villiers’s Mouvement pour la France (MPF). A closer look, however, would reveal that many of these parties are indeed splinter groups from mainstream parties/coalitions. Their existence, in the first place, can be explained with the constraining effects of the electoral system, as it has been noted in details elsewhere (Milner 2000; Usherwood 2002). To be sure, there
are other parties in the French political system espousing hard eurosceptical positions. Among the most notable ones are Jean-Marie Le Pen’s *Front National*, Bruno Mégret’s *Mouvement National Républicain* (splinter from FN), the peasant party *Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions (CPNT)*, and the Trotskysts *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* and *Lutte Ouvrière*. Their take on the European integration, however, is much less flexible, and much more radical.

In order to understand the dynamics of the splits, it is necessary to focus on the period of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, with the so-called French “*petit oui*” and its consequences for the patterns of the political contestation, as it was around that time when some of the major splits happened, or became impendent. The 1992 referendum on Maastricht opened a venue for dissent for some political factions and emboldened them to take a risk by pursuing an independent path to success and to acquire more important role in the political system by spearheading eurosceptic campaign. This led to the splinter of two major factions, MDC to the left, and MPF to the right, and planted the seeds for future splits, particularly in the RPR. In the mean time the support for European integration among the voters drastically dropped, from the heights of 70% in 1990 to merely 58% at the time of the referendum in 1992 (European Commission 1994). The galvanizing anti-TEU campaign seemed to have paid-off. The splinter groups, in particular, betted on their ability to galvanize enough support for their eurosceptic agenda, as to become significant actors before the 1993 parliamentary elections and the 1994 EP elections,
and thus to become key partners in the context of ongoing fragmentation of the political system with regard to governing coalitions. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty referendum opened an opportunity to break ranks, and to pursue new venue for independent political contestation for some groups within the large mainstream formations, which were previously forced to stay within their ranks by the constraints of the electoral system.

Following the main argument of the chapter, let us look now into the dynamics of hard and soft euroscepticism adopted by the PCF and some of this splinter parties, their relationships with the kin-mainstream parties on the one hand, and with the marginal extreme parties, both left and right, on the other, and their strategic calculations for coalitionability. Since the French Communist Party is the veteran among the case parties in this examination, and it is fair to say that up until the end of 1970s was a mainstream party, the analysis will focus mainly on it. To place the elaborations in proper context, however, let us first look into the electoral rhythm for legislative elections since 1980 on and identify the cycles within it with regard to mainstream parties in power. In addition, a presidential dimension is added in attempt to bring a greater clarity of the analysis, since France is semi-presidential republic and the role of the president is more than just ceremonial, and the role of the exceptionalism was already determined. Table 5.2 outlines the electoral cycles and the governments in power, along with the results for the political parties in focus.
Table 5.2  French Elections 1981 - 2007

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Lutte Ouvrier</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC/PR/MRC</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
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<td>2.4%</td>
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<td>1.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPNT</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur de France

Following the rhythm of ascent to and descent from power of the French Socialist Party from 1980 on, and especially after the SEA in 1986, the Communist Party has adopted highly flexible and adjustable policy towards the issue of European integration. Since 1950s the PCF maintained critical position towards the European Community. The party’s long-standing policies and activities towards the European Community and all its institutions and bodies were traditionally highly critical. Up until the early 1960s the party expressed vigorous opposition to any of the policies of unification and integration, seeing them synonymous with capitalist expansion. The general line maintained by the PCF since 1945 was to follow mot-a-mot the official
line of the USSR, therefore rejecting the European Community as US tool of foreign policy and based on a principle for common capitalist hegemony, which contradicts the classical Marxist doctrine. Therefore, in the PCF’s view, the existence of the European Community and its political and economic principles underpinned the ideological view on capitalism’s desperate attempts to ensure its survival in the inevitable destiny of its impending demise (Callot 1988).

This position changed radically in the 1960s, when the PCF, again following a change in the USSR’s political line, was forced to recognize the relative effectiveness of the European institutions and the success of the common economic policies, including internalization of markets, increased productivity, and mass production, all of which had impact on the core party constituents. It was then, when the PCF decided to adopt a different approach to the EC, in particular by infiltrating its institutions in order to modify their mode d’emploi (ibid. 310). This is a vivid testimony of political pragmatism replacing the rigid ideological position towards the EC, especially in the context of the political conjuncture of Soviet financing, guidance and influence over the communist parties across Europe, and in particular in France. By 1979 the PCF’s pragmatic position to European politics reflected its stance in the first direct elections for the EP. The Communists positioned themselves as a constructive political force, putting forward a list of 20 propositions to improve the work of the Parliament, which led at the end of creating an image of responsible and engaged actors in European politics (Brunet 1987). This strategic choice eventually
culminated in a close partnership between the PS and the PCF. Despite their
despite their opposition to François Mitterrand in the first round of the presidential elections, they
hastily threw their support behind him in the second round, and abstained from
attacking the PS in legislative elections. In exchange, they received four ministerial
positions in the Socialist government of Pierre Mauroy. Thus, the PCF’s ascendance
to power in the early 1980s is among the clearest demonstrations of payoff of the
coalitionability strategy with regard to small political parties. It is, in fact, not an
isolated event either. The same change of hearts for the Communists happened once
again in the mid-1990s when they significantly softened their eurosceptic positions
from the heights they reached in the aftermath of the SEA, and particularly the TEU

After the dramatic fallout between the Communists and the Socialists in 1984,
shortly after the European elections, the PCF withdrew its support for the
government and its ministers from the Socialist cabinet and hardened its rhetoric
towards the EC. Until the 1984 elections, the PCF’s position towards the EC and the
European integration was largely non-present. Geroges Marchais, the party’s
Secretary General at the time, insisted on a very scarce mentioning of the European
affairs in the party manifesto (Callot 1988). One could argue that PCF and his own
positions towards EC was, in fact, favorable, albeit scarce. With only three lines
devoted to Europe, in an earlier report to the Party Committee he equated France’s
existence as inseparable from that of EC, and emphasized the importance of
independence and neutrality, primarily militarily and politically, in the context of the European institutions (Marchais 1984).

This position changed dramatically in the aftermath of the European elections. One reason, among many for leaving the government, was strategic: the PCF hoped to contain some of the damage it occurred from participating in the increasingly unpopular socialist-led government. By 1984, the level of unemployment was rapidly rising, and the economic forecast was dim, predicting drastic “dégraissage” and inevitable contraction of the economic growth and the industry output (Raymond 2005: 77; see also Criddle 1993). Replacing the traditional leftwing Pierre Mauroy with the rightwing economist Laurent Fabius at the premiership served as a catalyst that led to the separation of the coalitional partners later that year. While the June European elections served as both, a setback and a wakeup call, for the Left as a whole, the damage for the Communists was disproportionately greater in comparison with that of the Socialists. From 20.57% and 19 seats the PCF won after the 1979 EP elections, it went down to just 11.3% or 10 seats. For comparison, the PS received 23.57% of the vote in 1979, which gave it 22 seats, and went down to 20.75% or 20 seats. The PCF’s leadership interpreted these results, and correctly so, as punishment for their collaboration with the PS by their electorate, which tends to be much more hardcore ideologically driven and inflexible than that of the Socialists. It was, indeed, a punishment for the failure of the Communist party to exert any meaningful control over the economic and social agenda of the government and to
defend their interests. The tactical change of the premiership from Mauroy to Fabius late in July by the president Mitterrand provided the PCF with the needed excuse for divorce, and they quickly terminated the coalition.

Now in opposition, the Communists’ first priority was to distance the party’s political line from that of the Socialists in light of the incoming elections in 1986. At odds with the kin-mainstream party, the PS, and in the light of the possible continuation of the pro-European policy of the government from the next cabinet, the PCF’s adoption of hard euroscepticism at that time was strategically advantageous. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, the PCF was coming out already very strongly against the EC, hence marking complete turnaround from its position just a few years earlier. Not coincidentally, at the time of domestic debates of the merits of the TEU, it was once again a socialist government in power, led first by Michel Rocard, and later by Édith Cresson and for a short period at the end by Pierre Bérégovoy. At no point between 1988 and 1993, during which period the PS was in power, did the PCF find itself positioned as a potential coalitional partner, or holding a self-image as such. Nor did it act that way. The PCF charged that the Maastricht Treaty was a project of central bankers and industrialists. High party functionaries, such as Jean-Claude Gayssot (later a Minister of Transport in Jospin’s cabinet), created and ardently defended in the public debates powerful symbols and ideologemes,
such as the Maastricht Treaty being essentially a pet project of “la grande bourgeoisie.” In a similar vein, another high party official, Roland Leroy, editor in chief of the official PCF newspaper *L’Humanité*, called Maastricht “a project of the right… concocted by capitalist Europe.” And Piero Rainero, member of the PCF’s Politburo, recognized in Maastricht a continuation of an anti-France trend with regard to its maritime and fishery industry, which has started at the time of Spain’s accession in EC. In brief, the French Communist Party became one of the most vocal opponents to the Maastricht Treaty, sort of the leftwing hard eurosceptic leader. His position gave it the halo of generally eurosceptic party, with the nuances disappearing in the process.

Yet, just a couple years later the PCF’s policy towards the EU and the process of integration changed again in yet another strategic turnaround. For starters, the party had a new leadership. The legendary Georges Marchais retired in 1994 and he was replaced by Robert Hue — an ambitious reformer and pragmatist. His presidential bit in 1995 marked a slight improvement over performance of the party in the last presidential elections in 1988, when the Communist’s candidate André Lajoinie gathered 6.67% of the vote, versus 8.66% for Hue this time around. This relative success gave him a mandate to embark on a reform, which popularly came to be known as “la mutation.” He was supported in this process by the PCF’s MEP and

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103 All quotes are from articles and reports in *L’Humanité* in the period between April 1992 and November 1992.
member of the national bureau Philippe Herzog, who was also a leader of an internal
faction called Confrontation. Herzog and his supporters pushed initially for reform as
alternative to Hue’s leadership, but settled for common policy for greater openness
towards the EU and quick ending of the PCF’s hostility towards the European
project as a whole (Raymond 2005). On the other side of the equation were the
refondateurs of Guy Hermier, hardliners who sought greater radicalization of the
Communist party, and wider alliance with such eurosceptic groups as Jean-Pierre
Chevèntement’s MDC, the ecologists Verts, and the Trotskits’ far left groups. At the
party congress in December 1996, Hue managed to impose his reformist agenda and
to rally behind himself large enough support in favor of cooperation with the PS and
drastic softening of the eurosceptic rhetoric.

Since 1995 the Communists began to change their hard anti-European
position, taming it down in the context of the internal reform Hue was pushing, and
with an eye in the next elections, in which they sought strategically to advance
balanced and opened pro-European policy in tune of the PS’s one. Over that course,
both parties made statements supporting a ‘social Europe’. In April 1997 they
adopted a joint declaration, in which the two parties declared inter alia:

Nous sommes convaincus que l’Europe a un modèle de civilisation
à affirmer: démocratie politique, développement économique,

104 Hue was championing this approach and repeatedly called for “social Europe” in the next few years,
including during his foreign trips/1 /2ee for example Hue’s "Déclaration de Robert Hue lors de sa visite en
Pologne” PCF archive 2000.
solidarité sociale, diversité culturelle... [N]ous disons non à l'Europe libérale, à l'Europe de l’argent-roi et de la soumission aux marchés financiers.105 (L’Humanité 1997)

In the haste of the Spring 1997 legislative electoral campaign, an urgency caused by the unexpected resignation of Allain Joupé, the PCF leadership adopted the “euroconstructive” approach. This was an ambitious attempt to balance against its previous general and hard opposition to the trends of the European integration. For the next few years, in the running towards the 1999 European elections, the PCF continued to emphasize the key phrase “euroconstructive.” Right before the elections in 1997 and later on in 1998 and 1999, the PCF’s position towards the EU remained largely parallel to that of the PS. For example, in a speech to the Assemblé National in December 1997, Robert Hue remarked with regard to the recent reorientation of the Communist party towards the European integration in the following manner:

Ceux qui seraient « à l'affût » des différences au sein de la majorité seront déçus. Ce débat exigeant sur les choix européens de la France est normal et traverse toute la société. Le PCF l’aborde avec un esprit très largement « euroconstrutif »: Nous ne souhaitons pas l’échec de la construction européenne, nous voulons de toutes nos forces contribuer à la réussite de l’expérience engagée dans notre pays. Et c’est parce que nous sommes convaincus que dans le monde d’aujourd’hui, et tel que

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105 “We are determined that the European model affirms: political democracy, economic development, social solidarity, cultural diversity… (but) We say “no” to the liberal Europe, to the Europe of the money-ruling (money-king), and the submission to the financial markets.” (Translation the author).
nous voulons le changer, nous avons besoin de l’Europe.106 (L’Humanité 1997)

The PCF’s strategy to present itself coalitionable and responsible partner, including with regard to its European political position, paid off. In the aftermath of the 1997 elections, the Communist party entered Lionel Jospin’s coalitional government with two middle-ranking ministerial positions, and two state secretary ones, as well as other junior posts.107 Unlike Georges Marchais’s confrontational style during the previous coalitional government between the two formations in the early 1980s, Robert Hue abstained from voicing any major criticism against the socialist-led government, in tune with the PCF’s demonstration of coalitional loyalty. The only major dissent the Communists had had with the PS with regard to Europe, was the campaign they launched in late 1997 and well into 1998 to push for a referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty. They did not oppose the Treaty in general, but voiced specific criticisms with regard to the Euro. They also sought to link their opposition to the AMT with their domestic agenda with regard to thirty-nine hours’ pay for thirty-five workweek, halt the ongoing processes of privatization, and increase the wealth tax. Some of these demands made their way into the PS post-electoral political agenda. At the end of the day, the PCF failed to gather enough support and

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106 “Those who are “on the lookout” for differences within the majority will be disappointed/1 /2his needed debate over the choices for France with regard to European matters is normal and it encompasses the entire society...The PCF tackles [the debate over the European integration process] with a “euroconstructive” spirit/1 /2e do not want the failure of European integration; we want to contribute with all our strength to help for the success of this experience to be brought to our country/1 /2his is because we are convinced that in the contemporary world, the one we want to reform, we need Europe” (Translation the author).

107 Jean-Claude Gayssot became a Minister of Transportation; Marie-George Buffet became a Minister of the Youth and Sport;
carry out their ambition for a referendum, as the pragmatists prevailed over the maximalists.

It is notable that before the sudden and unexpected resignation of Allain Joupé in December of 1996, the PS as a party, and Lionel Jospin himself, were highly critical of the Amsterdam Treaty. With more than a year to go before his mandate to expire, Joupé took a tactical risk of resigning under what was largely considered social, not political wave of protests, led by the largest workers’ union, closely affiliated with the PCF. Neither the PCF, nor the PS, have ever asked for the resignation of Joupé’s cabinet. For his part, Joupé bet on the speculation that the Communists are too weak, and the Socialists too unreconstructed, to formulate a viable alternative and govern after him (see Moss 1998). As late as 1996, at the zenith of the mass protests against Joupé’s cabinet, prominent socialists, including Laurent Fabius and Martine Aubry came out attacking aspects of the EU, and in particular what they called “the failure of the EU social policy” (Michel 1998). But in the aftermath of the electoral results in May 1997, Jospin was forced to abandon his criticism, to continue with the French policy towards the AMT he inherited from Joupé, and to accept the status quo with regard to already negotiated clauses. Furthermore, by early 1997 it was already clear to everyone, including the PCF leadership and the left-wing Socialist faction, that there is very little chance for re-

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108 Fabius is a long-time leader of the rightwing of the PS, economist himself, and pragmatist/ the 1980s he served as Prime Minister, Minister of Finances, and President of the Assamble National.

109 Daughter of Jaques Delors, she is currently the First Secretary of the PS and mayor of Lille. Aubry is a centrist.

The PCF changed its position towards the EU and hardened its euroscepticism once again during the referendum of Constitution of the European Union, and continued this trend in its opposition to the Lisbon Treaty. The Communists were among the adamant “no” campaigners, often teaming up with “no” dissenters from the PS, such as Laurent Fabius and François Hollande, as well as with other leftwing eurosceptics, such as the Chevènement’s movement. When president Jacques Chirac announced on Bastille Day 2004 with regard to the Constitution project that “the French people are directly concerned and will be consulted directly” (Le Figaro 2004), the PCF and other eurosceptic parties were jubilant and invigorated. There was no constitutional requirement for the call of this referendum, and the decision for it rested entirely in the hands of the head of state. Since the Maastricht Treaty some twelve years before that, this was the first time the PCF had a chance to flex its muscles vis-à-vis the mainstream parties. All small and marginal parties, some of which splinters from mainstream ones after the TEU, knew they stand to capitalize on the growing disenchantment of the French citizens with the processes of globalization, the role of France in the new world order, and hence the place of the French-ness in all that as source of national and individual identity. For them, this was another opportunity to mobilize popular dissent not only with regard to the direction of development of the European Union. Even more
importantly, this was an opening for greater populism, when the small parties could give a chance for the ordinary French to square vis-à-vis the dominant political elites with regard to such domestic problems as corruption, social, cultural, and religious faulty lines within the society, unemployment, immigration, and many more.

Just as in 1992, the referendum on the Constitution was not an ordinary electoral cycle and the characteristics of the “yes” and “no” campaigns reflected that. In regular legislative elections, the issue of European integration is one, among many. Since 1990s on, it may be a salient one, nevertheless it is but one venue for political contestation. In the referendum, it is the issue on the table, albeit often behind it to hide other, utterly domestic, issues. This particularity of the referendum then made possible for factions within the mainstream parties to take eurosceptic positions, and for eurosceptic parties to harden their rhetoric. For that reason it would be wrong to read too much into the hard “no” the PCF advocated during the referendum. The strategic nature of this position is consistent with the overall analysis of the preferences of the party at the time, its position in the system, and its goals. The 2005 referendum is some two years away from the regular presidential and legislative elections; in power is a conservative government led by the very popular Nicolas Sarkozy and under the tutelage of a right president, Jacques Chirac. The mainstream kin-party, the PS, is currently in opposition and with no consistent and homogeneous position towards the EU. Number one and two leaders of the Socialists — François Hollande and Laurent Fabius — campaigned against the Constitution, actively
opposing the reformists around Martine Aubry and the former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. Finally, the referendum is taking place in a particular historical and political context of big bang European enlargement, with all the consequences this has with regard to labor immigration. By default, the first job seekers to arrive in the aftermath of the big bang enlargement to the East would be low skilled workers, who inadvertently pose a direct threat to the French workers — the main constituents of the Communist Party. Finally, and perhaps more importantly than any of the previous factors mentioned above, the PCF calculated that it has a real chance to win this time, and to be hailed as the leader of the “no” campaign beyond its immediate electoral base. This was a historical opportunity to sneak out of the PS shadow and establish itself once again as a leader on the far left. At the end all paid off, albeit the polls did not record any significant gain in terms of any visible electoral improvement of the PCF stand. This, however, has much more to do with the role of the fading core ideological raison d’être of the Communist party all across Europe, than with some alleged strategic missteps by the PCF. Arguably, without the successful strategic choices, PCF would have marginalized even further.110

Emboldened from its success, the PCF followed the same strategy with regard to the Lisbon Treaty, hoping to increase its performance at the polls. Without a popular referendum, however, the only meaningful way of opposition was to vote

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110 Tracing the electoral performance of the Communist party over a period of thirty years, it is easy to establish its decline as a steady trend than as a fluctuating performance. In 1946 PCF took some 28.2% of the vote, in 1968 its electoral share shrank to 20.0%, in 1988 it was 11.3%, in 1997 it was 9.9%, and in 2007 it was the all time lowest 4.3% (Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur de France).
against the ratification in the *Assemblée Nationale*. The parliamentarian group of *Gauche Démocrate et Républicaine* (GDR), which the PCF formed with the Greens and other far-left groups, unanimously voted against the Lisbon Treaty on February 7, 2008 (Assemblée Nationale 2008). In the vote they were joined by 25 socialists, while a group of another 17, among which the leader of the Socialist dissenters, Laurent Fabius, did not participate in the vote (Le Figaro 2008).

In short, since early 1980s, the PCF continuously has been changing its position towards the processes of European integration, making it contingent upon whether it held an image of itself as being coalitionable or not, and at the end whether this strategy was paying off or not. In the run up of the 1981 elections, it abandoned its ideologically loaded anti-European Community rhetoric in attempt to build up an image of reliable and coalitionable partner. Between 1984 and 1995 the PCF’s leadership harbored no illusions regarding its chances to ascend to power as a coalitional partner of its kin-mainstream party, the Socialist party, and instead strategically placed its bet on hard euroscepticism. In the 1992-3 period of hot debate of the Maastricht Treaty, it sought to capitalize from its hard euroscepticism and to undermine the stand alone Socialist government. In the middle of 1990s, it sought to tune-up its European policy once again in accordance with that of the Socialists, and by 1997 all but abandoned its earlier euroscepticism and professed its support for the EU, although mixed with some qualified, specific criticism of various aspects of the European integration. This policy was once again abandoned, when the Socialists...
lost power to the center-right UMP. The PCF’s euroscepticism hardened in the run-up of the referendum on the European Constitution, and later on during the debates for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which was *de facto* the rejected Constitutional project. In both campaigns the PCF sought to spearhead a position, which it believed was largely popular, and in a political context which had no immediate potential for coalitionability and ascendance to power.

The PCF’s strategic behavior towards the European integration, in that sense, epitomizes the rational and pragmatic approach political parties adopt towards the issue of Europe, and is by far the best example, not only in the French political system, but in the context of the Western European politics, of how carefully veiled in ideological coating rationality trumps inflexible ideological positions. Its success also illustrates how small marginal political parties can enjoy the luxury of flexing the image and identity they project to the electorates, depending on different political context. This fluidity of principled positions is much less apt for the mainstream parties, over which the *Shadow of the Future* hangs as the Sword of Damocles until the day they ascend to power.

The PCF is, of course, not the only small party adopting this flexible approach to European integration. The eurosceptic Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s *Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen* capitalized well by adopting the same strategy. When in 1991 he broke ranks with the Socialist party, he established his Movement as hard eurosceptic
one, firmly opposing the Maastricht Treaty’s provisions as anti-national and campaigned for an alternative course of the integration process under the banner “Pour une autre Europe.” In his opposition to the TEU, Chevènement intertwined also opposition to US hegemony, anti-federalism, anti-globalization, pro-“third-worldist,” pro-multipolar world and pro-intergovernmentalism positions (see Milner 2004). Many of these positions then changed and by the 1997 legislative elections, the MDC had largely abandoned its hard euroscepticism, especially with regard to the TEU provisions. His was, de facto, an almost 180-degree turnaround from the initial reason for the creation of the party in 1991. The mainstream explanation for its change of direction usually underscores Chevènement’s consideration of the externalities from greater European integration, including the possibility of implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as an effective tool of opposition to US hegemony (ibid., see also Milner 2000, Knapp and Wright 2006). While this argument is largely consistent with the official statements by MDC/MRC leadership (MRC official website), it fails to explain why Chevènement and the others leaders failed to grasp these potentials of the TEU at the time of the referendum in 1992. Nothing has changed with regard to the foundations for common European action, as the CFSP was envisioned in and established by the TEU back in 1992, and not in 1997, yet the MDC position turned around.

111 For an alternative Europe.
What changed, of course, was the political conjuncture. In the run-up to the spring elections in 1997, most of the political analysts estimated that the Socialist party is not prepared to win the elections alone, and to govern. The potential for coalition building increased enormously. The PCF was first to respond, as it became clear from the above elaborations. The MDC saw the same opportunity and was quick to jump on the bandwagon. The party strategically changed some of the accents in its manifesto and the slogans it raised. Emphasized the republican nature of the French state, and focused further on the need of effective common European opposition to the US foreign policy dominance, and the desire to join projects, which enhance the French prestige while pooling the cost without jeopardizing the national sovereignty (Milner 2004). As a result, it adopted new slogans such as “L’Europe-puissance”\textsuperscript{112} and “L’Europe des projets.”\textsuperscript{113} From opposing the CFSP, among the other provisions in the TEU in 1992, Chevènement and his Movement embraced it and focused instead their opposition to specifics in the post-Maastricht integration – a much more specific and qualified opposition to EU. The coalitionability image paid off. In 1997 Chevènement himself became Minister of Interior in Lionel Jospin’s new government, and his party was officially recognized as part of the governing majority in the \textit{Assemblée Nationale}.

\textsuperscript{112} The European power.
\textsuperscript{113} Europe of the projects.
Predictably, the MDC followed the path of the PCF with regard to its campaigning and post-election behavior in 2002 and 2007. The party failed to pass the threshold in the 2002 elections and remained without parliamentarian representation. In 2003 it restructured itself, changed its name to Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen (MRC), and in 2007 managed to elect one MP and one Senator. Both voted against the ratification of Lisbon Treaty in the Assemblée Nationale and the Senat, respectively.

**Conclusion**

The evidence in this chapter establishes the strategic nature of euroscepticism adopted by the marginal parties. It illustrates in clear and irrefutable manner how the notion of coalitionability small political parties’ elites hold determines their strategic behavior vis-à-vis the issue of Europe. It also illustrates how self-image, presence or absence of kin-mainstream party in power, and type of electoral system, impact the strategic decision making of the elites. The inter-party dynamics between mainstream political parties and marginal parties is conditioned further by the presence of populist, extreme parties in the absolute margins. The model offered in this chapter is dynamic and strives to capture the complexity of this interplay. It also demonstrates the superiority in application of the notion of coalitionability in the context of strategic electoral competition for small marginal parties over the notion
of *Shadow of the Future*, which is the dominant strategy for the mainstream political parties.

The *coalitionability* model is not universal. There are certain conditions under which it becomes operational, and is largely valid for small political associations. It offers, however, a parsimonious and powerful explanation for the fluctuation of attitudes towards the processes of European integration by eurosceptic parties, which do not hang on the ideological fringes of the political system.
Conclusion

It is not easy to reconcile with the apparent differences between the dry and mundane nature of what seems like incessant bureaucratic procedures, regulations, and declarations, summoned in treaties and enshrined in a quasi-sacrosanct collection called *acquis communitaire* on the one hand, and the complex and farfetched elaborations many scholars tend to make with regard to the motivations and goals behind these procedures of the main protagonists of the process of integration on the other hand. In fact, a simple rule governs these dynamics. When there is impetus in one direction of policy making, and when this push produces winners and losers, there is always a tendency for a reaction in the other direction by forces, which stand to gain from opposing that policy. The so called *permissive consensus*, which arguably prevented the oppositional push against deepening European integration from materializing a long time, must be regarded in that sense as a rather anomalous event in domestic and international political discourse. Albeit the current work refers to the “death of the permissive consensus” in fact there are good reasons to question its validity altogether. Was there ever a widely established collusion between European political elites with regard to some grand vision of an “ever closer Europe?” What should we make of the “empty chair” crisis and the apparent intergovernmentalist
approach De Gaulle had for the European Community? Or, for that matter, what to do about the overall anti-European position of the two British mainstream parties, albeit in different periods? Did these not precede the discussion of party-based euroscepticism and what is their relationship with the latter?

Future research has much to question and revise with regard to “traditional” theories of European politics, regarding integration and opposition to it. For starters, I see a potential for challenge to the mainstream view of studying European politics as a continuum, from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, there are many moments in between these two seminal points of reference for integration, which demarcate distinct periods, each marking a very different phase, and being marked by very different policy-making dynamics. Such a dissemination of what the literature body has considered parts of the greater whole must be better reflected in theoretical works. The two general approaches to analyzing political philosophy, the holistic and particularistic, find their representation here in the study of European Union politics. The two tendencies can be observed in the way prominent scholars have analyzed many important historical events. Going back to the great Thucydides, one can argue that among his important contributions to the fields of history and political philosophy is not only the structural realist approach he took in analyzing the Peloponnesian Wars. There is no doubt that his approach has greatly influenced the pioneers of contemporary political philosophy, starting with Nicollo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. His other great contribution, however, is in the way he treated the
Peloponnesian Wars as a continuation of the same process, even though the events hardly seemed to share similar characteristics. One can argue that traditional contemporary historical and political studies follow his approach also with regard to studying such topics, as classical nineteenth century Balance of Power in European history, or studies of the Cold War. Contemporary scholarship tends to treat these long and diverse historical periods, marked by different political, economic, social, and cultural developments as marked by commonly shared characteristics, albeit evolving into one single entity.

One can argue with regard to the historic evolution of European Union politics that a similar approach has been implicitly applied and has dominated the field for the past fifty years. In the context of European Union political studies this apparent homogeneity is dictated by the even more ostensible fact that the object of research is the adaption of a specific regional organization, and its transformation from traditional agent of intergovernmental global governance, into a *sui generis* institutional arrangement of a new kind. If I put on the hat of a futurist, perhaps it would be not too farfetched to claim that the evolution of the very type of supranational regional governance among still sovereign member states – at least in perception – shows the gradual emergence of a new form of global governance regime in the context of a slowly dying monopoly of the nation-state. To borrow Robert Keohane’s concept, the European Union seem to embody the best the principles of “complex interdependence.”
This is the place, however cautiously, to suggest a revised approach to the way European politics are researched and theorized. Where scholars saw shared common characteristics in the case of classical Balance of Power, or the Cold War, in periods of very diverse and different developments, one should recognize the misleading homogeneity of such characteristics in European politics. They are misleading, because such homeopathic approach forces researchers to examine the continuity of politics just because they relate to the evolution of the same “unidentified political object” as Jacques Delors has called the European Union. This continuity is imposed by the mere fact of researching the political dynamics of this quasi-international organization. But this is the greatest fallacy of the approach. Studying the politics of European integration as a coherent and homogenous continuum from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon fails to account for the incompatibilities of the different stages of development. A more nuanced approach necessarily will have to leave this domain of overarching, holistic perception of European politics, and recognize the apparent stark differences between the periods in it. The politics of European integration are not coherent and historically homogeneous.

What meets the eye is elusive; the history of European politics seems to share a superficial coherence of observed, analyzed and theorized characteristics, because they all relate to the evolution of the European Union. But in reality this holistic approach is confusing and misleading. If we return to the “empty chair” crisis, a careful analysis will demonstrate that De Gaulle’s position was not anti-European.
But by no means was it pro-European either. One reason for that is the missing context for pro- and anti-European at that time. The politics of the European Community were part of international political dynamics, very much the same as the international political dynamics at UN level since 1945 on, albeit bearing the imprint of their own idiosyncrasies. Starting with the direct elections for European Parliament in 1979, everything changed. The politicization of European integration was not only initiated, but greatly accelerated by the SEA and Maastricht Treaties. In short, comparing the politics before mid-1970s and mid-2000s is to compare two very different dynamics.

To return to my previous point, what we tend to call today the permissive consensus may not have had, in fact, much meaning to begin within the context of the political discourse of the 1960s and some of the 1970s. De Gaulle’s forceful politics during the 1960s, with the “empty chair” crisis as its epitome, could almost seem to be an example of “early euroscepticism in action.” But this conclusion would be misleading. Euroscepticism becomes meaningful only in the context of the dynamic of an unprecedented deepening of European integration, which was first enacted by the SEA in mid 1980s. This is the time when the focus switched from intergovernmental politics to interparty politics. Only in this context does it make sense to talk about a permissive consensus as some type of political strategy, characteristic of the central governing elites’ attempts to address the issues linked to
the evolution of the European integration and at the same time as their strategy to consolidate their own policy-making and redistributive powers.

Understanding why and under what conditions political parties’ elites embrace eurosceptic positions, as well as what determines their type and scope of such opposition, elicits a number of aspects of the growing complexity and variety of domestic political contestation. The current study of euroscepticism relates not only to the general ideology / structure / strategy debate with regard to political party behavior. It also strives to contribute to the growing body of research on Europeanization and identity formation. Researching and comparing models of party politics and strategies with regard to euroscepticism could potentially reveal associations and systemic characteristics that could define — positively or negatively — the susceptibility of party systems to transform under pressure from the outside. The implications from such dependency and susceptibility would be significant with regard to the potential effects supranational entities could have on the institutional design and the internal political dynamics of current and potential member countries. Indeed, such implications potentially transcend the level of European micro-theories and would contribute to cross-disciplinary studies of democratization, identity formation, and European nationalism.

The current research project has touched upon these potentially understudied trends in the transition and transcendence of political issues from global to domestic
Conclusion

politics. The growing path-dependency can be further researched with regard to the changing normative framework of domestic and international politics in democratic societies. Almost three decades ago European politics were deemed “second order” in regards to domestic politics (Reif & Schmitt 1980). If the findings from the current research are correct, we may be witnessing, in some cases, an actual preference shift from second to first order. While this may not be a sustainable trend in the short term, it is evident that European politics are gradually occupying a growing share of the overall political discourse in individual member-states. Debates over European politics are steadily becoming part of the regular portfolio of every political actor, major or marginal. This trend cannot be dismissed easily. It signifies growing an interconnectedness and demarcation blurring between national and European politics. The one and the other become parts of the whole.

More than 200 years ago the forefathers of American democracy did not foresee the normative changes in the institutional arrangements they proposed would have over the way democratic principles dictate the norms and soft law today. Slave owners themselves, they could not possibly have imagined the consequential importance of the inevitable correlation between democracy, freedoms, human rights, enfranchisement of all segments of the society regardless of race, gender, religion, etc. Arguably, the far reaching changes in the political, social, economic, and cultural domains of European societies stemming from the unprecedented deepening of European integration today are equally loaded with the potential for changes
unforeseen today. Perhaps, however, they will be revealed to generations of future scholars and policy-makers. It is necessary to recognize, that none of these changes is possible without the corrective of the dialectical forces of opposition to Europe. The function they serve is very different than that of the strategic, somewhat narrower political motivation of the actual political entrepreneurs. Even if these functions are not recognized by the eurosceptics themselves today, they are part of the macro-system of the European policy, without which a political balance would not be possible.

One has to acknowledge that euroscepticism as a strategy does not pertain exclusively to the marginal political entrepreneurs. The governing political elites stand to win from employing moderate, “healthy” eurosceptical positions in their strategic political discourse, too. Following Putnam’s ‘two level games’ model (1988), governing parties and coalitions have the perfect excuse vis-à-vis their constituents when adopting unpopular policies. They can blame the European Union for the imposition of the decisions. By such recognition, they not only could shift responsibility over to the ‘distant’ European Commission (usually), or over the “incoherent” European Council (less often), but also, arguably, they could deprive their political opponents of political criticism by preempting it. In addition, they also would have greater political leverage vis-à-vis their counterparts on EU level negotiations, pointing finger at potentially growing domestic opposition against ‘unpopular’ measures, which in reality may or may not be the case.
This is not just a hypothetical speculation. The Irish government’s actions during the Nice Treaty negotiations, and the events leading to the referendum, are exemplify the actual exploitation of these strategies, as discussed in chapter four. The Irish government walked a thin line between the growing pressure for concessions from its European counterparts, excusing itself with the looming opposition to European integration inside the country. While, at the same time it allowed and tacitly facilitated the proliferation of this same opposition inside Ireland. The pressure from Europe became a convenient excuse in front of its domestic constituents for taking some unpopular decisions, at the same time rejecting any responsibility for them. Similarly, at least for the past five years, different French governments kept hiding behind sacrosanct “vital national interests,” which tackling could produce a tidal effect of euroscepticism, in an attempt to oppose the pressure from the European Commission to stop with the practice of state protectionism. At the same time, whenever the French government had to take steps that were unpopular, it kept excusing itself by claiming pressure from the European Union. Thus, in 2005 the then-French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin declared the French yogurt maker Danone a “national treasure,” which must be protected against foreign takeover. Furthermore, a couple years later, a government orchestrated merger between the French energy firms Suez and Gaz de France prevented the Italian owned Enel from taking over Suez, while in a similar move the governing party in Spain pushed legislation through the Spanish Congress and Senate to ban the
takeover of the Spanish energy company Endesa by the German E.ON. In each and every one of these cases, the usual excuse governments used to their European partners was the specter of euroscepticism and the growing opposition to Europe among the French and Spanish citizens, if indeed this poorly disguised protectionism were to be removed. At the same time, it was the European Union that became the scapegoat, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the center-right government of François Fillon scrapped the highly popular 35-hour work week – a lasting legacy of the French Socialist government of Lionel Jospin. In this case, the government diffused popular criticism and widespread anger by excusing the decision with unprecedented pressure the governing elite faced from Europe and the dynamics of the growing globalization, which necessitated the reforms. It must be no mystery then why a growing number of citizens in the member-states, in this case Ireland and France, increasingly became disillusioned with the politics of the European Union and in response formed eurosceptic attitudes. It is also understandable the desire of many in that context to see implementation of greater accountability and transparency about the deliberations and decision-making on European level.

One last area for future research, which becomes clear in the current work, is the role of the individual leaders. Political leaders are not simply captains of ships, shouting commands to the crew. They are political intrigants, whose mastery of maintaining control of their own “ship” depends on the vision they convey in the “commands” they shout to the crew. Jörg Haider made a strategic mistake by
directing the FPÖ towards wild populism based on elevated anti-European rhetoric preceding the 1999 elections. This tactical mistake came back to haunt him, costing him consequently his place in the Austrian government, his leadership of the party, his place in the parliament, and finally his cozy place as a regional governor. An alternative development, the Danish Peoples’ Party made a remarkable turnaround from a populist eurosceptic party, to a responsible member of the Danish government. This would not have been possible without the pragmatic and charismatic leadership of the party’s chair, Pia Kjaersgaard, who is also the most recognizable face of the party, and whose visionary ideas are behind the party’s ascendance to power and prominence.

At the end of the current work I would like to return to the problem, which haunts not only this research, but generally speaking, the entire body of theoretical scholarship on euroscepticism – the issue of definition. It is clear that without proper definition no phenomenon in the social sciences, and arguably in any science, can be properly studied. Euroscepticism does not lend itself easily to theoretical conceptualization. Is it a symptom, or is it a strategy? Is it a new social cleavage, or is it a new dimension of an old one? Is it cued from the political elites, or is it reflected popular attitude? Any serious consideration of these antagonistic notions pertaining to euroscepticism require a proper definition, and in each and every case the definitions will be at least as antagonistic as the underlying notions. The current scholarship strives to arrive to acceptable, that is almost universal, definition of
euroscepticism, regardless of the dialectical differences outlined above. This is, in my opinion, a “mission impossible.” Definitions of abstract concepts in the social sciences serve more than a role of logical entities. The concept they define necessarily must predate the definition itself. A problem arises, however, when the process of conceptualizing the logical notion, as it is in the specific case of euroscepticism, evolves around fluid dynamics, and not around stable set of characteristics of this logical entity. This is to be found, arguably, in the biggest criticism to Flood’s (2004) spectral definition of euroscepticism.

On the other hand, path breaking euroscepticism researchers, such as Taggart and Szczerbiak, and Kopecky and Mudde offer definitions, which are inevitably broad and inclusive of wide variety of incompatible notions. As a starter, the “hard” or “soft” types of euroscepticism by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000), suffer from number of explicit and implicit contradictions, as Kopecky and Mudde point correctly (2002). The latter’s definition, however, is no less problematic. They all exhibit the symptoms of wide categorization, which inevitably blur the nuances. Is a criticism of a specific policy of the European Union a form of “soft” euroscepticism, or a “specific” euroscepticism? A criticism can be simultaneously “hard” and “specific,” but it can also be “soft” and “diffuse.” Hence, the two approaches are not incompatible with each other. However, in the light of this theoretical discussion one has to ask also whether a case of “soft” and “specific” criticism is indeed a case of euroscepticism in a first place. Arguing otherwise means that one should speak of
European integration either good or nothing, or one runs the risk of being branded a eurosceptic.

In a seminal discussion of the theoretical problems associated with definitions in comparative politics Sartori (1970: 1041) comments, “[t]he rules for climbing and descending along a ladder of abstraction are thus very simple rules. . . .We make a concept more abstract and more general by lessening its properties or attributes . . .” Therefore, a definition on which a wide consensus is achievable is by default too broad and vague, located at the upper levels of the ladder. In the case of euroscepticism, the higher we climb on the ladder of definition, the more incompatible notions will remain under. The cost of achieving consensus on a definition, by climbing too high, will be then to produce a definition that is too general and vague. This in turn will eliminate the very raison d’être and function of the definition in a first place. However, the more we climb down the ladder, hence the more specific we and nuanced we become, the less we will be able to reach a consensus.

In the light of this musing on the eternal problem with definitions in the social sciences, one is left with an even grimmer alternative. A frequently evoked controversial quote attributed to the late Supreme Justice, the honorable Potter Stewart sums this alternative view. In discussing pornography, he once explained the hard core version of this entertainment genre, or more precisely the difficulty of
defining the word “obscene” in logical terms, by saying, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced… [b]ut I know it when I see it” (1964). In such a view, it is tempting to leave hard defining issues, such as euroscepticism, in the “eye of the beholder.” No doubt, this is perhaps the best way to deal with the multifarious opposition to Europe, in all its forms and types. From policy-making point of view, such an approach has its strategic advantages. By concluding that euroscepticism is just a black box, stuffed with content at will – ideology, strategy, identity – may be extremely desirable by the political entrepreneurs, which are the primary and most frequent subscribers to euroscepticism. From a scholarly point of view, however, such an approach is unsatisfactory to say the least. Hence, a bad definition becomes much better than no definition at all. The nature of this general, theoretical, and insatiable debate points to one conclusion, which is paradoxically much less controversial than all the substance with regard to euroscepticism – the mere notion of opposition to the politics of integration of European Union is socially constructed. It requires dynamic scholarly approach to deconstruct it and to decouple it from its inevitable association with the policy itself. otherwise, the discussion runs the risk of becoming part of the political discourse itself.

114 The statement was made during the discussion of *Jacobellis vs. *Huston on April 29, 1963. The frequency with which this quote has been used has caused many controversies. Just recently, the special envoy of the President Obama to Afghanistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke commented on ways of measurement of success and progress of US involvement in Afghanistan, responded “In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue: We’ll know it when we see it,” in *Foreign Policy* “Holbrooke on Success: We’ll know it when we see it,” Afpak channel, August 12, 2009, accessed online on December 11, 2009.
## Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PARTY NAME</th>
<th>L/R</th>
<th>Sov/Int'lism</th>
<th>EU / ESK</th>
<th>Market Econ</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>AUSTRIA</strong></td>
<td>AUT: KPÖ Communist Party</td>
<td>-40.43</td>
<td>-10.34</td>
<td>-45.45</td>
<td>-100.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUT: SPO Socialists</td>
<td>-18.43</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td>44.60</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AUT: GA Greens</td>
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<td>-31.82</td>
<td>-30.16</td>
<td>38.71</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUT: OVP Christian Democrats (People's Party)</td>
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<td>14.29</td>
<td>59.49</td>
<td>79.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUT: FPÖ Freedom Movement</td>
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<td>56.99</td>
<td>-34.15</td>
<td>73.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>58.14</td>
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<td>93.29</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEL: PS Francophone Socialists</td>
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<td>95.37</td>
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Appendix B

European Integration vs. Left / Right Ideology
Appendix B

European Integration vs. Market Economy

Series 1
Appendix B

**Sweden**

- **Left/Right**
- **Sovereignty**
- **EU Integration**
- **Market Economy**
## Appendix C

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### Appendix C

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<td>Hand</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
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<td>IRE: Socialist Party</td>
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<td>ITA: DP Proletarian Democracy</td>
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<td>see PRC</td>
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Note: Soft, Hard, and Marginal refer to the extent of support for each party, with values indicating the percentage of voters. The table includes examples of political parties from various countries, such as Greece, Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Italy.
### Appendix C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Left/Right</th>
<th>went (%)</th>
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<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Seats (%)</th>
<th>Continental (%)</th>
<th>CEE (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>LUX: PCL, KPL, Communists</td>
<td>Hand</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1.23%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LUX: Gille Gap Green Alternatives</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Mid-range</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>LUX: ADR, Pension Justice</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Mid-range</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>0.94%</td>
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<td>LUX: The Left</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
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<td>no</td>
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<td>Marginal</td>
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<td>Hand</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>NET:</strong> CU, Reformed Political Federation*</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
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<td>see CU</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>POR:</strong> BE, Left Bloc</td>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
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<td>2.80%</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>POR:</strong> UDP, Popular Democratic Union</td>
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<td><strong>POR:</strong> ID, Democratic Intervention</td>
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<td>4.58%</td>
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<td><strong>SWE:</strong> (S), Social Democrats</td>
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<td>131</td>
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<td><strong>SWE:</strong> (C), Centre Party</td>
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<td>22</td>
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*Source: CEVIPOF.

1. Federal elections results only for Chamber of Representatives.
2. The Danish Communist Party is now part of the Red-Green Unity List and gained representation in the Danish Parliament in 2004 as such.
3. The Progress Party did not participate in the 2005 and 2007 parliamentary elections, but only in 2005 the local and regional elections.
4. The June Movement and People's Movement Against the EU do not consider themselves political parties per se. They do not participate in either local elections or general (Folketing) elections, but only in elections for European Parliament and referendums on the EU.
5. All election results are from the 2nd round.
6. The results for all these parties.
7. The party was just created in February 2009 and the only data available will be from this year's elections.
8. This is a single issue movement created in 2006 by various members of the House of Commons, mainly from the Conservative, UKIP, and DUP parties, but with the participation of some Labor MPs as well.
## Appendix D

### EC/ EU Commission 1985 - 2009

**Barroso European Commission**

**2004-2009**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Portfolio</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Political Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Affiliated Party in Power at time of appointment</th>
<th>Mainstream/Marginal</th>
<th>Last National Position prior to becoming Commissioner</th>
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<td>Jose Manuel Barroso</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party SDP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Margot Wallstrom</td>
<td>Vice President / Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Minister of Social Affairs</td>
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<td>Gunter Verheugen</td>
<td>Vice President / Enterprise and Industry</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>German Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Dept. of Foreign Affairs Minister of State</td>
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<td>Jacques Barrot</td>
<td>Vice President / Justice, Freedom and Security</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Minister of Labor and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>Siim Kallas</td>
<td>Vice President / Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Estonian Reform Party</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Antonio Tajani</td>
<td>Vice President / Transport</td>
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<td>Forza Italia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>MEP since 1994</td>
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<td>Franco Frattini (2004-2008)</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>People of Freedom</td>
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<td>Foreign Minister</td>
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<td>Viviane Rading</td>
<td>Information and Media</td>
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<td>MEP since 1989</td>
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<td>Party</td>
<td>Position</td>
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<td>Stavros Dimas</td>
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<td>Dalla Grybausjaite</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Algirdas Šemeta</td>
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<td>Janez Potocnik</td>
<td>Financial Programming and Budget</td>
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<td>Olli Rehn</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Louis Michel</td>
<td>Taxation and Customs Union</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>VVD Liberals</td>
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<td>Mariann Fischer Boel</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Denmark</td>
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Minister of Industry, Energy and Technology and Secretary-General of Nea Democratia
Minister of Public Administration
Minister for European Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance
Minister of European Affairs State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs MEP since 1995
Foreign Minister
Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>Benita Ferrero-Waldner</td>
<td>External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>Austrian People's Party OVP</td>
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<td>Charlie McCreevy</td>
<td>Internal Market and Services Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Fianna Fail</td>
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<td>Vladimir Spidla</td>
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<td>Czech Social Democrat Party</td>
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<td>Andris Piebalgs</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Latvian Way</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Finance Minister and Ambassador to the EU</td>
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<td>Miglena Kuneva</td>
<td>Consumer Protection</td>
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<td>NDSV</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Minister of European Affairs Chief Negotiator with EU and Secretary of State of the Ministry of European Integration</td>
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<td>Leonard Orban</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Androulla Vassiliou</td>
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<td>Catherine Ashton</td>
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Previous position is the highest position held

In power - mark the last election
### Prodi European Commission

#### 1999-2004

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<th>Last National Position prior to becoming Commissioner</th>
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<td>Romano Prodi</td>
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<td>Neil Kinnock</td>
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<td>Labor</td>
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<td>Leader of Opposition, House of Lords</td>
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<td>Olli Rehn</td>
<td>Entreprise and Information Society</td>
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<td>Attorney General</td>
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<td>Michael Schreyer</td>
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<td>Anna Diamantopoulou</td>
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<td>Christian Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>Markos Kyprianou</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Pavel Telicka</td>
<td>Health and Consumer Protection</td>
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### Appendix D

#### Santer European Commission

**1995-1999**

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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Mainstream/Marginal</th>
<th>Last National Position prior to becoming Commissioner</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jacques Santer</td>
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<td>Christian Social People's Party / CSV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Leon Brittan</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
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<td>Home Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manuel Marin</td>
<td>Vice-President, External Relations Internal Market, Services, Customs and Taxation</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Chief Negotiator with EC</td>
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<td>Mario Monti</td>
<td>Services, Customs and Taxation</td>
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<td>Franz Fischler</td>
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<td>Socialist Party (Francophone)</td>
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<td>Fianna Fail</td>
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<td>Government Delegation to UN Minister of Education, Social Affairs</td>
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<td>Ritt Bjerregaard</td>
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<td>Social Democrats</td>
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<td>Martin Bangemann</td>
<td>Industrial Affairs, Information and Telecommunications Technologies</td>
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<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Labor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Leader of Opposition, House of Lords</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christos Papoutsis</td>
<td>Energy, Euratom Supply Agency, Tourism</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>PASOK</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anita Grdin</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Minister Foreign Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Erkki Liikanen</td>
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<td>Edith Cresson</td>
<td>Research, Science and Technology Relations with CEE, CFSP, External Service Relations with African, Caribbean, Pacific Countries Relations with the EP, Culture, Audiovisual Policy</td>
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<td>Hans van den Broek</td>
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<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Joao de Deus Pinheiro</td>
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## Delors I & II European Commission (combined)
### 1985-1994

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<td>President</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
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<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Economics, Finance and Budget Minister</td>
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<td>Frans Andriessen</td>
<td>Vice-President, Agriculture and Fisheries</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Appeal</td>
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<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henning Christophersen</td>
<td>Vice-President, Budget, Financial Control, Personnel, Administration</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
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<td>Lord Cockfield</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
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<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Trade</td>
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<td>PSOE</td>
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<td>Karl-Heinz Narjes</td>
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<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
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<td>Chef de Cabinet of the President of EC</td>
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<td>Lorenzo Natali</td>
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<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Minister of Tourism, Agriculture, Marine, Public Works</td>
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<td>Claude Cheysson</td>
<td>Mediterranean Policy and North-South Relations</td>
<td>France</td>
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### Appendix D

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<td>Willy De Clercq</td>
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<td>Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance</td>
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<td>Labour</td>
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<td>Antonio Cardoso e Cunha</td>
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<td>Abel Matutes</td>
<td>Credit, Investments, Financial Instruments and Small &amp; Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>Nicolas Mosar</td>
<td>Energy and Euratom</td>
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<td>Christian Social People's Party / CSV</td>
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<td>Christian Democrats / Christian Social Union of Bavaria</td>
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<td>Carlo Ripa di Meana</td>
<td>Institutional Reforms, Information Policy, Culture and Tourism</td>
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<td>Grigoris Varfis</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>PASOC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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<td>Filippo Maria Pandolfi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Christian Democrats</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Jean Dondelinger</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Independent</td>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ray MacSharry</td>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Fianna Fail</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Minister of Finance, Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
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<td>Bruce Millan</td>
<td>Regional Policy</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Scotland</td>
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<td>Vasso Papandreou</td>
<td>Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>PASOC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Minister of Environment</td>
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<td>Christiane Scrivener</td>
<td>Taxation and Customs Union</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>MEP</td>
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<td>Antonio Ruberti</td>
<td>Vice-President, Science, Research, Technological Development and Education</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italian Socialist Party</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Minister for the Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research</td>
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<td>Marcelino Oreja</td>
<td>Environment and Fisheries</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>People's Party</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Secretary General of the Council of Europe, MEP</td>
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<td>Ioannis Paleokrassas</td>
<td>Institutional Reform, Internal Market and Entreprise</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>New Democracy</td>
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<td>Minister of Finance, Secretary of State, Director General of Political Affairs of the Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti</td>
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<td>Rene Steichen</td>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
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<td>Christian Social People's Party / CSV</td>
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<td>Raniero Vanni d'Archirafi</td>
<td>Institutional Reform, Internal Market and Entreprise</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italian Socialist Party</td>
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<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>Director General of Political Affairs of the Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti</td>
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Bibliography

Vita

VITA

May 30, 1973 Born, Sofia, Bulgaria

EDUCATION

2009 Ph.D. Political Science – Northeastern University, Boston, MA
2003 M.P.P. Public Policy and International Security – University of Chicago, Chicago, IL
1998 M.A. Humanitarian and Slav Studies – University of Sofia, Sofia, Bulgaria
1997 B.A. Humanitarian and Slav Studies – University of Sofia, Sofia, Bulgaria

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

2005 – present SGA Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Northeastern University
2006 – present Senior Graduate Lecturer, College of Professional Studies, Northeastern University
2009 – present Lecturer (part time), Department of Political Science, UMASS Dartmouth

Graduate

GST6300 Terrorism and Global Security – a seminar
GST6320 Peace and Conflict – a seminar
GST6540 Politics of the European Union – a seminar

Undergraduate

POL U580 Religion and Terrorism
POL U515 Democracy and Democratization in Comparative Perspective
POL U160 Introduction to International Relations
POL 4361 Religion and Global Terrorism
IAF U100 Introduction to International Affairs,
IAF U101 Globalization and International Affairs,
POL 4331 Theory of International Relations
POL 4332 International Organizations
PSC 366 Islam and Politics: Al Qaeda and Jihadi Terrorism in the Middle East, UMASSD

2004 – 2005 Occasional Lecturer (substitute), Department of Political Science, Northeastern University
2003 – 2004 Teaching Assistant (part time), Department of Political Science, Northeastern University
2002 – 2003 Teaching Assistant (part time), Department of Humanities, University of Chicago
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2004 – 2007  Research Fellow, *Center for the Study of Democracy*, Northeastern University


2002 – 2003  Researcher (internship), *GC Center at Chicago Council on Foreign Relations*


HONORS

2003  Graduated with honors

1998  Graduated with Magna Cum Laude

AWARDS

2006-2009  Senior Graduate Assistant Fellowship, GSAS Northeastern University

2005  Best Graduate Student Paper Award 2004, NPSA, PSA, and Lanahan Publishers, Inc. (Nov. 11-13), MA

2003 – 2005  Graduate Student Fellowship, GSAS, Northeastern University

2001 and 2002  Harris Fellowship, Irving Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago

CONFERENCE PAPERS & PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

2008  Chair: *European Political Conflict and Violence*, Northeastern Political Science Association and International Studies Association, Boston, MA November 12-15

2008  Discussant: *European Union*, APSA, Boston MA November 12-15

2006  Presenter: “Bulgaria and Romania: Failed Students or a Failed Mentor?” Northeastern Political Science Association & International Studies Association, Boston, MA November 9-11

2006  Chair: *The EU and the Democratization in Southeastern Europe*, Northeastern Political Science Association & International Studies Association, Boston, MA November 9-11

2005  Presenter: “Democratization of the EU After the Enlargement: Necessary, Inevitable, or Impossible?” Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI March 1-5

2005  Discussant: *The Political Roots of Terrorism*, Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana January 5-8
2004 **Presenter:** “Terrorism, Elections and Democracy Under Pressure,” Northeastern Political Science Association & International Studies Association, Boston, MA Nov 11-13

2004 **Presenter:** “Institutional Design and Perspectives for EU Membership: The Bulgarian Judicial System and the EU Enlargement,” New England Political Science Association, Portsmouth, NH May 4-5

2004 **Discussant:** Political Terrorism in the Contemporary World, New England Political Science Association, Portsmouth, NH, April 30

“Ancient Myths and Contemporary Reality in the Greek National Identity”