A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY ON PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN POLICE

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by

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Levels of public confidence in police vary greatly internationally, yet little is known about the causes of this variation. At the same time, studies demonstrate that public confidence in the police is a requirement for police effectiveness. It is therefore critical to develop a better understanding of the factors that influence public perceptions of the police. In this dissertation, I investigate public confidence in the police and seek to identify country-level factors which contribute to its variation cross-nationally. I approach this study from Rawls’ conception of political legitimacy. I hypothesize that level and stability of democracy in government increase confidence in the police, while government corruption lowers this confidence. I further hypothesize that these effects are particularly exaggerated among ethnic minority groups. To test these hypotheses, I conduct a cross-national, multi-level study on the impact of individual and country-level factors on public confidence in the police. This study includes more countries, more recent data, and a larger range of country-level explanatory variables than any existing cross-national research on confidence in the police. In order to take a deeper look at the importance of government context for public confidence in the police over time, I also undertake a case study of two new democracies, Lithuania and the Czech Republic. I compare public confidence in the police in these nations to that in an older, more stable democracy, the United Kingdom.

Results from the multi-level study indicate that government corruption and ethnic diversity reduce public confidence in the police, while a high degree of democracy increases this confidence. Corruption likely mediates the relationship between the stability of democracy and confidence in the police. Further, ethnic minority groups may have less confidence in the police
in more corrupt countries, but their levels of confidence do not seem to depend on whether or not a country is democratic. However, missing data problems prevent any definitive conclusions regarding confidence in the police among minority populations. I do not find evidence that police organizational structure impacts people’s confidence in the police. Results of the case study confirm multi-level findings; but they also point to the possibility that too much government corruption reduces the positive impact of a high level of democracy on confidence in the police. Collectively, these results suggest that reduction of government corruption may be the most important thing a nation can do to garner confidence in the police among its citizens. Thus, although nascent democracies historically prioritize structural re-organization efforts to reform the police, they may derive greater benefit from reducing public perceptions of government corruption.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Confidence in the police is a broad measure of the public’s support for the police as an organization. Such support is critical to a well-functioning policing institution. Indeed, previous studies demonstrate that individuals with low confidence in the police are less likely to comply with police demands, report crimes, call the police for assistance, or cooperate by supplying information (Ren et al. 2005; Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Cao and Zhao 2005; Tyler 1990). Public confidence in the police is also essential to the popular assessment of police legitimacy – the belief among the public that police deserve to “rule” (Tyler et al. 2007: 10). In settings where the legitimacy of the police is limited, policing takes on more arbitrary and violent forms (Goldsmith 2005). On the other hand, when considered legitimate, the police rely on the “authority of their office” and less on coercive force to secure obedience (Roberts and Hough 2005: 30). Although few would, therefore, dispute the importance of public confidence in the police, factors that likely impact it, such as democracy and corruption, have not been well studied in many countries.

The results of a recent survey indicate that considerable variation exists among countries in the level of public confidence in the police (World Values Survey 2011). For example, less than four percent of people in Serbia, 17 percent in the United States, and 36 percent in Finland report having “quite a lot of confidence in police” (World Values Survey 2011). Nevertheless,

1In some countries, however, police organizations take on a militaristic, rather than civil form and in these police states law enforcement may be referred to as “militia” not “police” (Bayley 1985; Kaariainen 2007; Goldsmith 2005).
few studies have attempted to empirically or theoretically explain this variation. In particular, the influence of country-level factors, such as the degree of democracy, corruption, and ethnic diversity, on public confidence in the police remains poorly understood. Instead, most research on public support for the police is limited to the United States and focuses on individual-level influences, such as a person’s evaluation of their encounters with the police. Although it is important to study such relations, the vast majority of the public does not have any contact with the police in a given year (Transparency International 2011) and will nonetheless make confident evaluations of them. Additionally, single-country studies offer evidence that ethnic minority groups have less confidence in the police in a variety of other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, South Africa, Slovenia and Argentina (Jefferson and Walker 1993; Tyler 2007). Yet, no existing studies examine how country-level conditions impact confidence in the police among such minority groups. This has left a knowledge gap in the understanding of how country-level factors influence public confidence in the police. It is critically important to the study of policing, therefore, to evaluate confidence in the police in different societies and to better understand how characteristics of those societies affect this confidence.

In this dissertation, I examine two questions: (1) Does government context, specifically corruption and levels and stability of democracy, impact public confidence in the police? (2) Do ethnic minority groups have more confidence in the police in stable and strong democratic countries than in less democratic countries? The remainder of this chapter investigates these questions. Because John Rawls is considered by many to be the pre-eminent political philosopher to theorize about democracy, particular reference is made to his conception of political legitimacy when discussing the impact of democracy on confidence in the police. When
considering ethnic minority groups’ confidence in the police, both Rawls political theory and conflict theory are referred to in order to provide contrasting arguments. The chapter also examines factors that may hinder any positive impact of democracy on confidence in the police, including corruption, ethnic diversity, and crime. It concludes by summarizing the content of the remaining chapters in the dissertation.

A DEFINITION OF CONFIDENCE IN POLICE

The term confidence in police has been used as a measure of public support for the police for nearly three decades. It is most commonly conceptualized as a measure of diffuse support for the police institution, as opposed to specific support for individual officers (Cao and Hou 2001; Ivkovic 2008; Kaariainen 2007). Easton (1965) is the first to distinguish between diffuse and specific support of political institutions. He characterizes diffuse support as the amount of goodwill and esteem toward an institution as opposed to particular incumbents (Easton 1965). Although many apply Easton’s conceptualization of diffuse support to discussions of confidence in the police, alternative models have been proposed and little evidence is available to determine their validity.

It is plausible that confidence in the police taps into something even broader than diffuse support. For example, it might include both a person’s assessment of institutional support and the performance of the police, such as their effectiveness in solving crime (Roberts and Stalans 2000). Others argue that the term confidence measures only the specific performance of the police whereas trust measures a broader level of support (Gilmour 2008). In that vein, Gilmour (2008) sees trust as the foundation for confidence. For example, if a person trusts the police, it
makes it easier to restore that person’s confidence in the police, if the confidence is ever lost. On the other hand, if a person loses trust in the police, it would be very difficult to repair. Indeed the restoration process would “begin at a much deeper, more personal level than a public service is likely to have the resources to manage” (Gilmour 2008: 55). Although Gilmour (2008) attempts to uncouple trust from confidence, the two terms remain closely related in his analysis, and he ultimately describes confidence as a result of trust. Still, other studies suggest that assessments of trust, but not necessarily confidence, in political institutions may be based on the behavior of specific incumbents and therefore more fragile (Iyengar 1980). Given this lack of semantic consensus, it is not surprising that some studies examining support for the police consider trust (Kaariainen 2007) and others—confidence (Cao 2001; Cao and Burton 2006; Cao and Hou 2001; Cao and Stack 2005; Stack and Cao 1998).

It is difficult to discriminate between differing definitions of public confidence in the police because studies show it is highly correlated with specific attitudes toward law enforcement (Cao and Hou 2001; Frank et al. 1996) as well as broader assessments of institutional trust (Jackson and Bradford 2010). Yet, even when people are asked about the efficacy of a political organization, they may actually base their assessment on the degree of diffuse support for the institution (Iyengar 1980). Therefore, even specific considerations of effectiveness may not simply reflect a few discrete encounters with the police, but instead may reveal a diffuse perception developed through socialization in early childhood (Iyengar 1980). Consequently, researchers have argued that “whatever it is called – confidence toward the police, satisfaction with the police, and trust in the police – this concept taps the public’s global attitude toward the police as an institution in society” (Cao and Hou 2001: 88).
Overall, it is clear that diffuse and specific support and confidence and trust are strongly related to one another, even though subtle differences exist. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, the terms confidence and trust are not used interchangeably in this dissertation, which examines public confidence in the police. For this purpose, I consider public confidence in the police to be a broad measure of the public’s diffuse support for the police as a governmental institution.

GOVERNMENT CONTEXT AND CONFIDENCE IN POLICE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Importance of Government Context

In evaluating public confidence in the police in the context of such a definition, it is important to consider the impact of the broader governing body. At a basic level, the police are an essential part of government (Beare and Murray 2007: 99; Kaariainen 2007; Smith 2007). Indeed, preserving order, by force if needed, is generally seen as the central function that characterizes the modern state, and the police are the specialist arm of the state that perform this job (Bittner 1970; Smith 2007). France provides an example of how the public's confidence in the state powerfully influences confidence in the police (Smith 2007). Although the French police have refused to produce an effective system for investigating complaints and have denied findings from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, until recently, they have enjoyed high levels of confidence amongst the public. Smith suggests this is a direct reflection of the public’s high regard for government in France. Therefore, in order to understand a police
organization and how much confidence the public places in it, one must consider the political system wherein it operates (Klockars 1985; Smith 2007).

Indeed, social psychologists Albrecht and Green (1977) provide further theoretical support for this argument. They claim that feelings toward the police are not isolated but part of a much wider attitude complex that reflects a person’s basic outlook on the larger legal and political system (Albrecht and Green 1977). Thus, polls showing low confidence in the police may only touch the surface of a much deeper problem. People who have negative thoughts about the police often think of themselves as “generally alienated” from the political system (Albrecht and Green 1977: 81). Further, people or groups who feel estranged from the political system or who believe that the state is insensitive to their needs, will likely shift their disappointment to those governmental workers closest to them, frequently the police (Benson 1981: 48).

Conversely, to the extent that the government is viewed as legitimate and fair, the police are likely to benefit from this evaluation. It is therefore critical to investigate what determines people’s confidence in government, because people’s views on government shape their opinions about the police. In doing so, I specifically consider democratic regimes. Because democratic governments are considered by most to be the fairest form of governance, it is therefore argued that citizens of democracy view government institutions, including the police, more favorably (Dowding et al. 2004).
Democracy, Political Legitimacy and Confidence in Police

Democracy can be thought of as a procedure for governing that allows the public to reach collective decisions about laws and policies of the State, in a way that permits each member to participate in decisions (Catt 1999: 4). In an ideal democracy, everyone has an equally weighted vote in determining the outcome of an election, an equal opportunity to have a voice in public debates, and to run for office (Christiano 2002). This process, which ensures that every person has an equal opportunity to participate in the political process, is said to ensure equal political equality. Political equality is perhaps the most elementary principle behind democracy (Catt 1999; Dahl 2000). It expresses the ideal of people as free and equal citizens and it demands that, when answering the question of who should to make the decisions, “[t]he answer is, the people” (Christiano 2002: 45). It is, however, essential to view democracy as an evolving process and even the most advanced democracies do not meet the ideals that define this type of government.

For proceduralists, democratic processes are a requirement of justice and every outcome of a democratic procedure is seen as just (Freeman 2003: 91). On the other hand, according to Rawls (1971), the most just society would be one that has not only procedural justice, but also substantive justice (Rawls 1971). However, Rawls (2005) makes the crucial distinction between what is required to achieve justice versus political legitimacy, justification for the exercise of

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2 I follow Dahl (2000) in his use of the terms government and state. Dahl defines state as “a very special type of association that is distinguishable by the extent to which it can secure compliance with its rules, among all those over whom it claims jurisdiction, by its superior means of coercion.” The government ordinarily refers to “the government of the state under whose jurisdiction” a person lives (Dahl 2000: 41).

3 Substantive justice is justice determined by outcomes, not just the fairness of a procedure (Rawls 1971).
authority. He argues that legitimacy requires less than justice and can be achieved through fair democratic procedures alone (Rawls 2005). Under this conception, although the outcomes of these procedures do not necessarily have to be just, it also stands that they cannot be too unjust (Rawls 2005: 428). Importantly, there is a critical point when the injustice of the outcomes of a legitimate democratic procedure damages its legitimacy (Rawls 2005: 428). From a Rawlsian perspective then, one may posit that fair and democratic procedures should lead to political legitimacy.

The public generally views politically legitimate, democratic governments more favorably because people consider the fairness of procedures when they evaluate political institutions (Klosko 2000). Two different psychological processes may explain this generalization. The first is a self-interest explanation, which makes the case that people care about procedures because they think fair procedures will produce more beneficial outcomes for themselves. The second is referred to as a group values model. This model suggests that individuals are motivated by a concern for their place in society and the fairness of procedures may provide them with a sense of their status within a group. These psychological processes are not mutually exclusive and have even been combined in a hybrid “sense-making” model (Klosko 2000). While the role of such psychological processes in the foundation of procedural justice may be debated, it is clear, as Klosko (2000: 218) argues, that individuals’ perceptions of
authorities are crucially influenced by their experience of procedural fairness.⁴ Although, it is possible that ethnic minorities have different experiences with or perceptions of procedural fairness, overall, the public may be most likely to regard the government favorably in a democracy. The police, as the government’s most noticeable agents, are likely to benefit from the public’s high regard for government.

Confidence in Police among Ethnic Minorities: Consensus vs. Conflict Perspective

In Rawls’ (2005) conception of political legitimacy, consensus among the public about the legitimacy of government is possible in a democracy. However, from a conflict perspective there is reason to believe that ethnic minority groups may not see democratic governments as legitimate (Quinney 1990).⁵ Thus, these contrasting ideas are discussed in order to develop a theoretical perspective on the question of whether ethnic minorities are more likely to have confidence in the police in a more democratic society.

As stated, Rawls (2005) argues that in a democracy an overlapping consensus among citizens about procedures for governing is possible. More specifically, he believes that as the fairest form of governance, citizens are inclined to view democratic governments as legitimate. Indeed, the theoretical foundation of democracy is rooted in the idea that all are born equal and free without regard to their gender, race and religion. In theory, a democracy is “a society that

⁴ Although some of the evidence to support his claims is derived from the work of Tyler, Klosko seeks to extend his social psychological focus to an understanding of the procedures that are relevant to political legitimacy. Therefore, I discuss Klosko here, whereas Tyler’s work is discussed in Ch. 2.

⁵ “Ethnicity” is defined here as a blend of racial and linguistic traits (Alesina et al. 2003).
treats members as equal moral persons, irrespective of differences of background and natural endowment” (Cohen 2011: 195). Such a society should value all individuals more so than undemocratic systems (Freeman 2007). One could thus argue that in a democratic society all citizens, not just members of a majority group, will see the government as legitimate. As already discussed, people are willing to evaluate a political system favorably if that system uses fair procedures. Thus, democratic governments are likely to produce confidence among both ethnic minorities and majority groups and the police are likely to benefit from this positive evaluation.

In contrast to the view that consensus underlies the political process in a democracy, conflict theorists argue there is no agreed upon social contract among citizens and the state in any society. Thus, conflict theorists believe that even democratic societies are separated down political lines (Quinney 1970; Turk 1969) and in this sense, democracy is actually a facade (Dahl 1989: 265). Conflict theorists traditionally argue that differences among people in society lead to conflicts over resources and eventually to problems with powerlessness among certain groups (Chambliss and Seidman 1971; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Quinney 1970; Turk 1969). Turk (1969) further elaborates that modern social order is depicted not by consensus, but by conflict and domination by authorities, such as police and judges, over subjects, such as the poor.

Dominant groups create the rules and laws of society based on their norms and values, and the behavior of the less powerful will be defined as deviant (Liska and Yu 1992). Crime control, then, according to conflict theorists, is an “instrument of the powerful used to control those actions and groups which threaten their interests” (Liska, Chamlin, and Reed 1985: 122).

More recently, conflict theory has emphasized the salience of race in grounding relationships between more and less powerful groups in society (Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005;
Hawkins 1987; Liska, Chamlin, and Reed 1985; Mitchell and Sidanius 1995; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2000). Some have argued that, at least in the United States, it is the non-whites that are especially threatening to the white majority. When majority groups see a threat to their social standing, they take action to diminish the competition (Blalock 1967; Parker 2008). For example, if whites increasingly identify blacks as a threat to political power, the white population may increase social control efforts aimed at blacks to preserve its dominance (Blalock 1967; Parker 2008).

In addition to increasing social control efforts toward minority groups, there are also more subtle ways in which dominant groups in society use authorities, such as the police, to keep ethnic minorities from gaining power. For example, the police have symbolic power and communicate powerful social meanings to people about social and political life (Innes 2004; Loader 2006). Often such meanings are repressive and have exclusionary functions, especially for ethnic minorities. For example, the police are often portrayed in a way that maintains dominant public interests and has the effect of promoting insecurity among those who are socially disadvantaged (Loader 2006: 211). This happens because policing institutions are often seen as adored national symbols that come to be the object of uncritical support from majority groups (Loader 2006). In some circumstances, this “valorization” of the police becomes connected to promoting the culture of the majority against others. Northern Ireland and the close emotional link between the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Protestant majority is an example. Loader (2006: 212) also draws attention to the relationship between the English Bobbies and a longing for a once “white England.” Therefore, the police, even in democracies, are often
symbols of identification with a national community, usually a majority group, and this is likely to make members of minority groups feel rejected by a society (Loader 2006).

In contrast to Rawls’ notion of political consensus in democracies, a conflict perspective would argue that ethnic minorities should have less confidence in the police in all societies, including democracies. This distinction arises from the view of conflict theorists that the police often represent and are associated with dominant groups and their interests. Further, these dominant groups are likely to alienate minority groups from the political process in order to keep themselves in a position of power. According to Benson (1981: 48) “individuals or groups who feel alienated from the political process or who believe the state to be unresponsive to their needs, might transfer their dissatisfaction to those governmental agents most visible to them—the police.” Benson (1981) illustrates this by pointing out that throughout the time of civil unrest in the 1960s and early 1970s minority groups, who felt that the state was unresponsive to their needs, explicitly contested the authority and legitimacy of the current political order through demonstrations. These groups are hostile toward and distrustful of the political structure. Benson (1981) argues that this distrust toward the political structure is projected to its representatives, the police. Thus, the police are often the object of both verbal and physical attack because of the dissatisfaction people have with the existing political order.

Despite such arguments from conflict theorists, ethnic minority groups may still have more confidence in the police in a democracy. It is thought that democracy is especially important for minorities – without protections for minorities incorporated in a constitution or bill of rights, the tyranny of a majority can be problematic (Easterly 2006). For example, a majority group may vote to censor dissidents if they don’t like some minority viewpoint (Easterly 2006:}
19). Indeed, by definition, democracy entails some protection of individual rights and freedom of speech (Easterly 2006). However, even constitutional democracies can and do inflict harm on minority groups. A democratic process, though, in the long run, may cause less damage to the basic rights and interests of members of the public, than any undemocratic option (Dahl 2000).

“If only because democratic governments prevent abusive autocracies from ruling, they meet this requirement better than non-democratic governments” (Dahl 2000: 48). In this sense, it is likely that minority groups will have more confidence in a government and its police in a democracy than in a less or nondemocratic state.

In addition to ethnic self-identification, there are other, broader social factors that may influence a person’s confidence in the police. The remainder of the chapter discusses three factors - government corruption, ethnic diversity and crime - that have the potential to influence the relationship between democracy and confidence in the police.

POTENTIAL THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND CONFIDENCE IN POLICE

Government Corruption and Democratic Stability

Democratic governance can itself produce political legitimacy, regardless of the outcome, through fair procedures (Rawls 2005). This is true unless the outcomes are too unjust. Outcomes

6 This certainly does not make the injustices of a democracy any less wrong. There are additional reasons for considering democracies as more respectful of essential human interests than undemocratic countries (Dahl 2000: 48). See Dahl (2000: 45) for a list of nine other reasons.
may be too unjust when political corruption is widespread, even in cases where the government is chosen through democratic means. For example, political legitimacy is likely weakened when there are widespread problems with elected officials acting in corrupt ways, whether or not the election that brought the officials into office is fair (You 2006). In such a system, government actions may lose their legitimacy because the decisions or laws made by corrupt officials can be unfair.

In order to be fair, decision makers ought to be impartial, honest, and arrive at decisions based on unbiased information (Tyler 1990). Corruption is a violation of such procedures and specifically involves “betrayal of public trust placed in officials to act fairly and impartially” (You 2006: 151). More specifically, democracy is based on the ideal of political equality, whereas public sector corruption is based on the idea that the state will care for its people in a random and unequal manner (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002). Thus, according to Rawls (1971), fair laws will be made when representatives endeavor to enact just laws and explore with citizens how to best achieve them. “Representatives represent their constituents in a substantive sense, they must seek first to pass just and effective legislation since this is a citizen’s first interest in government” (Rawls 1971: 199-200). Further, marginalized groups in society, such as ethnic minority groups may be more likely to be harmed by government corruption. Such groups may not have the ability to protect themselves from government agents who are only interested in becoming more powerful.

Corruption leads to a lack of ability among citizens to influence decisions that affect their lives, one of the key components of democracy (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). Corruption has been particularly problematic in new democracies where it threatens the very future of these fragile
governments (Seligson 2002). With this in mind, democracy requires some amount of stability to produce support amongst its citizens. Democracy, as suggested earlier, is best viewed as an evolving process. A long period of democracy may have the effect of reducing government corruption (Treisman 2003). Corruption may become more risky and offer less rewards to government officials as a country’s political arena stabilizes. The stability of democracy can therefore, frequently be defined in terms of how many years of continuous democracy a country has experienced (Beck et al. 2001; Inglehart 1997; Treisman 2000).

A lack of political party stability is common in young, unstable, democracies, especially in post-communist countries. In these nations, political parties often present themselves as uncorrupt and win elections during an anti-incumbent sentiment (Diamond 2008). However, the new party seems to quickly lose public support because of their own corruption (Diamond 2008). Too many parties have come and gone from the political arena in these countries (Diamond 2008). While it is normal for political party support to vary, democracy needs some amount of stability for successful governance to take place. Stable democracy may therefore have the effect of reducing corruption and ensuring adequate party stability. In this sense, it is possible that stable democracy with low levels of corruption can better ensure confidence in government and, by extension, the police than can fair democratic procedures alone among both majority and minority groups.

Ethnic diversity

In addition to government corruption, there are certain social factors in a country that may hinder the possible impact of democracy on confidence in the police. For example, the level
of ethnic diversity in a society may have important consequences on how much trust people place in institutions such as the police (You 2006). It is possible, for instance, that ethnically diverse countries tend to be better functioning democracies with lower levels of corruption (You 2006). Stronger democracy could in turn lead people to have higher levels of confidence in the government, and the police would be likely to benefit from this positive evaluation. However, as Lane and Ersson (2003) point out, “there are many democracies that are ethnically divided yet still work well [the United States, for example]; and there are several dictatorships that operate in homogenous countries [China, for example]”. It is still unclear, therefore, whether democracy is strengthened in ethnically homogenous societies.

Nonetheless, ethnic diversity is regularly thought to be particularly difficult to reconcile with democracy (Gerrits and Wolffram 2005). The conflict perspective (Turk 1969) discussed above can be used to understand this; albeit on a broader level. For example, it has been argued that as a society becomes more ethnically diverse, the society will have more conflict on a regular basis as more people struggle to secure valued and limited resources (Sellin 1938). The high levels of ethnic diversity are likely to be seen as threatening to authorities, then, because the diversity is likely to pose a perceived social control problem (Liska and Yu 1992; Turk 1969). While the government may direct the police to strengthen control efforts toward minorities, all citizens may hold the government and the police responsible for the perceived breakdown of social control in diverse societies. In this sense, the conflict theory can help to understand why citizens might have less confidence in the police in a more ethnically diverse country.

On the other hand, ethnic diversity may promote stronger democratic institutions. For instance, Birnir (2007: 62) suggests that ethnic diversity, in new democracies, can advance vote
stability and “jump-start institutionalization of the party system by inducing stability in the pattern of voting”. This occurs because minority groups tend to have more stable voting preferences (Birnir 2007). Ethnic minorities may also be more likely to vote in new democracies, because if enough of them do so a member of their group could win a legislative seat in some countries (Barany and Moser 2005). Further, because members of different ethnic groups may respond similarly to procedural attributes, such as democratic procedures, support for institutions in democracies may not suffer public support deficits even in ethnically diverse societies (Klosko 2000). This argument parallels the earlier discussion about consensus in society and ethnic minorities. Thus, to the extent that Rawls’ ideas about consensus in society are accurate, an ethnically diverse society may not threaten democracy because all people, including minorities believe the political system to be legitimate. This regard for the political system could then carry over to the police. Therefore, it is possible that democracy works better in more ethnically diverse countries. In this case, one might hypothesize that all citizens would have more confidence in government and the police in ethnically diverse countries. This dissertation seeks to test this question.

Crime and Democracy

Crime rates are yet another social condition that may reduce any positive impact of democracy on confidence in the police. Citizens may hold their government responsible for crime problems in their country and the police, as the most visible branch of government, are likely to be held responsible as well. In this sense, political fairness alone would not lead to
confidence in government if the public believes the government is incapable of keeping them safe.

On the other hand, it may not actually be crime itself, but what it represents to the public that leads people to lose confidence in the government and the police. More specifically, Jackson and Sunshine (2007) argue that public confidence in the police is actually influenced by concerns about the perceived amount of social cohesion in a community and not by crime itself or the fear of crime (Jackson and Sunshine 2007). As these authors maintain, in a neo-Durkheimian sense, crime operates as an indicator of the collapse of moral norms and social organization. Thus, crime and disorder can make people question the moral composition of society and individuals may blame social control agents for this lack of moral order (Jackson and Sunshine 2007: 214). Ultimately, Jackson and Sunshine (2007) argue that the public’s confidence in the police is lowered when values and norms of a community are thought to be weakening. Therefore, the effect of crime on confidence in the police may be indirect through perceptions of failing moral order.

Another way that crime may indirectly impact public confidence in the police is by weakening democracy and thereby reducing confidence in the government and the police. However, because there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical work on the connection between democracy and crime, it is unclear whether, and in what ways, this process occurs (La Free and Karstedt 2006). It is possible that repressive responses from government to rising crime rates may generate negative perceptions of government and legitimacy of its actions. Moreover, powerful members of society define crime, often in a way that suits their interests and stigmatizes the powerless (Quinney 1970). Thus, crime may not only lead people to blame
government for a deteriorating moral order, but also for what majority groups perceive to be a lack of control over marginalized groups.

Ultimately, whether directly or indirectly, crime may reduce the confidence the public places in the government, particularly their most visible agents of control, the police.

ARGUMENT IN SUM

Confidence in the police is a diffuse measure of public support for the police institution. Given that the police are an essential and highly visible part of government, they are likely to benefit from favorable perceptions of government. From a Rawlsian perspective, people look to the fairness of procedures when they evaluate political institutions and they are, therefore, most likely to view government favorably in a democratic nation. However, certain injustices, such as widespread government corruption, can damage the legitimacy of a democratic political system. This frequently occurs in new democracies. Indeed, democracy may require some degree of stability in order to create strong levels of confidence in government, and the police by extension. Although conflict theorists suggest democracy may alienate minority groups by pitting their interests against those of the majority, the preservation of individual and minority rights is central to democratic governance. Therefore, while imperfect, democratic states are likely to experience higher levels of confidence in the police and the broader government than nations with alternative forms of governance. When considering specific national settings, this framework might be modified for both majority and ethnic minority groups by levels of corruption, ethnic heterogeneity, and crime.
CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I proffer a definition of confidence in police and discuss some of the difficulties associated with any such definition. I present research questions and advance an argument for the importance of considering the government context when seeking to understand a person’s confidence in the police. Two broad perspectives, conflict theory and Rawls’ ideas on political legitimacy, are put forth in an effort to predict whether ethnic minority groups might have more confidence in the police in democracies than in less democratic or nondemocratic societies.

The remainder of this dissertation advances a theoretical and empirical study of public confidence in the police from an international perspective. In Chapter 2, an exhaustive review of previous studies on the impact of individual and country-level factors on confidence in the police is undertaken. Next, in Chapter 3, I lay out hypotheses about what impacts confidence in the police and describe the research methods and data sources that are used to test these hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I provide descriptions of statistical techniques, and findings from a multi-level, hierarchical study aimed at better understanding the basis of public confidence in the police. This is followed, in Chapter 5, by a qualitative case study of the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom. Finally, in Chapter 6, I conclude with a discussion of the importance, limitations, and implications of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

In this chapter, I present a comprehensive review of studies that look at public confidence in the police. First, I discuss research that analyzes the effect of country-level factors, such as democracy and government corruption, on public confidence in the police. Next, I review previous studies that assess the impact of a variety of individual-level factors on confidence in the police, including race, gender, income, age and levels of life satisfaction and political trust. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the potential role for this dissertation in filling critical knowledge gaps left by previous studies on confidence in the police.

COUNTRY-LEVEL FACTORS INFLUENCING CONFIDENCE IN POLICE

Only two previous studies examine how country-level factors influence the amount of confidence people place in the police. The first study on this topic reveals that perceptions of corruption in government strongly explain country-level variation in trust in the police in 16 European countries (Kaariainen 2007). The study also finds that the amount of investment by government in public safety institutions affects confidence in the police, but to a lesser extent than corruption. This research supports previous studies that link government corruption to distrust of government (Anderson 2003; Kaariainen 2007; You 2006). The current dissertation seeks to test whether Kaariainen’s (2007) findings regarding the importance of perceived government corruption remain the same when including countries outside of Europe and controlling for a number of country-level factors.
More recently, Ivkovic (2008) has also endeavored to quantitatively examine how certain country-level factors affect public confidence in the police.\(^7\) Her 2008 investigation built on Kaarianinen’s by including the US and Canada in addition to European countries and a governance index that includes perceived levels of government corruption. Ivkovic’s findings suggest that a higher quality of governance in a country leads people to have a broad level of confidence in the police. Ivkovic (2008) also asks people a more specific question about the police’s ability to stop crime. In addition to governance, Ivkovic (2008) finds that other country level factors impact this, including police size, percentage of women police and whether a country has a single force or multiple forces and whether these are coordinated or uncoordinated. Despite the importance of Ivkovic’s study, her conclusions may be subject to scrutiny. To begin, the data Ivkovic uses are over a decade old and, as she notes, more recent data may be necessary since public opinions can change over extended periods of time. Her study also does not include a measure of respondent’s race/ethnicity, income, level of education or socioeconomic status. Furthermore, the unique effects of corruption on public confidence in the police are not discernable in Ivkovic’s study because it is incorporated into an extremely large governance index that includes hundreds of additional variables. Perhaps most problematically, this index includes measures of confidence in the police, the variable the study seeks to explain. Finally, researchers have criticized the use of the governance indicator in cross-national comparisons for a number of reasons.

\(^7\) It is therefore unfortunate that Ivkovic (2008) provides no mention Kaariainen’s (2007) work in her study.
In addition to corruption, in this study I argue that democracy impacts confidence in the police. The large governance index Ivkovic (2008) employs in her study contains some questions related to democracy, such as the extent to which people can participate in choosing their government. However, because the index contains hundreds of other variables, the precise impact of democracy on confidence in the police is not discernable. With this in mind, it is evident that no previous research specifically examines how democracy influences confidence in the police cross-nationally.

Sung’s (2006) work on police effectiveness, however, looks at a similar question – how democracy affects police effectiveness. Although police effectiveness and confidence in the police are separate concepts, they are related (Sung 2006). In fact, some researchers suggest that the public’s confidence in the police is one of the best ways to measure police effectiveness (Sung 2006). Sung’s study examines the impact of democracy on police effectiveness in 59 countries. His results suggest that in spite of early dissatisfaction with the police, emerging democracies could assume enhanced police effectiveness if they continue on the course of democratic consolidation, which tends to strengthen law enforcement. In mature democracies, democratic forms of policing – those forms concerned with protecting individual rights - are more likely to exist. Sung (2006: 347) ultimately concludes that persistent global democratization signifies “transnational convergence in more effective policing”. Although Sung does not utilize a hierarchical model, which would allow him to control for individual level factors, his work is important because it demonstrates that democratization may indeed affect confidence in the police.
The last study pertinent to my research is You’s 2006 study on social and political trust. His investigation reveals that democracy, corruption and fair income distribution influence levels of political trust (You 2006). This is important because political trust in You’s (2006) study is evaluated through an index of trust in six institutions, including the police. Although the current study focuses specifically on public confidence in the police, You’s work on political and social trust provides indirect support for the notion that corruption and democracy are important determinants of support for the police.

Overall, the current study, builds on previous international research on confidence in the police in a variety of ways. First, it assesses more country-level factors than any other international study on confidence in police, including the level and stability of democracy, perceived government corruption, ethnic diversity, crime, whether a police force is centralized, multiple or single and whether a country employs a gendarmerie force. In fact, many of these variables have never been employed in studies on confidence in police. Specifically, this will be the first study to look at the influence of levels and stability of democracy, ethnic diversity and police centralization on public confidence in police. Importantly, it will do all this while controlling for whether or not a person is an ethnic minority. The study also includes significantly more countries and more recent data than any previous study on public confidence in the police. The following section outlines previous literature regarding individual level influences on confidence in police and discusses how the current study fills certain gaps within that context.
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL FACTORS INFLUENCING CONFIDENCE IN POLICE

Public confidence in the police is primarily studied in the United States and at the individual-level. These studies often look at a person’s demographic characteristics, especially race, gender, age and socioeconomic status to explain public confidence in the police (Brown and Benedict 2002; Weitzer and Tuch 2005). To a lesser extent research focuses on attitude complexes, neighborhood conditions, contact with the police, victimization, and fear of crime. The following sections discuss this literature.

Race/Ethnicity and Confidence in Police

A blend of racial and linguistic characteristics defines the term “ethnicity” (Alesina et al. 2003). Many studies on confidence in the police intertwine race/ethnicity in this way, therefore in this section I use the terms race and ethnicity interchangeably. For example, in Weitzer and Tuch’s (2004: 312) study on race and perceptions of police misconduct, they define race “in its broadest sense to include both racial and ethnic groups” (see also Sampson and Bartusch 1998).

In research from the United States, blacks are the ethnic minority group which is most often studied (Brown and Benedict 2002). In the majority of these studies whites perceive the police more favorably than blacks (Brown and Benedict 2002). Indeed, since the 1950s, studies in the United States consistently show that blacks have less positive perceptions of the police (Benson 1981; Block 1971; Brown and Benedict 2002; Brunson 2007; Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Cao and Hou 2001; Decker 1981; Decker 1985; Hagan and Albonetti 1982; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Lasley 1994; Peek, Lowe, and Alston 1981; Sherman 2002; Webb and Marshall 1995; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). Research on Latinos’ confidence in the police reveals
perceptions that are less favorable than whites’ but more positive than blacks’ (Brown and Benedict 2002; Weitzer and Tuch 2004). One study, however, finds that Latino’s have stronger reactions than African Americans to police contacts and this makes African American and Latino perceptions of criminal injustice more similar (Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005). These authors also find that Native Americans have less confidence in the police than whites, but that Asian’s perceptions of the police are not significantly different than whites. However, both Chinese and Vietnamese persons feel that police ought to be more knowledgeable about their cultural backgrounds (Song 1992: 710-713).

The basis of these types of racial disparities in public assessments of the police are not completely clear (Brown and Benedict 2002; Weitzer and Tuch 2004). In some studies neighborhood conditions - such as physical and social disorder, willingness of neighbors to help provide crime protection, and concentrated disadvantage – appear to account for the effect of race (Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). Other studies find no connection between race and neighborhood conditions (Webb and Marshall 1995). Similarly, negative contacts with the police, in some cases, explain the effects of race (Scaglion and Condon 1980; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). Yet other studies have found this to not be true (Erez 1984; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Rosenbaum et al. 2005). At any rate, it is important to keep in mind that most people, including ethnic minorities, do not have any experience with the

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8 Sampson and Bartusch (1998: 789) define concentrated disadvantage as “an economic disadvantage in racially segregated urban neighborhoods…for poverty, public assistance, unemployment, female-headed families with children, and percentage under 18…followed by…percentage black.”
police in a given year. Furthermore, some studies find that the impact of income may be tied to race (Boggs and Galiher 1975; Hagan and Albonetti 1982). However, other studies indicate that income does not impact blacks’ views of the police (Priest and Carter 1999; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). Therefore, there is no definitive explanation for why minority groups tend to have lower levels of confidence in the police.

Importantly, minority groups’ negative assessments of the police are not restricted to the United States. British surveys, for example, show elevated hostility toward the police among Afro-Caribbeans compared to whites and Asians (Jefferson and Walker 1993; Waddington and Braddock 1991). Minorities in France, South Africa, Slovenia and Argentina also display lower levels of confidence in the police than majority groups (Tyler et al. 2007). While it is, therefore, clear that ethnic minorities have less confidence in the police in many countries studied to date, no research has explored the country-level factors that may account for variations in this observation across national lines.

Gender, Age, Income and Confidence in Police

Whereas the vast majority of studies looking at demographic correlates of confidence in the police suggest that minorities have less confidence, a gender effect is much less clear. It is plausible that males have less positive perceptions of the police than females, because they have

9 However, minorities may have more contact with the police than whites (Weitzer and Tuch 2004).

10 However, as mentioned earlier, Kaariainen (2007) includes the following question “are you a member of a group discriminated against” as a way to incorporate race/ethnicity into the study.
more frequent contact with the police (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). On the other hand, from a feminist theoretical standpoint it is also possible that women in countries with low gender equality will be more likely to distrust the police. Yet many studies on confidence in the police find no gender effect (Cao and Zhao 2005; Reisig and Park 2004; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). Others studies show males to have higher levels of confidence in the police (Brown and Coulter 1983; Correia, Reisig, and Lovrich 1996). Still others suggest that females have greater confidence in the police (Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Hadar and Snortum 1975; Hagan, Shedd, and Payne 2005; Ivkovic 2008; Kaariainen 2007; Lasley 1994; Reisig and Giacomazzi 1998). Ultimately, the research to date has not determined whether gender affects a person’s confidence in the police.

With respect to age, the most common finding is that younger persons have less confidence in the police than older persons (Brown and Benedict 2002; Brown and Coulter 1983; Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Chandek and Reisig 2001; Murty, Roebuck, and Smith 1990; Sampson and Bartusch 1998; Smith and Hawkins 1973; Webb and Marshall 1995; Worrall 1999; Yagil 1998). This is not only the case in the US, but also in Japan (Cao and Stack 2005) and China (Curran and Cook 1993). This is perhaps because older individuals are much less likely to be involved in crime, at least partly as a result of the aging out process and stronger attachments to society (Cao and Hou 2001; Sampson and Laub 1993).

Lastly, there are inconsistent findings in studies from the United States regarding how a person’s socioeconomic status affects their confidence in the police. Some studies find that individuals in lower economic spheres have less confidence in the police than wealthier individuals (Benson 1981; Brown and Coulter 1983; Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Kaariainen
2007; Murty, Roebuck, and Smith 1990; Sampson and Bartusch 1998), others reveal that social class variables are non-significant (Block 1971; Cao and Zhao 2005; Davis 1990; Parker, Onyekwuluje, and Murty 1995; Smith and Hawkins 1973; Weitzer and Tuch 1999). Importantly, Kaariainen (2007), in his multi-level, cross-national study reports that financial insecurity at the individual level predicts lower levels of trust in the police in 16 European countries. The poor often have the least political power (Brown and Benedict 2002) and police control is targeted more often at those living on the margins of society than those who are privileged (Kaariainen 2007). It thus would not be surprising, according to a conflict perspective, if they viewed the government and the police more negatively than wealthier persons who have greater power to convert their cultural values into law (Bonger and Turk 1969). Further research will be necessary to clarify the extent to which a person’s income level - as opposed to categorical poverty – might impact their confidence in the police.

Attitudinal Factors and Confidence in Police

According to Albrecht and Green (1977), attitudes toward the police are related to perceptions of the larger legal and political system. Indeed, these authors show that perceptions of the police are closely related to the court system and the probability of a person obtaining legal justice despite concerns about power and wealth. Perceptions of the police are also connected to feelings of political alienation and powerlessness and to one’s degree of involvement in the political system (Albrecht and Green 1977). More recent research supports the notion that trust in the political system is related to public confidence in police (Cao and Zhao 2005). Indeed Cao and Zhao’s (2005) political trust variable, which includes measures of
how much a person trusts the armed forces, legal system, political parties, parliament, and civil services, is the single “most important explanatory variable” in predicting confidence in the police in the US and several Latin American countries (Cao and Zhao 2005: 410). It is, therefore, imperative to test whether political trust and confidence in the police are related in other countries and after controlling for county-level factors.

Adding to the potential attitude complex of which confidence in the police is a part, life satisfaction and political conservatism variables are also included in studies of confidence in the police (Stack and Cao 1998). Questions about one’s level of satisfaction with life are significant predictors of confidence in the police in the US, China, Japan, and other industrialized countries, but not in many Latin American countries. However the life satisfaction variable in Latin American countries may have been non-significant because of problems with missing data (Cao and Zhao 2005). Political conservatism is also a significant predictor of confidence in the police in the US, Japan and Latin American countries. However, Cao and Zhao (2005) argue that the concept of conservatism is vague and political trust is perhaps a more concrete assessment of people’s views on the political and legal system. Overall, previous findings warrant further study of political trust and life satisfaction in studies of confidence in the police.

Contact with Police/Procedural Justice Factors and Confidence in Police

Tyler (1990) focuses on the social psychological aspects of interaction between citizens and authority figures. He argues that when people interact with authority figures and determine that they are treated in a fair manner they perceive the authority figures as legitimate. One way he measures legitimacy is by looking at the amount of confidence and trust people report for the
police (Tyler 1990). Tyler views this as an illustration of procedural justice. Evidence from the
United States suggests that such judgments, which depend on perceptions of neutrality and the
opportunity to state one’s case before a decision is made, do in fact matter to people when they
evaluate the police and courts (Tyler 1990; Tyler et al. 2007). This line of work further
demonstrates that these procedural judgments are associated with support for the police, more so
than whether an outcome is perceived as favorable by an individual (Tyler 1990). Despite this
evidence, Smith (2007) warns against the conclusion that fair procedures are continuously and
universally the foundation of legitimacy or support for authority. It would be haphazard to do so,
partly because existing empirical evidence comes primarily from a single nation during a single
time period.

A more fundamental problem is that procedural justice models only seem to explain how
trust in the police is diminished, not how it originates (Smith 2007). For example, Skogan (2006)
finds that people who evaluate their encounters with the police negatively lower their general
opinions of the police, whereas there is no effect on general attitudes among those who evaluate
their experience positively. Further, many people report support for the police without having
much, if any, experience with the police (Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Smith 2007). In fact, some
research shows that as people have less experience with the police, they are more likely to see
them as trustworthy (Smith 2007). Further, for those who come into contact with the police, prior
beliefs about the police influence the evaluation of their encounters and experiences tend to
fulfill these pre-existing beliefs (Brandl et al. 1994; Frank et al. 1996; Rosenbaum et al. 2005).
Thus, attitudes toward the police are relatively stable and not readily influenced by occasional
police-initiated contacts (Rosenbaum et al. 2005: 359). To the extent that they do exert such
influence, the police can reduce people’s opinions of them by treating them poorly but are not easily capable of improving people’s judgments by treating them properly (Skogan 2006; Smith 2007).

Given the limitations of procedural justice models in explaining the origin of public confidence in the police, recent research has begun to examine the impact of people’s vicarious experiences of the police through the media as well as family and friends. Although little is known about the influence of such vicarious experiences, recent studies indicate that these have a significant impact on perceptions of the police (Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Weitzer and Tuch 2004). However, evidence also suggests that a person’s vicarious experiences are influenced by their preconceived views of the police (Rosenbaum et al. 2005). In summary, while the origins of an individual’s confidence in police remain unknown, it is clear that once these opinions are developed they are difficult to change, particularly to improve, and they color future experiences with police. Further exploration of the origins of confidence in the police is therefore critical.

Victimization and Fear of Victimization and Confidence in Police

Additional factors that may impact public confidence in the police are whether a person is a crime victim or fears becoming a victim of crime. The results of studies looking at the impact of victimization and fear of crime on an individual’s confidence in the police are mixed. Some studies find relationships between victimization and poor evaluations of the police (Block 1971; Kusow, Wilson, and Martin 1997; Priest and Carter 1999; Smith, Graham, and Adams 1991). Yet, other work shows that victims view the police more favorably than non-victims (Thurman and Reisig 1996). Still, some research reveals that whether or not one has been a victim does not
impact their confidence in the police (Smith and Hawkins 1973). Similarly mixed findings arise from studies considering the importance of the fear of victimization. Some research shows that confidence in the police is reduced by both fear of crime (Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996) and the belief that crime rates are high in one’s neighborhood (Benson 1981; Davis 1990; Murty, Roebuck, and Smith 1990; Reisig and Giacomazzi 1998; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). Other studies indicate that fear of crime does not impact attitudes toward the police (Smith and Hawkins 1973; Zevitz and Rettammel 1990). Thus, it is not clear whether fear of being a victim affects a person’s confidence in the police.

To summarize, research on confidence in the police can be advanced in a number of ways. To begin with, in order to improve the applicability of any findings the topic must be studied in more countries with contemporary data. Future studies need to consider and empirically analyze how distinct country-level factors, such as corruption, democracy, ethnic diversity, and police organizational structure uniquely impact public confidence in the police. Furthermore, research should specifically evaluate how certain country-level factors impact confidence in the police among ethnic minorities. Further, the two previous multi-level studies on confidence in the police did not specify which theoretical frameworks they used to guide the inclusion of variables in their studies. Finally, given the multitude of conflicting studies on the impact of individual-level factors on confidence in the police, additional research is needed to clarify the importance of these variables and their relevance internationally. This dissertation takes up each of these challenges and thus fills an important void in the study of confidence in the police.
CHAPTER 3. METHODS

In this chapter, I outline research hypotheses derived from the theoretical considerations discussed in Chapter 1. Next, I describe individual-level and country-level variables that will be used in a cross-national, multi-level study to test these hypotheses. Lastly, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages associated with the data used in this study. The statistical techniques and results of this study are presented in Chapter 4.

HYPOTHESES

H1a: As the stability of democracy increases in a country, public confidence in the police will increase.

H1b: As the level of democracy increases in a country, public confidence in the police will increase.

H2: As perceived government corruption increases in a country, public confidence in the police will decrease.

H3a: Ethnic minority groups will have higher levels of confidence in the police in more stable democracies

H3b: Ethnic minority groups will have higher levels of confidence in the police in countries with higher levels of democracy.

H3c: Ethnic minority groups will have lower levels of confidence in the police in countries with higher levels of perceived government corruption.
As described in more detail in Chapter 4, I employ a 2-level hierarchical model of confidence in the police in order to test these hypotheses. I utilize both country-level and individual-level factors as independent variables in 53 countries in order to test these hypotheses. To better address hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c I introduce cross-level interaction terms in the analysis, ethnic minority status x stability of democracy, ethnic minority status x level of democracy and ethnic minority status x corruption. These interactions provide information on how government context affects ethnic minorities’ confidence in the police in particular countries. In the following section I describe the data I use in the study, beginning with a general description of the World Values Survey.

MULTI-LEVEL STUDY DATA

Individual-Level Data

The individual-level data in this study comes from the most current (2005-2008) World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is a collaboration project with the European Values Study (EVS) and is composed of a global network of social scientists. These scientists seek to study people’s beliefs and values, in their respective countries, and how they change over time. The project, guided by an executive committee, has produced five waves of surveys since 1981 that cover over 80 countries and nearly 90 percent of the world’s population (World Values Survey 2011). Over 400 journal articles and books use data from the WVS to study topics ranging from democracy to the interaction of climate and culture (World Values Survey 2011).
The 2005-2008 wave is conducted from 2005-2007 in a total of 57 countries. The World Values Survey allows each country to determine their sampling strategy. As a result, only some countries chose participants through a simple random sample.\textsuperscript{11} Other countries employ more complicated types of random samples (for example, in Russia, participants are chosen through a multi-stage stratified cluster random route sample). In fact, all countries use some version of random sampling to gather samples. In order to correct for not having a simple random sample, some countries use pre-sampling weights while others use post-sampling weights. However, because the majority of countries do not use the post-sampling weight made available by the WVS, I do not include the post-sampling weight in the analysis of this data. In order to ensure that sampling errors do not significantly impact the present study, I compare findings with regular standard errors in HLM to ones with robust standard errors. Because the results are similar, it is likely that the model is correctly specified (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

The WVS is conducted mostly through face to face interviews in every country. However, in three countries (i.e., Australia, New Zealand, and Japan), it is conducted through written surveys. In each country, a nationally representative sample (in terms of respondents’ race/ethnicity, age, regional distribution, occupation, etc.) is taken of at least 1,000 people over the age of 18, in the respondent’s own environment and language.\textsuperscript{12} Given that each country

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{11}] Since many of the countries do not adjust for the probability of selection into the sample, the results must be interpreted with caution
  \item[\textsuperscript{12}] Although the WVS website describes the age of their sample population as 18 and over, a close look at individual countries reveals that some countries interview person’s who are as young as 15 years old. I have reached out to the WVS with regards to this discrepancy and am waiting to hear back.
\end{itemize}
employs its own sampling methodology, countries encounter different problems with regard to accessing difficult-to-reach populations. Every country, however, seems to have experienced problems with access to homeless persons, those who are ill, or who cannot be reached at their home or with a phone number. Nonetheless, researchers survey populations in rural and remote villages as well as poor areas and include people who live in shacks and huts. Interview length is not reported by most countries, however in Ethiopia the average interview is 78 minutes.

With regard to the substance of the surveys, question and answer wording and sequencing are identical, to the extent possible, in every language (Cao and Hou 2001). Researchers exclude questions that are not relevant to the people in the country they are interviewing. For example, a question about whether a person believes that prostitution is justifiable is not asked in Hong Kong because researchers there do not believe the question is applicable to the local context. However, researchers need approval from the WVS Executive Committee to change a word or phrase to make it easier for participants to understand. According to Cao and Huo (2001: 90), “the survey is one of the most cross-culturally comparable datasets of values and attitudes in existence”.

It is beneficial to use these data (as opposed to the US or European Social Survey for example) because of the range of countries included, varying from poor to rich, developing to developed, and from countries with authoritarian governments to liberal democracies (World Values Survey 2011). Another advantage of the WVS is that it allows respondents to choose their ethnic group from a list of country-specific ethnic group categories. For example, in France, respondents are given the option to identify themselves as one of the following: Central Asian; East Asian; South Asian; Black, Other Black; White/Caucasian; or mixed race. Given the intent
of this study to measure the impact of ethnic minority status on confidence in the police across countries, this information is of great importance. Finally, this data set is valuable as it provides data on demographic characteristics of respondents and their values and attitudes. Having demographic data on respondents in combination with their level of confidence in the police allows for an in depth examination of confidence in the police. In summary, the WVS is appropriate for the present study because it offers contemporary information about levels of confidence in the police for respondents from a wide variety of countries while also offering unique and extensive data about the respondents themselves.

In the current study I use 53 of the 57 countries in the latest wave of the WVS (Table 1). These countries are included because they collect data on confidence in the police and publish a sufficient amount of additional country-level data. Iraq and Egypt are not included in this analysis because these countries did not ask respondents about their level of confidence in the police. Also, Burkina Faso and Colombia are not included because neither country publishes current and reliable data on police organizational structure. Nonetheless, a sample of 53 countries is more expansive than most previous studies on confidence in the police and the two most similar, multi-level studies examine 16 countries (Kaariainen 2007) and 29 countries (Ivkovic 2008), respectively (see also, Sung 2006a - 26 countries; Sung, 2006b - 59 countries; and Cao and Zhao, 2005 - 9 countries).

Yet, the limited number of countries included in this dataset may still be problematic. This would be expected to create problems with statistical power such that actual relationships between variables may not be detectable. However, one study shows that multi-level logistic regression models require at least 50 groups for accurate estimation (Hox 2009). The current
study examines 53 groups (countries) and it therefore may accurately estimate parameters. However, a larger sample would be preferable and would better ensure accurate results.

As most studies that rely on survey data, the current study has missing data. Specifically, 13.7 percent of individual level data are missing.\textsuperscript{13} In order to determine whether data are missing completely at random (MCAR) I implement an informal test using logistic regression. I use “missing” as the dependent variable and the individual-level variables as independent variables to determine if they predict missingness (i.e., whether a case would be list-wise deleted from the analysis).

The results indicate that all independent variables (female, income, age, political trust and life satisfaction) are significant predictors of missingness. In other words these variables are related to whether or not a case is likely to be deleted from the analysis due to missing data. For example, younger people are more likely to have missing data for some variables in the study, and thus be deleted from the study since list-wise deletion would erase the person’s entire case (i.e. their data for every variable). According to this test, then, the data are not MCAR. Little’s test in SPSS confirms that these data are not MCAR.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} This number excludes missing data from the ethnic minority status variable for which there is a separate discussion below. Looking at each variable alone shows that 1.2 percent of life satisfaction, 1.3 percent of political trust, 0.3 percent of age, 0.1 percent of gender, 10 percent of income, and 22 percent of minority status data are missing.

\textsuperscript{14} Chi-square = 489.214, DF = 28, Sig = .000
Upon further examination of the informal test, it is apparent that the differences between groups in the study versus those that are deleted are small and the relationships, although statistically significant, are quite weak. For example, the mean age of people who are in the study is 41.8 and the mean age of those who are in the missing group is 42.75, a mean difference of -.955. In other words, people who are in the missing group are on average less than one year younger than those in the study. The same type of small differences between groups exists for all the other independent variables as well. It is likely that these variables are significant predictors of “missing” because of the large sample size in this study. The large sample size increases the power of the study and makes finding even very small relationships more likely.

Although Allison (2002) argues that list-wise deletion should ideally be employed when less than 10 percent of data are missing, using it in this case is unlikely to lead to substantial bias (Allison 2002). List-wise deletion is also the most conservative way of managing missing data. Thus, level-1 data are not imputed and I use list-wise deletion.

15 In order to better determine the degree to which missing data potentially affects the analysis in this study, I determine $\Phi$ for the female (dichotomous) variable and calculate the point bi-serial correlation for the other variables. For female, $\Phi = 0.031$. This means that, if the missing values for female were available, the percent of the explained variation in age would increase by 1 percent. All other independent variables (for which I calculate the point bi-serial correlations) would also add less than one percent of information.
Variable Description

*Dependent Variable.* The dependent variable in this study is *confidence in police.* Confidence in the police is measured by asking respondents how much confidence they have in the police organization in their country and providing them with four response options: 1). A great deal of confidence 2). Quite a lot of confidence 3). Not very much confidence 4). None at all. Although it may have been preferable to use this variable in its original, ordinal form, transforming this into a dichotomous variable may have the advantage of reducing potential translation problems across countries (Cao and Hou 2001). Therefore, the variable is recoded into a binary variable so that 1 = confidence (a great deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence) and 0 = little confidence (not very much and none at all).

Although the measure of confidence in the police is well suited for the purposes of this study, it may be subject to several limitations. The first limitation is that confidence in the police is measured by a single question (Cao and Hou 2001). This study seeks to predict general attitudes toward the police as an institution. Yet, by only asking a person how much confidence they place in the police as an organization, it may not be possible to ensure that the respondent thinks broadly about the police when answering the question. Thus, a variety of questions tapping people’s broad level of confidence in the police would have been ideal for this study. However, general attitudes (i.e., people’s broader ideas about the police) are predictive of and highly correlated with specific attitudes toward the police (Cao and Hou 2001; Frank et al. 1996). Brandl et al. (1994) compares people’s answers from a variety of broad and specific questions about support for the police and shows that support for the police is unaffected by the
kind of question participants are asked. In other words, a person who expresses broad support for
the police is also likely to voice specific support for the police. Further, a study of racial
differences in attitudes toward the police reports that the broad question, “in general, how
satisfied are you with the police?” is highly correlated with more specific questions asking
respondents to evaluate the job “the police are doing controlling the street sale and use of illegal
drugs” and “how good a job” the police are “doing to keep order on the streets and sidewalks”
(Frank et al. 1996: 326). The results of these two studies suggest that whether a person is asked
one or many questions about the police and whether the questions are broad or specific, even one
item can serve as an indicator of the person’s general level of support for the police. Thus, the
dependent variable in this study is likely to be measuring what I seek to understand, people’s
broad level of support for the police.

Another potential limitation comes from reliance on respondents’ self-reported
confidence in the police. On one hand, using self-reported data is appropriate in this study
because I aim to evaluate personal attitudes and perceptions (Schmitt 1994). Indeed it is difficult
to measure a person’s perceptions of the police without asking them to report the perception. On
the other hand, caution must be exercised with all self-reported data, which may be subject to
exaggeration, withholding of information, or non-response bias. Further, people may report
having confidence in the police because it is socially desirable. Of particular concern is the
reliability of reports originating in authoritarian or post-authoritarian countries where

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16 The overall police attitude scale made up of these three questions has a Cronbach’s alpha = .843
respondents may be especially reluctant to report their true perceptions of the police (Cao and Burton 2006).

A final concern relevant to the dependent variable is the extent to which this measure is comparable cross-culturally and whether the term confidence has a similar meaning across cultures. Although the WVS ensures that questions are identical in every language, it is possible that the word confidence could not be perfectly translated in all languages. This is an important point, because if confidence, as I intend it to be understood, is not a measured concept, the study’s results may have questionable validity. Overall, however, with respect to the study of confidence in the police, the WVS is the best dataset available that includes a large number of countries and it has been used for many years in a number of comparative studies (Cao and Hou 2001; You 2006). If large measurement error in confidence in the police exists, it will create large standard errors that might render the effects of some independent variables non-significant (Hox 2009).

*Attitudinal variables.* Two variables that ask people about their attitudes are included in the study. The first is life satisfaction. It is measured by a question asking the respondent “all things considered, how satisfied are your with your life as a whole these days?” ranging from (1-10) completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied. This variable is a potentially important factor in people’s confidence in police because general satisfaction with life could be associated with satisfaction with government, including the police.

The second attitudinal variable is political trust. Political trust is the average amount of confidence (from 6 to 9 after recoding, least trust to most trust) in five public institutions: the
armed forces, political parties, the government, parliament, and the civil service. You (2006) and Ivkovic (2008) use similar measures of political trust. I am particularly interested in the political trust variable because a person’s perception of the police is likely to be part of their broader attitude toward the political system in a country. Furthermore, because the police are an essential part of government, it is necessary to understand how people feel about the government as these perceptions are likely to carry over to the police.

Demographics. Although a central focus of this dissertation is to examine what type of society inspires confidence in the police amongst its people, it is possible that any relationships between country-level factors and confidence in the police might dissolve after controlling for individual-level effects (Kaariainen 2007). Therefore, in order to properly explore the impact of country-level factors such as level of democracy and government corruption, it is necessary to control for the characteristics of the individuals within those countries such as their level of trust in the political system (Kaariainen 2007). The individual-level variables in this study also come from the 2005-2008 WVS and include income, race, gender, age, life-satisfaction, and political trust.

The income variable is measured by the respondent’s assessment of household income on a scale listing 10 different (country specific) income groups. The question is specifically worded as follows (World Values Survey 2011):

On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the “highest income decile” in your country. We would like to know in what group your
household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Minority status in this study is represented as a dummy variable based on a question that asks a respondent to choose their ethnic group from an (exhaustive) list of country specific ethnic groups. I use the ethnic group with the highest percentage of respondents as “majority group” (0) and combine the others to create the “minority group” (1). The same procedure is used by You (Personal Communication, 2010). A limitation of this approach is that determination of ethnic minority status by reference to a population percentage may not reflect the social status of an ethnic group in a country. For example, a dominant minority may exercise power over, or to the exclusion of a considerable majority. Historically, this has happened in Rwanda, Burundi, Iraq, Syria, Rhodesia and South Africa during apartheid, and in certain Latin American countries such as Guatemala, Haiti and Peru (Sisk 2009). Also, it is possible that faulty sampling may artificially inflate the proportion of a large minority group to be that of a small majority.

Therefore, in order to ensure that the majority group (highest percentage of respondents) matches up to the dominant group in a country, I compare these results against Fearon’s (2003) classification of ethnic minority groups in 160 countries. I also use his classification when there is not a clear majority of respondents in a country (Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ethiopia) (see ethnic heterogeneity section below for a discussion of Fearon’s methods). Although Fearon’s list is a standard tool used for classifying ethnic minorities, ultimately there is no source that can guarantee a completely accurate classification of ethnic minorities for all the countries in this study. In addition, the minority status variable is further limited because 12 of the 53 countries (Georgia, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey) do not measure participants’ ethnicity. Therefore, missing data exists for all the respondents in each of these 12 countries, representing 22 percent of all respondents. The lack of ethnic minority status data is a limitation in this dissertation.

Age is measured by a question asking individuals to report how old they are. The respondent’s sex is coded by the researcher as male or female during the interview. This variable is labeled female in the current study and took on the value of one for female and zero for male.

Macro-Level Data

The country-level data in this study come from a variety of public data sources. These sources are described below in detail. It is necessary to impute macro-level missing data because HLM will not operate if any level-2 (macro) data are missing. For all missing data at the macro-level, I use AMOS 18 (software intended for structural equation modeling) to impute missing values using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation techniques. “The basic principle of ML estimation is to choose as estimates those values that, if true, would maximize the probability of observing what has, in fact, been observed” (Allison 2002: 13). The sample size used in this study is 53 countries.

Perceptions of Corruption. If government corruption is perceived to be a problem in a particular society, it is likely that people will see the government as unfair and untrustworthy. The police, as a visible extension of the government, may also be subject to these negative perceptions. Therefore, in this study I incorporate a measure of perceived government corruption in a country.
In order to gauge the level of perceived government corruption, I average six years (1998-2004) of data from Transparency International’s (TI) *Corruption Perceptions Index* (CPI). In the CPI, corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Transparency International 2011). The CPI uses a score from one, indicating highly corrupt to 10, indicating highly clean to rank countries based on the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist among politicians and public officials. However, in order to transform this variable so that a higher score represents higher levels of corruption, I multiply it by -1 and then add ten. Thus, 8.15 is the highest level of corruption and 0.20 represents the least amount of corruption. CPI data comes from 12 separate expert and opinion surveys in 180 countries (Transparency International 2011), which makes it an aggregate of multiple polls (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007). The index scores are closely correlated across years and with other corruption indices (including polls by Gallup International, Business International, and the World Bank) making it a very useful measure (Treisman 2000). Furthermore, the CPI is widely used by researchers, including Kaariainen (2007). Because one of the goals of the current study is to determine whether Kaariainen’s findings from Europe are comparable to the findings from other parts of the world, it is appropriate to utilize the same data source. Corruption data from the CPI include all countries considered in this study, except Andorra and Rwanda.

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17 Although more recent data are available, I use the 2004 survey to ensure this independent variable precedes the dependent variable, confidence in police (which is measured from 2005-2007).
Level of Democracy. In addition to corruption data, I include a measure of the level of democracy in a country. This variable is included because theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter’s 1 and 2 suggest that levels of democracy might impact confidence in the police independent of the duration of that democracy or the form of previous government. It is possible that people who currently live in a democracy view the police as more trustworthy. In theory, a democratic government ensures that people have a say in how their government affects their lives. To the extent that people believe this to be a fairer system, the police would likely benefit from this positive evaluation of the government.

To measure the level or strength of democracy I use Freedom House’s political rights scores, as derived from the 2004 Freedom in the World survey. This survey assesses global political rights and civil liberties in countries across the world and examines trends in democracy (Freedom House 2011). The political rights score is determined by a numerical rating between one and seven for 193 countries with one signifying the most and 7 the least free.

The political rights score is based on assessment of a country’s electoral process and the freedom and fairness of elections and electoral laws. The score also evaluates political pluralism and participation, giving consideration to the rights of citizens to organize in political parties, to make political choices free from military influence, and to vote in opposition. As such, the Freedom House political rights score is one of the most widely used measures of democracy (Casper and Tufis 2003; Sung 2006; Treisman 2000; You 2006). They are also closely associated

18 Again although more recent data are available, I use the 2004 survey to ensure this independent variable precedes the dependent variable, confidence in police (which is measured from 2005-2007).
with several other measures of democracy including the Polity Data Series (Casper and Tufis 2003). Because Freedom House political rights scores are so highly correlated with these other common measures of democracy, I employ only data from Freedom House in this study. This is in keeping with methods utilized in other international studies on confidence in the police. Freedom House political rights scores are available from 2004 for all 53 countries in the present study.

*Stability of Democracy.* In addition to the level of democracy, I also include a measure of the stability of democracy in a country as part of this study. It is predicted that the citizens of a country with a long history of democracy may view the police more positively than those either in a nascent democracy or an undemocratic state. Governments in new democracies often have difficulty convincing people that they are acting in the best interests of the public. Indeed, corruption tends to be problematic in younger democracies contributing to more frequent turnover of elected officials.

To assess the stability of a democracy, I utilize data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI). This cross-national dataset, created by Beck et al., (2001) covers 177 countries and has been updated every few years through 2006. Specifically, I employ the Tensys variable from this dataset, which indicates how many consecutive years a country has been democratic since 1930 (Beck et al. 2001). Inglehart (1997) also uses consecutive years of democracy as a measure of the stability of democracy. Although alternative data sources exist (Alvarez et al. 1996; Treisman 2000), these are outdated relative to the data of Beck et al (2001). In this dataset a country is deemed democratic, as opposed to authoritarian, if it scores a six or
seven on a slightly modified version of Ferree and Singh’s (1999) Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC). In order for a country to score a six or seven, multiple parties have to win seats in the legislature and presidential elections must be contested (Beck et al. 2001; Ferree and Singh 1999). Data from the DPI are available from all countries considered in this study except Andorra, Hong Kong, and South Korea.

**Ethnic Diversity.** In order to tap the level of ethnic diversity in a country, the present study uses Fearon’s (2003) measure of ethnic fractionalization. Fearon (2003: 10-11) defines ethnic groups in 160 countries by determining which groups meet the following conditions: 1. Membership in the group is reckoned primarily by descent by both members and nonmembers; 2. Members share some distinguishing cultural features, such as common language, religion, and/or customs; 3. These cultural features are held to be valuable by a large majority of members of the group; 4. The group has a homeland, or at least “remembers” one; 5. The group has a shared and collectively represented history as a group that is not wholly manufactured, but has some basis in fact; 6. The group is potentially “stand alone” in a conceptual sense – that is, it is not a caste or caste-like group (e.g., European nobility or commoners).

Fearon restricts this classification to groups that compose at least one percent of a nation’s population in the 1990s. Ethnic fractionalization specifically measures the probability that two randomly selected people from a country will be of different ethnicities. Scores closest to zero indicate a homogenous country and scores that approach one designate a country that is
more ethnically diverse. This ethnic fractionalization score is calculated using a formula in which the share of a group in a country is subtracted from one. Data from the Fearon (2003) model are available for all countries in this analysis except for Andorra and Hong Kong.

An alternative and widely used ethnic fractionalization measure is offered by Alesina et al. (2003) and I therefore use Alesina’s measure in supplementary analyses. According to both Fearon and Alesina et al. their measures are very similar. Although they do not report the exact correlation, a bivariate correlation from the two measures in the present study is 0.903. Alesina et al. define ethnicity by combining “language, self-reported ethnicity, and physical features, primarily skin color” (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2009: 8). This measure of ethnic fractionalization is, like Fearon’s (2003), computed using the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a country belong to two different ethnic groups (Alesina et al. 2003). As fractionalization escalates from zero to one, members of a society are likely to be surrounded by more dissimilar groups (Alesina et al. 2003; You 2006). The model of Alesina et al. is more comprehensive than previous fractionalization measures because it provides data for many more countries and uses consistent criteria across countries to alleviate classification problems. However, both Fearon and Alesina et al. point out that it is not clear how ethnic and linguistic groups are differentiated in Alesina’s work. This is because Alesina’s measure relies mainly on language classifications in certain European and African countries. Ethnic fractionalization data from the model of Alesina et al. (2003) are available for all 53 countries in the present analysis.

See Fearon (2003: 208) for the formula used to calculate the ethnic fractionalization scores.
**Homicide.** As discussed earlier, crime levels may impact the public’s confidence in the police. One possibility is that high crime levels lead to less confidence in the police since the public may hold the police accountable for crime. In other words, when people don’t perceive the police to be functioning properly, they may have little confidence in the policing organizations in their country. Another possibility is that crime hinders any positive effect democracy has on confidence in the police because people may blame government for the breakdown of social order that crime symbolizes. Therefore, I include country-level homicide rates as a country-level variable. I choose homicide as a crime indicator because it is considered to be the most valid and reliable measure of crime cross-nationally (Neapolitan 1997).

I utilize homicide data from the *United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems* (CTS). I average the data (homicide rates per 100,000 people) from 1997-2003 from three different waves of this survey. This helps to reduce issues related to random yearly variations (Antonaccio and Tittle 2007: 9). It is though that recent CTS data are an improvement from Interpol data and are advantageous because they are available from more nations (Neapolitan 1997; Antonaccio and Tittle 2007). Nevertheless, the CTS survey does not provide data for eight countries in the present study: Brazil, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vietnam.

**Organizational Structure of Police.** In the present study, I utilize systematically collected data on three aspects of police structural organization – force centralization, number of forces, and whether a country employs a gendarmerie force. The organizational structure of police institutions has been a topic of interest and debate among the police and researchers for many
years (Bayley 1985, 1992; Langworthy 1986; Maguire 2003; Manning 1997; Wilson 1978). Many believe that police organizational structure affects at least the quality of police work (Bayley 1992). Indeed, key developments in policing over the past century are attributed to changes in organization structure. In the United States, for example, some believe that decentralization of command is largely responsible for the 1980s move toward community-based model (Bayley 1997). Furthermore, centralization of command has often been thought to eliminate police corruption. However, due to mixed empirical support for the relationship between centralization and corruption, it is commonly thought that structure is weakly related to police outcomes (Bayley 1997).

Organizational structure of the police may be important for understanding how much confidence people have in the police. Yet, few studies have looked extensively at this topic. Four recent studies on organizational structure, however, are important to consider. Wilson’s (2006) research investigating the link between police structure and the implementation of community policing in the United States suggests that no general connection exists. In other words, a specific organizational type (e.g. centralized organizations) is no more likely to employ community policing than any other type (e.g. decentralized organizations). Another study by Sung (2006b) finds no relationship between police department size and perceptions of police effectiveness in 28 market democracies. However, Ivkovic (2008) found that the more sworn officers and fewer women officers there are in a country the less likely people are to report that police are capable of controlling crime. Further, her results suggest that people in countries with multiple, coordinated police forces are more likely to believe that police are able to stop crime. Finally, Maguire (2009) reports that both the size and height (the social space between the lowest
and highest officers) of a police department impacts arrest rates in cases of sexual abuse. Overall, the effect of police organizational structures on police effectiveness and public perceptions remains unclear. As Bayley (1992: 539) argues, “what is needed…is a serious examination of the assumptions about the importance of organization variables.” Indeed, to date no quantitative multi-nation study examines the impact of force centralization on public confidence in the police. In this study I include measures of police structure in an effort to fill this additional void in the study of public confidence in the police.

A discussion of organizational structure of the police requires a definition of the police. Yet, a single definition has not yet been universally accepted (Manning 2003). Bayley defines the police as “people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations within the group through the application of physical force” (1985: 7). The “within the group” requirement in such a definition is necessary in order to exclude armies. However, when military formations are used to maintain order in society, they may be considered as acting police (Bayley 1985: 8). This definition is adopted for the present study.

The organizational structure of police institutions is defined by three features: centralization, number of forces, and jurisdiction overlap (Bayley 1985). Command centralization or decentralization can be established by considering “whether operational direction can be given routinely to subunits from a single center of control” or “whether there is independence of command subunits” (Bayley 1985: 54). The number of forces simply refers to whether a country has a single police force, or multiple forces (Bayley 1985). Finally, multiple-force nations are separated into two groups depending on whether jurisdictions overlap (Bayley 1985: 57). A system is said to be multiple and coordinated in states such as Italy where one force
has jurisdiction over any given geographic area, even if there are numerous forces in the country (Bayley 1985). In contrast, a system is said to be multiple and uncoordinated in nations such as the United States where multiple forces have authority over a given geographic area. Because so few countries in this study utilize multiple and uncoordinated systems, there is insufficient variation to justify including this variable in the present study.

In addition to these features of police organizational structure, a measure of whether a country employs a gendarmerie force is also included. Gendarmerie forces are considered to be security forces that fall between the military and the police (Lutterbeck 2004). Since many gendarmerie forces, such as those in France, Spain and Italy have both an official military administrative status and a largely civilian policing mandate it is inappropriate to label them as paramilitary (Gobinet 2008: 452). Paramilitary forces, can be defined as those that “act in support of or in lieu of full-time active or reserve armed forces” (Gobinet 2008: 452). Gendarmerie forces are not military police because such a categorization would neglect their largely civilian police mandate (Gobinet 2008). Overall, gendarmerie forces are neither paramilitary nor military (Gobinet 2008) and they play an important policing role in many mature democracies, including the Netherlands, Italy and France.

In order to collect data on force centralization, number of forces, and whether a country employs a gendarmerie force, I begin by referencing the World Police Encyclopedia (Das and Palmiotto 2006). I utilize additional sources to either confirm the information from the Encyclopedia or find information that is not available from that source. I begin by visiting police organizations’ formal websites (English language only) for each country. I then refer to academic articles and books that have been written about the organizational structure of police
organizations in different countries (mostly qualitative studies of one to a handful of countries). Finally, I use OSCE and Interpol’s websites to collect additional and/or confirm information on the following questions for each country: Is command centralized or decentralized? Are there multiple or single forces? Does the country employ an active Gendarmerie force?

These data, originating from multiple sources and independently coded, may be more prone to transcriptional errors than other data in the present study. Furthermore, information on the police forces from different countries is available for different years, threatening the accuracy of its assessment. Nevertheless, after reviewing a number of sources, I am confident that I have obtained up-to-date and accurate information about the structure of police departments for every country in this study.

Data Limitations

One limitation of this study is that the data do not take into consideration personal experiences with the police. This is unfortunate because studies have shown that negative personal experiences with the police can be an important determinant of trust in the police at the individual-level (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2002; Weitzer and Tuch 2005). However, because most people do not have significant personal interactions with the police, perceptions of them are certainly more likely to form from a variety of indirect sources. For example, in 1999, only 21 percent of the United States public had an encounter with the police and a little over half of those contacts were in traffic stops (Sherman 2002). As many as 90 percent of the individuals involved in these stops report that the officers behaved properly. Importantly, in the same year, less than 0.5 percent of the US population age 16 or older report that they had an encounter with the police
during which they were threatened with or actually experienced force. Of these people, whites are as likely as blacks and Hispanics to describe this force as excessive (Sherman 2002).

Further, most people in other parts of the world also rarely come into contact with the police. For example, in 2007 only 18 percent of people in France, 11 percent of those in Bulgaria, 24 percent of those in Greece, 11 percent in Turkey, 24 percent in Ghana, 29 percent in Nigeria, 19 percent in Hong Kong, and 10 percent in Japan, report having any contact with the police in the 12 months prior to being questioned (Transparency International 2011). Therefore, contact between individuals and the police is relatively rare and although it may have some effect on public confidence in the police it should only be considered as a part of this equation and its influence may be secondary to that of vicarious contacts and country-level factors.

An additional limitation of this study is that the data do not provide information about individuals’ personal experiences with government corruption. Kaariainen, (2007), however, in his study of trust in the police in sixteen European countries, reports that the level of corruption in government measured at the country-level has an effect on trust in the police, independent of whether or not individual’s themselves come into contact with corrupt public officials (in fact, individual experience with corruption explained very little country-level variation). According to Kaariainen (2007: 428), this is not surprising since the level of corruption in government is commonly known among citizens. In other words, corruption within government becomes “everyday knowledge.” Despite these limitations, the present study offers a unique chance to examine confidence in the police among thousands of people from 53 different countries.
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

PLAN OF ANALYSIS

Given that the primary sources of data in this study are nested and can be reasonably grouped within higher units (individuals within countries), I employ a two-level hierarchal model to test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3. When data are nested, traditional statistical techniques (e.g. OLS) are inappropriate because units (people) within one country are more similar to each other than to units in other countries. For example, people in the US might have more similar levels of life satisfaction to each other than they would to the people in Russia. This would cause independent variables to be correlated with the error term in OLS (or in any analysis that relied on the assumption of independence) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In this situation, standard errors are attenuated and the risk of making a type I error would increase (McCoach 2010). Alternatively, hierarchical linear models (HLM) account for the non-independence of observations by allowing slopes and intercepts of lower units of analysis (demographics of individuals, for example) to vary based on membership within the larger units (countries, for example). These models also account for non-independence by including both individual and group-level errors (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

In HLM, each level has its own equation (or, as in the present case, each of two levels has their own equation). These equations describe relationships between variables within the levels and they describe how the variables in one level impact relationships at the other level (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). This structure allows one to hypothesize about relationships at both the individual level and country-level and across levels. Ultimately, HLM efficiently combines different levels of analysis into one comprehensive model.
The major advantage of using HLM for the purposes of the current study is that both individual and country-level relationships are “simultaneously modeled and estimated” (Sampson and Bartusch 1998: 790). I estimate the impact of individual-level and country-level factors on the log odds of an individual having confidence in the police versus no confidence in the police. The extent to which country-level factors shape the effects of ethnic minority status on confidence in the police is also estimated. For example, I examine the extent to which an ethnic minority’s confidence in the police is shaped by the level of democracy in a country. For all these reasons, HLM is an appropriate statistical technique to use in the current study.

Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model

I am unable to employ traditional HLM for this study because the outcome variable, confidence-in-police, is binary. Therefore, inference from normal distribution theory is inappropriate and the assumptions of the traditional HLM, linearity and normality at level-1, will be violated. More specifically, the linearity assumption would be violated because there would be no boundaries on the predicted estimates of the level-1 outcomes in traditional HLM. Thus, predicted values of confidence in the police would be out of range. A logit transformation is necessary to constrain the outcome to lie in the interval (0, 1). The normality assumption would be violated because the level-1 random effect can only take on two values, and thus, “cannot be normally distributed” (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292). Finally, the level-1 random effect would not possess homogenous variance; instead, it would be contingent on the predicted value of the outcome variable (confidence in the police) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292).
Fortunately, alternative methods for computing models with discrete outcomes are available. For example, a high-order Laplace transformation is “an alternative approximation that is typically accurate and computationally convenient” (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292). Models which use such approximations are referred to as hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs). The difference between HLM and HGLM is similar to the difference between traditional linear and non-linear models (between single-level linear regression and generalized linear models, for example) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Generalized models allow data that violate the normality and linearity assumptions of standard HLM to be logically analyzed. In particular, I employ a hierarchical generalized linear model that uses the Bernoulli distribution and a logit link function. In the following sections, I outline descriptive information about the data, describe the specific steps I take to run the model, and report the results.

Description of Data

There are seven level-1 variables in this study (including confidence in the police). In Table 2 descriptive information about the data is provided. The table indicates that slightly more

\[\text{\textsuperscript{20}} \text{Yet, a few new problems crop up in moving to the multi-level setting. For example, “the variability in the level-1 outcome may be greater than expected under the level-1 sampling model” (referred to as overdispersion; underdispersion is the opposite problem) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 334).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{21}} \text{All continuous level-one data are normally distributed as indicated by the data plotted on a histogram and then by looking at tests of normality provided by SPSS: p-plots, skewness and kurtosis scores and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests.}\]
than half of the sample (52 percent) is female and 18 percent report being an ethnic minority. The average age of study respondents is just under 42 years. A country-specific income indicator (on a scale from one to 10, where one indicates the person is in the lowest income bracket and 10 indicates they are in the highest) shows that most study respondents fell in the middle of the income spectrum. Further, the average respondent has slightly more rather than less political trust (described above) and is more rather than less satisfied with their life. Lastly, 59 percent of respondents have confidence, as opposed to no confidence, in the police.

At the country-level, democratic countries such as Finland, Norway and Australia enjoy very high levels of confidence in the police. However, authoritarian countries such as Vietnam and Jordan also have high levels of public confidence in the police. Latin American countries such as Peru and Argentina and post-communist European countries such as Moldova and Romania score towards the low end with respect to the public’s level of confidence in the police. Figure 1 displays a larger sample of countries and percentages of people within those countries reporting confidence in the police.

Level-2 descriptive statistics are also shown in Table 2. Eighty one percent of the sampled countries have centralized police departments, 53 percent have multiple police forces, and 43 percent have a gendarmerie force. On average, countries in the sample experience 5.81 homicides for every 100,000 people. A histogram of homicide data shows that this variable is severely and positively skewed to the right. Numerical tests for normality confirm this finding.22

22 Skewness = 4.17; Kurtosis = 21.74. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests are both significant.
Therefore, I include the log of the homicide rate in the level-2 HLM equation. Most countries in the sample have moderate levels of ethnic fractionalization (0.41). On average, countries in the sample are perceived to be moderately corrupt (average is 4.95 on a scale of one through 10). Furthermore, the typical country in the sample has been democratic for 35 consecutive years. Most countries in the sample have a fairly high level of democracy (mean of 2.49 with one the highest and seven the lowest level).

The variable tapping level of democracy, when graphed on a histogram, appears very slightly positively skewed. Skewness (1.04) and Kurtosis (-0.04) scores indicate that the variable is within normal limits. However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests are both significant, indicating a departure from normality. Common transformations, such as logging, squaring, or taking the square root of the variable do not seem to produce a more symmetrical variable. The variable, when graphed in its various transformed states looks less normal than the original variable. Further transformations do not make the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests non-significant. Because it is not advisable to transform a variable whose distribution is close to normal and because formal tests of normality can be overly sensitive, particularly with large samples, I chose to leave this level of democracy variable in its natural form in model 1 (Tukey 1977).

23 The base-10 logarithm transformed homicide into a normally distributed variable. The histogram of the logged homicide rate appears to be normally distributed and this is confirmed by the following: skewness = 0.302; Kurtosis = -0.2447. Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests are non-significant.
However, a P-P plot indicates a slightly s-shaped curve. This suggests that the level of democracy is somewhat skewed and perhaps would fit a binomial distribution. Therefore I therefore dichotomize the level of democracy into a binary variable, measuring whether a country is fully democratic or not, and enter it in a separate model, model 2. Countries that receive a designation of one by the Freedom House are those that most completely meet the ideals of an electoral democracy. Countries that receive all other designations (two through seven) indicate that the country in question has fewer political rights, and thus does not provide citizens with the highest levels of political freedom. In model 2, I replace the original level of democracy variable with this new binary variable. A simple correlation between confidence in the police and the level of democracy is non-significant, but the dichotomized, full democracy/not full-democracy variable is significantly related to confidence in the police.

Plan of Analysis

In order to properly estimate the proposed hierarchical models, several steps are taken. First, the level-1 model is specified (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Estimating a level-1 model by including all possible predictors and then changing the model by deleting variables whose effects are non-significant is not advisable in HLM (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292). There is a limited amount of variation to be explained, and it is easy to over-fit a model by having too many random level-1 parameters, for example, because the variation would be split up into too many small pieces (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292). Explanatory variables would be given very little power in this case. Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) thus recommend using a step-up approach instead of the saturated model.
Therefore, I begin by only including independent and control variables that theoretical considerations suggest to be important. I include independent variables related to a person’s background including age, sex, income and ethnic minority status and attitudinal variables including political trust and life satisfaction. These variables are either theoretically warranted predictors or control variables (see Chapters 1 and 2). Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem among these level-1 independent variables (Table 3).  

Next, I establish whether the level-1 intercept should be fixed or random. I do this by examining a two-level (non-linear) model where the level-1 intercept is the dependent variable at level-2 and no country-level variables are added to level-2. I find that the intercept is indeed significant (P value < 0.001) (Table 4). This suggests that there is variance remaining at level-2 after controlling for level-1 variables. In other words, the level of confidence in the police in a country still varies after controlling for respondent’s age, gender, income, life satisfaction, political trust and ethnic minority status. Although the ICC is often used as a measure of the amount of variance at level 1 that could be explained by level 2 factors, it is unclear what the ICC would mean when a generalized linear model link is used at level 1.

Finally, I determine whether other coefficients should be fixed or random. I accomplish this by first deciding if theory requires random effects for these coefficients - if so, they remain random. The slope for ethnic minority status is kept random since it has the theoretical potential to interact with the level and stability of democracy at the county-level. Since theory does not

24 The strongest relationship is between confidence in police and political trust however, $r = 0.485$, which is below the 0.7 level at which one might suspect problems with multicollinearity.
dictate whether the other level-1 variables should be random, I employ a diagnostic model in which each level-1 coefficient is initially treated as a random effect. In the level-2 equation the intercept is the only predictor. Making all level-1 variance components random produces significant effects for all included variables except income (Table 5). With the exception of political trust, however, these coefficients have small variances. Ultimately, I keep political trust as random because it is significant and has the largest variance component. I also keep minority status as random on the basis of theoretical requirements.

The level-1 model is displayed below. As mentioned earlier, the level-1 model uses the Bernoulli distribution and a logit link function in which the log of the odds of having confidence in the police is a function of a person’s demographics and attitudes. It is composed of the following level-1 equation:

$$\eta_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{LIFE SATISFACTION})_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(\text{AGE})_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(\text{INCOME})_{ij} + \beta_{4j}(\text{POLITICAL TRUST})_{ij} + \beta_{5j}(\text{FEMALE})_{ij} + \beta_{6j}(\text{MINORITY})_{ij}$$

where $\eta_{ij}$ is the expected log odds of having confidence in the police (for a female of average age, who has average levels of life satisfaction, political trust and income and who is a minority in a country). There are $i = 1, \ldots, n_j$ level-1 units nested with $j = 1, \ldots, J$ level-2 units. Thus, person $i$ is nested in country $j$ (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292). $\beta_{0j}$ is a random intercept. $\beta$'s are level-1 coefficients. The terms in parentheses are level-1 predictors (usually denoted by $X_{ij}$).

All level-1 variables are originally entered in their natural metric. Next, I run a model with all level-1 variables group-centered. When a variable is group-centered, the group mean for
that variable is subtracted from the raw value.\textsuperscript{25} Often, a specific research question requires a single type of centering, but different types of centering can be employed to deal with various questions in one study (Enders and Tofighi 2007).\textsuperscript{26} Either type of centering can be employed when one is interested in the effect of aggregate level-1 means as level-2 predictors. I add the average age, life satisfaction, gender, and political trust scores from level-1 as predictors at level-2. Group centering removes between-cluster mean differences from level-1 scores. Thus, it is imperative to add aggregate variables at level-2 when group centering because without them all “information about the between cluster variability is lost” (McCoach 2010: 130). Group mean centering analyzes the relationship between level-2 variables and the dependent variable without controlling for level-1 variables, which is why it is so important to add the aggregate level-1 scores to level-2 when using group centering. This is also why grand-mean centering (or no centering) is preferable when looking at the effect of a level-2 variable while controlling for level-1 variables. I interpret results based on these recommendations.

The next step is to decide which variables to include in the level-2 equation. Similar to the process for building the level-1 equation, I begin by choosing potential covariates for the level-2 intercept based on reference to theory. I therefore include the level-2 variables that are

\begin{itemize}
\item For example, age = age – the group mean for a particular country (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292).
\item For example, I use group centering when the relationship between a level-1 variable and the dependent variable is of substantive interest and when examining cross-level interactions (Enders and Tofighi 2007). I look at results from the variables in their natural metric when interpreting the effect of a level-2 variable on the dependent variable while controlling for level-1 variables.
\end{itemize}
described in Table 2. I then specify additional level-2 regression equations using the level-1 intercept, the coefficient for minority status, and the coefficient for political trust as dependent variables (per the discussion of random effects above). For the equation with the level-1 intercept as the dependent variable at level-2, I use all the group level factors (uncentered) as independent variables.\(^{27}\) Whereas, for the equation with minority as the dependent variable at level-2, it is only necessary to incorporate level and stability of democracy and corruption (see interaction term below). Lastly, for the equation with political trust as the dependent variable at level-2, it is not necessary to include group-level variables in the equation; I simply use the intercept as the only predictor.

I treat level-2 coefficients as random effects, as is typical (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 292) and rely mostly on unit-specific results.\(^{28}\) Cross-level interactions between ethnic minority status and stability and level of democracy and corruption are entered at this point. Therefore, level-2 equations take the following form:

\[^{27}\text{According to Raudenbush and Bryk (2002: 35) the location of the x for group level variables is not as important as considerations with individual level variables since “problems of numerical instability are less likely…”}\]

\[^{28}\text{The unit specific model explains how variation in explanatory variables at level-2 connects to variation in the level-1 processes in all level-2 units. In contrast, the population-average estimates cannot provide information on distributions of outcomes across level-2 units (countries) except by specifying the mean. The unit-specific estimates (or country-specific estimates in this case) hold constant both other predictors and the random effect value. The population average estimates, in contrast, hold constant the predictors, but averages over the distribution of the level 2 random effects. The “unit-specific models are richer, but the price is greater sensitivity to model assumptions” (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002: 303-304). I rely on unit specific results, but report population average models in Table 10 and discuss them when necessary.}\]
\[ \beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{ETHNIC FRACTION}) + \gamma_{03}(\text{HOMICIDE}) + \gamma_{04}(\text{CENTRALIZED}) + \gamma_{05}(\text{MULTIPLE POLICE FORCES}) + \gamma_{06}(\text{GENDARMERIE}) + \gamma_{07}(\text{CORRUPTION}) + \gamma_{08}(\text{AVE LIFE SATISFACTION}) + \gamma_{09}(\text{AVE AGE}) + \gamma_{10}(\text{AVE POLITICAL TRUST}) + \gamma_{11}(\text{AVE FEMALE}) + \gamma_{12}(\text{LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{13}(\text{LOG HOMICIDE}) + u_{0j} \]

and,

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \]

and,

\[ \beta_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{CORRUPTION}) + \gamma_{03}(\text{LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY}) + u_{0i} \]

where \( \gamma_{00}, \ldots, \gamma_{63} \) are level-2 coefficients (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The terms in parentheses are level-2 predictors (usually denoted by \( W_j \)). \( u_{0j}, u_{4j}, u_{6j} \) are level-2 random effects (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

Multicollinearity is potentially problematic between corruption and stability of democracy since the correlation between the two is 0.753 (Table 6). However, because theory dictates that both are important predictors of confidence in the police, both variables are included in the level-2 equation for the intercept so as to reduce the risk of a specification error.

The next step is to run the model, using HLM 6.08 software, by allowing level-1 coefficients to vary over countries as a function of country characteristics (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

In model 1, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for corruption is 4.08 and 5.15 for stability of democracy. In model 2, the VIF for corruption is 5.8 and 4.4 for stability of democracy. The VIFs are higher than the commonly accepted threshold of 4 (Fisher and Mason 1981), but given that this is a cross-national, multi-level study, high VIFs are common and these are only slightly above the threshold of 4. Still the results should be viewed with caution, since including both variables carries a risk of not being able to identify the true contribution each variable makes and standard errors may be inflated. However, both variables have small standard errors.
Thus, the final model is denoted by the full equation:

\[ Y_i = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION}) + \gamma_{03}(\text{HOMICIDE}) + \gamma_{04}(\text{CENTRALIZED}) + \gamma_{05}(\text{MULTIPLE POLICE FORCES}) + \gamma_{06}(\text{GENDARMERIE}) + \gamma_{07}(\text{CORRUPTION}) + \gamma_{08}(\text{AVE LIFE SATISFACTION}) + \gamma_{09}(\text{AVE AGE}) + \gamma_{10}(\text{AVE POLITICAL TRUST}) + \gamma_{11}(\text{AVE FEMALE}) + \gamma_{12}(\text{LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{13}(\text{LOG HOMICIDE}) + \gamma_{14}(\text{LIFE SATISFACTION}) + \gamma_{15}(\text{AGE}) + \gamma_{16}(\text{INCOME}) + \gamma_{17}(\text{POLITICAL TRUST}) + \gamma_{18}(\text{FEMALE}) + \gamma_{19}(\text{MINORITY}) + \gamma_{20}(\text{STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{21}(\text{CORRUPTION}) + \gamma_{22}(\text{LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY}) + \gamma_{23}(\text{MINORITY}) + \gamma_{24}(\text{POLITICAL TRUST}) + \gamma_{25}(\text{MINORITY}) \]

RESULTS

After imputing country-level data, I examine 70,959 people’s confidence in the police in 53 countries. In these countries, more people report having confidence (58.7 percent) than no confidence (41.3 percent). The final model based on the above equations, as well as a second model that includes the dichotomized level-of-democracy variable, are discussed in this section. First, however, I present a discussion of the simple bivariate correlations between level-1 variables and the dependent variable and between level-2 variables and the dependent variable. With regard to level-1 variables, the strongest (positive) correlation is between a person’s level of political trust and their level of confidence in the police. They share nearly 24 percent of variation. Life satisfaction has the second largest positive relationship to confidence in the police, although this relationship only explained one percent of variation. The remaining

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30 Country-level missing data are imputed in AMOS. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion.
variables including age, income and ethnic minority status are all significantly related to confidence in the police, but the amount of variation they accounted for is less than one percent.

At level-2, corruption shares the strongest negative correlation (-0.44) with confidence in the police, where high corruption is related to low confidence in the police. Stability of democracy is also related to confidence in the police (0.34), but in a positive direction. Hence, as the years of democracy increase so does confidence in the police. Further, these results indicate that the log of the homicide rate (-0.30) and ethnic fractionalization (-0.33) are significantly related to confidence in the police. Finally, the original level of democracy variable is not significantly related to confidence in the police, but a dichotomized level of democracy variable is significant (0.03). As discussed earlier, potential problems arise from the high correlations between corruption and the stability of democracy (0.78) in model 1, and corruption and the binary democracy variable (0.76) in model 2. To gain a more in-depth understanding of how these variables impact public confidence in the police, I employ multi-level models.

In order to estimate the amount of variation between countries with respect to the public’s confidence in the police, I estimate a model with no predictors (the unconditional model) and observe that $\gamma_{00} = 0.43$. In other words, the expected log-odds of having confidence is 0.43 (the average across persons and countries, for a country with random effect $\nu_{oj} = 0$). This results in an odds of $\exp(0.43) = 1.53$, or to a probability of $1/(1+\exp(0.43)) = 0.39$. Further, assuming a country’s log-odds of having confidence in the police is approximately normally distributed, with mean 0.43 and variance 0.97, about 95 percent of countries in the sample should have values of $\beta_{oj}$ between $0.43 \pm 1.96 \times \sqrt{0.97}$, or between -1.49 and 2.35. This indicates that 95 percent of countries should lie between 0.225 and 0.485 in regard to the probability of having
confidence in the police. Therefore, the estimated population average might be a more accurate portrayal of the amount of variation between countries since the probability 0.47 is closer to the actual population mean of confidence in the police of 0.59 (See Raudenbush and Bryk, 2000: 303 for a more in-depth discussion of the population average probability).

Tables 7 and 8 display the results of two HLM models using the logit link function.\footnote{I present robust error estimates in the Appendix. They are not presented in the primary models because they are best for data that have moderate fairly large number of level 2 units compared to level 1 units. Similarity between the errors means that assumptions about the accuracy of the coefficient estimates are not susceptible to departures of the data from assumptions about the distribution of the random effects (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Thus, it is notable that the robust error estimates do not differ much from those in the primary model in this study.} Model-1 is the primary model and is based on equation 1.5 presented above (table 7). Model-2 is identical to the first model, except the continuous level of democracy variable is replaced by a binary full democracy/not full democracy variable (table 8). Results are shown for both group-centered independent variables and un-centered independent variables in the table. Tables 9, 10, and 11, respectively, present unit-specific results with robust standard errors, population average results and unit specific results for Alesina and colleagues’ ethnic diversity variable for both models 1 and 2.

In model 1, certain findings from the multi-level study confirm prior research whereas some findings are surprising. At the individual level, when other variables are held constant, whether an individual is an ethnic minority is not statistically related to confidence in the police. This is the first study to look at the relationship between being an ethnic minority and confidence in the police across countries. However, in many studies based in the United States and in several...
other single-country studies, being a minority significantly lowers a person’s confidence in the police (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, You’s (2006) research suggests that minority status significantly affects a person’s level of political trust. In this context, the finding that being an ethnic minority may not have a significant impact on a person’s confidence in the police across countries contradicts much previous research. However, there is a significant amount of missing minority data across countries in this study and it is possible that this has affected the outcome of this analysis.

Life satisfaction and political trust have been recently found to be important predictors of confidence in the police (Cao and Zhao 2005). Indeed, it is found here that the average level of political trust a person has is strongly associated with confidence in the police. Being satisfied with one’s life is also a significant predictor of having confidence in the police. With regard to political trust, as it increases, it is associated with a higher log-odds (2.06) of having confidence in the police. More specifically, there is over a 200 percent change in the odds of having confidence in the police for an increase in a person’s level of political trust, holding other variables constant. It is possible that political trust mediates the relationship between ethnic minority status and confidence in the police. Specifically, minority groups may have lower levels of political trust and this attitude, rather than being an ethnic minority itself, may explain why minority status was non-significant. Results also show that the more satisfied a person is with their life, the higher their odds, $e^b = 1.04$ of having confidence in the police.

Consistent with prior research (see Chapter 2), age is significantly related to confidence in the police in such a way that older persons are more likely to have confidence in the police. Technically, holding other variables constant, older age is associated with higher log odds
(0.003) of having confidence in the police. In other words, a change in age results in a 0.3 percent change in the odds of having confidence in the police. Mixed results have previously been found for the effects of gender and income on confidence in the police. The results of this study show that gender is significantly associated with confidence in the police. Specifically, holding other variables constant, being female increases the log odds (0.138) of having confidence in the police. Thus, being female results in an $e^{0.138} = 1.15$ change in the odds of having confidence in the police, or a $15\%$ change in the odds of having confidence in the police, holding other variables constant. Unlike gender, income is not significantly related to confidence in the police. Thus, in this study, although income and confidence in the police are weakly associated in a simple correlation, once other individual-level and country-level variables are taken into account, a person’s income level no longer influences their confidence in the police.

Notably, at the individual level, age, gender, political trust and life satisfaction have similar effects regardless of the model’s specification. Further, as in model-1 income and minority status are non-significant in all these models. Thus, with respect to the level-1 variables, the results of this study seem to be fairly robust.

With regard to the country-level variables, and in congruence with their simple correlations with confidence in the police, perceived government corruption and ethnic diversity are significant in model-1 and in model-2. People in more corrupt countries have a lower log odds of having confidence in the police (-0.21), holding other country and individual level variables constant. In other words, a change in perceived corruption at the country-level is associated with a 21 percent change in the odds of a person in that country having confidence in
the police. Ethnic diversity is also negatively associated with confidence in the police (log odds = -1.24) when other predictors are held constant. Thus, citizens (both majority and ethnic minority groups) who live in more ethnically diverse countries tend to have less confidence in the police. The previously mentioned result that ethnic minority status is not significantly related to confidence in the police is consistent with this finding, in the sense that both minority and majority groups have lower confidence under certain circumstances.

Life satisfaction, when aggregated within a country and added as a predictor at level-2 is also significant in both models. Thus, not only does a person’s life satisfaction influence their confidence in the police, but the average level of satisfaction in a country is positively associated with a person’s confidence in the police, holding other variables constant.

The cross-level interactions in model-1 are non-significant. However, the interaction between being an ethnic minority and corruption is significant in model-2. Being an ethnic minority in a more corrupt country lowers the odds ($e^b = 1.15$) of having confidence in the police.

Since no police organizational structure variable has a simple correlation with confidence in the police, it is not too surprising that these variables remain non-significant in model’s 1 and 2. Further, the level of democracy also does not have a simple correlation with confidence in the police and remains non-significant in model-1. It is possible that the level of democracy is non-significant because of the linearity problem discussed earlier. Thus, in model-2, I replaced the level of democracy variable with a binary, full-democracy/not full-democracy variable. This is significantly related to confidence in the police in a simple correlation and is a significant predictor of confidence in the police in model-2. In particular, holding other variables constant,
there is an $e^{b} = 0.90$ increase in the odds that a person in a fully democratic country will have confidence in the police in comparison with a person living in a country that is not fully democratic.

Despite a moderate, simple correlation between the stability of democracy and confidence in the police, this relationship becomes non-significant when other variables are accounted for in both models. Perceived government corruption might be mediating the relationship between the stability of democracy and confidence in the police. To illustrate, stability of democracy has a strong correlation with corruption and both these variables have simple correlations with confidence in the police. However, once these are both entered into the model, stability becomes non-significant in both model-1 and in model-2. Thus, people in stable democracies may be more likely to have confidence in the police because such countries have lower levels of perceived government corruption and vice versa. Further, because full democracy remains significant after controlling for stability of democracy and corruption, people living in a full democracy (in terms of level of political freedom) may be more likely to have confidence in the police whether or not that country has been democratic for many decades.

Additionally, the log of homicide has a significant simple correlation with confidence in the police, but is non-significant in both model-1 and in model-2. However, this variable has a fairly strong, significant simple correlation with ethnic fractionalization. Since both these variables are related to confidence in the police, but when entered into the multi-level models, the log of homicide becomes non-significant this could indicate that ethnic fractionalization mediates the relationship between the log of homicide and confidence in the police. In other words, countries with high homicide rates, in this sample, may also be heavily fractionalized
down ethnic lines. In these countries, people may be less likely to have confidence in the police, not because of the high crime rate, per se, but because of the perceived breakdown of social norms that might exist in countries that are ethnically diverse.

Taken together, these findings do not support hypothesis 1a, that as the stability of democracy increases in a country, public confidence in the police will increase. Though, as just stated, it could be that corruption mediates the relationship between years of democracy and confidence in the police. Model 1 does not support hypothesis 1b, that as the level of democracy increases in a country, public confidence in the police will increase. However model-2 shows that full democracy in a country increases the odds that a person in that country will have confidence in the police. This study supports the second hypothesis that as perceived government corruption decreases in a country, public confidence in the police will increase. Finally, these findings do not support hypotheses 3a and 3b, that ethnic minorities will have higher levels of confidence in the police in more stable democracies and in countries with higher levels of political rights. However, I do find, in congruence with hypothesis 3c, that ethnic minority status and corruption interact. Minorities who live in more corrupt countries are less likely to have confidence in the police. However, because of missing data problems with the ethnic minority variable, these results should be interpreted with caution.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I describe the analytic strategies employed in this dissertation and discuss the findings. Overall, the study of public confidence in the police in 53 countries using a
combination of macro- and micro-level predictors shows that perceived government corruption and ethnic diversity can hamper citizens’ confidence in their police whereas full democracy (in terms of level of political freedom) seems to garner support for the police. Furthermore, people who have high levels of trust in the political system and are satisfied with their own life are more likely to have confidence in the police. These findings highlight Albecht and Green’s (1977) argument that attitudes about the police are connected to people’s broader attitudes toward their government and the political process in the country within which they live. It appears that they may also relate to how satisfied people are with their personal lives. Unfortunately, garnering political trust and life satisfaction in people is certainly not an easy or straightforward task. However, reducing political corruption at the country-level may increase people’s trust in the political system and the police, by extension. Ultimately, despite data limitations, the findings from this research shed light on issues that have not been previously addressed in the study of public confidence in the police.
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY

As stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this dissertation is to better understand why people have confidence in the police in the country in which they live, with a particular focus on the effect of government context. To this end, the preceding chapter quantitatively explored confidence in the police using multi-level, hierarchical models. A benefit of such a study is that it provides a wealth of quantitative information on the impact of distinct variables on confidence in the police. However, such a study is not able to look in-depth at how complex factors play out in particular countries over a period of time. A case study is thus undertaken in this chapter in order to more closely examine how government context affects confidence in the police in particular countries over a number of years.

Specifically, the aim of this Chapter is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between democracy, government corruption and confidence in the police. I also seek to explore the impact of police organizational structure and ethnic minority status on confidence in the police in the countries in this case study. In the previous chapter it is suggested that government corruption mediates the relationship between democratic stability and confidence in the police. I am therefore particularly interested in further exploring whether and how the stability of democracy (as indicated by how many years it has been democratic) and government corruption impact confidence in the police. With this mind, in this case study, I investigate confidence in the police in two young, but full democracies (in terms of level of political freedom) and compare them to an old, stable democracy.
For the young democracies, I investigated confidence in the police in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, during the 1990s. I also assessed confidence in the police in the United Kingdom during this time period in order to compare the new democracies to an old, stable democratic nation. I focus on Central and Eastern European, post-communist countries in the 1990s for four main reasons.

First, I chose these countries because it is possible to compare them to one another. Post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe had uniquely similar experiences to one another in their transition to democracy. This is because communist domination came to an end in a shorter period of time in this region (between 1989-1991), than it did elsewhere in the world (Skaaning 2006). For example, democratic transitions occurred in Latin America and Southern Europe from the mid-1970s onward (Skaaning 2006). Further, prior to this transition there had been a steadier and more severe suppression of civil and political rights in Central and Eastern Europe compared to other autocratic countries in the world (Dryzek and Holmes 2002: 255-256; Skaaning 2006). The end of communism therefore brought about a very dramatic and swift improvement in the level of democracy in the countries in this region (Skaaning 2006). By

32 The post-communist countries I am referring to are as follows (Skaaning 2006): Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 11 of these are now liberal democracies (most from the Central Eastern European region and the three Baltic countries) Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia (Diamond 2008).
contrast, the Latin American wave of democratization was slower, uneven, and moderate; the forms of repression were more varied, and the usual level of regard for political rights was higher during this period (Skaaning 2006).

The second reason why these countries are chosen for this case study is because although they are new democracies, they were fully democratic in the 1990s, at least in the sense that they afforded the public a full range of political rights as measured by the Freedom House, *(Freedom House* 2011). Because full political rights were also afforded to citizens in the United Kingdom during the 1990s, the level of democracy is to some extent controlled for in this case study and I can better focus on the stability of democracy and government corruption.

Third, including these countries allows for an investigation of how police organizational structures affect the public’s confidence in the police in new versus old democracies. Significant police reforms were undertaken in communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s and I evaluate how levels of confidence in the police might be affected or unaffected by these changes.

Finally, I focus on Central and Eastern European post-communist countries in the 1990s because literature on policing in post-communist countries in this era is widely available. This is because the downfall of communism in the region, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Diamond 2008) was so significant (Bayley 2006). Because of these events, 28 countries left communism behind and many became democratic nations (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2004). Further, this move toward democracy marked the end of the third, or some say the beginning of the fourth, wave of democracy across the globe (Schraeder 2002).
In order to compare these countries to one in which democracy has a long history, public confidence in the police in the United Kingdom in the 1990s will also be examined. The United Kingdom serves as a good comparison for several reasons. First, the United Kingdom is representative of the Western world and the stable, well functioning democracies that exist in the West. Second, the modern day police were first developed in London in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel (Berg 1999). As a result, a vast amount of literature is available on the police in the United Kingdom and a variety of the police policies and reforms have been implemented or experimented with in the United Kingdom. Lastly, many countries have adopted the British model of policing, often times because they are former British colonies. Therefore, much can be learned by considering the public’s confidence in the police in the United Kingdom as compared to the Czech Republic and Lithuania.

The decision to study the Czech Republic and Lithuania from among all the Central and Eastern European post-communist countries, by and large derives from practical considerations. Most notably, I was limited by data considerations when choosing which specific countries to study. The first step in deciding which countries to include in this case study involved making a list of the countries for which confidence in the police data is available from the World Values

33 Policing itself was not invented by Peel in the 1800s. The history of policing dates back more than 5,000 year (Enders and Dupont 2001: 2). It is “specialist police services” as we know them today that started with Peel in 1829 (Enders and Dupont 2001).

34 Because there is so much information available about policing in the United Kingdom and less about the other two countries, however, there is a lack of consistency with respect to the available data. This is a potential weakness of the case study.
Survey from the 1990s. Using these guidelines, I was left with Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The next step was to perform some exploratory research on which countries have police websites and research on police available in English. The Czech Republic and Lithuania had the only comprehensive English language police websites and the most relevant studies of policing. Therefore, I chose these two countries for inclusion in the present case study. However, as described in more detail below, these are countries with different histories because unlike the Czech Republic, Lithuania was part of the USSR for many years and this may affect public confidence in the police.

In the following sections of this chapter, I present and discuss the methods used in this case study. The qualitative data, consisting of existing literature on various explanatory factors, are then analyzed. Levels of confidence in the police in each country are discussed. Next, broad country-level factors are analyzed and, as the spiraling process suggests, more specific data on the police in each country are then analyzed. I subsequently consider ethnic minorities and their relationship with the police in the three countries. Lastly, I discuss findings and draw conclusions in the final section of this chapter.

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35 Although findings from this case study cannot be readily generalized to other countries, a goal of this study is to provide more color into how different governing structures may impact public confidence in police in new versus old democracies. Future studies should re-test the ideas put forth in the current study in additional countries.
CASE STUDY METHODS

In order to examine confidence in the police in the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, I performed an analysis of existing literature related to a variety of country-level factors (stability and level of democracy and police organizational structure) and ethnic minority status. To ensure that this analysis was carried out in a systematic fashion, I created an Excel data table with a section for each of the potentially important factors. For each variable, I took notes from a variety of sources. A spiraling process was used, whereby I moved from general to more specific readings and official information while looking for emerging themes (Creswell 1998; Palys 1997; Silverman 2000). Thus, I first looked at the relevant country reports from the CIA World Fact Book’s website and Freedom House’s Nations in Transit website to gain an understanding of basic contextual information about the countries under consideration. This information included a brief historical sketch of the countries and a look at each country’s specific type of government/democracy and racial and ethnic make-up during the 1990s. I entered notes from this research in the “contextual information” section of the data table.

Second, literature on democracy in the three countries was analyzed and all data were entered into the “democracy literature” section of the table. Next, a record of the country’s political rights scores from the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports, which had data dating back to 1972, was used to conceptualize the progression of democracy in each country. However, I also took a more in-depth look at democracy by analyzing existing literature. Notes

36 Although the Nations in Transit reports only date back to 2003, they provide useful historical sketches of the Czech Republic and Lithuania.
from this section were put in the “level of democracy” column of the data table. Next, I used the data of Beck et al. (2001) on the stability of democracy to record how many years a country had been democratic and entered this information into the “stability of democracy” cell of the data table. Then, I coded scores from Transparency International’s country reports on the level of perceived government corruption in the same years that confidence-in-police data are available. Information collected from these reports was placed in the “corruption” section of the table.

More specifically, academic studies on policing in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the United Kingdom were analyzed and information was added to the “specific police literature” portion of the table. Next, data on police organizational structure was taken from the World Police Encyclopedia (see Chapter 3) and entered in the “police structure” section. Confidence in the police data were then collected from the 1990s from the World Values Survey, notes were put into the “confidence in police” section (in Lithuania from 1990, 1997 and 1999; in the Czech Republic from 1990, 1991, 1998, and 1999; and in the United Kingdom from 1990 and 1999). Next, I referred to the police websites of Lithuania and the Czech Republic and entered useful information into the “police websites” column. Lastly, I entered information about ethnic minorities, from a variety of academic books and journals on the topic of ethnic minority groups in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom, into the “ethnic minority” section of the spreadsheet for each country.
During and after the data collection process, I analyzed these notes and searched for common themes in how country-level factors and a person’s ethnic minority status affect confidence in the police in these countries.\textsuperscript{37}

CONFIDENCE IN POLICE

The World Values Survey includes data on public confidence in the police from the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Lithuania in the years 1990 and 1999. However, it also includes data from the Czech Republic in 1991 and 1998 and from Lithuania in 1997. Thus, I took advantage of this additional information about public confidence in the police in the Czech Republic and in Lithuania in this analysis.

Although people in the Czech Republic and Lithuania had low levels of confidence in the police during the 1990s, data from the WVS indicate that these levels still varied between these two countries. The levels differed even more when comparing the Czech Republic and Lithuania to the United Kingdom. In 1990, only 28.5 percent of Lithuanians expressed either (quite a lot or a great deal of) confidence in the police. In 1997, even fewer Lithuanians had confidence in the police at 20.8 percent. In 1999, the situation improved slightly where 26.4 percent had confidence in the police. Lithuania had some of the lowest levels of confidence in the police in comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries (\textit{World Values Survey} 2011). In the United Kingdom in 1990, 77 percent of the population had either a great deal or quite a lot of

\textsuperscript{37} Because I use the spiraling procedure to analyze this data, it was necessary to organize the spreadsheet from the broadest to most specific information source, as opposed to organizing data by variable, for example.
confidence in their police. In 1999, 69 percent of people had the same level of confidence in the police. In the middle of these two extremes, but still at the lower end, lies the Czech Republic. In 1990, 34.1 percent of the population reported either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police. In 1998, as many as 44.3 percent expressed having confidence and in 1999 confidence levels slip to a mere 33 percent – the lowest score since the World Values Survey began interviewing Czechs.

What can account for this variation? I began by looking at broad country-level factors and proceeded to more specific factors about police in the three countries. Finally I examined the status of ethnic minorities and the police in each country.

ANALYSIS

In this section, a brief overview of the history of each country and its specific type of government is provided. Further, the ethnic make-up of people in these countries is also discussed. This section illustrates important differences and similarities among the countries.

The Czech Republic

The closely connected Czechs and Slovaks, once residing under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, formed the nation of Czechoslovakia after World War I (CIA World Factbook 2011). The country then fell under Soviet influence following World War II. Specifically, only a small portion of Eastern Czechoslovakia was officially taken over by the Soviet Union. The rest of Czechoslovakia was heavily influenced by, but not officially a part of, the Soviet Union, and was thus a satellite state (NATO 2011). In 1989, Czechoslovakia gained freedom from Soviet
influence by way of a peaceful “Velvet Revolution.” This revolution, which eventually led to Czechoslovakia’s independence from communist rule, was composed of a series of non-violent, major civic protests that lasted several weeks (Skalnik Leff 1997). Four years later, Czechoslovakia separated into two separate nations, The Czech Republic and Slovakia (CIA World Factbook 2011). The split was non-violent, although not preferred among many Czechs and Slovaks at the time, and is often referred to as the “velvet divorce” (Skalnik Leff 1997).

After establishing independence, the Czech Republic became a parliamentary democracy (CIA World Factbook 2011). Under this political system the parliament formed a legislative body and chose a prime minister and cabinet ministers according to the strength of parties as determined by public parliamentary elections. By this system, the government had responsibilities to both the public and the parliament (CIA World Factbook 2011). The relationship between Czech democracy and confidence in the police is examined below.

Czechs made up over 90 percent of the population of the Czech Republic with respect to ethnicity in the 1990s (Vermeersch 2006). During this time, the Roma (also referred to as Gypsies) were the largest minority group in the Czech Republic and made up somewhere

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38 The Czech Republic has a population of 10,211,904 and is slightly smaller than South Carolina (CIA World Factbook 2011). The Czech Republic is landlocked between the countries of Slovakia, Germany, Poland, and Austria (CIA World Factbook 2011).
between 0.3-2.9 percent of the population (Vermeersch 2006). A discussion about how the Roma viewed the Czech police in the 1990s is presented in a later section.

Lithuania

Beginning in 1569, Lithuania and Poland were integrated into a single (two-part) country, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (CIA World Factbook 2011). This state survived for over two-hundred years until 1795, when it was divided up by neighboring, more powerful countries. Lithuania reclaimed its independence after the World War I, but in 1940 it was taken over by the Soviet Union (CIA World Factbook 2011). Thus, whereas the Czech Republic was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, Lithuania was officially forced to incorporate into that nation. This was important because Soviet Republics faced more severe repression under the totalitarian rule of the Soviet Union than did communist states in other parts of East and Central Europe. However, Lithuania and the other Baltic states stood out from other former Soviet Republics in that their government claimed they were illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union and thus maintained that they were an independent state under illegal occupation until 1991 (Fried 2007). In March of 1990, Lithuania was the first Soviet republic to proclaim its sovereignty. Moscow did not recognize this declaration, however, until after its unsuccessful

39 It is thought that the Roma left their home in India between the 9th and 10th centuries, traveled through Asia and the Middle East to Central and Western Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries (Minorities at Risk Project 2011).
coup in 1991. The last Russian troops eventually withdraw from Lithuania in 1993. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuania’s experience was notably better than that of many other post-Soviet states, both economically and politically (Rose 2009). Like the Czech Republic, after Lithuania’s independence their government became a parliamentary democracy (CIA World Factbook 2011). I examine the connection between Lithuanian democracy and confidence in the police below.

Lithuania was more ethnically diverse than the Czech Republic in the 1990s. Lithuanians were the major ethnic group at 83.4 percent of the population. The next two largest ethnic groups were the Polish and the Russians who made up 6.7 and 6.3 percent of the population, respectively (CIA World Factbook 2011). However, the Roma who made up around 0.07 percent of the Lithuanian population, were the most marginalized group in this society (Minorities at Risk Project 2011). Further, the Polish and Russians did not face any real discrimination in Lithuania (Minorities at Risk Project 2011). Thus, I focus on the Roma in subsequent discussions about Lithuania’s minorities and confidence in the police.

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40 Lithuania has a population of 3,555,179 and it is slightly bigger than West Virginia. Lithuania is located in Eastern Europe, where it sits between Latvia and Russia and borders the Baltic Sea. It is considered a Baltic state (CIA World Factbook 2011).
United Kingdom

As the prevailing industrial and naval power of the 19th century, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was instrumental in developing parliamentary democracy (CIA World Factbook 2011). At its peak, the British Empire extended over a quarter of the earth's surface (CIA World Factbook 2011). In the first half of the 1900s, however, the United Kingdom's power was gravely reduced through both World Wars and the withdrawal of the Irish Republic (CIA World Factbook 2011). During the second half of the 20th century, after the dismantling of the British Empire, the United Kingdom rebuilt itself into a modern and affluent European country.

The United Kingdom is a stable democracy (Freedom House 2011). Specifically, it is a Constitutional Monarchy, which is defined by the CIA World Fact Book as a government whereby the monarch’s rights, obligations, and responsibilities are described by written law or tradition. The United Kingdom is simultaneously a parliamentary democracy.

In the 1990s in Great Britain about 94 percent of the public was white (Owen 1996). The two largest ethnic minority groups were blacks, particularly Black-Caribbeans and Black-Africans who make up 1.8 percent of the population and South Asians, particularly Indians and Pakistanis who made up 2.9 percent of the population. The Chinese and other groups accounted for approximately 1.2 percent of the population (CIA World Factbook 2011).

\[41\] I refer to Great Britain because ethnicity information is not collected from Northern Ireland in the 1991 census (Office for National Statistics, 2010). The ethnic minority population in Great Britain increased by 53 percent by the 2001 census, partly because the census added a mixed race category (Office for National Statistics, 2010).
The level of democracy, as determined by the extent of political rights afforded to the public, in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the United Kingdom is assessed by the political rights scores for these nations in the Freedom House *Freedom in the World Surveys*. The Freedom House (2011) rates each country’s level of political rights on a scale of one to seven; a score of one designates the highest amount of political freedom and seven the least degree of freedom. These political rights scores are based on evaluations of a country’s electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of its government. In addition to the Freedom House rankings, a review of literature about democracy in these three countries is also undertaken.

With regard to the Freedom House rankings, Czechoslovakia received a rating of one, which indicated political freedom, from the Freedom House in 1990. Prior to that Czechoslovakia was considered undemocratic every year dating back to 1972 when the Freedom House began rating countries on political and civil rights. When Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic retained its rating of one that year and continued to do so each year in the 1990s.

A review of literature revealed, on the one hand, that the Czech Republic did in fact provide citizens with a full range of political rights. For example, the Czech Republic’s elections

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42 For more information on the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Survey see Chapter 3.
were rooted in proportional representation and were carried out in a fair manner. Moreover, formal constraints on political activities were almost non-existent (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). Furthermore, the military rested securely under civil control and presented no serious threat to democracy in the 1990s (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). On the other hand, many political problems plagued the Czech Republic. For example, the government failed to fully put provisions of the constitution into practice when the senate did not materialize until the fall of 1996, nearly four years after the Czech constitution was accepted (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). This was problematic and it reduced Prime Minister Klaus’ accountability. Notably, by 1997, in the midst of accusations of corruption, Klaus resigned (Kraus 2003). Further, the 1998 parliamentary elections were accused of being unfair because of an agreement between leaders of the opposing parties that restricted significant political competition (Kraus 2003). Ultimately, although the Czech Republic had all the makings of an electoral democracy throughout the 1990s, the spirit of democracy in the country seemed to be lacking.

To make sense of the fact that the Freedom House rated a country with such political turmoil as one with the highest degree of political freedom, it was helpful to view the Freedom House ratings as based on “minimalist” definitions. That is, they focus on whether elections are free and fair (Deegan-Krause 2006). More specifically, according to Deegan-Krause, minimalist definitions pay too much attention to how elections are carried out, while the behavior of elected officials is ignored. Elected officials, who do not act in the best interests of the people who elected them, threaten democracy. In fact, they may be the biggest threat to democracy (Deegan-Krause 2006). Indeed, Huntington (1996: 8) argued that future threats to democracy will probably result from “political leaders and groups who win elections, take power, and then
manipulate the mechanisms of democracy to curtail or destroy democracy.” Fortunately, President Havel fixed these political crises in accord with the constitution and in a way that ensured democracy would continue to reign in the country (Kraus 2003). However, the Czech Republic’s trust in government is, understandably, greatly reduced (Kraus 2003).

The Freedom House began rating Lithuania in 1991. In that year and in 1992 Lithuania received a two for political rights. This score indicated that although the country still provided a wide range of political rights to the people, it experienced problems that weakened its democracy. Although the Freedom House does not explain why Lithuania received this rating, it seems appropriate. First, the last Soviet troops did not leave Lithuania until 1993. The Freedom House does not give a country a rating of one unless they are completely free from domination by foreign powers (Freedom House 2011). Further, the 1992 parliamentary election campaigns were quite bitter and many predicted that the Sajudis government would not give up power if they lost to the Democratic Labour Party (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). In the end, the Sajudis party did lose and left office willingly (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). Ultimately, all elections in Lithuania in the 1990s were free from major problems and were considered to be fair (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). Lithuania first received a Freedom House rating of one in 1993 and continued to do so in each year since that time.

A review of the literature, however, revealed serious political problems in Lithuania. For example, many government officials in the 1990s were paternalistic, overconfident and corrupt (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). The politicians seemed unsympathetic to the fact that many Lithuanians were suffering from economic hardships (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002: 51). Further, legislation was often passed to benefit party loyalists (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). If free
elections were the defining measure of democracy, Lithuania would pass the test (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002). However, if the respect leaders had for the public were emphasized, one might question whether Lithuania was a genuine democracy in the 1990s. In other words although fair elections took place in Lithuania during the 1990s, because elected officials often did not work in the interest of the public, the spirit of democracy seemed to be lacking in this country. It is, therefore, no surprise that Lithuanians had little trust in political parties and institutions in the 1990s (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002).

The experiences that the Czech Republic and Lithuania had with democracy in the 1990s seem to support a conflict perspective -- once they were elected, officials served their own interests at the expense of less powerful members of society. Because ethnic minority groups may be more marginalized members of society, they might have lower levels of confidence in the government than majority groups in new democracies, as their rights are unlikely to be protected. The specific experiences of ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic and Lithuania are analyzed below.

The Freedom House gave the United Kingdom a rating of one, indicating the highest level of political freedom, every year since 1972 when it began collecting data. This came as no surprise since the United Kingdom plays an important role in advancing parliamentary democracy throughout the world (CIA World Factbook 2011). The citizens in the United Kingdom were able to alter their government democratically and had all the other freedoms that democracy required in the 1990s (Freedom House 2011).

However, the United Kingdom struggled with political problems in the 1990s. Specifically, Britain experienced tensions with Northern Ireland leading up to and even
following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 (*Freedom House* 2011). Britain officially gave power to a Northern Ireland assembly in Belfast in 1999. A shared-power agreement among the Sinn Fein (the political arm of the Irish Republican Army) and the Ulster Unionists arose from the Belfast Agreement of April 1998, also known as the Good Friday Agreement. Yet internal fighting between loyalist paramilitary organizations and disagreements around police reform, the presence of the British military, and disarmament endangered this agreement during the 1990s (*Freedom House* 2011). Nonetheless, the public in Britain retained high levels of trust in government throughout this time.

In summary, solely focusing on the level of political rights afforded to citizens based on the Freedom House ratings might lead one to conclude that democracy functioned in the same way in the United Kingdom as it did in the Czech Republic or Lithuania during the 1990s. However, a deeper look revealed that, particularly in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, unique and significant threats to democracy existed during this time. Because of this, it is useful to consider the stability of democracy in these countries. Freedom House ratings, indicate the extent to which a country is providing certain political rights to its citizens. It is thus measuring the level or degree of democracy (Inglehart 1997). On the other hand, a measure of how many continuous years of elections have been free and fair can be used as a measure of the stability of democracy (Inglehart 1997).

The level of democracy in a country can be high, while its stability low. This was the case with the Czech Republic and Lithuania. In their most recent experience with democracy both countries experienced their first democratic elections in the 1990s. They both had a high level of democracy in that same decade. The United Kingdom on the other hand, was one of the
most stable democracies in the world, as measured by continuous years of democracy (Huntington 1991; Vanhanen 1984). A long stint with democracy seemed to stabilize the political process. Indeed, throughout the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, free and fair elections were established, but the parties that engaged in the electoral competition were not (Diamond 2008: 195-196). From the very start of the 1990s, numerous parties rose and fell from power and some completely left the political arena (Diamond 2008). It seemed that a precedent had been set where new political parties introduced themselves as the uncorrupt, non-establishment politics and won elections amid anti-incumbent sentiment (Diamond 2008). However, these new parties then quickly lost public favor through their own corruption and substandard policy performance (Diamond 2008). This was the case in Lithuania, and, to a lesser extent, in the Czech Republic (Birch 2001; Diamond 2008). While it is normal for vote totals to shift around, democracy necessitates some amount of stability in the character and support of its constituent political parties for successful governance to take place. This degree of party stability had still not yet been realized in Lithuania and the Czech Republic in the 1990s (Diamond 2008). Thus, we may have only been observing a mirage of democracy in these post-communist democracies. In addition to ensuring party stability, continuous years of democracy may also reduce the amount of government corruption. Such corruption is discussed in the following section.
Government Corruption

Government corruption was pervasive in all post-communist European countries in the 1990s (Kaldor and Vejvoda 2002).43 It ranged from petty acts such as bribing traffic officers or building examiner inspectors, to grand corruption such as illegally influencing political choices at the highest level of government (Karklins 2002: 22). It also involved the taking of public assets by bureaucrats who sometimes converted entire public organizations into a sphere for private gain (Karklins 2002). Although the degree and type of corruption varied from one post-communist region to another, the fundamental features of this corruption were similar across the countries (Karklins 2002). The precise form that a corrupt act takes (bribes, nepotism, exploitation, and so on) is less important than how it distorts the workings of the political system. Thus, in addition to the direct costs of corruption for the people, corruption can undermine democracy itself (Karklins 2002). By interfering with the objectives of public organizations, corruption weakens democracy and good governance by both diminishing public confidence in state and political institutions and undermining proper political function (Karklins 2002). In fact, even after many years after the transition from communism, corruption was still the leading obstacle to democratic development in post-communist countries (Karklins 2002).

The large degree of corruption in the post-communist countries has been blamed on different causes. Some view this corruption as the inheritance of communist norms and organizations that stress personal connections, merge political and economic power, and make the rule of law a secondary priority (Treisman 2003). Others see it as the result of the fears and

43 Corruption, the “misuse of public power for private gain” (Karklins 2002: 23) is also defined in Chapter 1.
opportunities for profit from the economic changeover itself. Still others assign responsibility to
the reformers who planned economic changes incorrectly and paid scant attention to the
construction of institutions (Treisman 2003). However, according to Treisman (2003) all of these
ideas presuppose that corruption in post-communist countries is a different occurrence that
should be accounted for in its own terms (Treisman 2003). In fact, Treisman (2003) argues
that high levels of corruption in post-communist countries may have little to do with post-
communism. While post-communist countries may be corrupt in unique ways, they are not
corrupt as a result of unique causes. The countries in this region possessed corrupt and
unresponsive governments, primarily because they lacked a post-war record of democracy
(Treisman 2003). The choices leaders made and the effectiveness of their attempts to improve
government may have therefore been strongly constrained by characteristics of the countries they
led and the conditions they inherited (Treisman 2003). Whatever the cause of corruption in post-
communist countries, it is clear that it had serious consequences. A critical consideration for the
current study, however, is how corruption impacted the Czech Republic and Lithuania in
comparison to the United Kingdom.

As in the rest of the post-communist region, corruption in the Czech Republic was
problematic in the 1990s (OECD 2011). Although it is hard to determine the exact level of
corruption (OECD 2011), data has been collected on perceived corruption in the country. The
Czech Republic was first rated on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in
1996 (data for this index is collected from the previous two years) where it received a 5.37 (10
being highly clean and zero being highly corrupt). The Czech Republic’s score dropped slightly to 5.2 in 1997 and then again to 4.8 in 1998, indicating higher corruption. In 1999, corruption reached its highest level (with a score of 4.6) in the Czech Republic since the beginning of data collection by Transparency International. Although Transparency International does not publish reports to explain a country’s score on the Corruption Perceptions Index, a review of literature revealed that serious political scandals took place throughout the 1990s, but mainly after 1995. These scandals may explain why the Czech Republic was increasingly perceived as corrupt throughout that decade. For example, Prime Minister Klaus of the Civic Democratic Party resigned in 1997 after evidence of widespread corruption in his parties’ financial management surfaced (Appel 2004). Further, the 1998 parliamentary elections were seen as unfair because opposing parties, civic democrats and social democrats, worked together to ensure each of their parties had power while limiting competition from other parties (Freedom House 2011). It had been argued that civic democrats and social democrats ignored each other’s misdeeds in private, while pretending to be political opponents in public (Jordan 2002). Ultimately, political corruption in the Czech Republic in the 1990s likely explains public trust deficits in government.

Corruption in Lithuania was also quite problematic. Transparency International does not publish a measure of the perceived levels of corruption in Lithuania until 1999, though, as was the case with the Czech Republic, the data for this report were collected from the previous two years. Lithuania received a 3.8 on the CPI scale. In noting that “corruption is endemic” in

44 For more information on this index see Chapter 3.
45 It was ranked 37 out of 85 countries that year.
Lithuania, Girnius (2002: 54) discusses the 1995 World Bank study which revealed that 54 percent of businesses reported paying bribes to government officials. In addition, 80 percent of foreign investors claimed they had been asked for bribes and 90 percent asserted that corruption was an obstacle to expanding investment.

In the political realm, principal members of the Foreign Ministry were paid bonuses up to 335 percent of their base salaries (Girnius 2002). It is also notable that legislation in Lithuania was often badly drafted and conflicting with previous laws, leaving government agencies broad discretion in law enforcement (Girnius). The legislature did not have a proper way of figuring out whether the executive branch had accurately implemented laws or inducing compliance when it did not (Girnius 2002). Committees did not have power to subpoena or compel officials to discuss evidence or give records over to the proper authorities. Lastly, judges were often inadequately trained, vulnerable to bribery, and lacking in the skills necessary to interpret and apply laws (Girnius 2002). Ultimately, it is clear that corruption was widespread in Lithuania during the 1990s (Girnius 2002).

Government corruption was also perceived to exist in the United Kingdom, but not nearly to the extent that it did in post-communist countries. For example, in the 1990s, the Conservative and Labour parties were thought to be overly dependent on money from corporations and this was thought to impact their policy decisions. Transparency International ratings showed that the United Kingdom scored an 8.5 (out of 10) in 1995, an 8.4 in 1996, an 8.2 in 1997, and an 8.6 in 1999. Thus the corruption problem, although somewhat problematic, was perceived to be

46 This placed the United Kingdom at 13 out of 99 countries.
vastly less severe in the United Kingdom than in either the Czech Republic or Lithuania.
Corruption may lead to unjust outcomes and thereby call into question the legitimacy of a
government, even one that is democratic. More specifically, democracy relies on ensuring
political equality and public sector corruption violates this ideal by treating people in a random
and unequal manner (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002). Indeed, corruption seemed to hamper
the public’s perception of government in the Czech Republic and in Lithuania.

Police Organizational Structure and Specific Police Research

To what extent does the organizational structure of the police in the Czech Republic,
Lithuania, and the United Kingdom contribute to confidence in the police among the public? For
several countries, the change from communism to democracy produced significant
transformations, not only in politics and the economy, but also in the criminal justice system
(Ivkovic and Shelley 2008: 59). The introduction of these changes was important because under
communism the police’s main purpose was to “serve and protect the needs of the government,
while operating under a veil of secrecy” (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008: 59). To accomplish this
objective, it was not unusual for the police to engage in human rights violations and to disregard
the public’s needs (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). Crime prevention and criminal investigations
were considered less important than the political type of policing that took place in communist
countries (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). This type of policing characterized both the Czech
Republic and Lithuania prior to their democratic transformation.

Immediately after gaining independence, the government of the Czech Republic began
reforming police institutions (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). Though many of these changes were
put into practice by the Czech government, the European Union had a degree of control over the reforms. The Police Act of 1991, the biggest post-transition reform, produced key legal changes and established the function of the modern Czech police (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003). The Act delineated the precise rules for how the Czech police should operate and their responsibility to the rule of law (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). In particular, the Act stated that officers must inform citizens of their rights and when asked, display police ID (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). It also, among other things, defined the fair use of force and limited the capacity of the police to collect information about individuals outside the scope of a criminal investigation (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008).

Following the Velvet Revolution and establishment of the Police Act, much importance was placed on decentralizing command structure of the police in the Czech Republic (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003). Prior to 1989, the Czech police were under the central control of the Ministry of the Interior and were part of a single operational division that was easily monitored. In their attempt to decentralize police functions, the Czech police were separated into three operational units. However, this caused organizational problems such as repetition of tasks and wasted resources (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003). In an attempt to lessen repetition and improve the stream of information through the department, a move back to centralized command commences in the mid-1990s (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003).

The National Police of the Czech Republic thus remained centralized under the command of the Interior Ministry and acted as the single police force in the country (Das and Palmiotto 2006). This allowed Czech police to focus on reforms to increase effectiveness (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003). In fact, some suggest that the Czech police had improved their crime
prevention skills. To the extent that this is true, these claims imply that Czech police were becoming a more modern force by concentrating on crime prevention (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003).

Despite some successes, many problems were manifest in the Czech police organization of the 1990s. Although the police seemed to have taken on a more democratic style, they at times, displayed troublesome behavior that was more characteristic of the communist era forces (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003). For example, in 1999 the Prague Police were accused of several brutality (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003). Further, in spite of numerous attempts at reducing corruption in the Czech government, police corruption was a serious problem in the Czech Republic (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). In fact, the Czech public ranked the police as one of the more corrupt social institutions (Ivkovic and Shelley 2008). Ultimately, the transition toward a more democratic type of policing is far from finished in the Czech Republic though identifiable progress was made in the 1990s (Jenks, Costelloe, and Krebs 2003).

Similar to the Czech Republic, social changes in Lithuania through the early 1990s generated a need for a completely new policing response (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004). Unfortunately, this police reform produced employment insecurity and internal turmoil (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004 2004). Within the Lithuanian police force, there were poor work conditions and pay was low (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004 2004). Russian military forces remained in Lithuania in the beginning of the 1990s even though a goal of the early period of independent policing was to show that the Lithuanian police were capable of defending the public from Russian aggression (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004 2004). Not surprisingly, the
notion of community or democratic policing was not included on the policy agenda (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004 2004).

Police restructuring in Lithuania can be linked back to the Police Act of 1990. The Act was responsible for changing the name of law enforcement from “militia” to the civilian-like name, “police” (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004 2004). In restructuring the militia in 1990, the goal, in part, was to decentralize the government’s power over the police by establishing separate systems for state and municipal police (Uildriks and Reenen 2003). This change was difficult and, in the end, this dual system failed (Uildriks and Reenen 2003). This was largely because the municipal police remained below the state police in stature and organizational problems were widespread (Uildriks and Reenen 2003: 51). By the late 1990s, it was clear that police services worked without a consistent strategy and there was extensive overlap in tasks. Thus, the Lithuanian Police remained accountable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and were headed by the Police Commissioner General - their structure became centralized and hierarchical (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004 2004).47

Despite the restructuring failure, some important progress was made over the course of the 1990s in the Lithuanian Police, especially along political lines. For example, police brutality dropped significantly, political prosecutions become nearly non-existent, and the police no longer performed the role of prosecutor and investigator that is typical of the communist era

47 The Lithuanian Police system is the single general police force in the country, however several specialized agencies exist (e.g., State Border Guard Service; Customs Criminal Service; Special Investigation Service; State Security Department, etc.) (POLIS 2011).
Simultaneously, the focus of policing turned away from working as an arm of the Soviet government to fighting crime (Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto 2004). In this way, the Lithuanian Police force became more modern. Further, on an organizational level, the problem of police corruption was taken seriously during the 1990s (Uildriks and Reenen 2003). Nevertheless, the police were still thought to be corrupt by a broad section of the Czech public and they are notorious for taking bribes to excuse traffic offences (Uildriks and Reenen 2003). Further, some members of the public claim they had to bribe the police and public prosecutors to guarantee a quick criminal investigation (Uildriks and Reenen 2003). According to Juska, Johnstone, and Pozzuto (2004: 163), in Lithuania, “whereas the names may have changed, from militia to police, the underlying structures and perceived functions still reflect a politicized perspective of policing by authority, rather than by consent.”

In contrast to the Czech Republic and Lithuania, the United Kingdom had a system of local policing in the 1990s (Jones and Newburn 2002). Not surprisingly Bayley (1990) classified the United Kingdom as having a moderately decentralized police force. However, it was more recently argued that the police in the United Kingdom are witnessing a long-term tendency towards centralization (Jones and Newburn 2002). Indeed “over the past 20 years, British policing has moved closer towards national control from the Home Office”, (Edwards 2001: 19). The Police and Magistrates Courts Act of 1994 altered the structure of the police by restricting their size and mandating that a percentage of the police were nominated by the Home Office (Edwards 2001). Although the County and Borough Police Act of 1856 still compelled the United Kingdom government to pay for most local policing, budgets for the police were restricted and part of the standard by which police departments were judged worthy of funding
was compliance with national policing priorities put out by the Home Office (Edwards 2001). Further, the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 called for the police and local councils to create shared crime prevention policies. Since both the police and local councils relied on the government for a major percentage of their financing, there was substantial pressure on these organizations to comply with the desires of the central government (Edwards 2001).

There are around 52 different police forces in the United Kingdom (43 in England and Wales, eight in Scotland, and one in Northern Ireland). These different constabularies vary greatly in size. In England and Wales, for example, the Metropolitan Police has over 30,000 officers while the smallest provincial force has around 1,000 officers (Jones and Newburn 2002). Therefore, in practice, policing in the United Kingdom was less centralized than policing in the Czech Republic or Lithuania.

Similar to Lithuania, police corruption was problematic in the United Kingdom in the 1990s. This corruption took many forms ranging from bribery to planting evidence and concealing serious crimes (Miller 2003). Many efforts were aimed at combating this problem. For example, a governmental task force on corruption met in 1998 to establish policies on preventing police corruption in the United Kingdom (Miller 2003). The meeting led to the creation of “professional standards units” in many police forces throughout England and Wales (Miller 2003). These units sought to find and investigate police corruption.

Taken together, the organizational structure of the police was fairly similar in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, in comparison with the United Kingdom. In the Czech Republic and Lithuania efforts to decentralize the police forces during the early 1990s were largely unsuccessful. Both the Czech Republic and Lithuania therefore retained a centralized and single
force that took responsibility for general policing. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, the police forces in both these countries became more modern by focusing on the prevention of crimes and eliminating the political types of policing common during Soviet rule. Although, policing in the United Kingdom began a current trend toward centralization in the 1990s, the country still had multiple forces at work and was less centralized than the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Police corruption was a problem in all three of the countries to slightly varying degrees. It was quite problematic in Lithuania and the Czech Republic and although it was an issue in the United Kingdom, it was less endemic in this country. Finally, it is notable that the police force of the United Kingdom is one of the oldest modern-day police forces whereas those of the Czech Republic and Lithuania remain in a relative infancy, having been established in their contemporary form following the fall of the Soviet Union.\(^{48}\)

Ethnic Minority Groups and Confidence in the Police

After considering broad variables that may impact confidence in the police, as the spiraling process suggests, it is important to consider more specific information about a country that may impact such confidence. Because ethnic minority groups may have less confidence in the police than majority groups in certain countries (see Chapter 2), minority groups’ experiences with police in the Czech Republic, Lithuania and the United Kingdom is assessed in this section.

\(^{48}\) It should be noted that in the United Kingdom it is likely that there are more and better methods for detecting government corruption.
In the 1990s the Roma were the largest minority group in the Czech Republic, making up between 0.3 and 2.9 percent of the population (Vermeersch 2006). Unfortunately, this group was the target of much discrimination throughout this decade.\textsuperscript{49} The Roma were discriminated against in the areas of employment, education, and housing (Vermeersch 2006; \textit{Minorities at Risk Project} 2011). In addition, they were victimized in violent attacks at an increasing rate throughout the 1990s (Vermeersch 2006; \textit{Minorities at Risk Project} 2011). The Roma also reported being a target of police discrimination and not being able to count on the police (Vermeersch 2006). Indeed, they often refrained from contacting the police after being attacked, because they believed the police would not help them (Selm 2003). In the late 1990s, efforts were made among the Czech government to make the Roma feel more secure by establishing ways to recruit Roma to the police force. It is not clear how effective this policy was or whether it increased the Roma peoples’ confidence in the Czech police.

There are no official data on how ethnic minorities felt about the Czech police in the 1990s. Further, since there are so few Romani’s in the Czech Republic, their ratings of the police are unlikely to have much of an effect on the outcome of a large-scale study on confidence in the police despite their experience of discrimination from the government and the police. The Roma were the only minority that the World Values Survey included in their interviews with people in the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, however the survey only included two Romanis, both of

\textsuperscript{49} In fact, the Roma have been discriminated against in many post-communist countries (\textit{Minorities at Risk Project} 2011).
whom declared they had no confidence in the Czech police. With such small sample sizes, conclusions cannot be drawn about the Romas’ confidence in the police based on this data. However, anecdotal evidence from the late 1990s and from an interview conducted by the Open Society Institute suggested that the Roma did not have much confidence in the Czech police (Bukovská and Boučková 2002).

In Lithuania, the Roma, who made up 0.07 percent of the population in the 1990s, were the most marginalized group in society and faced multiple types of discrimination (Rechel 2009). Polls confirmed that the Roma were the most unpopular ethnic group in Lithuania. Perhaps this was because media portrayals frequently displayed the Roma as criminals (Rechel 2009). As in the Czech Republic, the Roma in Lithuania faced discrimination from the police. In the early 1990s, for example, the Romanis were targets of serious violence and when they asked for protection from police, they were told to head to Russia, where the police told them they would be treated better (Guy 2001). It was also reported that Romanis were beaten by Lithuanian Police during unwarranted raids and searches of their homes (Bukovská and Boučková 2002). The Lithuanian Police denied any wrongful treatment of the Roma (Bukovská and Boučková 2002). I was not able to locate specific survey data reporting how the Roma felt about the police in Lithuania in the 1990s, though one might reasonably infer from this discussion that they had very low levels of confidence (World Values Survey 2011).

50 The lack of data on the Roma is similar to other countries in the WVS with small minority populations. This may explain why the ethnic minority status variable in Ch. 3 was non-significant.
In the 1990s, African-Caribbeans in the United Kingdom, who made up less than two percent of the population, suffered from constant economic and political discrimination (Minorities at Risk Project 2011). Specifically, they were under-represented in the political realm and faced barriers to housing and all types of employment. Further, they were treated unfairly by public officials. For example, they were the victims of discriminatory targeting by traffic police (Minorities at Risk Project 2011). Not surprisingly, their relations with the police were commonly hostile and many African-Caribbeans believed the police to be racist in the United Kingdom (Minorities at Risk Project 2011). Evidence supports such claims. For example, a 1999 government document reported that London's police force was overflowing with institutionalized racism (Freedom House 2011). The findings were the result of accusations of police harassment of blacks and, particularly, the Stephen Lawrence case. In this 1993 case, a black student who was 18 years of age was stabbed to death by a group of white teens (Freedom House 2011). A report from The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated that censure of the police for the management of the Lawrence case motivated a subsequent police backlash against minorities (Freedom House 2011). The report also noted that blacks were disproportionately killed in police custody in the United Kingdom (Freedom House 2011).

Overall, in each of the three countries in this analysis, ethnic minorities faced social forms of discrimination and official forms of discrimination from various organizations, including the police in the 1990s. Survey data on minority groups’ perceptions of the police is lacking in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, though anecdotal evidence suggested that such groups placed little confidence in them in the 1990s. A combination of World Values Survey
data and academic literature confirmed that African-Caribbean’s had lower levels of the police in the United Kingdom. Thus, in general, it seemed that minority groups were no more likely to place confidence in the police in a stable democracy such as the United Kingdom, compared to newer democracies such as the Czech Republic and Lithuania.51

FINDINGS

What can account for the vastly higher levels of confidence in the police in the United Kingdom versus the Czech Republic and Lithuania? First, looking at the broader variables, as the spiraling process suggests, showed that important similarities and differences emerged between the three countries. Governments in both the Czech Republic and Lithuania were transformed from a communist regime to a democratic one in the early 1990s under mostly peaceful circumstances. Although the Freedom House ratings indicated that the public in each of these countries enjoyed full political rights in the 1990s, both countries experienced significant political problems and the level of political freedom did not seem to garner confidence in the police in these countries. The most striking difference between the Czech Republic and Lithuania in comparison to the United Kingdom is that the latter was a more stable democracy in terms of consecutive years of democratic elections with vastly lower levels of perceived government corruption. It is difficult to determine whether stability of democracy or lack of corruption had a stronger effect on public confidence in the police in these countries. However, specific examples

51 Although the number of continuous years of democracy is used in this dissertation to represent how stable a democracy is, there are certainly other factors that may determine how stable democracy is in a country.
of government corruption seemed to account for drops in confidence in the police in the Czech Republic and Lithuania in the 1990s. Further, results from the previous chapter suggest that older democracies tend to have less corruption and it is the lack of corruption that makes democracy more meaningful and influences people’s confidence in the government and the police. However, the importance of the stability of democracy itself cannot be ruled out as an important factor since it is one of the more striking differences between the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic and Lithuania in this case study.

Because both the Czech Republic and Lithuania became democratic in the early 1990s, the stability of democracy variable could not explain why the Czech Republic had higher levels of confidence in the police than Lithuania. The main difference among the broad factors I examined between the Czech Republic and Lithuania is that levels of perceived government corruption are less extreme in the Czech Republic than in Lithuania in the 1990s. Therefore, this case study offered additional evidence to suggest that corruption hinders the positive effects of democracy on public confidence in the police.

A specific example from the Czech Republic further emphasizes this point. As discussed above, confidence in the police in the Czech Republic took a sudden and steep downturn from 1998 to 1999, as measured by data from the previous two years. The dip from 1998 to 1999 was by far the biggest change in the public’s confidence throughout the 1990s. One potential reason for this downturn in confidence was that the country’s Prime Minister Klaus (of the Civic Democratic Party) resigned in 1997 in the midst of accusations of corruption (Freedom in the World, 2007). Further, the 1998 parliamentary elections were accused of being unfair because of an agreement between opposing parties to restrict significant political competition (Freedom
Trust in government also fell during this time - from around 48 percent in 1990 to 30.7 percent by 1999. If confidence in the police fell in the Czech Republic in the 1990s because of political corruption this further supports the theory that the political legitimacy inherent to democracy can be damaged by corruption and this can lead to distrust of government institutions, including the police. It is also possible that in a more stable democracy these events would have had a less dramatic effect. More specifically, problems with political officials or the police may be more likely to be seen by the public as a unique and unfortunate event, not characteristic of the entire political system or the police force, in a stable democracy.

Proceeding to more specific information, the police in the Czech Republic and Lithuania appeared to have similar organizational structure. That is to say, they were both moderately centralized. Further, both countries had problems with police corruption, but this slowly improved throughout the 1990s. Thus police organizational structure cannot be used to explain differences in levels of confidence in the police between these two countries, but differences in police structure can be looked at in the Czech Republic and Lithuania versus the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom’s police force was also moderately centralized, but considerably less so than in the Czech Republic or Lithuania. Yet, it was still not greatly decentralized like the United States, for example (Bayley 1985). This lesser degree of police centralization in the United Kingdom did not prevent police corruption as the forces in the United Kingdom continue to work towards decreasing police corruption. Nonetheless, the police in the United Kingdom often stand as a model of what newer democracies strive for in terms of police modernization and performance. Further, because the United Kingdom police forces are moderately centralized and for the most part they can be controlled from the Home Office, the differences in police
organizational structure between the three countries in this case study do not seem to be very large. It is likely that police structure made a minimal impact on confidence in the police at least in the United Kingdom, Lithuania and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. Though, certainly it may have had a different effect in other countries.

At a micro-level, ethnic minority groups were examined in the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. In each country, minorities were the victims of official discrimination by the police and of various other forms of social discrimination. The WVS indicated that confidence in the police was lower among ethnic minorities relative to majority populations in the United Kingdom during the 1990s (World Values Survey 2011). Unfortunately, the WVS only interviewed two minorities in the Czech Republic during the 1990s and did not include information about minority groups in Lithuania. However, based on the discussion in this chapter of the poor treatment of minorities, anecdotal evidence suggested that minorities in Lithuania and the Czech Republic may have less confidence in the police than majority groups in these countries during the 1990s. Because the primary minority group in the Czech Republic, the Roma, made up such a small proportion of the Czech population, it is unlikely that poor ratings of the police by minorities in this country would have any large-scale impact on the overall confidence in the police rating in the Czech Republic. This emphasizes the need for additional studies to look more in-depth at minority groups’ confidence in the police. The small number of minorities in the WVS for some countries may also partly explain the lack of a statistical relationship reported in Chapter 4 between ethnic minority status and confidence in the police. Further, although Lithuania is a more ethnically diverse country, no WVS data are available for its ethnic minorities. This highlights the possibility that the findings regarding
confidence in the police among minority populations may be due to a lack of data and not a lack of a relationship between minority status and confidence in the police.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I conducted a case study of the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and Lithuania in order to assess the effect of government context on public confidence in the police. A variety of variables were examined, including the level and stability of democracy, government and police corruption, police organizational structure and the treatment of ethnic minorities in each country. Ultimately, the stability of democracy and political corruption stood out as the most important factors.

The United Kingdom had much higher levels of confidence in the police than Lithuania or the Czech Republic. At the same time, the United Kingdom was a stable democracy and the public viewed government corruption to be much less of a problem relative to perceptions in the post-communist countries. I suggest that even though the Czech Republic and Lithuania are fully democratic in terms of political rights, their high levels of political corruption may have hindered the positive effects of democracy – especially political legitimacy, which was greatly lacking in these post-communist countries. As Treisman (2000) found, a long history of democracy may lower corruption. Further, since the United Kingdom was a stable democracy, this may have prevented unfair political incidents from disgracing the whole political system (or unfair police incidents from staining the whole police system). Additionally, it was noted that ethnic minority groups in the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania may have had less confidence in the police than majority groups. The benefits of a stable democracy in the United Kingdom did not seem to prevent this.
The police are part of the larger government in a country and therefore, as mentioned previously in this study, it is likely that the police are judged by the same standards as the rest of the political system. When an election is unfair or executed poorly there is reason to believe that the citizens of a democracy, especially a new democracy would judge their government and the police negatively as a result of this poor performance (see Chapter 1). Citizens in post-communist democracies tend to be skeptical of government – a remnant of Soviet influence. Thus, in new and emerging democracies, government officials, not just the police, must work hard to earn the trust of their citizens. One way they can do this is by reducing political corruption and working toward implementing some level of party stability within the political system. Finally, additional studies will be necessary to assess and understand the existence of low levels of confidence in the police that may exist among ethnic minorities in any given country. Nonetheless, this case study provided a more in-depth analysis of confidence in the police between citizens living in old versus new democracies than has previously been available.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

Previous research on confidence in the police has primarily focused on people’s interactions with the police. This research has typically been conducted within a single country, often the United States. Yet, many people have no contact with the police in a given year and will nonetheless view them favorably. Therefore, the goal of this dissertation was to fill gaps in policing research by exploring public confidence in the police across countries and by exploring the impact of both country-level and individual-level factors. Specifically, confidence in the police was investigated through a multi-level analysis of 53 countries and a comparative case study of two young democracies, the Czech Republic and Lithuania, and a more stable democracy, the United Kingdom. Taken together, findings suggest that both individual and country-level characteristics influence individuals’ confidence in the police.

In this dissertation, I argued that when people evaluate the police they reflect on the government in their country, of which the police are a vital part. Indeed, it was discovered that more confidence in the political system leads to more confidence in the police. Drawing on a Rawlsian perspective, it was also suggested that the public should have more confidence in the police in a democracy than in less democratic or nondemocratic societies. When the level of democracy variable was transformed into a binary, full democracy/not full democracy variable in the multi-level study, I found that full democracy increased citizens’ confidence in the police. This result was consistent with Rawls’ argument that in a democracy political legitimacy can be attained through free and fair elections alone, regardless of outcomes. However, Rawls also stated that when outcomes are too unjust, the legitimacy of a democratic political regime can be damaged, regardless of the fairness of governing procedures. Government corruption is one such
case where outcomes may be too unjust. This concept was also supported by both studies in this
dissertation, which revealed that public confidence in the police was diminished in countries
where government corruption was perceived to be problematic. Results from the case study, in
particular, suggested that when corruption in government was widespread, democratic legitimacy
was called into question regardless of how free and fair elections were and public support for the
police suffered greatly.

In addition to theorizing about the current level of democracy, I also hypothesized that
stable democracy would lead to higher levels of confidence in police. Although a direct
relationship was not found between the stability of democracy and confidence in the police,
evidence from the multi-level study suggested that corruption mediates their relationship. In
other words, people living in older democracies had more confidence in the police because these
countries had lower levels of government corruption. The case study examined this issue in more
depth and results supported this notion. In fact, the case study pointed toward perceived
problems with government corruption as the single most harmful detriment to the public’s
confidence in the police.

Whether ethnic minority groups had less confidence in the police than majority groups
was also investigated in this dissertation, given that some research in the United States revealed
that minorities had less favorable perceptions of police. In line with Rawls’ perspective, it was
hypothesized that ethnic minority groups would have more confidence in the police in more
democratic countries. Democratic societies, in theory, should better protect ethnic minority
groups’ political rights more so than any other type of government. However, results from the
multi-level study did not confirm this hypothesis. More generally, I found no difference between
minority and majority groups’ confidence in the police across counties in the quantitative study. However, case study findings suggested that ethnic minorities may have less confidence in all countries, including stable, high functioning democracies. This finding supports a conflict perspective -- those in power exploit less powerful groups in society, such as ethnic minorities, in order to further their own interests. As a result, ethnic minorities may have low levels of confidence in the police. Further supporting this idea, albeit at a broader levels is the finding from the multi-level study that as ethnic diversity increased in a country, public confidence in the police decreased. It was argued in Chapter 1 that ethnic diversity may be threatening to government officials because the diversity is likely to pose a perceived social control problem (Liska and Yu 1992; Turk 1969). This would encourage governments to direct police to strengthen control efforts toward minorities. In diverse societies then, all citizens would be likely to hold the government and the police responsible for the perceived breakdown of social control. This idea was supported in the multi-level study. Furthermore, although homicide rates were not found to impact confidence in the police, findings from the multi-level study suggest that ethnic diversity may mediate the relationship between crime and confidence in the police. That is, countries with high homicide rates may be more likely to be ethnically diverse and it is the diversity and the breakdown of social order which it represents, that impacts a person’s confidence in the police. 

Also in line with a conflict perspective, I found evidence that ethnic minorities who lived in countries with higher levels of perceived corruption had less confidence in the police than minorities who lived in countries with lower levels of perceived corruption. The idea that ethnic minority groups in more corrupt countries had lower levels of confidence in the government and
the police, even in a democracy, is an important finding. It may be the case that corruption is most likely to affect marginalized groups such as ethnic minorities. Thus, even though ethnic minorities, in theory have more rights under democratic regimes, perceived levels of corruption can hinder their confidence in the government more so than majority groups. Unfortunately, however, because of data limitations with the minority status variable in the multi-level study and because little data exist on minority groups’ confidence in the police in the Czech Republic and Lithuania it was difficult to definitely conclude on this issue. Nevertheless, much evidence pointed to victimization of minority groups by police in these countries and in the United Kingdom, at least in the 1990s.

In summary, findings from this dissertation partly supported Rawls’ ideas about political legitimacy and partly identified with theories focused on conflict in society. In accord with Rawls’ perspective, democracy provides the opportunity for political legitimacy to flourish, which in turn should lead the public to place confidence in the police. However, as Rawls suggested when outcomes of a fair democratic procedure become too unjust, as they seem to do with government corruption, political legitimacy suffers and so does the public’s confidence in the police. On the other hand, conflict perspectives were supported in this dissertation with regard to ethnic minority groups and their confidence in police in general and in corrupt and ethnically diverse societies.

In addition to addressing the impact of country-level factors on confidence in police, this dissertation also analyzed a variety of individual-level variables. In agreement with many previous studies, the multi-level analysis suggested that older persons and females had more confidence in the police. In addition, people with higher life satisfaction placed more confidence
in the police. Therefore, not only did people’s opinions about the political system relate to their confidence in police, but people’s attitudes towards their own life were important for understanding how they perceive the police. Overall, this dissertation found that both country and individual level factors strongly relate to public confidence in the police in 53 countries and in the Czech Republic and Lithuania, as compared to the United Kingdom.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

In general, previous studies on confidence in the police have lacked a theoretical basis for the development of hypotheses and statistical models. Therefore, this dissertation made contributions to the theoretic understanding of public confidence in police by drawing on political philosophy to deduce and test hypotheses. The current study provided some support for theoretical considerations that are typically tested outside the criminological discipline. More specifically, by looking at the police as a part of a country’s larger government in this dissertation, I was able to use existing political perspectives, such as that provided by Rawls, to understand what impacted confidence in the government. Such confidence may likely be carried over to the police. As mentioned in the previous section, I found support for some of Rawls’ ideas on political legitimacy. These ideas could be adopted for future theoretical considerations of people’s views toward, not just police institutions, but also toward the larger legal and judiciary system in a country. Ultimately, compared to prior studies, by examining police within the context of government and within Rawls’ theory of political legitimacy, this dissertation broadened the focus of research on confidence in the police.
Moreover, an assumption throughout this dissertation was that people care about procedures when they evaluate the government and the police. Instead of looking at micro-level interactions between the police and the public, as is usually the case in procedural justice research in the criminological field, I took a broader approach by focusing on the fairness of governing procedures at the country level. This type of broad procedural justice research, which is more often used in political science, could be very useful for the fields of policing and criminology in future studies. This is especially true in light of arguments that criminology, as a field, should concentrate more on the relationship between democracy and criminal justice organizations (La Free and Karstedt 2006). The findings of this dissertation suggest that democracy can provide the basis for favorable perceptions of government which are then carried over to police, as long as government corruption is not too problematic. In fact, broad procedural attributes of a country’s government influenced people’s views about police more than crime rates or police organizational structure in my analyses. Therefore, theories that identify broad procedural fairness as an important determinant of public attitudes toward political institutions were supported in this dissertation and should be further tested in future studies on public confidence in the police.

METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Most research on public confidence in the police, prior to this dissertation, had been conducted in the United States. Thus, explanations that had been put forth and tested may have only explained public confidence in the police in select nations in the world. The current study examined confidence in the police in more countries than any previous study. In addition to
studying confidence in the police cross-nationally, this dissertation made another methodological contribution by employing a multi-level hierarchical analysis on the largest number of countries to date. Despite advantages when dealing with nested data, most of the existing cross-national studies in policing research were conducted by analyzing data with simple regression models using only individual-level data from a single nation or in a handful of countries (Stack and Cao 1998; Cao 2001; Cao and Burton 2006; Cao and Hou 2001; Cao and Stack 2005). The two studies that were exceptions only examined countries within Europe, the US, and Canada (Ivkovic 2008; Kaariainen 2007). The present study was also the first to use multilevel techniques to examine the interactions between ethnic minority status and certain country-level variables. Further, the case study in this dissertation was the only one, to the best of my knowledge that compared confidence in the police among the public in new versus old democracies. Lastly, this dissertation implemented the latest version of the World Values Survey (2005-2008) such that the data in the multi-level study were more current than that utilized in previous studies.

LIMITATIONS

The findings of this study are tentative for several reasons. Aside from limitations I discuss in Chapter 3 regarding the dependent variable and lack of data on people’s personal experiences with the police and corruption, it is possible that important variables, other than those I reviewed in this analysis, influence people’s confidence in the police. This may include types of police organization other than those I examine. Specifically, although the centralization and number of forces and whether a country employs a gendarmerie force are not significant
predictors of confidence in the police in this dissertation, other factors may be important. For example, a police organization’s functional organization might significantly relate to confidence in the police. A democratic country may be more likely to perform police work in certain ways (Kaariainen 2007). It is also possible that the racial make-up of a police force would influence confidence in police especially among minorities. However, some studies in the US have show that this has no effect on confidence in the police (Brown and Benedict 2002; Chandek and Reisig 2001). Furthermore, variables related to a country’s wealth and/or the level of income disparity may have an impact on how people view the government and thus the police. Despite these limitations, results of this study provide a more in-depth understanding of public confidence in the police than previous research.

FUTURE RESEARCH

As mentioned above, future cross-national studies of confidence in the police should develop better measures of ethnic minority status and analyze minority groups’ perceptions of police. Because of data limitations in my dissertation, my results could only suggest, but not conclude that ethnic minority status is an important determinant of public confidence in the police. Additionally, research on the form of the relationship between democracy, corruption, and ethnic diversity deserves much attention. In particular, research should investigate why people in certain nondemocratic, authoritarian countries report high levels of confidence in the police. It is also necessary for researchers to develop more comprehensive measures of confidence in police that can better differentiate between people’s broad versus specific support for police. Further, cross-national, quantitative studies should examine how different aspects of
police organizations affect people’s confidence in them, such as democratic versus other styles of policing. Lastly, a recent study found that, controlling for ethnic heterogeneity, more ethnically segregated countries, have a considerably lower quality of government than less segregated countries (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2009). This finding supports the claims of certain theorists, such as relative deprivation theorists, for example, who argue that ethnic segregation, not heterogeneity in a neighborhood, is related to crime rates and potentially to confidence in the police (Hipp 2007). Therefore, future research should investigate whether ethnic segregation or diversity in a country differentially impacts individuals’ perceptions of the police and how such country-level factors interact with minority status.

POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

Three important trends highlight the importance of this dissertation. One is that an ever-increasing number of democratizing countries and new democracies are looking to reform police in their countries (Sung 2006). Discussion of reform is often centered on how changes to the organizational structure of the police would make them more or less trustworthy among the public (Bayley 1992). This is not surprising given the continuing popularity of community policing and the growing realization that cooperation between the public and police is critical to successful law enforcement (Cao and Zhao 2005). Yet it is not clear what police institutions can actually do to increase the community’s support for them as such support may be most strongly connected to people’s perceptions of the broader government in a country and to how satisfied a person is with their life. This does not, however, imply that police reform is not important. On the contrary, police reforms that make police more democratic and respectful of the human rights
of those they serve should be considered vitally important and should be implemented in every country. This is true regardless of whether the reforms are found to significantly increase public confidence in the police in empirical research.

Sung’s (2006) cross-national study finds that the police become more effective as democratization matures. Since democratic forms of policing are more likely to develop in such settings and democracy seems to improve perceptions of the police in the long run, police reformers should be encouraged. If transitional countries continue down the road of democracy despite hardships along the way, the police are likely to eventually become more effective and democratic. However, an important challenge for the future will be to determine how the problem of low confidence in the police can be alleviated in countries while they transition into more democratic forms of governance. This is certainly a question that will plague countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Egypt, among others. One possible solution is for new democracies to look toward more stable democracies that retain high levels of confidence in police and apply strategies that have worked in those countries. This could ease the transition pains and encourage public confidence in the police at an earlier stage.

Secondly, as countries become more ethnically heterogeneous (United Nations Development Programme 2011), it is essential to gain a better understating of how such heterogeneity affects social control, as maintaining order in diverse countries isn’t always easy (Tyler et al. 2007). Public confidence in the police is a measure of police legitimacy (Tyler 1990). This legitimacy is important because when the police are perceived to be legitimate their decisions are more often followed voluntarily (Tyler et al. 2007). Attempting to gain control over others based only on possession of power is unproductive and costly. It is more advantageous
when people voluntarily comply with the police because they believe it is the right thing to do than when they comply because of anticipated reward or punishment for behavior (Tyler et al. 2007). Tyler et al (2007: 11) conclude that “(s)uch deference, to the extent that it occurs, makes it much easier for legal authorities to effectively establish and maintain social order.” In the quantitative study in this dissertation, I found that the public has less confidence in the police in more ethnically diverse countries. Although additional research should confirm this finding, it is vital for governments and police institutions to establish better policies for helping diverse members of a society develop better and closer relationships, including the police and everyday citizens.

Third, many speculate that private security is threatening the future of public policing. Researchers argue that the overlapping of functions traditionally used to distinguish between public police and all other forms of police is evidence of a substantial and meaningful change taking place in public policing. The extent to which these and other changes are indicative of a new era where public police start to disappear and private security takeover is being debated. Thus, while some see these changes in policing as a radical break with the past (Bayley and Shearing 1996), others see the transformation of policing as real but overstated (Jones and Newburn 2002). More recently it has been persuasively argued that these changes are not revealing the coming of a new era, but instead, a return to similar times in history (Zedner 2006). Because of high levels of insecurity in new democracies, such countries are at an even greater risk of turning to private security. Maintaining public police as the primary agents of social control is essential for a variety of reasons, not the least because private security tends to favor the wealthy (Bayley and Shearing 1996). It is thus crucial to develop a better understanding of
what leads the public to view the police favorably and to what extent they do so currently. Understanding this might be a key to ensuring that public policing remains or becomes a public good in all countries. Ultimately, this dissertation makes a contribution to the policing field on a cross-national level while also posing novel questions for future research.
APPENDIX A: FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 1. Countries by region (n=53)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>North Africa and the Middle East</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Western Europe and USA</td>
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### Table 3. Correlations between Dependent and Independent Variables at the Individual Level (N=72,680)

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<th>Age</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Female</th>
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**p < .01

### Table 4. Final estimation of variance components: only level-1 predictors entered

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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Variance Component</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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### Table 5. Final estimation of variance components: level-1 coefficients random and intercept as level-2 predictor

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<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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Table 6. Correlations between Dependent Variable and Independent Variables at the Country-level (N=53)

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<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Homicide</th>
<th>Fractionalization</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Stability Of Democracy</th>
<th>Level of Democracy</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple Police Forces</td>
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*p < .05

**p < .01
Table 7  Final Estimation of Fixed Effects - Unit Specific Model  
(N=72,680)

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<td>SE</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>e&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>e&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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*p < .05  
Bold coefficients and standard errors indicate that the associated variable is group-centered
Table 8. Final Estimation of Fixed Effects - Unit Specific Model  
(N=72,680)

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* p < .05  
Bold coefficients and standard errors indicate that the associated variable is group-centered
Table 9. Final Estimation of Fixed Effects - Unit Specific Model with Robust Standard Errors
(N=72,680)

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**Cross-level interactions with minority:**

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* p < .05

Bold coefficients and standard errors indicate that the associated variable is group-centered.
Table 10. Final Estimation of Fixed Effects – Population Average Model (N=72,680)

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*p < .05

Bold coefficients and standard errors indicate that the associated variable is group-centered.
Table 11. Final Estimation of Fixed Effects - Unit Specific Model with Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization measure (N=72,680)

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</table>

*Bold coefficients and standard errors indicate that the associated variable is group-centered.*
Figure 1. Percent of People having Confidence in Police in a Sample of Countries
REFERENCES


Easterly, William. 2006. *The white man's burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*. New York: Penguin Press.


